fix(security): harden git_gate.py shell rendering with shlex.quote and name validation

Use shlex.quote() on name and upstream_url in git_gate_render_entrypoint()
so special characters (single quotes, spaces, semicolons) cannot break or
inject into the generated sh script.

Add _GIT_NAME_RE validation in GitEntry.from_repos_entry() to restrict
repo names to [A-Za-z0-9._-]+, making the manifest the first line of
defence and shlex.quote() the belt-and-suspenders backstop.

Closes #155

.codex/skills/quality-eval/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+name: quality-eval
+description: Use when the user asks to objectively evaluate, score, rate, audit, or quality-gate code, codebases, files, pull requests, or snippets using a strict 5-dimension engineering rubric with scores and refactoring steps.
+metadata:
+  short-description: Score code quality with a strict rubric
+---
+
+# Quality Eval
+
+## Role
+
+Act as a Staff Software Engineer and automated quality gate. Evaluate code objectively against the rubric below, surface hidden anti-patterns, and provide a mathematical grade with atomic refactoring steps.
+
+## Evaluation Rules
+
+- Evaluate only against the five rubric dimensions.
+- Be candid. Do not inflate scores for politeness.
+- Avoid generic advice. Every recommendation must name a specific code location, behavior, or pattern and include a concrete improvement direction.
+- Inspect the code before scoring. For codebases, read enough representative files, tests, and architecture boundaries to justify the scope.
+- When exact line numbers are available, cite them.
+- Do not reveal private chain-of-thought. In the required `Chain of Thought Analysis` section, provide a concise, step-by-step audit rationale with observable findings and score justifications.
+
+## Rubric
+
+Score each dimension from 1 to 5 using these anchors:
+
+| Dimension | Score 1 (Fail) | Score 3 (Pass) | Score 5 (Exemplary) |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| **Architecture** | Spaghettified; tight coupling; violated separation of concerns. | Modular but relies on leaky abstractions or mixed domains. | Strict domain isolation; follows SOLID; clear dependency inversion. |
+| **Readability** | Cryptic naming; deep nesting (>3 levels); widespread DRY violations. | Idiomatic but features over-complex functions or sparse documentation. | Self-documenting; expressive naming; high cohesion; flat structure. |
+| **Resilience** | Swallows errors blindly; lacks contextual logging; fragile to bad input. | Basic try/catch blocks present but lacks granular, typed error handling. | Explicit error boundaries; contextual logging; structured failure modes. |
+| **Testability** | Hardcoded dependencies make mocking or isolated testing impossible. | Pure functions are testable, but side-effect heavy logic lacks test hooks. | Decoupled IO; deterministic execution; structured for unit and integration tests. |
+| **SecOps** | Hardcoded secrets; O(n^2) bottlenecks; zero input sanitization. | Safe from obvious flaws but lacks deep defensive optimization. | Validated inputs; optimized algorithmic complexity; zero security debt. |
+
+## Scoring Method
+
+1. Determine the evaluated scope and primary language.
+2. Identify concrete evidence for each dimension.
+3. Assign integer dimension scores from 1 to 5.
+4. Compute `composite_score` as the arithmetic mean of the five dimension scores, rounded to one decimal place.
+5. Include code snippets only when they make a refactoring step more actionable.
+
+## Required Output
+
+Structure every response into exactly these three Markdown sections:
+
+### 1. Chain of Thought Analysis
+
+Provide a concise step-by-step audit rationale. Name specific files, functions, patterns, anti-patterns, and rubric anchors. Keep it evidence-based and do not include hidden private reasoning.
+
+### 2. Normalized Score Report
+
+```json
+{
+  "evaluation_metadata": {
+    "target_scope": "string",
+    "primary_language": "string"
+  },
+  "metrics": {
+    "architecture_and_modularity": 0,
+    "readability_and_maintainability": 0,
+    "error_handling_and_resilience": 0,
+    "testability_and_mocking": 0,
+    "security_and_performance": 0
+  },
+  "composite_score": 0.0
+}
+```
+
+### 3. Atomic Refactoring Playbook
+
+* **High Priority (To lift Score 1/2 to 3):**
+  - [ ] Actionable, specific refactoring step with file/line/context reference.
+* **Medium Priority (To lift Score 3 to 4/5):**
+  - [ ] Optimization or architectural pattern implementation step.
+

.codex/skills/quality-eval/agents/openai.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+display_name: Quality Eval
+short_description: Scores code quality with a strict five-dimension rubric and refactoring playbook.
+default_prompt: Evaluate this code objectively using the quality-eval rubric and return the three-section score report.

AGENTS.md

@@ -28,14 +28,28 @@ the container lifecycle and the copying of skills and env vars into it.
 - `bot-bottle.json` — legacy manifest of named agents (env / skills / prompt
   per agent), consumed by `cli.py`. See "Manifest" under
   "Intended design".
-- `docs/INDEX.md` — pointer to the research notes.
+- `docs/README.md` — docs overview; when to write which document.
-- `docs/prds/` — product requirement docs.
+- `docs/prds/` — product requirement docs (see `docs/prds/README.md` for format).
-- `docs/research/` — research notes (empty for now, kept tracked via `.gitkeep`).
+- `docs/research/` — research notes (see `docs/research/README.md`).
+- `docs/decisions/` — decision records (ADR-lite).
 
 ## Conventions
 
-- Product requirement docs live in `docs/prds/`.
+- Three kinds of doc, each with its own conventions in-folder; see
-- Research notes live in `docs/research/`.
+  `docs/README.md` for when to write which:
+  - **PRDs** (`docs/prds/`) — one feature per file, numbered
+    `NNNN-kebab.md`. A `Status:` line tracks lifecycle: Draft → Active
+    (shipped to `main`) → Superseded/Retargeted. Format in
+    `docs/prds/README.md`.
+  - **Research notes** (`docs/research/`) — opinionated investigations;
+    unnumbered kebab-case, freeform and verdict-first. See
+    `docs/research/README.md`.
+  - **Decision records** (`docs/decisions/`) — ADR-lite, numbered
+    `NNNN-kebab.md`, for policies and non-feature decisions. See
+    `docs/decisions/README.md`.
+- Keep decision rationale self-contained in the repo, not in Gitea
+  issue threads. Issues are an ephemeral inbox; the durable "why" lives
+  in a PRD, research note, or decision record.
 - Low dependencies by default. The project is Python, stdlib-first (no
   runtime pip dependencies in the package itself; the only language
   runtime is the Python 3.13 used by the CLI + sidecars). Ask before

Dockerfile.claude

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ FROM node:22-slim
 # tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out to it) works
 # against pipelock's bumped TLS without the agent needing local DNS.
 RUN apt-get update \
-  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils \
+  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
   && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Install claude-code globally. Pinned to the version verified in the v1

Dockerfile.codex

@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
 FROM node:22-slim
 
 RUN apt-get update \
-  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils \
+  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
   && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.134.0 \
+RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.136.0 \
   && npm cache clean --force
 
 USER node

Dockerfile.sidecars

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #   9099  egress (mitmproxy, pipelock's upstream — not externally
 #                 addressed by the agent)
 #   9418  git-gate (git-daemon)
+#   9420  git-gate smart HTTP (smolmachines agent-facing transport)
 #   9100  supervise (MCP HTTP)
 
 # Stage 1: pipelock binary. The upstream pipelock image is a
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ COPY bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py       /app/yaml_subset.py
 COPY bot_bottle/supervise.py         /app/supervise.py
 COPY bot_bottle/supervise_server.py  /app/supervise_server.py
 COPY bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py      /app/sidecar_init.py
+COPY bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py  /app/git_http_backend.py
 COPY bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
 RUN chmod +x /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
 
@@ -97,7 +99,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p \
 
 # Documentation only — the compose renderer publishes whichever
 # subset the bottle uses.
-EXPOSE 8888 9099 9418 9100
+EXPOSE 8888 9099 9418 9420 9100
 
 # WORKDIR matches Dockerfile.supervise's prior layout so the
 # in-app same-dir import in supervise_server.py stays deterministic.

README.md

@@ -157,14 +157,8 @@ and MCP endpoints resolve without an agent-side change.
   upstream has *now* (fail-closed if unreachable). The agent's
   `~/.gitconfig` rewrites the real URL to the gate via `insteadOf`,
   so push, fetch, clone, and pull all route through. The agent
-  never sees the upstream credential. If the upstream's hostname
+  never sees the upstream credential. Brought up only when
-  isn't resolvable from the gate container (e.g. a Tailscale-only
+  `bottle.git` has entries. Design in `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
-  host whose public DNS points elsewhere), pin its IP via
-  `ExtraHosts: { "<hostname>": "<ip>" }` on the `bottle.git` entry —
-  the gate's `/etc/hosts` gets the override while the agent's
-  `insteadOf` rewrite still keys off the original hostname. Brought
-  up only when `bottle.git` has entries. Design in
-  `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
 - **cred-proxy image** — per-bottle sidecar (`python:3.13-alpine`
   base, stdlib-only) that holds API tokens declared in
   `bottle.cred_proxy.routes`. Each route names a `path`,
@@ -349,11 +343,40 @@ The `gitea-dev` bottle. Backs my work on personal projects: provider
 auth through egress and gitea.dideric.is over SSH.
 ````
 
-For a Codex-backed base bottle, set `agent_provider.template: codex`
+For a Codex-backed base bottle, set `agent_provider.template: codex`.
-and use the `codex_auth` egress role for the OpenAI API route. The
+The Codex template expects ChatGPT/device login state instead of an
-built-in Codex template uses `Dockerfile.codex`; set
+`OPENAI_API_KEY` env var; no API-key placeholder is forwarded into the
-`agent_provider.dockerfile` to build the agent from a custom
+agent. To let bot-bottle read the host's current Codex ChatGPT access
-Dockerfile while keeping the bot-bottle sidecars in place.
+token and inject it from egress only for Codex's API calls, opt in
+explicitly:
+
+```yaml
+agent_provider:
+  template: codex
+  forward_host_credentials: true
+
+egress:
+  routes:
+    - host: auth.openai.com
+      path_allowlist:
+        - /api/accounts/deviceauth/
+```
+
+Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host before launch. The
+launcher reads `tokens.access_token` from the host's
+`~/.codex/auth.json`, verifies it is fresh user/device auth, and passes
+it to the sidecar's `EGRESS_TOKEN_N` env slot. The agent container gets
+a dummy `~/.codex/auth.json` that preserves the host auth-mode shape
+but replaces credential values with placeholders. It keeps the selected
+ChatGPT account id so Codex sends requests for the same account while
+egress owns the real bearer token. The agent never receives real access
+tokens, refresh tokens, or `OPENAI_API_KEY`. The effective egress table
+automatically adds or upgrades `api.openai.com` and `chatgpt.com` to
+authenticated routes when `forward_host_credentials` is true.
+
+The built-in Codex template uses `Dockerfile.codex`; set
+`agent_provider.dockerfile` to build the agent from a custom Dockerfile
+while keeping the bot-bottle sidecars in place.
 
 ### Example agent (`~/.bot-bottle/agents/gitea-helper.md`)
 

bot-bottle.demo.json

@@ -4,14 +4,15 @@
       "env": {
         "FAKE_TOKEN": "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
       },
-      "git": [
+      "git-gate": {
-        {
+        "repos": {
-          "Name": "foo",
+          "foo": {
-          "Upstream": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
+            "url": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
-          "IdentityFile": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
+            "identity": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
-          "KnownHostKey": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
+            "host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
+          }
         }
-      ]
+      }
     }
   },
 

bot_bottle/agent_provider.py

@@ -7,14 +7,24 @@ command, default image, and prompt/auth behavior.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-from dataclasses import dataclass
+import json
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Literal
 
+from .codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
+from .egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
+
 
 PROVIDER_CLAUDE = "claude"
 PROVIDER_CODEX = "codex"
 PROVIDER_TEMPLATES = frozenset({PROVIDER_CLAUDE, PROVIDER_CODEX})
+
+# Hosts that egress injects the host ChatGPT bearer on when Codex
+# forward_host_credentials is enabled. Pipelock must pass these through
+# (no TLS MITM) or its header DLP blocks the injected JWT.
+CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com")
 PromptMode = Literal["append_file", "read_prompt_file"]
 
 
@@ -24,14 +34,68 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
     command: str
     image: str
     dockerfile: str
-    auth_role: str
-    placeholder_env: str
     prompt_mode: PromptMode
     bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
     resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
     remote_control_args: tuple[str, ...]
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentProvisionDir:
+    guest_path: str
+    mode: str = "700"
+    owner: str = "node:node"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentProvisionFile:
+    host_path: Path
+    guest_path: str
+    mode: str = "600"
+    owner: str = "node:node"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentProvisionCommand:
+    argv: tuple[str, ...]
+    error: str = ""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentProvisionPlan:
+    """Provider-owned guest setup.
+
+    Backends interpret this plan with their own copy/exec primitives.
+    Provider-specific content stays here so future provider plugins can
+    return the same shape without adding backend-plan fields.
+
+    `egress_routes` are provider-declared EgressRoutes that backends
+    pass to `Egress.prepare` and `PipelockProxy.prepare`. This keeps
+    provider logic out of the egress and pipelock modules — they merge
+    provider routes generically without knowing the provider type.
+
+    `hidden_env_names` is the set of env var names the provider injected
+    as non-secret placeholders. `print_util.visible_agent_env_names` uses
+    this to suppress them from the preflight summary so operators don't
+    mistake them for real credentials.
+    """
+
+    template: str
+    command: str
+    prompt_mode: PromptMode
+    image: str
+    dockerfile: str
+    guest_env: dict[str, str]
+    env_vars: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    dirs: tuple[AgentProvisionDir, ...] = ()
+    files: tuple[AgentProvisionFile, ...] = ()
+    pre_copy: tuple[AgentProvisionCommand, ...] = ()
+    verify: tuple[AgentProvisionCommand, ...] = ()
+    egress_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
+    hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
+    provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
 _REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
 
 
@@ -41,8 +105,6 @@ _RUNTIMES = {
         command="claude",
         image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
         dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.claude"),
-        auth_role="claude_code_oauth",
-        placeholder_env="CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
         prompt_mode="append_file",
         bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
         resume_args=("--continue",),
@@ -53,8 +115,6 @@ _RUNTIMES = {
         command="codex",
         image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
         dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.codex"),
-        auth_role="codex_auth",
-        placeholder_env="OPENAI_API_KEY",
         prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
         bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
         resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
@@ -67,6 +127,126 @@ def runtime_for(template: str) -> AgentProviderRuntime:
     return _RUNTIMES[template]
 
 
+def agent_provision_plan(
+    *,
+    template: str,
+    dockerfile: str,
+    state_dir: Path,
+    guest_home: str = "/home/node",
+    guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    auth_token: str = "",
+    forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
+    host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    trusted_project_path: str = "",
+) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
+    runtime = runtime_for(template)
+    resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
+    trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
+    env_vars: dict[str, str] = {}
+    provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = {}
+    dirs: list[AgentProvisionDir] = []
+    files: list[AgentProvisionFile] = []
+    pre_copy: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
+    verify: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
+    egress_routes: list[EgressRoute] = []
+    hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
+
+    if template == PROVIDER_CODEX:
+        env_vars["CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE"] = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
+        auth_dir = resolved_guest_env.get("CODEX_HOME", f"{guest_home}/.codex")
+        if forward_host_credentials:
+            env_vars["CODEX_HOME"] = auth_dir
+        dirs.append(AgentProvisionDir(auth_dir))
+        config_path = f"{auth_dir}/config.toml"
+        config_file = state_dir / "codex-config.toml"
+        toml_path = trusted_path.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
+        config_file.write_text(
+            f'[projects."{toml_path}"]\n'
+            'trust_level = "trusted"\n'
+        )
+        config_file.chmod(0o600)
+        files.append(AgentProvisionFile(config_file, config_path))
+
+        for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
+            egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
+                host=host,
+                auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
+                token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
+                tls_passthrough=True,
+            ))
+        if forward_host_credentials:
+            _host_env = host_env or dict(os.environ)
+            provisioned_env[CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF] = codex_host_access_token(
+                _host_env,
+            )
+            auth_file = state_dir / "codex-auth.json"
+            write_codex_dummy_auth_file(auth_file, _host_env)
+            files.append(AgentProvisionFile(auth_file, f"{auth_dir}/auth.json"))
+            pre_copy.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
+                "find", auth_dir,
+                "-maxdepth", "1",
+                "-type", "f",
+                "(",
+                "-name", "*.sqlite",
+                "-o", "-name", "*.sqlite-*",
+                "-o", "-name", "*.codex-repair-*.bak",
+                ")",
+                "-delete",
+            ), "codex host credentials: could not reset runtime db files"))
+            verify.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
+                "runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
+                "env",
+                f"HOME={guest_home}",
+                f"CODEX_HOME={auth_dir}",
+                "codex", "login", "status",
+            ), (
+                "codex host credentials: dummy auth was copied into the "
+                "guest, but Codex did not accept it"
+            )))
+    if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
+        env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"] = "1"
+        env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"] = "1"
+        claude_config = state_dir / "claude.json"
+        claude_projects = {
+            guest_home: {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True},
+        }
+        claude_projects[trusted_path] = {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True}
+        claude_config.write_text(json.dumps({
+            "hasCompletedOnboarding": True,
+            "theme": "dark",
+            "bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
+            "projects": claude_projects,
+        }, indent=2) + "\n")
+        claude_config.chmod(0o600)
+        files.append(AgentProvisionFile(claude_config, f"{guest_home}/.claude.json"))
+        egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
+            host="api.anthropic.com",
+            auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
+            token_ref=auth_token,
+            tls_passthrough=True,
+        ))
+        if auth_token:
+            env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = "egress-placeholder"
+            hidden_env_names = frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"})
+
+    return AgentProvisionPlan(
+        template=template,
+        command=runtime.command,
+        prompt_mode=runtime.prompt_mode,
+        image=runtime.image,
+        dockerfile=dockerfile,
+        env_vars=env_vars,
+        guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
+        dirs=tuple(dirs),
+        files=tuple(files),
+        pre_copy=tuple(pre_copy),
+        verify=tuple(verify),
+        egress_routes=tuple(egress_routes),
+        hidden_env_names=hidden_env_names,
+        provisioned_env=provisioned_env,
+    )
+
+
 def prompt_args(
     prompt_mode: PromptMode,
     prompt_path: str | None,

bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py

@@ -32,15 +32,22 @@ manifest does not carry a backend field; the host picks.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
+import sys
 from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
 from contextlib import AbstractContextManager
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Generic, Sequence, TypeVar
 
-from ..log import die
+from ..agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
+from ..egress import EgressPlan
+from ..git_gate import GitGatePlan
+from ..log import die, info
 from ..manifest import GitEntry, Manifest
+from ..supervise import SupervisePlan
 from ..util import expand_tilde
+from ..workspace import WorkspacePlan
+from .print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
 from .util import host_skill_dir
 
 
@@ -65,15 +72,57 @@ class BottleSpec:
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class BottlePlan(ABC):
     """Base output of a backend's prepare step. Concrete subclasses
-    (e.g. DockerBottlePlan) add backend-specific resolved fields and
+    (e.g. DockerBottlePlan) add backend-specific resolved fields."""
-    implement `print`."""
 
     spec: BottleSpec
     stage_dir: Path
+    git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
+    egress_plan: EgressPlan
+    supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
+    agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan
+    workspace_plan: WorkspacePlan
 
-    @abstractmethod
     def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
         """Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr."""
+        del remote_control
+        spec = self.spec
+        manifest = spec.manifest
+        agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
+        bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
+
+        env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
+            sorted(
+                set(bottle.env.keys())
+                | set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
+            ),
+            hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
+        )
+
+        print(file=sys.stderr)
+        info(f"agent           : {spec.agent_name}")
+        info(f"provider        : {self.agent_provision.template}")
+        print_multi("env             ", env_names)
+        print_multi("skills          ", list(agent.skills))
+        info(f"bottle          : {agent.bottle}")
+
+        identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
+        if identity:
+            info(f"  git identity  : {identity}")
+
+        git_lines = [
+            f"{u.name} → {u.upstream_host}:{u.upstream_port}"
+            for u in self.git_gate_plan.upstreams
+        ]
+        if git_lines:
+            print_multi("  git gate      ", git_lines)
+
+        if self.egress_plan.routes:
+            egress_lines = []
+            for r in self.egress_plan.routes:
+                auth = f" [auth:{r.auth_scheme}]" if r.auth_scheme else ""
+                egress_lines.append(f"{r.host}{auth}")
+            print_multi("  egress        ", egress_lines)
+        print(file=sys.stderr)
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -273,7 +322,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
         decide whether to add provider-specific prompt args to the agent's
         argv.
 
-        Default orchestration: ca → prompt → skills → git →
+        Default orchestration: ca → prompt → skills → workspace → git →
         supervise. CA install runs first so the agent's trust store
         is rebuilt before anything inside the agent makes a TLS call.
         Subclasses typically don't override this; they implement the
@@ -286,7 +335,9 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
         intercepted without per-tool reconfiguration."""
         self.provision_ca(plan, target)
         prompt_path = self.provision_prompt(plan, target)
+        self.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
         self.provision_skills(plan, target)
+        self.provision_workspace(plan, target)
         self.provision_git(plan, target)
         self.provision_supervise(plan, target)
         return prompt_path
@@ -300,6 +351,11 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
         backend overrides to docker-cp the cert in and run
         `update-ca-certificates`."""
 
+    def provision_provider_auth(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
+        """Install non-secret provider auth marker files into the agent
+        home when a provider needs them to select the right auth mode.
+        The default is no-op."""
+
     @abstractmethod
     def provision_prompt(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> str | None:
         """Copy the prompt file into the running bottle. Returns the
@@ -312,6 +368,11 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
         """Copy the agent's named skills from the host into the
         running bottle. No-op when the agent has no skills."""
 
+    def provision_workspace(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
+        """Copy the operator workspace into the running bottle when
+        the backend cannot bake it into the agent image. Default is
+        no-op for backends like Docker that handle this before launch."""
+
     @abstractmethod
     def provision_git(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
         """Copy the host's cwd `.git` directory into the running
@@ -413,14 +474,20 @@ def enumerate_active_agents() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
     """All currently-running agents, across every available
     backend. Used by CLI `list active` and the dashboard's agents
     pane so neither has to know which backends exist. Skips
-    backends whose `is_available()` reports False. Ordered by
+    backends whose `is_available()` reports False.
-    backend name, then by whatever each backend's
+
-    `enumerate_active` returns."""
+    Sorted by `(started_at, slug)` so the list is stable across
+    dashboard refresh ticks — agents don't shift position while
+    the operator navigates with arrow keys. ISO 8601 timestamps
+    sort lexicographically in chronological order; `slug` is the
+    deterministic tiebreaker. Agents with missing metadata
+    (`started_at == ""`) sort first."""
     out: list[ActiveAgent] = []
     for name in known_backend_names():
         if not has_backend(name):
             continue
         out.extend(_BACKENDS[name].enumerate_active())
+    out.sort(key=lambda a: (a.started_at, a.slug))
     return out
 
 

bot_bottle/backend/docker/backend.py

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
 from .provision import ca as _ca
 from .provision import git as _git
 from .provision import prompt as _prompt
+from .provision import provider_auth as _provider_auth
 from .provision import skills as _skills
 from .provision import supervise as _supervise_prov
 
@@ -62,6 +63,9 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
     def provision_prompt(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> str | None:
         return _prompt.provision_prompt(plan, target)
 
+    def provision_provider_auth(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
+        _provider_auth.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
+
     def provision_skills(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
         _skills.provision_skills(plan, target)
 

bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_plan.py

@@ -2,30 +2,25 @@
 
 Carries the Docker-specific resolved fields produced by
 DockerBottleBackend.prepare. The launch step consumes it without
-further resolution; show_plan-style rendering is the `print` method.
+further resolution; preflight rendering is inherited from BottlePlan.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import sys
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
-from ...egress import EgressPlan
-from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
-from ...log import info
 from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
-from ...supervise import SupervisePlan
 from .. import BottlePlan
-from ..print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     """Docker-specific resolved fields produced by
-    DockerBottleBackend.prepare. Inherits `spec` and `stage_dir` from
+    DockerBottleBackend.prepare. Inherits `spec`, `stage_dir`,
-    BottlePlan."""
+    `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`, and
+    `agent_provision` from BottlePlan."""
 
     slug: str
     container_name: str
@@ -46,60 +41,16 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
     prompt_file: Path
     proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
-    git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
-    egress_plan: EgressPlan
-    # None when bottle.supervise is False. PRD 0013 supervise sidecar
-    # is opt-in via the manifest's bottle.supervise field.
-    supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
     use_runsc: bool
-    agent_command: str = "claude"
-    agent_prompt_mode: PromptMode = "append_file"
-    agent_provider_template: str = "claude"
 
-    def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
+    @property
-        """Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr — compact form
+    def agent_command(self) -> str:
-        intended to fit on screen without scrolling. The full
+        return self.agent_provision.command
-        structured shape (image, container, runtime, etc.) lives on
-        this dataclass for tooling that wants to introspect it."""
-        del remote_control  # not surfaced in the compact summary
-        spec = self.spec
-        manifest = spec.manifest
-        agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
-        bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
-        # The agent sees the union of literal env names (rendered into
-        # --env-file) and forwarded env names (`-e NAME` with the
-        # value arriving via subprocess env). The forwarded set holds
-        # the OAuth token (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) and any host-env
-        # interpolations from the manifest; egress holds
-        # upstream tokens in its own environ, so no token forwarding
-        # from the agent to the proxy is needed.
-        env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
-            sorted(set(bottle.env.keys()) | set(self.forwarded_env.keys())),
-            agent_provider_template=self.agent_provider_template,
-        )
 
-        print(file=sys.stderr)
+    @property
-        info(f"agent           : {spec.agent_name}")
+    def agent_prompt_mode(self) -> PromptMode:
-        info(f"provider        : {self.agent_provider_template}")
+        return self.agent_provision.prompt_mode
-        print_multi("env             ", env_names)
-        print_multi("skills          ", list(agent.skills))
-        info(f"bottle          : {agent.bottle}")
 
-        identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
+    @property
-        if identity:
+    def agent_provider_template(self) -> str:
-            info(f"  git identity  : {identity}")
+        return self.agent_provision.template
-
-        git_lines = [
-            f"{u.upstream_host}:{u.upstream_port}"
-            for u in self.git_gate_plan.upstreams
-        ]
-        if git_lines:
-            print_multi("  git gate      ", git_lines)
-
-        if self.egress_plan.routes:
-            egress_lines = []
-            for r in self.egress_plan.routes:
-                auth = f" [auth:{r.auth_scheme}]" if r.auth_scheme else ""
-                egress_lines.append(f"{r.host}{auth}")
-            print_multi("  egress        ", egress_lines)
-        print(file=sys.stderr)

bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py

@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ class BottleMetadata:
     # written before chunk 3 (resume / inspect should fall back to
     # deriving from identity in that case).
     compose_project: str = ""
+    # PRD 0040: backend name ("docker" or "smolmachines"). Empty string
+    # for state dirs written before PRD 0040; callers default to "docker"
+    # for backward compatibility.
+    backend: str = ""
 
 
 def metadata_path(identity: str) -> Path:
@@ -138,6 +142,7 @@ def read_metadata(identity: str) -> BottleMetadata | None:
         copy_cwd=bool(raw.get("copy_cwd", False)),
         started_at=str(raw.get("started_at", "")),
         compose_project=str(raw.get("compose_project", "")),
+        backend=str(raw.get("backend", "")),
     )
 
 

bot_bottle/backend/docker/compose.py

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ from ...egress import (
     EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
     EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
 )
-from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts
+from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
 from ...log import die, warn
 from ...pipelock import PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME
 from ...supervise import (
@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
             env.append(token_env)
 
     # --- git-gate ----------------------------------------------------
-    extra_hosts: list[str] = []
     gp = plan.git_gate_plan
     if gp.upstreams:
         volumes += [
@@ -217,8 +216,6 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
                     u.known_hosts_file,
                     f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-known_hosts",
                 ))
-        extra_map = git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts(gp.upstreams)
-        extra_hosts = [f"{host}:{ip}" for host, ip in sorted(extra_map.items())]
 
     # --- supervise ---------------------------------------------------
     sp = plan.supervise_plan
@@ -261,8 +258,6 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
         "environment": env,
         "volumes": volumes,
     }
-    if extra_hosts:
-        service["extra_hosts"] = extra_hosts
     return service
 
 
@@ -286,6 +281,8 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
         f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
         f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
     ]
+    for name, value in sorted(plan.agent_provision.guest_env.items()):
+        env.append(f"{name}={value}")
     # Forwarded vars (OAuth token, manifest host-interpolations):
     # bare name → inherits from compose-up process env, value
     # never lands on argv or in the compose file.

bot_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Callable, Generator
 
 from ...egress import egress_resolve_token_values
-from ...log import info
+from ...log import info, warn
 from . import network as network_mod
 from . import util as docker_mod
 from .bottle import DockerBottle
@@ -87,10 +87,11 @@ def launch(
     def teardown() -> None:
         try:
             stack.close()
-        except BaseException:
+        except BaseException as exc:
-            # Teardown must not raise; swallow so the caller's
+            warn(
-            # __exit__ path can still propagate the original error.
+                f"teardown failed for container {plan.container_name}"
-            pass
+                f" (compose-down): {exc!r}"
+            )
 
     try:
         # Step 1: agent image build. Sidecar images get built lazily by
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ def launch(
         )
         if plan.derived_image:
             docker_mod.build_image_with_cwd(
-                plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.spec.user_cwd
+                plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.workspace_plan
             )
 
         # Networks: compose-managed. The names are derived
@@ -176,11 +177,10 @@ def launch(
         # Step 7: compose up. Token values + the OAuth placeholder
         # flow through subprocess env; the compose file holds only
         # bare names for the secret-carrying entries.
-        token_values: dict[str, str] = {}
+        effective_env = {**dict(os.environ), **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
-        if plan.egress_plan.routes:
+        token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
-            token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
+            plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
-                plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, dict(os.environ),
+        )
-            )
         compose_env: dict[str, str] = {
             **os.environ,
             **plan.forwarded_env,

bot_bottle/backend/docker/prepare.py

@@ -12,15 +12,17 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from dataclasses import replace
 from pathlib import Path
 
-from ...agent_provider import runtime_for
+from ...agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, runtime_for
 from ...egress import Egress
 from ...env import ResolvedEnv, resolve_env
 from ...git_gate import GitGate
 from ...log import die
 from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
 from ...supervise import Supervise
+from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
 from .. import BottleSpec
 from . import util as docker_mod
 from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
@@ -61,6 +63,8 @@ def resolve_plan(
     bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
     provider = bottle.agent_provider
     provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
+    guest_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node")
+    workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
 
     # PRD 0016 follow-up: identity, not bare slug. A fresh `start`
     # mints a random-suffixed identity (so parallel runs of the same
@@ -78,6 +82,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
         copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
         started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
         compose_project=f"bot-bottle-{slug}",
+        backend="docker",
     ))
     # Clear any leftover preserve marker from a prior capability-block
     # so this fresh launch can be cleaned up at session-end unless
@@ -158,17 +163,45 @@ def resolve_plan(
     prompt_file.write_text("")
     prompt_file.chmod(0o600)
 
-    pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
-    pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(bottle, slug, pipelock_dir)
-
     git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
     git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     git_gate_plan = git_gate.prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
 
+    resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
+    # Everything that should reach the bottle by-name (so its value
+    # never lands on argv or in env_file) goes into one dict. Nothing
+    # mutates the host os.environ.
+    forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
+    _write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
+    prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt)
+
+    use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
+    agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
+        template=provider.template,
+        dockerfile=dockerfile_path,
+        state_dir=agent_dir,
+        guest_home=guest_home,
+        forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
+        auth_token=provider.auth_token,
+        host_env=dict(os.environ),
+        trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
+    )
+    guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
+    for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
+        guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
+    agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=guest_env)
+
+    pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
+    pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(
+        bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
+    )
+
     egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
     egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    egress_plan = egress.prepare(bottle, slug, egress_dir)
+    egress_plan = egress.prepare(
+        bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
+    )
 
     supervise_plan = None
     if bottle.supervise:
@@ -196,33 +229,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
             slug, supervise_dir,
             dockerfile_content=dockerfile_content,
         )
-    resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
-    # Everything that should reach the bottle by-name (so its value
-    # never lands on argv or in env_file) goes into one dict. Nothing
-    # mutates the host os.environ.
-    forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
-    # When the bottle declares an egress route with the
-    # `claude_code_oauth` role marker, claude-code's outbound
-    # Authorization gets stripped + re-injected by egress. The
-    # agent's environ still needs *something* claude-code recognises
-    # as a credential or it refuses to start; ship a non-secret
-    # placeholder. The placeholder isn't any real token value, so
-    # leaking it would tell an attacker only that egress is in
-    # front. Manifest validation enforces singleton on this role.
-    has_provider_auth = any(
-        provider_runtime.auth_role in r.roles for r in egress_plan.routes
-    )
-    if has_provider_auth:
-        forwarded_env[provider_runtime.placeholder_env] = "egress-placeholder"
-    if provider.template == "claude" and has_provider_auth:
-        # Belt-and-braces: turn off telemetry endpoints (statsig,
-        # error reporting) that egress can't gate by auth.
-        forwarded_env.setdefault("CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC", "1")
-        forwarded_env.setdefault("DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING", "1")
-    _write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
-    prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt)
-
-    use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
 
     return DockerBottlePlan(
         spec=spec,
@@ -242,9 +248,8 @@ def resolve_plan(
         egress_plan=egress_plan,
         supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
         use_runsc=use_runsc,
-        agent_command=provider_runtime.command,
+        agent_provision=agent_provision,
-        agent_prompt_mode=provider_runtime.prompt_mode,
+        workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
-        agent_provider_template=provider.template,
     )
 
 

bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/git.py

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
 
   1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that .git
-     into /home/node/workspace/.git so the agent operates on the
+     into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on the
      user's repo.
   2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
      ~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
 import subprocess
-from pathlib import Path
 
 from ....git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_render_gitconfig
 from ....log import info
@@ -40,19 +39,22 @@ def _provision_cwd_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
     """If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
     it into /home/node/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
     otherwise."""
-    if not (plan.spec.copy_cwd and Path(plan.spec.user_cwd, ".git").is_dir()):
+    workspace = plan.workspace_plan
+    if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
         return
     container = target
-    info(f"copying {plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git -> {container}:/home/node/workspace/.git")
+    guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
+    host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
+    info(f"copying {host_git} -> {container}:{guest_workspace_git}")
     subprocess.run(
-        ["docker", "cp", f"{plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git", f"{container}:/home/node/workspace/.git"],
+        ["docker", "cp", host_git, f"{container}:{guest_workspace_git}"],
         stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
         check=True,
     )
     subprocess.run(
         [
             "docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container,
-            "chown", "-R", "node:node", "/home/node/workspace/.git",
+            "chown", "-R", workspace.owner, guest_workspace_git,
         ],
         stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
         check=True,

bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/provider_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Provision non-secret provider auth markers into a Docker bottle."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+
+from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
+
+
+def provision_provider_auth(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
+    """Apply provider-owned guest setup through Docker primitives."""
+    provision = plan.agent_provision
+    for d in provision.dirs:
+        _exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", d.guest_path])
+        _exec(target, ["chown", d.owner, d.guest_path])
+        _exec(target, ["chmod", d.mode, d.guest_path])
+    for command in provision.pre_copy:
+        _exec(target, list(command.argv))
+    for f in provision.files:
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "cp", str(f.host_path), f"{target}:{f.guest_path}"],
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            check=True,
+        )
+        _exec(target, ["chown", f.owner, f.guest_path])
+        _exec(target, ["chmod", f.mode, f.guest_path])
+    for command in provision.verify:
+        _exec(target, list(command.argv))
+
+
+def _exec(target: str, argv: list[str]) -> None:
+    subprocess.run(
+        ["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", target, *argv],
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        check=True,
+    )

bot_bottle/backend/docker/util.py

@@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import re
 import shutil
 import subprocess
+import tempfile
 from typing import Iterable, Iterator
 
 from ...log import die, info
+from ...workspace import WorkspacePlan
 
 
 # Cap on the suffix the container-name conflict logic will try before
@@ -116,35 +118,39 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
     subprocess.run(args, check=True)
 
 
-_TRUST_DIALOG_NODE_SCRIPT = (
+def build_image_with_cwd(
-    'const fs=require("fs"),p=process.env.HOME+"/.claude.json",'
+    derived: str,
-    'c=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p,"utf8"));'
+    base: str,
-    'c.projects=c.projects||{};'
+    workspace: WorkspacePlan,
-    'c.projects[process.env.HOME+"/workspace"]={hasTrustDialogAccepted:true};'
+) -> None:
-    'fs.writeFileSync(p,JSON.stringify(c,null,2));'
+    """Build a thin derived image that copies the workspace into
-)
+    the plan's guest path and sets the plan's workdir."""
-
-
-def build_image_with_cwd(derived: str, base: str, cwd: str) -> None:
-    """Build a thin derived image that copies <cwd> into
-    /home/node/workspace and adds a trust-dialog entry for it."""
     import os
 
+    cwd = str(workspace.host_path)
     if not os.path.isdir(cwd):
         die(f"cwd not found at {cwd}")
-    info(f"building image {derived} from {base} with {cwd} -> /home/node/workspace")
+    info(f"building image {derived} from {base} with {cwd} -> {workspace.guest_path}")
-    dockerfile = (
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bot-bottle-cwd.") as tmp:
-        f"FROM {base}\n"
+        context_dir = os.path.join(tmp, "context")
-        f"COPY --chown=node:node . /home/node/workspace\n"
+        staged_workspace = os.path.join(context_dir, "workspace")
-        f"RUN node -e '{_TRUST_DIALOG_NODE_SCRIPT}'\n"
+        shutil.copytree(
-        f"WORKDIR /home/node/workspace\n"
+            cwd,
-    )
+            staged_workspace,
-    subprocess.run(
+            symlinks=True,
-        ["docker", "build", "-t", derived, "-f", "-", cwd],
+            ignore=shutil.ignore_patterns(".git"),
-        input=dockerfile,
+        )
-        text=True,
+        dockerfile = (
-        check=True,
+            f"FROM {base}\n"
-    )
+            f"COPY --chown=node:node workspace/. {workspace.guest_path}\n"
+            f"WORKDIR {workspace.workdir}\n"
+        )
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "build", "-t", derived, "-f", "-", context_dir],
+            input=dockerfile,
+            text=True,
+            check=True,
+        )
 
 
 def image_id(ref: str) -> str:

bot_bottle/backend/print_util.py

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Sequence
 
-from ..agent_provider import runtime_for
 from ..log import info
 
 
@@ -30,16 +29,13 @@ def print_multi(label: str, values: Sequence[str]) -> None:
 
 
 def visible_agent_env_names(
-    env_names: Sequence[str], *, agent_provider_template: str,
+    env_names: Sequence[str], *, hidden_env_names: frozenset[str],
 ) -> list[str]:
     """Env names worth showing in launch summaries.
 
-    Provider auth placeholders (`OPENAI_API_KEY`,
+    Provider-injected placeholder env vars are implementation details:
-    `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`) are implementation details: they are
+    they are non-secret dummy values that satisfy provider CLIs while
-    non-secret dummy values that satisfy the provider CLI while egress
+    egress injects the real Authorization header. The plan's
-    injects the real upstream Authorization header. Showing them in
+    `hidden_env_names` carries exactly which names to suppress.
-    preflight makes the operator think a real key is entering the
-    agent, so hide only that provider-owned placeholder.
     """
-    hidden = {runtime_for(agent_provider_template).placeholder_env}
+    return sorted({name for name in env_names if name and name not in hidden_env_names})
-    return sorted({name for name in env_names if name not in hidden})

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/backend.py

@@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
 from .provision import ca as _ca
 from .provision import git as _git
 from .provision import prompt as _prompt
+from .provision import provider_auth as _provider_auth
 from .provision import skills as _skills
 from .provision import supervise as _supervise
+from .provision import workspace as _workspace
 
 
 class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
@@ -61,11 +63,21 @@ class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
     ) -> str | None:
         return _prompt.provision_prompt(plan, target)
 
+    def provision_provider_auth(
+        self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
+    ) -> None:
+        _provider_auth.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
+
     def provision_skills(
         self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
     ) -> None:
         _skills.provision_skills(plan, target)
 
+    def provision_workspace(
+        self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
+    ) -> None:
+        _workspace.provision_workspace(plan, target)
+
     def provision_git(
         self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
     ) -> None:

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py

@@ -45,19 +45,11 @@ _HOME_FOR = {
 }
 
 
-def _env_flags_for(user: str) -> list[str]:
+def _env_assignments_for(user: str, env: Mapping[str, str]) -> list[str]:
     home = _HOME_FOR.get(user, f"/home/{user}")
-    return ["-e", f"HOME={home}", "-e", f"USER={user}"]
+    out = [f"HOME={home}", f"USER={user}"]
-
-
-def _guest_env_flags(env: Mapping[str, str]) -> list[str]:
-    """Render `{K: V}` into a flat `-e K=V` argv slice for
-    `smolvm machine exec`. `smolvm machine create -e` set env
-    on PID 1 but it doesn't propagate to fresh exec process
-    trees, so we have to re-pass them every call."""
-    out: list[str] = []
     for k, v in env.items():
-        out += ["-e", f"{k}={v}"]
+        out.append(f"{k}={v}")
     return out
 
 
@@ -98,9 +90,8 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
         flags = ["smolvm", "machine", "exec", "--name", self.name]
         if tty:
             flags += ["-i", "-t"]
-        flags += _env_flags_for("node")
+        agent_tail = ["env", *_env_assignments_for("node", self._guest_env),
-        flags += _guest_env_flags(self._guest_env)
+                      self.agent_command]
-        agent_tail = [self.agent_command]
         provider_prompt_args = prompt_args(
             self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=argv,
         )
@@ -148,16 +139,16 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
         on both backends. Pass `user="root"` for tests that need
         root.
 
-        `runuser -u <user> -- /bin/sh -c <script>` switches UID
+        `runuser -u <user> -- env ... /bin/sh -c <script>` switches UID
-        without invoking a login shell; HOME / USER are set via
+        without invoking a login shell, then sets HOME / USER and the
-        `smolvm -e` (see `_env_flags_for`)."""
+        bottle env in the child process."""
-        argv = (
+        argv = [
-            _env_flags_for(user)
+            "--", "runuser", "-u", user, "--",
-            + _guest_env_flags(self._guest_env)
+            "env", *_env_assignments_for(user, self._guest_env),
-            + ["--", "runuser", "-u", user, "--", "/bin/sh", "-c", script]
+            "/bin/sh", "-c", script,
-        )
+        ]
-        # _smolvm.machine_exec expects argv (the bit after `--`);
+        # Call smolvm directly because this path needs the host-side
-        # the -e flags go before, so call smolvm directly.
+        # subprocess capture shape used by the Docker backend.
         r = subprocess.run(
             ["smolvm", "machine", "exec", "--name", self.name] + argv,
             capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle_plan.py

@@ -8,25 +8,20 @@ in chunk 4."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import sys
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
-from ...egress import EgressPlan
-from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
-from ...log import info
 from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
-from ...supervise import SupervisePlan
 from .. import BottlePlan
-from ..print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     """Resolved fields the launch step needs to bring up the bottle.
 
-    Inherits `spec` and `stage_dir` from BottlePlan."""
+    Inherits `spec`, `stage_dir`, `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`,
+    `supervise_plan`, and `agent_provision` from BottlePlan."""
 
     slug: str
     # Per-bottle docker subnet for the sidecar bundle container.
@@ -68,7 +63,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     # empty when the agent has no prompt — claude-code reads it
     # via --append-system-prompt-file only when non-empty.
     prompt_file: Path
-    # Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The same shape the
+    # Inner Plans for the sidecar bundle daemons. The same shape the
     # docker backend uses — same `.prepare()` calls produced
     # them — but our launch step doesn't populate the
     # docker-specific network fields (internal_network,
@@ -77,11 +72,6 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     # per-bottle bridge with a pinned IP. The unused fields stay
     # at their dataclass defaults.
     proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
-    git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
-    egress_plan: EgressPlan
-    # None when bottle.supervise is False, matching the docker
-    # backend's convention.
-    supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
     # Agent-side endpoints. On Docker Desktop the docker bridge
     # IPs aren't reachable from the smolvm guest (TSI uses macOS
     # networking; docker container IPs live in the daemon's VM),
@@ -93,43 +83,19 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
     agent_proxy_url: str = ""
     agent_git_gate_host: str = ""
     agent_supervise_url: str = ""
-    agent_command: str = "claude"
-    agent_prompt_mode: PromptMode = "append_file"
-    agent_provider_template: str = "claude"
-    agent_dockerfile_path: str = ""
 
-    def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
+    @property
-        """Compact y/N preflight. Same shape as the Docker
+    def agent_command(self) -> str:
-        backend's so operators see one format across backends."""
+        return self.agent_provision.command
-        del remote_control  # not surfaced in the compact summary
-        spec = self.spec
-        manifest = spec.manifest
-        agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
-        bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
 
-        env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
+    @property
-            sorted(bottle.env.keys()),
+    def agent_prompt_mode(self) -> PromptMode:
-            agent_provider_template=self.agent_provider_template,
+        return self.agent_provision.prompt_mode
-        )
-        upstreams = [
-            f"{g.Name} → {g.Upstream}" for g in bottle.git
-        ]
-        # Use the resolved egress_plan (lowercase `host` on the
-        # plan-level EgressRoute) rather than `bottle.egress.routes`,
-        # which is the manifest's capitalized-attr form.
-        routes = [r.host for r in self.egress_plan.routes]
 
-        print(file=sys.stderr)
+    @property
-        info(f"agent           : {spec.agent_name}")
+    def agent_provider_template(self) -> str:
-        info(f"provider        : {self.agent_provider_template}")
+        return self.agent_provision.template
-        print_multi("env             ", env_names)
+
-        print_multi("skills          ", list(agent.skills))
+    @property
-        info(f"bottle          : {agent.bottle}")
+    def agent_dockerfile_path(self) -> str:
-        identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
+        return self.agent_provision.dockerfile
-        if identity:
-            info(f"  git identity  : {identity}")
-        if upstreams:
-            print_multi("  git gate      ", upstreams)
-        if routes:
-            print_multi("  egress        ", routes)
-        print(file=sys.stderr)

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py

@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import dataclasses
 import os
-import time
 from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Callable, Generator
 
-from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, egress_resolve_token_values
+from ...egress import (
+    EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
+    egress_resolve_token_values,
+)
 from ...pipelock import (
     PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
     PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
@@ -45,7 +47,6 @@ from ..docker.git_gate import (
     GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
     GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
     GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
-    GIT_GATE_PORT as _GIT_GATE_PORT,
 )
 from ..docker.pipelock import (
     BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ _SMOLMACHINE_CACHE_DIR = Path.home() / ".cache" / "bot-bottle" / "smolmachines"
 # them up post-start. Pipelock's port is an env-overridable string
 # in docker.pipelock; coerce to int here.
 _PIPELOCK_PORT = int(_PIPELOCK_PORT_STR)
+_GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
 _SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
 
 
@@ -91,199 +93,23 @@ def launch(
     via the ExitStack."""
     stack = ExitStack()
     try:
-        # 1. Reserve a loopback alias for this bottle. macOS only
+        loopback_ip, network = _allocate_resources(plan, stack)
-        # routes 127.0.0.1 by default; the per-bottle alias is
+        plan = _mint_certs(plan)
-        # what bundles the docker port-publishes and TSI allowlist
+        plan = _start_bundle(plan, network, loopback_ip, stack)
-        # against, so this bottle can't reach other bottles' (or
+        plan = _discover_urls(plan, loopback_ip)
-        # other host services') ports on the loopback. Lazy
-        # sudo-driven on first use per boot. No-op on Linux.
-        _loopback.ensure_pool()
-        loopback_ip = _loopback.allocate(plan.slug)
 
-        # 2. Per-bottle docker bridge.
+        # Build the agent image and pack it into a `.smolmachine`
-        network = _bundle.bundle_network_name(plan.slug)
+        # artifact (or hit the per-Dockerfile-digest cache). Runs
-        _bundle.create_bundle_network(network, plan.bundle_subnet, plan.bundle_gateway)
+        # here, not in prepare, so the docker-build output doesn't
-        stack.callback(_bundle.remove_bundle_network, network)
+        # garble the dashboard's preflight modal.
-
-        # 2. Mint per-bottle CAs and update the inner Plans with
-        # their launch-time paths. pipelock always runs in the
-        # bundle; egress's CA is only minted when the bottle
-        # declares routes (otherwise egress runs idle without
-        # MITM and the CA files would be unused).
-        ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.parent)
-        proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
-            plan.proxy_plan,
-            ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
-            ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
-        )
-        egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
-        if egress_plan.routes:
-            egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
-                plan.egress_plan.routes_path.parent,
-            )
-            egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
-                egress_plan,
-                mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
-                mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
-                pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
-                # On smolmachines, egress's upstream is pipelock
-                # on the bundle's localhost — they're in the same
-                # container's network namespace.
-                pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
-            )
-        plan = dataclasses.replace(
-            plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan, egress_plan=egress_plan,
-        )
-
-        # 3. Build the BundleLaunchSpec from the (now-resolved)
-        # inner Plans: daemon subset, env, bind-mounts, and the
-        # loopback alias to bind published ports against. The
-        # spec's ports_to_publish list expands depending on which
-        # daemons the agent needs to reach from the smolvm guest.
-        bundle_spec = _bundle_launch_spec(plan, network, loopback_ip)
-        token_env = _resolve_token_env(plan, os.environ)
-        _bundle.ensure_bundle_image(bundle_spec.image)
-        _bundle.start_bundle(bundle_spec, env={**os.environ, **token_env})
-        stack.callback(_bundle.stop_bundle, plan.slug)
-
-        # 4. Discover the host-side ports docker assigned for the
-        # bundle's published container ports, and bind the
-        # agent's URLs to `<loopback_ip>:<host port>`. Docker
-        # container IPs (192.168.x.x in the daemon's bridge)
-        # aren't reachable from the smolvm guest on macOS — TSI
-        # uses macOS networking, and macOS sees the daemon's
-        # bridge via the published-port loopback forward only.
-        #
-        # Proxy hop order matches the docker backend: when the
-        # bottle declares egress routes, the agent's first hop is
-        # egress (for token injection), then pipelock. Without
-        # routes, the agent dials pipelock directly. Whichever
-        # one is "agent-facing" is the daemon whose port we
-        # publish on host loopback; the other stays bundle-
-        # internal as the upstream proxy.
-        if plan.egress_plan.routes:
-            agent_facing_port = _EGRESS_PORT
-        else:
-            agent_facing_port = _PIPELOCK_PORT
-        agent_facing_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
-            plan.slug, agent_facing_port, host_ip=loopback_ip,
-        )
-        agent_proxy_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{agent_facing_host_port}"
-        agent_git_gate_host = ""
-        if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
-            git_gate_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
-                plan.slug, _GIT_GATE_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
-            )
-            agent_git_gate_host = f"{loopback_ip}:{git_gate_host_port}"
-        agent_supervise_url = ""
-        if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
-            supervise_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
-                plan.slug, _SUPERVISE_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
-            )
-            agent_supervise_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{supervise_host_port}/"
-
-        # Stamp the URLs onto the plan + guest_env. provision_git
-        # and provision_supervise read the plan fields; the agent
-        # reads guest_env on every exec_agent.
-        #
-        # NO_PROXY has to include the per-bottle loopback alias —
-        # otherwise claude's HTTPS_PROXY catches direct calls to
-        # the supervise URL (`http://<alias>:<port>/`) and proxies
-        # them through egress, which has no route for the alias
-        # and rejects with "Failed to connect". The git-gate URL
-        # uses git://, not affected by HTTP_PROXY, so the alias
-        # only has to be in NO_PROXY for the MCP / supervise
-        # path. Append rather than overwrite so prepare.py's
-        # `localhost,127.0.0.1` baseline stays in place.
-        existing_no_proxy = plan.guest_env.get("NO_PROXY", "localhost,127.0.0.1")
-        guest_env = {
-            **plan.guest_env,
-            "HTTPS_PROXY": agent_proxy_url,
-            "HTTP_PROXY":  agent_proxy_url,
-            "NO_PROXY":    f"{existing_no_proxy},{loopback_ip}",
-        }
-        if agent_git_gate_host:
-            guest_env["GIT_GATE_URL"] = f"git://{agent_git_gate_host}"
-        if agent_supervise_url:
-            guest_env["MCP_SUPERVISE_URL"] = agent_supervise_url
-        plan = dataclasses.replace(
-            plan,
-            guest_env=guest_env,
-            agent_proxy_url=agent_proxy_url,
-            agent_git_gate_host=agent_git_gate_host,
-            agent_supervise_url=agent_supervise_url,
-        )
-
-        # 5. Build the agent image and pack it into a
-        # `.smolmachine` artifact (or hit the per-Dockerfile-digest
-        # cache). Runs here, not in prepare, so the docker-build
-        # output doesn't garble the dashboard's preflight modal:
-        # both the curses-endwin path and the tmux pane-routing
-        # path redirect stderr around `launch` already.
         agent_from_path = _ensure_smolmachine(
             plan.agent_image_ref,
             dockerfile=plan.agent_dockerfile_path,
         )
 
-        # smolvm VM. --from carries the pre-packed .smolmachine
+        _launch_vm(plan, agent_from_path, loopback_ip, stack)
-        # artifact; --allow-cidr + -e carry the per-bottle TSI
+        _init_vm(plan)
-        # allowlist + env. The allowlist is the per-bottle
-        # loopback alias — narrowing it to one /32 keeps the
-        # agent from reaching other host loopback services or
-        # other bottles' published ports. Smolfile isn't usable
-        # here — smolvm 0.8.0 makes `--from` and `--smolfile`
-        # mutually exclusive.
-        _smolvm.machine_create(
-            plan.machine_name,
-            from_path=agent_from_path,
-            allow_cidrs=[f"{loopback_ip}/32"],
-            env=plan.guest_env,
-        )
-        stack.callback(_smolvm.machine_delete, plan.machine_name)
-        # Workaround smolvm 0.8.0: `--allow-cidr` is silently
-        # dropped when combined with `--from`. Patch the persisted
-        # state DB to set the allowlist before start so the booted
-        # VM's TSI actually enforces. See loopback_alias's module
-        # docstring for the investigation that led here.
-        _loopback.force_allowlist(plan.machine_name, [f"{loopback_ip}/32"])
-        _smolvm.machine_start(plan.machine_name)
-        stack.callback(_smolvm.machine_stop, plan.machine_name)
 
-        # 6. Repair filesystem ownership + perms that smolvm's
-        # pack process remapped to the host invoker's uid (501
-        # on macOS) rather than preserving the image's expected
-        # ownership.
-        #
-        #  - /home/node → node:node so the node user can write
-        #    its own dotfiles (claude appendFileSync on
-        #    ~/.claude.json otherwise bails with ENOENT/EPERM
-        #    and the TUI hangs without surfacing the error).
-        #  - /tmp + /var/tmp → root:root mode 1777 so non-root
-        #    processes can create their per-uid scratch dirs
-        #    (claude-code creates /tmp/claude-<uid>/ as soon as
-        #    it spawns a Bash tool call).
-        #
-        # All folded into one sh -c so we only pay one
-        # machine_exec round trip — back-to-back exec calls
-        # right after machine_start hit a SIGKILL race in
-        # libkrun's exec channel (see provision_ca for the
-        # other half of this same workaround).
-        _smolvm.machine_exec(plan.machine_name, [
-            "sh", "-c",
-            "chown -R node:node /home/node && "
-            "chown root:root /tmp /var/tmp && "
-            "chmod 1777 /tmp /var/tmp",
-        ])
-
-        # Wait briefly for the VM to settle. Back-to-back smolvm
-        # machine_exec calls immediately after machine_start
-        # occasionally SIGKILL the in-VM child at ~100ms (looks
-        # like a VM warm-up race in libkrun's exec channel).
-        # 1.5s is empirically enough to dodge it; provisioning
-        # already takes seconds so the wait is amortized.
-        time.sleep(1.5)
-
-        # 7. Provision (CA / prompt / skills / git / supervise).
         prompt_path = provision(plan, plan.machine_name)
 
         yield SmolmachinesBottle(
@@ -297,6 +123,180 @@ def launch(
         stack.close()
 
 
+def _allocate_resources(
+    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
+    stack: ExitStack,
+) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Reserve a loopback alias and create the per-bottle docker bridge.
+
+    macOS only routes 127.0.0.1 by default; the per-bottle alias
+    scopes TSI's allowlist to this bottle's published ports so the
+    agent can't reach other bottles' or host services' ports on
+    loopback. No-op on Linux."""
+    _loopback.ensure_pool()
+    loopback_ip = _loopback.allocate(plan.slug)
+    network = _bundle.bundle_network_name(plan.slug)
+    _bundle.create_bundle_network(network, plan.bundle_subnet, plan.bundle_gateway)
+    stack.callback(_bundle.remove_bundle_network, network)
+    return loopback_ip, network
+
+
+def _mint_certs(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
+    """Mint per-bottle CAs and return the plan with CA paths filled.
+
+    Pipelock always runs in the bundle. Egress's CA is only minted
+    when the bottle declares routes — otherwise egress runs idle
+    without MITM and the CA files would be unused."""
+    ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.parent)
+    proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
+        plan.proxy_plan,
+        ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
+        ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
+    )
+    egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
+    if egress_plan.routes:
+        egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
+            plan.egress_plan.routes_path.parent,
+        )
+        egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
+            egress_plan,
+            mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
+            mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
+            pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
+            # On smolmachines, egress's upstream is pipelock on the
+            # bundle's localhost — they're in the same container's
+            # network namespace.
+            pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
+        )
+    return dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
+
+
+def _start_bundle(
+    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
+    network: str,
+    loopback_ip: str,
+    stack: ExitStack,
+) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
+    """Build the BundleLaunchSpec, resolve token env, start the
+    sidecar bundle container, and register teardown."""
+    bundle_spec = _bundle_launch_spec(plan, network, loopback_ip)
+    token_env = _resolve_token_env(plan, dict(os.environ))
+    _bundle.ensure_bundle_image(bundle_spec.image)
+    _bundle.start_bundle(bundle_spec, env={**os.environ, **token_env})
+    stack.callback(_bundle.stop_bundle, plan.slug)
+    return plan
+
+
+def _discover_urls(
+    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
+    loopback_ip: str,
+) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
+    """Discover host-side ports for published container ports and
+    return the plan with URLs + guest_env stamped in.
+
+    Docker container IPs (192.168.x.x in the daemon's bridge)
+    aren't reachable from the smolvm guest on macOS — TSI uses
+    macOS networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
+    published-port loopback forward only.
+
+    Proxy hop order: when the bottle declares egress routes, the
+    agent's first hop is egress (for token injection), then
+    pipelock. Without routes, the agent dials pipelock directly.
+    NO_PROXY includes the per-bottle loopback alias so the
+    supervise + git-gate URLs bypass HTTPS_PROXY."""
+    if plan.egress_plan.routes:
+        agent_facing_port = _EGRESS_PORT
+    else:
+        agent_facing_port = _PIPELOCK_PORT
+    agent_facing_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
+        plan.slug, agent_facing_port, host_ip=loopback_ip,
+    )
+    agent_proxy_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{agent_facing_host_port}"
+
+    agent_git_gate_host = ""
+    if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
+        git_gate_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
+            plan.slug, _GIT_HTTP_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
+        )
+        agent_git_gate_host = f"{loopback_ip}:{git_gate_host_port}"
+
+    agent_supervise_url = ""
+    if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
+        supervise_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
+            plan.slug, _SUPERVISE_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
+        )
+        agent_supervise_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{supervise_host_port}/"
+
+    existing_no_proxy = plan.guest_env.get("NO_PROXY", "localhost,127.0.0.1")
+    guest_env = {
+        **plan.guest_env,
+        "HTTPS_PROXY": agent_proxy_url,
+        "HTTP_PROXY":  agent_proxy_url,
+        "NO_PROXY":    f"{existing_no_proxy},{loopback_ip}",
+    }
+    if agent_git_gate_host:
+        guest_env["GIT_GATE_URL"] = f"http://{agent_git_gate_host}"
+    if agent_supervise_url:
+        guest_env["MCP_SUPERVISE_URL"] = agent_supervise_url
+
+    return dataclasses.replace(
+        plan,
+        guest_env=guest_env,
+        agent_proxy_url=agent_proxy_url,
+        agent_git_gate_host=agent_git_gate_host,
+        agent_supervise_url=agent_supervise_url,
+    )
+
+
+def _launch_vm(
+    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
+    agent_from_path: Path,
+    loopback_ip: str,
+    stack: ExitStack,
+) -> None:
+    """Create, patch, and start the smolvm VM; register teardown.
+
+    --allow-cidr is the per-bottle loopback alias so the guest can
+    only reach this bottle's bundle ports. force_allowlist patches
+    smolvm 0.8.0's silent-drop of --allow-cidr when combined with
+    --from. Smolfile isn't usable here — smolvm 0.8.0 makes --from
+    and --smolfile mutually exclusive."""
+    _smolvm.machine_create(
+        plan.machine_name,
+        from_path=agent_from_path,
+        allow_cidrs=[f"{loopback_ip}/32"],
+        env=plan.guest_env,
+    )
+    stack.callback(_smolvm.machine_delete, plan.machine_name)
+    # Workaround smolvm 0.8.0: `--allow-cidr` is silently dropped
+    # when combined with `--from`. Patch the persisted state DB
+    # before start so the booted VM's TSI actually enforces.
+    _loopback.force_allowlist(plan.machine_name, [f"{loopback_ip}/32"])
+    _smolvm.machine_start(plan.machine_name)
+    stack.callback(_smolvm.machine_stop, plan.machine_name)
+
+
+def _init_vm(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> None:
+    """Repair filesystem ownership and wait for exec channel readiness.
+
+    Ownership repair: smolvm's pack process remaps files to the host
+    invoker's uid (501 on macOS). /home/node must be node:node so
+    Claude Code can write ~/.claude.json; /tmp + /var/tmp need root
+    mode 1777 so non-root processes can create per-uid scratch dirs.
+    All folded into one sh -c to avoid back-to-back exec calls
+    immediately after machine_start (libkrun exec-channel race).
+
+    wait_exec_ready polls until the exec channel is ready for the
+    subsequent provision calls, replacing the empirical sleep."""
+    _smolvm.machine_exec(plan.machine_name, [
+        "sh", "-c",
+        "chown -R node:node /home/node && "
+        "chown root:root /tmp /var/tmp && "
+        "chmod 1777 /tmp /var/tmp",
+    ])
+    _smolvm.wait_exec_ready(plan.machine_name)
+
+
 def _bundle_launch_spec(
     plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, network: str, loopback_ip: str,
 ) -> _bundle.BundleLaunchSpec:
@@ -305,10 +305,10 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
     Daemons in the CSV:
       - egress + pipelock are always present (pipelock is the
         agent's first hop; egress is its upstream).
-      - git-gate is conditional on plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
+      - git-gate + git-http are conditional on plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
       - supervise is conditional on plan.supervise_plan.
 
-    Env + volumes are the union of the four daemons' needs, with
+    Env + volumes are the union of the sidecar daemons' needs, with
     daemon-private values only (HTTPS_PROXY is scoped to the
     egress process by egress_entrypoint.sh — see PRD 0024's bundle
     bind-address PR)."""
@@ -320,10 +320,9 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
     # is "agent-facing" gets its port published on the host
     # loopback (see `_ensure_smolmachine`'s discovery loop) and the
     # other stays bundle-internal. The bundle is NOT reachable by
-    # bridge IP from the smolvm guest, so the
+    # bridge IP from the smolvm guest on macOS — TSI uses macOS
-    # PRD-0023-chunk-3 EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1 mitigation
+    # networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
-    # isn't needed: the agent can only dial whatever daemon's
+    # published-port loopback forward only.
-    # host port we publish, period.
 
     # --- pipelock ---------------------------------------------
     pp = plan.proxy_plan
@@ -350,10 +349,9 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
             env.append(token_env)
 
     # --- git-gate ---------------------------------------------
-    extra_hosts: list[str] = []
     gp = plan.git_gate_plan
     if gp.upstreams:
-        daemons.append("git-gate")
+        daemons += ["git-gate", "git-http"]
         volumes += [
             (str(gp.entrypoint_script), GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER, True),
             (str(gp.hook_script), GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER, True),
@@ -395,7 +393,7 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
     else:
         ports_to_publish = [_PIPELOCK_PORT]
     if gp.upstreams:
-        ports_to_publish.append(_GIT_GATE_PORT)
+        ports_to_publish.append(_GIT_HTTP_PORT)
     if sp is not None:
         ports_to_publish.append(_SUPERVISE_PORT)
 
@@ -414,15 +412,13 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
 
 
 def _resolve_token_env(
-    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, host_env: object
+    plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, host_env: dict[str, str],
 ) -> dict[str, str]:
     """Resolve the egress token env-var values from the host's
     environ so they reach the bundle's process env via docker's
     `-e NAME` inheritance. Empty when no routes declare auth."""
-    ep = plan.egress_plan
+    effective_env = {**host_env, **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
-    if not ep.routes:
+    return egress_resolve_token_values(plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env)
-        return {}
-    return egress_resolve_token_values(ep.token_env_map, dict(host_env))
 
 
 def _ensure_smolmachine(image_ref: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> Path:

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/loopback_alias.py

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ alias gets handed to a new bottle."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import fcntl
 import json
 import os
 import platform
@@ -83,6 +84,14 @@ _POOL_START = 16
 _POOL_END = 31  # inclusive
 
 
+# File lock that serialises concurrent allocate() calls so two
+# simultaneous launches can't read the same docker state and claim
+# the same alias. Narrowed to the allocate() call itself; docker run
+# runs after the lock is released. Once the container is running it
+# appears in docker state and future allocate() calls will see it.
+_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH = Path.home() / ".cache" / "bot-bottle" / "smolmachines.lock"
+
+
 # Loopback aliases pool: 127.0.0.<start>..127.0.0.<end>.
 def _pool_addresses() -> list[str]:
     return [f"127.0.0.{i}" for i in range(_POOL_START, _POOL_END + 1)]
@@ -179,9 +188,20 @@ def allocate(slug: str) -> str:
     On non-macOS the whole `127.0.0.0/8` is loopback by default;
     `127.0.0.1` is fine to share and we skip the alias dance.
     This still returns a deterministic address so launch.py's
-    callers don't have to branch on platform."""
+    callers don't have to branch on platform.
+
+    An exclusive file lock serialises concurrent calls so two
+    simultaneous launches don't read the same docker state and
+    claim the same alias."""
     if not _is_macos():
         return "127.0.0.1"
+    _ALLOC_LOCK_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w") as lf:
+        fcntl.flock(lf, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        return _allocate_locked()
+
+
+def _allocate_locked() -> str:
     in_use = _aliases_in_use()
     for ip in _pool_addresses():
         if ip not in in_use:

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py

@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from dataclasses import replace
 from pathlib import Path
 
-from ...agent_provider import runtime_for
+from ...agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, runtime_for
 from ...backend import BottleSpec
 from ...backend.docker.bottle_state import (
     BottleMetadata,
@@ -27,9 +28,11 @@ from ...backend.docker.bottle_state import (
     write_metadata,
 )
 from ...egress import Egress
+from ...env import resolve_env
 from ...git_gate import GitGate
 from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
 from ...supervise import Supervise
+from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
 from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
 from .util import smolmachines_bundle_subnet, smolmachines_preflight
 
@@ -58,6 +61,8 @@ def resolve_plan(
     bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
     provider = bottle.agent_provider
     provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
+    guest_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME", "/home/node")
+    workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
 
     slug = spec.identity or bottle_identity(spec.agent_name)
 
@@ -69,72 +74,34 @@ def resolve_plan(
         cwd=spec.user_cwd if spec.copy_cwd else "",
         copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
         started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-        # No compose project for smolmachines bottles; chunk 4
-        # will give dashboard discovery a backend-specific path.
         compose_project="",
+        backend="smolmachines",
     ))
 
     subnet, gateway, bundle_ip = smolmachines_bundle_subnet(slug)
 
-    # Agent's env: the prepare-time view doesn't yet know the
+    # Agent's env: resolve through resolve_env() so ?prompt entries
-    # host loopback ports the bundle's daemons get published on
+    # are prompted and ${HOST_VAR} entries are interpolated — matching
-    # (those come from docker AFTER `docker run` returns), so
+    # the Docker backend's contract. Forwarded (secret/interpolated)
-    # HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are
+    # values still reach the guest as -e K=V smolvm flags because
-    # populated in launch.py and stamped onto guest_env there.
+    # smolvm 0.8.0 has no env-file or stdin injection path; this is
-    # What we set here is the part that doesn't depend on
+    # the known argv-exposure gap documented in PRD 0038.
-    # bundle bringup — bottle.env literals, the empty-NO_PROXY
+    # HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are populated
-    # safe default, and the TLS trust env trio
+    # in launch.py after bundle bringup.
-    # (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE)
+    resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
-    # pointing at Debian's update-ca-certificates output bundle.
     guest_env: dict[str, str] = {
-        **bottle.env,
+        **resolved.literals,
+        **resolved.forwarded,
         "NO_PROXY":    "localhost,127.0.0.1",
         "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
         "SSL_CERT_FILE":       "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
         "REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE":  "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
     }
 
-    # Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
-    # platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
-    # a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
-    # dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
-    # bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
-    # dependency).
-    pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
-    pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(bottle, slug, pipelock_dir)
-
     git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
     git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     git_gate_plan = GitGate().prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
 
-    egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
-    egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    egress_plan = Egress().prepare(bottle, slug, egress_dir)
-
-    # Claude-code refuses to start without *something* it
-    # recognises as a credential. When the bottle has an egress
-    # route carrying the `claude_code_oauth` role marker, egress
-    # strips + re-injects the real Authorization header on the
-    # outbound leg using a token held in egress's own environ — so
-    # the agent gets a non-secret placeholder here (matches the
-    # docker backend's forwarded_env logic in
-    # bot_bottle/backend/docker/prepare.py).
-    has_provider_auth = any(
-        provider_runtime.auth_role in r.roles for r in egress_plan.routes
-    )
-    if has_provider_auth:
-        guest_env[provider_runtime.placeholder_env] = "egress-placeholder"
-    if provider.template == "claude" and has_provider_auth:
-        guest_env.setdefault("CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC", "1")
-        guest_env.setdefault("DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING", "1")
-
-    supervise_plan = None
-    if bottle.supervise:
-        supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
-        supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        supervise_plan = Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir)
-
     # Prompt file is always written (mode 0o600) so the in-VM
     # path always exists. Content is the agent's `prompt`
     # field (markdown body) — empty for agents with no prompt.
@@ -162,6 +129,45 @@ def resolve_plan(
     else:
         image_default = provider_runtime.image
     agent_image_ref = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_IMAGE", image_default)
+    agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
+        template=provider.template,
+        dockerfile=agent_dockerfile_path,
+        state_dir=agent_dir,
+        guest_home=guest_home,
+        guest_env=guest_env,
+        forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
+        auth_token=provider.auth_token,
+        host_env=dict(os.environ),
+        trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
+    )
+    merged_guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
+    for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
+        merged_guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
+    agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=merged_guest_env)
+
+    # Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
+    # platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
+    # a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
+    # dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
+    # bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
+    # dependency).
+    pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
+    pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(
+        bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
+    )
+
+    egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
+    egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    egress_plan = Egress().prepare(
+        bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
+    )
+
+    supervise_plan = None
+    if bottle.supervise:
+        supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
+        supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        supervise_plan = Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir)
 
     return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
         spec=spec,
@@ -172,16 +178,14 @@ def resolve_plan(
         bundle_ip=bundle_ip,
         machine_name=machine_name,
         agent_image_ref=agent_image_ref,
-        guest_env=guest_env,
+        guest_env=agent_provision.guest_env,
         prompt_file=prompt_file,
         proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
         git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
         egress_plan=egress_plan,
         supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
-        agent_command=provider_runtime.command,
+        agent_provision=agent_provision,
-        agent_prompt_mode=provider_runtime.prompt_mode,
+        workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
-        agent_provider_template=provider.template,
-        agent_dockerfile_path=agent_dockerfile_path,
     )
 
 

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/ca.py

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ flag exists; the VM init is root), so we don't need the explicit
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import time
+
 from ....log import die
 from ...util import (
     AGENT_CA_BUNDLE,
@@ -26,6 +28,9 @@ from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
 from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
 
 
+_SIGKILL_EXIT = 128 + 9
+
+
 def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
     """Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the guest, rebuild the
     trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
@@ -40,17 +45,16 @@ def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
     # REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE) on the guest_env covers Node + Python
     # `requests` / libraries that don't load the system bundle.
     #
-    # chown + chmod + update-ca-certificates run in one
+    r = _install_ca(target)
-    # `sh -c` so we only pay one machine_exec round trip; the
+    if r.returncode == _SIGKILL_EXIT:
-    # `&&` chaining surfaces the first failure as the return
+        # smolvm/libkrun can SIGKILL an otherwise-normal exec
-    # code.
+        # during early-VM provisioning. `update-ca-certificates`
-    r = _smolvm.machine_exec(target, [
+        # is idempotent, so retry the same install once after a
-        "sh", "-c",
+        # short settle delay before treating it as fatal.
-        f"chown root:root {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
+        time.sleep(1.0)
-        f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
+        r = _install_ca(target)
-        f"update-ca-certificates",
+
-    ])
+    if r.returncode != 0:
-    if r.returncode != 0 or "1 added" not in (r.stdout or ""):
         # update-ca-certificates not adding our cert is fatal —
         # claude-code's TLS handshake against the egress-MITM'd
         # api.anthropic.com would fail downstream. Bail early
@@ -66,6 +70,23 @@ def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
     log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
 
 
+def _install_ca(target: str) -> _smolvm.SmolvmRunResult:
+    # chown + chmod + update-ca-certificates + bundle
+    # verification run in one `sh -c` so we only pay one
+    # machine_exec round trip; the `&&` chaining surfaces the
+    # first failure as the return code. The verify check is more
+    # stable than requiring "1 added" in stdout: a retry after a
+    # partially-completed first run may legitimately report "0
+    # added" while the cert is already installed.
+    return _smolvm.machine_exec(target, [
+        "sh", "-c",
+        f"chown root:root {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
+        f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
+        f"update-ca-certificates && "
+        f"openssl verify -CAfile {AGENT_CA_BUNDLE} {AGENT_CA_PATH}",
+    ])
+
+
 # Re-exported for the launch/provision_ca caller + tests. The path
 # constants live in the shared `backend.util` (Debian's
 # `update-ca-certificates` layout is the same in both backends).

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/git.py

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
 
   1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that
-     .git into /home/node/workspace/.git so the agent operates on
+     .git into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on
      the user's repo.
   2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
      ~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
 Differs from `backend.docker.provision.git` in one address detail:
 the TSI-allowlisted guest can only reach the bundle's pinned IP
 (no DNS resolver in the /32 allowlist), so the insteadOf URLs
-are `git://<bundle_ip>:<port>/<name>.git` rather than the
+are `http://<bundle_ip>:<port>/<name>.git` rather than the
 docker backend's `git://git-gate/<name>.git`. The render itself
 is the shared `git_gate_render_gitconfig` on the platform-neutral
 git_gate module."""
@@ -58,20 +58,22 @@ def _provision_cwd_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
     """If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
     it into <guest_home>/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
     otherwise."""
-    if not (plan.spec.copy_cwd and Path(plan.spec.user_cwd, ".git").is_dir()):
+    workspace = plan.workspace_plan
+    if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
         return
-    guest_workspace_git = f"{_guest_home()}/workspace/.git"
+    guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
-    info(f"copying {plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git -> {target}:{guest_workspace_git}")
+    host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
+    info(f"copying {host_git} -> {target}:{guest_workspace_git}")
     # mkdir -p the workspace dir so `machine cp` lands the .git
     # directly there even on first-time bottles.
-    _smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", f"{_guest_home()}/workspace"])
+    _smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", workspace.guest_path])
     _smolvm.machine_cp(
-        f"{plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git", f"{target}:{guest_workspace_git}",
+        host_git, f"{target}:{guest_workspace_git}",
     )
     # `machine cp` lands files as root; the agent runs as node so
     # the workspace tree must be chowned over.
     _smolvm.machine_exec(
-        target, ["chown", "-R", "node:node", guest_workspace_git],
+        target, ["chown", "-R", workspace.owner, guest_workspace_git],
     )
 
 
@@ -82,12 +84,14 @@ def _provision_git_gate_config(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> Non
     if not bottle.git:
         return
 
-    # `127.0.0.1:<host port>` form: the bundle's git-gate port
+    # `<loopback alias>:<host port>` form: the bundle's git-gate
-    # is published on host loopback at launch time so the
+    # HTTP port is published on host loopback at launch time so
-    # smolvm guest (which can only reach macOS networking via
+    # the smolvm guest (which can only reach macOS networking via
     # TSI, not the docker bridge IP) can dial it. launch.py
     # populates `plan.agent_git_gate_host` after bundle bringup.
-    content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(bottle.git, plan.agent_git_gate_host)
+    content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(
+        bottle.git, plan.agent_git_gate_host, scheme="http",
+    )
 
     guest_gitconfig = f"{_guest_home()}/.gitconfig"
     # Stage the file under the plan's stage_dir so `machine cp`

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/provider_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"""Provision non-secret provider auth markers into a smolmachines bottle."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from ....log import die
+from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
+from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
+
+
+def provision_provider_auth(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
+    """Apply provider-owned guest setup through smolvm primitives."""
+    provision = plan.agent_provision
+    for d in provision.dirs:
+        _exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", d.guest_path], f"could not create {d.guest_path}")
+        _exec(target, ["chown", d.owner, d.guest_path], f"could not chown {d.guest_path}")
+        _exec(target, ["chmod", d.mode, d.guest_path], f"could not chmod {d.guest_path}")
+    for command in provision.pre_copy:
+        _exec(target, list(command.argv), command.error)
+    for f in provision.files:
+        _smolvm.machine_cp(str(f.host_path), f"{target}:{f.guest_path}")
+        _exec(target, ["chown", f.owner, f.guest_path], f"could not chown {f.guest_path}")
+        _exec(target, ["chmod", f.mode, f.guest_path], f"could not chmod {f.guest_path}")
+    for command in provision.verify:
+        _exec(target, list(command.argv), command.error)
+
+
+def _exec(target: str, argv: list[str], error: str) -> None:
+    result = _smolvm.machine_exec(target, argv)
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip()
+        if detail:
+            detail = f": {detail}"
+        die(f"agent provider provisioning: {error}{detail}")

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/workspace.py

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"""Copy the operator workspace into a smolmachines guest."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import shlex
+
+from ....log import info
+from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
+from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
+
+
+def provision_workspace(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
+    """Copy host cwd contents to the planned guest workspace."""
+    workspace = plan.workspace_plan
+    if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_contents):
+        return
+
+    guest_parent = workspace.guest_path.rsplit("/", 1)[0] or "/"
+    guest_path_q = shlex.quote(workspace.guest_path)
+    guest_parent_q = shlex.quote(guest_parent)
+    owner_q = shlex.quote(workspace.owner)
+    mode_q = shlex.quote(workspace.mode)
+    info(f"copying {workspace.host_path} -> {target}:{workspace.guest_path}")
+    _smolvm.machine_exec(
+        target,
+        ["sh", "-c", f"rm -rf {guest_path_q} && mkdir -p {guest_parent_q}"],
+    )
+    _smolvm.machine_cp(str(workspace.host_path), f"{target}:{workspace.guest_path}")
+    _smolvm.machine_exec(
+        target,
+        [
+            "sh", "-c",
+            f"chown -R {owner_q} {guest_path_q} && "
+            f"chmod {mode_q} {guest_path_q}",
+        ],
+    )

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/smolvm.py

@@ -27,11 +27,13 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import shutil
 import subprocess
+import time
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Mapping, Sequence
 
 
+
 _SMOLVM = "smolvm"
 
 
@@ -197,6 +199,34 @@ def machine_exec(
     )
 
 
+def wait_exec_ready(name: str, *, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll `machine exec true` until exit 0 or `timeout` elapses.
+
+    Replaces `time.sleep(1.5)` after `machine_start`: libkrun's exec
+    channel needs a brief warm-up before back-to-back exec calls are
+    safe. Polling exits as soon as the channel is ready and fails
+    loudly if the VM never responds."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    delay = 0.1
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        r = machine_exec(name, ["true"])
+        if r.returncode == 0:
+            return
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            break
+        time.sleep(min(delay, remaining))
+        delay = min(delay * 2, 0.5)
+    argv = ["smolvm", "machine", "exec", "--name", name, "--", "true"]
+    raise SmolvmError(
+        argv,
+        subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            args=argv, returncode=-1, stdout="",
+            stderr=f"exec channel not ready after {timeout:.0f}s — VM may have failed to boot.",
+        ),
+    )
+
+
 def machine_cp(src: str, dst: str) -> None:
     """`smolvm machine cp SRC DST`. Path syntax: `machine:path` to
     reference a path inside the VM, bare path for the host. Both

bot_bottle/cli/__init__.py

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import sys
 
-from ..log import Die, die
+from ..log import Die, die, error
+from ..manifest import ManifestError
 from ._common import PROG
 from . import list as _list_mod
 from .cleanup import cmd_cleanup
@@ -63,6 +64,11 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
         die(f"unknown command: {command}")
     try:
         return handler(rest) or 0
+    except ManifestError as e:
+        # Manifest/config problems surface as a catchable exception;
+        # print the reason and exit non-zero (same UX die() used to give).
+        error(str(e))
+        return 1
     except Die as e:
         return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
     except KeyboardInterrupt:

bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import subprocess
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import time
+import traceback
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -52,8 +53,8 @@ from ..backend.docker.pipelock_apply import (
     parse_allowlist_content,
     render_allowlist_content,
 )
-from ..log import info
+from ..log import Die, error, info
-from ..manifest import Manifest
+from ..manifest import Manifest, ManifestError
 from ..supervise import (
     ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT,
     COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
@@ -174,6 +175,13 @@ def approve(
             qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
         )
     elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
+        _meta = read_metadata(qp.proposal.bottle_slug)
+        if _meta is not None and not _meta.compose_project:
+            raise CapabilityApplyError(
+                "capability-block remediation is not supported for smolmachines "
+                "bottles. Reject this proposal or handle the capability change "
+                "manually, then restart the bottle."
+            )
         diff_before, diff_after = apply_capability_change(
             qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
         )
@@ -639,23 +647,19 @@ def _bottle_for_slug(
 ) -> tuple["object", str]:
     """Return `(bottle_handle, prompt_path_hint)` for a re-attach.
     If the slug is in `bottles` (dashboard-owned), return the stored
-    handle directly. Otherwise synthesize a `DockerBottle` from the
+    handle directly. Otherwise synthesize a bottle from the persisted
-    container name `bot-bottle-<slug>`. For synthesized bottles
+    metadata. The backend field in metadata (PRD 0040) selects Docker
-    the prompt-file path comes from the manifest's agent if we can
+    or smolmachines; unknown or missing metadata defaults to Docker.
-    resolve it via metadata.json + the loaded manifest; otherwise
-    the re-attach runs without `--append-system-prompt-file`.
 
     Returns the empty string for prompt_path_hint when we omit the
     flag — the caller passes None to DockerBottle in that case."""
     from ..backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
     from ..backend.docker.bottle_state import read_metadata
+    from ..backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
     if slug in bottles:
         _cm, bottle, _identity = bottles[slug]
         return bottle, ""
-    # The container hosting the agent's agent process is named
+    instance_name = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
-    # `bot-bottle-<slug>` — set by the compose renderer
-    # (no service suffix on the agent service, by design).
-    container_name = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
     prompt_path: str | None = None
     metadata = read_metadata(slug)
     if metadata is not None and manifest is not None:
@@ -665,11 +669,18 @@ def _bottle_for_slug(
                 "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node",
             )
             prompt_path = f"{container_home}/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"
-    synth = DockerBottle(
+    backend = metadata.backend if metadata is not None else ""
-        container=container_name,
+    if backend == "smolmachines":
-        teardown=lambda: None,
+        synth: object = SmolmachinesBottle(
-        prompt_path_in_container=prompt_path,
+            instance_name,
-    )
+            prompt_path=prompt_path,
+        )
+    else:
+        synth = DockerBottle(
+            container=instance_name,
+            teardown=lambda: None,
+            prompt_path_in_container=prompt_path,
+        )
     return synth, (prompt_path or "")
 
 
@@ -1277,9 +1288,57 @@ def cmd_dashboard(argv: list[str]) -> int:
         curses.wrapper(_main_loop)
     except KeyboardInterrupt:
         return 130
+    except Die as e:
+        # die() printed the reason to stderr, but that happened while
+        # curses owned the terminal — the text landed on the alternate
+        # screen and was wiped when the terminal was restored. Re-surface
+        # it now that we're back on the normal screen.
+        if e.message:
+            error(e.message)
+        else:
+            error("dashboard exited on a fatal error (no detail captured).")
+        return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
+    except Exception as e:
+        # Any other crash inside the TUI. The traceback would otherwise
+        # vanish with the alternate screen, so persist it and tell the
+        # operator where to look.
+        log_path = _write_crash_log(e)
+        error(f"dashboard crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
+        error(f"full traceback written to {log_path}")
+        return 1
     return 0
 
 
+def _write_crash_log(exc: BaseException) -> Path:
+    """Persist `exc`'s traceback to a stable file under ~/.bot-bottle/
+    and return its path.
+
+    The dashboard runs under curses, so a crash's stderr/traceback is
+    painted onto the alternate screen and lost when the terminal is
+    restored — this leaves the operator a durable record of *why* it
+    died. Best-effort: falls back to a tempfile if the home dir can't
+    be written."""
+    stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
+    body = "".join(
+        traceback.format_exception(type(exc), exc, exc.__traceback__)
+    )
+    entry = f"=== dashboard crash {stamp} ===\n{body}\n"
+    try:
+        log_dir = _supervise.bot_bottle_root() / "logs"
+        log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        path = log_dir / "dashboard-crash.log"
+        with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(entry)
+        return path
+    except OSError:
+        fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
+            prefix="bot-bottle-dashboard-crash-", suffix=".log",
+        )
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+            fh.write(entry)
+        return Path(tmp)
+
+
 def _list_once() -> int:
     pending = discover_pending()
     if not pending:
@@ -1407,8 +1466,17 @@ def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None:
         if manifest_cache[0] is None:
             manifest_cache[0] = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD, missing_ok=True)
         return manifest_cache[0]
-    if not _get_manifest().bottles and not _get_manifest().agents:
+    # A malformed manifest must not take the whole dashboard down — the
-        status_line = "warning: no bot-bottle config/agents found; new-agent picker is empty"
+    # operator may just be watching running bottles. Degrade to a
+    # status-line warning instead. (Any non-config error propagates to
+    # cmd_dashboard's crash handler.)
+    try:
+        _loaded = _get_manifest()
+    except ManifestError as e:
+        status_line = f"config error: {e}"
+    else:
+        if not _loaded.bottles and not _loaded.agents:
+            status_line = "warning: no bot-bottle config/agents found; new-agent picker is empty"
     # First-tick guard: a brand-new dashboard finds any
     # pre-existing queue entries on its first poll; those
     # shouldn't ring the bell as if they just arrived.
@@ -1494,6 +1562,9 @@ def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None:
             # bottle running.
             try:
                 manifest = _get_manifest()
+            except ManifestError as e:
+                status_line = f"config error: {e}"
+                continue
             except Exception as e:
                 status_line = f"manifest load failed: {e}"
                 continue

bot_bottle/cli/resume.py

@@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
         user_cwd=metadata.cwd or USER_CWD,
         identity=metadata.identity,
     )
+    backend_name = metadata.backend or None
     return _launch_bottle(
         spec,
         dry_run=args.dry_run,
         remote_control=args.remote_control,
+        backend_name=backend_name,
     )

bot_bottle/codex_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+"""Host Codex auth helpers.
+
+Reads the host's Codex ChatGPT/device-login auth state and returns only
+the short-lived access token needed by egress. This module deliberately
+does not expose refresh tokens or raw auth payloads.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import os
+from copy import deepcopy
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from .log import die
+from .util import expand_tilde
+
+
+def codex_auth_path(host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> Path:
+    env = os.environ if host_env is None else host_env
+    home = env.get("CODEX_HOME")
+    if home:
+        return Path(expand_tilde(home)) / "auth.json"
+    return Path.home() / ".codex" / "auth.json"
+
+
+def codex_host_access_token(
+    host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    path = codex_auth_path(host_env)
+    if not path.is_file():
+        die(
+            f"codex host credentials: auth file missing at {path}. "
+            "Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host or disable "
+            "agent_provider.forward_host_credentials."
+        )
+    raw = _read_auth_object(path)
+
+    auth_mode = raw.get("auth_mode")
+    if not isinstance(auth_mode, str) or auth_mode == "api_key":
+        die(
+            "codex host credentials: host Codex auth is not user/device "
+            "auth. Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host."
+        )
+
+    tokens = raw.get("tokens")
+    if not isinstance(tokens, dict):
+        die(f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens")
+    access = tokens.get("access_token")
+    if not isinstance(access, str) or not access:
+        die(
+            f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens.access_token. "
+            "Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host."
+        )
+
+    exp = _jwt_exp(access)
+    if exp is None:
+        die("codex host credentials: tokens.access_token is not a JWT with exp")
+    check_now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    if exp <= check_now:
+        die(
+            "codex host credentials: host Codex access token is expired. "
+            "Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host and restart the bottle."
+        )
+    return access
+
+
+def codex_dummy_auth_json(
+    host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Return a non-secret `auth.json` that keeps Codex in the host's
+    auth branch while egress owns the real bearer token.
+
+    The dummy access/id tokens carry the *host* token's real `exp` so
+    Codex's proactive refresh lifecycle (it refreshes when its local
+    access token is at/past expiry) tracks the real token instead of
+    firing after an artificial TTL. Codex cannot refresh inside the
+    bottle — the refresh token is a placeholder and the OpenAI token
+    endpoint is off-route — so a shorter dummy exp would drop Codex to
+    the sign-in screen the moment it lapsed, even while egress still
+    holds a valid bearer."""
+    path = codex_auth_path(host_env)
+    access = codex_host_access_token(host_env, now=now)
+    raw = _read_auth_object(path)
+    host_exp = _jwt_exp(access)
+    exp_ts = int(host_exp.timestamp()) if host_exp is not None else None
+    dummy = _redact_codex_auth(deepcopy(raw), now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+    return json.dumps(dummy, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n"
+
+
+def write_codex_dummy_auth_file(
+    path: Path,
+    host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path.write_text(codex_dummy_auth_json(host_env, now=now))
+    path.chmod(0o600)
+
+
+def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict:
+    try:
+        raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
+        die(f"codex host credentials: could not read valid JSON at {path}: {e}")
+    if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+        die(f"codex host credentials: {path} must contain a JSON object")
+    return raw
+
+
+def _dummy_exp(now: datetime | None, exp_ts: int | None) -> int:
+    if exp_ts is not None:
+        return exp_ts
+    check_now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    return int(check_now.timestamp()) + 3600
+
+
+def _dummy_timestamp(now: datetime | None = None) -> str:
+    check_now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    if check_now.tzinfo is None:
+        check_now = check_now.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    check_now = check_now.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    return check_now.isoformat(timespec="milliseconds").replace("+00:00", "Z")
+
+
+def _dummy_jwt(now: datetime | None = None, *, exp_ts: int | None = None) -> str:
+    return _encode_dummy_jwt({
+        "exp": _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts),
+        "sub": "bot-bottle-placeholder",
+    })
+
+
+def _dummy_jwt_from_host(
+    value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+    parts = value.split(".")
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(_b64url_decode(parts[1]))
+    except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+    return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(payload, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
+
+
+def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
+    def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
+        raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
+
+    return f"{enc({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{enc(payload)}.placeholder"
+
+
+def _redact_jwt_payload(
+    payload: dict,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+    exp_ts: int | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    out = _redact_claims(payload)
+    if not isinstance(out, dict):
+        out = {}
+    out["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
+    out.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
+    return out
+
+
+def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        out: dict[str, object] = {}
+        for key, inner in value.items():
+            lower = key.lower()
+            if key == "https://api.openai.com/profile":
+                out[key] = _redact_profile_claim(inner)
+            elif key == "https://api.openai.com/auth":
+                out[key] = _redact_auth_claim(inner)
+            elif lower == "email":
+                out[key] = "bot-bottle@example.invalid"
+            elif lower == "email_verified":
+                out[key] = True
+            elif lower in {"exp", "iat", "nbf", "auth_time", "pwd_auth_time"}:
+                out[key] = inner if isinstance(inner, (int, float)) else 0
+            elif lower in {"aud", "scp", "amr"}:
+                out[key] = inner if isinstance(inner, list) else []
+            elif isinstance(inner, bool):
+                out[key] = inner
+            elif isinstance(inner, dict):
+                out[key] = {}
+            elif isinstance(inner, list):
+                out[key] = []
+            else:
+                out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
+        return out
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return []
+    return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
+
+
+def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict:
+    profile = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+    return {
+        "email": "bot-bottle@example.invalid",
+        "email_verified": bool(profile.get("email_verified", True)),
+    }
+
+
+def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict:
+    auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+    out: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for key, inner in auth.items():
+        lower = key.lower()
+        if lower == "chatgpt_plan_type" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
+            out[key] = inner
+        elif lower == "chatgpt_account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
+            # Current Codex uses the selected account id when building
+            # ChatGPT requests. Keep that non-secret identifier aligned
+            # with the host while egress owns the real bearer token.
+            out[key] = inner
+        elif lower == "localhost" and isinstance(inner, bool):
+            out[key] = inner
+        elif isinstance(inner, bool):
+            out[key] = inner
+        elif isinstance(inner, list):
+            out[key] = []
+        elif isinstance(inner, dict):
+            out[key] = {}
+        else:
+            out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
+    out.setdefault("chatgpt_plan_type", "unknown")
+    out.setdefault("user_id", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
+    out.setdefault("chatgpt_user_id", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
+    out.setdefault("chatgpt_account_id", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
+    return out
+
+
+def _redact_codex_auth(
+    value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
+) -> object:
+    auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+    out: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for key, inner in auth.items():
+        lower = key.lower()
+        if lower == "auth_mode" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
+            out[key] = inner
+        elif lower == "openai_api_key":
+            out[key] = None
+        elif lower == "last_refresh":
+            # Codex parses this as a timestamp on startup. Keep the
+            # schema valid without copying host-side session metadata.
+            out[key] = _dummy_timestamp(now)
+        elif lower == "tokens":
+            out[key] = _redact_token_block(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+        else:
+            out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
+    return out
+
+
+def _redact_token_block(
+    value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    tokens = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
+    out: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for key, inner in tokens.items():
+        lower = key.lower()
+        if lower in {"access_token", "id_token"}:
+            out[key] = _dummy_jwt_from_host(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
+        elif lower == "account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
+            # Current Codex uses this non-secret selected account id
+            # while egress owns the real bearer token.
+            out[key] = inner
+        else:
+            out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
+    return out
+
+
+def _redact_unknown_auth_value(value: object) -> object:
+    if isinstance(value, bool):
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return []
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
+
+
+def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
+    parts = token.split(".")
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(_b64url_decode(parts[1]))
+    except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        return None
+    exp = payload.get("exp")
+    if not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
+        return None
+    return datetime.fromtimestamp(exp, timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _b64url_decode(value: str) -> str:
+    padded = value + ("=" * (-len(value) % 4))
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii")).decode("utf-8")
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "codex_auth_path",
+    "codex_dummy_auth_json",
+    "codex_host_access_token",
+    "write_codex_dummy_auth_file",
+]

bot_bottle/egress.py

@@ -24,12 +24,19 @@ flow (PRD 0014) at egress and renames the MCP tool.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import dataclasses
 from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
+from .egress_addon_core import Route
 from .log import die
-from .manifest import Bottle
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from .manifest import Bottle
+
+CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CODEX_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
 
 
 # DNS name agents will dial for the per-bottle egress sidecar.
@@ -48,32 +55,30 @@ EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
-class EgressRoute:
+class EgressRoute(Route):
-    """One resolved route on the egress sidecar.
+    """Host-side extension of the addon's `Route`.
 
-    `host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
+    Inherits `host`, `path_allowlist`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
-    optional `path_allowlist` constrains the URL path; empty tuple
+    from `egress_addon_core.Route` — those are the fields that cross the
-    means no path-level filtering. The `auth_scheme` / `token_env` /
+    YAML wire into the sidecar. The three fields below are host-only and
-    `token_ref` triple is the credential-injection config; empty
+    are never serialised to the addon.
-    strings mean "no auth injection" (the manifest's nested `auth`
-    block was omitted).
 
-    `token_env` is the env-var slot inside the egress container
+    `token_ref` is the host env var the CLI reads at launch and forwards
-    (e.g. `EGRESS_TOKEN_0`); `token_ref` is the host env var
+    into the container's environ under `token_env`. Routes that share a
-    the CLI reads at launch and forwards into the container's environ
+    `token_ref` coalesce to one `token_env` slot.
-    under `token_env`. Routes that share a `token_ref` coalesce to
-    one `token_env` slot.
 
-    `roles` carries the manifest route's optional role markers (see
+    `roles` carries the manifest route's role tuple (reserved for
-    `manifest.EGRESS_ROLES`). The launch step reads these for
+    future use; always empty today).
-    side effects like the claude-code OAuth placeholder env."""
+
+    `tls_passthrough` signals that pipelock must not TLS-MITM this
+    host — either because the manifest declared `pipelock.tls_passthrough:
+    true` (lifted in `egress_manifest_routes`) or because a provider
+    route set it (e.g. egress injects its own Bearer on that host
+    after the agent boundary and pipelock's header DLP would block it)."""
 
-    host: str
-    path_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    auth_scheme: str = ""
-    token_env: str = ""
     token_ref: str = ""
     roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    tls_passthrough: bool = False
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -130,55 +135,60 @@ class EgressPlan:
 def egress_manifest_routes(
     bottle: Bottle,
 ) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
-    """Lift each `bottle.egress.routes[]` manifest entry into a
+    """Lift each `bottle.egress.routes[]` manifest entry into an EgressRoute.
-    resolved EgressRoute. Order is preserved so route lookup at
+    Order is preserved. Token slots are not assigned here — slot assignment
-    the proxy is stable.
+    is a final step in `egress_routes_for_bottle` after provider and manifest
-
+    routes are merged."""
-    Token-env slots are assigned per distinct `token_ref`: the first
-    authenticated route with `token_ref` "GH_PAT" gets
-    `EGRESS_TOKEN_0`; a second route with the same `token_ref`
-    shares slot 0. Unauthenticated routes (`auth` omitted) contribute
-    no slot.
-
-    This is the effective set the addon enforces. Provider runtime
-    routes are intentionally not injected implicitly; every allowed
-    host must come from the home-owned bottle manifest."""
     out: list[EgressRoute] = []
-    slot_for_token: dict[str, str] = {}
     for r in bottle.egress.routes:
-        if r.AuthScheme and r.TokenRef:
+        out.append(EgressRoute(
-            token_env = slot_for_token.get(r.TokenRef)
+            host=r.Host,
-            if token_env is None:
+            path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
-                token_env = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{len(slot_for_token)}"
+            auth_scheme=r.AuthScheme,
-                slot_for_token[r.TokenRef] = token_env
+            token_ref=r.TokenRef,
-            out.append(EgressRoute(
+            roles=r.Role,
-                host=r.Host,
+            tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
-                path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
+        ))
-                auth_scheme=r.AuthScheme,
-                token_env=token_env,
-                token_ref=r.TokenRef,
-                roles=r.Role,
-            ))
-        else:
-            out.append(EgressRoute(
-                host=r.Host,
-                path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
-                roles=r.Role,
-            ))
     return tuple(out)
 
 
 def egress_routes_for_bottle(
     bottle: Bottle,
+    provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
 ) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
-    """Effective egress routes. This is what gets rendered into
+    """Effective egress routes for the agent.
-    routes.yaml + what the addon enforces.
 
-    Operators that want to allow a host declare it directly in
+    Provider routes own their hosts outright; manifest routes for hosts
-    `bottle.egress.routes` as an authenticated route or bare-pass entry
+    not claimed by any provider are appended. Token slots are assigned
-    (`- host: <name>`). The legacy `bottle.egress.allowlist`
+    in a final pass over the merged list in order, so provisioned routes
-    folding is gone — egress is the single allowlist surface."""
+    get the lower slot numbers."""
-    return egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
+    manifest = egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
+    provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
+    merged = list(provider_routes) + [
+        r for r in manifest if r.host.lower() not in provisioned_hosts
+    ]
+    return _assign_token_slots(merged)
+
+
+def _assign_token_slots(
+    routes: list[EgressRoute],
+) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
+    """Assign EGRESS_TOKEN_N slots to authenticated routes in order.
+
+    Routes sharing a token_ref share a slot. Unauthenticated routes
+    (no auth_scheme / token_ref) keep token_env empty."""
+    slot_for_ref: dict[str, str] = {}
+    out: list[EgressRoute] = []
+    for r in routes:
+        if r.auth_scheme and r.token_ref:
+            slot = slot_for_ref.get(r.token_ref)
+            if slot is None:
+                slot = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{len(slot_for_ref)}"
+                slot_for_ref[r.token_ref] = slot
+            out.append(dataclasses.replace(r, token_env=slot))
+        else:
+            out.append(r)
+    return tuple(out)
 
 
 def egress_token_env_map(
@@ -193,7 +203,7 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
     silently picking one."""
     out: dict[str, str] = {}
     for r in routes:
-        if not r.token_env:
+        if not (r.auth_scheme and r.token_ref and r.token_env):
             continue
         existing = out.get(r.token_env)
         if existing is not None and existing != r.token_ref:
@@ -206,35 +216,43 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
     return out
 
 
+def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict:
+    """Return the addon-visible fields for one route.
+
+    Single authoritative mapping between EgressRoute (host-side) and
+    egress_addon_core.Route (sidecar-side). When a field is added to
+    the addon's Route that must appear in the YAML, add it here and
+    in egress_addon_core._parse_one together."""
+    fields: dict = {"host": r.host}
+    if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
+        fields["auth_scheme"] = r.auth_scheme
+        fields["token_env"] = r.token_env
+    if r.path_allowlist:
+        fields["path_allowlist"] = list(r.path_allowlist)
+    return fields
+
+
 def egress_render_routes(
     routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
 ) -> str:
     """Serialize the route table for the addon to read.
 
-    YAML content — no token values, no host env-var names. The only
+    YAML content — no token values, no host env-var names. Fields are
-    thing the addon needs at runtime is the host → path_allowlist
+    determined by `_route_to_yaml_fields`, which is the single point of
-    + auth_scheme + in-container env-var mapping. The actual token
+    truth for the EgressRoute → egress_addon_core.Route mapping."""
-    values arrive via the container's environ.
-
-    Authenticated routes carry `auth_scheme` + `token_env`;
-    unauthenticated routes omit both keys (the addon's parser
-    enforces both-or-neither). Hand-rolled YAML in the style of
-    `pipelock_render_yaml` so the addon's parser
-    (`yaml_subset.parse_yaml_subset`) round-trips it cleanly."""
     lines: list[str] = ["routes:"]
     if not routes:
-        # `routes:` with an empty list on the same line — the parser
-        # needs SOMETHING here. Empty inline list is the cleanest.
         lines[0] = "routes: []"
         return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
     for r in routes:
-        lines.append(f'  - host: "{r.host}"')
+        f = _route_to_yaml_fields(r)
-        if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
+        lines.append(f'  - host: "{f["host"]}"')
-            lines.append(f'    auth_scheme: "{r.auth_scheme}"')
+        if "auth_scheme" in f:
-            lines.append(f'    token_env: "{r.token_env}"')
+            lines.append(f'    auth_scheme: "{f["auth_scheme"]}"')
-        if r.path_allowlist:
+            lines.append(f'    token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
+        if "path_allowlist" in f:
             lines.append("    path_allowlist:")
-            for p in r.path_allowlist:
+            for p in f["path_allowlist"]:
                 lines.append(f'      - "{p}"')
     return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
 
@@ -274,18 +292,23 @@ class Egress(ABC):
     sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on
     concrete subclasses."""
 
-    def prepare(self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path) -> EgressPlan:
+    def prepare(
-        """Lift `bottle.egress.routes` into resolved routes,
+        self,
-        render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
+        bottle: Bottle,
+        slug: str,
+        stage_dir: Path,
+        provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
+    ) -> EgressPlan:
+        """Lift `bottle.egress.routes` + `provider_routes` into resolved
+        routes, render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
         return the plan. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess. The
         token-env map records the mapping the launch step uses to
-        forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's
+        forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's environ.
-        environ.
 
         Returned plan is incomplete: the launch step must fill
         `internal_network` / `egress_network` / `pipelock_proxy_url`
         via `dataclasses.replace` before passing it to `.start`."""
-        routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle)
+        routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)
         routes_path = stage_dir / "egress_routes.yaml"
         routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes))
         routes_path.chmod(0o600)
@@ -297,6 +320,7 @@ class Egress(ABC):
         )
 
 __all__ = [
+    "CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF",
     "EGRESS_HOSTNAME",
     "EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER",
     "Egress",

bot_bottle/git_gate.py

@@ -29,22 +29,21 @@ backend-specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import shlex
 from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
-from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Mapping
 
-from .log import die
 from .manifest import Bottle, GitEntry
 
 
 # Short network alias for git-gate inside the sidecar bundle. The
 # agent's `.gitconfig` insteadOf rewrites resolve through this name.
 GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"
-
+# Bound half-open git client sessions. If an agent/tool runner is
-
+# interrupted during push, git daemon should reap the receive-pack
-def _empty_str_map() -> dict[str, str]:
+# child instead of keeping the gate wedged indefinitely.
-    return {}
+GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -60,10 +59,7 @@ class GitGateUpstream:
     KnownHostKey string from the manifest; the gate's start step
     materialises it into a known_hosts file if non-empty.
 
-    `extra_hosts` is a `{hostname: ip}` map the backend injects into
+    the gate credential paths inside the running sidecar."""
-    the gate container's `/etc/hosts` via `--add-host` so the gate
-    can resolve upstream hostnames that aren't reachable via the
-    container's default DNS (e.g. Tailscale-only hosts)."""
 
     name: str
     upstream_url: str
@@ -72,7 +68,6 @@ class GitGateUpstream:
     identity_file: str
     known_host_key: str
     known_hosts_file: Path = Path()
-    extra_hosts: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=_empty_str_map)
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -109,46 +104,19 @@ def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: Bottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]
             upstream_port=e.UpstreamPort,
             identity_file=e.IdentityFile,
             known_host_key=e.KnownHostKey,
-            extra_hosts=dict(e.ExtraHosts),
         )
         for e in bottle.git
     )
 
 
-def git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts(
-    upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...],
-) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Merge every upstream's `extra_hosts` into a single
-    `{hostname: ip}` map for `--add-host` on the gate container. Two
-    entries naming the same hostname with different IPs is a manifest
-    bug — the gate has one /etc/hosts — so die loudly with the
-    conflicting names rather than silently picking one."""
-    merged: dict[str, str] = {}
-    source: dict[str, str] = {}
-    for u in upstreams:
-        for host, ip in u.extra_hosts.items():
-            existing = merged.get(host)
-            if existing is None:
-                merged[host] = ip
-                source[host] = u.name
-            elif existing != ip:
-                die(
-                    f"git-gate ExtraHosts conflict: '{host}' maps to "
-                    f"'{existing}' in upstream '{source[host]}' and to "
-                    f"'{ip}' in upstream '{u.name}'. The gate has one "
-                    f"/etc/hosts; pick one IP."
-                )
-    return merged
-
-
 def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
-    entries: tuple[GitEntry, ...], gate_host: str
+    entries: tuple[GitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
 ) -> str:
     """Render the agent's ~/.gitconfig content for git-gate
     `insteadOf` rewrites. Pure host-side, no docker / smolvm;
     exposed for tests + reuse across backends.
 
-    `gate_host` is the part of the URL between `git://` and the
+    `gate_host` is the part of the URL between `<scheme>://` and the
     repo path — backends differ here:
       - docker:        `git-gate` (the short network alias)
       - smolmachines:  `<bundle_ip>:<port>` (no DNS in the
@@ -165,7 +133,7 @@ def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
         "# fetch-from-upstream-before-every-upload-pack via access-hook).\n",
     ]
     for entry in entries:
-        out.append(f'[url "git://{gate_host}/{entry.Name}.git"]\n')
+        out.append(f'[url "{scheme}://{gate_host}/{entry.Name}.git"]\n')
         out.append(f"\tinsteadOf = {entry.Upstream}\n")
         if entry.RemoteKey and entry.RemoteKey != entry.UpstreamHost:
             port = (
@@ -233,20 +201,20 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
         "  git -C \"$repo\" config git-gate.identityFile \"$keyfile\"",
         "  git -C \"$repo\" config git-gate.knownHosts \"$hostsfile\"",
         "  git -C \"$repo\" config receive.denyCurrentBranch ignore",
+        "  git -C \"$repo\" config http.receivepack true",
         "  install -m 755 /etc/git-gate/pre-receive \"$repo/hooks/pre-receive\"",
         "}",
         "",
         "mkdir -p /git",
     ]
     for u in upstreams:
-        # Single-quote args so URL/path content (containing : and /)
+        lines.append(f"init_repo {shlex.quote(u.name)} {shlex.quote(u.upstream_url)}")
-        # passes through ash unmangled. Names came through the manifest
-        # validator so they don't contain a single quote.
-        lines.append(f"init_repo '{u.name}' '{u.upstream_url}'")
     lines.extend([
         "",
         "exec git daemon \\",
         "  --reuseaddr \\",
+        f"  --timeout={GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
+        f"  --init-timeout={GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
         "  --base-path=/git \\",
         "  --export-all \\",
         "  --enable=receive-pack \\",
@@ -280,7 +248,14 @@ while IFS=' ' read -r old new ref; do
   [ -z "$ref" ] && continue
   [ "$new" = "$zero" ] && continue
   if [ "$old" = "$zero" ]; then
-    log_opts="$new"
+    # New ref: scan only the commits this push introduces — those
+    # reachable from $new but not from any ref the gate already has.
+    # Everything already on the gate arrived via upstream mirror-fetch
+    # or a previously gitleaks-scanned push, so it's already-upstream
+    # or already-scanned; re-scanning it (the old `$new` full-ancestry
+    # range) only resurfaces historical findings and blocks every new
+    # branch. See PRD 0028 / issue #106.
+    log_opts="$new --not --all"
   else
     log_opts="$old..$new"
   fi
@@ -300,7 +275,7 @@ if [ ! -f "$hostsfile" ]; then
   echo "git-gate: add KnownHostKey to the bottle.git entry and restart the bottle" >&2
   exit 1
 fi
-ssh_cmd="ssh -i $keyfile -o UserKnownHostsFile=$hostsfile -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes"
+ssh_cmd="ssh -i $keyfile -o UserKnownHostsFile=$hostsfile -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10"
 
 while IFS=' ' read -r old new ref; do
   [ -z "$ref" ] && continue
@@ -355,7 +330,7 @@ if [ -z "$keyfile" ] || [ ! -f "$hostsfile" ]; then
   echo "git-gate: missing credentials for $repo_dir; refusing fetch" >&2
   exit 1
 fi
-ssh_cmd="ssh -i $keyfile -o UserKnownHostsFile=$hostsfile -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes"
+ssh_cmd="ssh -i $keyfile -o UserKnownHostsFile=$hostsfile -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=10"
 
 echo "git-gate: refreshing $repo_dir from upstream" >&2
 if ! GIT_SSH_COMMAND="$ssh_cmd" git -C "$repo_dir" fetch origin --prune >&2; then
@@ -429,7 +404,6 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
                     identity_file=u.identity_file,
                     known_host_key=u.known_host_key,
                     known_hosts_file=known_hosts_file,
-                    extra_hosts=dict(u.extra_hosts),
                 )
             )
         return GitGatePlan(

bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+"""Tiny smart-HTTP wrapper for git-gate repos.
+
+Used by the smolmachines backend where `git://` push traffic over the
+host-published Docker port can hang before receive-pack reaches hooks.
+The wrapper serves the same `/git/*.git` bare repos through
+`git http-backend`, so pre-receive and upstream forwarding remain the
+git-gate enforcement point.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+
+DEFAULT_PORT = 9420
+
+# Body-size cap matching supervise_server.py's 1 MiB limit.
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    server_version = "bot-bottle-git-http/1"
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        self._run_backend()
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        self._run_backend()
+
+    def _run_backend(self) -> None:
+        parsed = urlsplit(self.path)
+        if self._is_upload_pack(parsed.path, parsed.query):
+            repo_dir = self._repo_dir(parsed.path)
+            if repo_dir is None:
+                self.send_error(404)
+                return
+            hook_path = os.environ.get(
+                "GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook",
+            )
+            peer = self.client_address[0]
+            hook = subprocess.run(
+                [hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
+                capture_output=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if hook.returncode != 0:
+                detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
+                    "utf-8", errors="replace",
+                ).rstrip()
+                if detail:
+                    for line in detail.splitlines():
+                        self.log_message("access-hook denied %s: %s",
+                                         parsed.path, line)
+                else:
+                    self.log_message(
+                        "access-hook denied %s: exit=%d (no output)",
+                        parsed.path, hook.returncode,
+                    )
+                self.send_response(403)
+                self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
+                self.end_headers()
+                self.wfile.write(hook.stderr or hook.stdout)
+                return
+        env = os.environ.copy()
+        env.update({
+            "GIT_PROJECT_ROOT": os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", "/git"),
+            "GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL": "1",
+            "REQUEST_METHOD": self.command,
+            "PATH_INFO": parsed.path,
+            "QUERY_STRING": parsed.query,
+            "CONTENT_TYPE": self.headers.get("content-type", ""),
+            "CONTENT_LENGTH": self.headers.get("content-length", "0"),
+            "REMOTE_ADDR": self.client_address[0],
+            "REMOTE_PORT": str(self.client_address[1]),
+            "REMOTE_USER": "",
+            "SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name,
+            "SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port),
+            "SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
+        })
+        for header, variable in (
+            ("accept", "HTTP_ACCEPT"),
+            ("content-encoding", "HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING"),
+            ("git-protocol", "HTTP_GIT_PROTOCOL"),
+            ("user-agent", "HTTP_USER_AGENT"),
+        ):
+            value = self.headers.get(header)
+            if value:
+                env[variable] = value
+        raw_length = self.headers.get("content-length", "0") or "0"
+        try:
+            length = int(raw_length)
+        except ValueError:
+            self.send_error(400, "Bad Content-Length")
+            return
+        if length < 0:
+            self.send_error(400, "Negative Content-Length")
+            return
+        if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            self.send_error(413, "Request body too large")
+            return
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "http-backend"],
+            input=body,
+            env=env,
+            capture_output=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        self._write_cgi_response(proc.stdout)
+
+    def _repo_dir(self, path: str) -> Path | None:
+        root = Path(os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", "/git")).resolve()
+        relative = path.lstrip("/").split(".git", 1)[0] + ".git"
+        candidate = (root / relative).resolve()
+        if root not in (candidate, *candidate.parents):
+            return None
+        if not candidate.is_dir():
+            return None
+        return candidate
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_upload_pack(path: str, query: str) -> bool:
+        if path.endswith("/git-upload-pack"):
+            return True
+        if path.endswith("/info/refs"):
+            return any(
+                pair == "service=git-upload-pack"
+                for pair in query.split("&")
+            )
+        return False
+
+    def _write_cgi_response(self, raw: bytes) -> None:
+        head, sep, body = raw.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")
+        line_sep = b"\r\n"
+        if not sep:
+            head, sep, body = raw.partition(b"\n\n")
+            line_sep = b"\n"
+        status = 200
+        headers: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+        for line in head.split(line_sep):
+            if not line:
+                continue
+            key, _, value = line.decode("latin1").partition(":")
+            value = value.strip()
+            if key.lower() == "status":
+                status = int(value.split()[0])
+            else:
+                headers.append((key, value))
+        self.send_response(status)
+        for key, value in headers:
+            self.send_header(key, value)
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
+        sys.stdout.write(fmt % args + "\n")
+        sys.stdout.flush()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    port = int(os.environ.get("GIT_HTTP_PORT", str(DEFAULT_PORT)))
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", port), GitHttpHandler)
+    sys.stdout.write(f"git-http listening on 0.0.0.0:{port}\n")
+    sys.stdout.flush()
+    server.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

bot_bottle/log.py

@@ -14,11 +14,23 @@ def warn(msg: str) -> None:
     print(f"bot-bottle: warning: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
 
 
+def error(msg: str) -> None:
+    print(f"bot-bottle: error: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
+
+
 class Die(SystemExit):
     """Raised by die() so callers (and tests) can distinguish a deliberate
-    fatal exit from an unrelated SystemExit."""
+    fatal exit from an unrelated SystemExit.
+
+    Carries the human-facing message so a caller that suppressed stderr
+    — e.g. the curses dashboard, whose alternate screen is wiped when the
+    terminal is restored — can re-surface the reason after the fact."""
+
+    def __init__(self, code: int = 1, message: str = "") -> None:
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.message = message
 
 
 def die(msg: str) -> NoReturn:
-    print(f"bot-bottle: error: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
+    error(msg)
-    raise Die(1)
+    raise Die(1, msg)

bot_bottle/manifest_agent.py

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""Agent configuration manifest dataclasses."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import cast
+
+from .agent_provider import PROVIDER_TEMPLATES
+from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
+from .manifest_git import GitUser
+from .manifest_schema import AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class AgentProvider:
+    """Provider/template for the agent process inside a bottle.
+
+    `template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
+    optionally points at a custom agent-image Dockerfile while leaving
+    bot-bottle's sidecar infrastructure intact.
+
+    `auth_token` names the host env var that holds the provider's OAuth
+    token (Claude only). The provisioner injects a provider-owned egress
+    route for api.anthropic.com that re-injects this token as the Bearer
+    header, and sets a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent
+    so the Claude Code CLI starts.
+
+    `forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
+    the egress sidecar (Codex only).
+    """
+
+    template: str = "claude"
+    dockerfile: str = ""
+    auth_token: str = ""
+    forward_host_credentials: bool = False
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "AgentProvider":
+        d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider")
+        for k in d:
+            if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "auth_token", "forward_host_credentials"}:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                    f"allowed: template, dockerfile, auth_token, forward_host_credentials"
+                )
+        template = d.get("template", "claude")
+        if not isinstance(template, str) or not template:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template must be a "
+                f"non-empty string"
+            )
+        if template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template {template!r} "
+                f"is not one of {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))}"
+            )
+        dockerfile = d.get("dockerfile", "")
+        if not isinstance(dockerfile, str):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.dockerfile must be a "
+                f"string (was {type(dockerfile).__name__})"
+            )
+        auth_token = d.get("auth_token", "")
+        if not isinstance(auth_token, str):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token must be a "
+                f"string (was {type(auth_token).__name__})"
+            )
+        if auth_token and template != "claude":
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
+                f"supported for template 'claude'"
+            )
+        forward_host_credentials = d.get("forward_host_credentials", False)
+        if not isinstance(forward_host_credentials, bool):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
+                f"must be a boolean (was {type(forward_host_credentials).__name__})"
+            )
+        if forward_host_credentials and template != "codex":
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
+                "is currently only supported for template 'codex'"
+            )
+        return cls(
+            template=template,
+            dockerfile=dockerfile,
+            auth_token=auth_token,
+            forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Agent:
+    bottle: str
+    skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    prompt: str = ""
+    # Per-agent git identity (issue #94). Overlays the referenced
+    # bottle's git-gate.user per-field at `Manifest.bottle_for`. Only
+    # `user` is allowed at the agent level; `repos` stays bottle-only
+    # because it carries credentials and host trust.
+    git_user: GitUser = GitUser()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object, bottle_names: set[str]) -> "Agent":
+        d = as_json_object(raw, f"agent '{name}'")
+        unknown = set(d.keys()) - AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
+        if unknown:
+            allowed = ", ".join(sorted(AGENT_MODEL_KEYS))
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"agent '{name}' has unknown key(s) {sorted(unknown)}; "
+                f"allowed keys are {allowed}."
+            )
+
+        bottle = d.get("bottle")
+        if not isinstance(bottle, str) or not bottle:
+            raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a defined bottle")
+        if bottle not in bottle_names:
+            available = ", ".join(sorted(bottle_names)) or "(none defined)"
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"agent '{name}' references bottle '{bottle}', which is not defined. "
+                f"Available: {available}"
+            )
+
+        skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+        skills_raw = d.get("skills")
+        if skills_raw is not None:
+            if not isinstance(skills_raw, list):
+                raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array (was {type(skills_raw).__name__})")
+            collected: list[str] = []
+            skills_list = cast(list[object], skills_raw)
+            for i, skill in enumerate(skills_list):
+                if not isinstance(skill, str):
+                    raise ManifestError(
+                        f"agent '{name}' skills[{i}] must be a string "
+                        f"(was {type(skill).__name__})"
+                    )
+                collected.append(skill)
+            skills = tuple(collected)
+
+        prompt_raw = d.get("prompt")
+        if prompt_raw is None:
+            prompt = ""
+        elif isinstance(prompt_raw, str):
+            prompt = prompt_raw
+        else:
+            raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string (was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})")
+
+        # git-gate: agents may declare only `git-gate.user` (name/email).
+        # `git-gate.repos` is bottle-only — it carries credentials and host trust.
+        git_user = GitUser()
+        git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
+        if git_raw is not None:
+            gd = as_json_object(git_raw, f"agent '{name}' git-gate")
+            for k in gd.keys():
+                if k != "user":
+                    raise ManifestError(
+                        f"agent '{name}' git-gate.{k} is not allowed at the "
+                        f"agent level; only git-gate.user (name/email) may be "
+                        f"set on an agent. git-gate.repos is bottle-only "
+                        f"(it carries credentials and host trust)."
+                    )
+            if "user" in gd:
+                git_user = GitUser.from_dict(name, gd["user"])
+
+        return cls(bottle=bottle, skills=skills, prompt=prompt, git_user=git_user)

bot_bottle/manifest_egress.py

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import cast
+
+from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
+
+
+# Auth schemes for the egress route's optional `auth` block.
+# Same values cred-proxy accepts today; `token` sidesteps the Gitea
+# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
+EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
+
+
+def validate_egress_routes(
+    bottle_name: str,
+    routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
+) -> None:
+    """Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
+
+    The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
+    route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
+
+    No cross-validation against `bottle.git-gate.repos` is performed.
+    git-gate (SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different
+    protocols; declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev
+    setup."""
+    seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
+    for r in routes:
+        key = r.Host.lower()
+        if key in seen_hosts:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes has duplicate host "
+                f"{r.Host!r}; each host must be unique on the proxy."
+            )
+        seen_hosts[key] = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PipelockRoutePolicy:
+    """Per-route pipelock policy overrides.
+
+    `TlsPassthrough` adds the route host to pipelock's
+    `tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so pipelock still enforces
+    the hostname allowlist but does not MITM/decrypt request bodies or
+    headers for that host.
+
+    `SsrfIpAllowlist` adds explicit IPs/CIDRs to pipelock's SSRF
+    allowlist for private/internal destinations behind this route.
+    """
+
+    TlsPassthrough: bool = False
+    SsrfIpAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(
+        cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object,
+    ) -> "PipelockRoutePolicy":
+        label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
+        d = as_json_object(raw, label)
+        for k in d:
+            if k not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                    f"only 'tls_passthrough' and 'ssrf_ip_allowlist' "
+                    f"are accepted"
+                )
+        tls_passthrough_raw = d.get("tls_passthrough", False)
+        if not isinstance(tls_passthrough_raw, bool):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"{label}.tls_passthrough must be a boolean "
+                f"(was {type(tls_passthrough_raw).__name__})"
+            )
+        ssrf_raw = d.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
+        if not isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist must be an array "
+                f"(was {type(ssrf_raw).__name__})"
+            )
+        ssrf_ip_allowlist: list[str] = []
+        for j, item in enumerate(ssrf_raw):
+            if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be a non-empty "
+                    f"string (was {type(item).__name__})"
+                )
+            try:
+                ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
+            except ValueError as e:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be an IP address "
+                    f"or CIDR (was {item!r}): {e}"
+                )
+            ssrf_ip_allowlist.append(item)
+        return cls(
+            TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw,
+            SsrfIpAllowlist=tuple(ssrf_ip_allowlist),
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EgressRoute:
+    """One route on the per-bottle egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
+
+    `Host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
+    optional `PathAllowlist` constrains the URL path to a set of
+    prefixes; empty tuple means no path-level filtering. The optional
+    `AuthScheme` / `TokenRef` pair drives credential injection:
+    when set, the proxy strips any inbound Authorization and injects
+    `<AuthScheme> <value-of-host-env-named-by-TokenRef>`. When the
+    manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
+    no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
+
+    `Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
+    rejected by the validator.
+
+    Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
+      - `host` required, non-empty.
+      - `path_allowlist` optional, list of absolute path prefixes.
+      - `auth` optional. If present, MUST carry both `scheme` and
+        `token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
+        error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
+        that case).
+      - `role` optional, reserved — any non-empty value is rejected.
+    """
+
+    Host: str
+    PathAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    AuthScheme: str = ""
+    TokenRef: str = ""
+    Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    Pipelock: PipelockRoutePolicy = field(default_factory=PipelockRoutePolicy)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "EgressRoute":
+        label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}]"
+        d = as_json_object(raw, label)
+        host = d.get("host")
+        if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
+            raise ManifestError(f"{label} missing required string field 'host'")
+
+        path_allow_raw = d.get("path_allowlist")
+        prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+        if path_allow_raw is not None:
+            if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} path_allowlist must be an array "
+                    f"(was {type(path_allow_raw).__name__})"
+                )
+            path_list = cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
+            collected: list[str] = []
+            for j, p in enumerate(path_list):
+                if not isinstance(p, str):
+                    raise ManifestError(
+                        f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string "
+                        f"(was {type(p).__name__})"
+                    )
+                if not p.startswith("/"):
+                    raise ManifestError(
+                        f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
+                        f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
+                    )
+                collected.append(p)
+            prefixes = tuple(collected)
+
+        auth_scheme = ""
+        token_ref = ""
+        if "auth" in d:
+            auth_raw = d.get("auth")
+            auth_d = as_json_object(auth_raw, f"{label} auth")
+            if not auth_d:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} auth is empty ({{}}); omit the 'auth' key "
+                    f"entirely if this route is unauthenticated. Otherwise "
+                    f"both 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are required."
+                )
+            auth_scheme_raw = auth_d.get("scheme")
+            if not isinstance(auth_scheme_raw, str) or not auth_scheme_raw:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} auth.scheme is required when 'auth' is set "
+                    f"(non-empty string)"
+                )
+            if auth_scheme_raw not in EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} auth.scheme {auth_scheme_raw!r} is not one of "
+                    f"{', '.join(EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES)}"
+                )
+            token_ref_raw = auth_d.get("token_ref")
+            if not isinstance(token_ref_raw, str) or not token_ref_raw:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} auth.token_ref is required when 'auth' is set "
+                    f"(name of the host env var holding the token value)"
+                )
+            for k in auth_d:
+                if k not in ("scheme", "token_ref"):
+                    raise ManifestError(
+                        f"{label} auth has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                        f"only 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are accepted"
+                    )
+            auth_scheme = auth_scheme_raw
+            token_ref = token_ref_raw
+
+        role_raw = d.get("role")
+        roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+        if role_raw is None:
+            roles = ()
+        elif isinstance(role_raw, str):
+            roles = (role_raw,)
+        elif isinstance(role_raw, list):
+            role_list = cast(list[object], role_raw)
+            collected_roles: list[str] = []
+            for r in role_list:
+                if not isinstance(r, str):
+                    raise ManifestError(f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})")
+                collected_roles.append(r)
+            roles = tuple(collected_roles)
+        else:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"{label} role must be a string or a list of strings "
+                f"(was {type(role_raw).__name__})"
+            )
+        if roles:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"{label} role {roles[0]!r} is not accepted; "
+                f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
+            )
+
+        pipelock = (
+            PipelockRoutePolicy.from_dict(bottle_name, idx, d["pipelock"])
+            if "pipelock" in d
+            else PipelockRoutePolicy()
+        )
+
+        for k in d:
+            if k not in ("host", "path_allowlist", "auth", "role", "pipelock"):
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
+                    f"'host', 'path_allowlist', 'auth', 'role', 'pipelock'"
+                )
+
+        return cls(
+            Host=host,
+            PathAllowlist=prefixes,
+            AuthScheme=auth_scheme,
+            TokenRef=token_ref,
+            Role=roles,
+            Pipelock=pipelock,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EgressConfig:
+    """Per-bottle egress configuration. Today this is just the
+    route table; the nesting under `egress:` leaves room for
+    per-bottle proxy settings (port override, log level, etc.) in
+    follow-ups."""
+
+    routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "EgressConfig":
+        d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress")
+        routes_raw = d.get("routes")
+        routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
+        if routes_raw is not None:
+            if not isinstance(routes_raw, list):
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes must be an array "
+                    f"(was {type(routes_raw).__name__})"
+                )
+            routes_list = cast(list[object], routes_raw)
+            routes = tuple(
+                EgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
+                for i, entry in enumerate(routes_list)
+            )
+            validate_egress_routes(bottle_name, routes)
+        for k in d:
+            if k != "routes":
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                    f"only 'routes' is accepted"
+                )
+        return cls(routes=routes)

bot_bottle/manifest_extends.py

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"""Internal bottle `extends:` resolution for manifests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from .manifest import Bottle, GitEntry
+
+
+def resolve_bottles(raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]]) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
+    """Apply `extends:` chains and return resolved Bottle objects."""
+    cache: dict[str, Bottle] = {}
+    for name in raws:
+        if name not in cache:
+            _resolve_one_bottle(name, raws, cache, ())
+    return cache
+
+
+def _resolve_one_bottle(
+    name: str,
+    raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]],
+    cache: dict[str, Bottle],
+    seen: tuple[str, ...],
+) -> Bottle:
+    from .manifest import Bottle, ManifestError
+
+    if name in cache:
+        return cache[name]
+    if name in seen:
+        chain = " -> ".join(seen + (name,))
+        raise ManifestError(f"bottle '{name}' is in an extends cycle: {chain}")
+    raw = raws[name]
+    parent_name_raw = raw.get("extends")
+    # Strip `extends:` before passing to Bottle.from_dict so it
+    # is not accidentally treated as a real Bottle field by future
+    # schema additions. It is only meaningful here.
+    child_raw = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k != "extends"}
+
+    if parent_name_raw is None:
+        bottle = Bottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
+        cache[name] = bottle
+        return bottle
+
+    if not isinstance(parent_name_raw, str):
+        raise ManifestError(
+            f"bottle '{name}' extends must be a string "
+            f"(was {type(parent_name_raw).__name__})"
+        )
+    parent_name: str = parent_name_raw
+    if parent_name == name:
+        raise ManifestError(
+            f"bottle '{name}' extends itself; remove the "
+            f"self-reference"
+        )
+    if parent_name not in raws:
+        avail = ", ".join(sorted(raws.keys())) or "(none)"
+        raise ManifestError(
+            f"bottle '{name}' extends '{parent_name}' which is not "
+            f"defined. Available bottles: {avail}"
+        )
+    parent = _resolve_one_bottle(parent_name, raws, cache, seen + (name,))
+    bottle = _merge_bottles(parent, child_raw, name)
+    cache[name] = bottle
+    return bottle
+
+
+def _merge_bottles(
+    parent: Bottle,
+    child_raw: dict[str, object],
+    name: str,
+) -> Bottle:
+    """Apply PRD 0025 merge rules."""
+    from .manifest import Bottle, GitUser
+    from .manifest_egress import validate_egress_routes
+
+    # Parse the child's declared fields into a Bottle (with the
+    # usual defaults for anything missing). Validation runs the same
+    # way it would for a leaf bottle: typos / wrong types die here.
+    child = Bottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
+
+    # env: dict merge, child wins on collision.
+    merged_env = {**parent.env, **child.env}
+
+    # git-gate.user: per-field overlay. Each non-empty field on child
+    # wins; empties fall through to parent. The default GitUser()
+    # is two empty strings, so a child that omits git-gate.user
+    # inherits the parent's user verbatim.
+    merged_git_user = GitUser(
+        name=child.git_user.name or parent.git_user.name,
+        email=child.git_user.email or parent.git_user.email,
+    )
+
+    # git-gate.repos: missing means inherit; an explicit empty object
+    # clears; otherwise parent and child merge by UpstreamHost with
+    # child entries replacing duplicate hosts.
+    if _child_declares_git_gate_repos(child_raw):
+        merged_git = _merge_git_remotes(parent.git, child.git) if child.git else ()
+    else:
+        merged_git = parent.git
+
+    # Presence-driven full-replace for the remaining list-valued +
+    # scalar fields.
+    merged_egress = child.egress if "egress" in child_raw else parent.egress
+    merged_agent_provider = (
+        child.agent_provider
+        if "agent_provider" in child_raw
+        else parent.agent_provider
+    )
+    merged_supervise = (
+        child.supervise if "supervise" in child_raw else parent.supervise
+    )
+    validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
+
+    return Bottle(
+        env=merged_env,
+        agent_provider=merged_agent_provider,
+        git=merged_git,
+        git_user=merged_git_user,
+        egress=merged_egress,
+        supervise=merged_supervise,
+    )
+
+
+def _child_declares_git_gate_repos(child_raw: dict[str, object]) -> bool:
+    from .manifest_util import as_json_object
+
+    git_raw = child_raw.get("git-gate")
+    if git_raw is None:
+        return False
+    git_obj = as_json_object(git_raw, "child git-gate")
+    return "repos" in git_obj
+
+
+def _merge_git_remotes(
+    parent: tuple[GitEntry, ...],
+    child: tuple[GitEntry, ...],
+) -> tuple[GitEntry, ...]:
+    by_host = {entry.UpstreamHost: entry for entry in parent}
+    for entry in child:
+        by_host[entry.UpstreamHost] = entry
+    return tuple(by_host.values())

bot_bottle/manifest_git.py

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+"""Git-related manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
+
+# Shell-safe characters for git-gate repo names. Names are embedded in
+# the generated entrypoint shell script (shlex.quote is the primary
+# defence; this regex is belt-and-suspenders and documents intent).
+_GIT_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$")
+
+
+def _opt_str(value: object, label: str) -> str:
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a string (was {type(value).__name__})")
+    return value
+
+
+def parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
+    """Parse `ssh://user@host[:port]/path` into (user, host, port, path).
+    Dies if `url` doesn't match the ssh:// shape v1 supports. Default
+    port is 22 (matches OpenSSH)."""
+    if not url.startswith("ssh://"):
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be an ssh:// URL (was {url!r})")
+    rest = url[len("ssh://"):]
+    if "@" not in rest:
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
+    user, _, hostpart = rest.partition("@")
+    if not user:
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} user is empty in {url!r}")
+    if "/" not in hostpart:
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
+    hostport, _, path = hostpart.partition("/")
+    if not path:
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} path is empty in {url!r}")
+    if ":" in hostport:
+        host, _, port = hostport.partition(":")
+        if not port.isdigit():
+            raise ManifestError(f"{label} port must be numeric in {url!r}")
+    else:
+        host = hostport
+        port = "22"
+    if not host:
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} host is empty in {url!r}")
+    return (user, host, port, path)
+
+
+def validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[GitEntry, ...]) -> None:
+    seen: dict[str, None] = {}
+    for g in git:
+        if g.Name in seen:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos has duplicate name '{g.Name}'; "
+                f"each entry maps to a distinct bare repo on the gate."
+            )
+        seen[g.Name] = None
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitEntry:
+    """One upstream the per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008) is allowed to
+    talk to. `Upstream` is the real remote URL the agent would push to
+    if there were no gate; the gate hosts a bare repo at /git/<Name>.git
+    and `IdentityFile` is the SSH key the gate uses to push that repo
+    upstream after gitleaks passes. The agent itself never holds the
+    upstream credential.
+
+    The Upstream URL is parsed once at construction and the pieces are
+    stashed in the `Upstream*` fields so the git-gate render step
+    doesn't have to re-parse.
+
+    Manifest source: `git-gate.repos.<Name>` (PRD 0047). The YAML keys
+    are `url`, `identity`, and `host_key`; the internal field names are
+    stable across that rename."""
+
+    Name: str
+    Upstream: str
+    IdentityFile: str
+    KnownHostKey: str = ""
+    RemoteKey: str = ""
+    UpstreamUser: str = ""
+    UpstreamHost: str = ""
+    UpstreamPort: str = ""
+    UpstreamPath: str = ""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_repos_entry(
+        cls, bottle_name: str, repo_name: str, raw: object
+    ) -> "GitEntry":
+        """Parse one entry from `git-gate.repos.<repo_name>`.
+
+        YAML keys: `url` (required), `identity` (required),
+        `host_key` (optional). The repo_name becomes `Name`."""
+        if not repo_name:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos has an empty key"
+            )
+        if not _GIT_NAME_RE.match(repo_name):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos name {repo_name!r} is invalid; "
+                f"allowed characters: A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ -"
+            )
+        label = f"git-gate.repos[{repo_name!r}]"
+        d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}")
+        for k in d:
+            if k not in {"url", "identity", "host_key"}:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                    f"allowed: url, identity, host_key"
+                )
+        upstream = d.get("url")
+        if not isinstance(upstream, str) or not upstream:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} missing required string field 'url'"
+            )
+        ident = d.get("identity")
+        if not isinstance(ident, str) or not ident:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} missing required string field 'identity'"
+            )
+        khk = _opt_str(
+            d.get("host_key"),
+            f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} host_key",
+        )
+        user, host, port, path = parse_git_upstream(
+            upstream, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} url"
+        )
+        return cls(
+            Name=repo_name,
+            Upstream=upstream,
+            IdentityFile=ident,
+            KnownHostKey=khk,
+            RemoteKey=host,
+            UpstreamUser=user,
+            UpstreamHost=host,
+            UpstreamPort=port,
+            UpstreamPath=path,
+        )
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class GitUser:
+    """Per-bottle `git config --global user.name` / `user.email`
+    pair (issue #86). The agent's commits inside the bottle are
+    attributed to this identity rather than the agent image's
+    image-baked default (no user, or whatever the image dropped
+    in). Either or both fields can be set independently.
+
+    `from_dict` is forgiving on shape (a single missing field is
+    fine — we just skip that config line at provisioning) but
+    strict on types (string-or-die)."""
+
+    name: str = ""
+    email: str = ""
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "GitUser":
+        d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user")
+        for k in d.keys():
+            if k not in {"name", "email"}:
+                raise ManifestError(
+                    f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                    f"allowed: name, email"
+                )
+        name = d.get("name", "")
+        email = d.get("email", "")
+        if not isinstance(name, str):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user.name must be a string "
+                f"(was {type(name).__name__})"
+            )
+        if not isinstance(email, str):
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user.email must be a string "
+                f"(was {type(email).__name__})"
+            )
+        if not name and not email:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user is set but neither "
+                f"name nor email is non-empty; remove the block or "
+                f"fill at least one field."
+            )
+        return cls(name=name, email=email)
+
+    def is_empty(self) -> bool:
+        return not self.name and not self.email
+
+
+def parse_git_gate_config(
+    bottle_name: str,
+    raw: object,
+) -> tuple[tuple[GitEntry, ...], GitUser]:
+    d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate")
+    for k in d.keys():
+        if k not in {"user", "repos"}:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate has unknown key {k!r}; "
+                f"allowed: user, repos"
+            )
+
+    git_user = (
+        GitUser.from_dict(bottle_name, d["user"])
+        if "user" in d
+        else GitUser()
+    )
+
+    git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
+    repos_raw = d.get("repos")
+    if repos_raw is not None:
+        repos = as_json_object(repos_raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos")
+        git = tuple(
+            GitEntry.from_repos_entry(bottle_name, name, entry)
+            for name, entry in repos.items()
+        )
+        validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name, git)
+
+    return git, git_user

bot_bottle/manifest_loader.py

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+"""Internal per-file Markdown manifest loader."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from .log import warn
+from .manifest_schema import (
+    entity_name_from_path,
+    validate_agent_frontmatter_keys,
+    validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys,
+)
+from .yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_frontmatter
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from .manifest import Agent, Bottle
+
+
+def check_stale_json(dir_path: Path, md_dir: Path, label: str) -> None:
+    """Die if `<dir_path>/bot-bottle.json` exists but `md_dir` does
+    not. The manifest format changed in PRD 0011 and we do not want
+    to silently leave the JSON content unused."""
+    from .manifest import ManifestError
+
+    legacy = dir_path / "bot-bottle.json"
+    if legacy.is_file() and not md_dir.exists():
+        raise ManifestError(
+            f"found {legacy} but {md_dir} does not exist. The manifest "
+            f"format changed in PRD 0011 — rewrite the JSON content "
+            f"as per-file Markdown under {md_dir}/bottles/ and "
+            f"{md_dir}/agents/. See README.md for the schema. "
+            f"({label})"
+        )
+
+
+def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
+    """Walk `<bottles_dir>/*.md`, parse each as a bottle, and return
+    `{name: Bottle}`. Missing dir returns an empty dict."""
+    from .manifest import ManifestError
+    from .manifest_extends import resolve_bottles
+
+    raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}
+    if not bottles_dir.is_dir():
+        return {}
+    for path in sorted(bottles_dir.glob("*.md")):
+        name = entity_name_from_path(path)
+        if name is None:
+            warn(
+                f"skipping {path}: filename must match "
+                f"[a-z][a-z0-9-]*.md (got {path.name!r})"
+            )
+            continue
+        try:
+            fm, _body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
+        except YamlSubsetError as e:
+            raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
+        validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
+        raws[name] = fm
+    return resolve_bottles(raws)
+
+
+def load_agents_from_dir(
+    agents_dir: Path,
+    bottle_names: set[str],
+    *,
+    source: str,
+) -> dict[str, Agent]:
+    """Walk `<agents_dir>/*.md`, parse each as an agent, and return
+    `{name: Agent}`. The Markdown body becomes the agent's prompt.
+    Missing dir returns an empty dict."""
+    from .manifest import Agent, ManifestError
+
+    out: dict[str, Agent] = {}
+    if not agents_dir.is_dir():
+        return out
+    for path in sorted(agents_dir.glob("*.md")):
+        name = entity_name_from_path(path)
+        if name is None:
+            warn(
+                f"skipping {path}: filename must match "
+                f"[a-z][a-z0-9-]*.md (got {path.name!r})"
+            )
+            continue
+        try:
+            fm, body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
+        except OSError as e:
+            raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
+        except YamlSubsetError as e:
+            raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
+        validate_agent_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
+        # Build the dict Agent.from_dict expects. The body becomes
+        # prompt; Claude Code passthrough fields stay in fm and get
+        # ignored by Agent.from_dict (reads bottle/skills/git-gate/prompt).
+        agent_dict: dict[str, object] = {
+            "bottle": fm.get("bottle"),
+            "skills": fm.get("skills", []),
+            "prompt": body.strip(),
+        }
+        if "git-gate" in fm:
+            agent_dict["git-gate"] = fm["git-gate"]
+        out[name] = Agent.from_dict(name, agent_dict, bottle_names)
+    return out

bot_bottle/manifest_schema.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+"""Internal manifest schema policy helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Filename-as-key uses kebab-case ASCII. The first character is a
+# letter so we don't conflict with hidden files / Markdown special
+# names (`.md`, `_template.md`, etc.). Filenames that fail this
+# pattern are skipped with a warning rather than crashing the load.
+_FILENAME_RX = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$")
+
+
+# Frontmatter keys we accept on each entity. Anything not in these
+# sets dies with a "did you mean" pointer: typos should not silently
+# ghost into an empty config.
+BOTTLE_KEYS = frozenset(
+    {"env", "extends", "agent_provider", "git-gate", "egress", "supervise"}
+)
+AGENT_KEYS_REQUIRED = frozenset({"bottle"})
+AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL = frozenset({"skills", "git-gate"})
+
+# Claude Code subagent fields bot-bottle ignores at launch but does
+# not reject. This lets the same file double as
+# `~/.claude/agents/*.md` without modification.
+CLAUDE_CODE_AGENT_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "name", "description", "model", "color", "memory",
+})
+AGENT_KEYS = (
+    AGENT_KEYS_REQUIRED | AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL | CLAUDE_CODE_AGENT_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS
+)
+AGENT_MODEL_KEYS = AGENT_KEYS | frozenset({"prompt"})
+
+
+def entity_name_from_path(path: Path) -> str | None:
+    """Return the entity name implied by the filename, or None if the
+    filename does not fit the [a-z][a-z0-9-]* convention."""
+    if path.suffix != ".md":
+        return None
+    stem = path.stem
+    if not _FILENAME_RX.match(stem):
+        return None
+    return stem
+
+
+def validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys(path: Path, keys: object) -> None:
+    _validate_frontmatter_keys("bottle", path, keys, BOTTLE_KEYS)
+
+
+def validate_agent_frontmatter_keys(path: Path, keys: object) -> None:
+    _validate_frontmatter_keys("agent", path, keys, AGENT_KEYS)
+
+
+def _validate_frontmatter_keys(
+    kind: str,
+    path: Path,
+    keys: object,
+    allowed_keys: frozenset[str],
+) -> None:
+    from .manifest_util import ManifestError
+
+    key_set = set(keys)
+    unknown = key_set - allowed_keys
+    if unknown:
+        allowed = ", ".join(sorted(allowed_keys))
+        raise ManifestError(
+            f"{kind} file {path}: unknown frontmatter key(s) "
+            f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}."
+        )

bot_bottle/manifest_util.py

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+"""Shared manifest primitives used by all manifest sub-modules."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import cast
+
+
+class ManifestError(Exception):
+    """A manifest file (or the manifest tree) is invalid."""
+
+
+def as_json_object(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Assert that `value` is a JSON object (str-keyed dict) and return
+    a view typed as `dict[str, object]` so downstream `.get(...)` calls
+    have a typed surface."""
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a JSON object (was {type(value).__name__})")
+    items = cast(dict[object, object], value)
+    out: dict[str, object] = {}
+    for k, v in items.items():
+        if not isinstance(k, str):
+            raise ManifestError(f"{label} keys must be strings (found {type(k).__name__})")
+        out[k] = v
+    return out

bot_bottle/pipelock.py

@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import cast
 
-from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, egress_routes_for_bottle
+from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
 from .supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME
 from .manifest import Bottle
 
@@ -50,14 +49,17 @@ PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME = "pipelock"
 # --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
 
 
-def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
+def pipelock_effective_allowlist(
+    bottle: Bottle,
+    provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
+) -> list[str]:
     """Hostnames pipelock allows. Sorted for stability.
 
-    Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle)` — egress is the
+    Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)` —
-    single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is the downstream
+    egress is the single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is
-    copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For bottles without
+    the downstream copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For
-    any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except for supervise
+    bottles without any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except
-    sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
+    for supervise sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
 
     The supervise sidecar's hostname is auto-added when supervise
     is enabled (sibling-sidecar traffic that flows through pipelock
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
     `bottle.git` do NOT contribute here — git traffic flows
     through git-gate (PRD 0008), not pipelock."""
     seen: dict[str, None] = {}
-    for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle):
+    for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
         if r.host:
             seen.setdefault(r.host, None)
     if bottle.supervise:
@@ -98,19 +100,23 @@ def pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle: Bottle) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
-def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
+def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(
+    bottle: Bottle,
+    provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
+) -> list[str]:
     """Hostnames pipelock should pass through (no TLS MITM).
 
-    A route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`. This is
+    A manifest route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`
-    useful for provider API routes where egress injects the
+    (lifted into `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough` in `egress_manifest_routes`).
-    Authorization header after the agent boundary; pipelock still
+    Provider routes that set `tls_passthrough=True` (e.g. Codex credential
-    enforces the host allowlist but does not decrypt and scan that
+    routes where egress injects the host bearer after the agent boundary)
-    provider request.
+    are also included. Both arrive via `egress_routes_for_bottle` — no
+    provider-specific branching needed here.
     """
     seen: dict[str, None] = {host: None for host in DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH}
-    for route in bottle.egress.routes:
+    for route in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
-        if route.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough:
+        if route.tls_passthrough:
-            seen.setdefault(route.Host, None)
+            seen.setdefault(route.host, None)
     return sorted(seen.keys())
 
 
@@ -142,6 +148,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
     ca_cert_path: str = "",
     ca_key_path: str = "",
     ssrf_ip_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = (),
+    provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
 ) -> dict[str, object]:
     """Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
 
@@ -171,7 +178,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
         "version": 1,
         "mode": "strict",
         "enforce": True,
-        "api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle),
+        "api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle, provider_routes),
         "forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
     }
     if not pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle):
@@ -205,7 +212,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
             "enabled": True,
             "ca_cert": ca_cert_path,
             "ca_key": ca_key_path,
-            "passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle),
+            "passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle, provider_routes),
         }
     effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist = pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
         bottle, ssrf_ip_allowlist,
@@ -215,6 +222,180 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
     return cfg
 
 
+_PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = {
+    "version",
+    "mode",
+    "enforce",
+    "api_allowlist",
+    "seed_phrase_detection",
+    "forward_proxy",
+    "dlp",
+    "request_body_scanning",
+    "tls_interception",
+    "ssrf",
+}
+
+
+def _pipelock_render_error(section: str, key: str, expected: str) -> ValueError:
+    return ValueError(
+        f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} must be {expected}"
+    )
+
+
+def _reject_unknown_keys(
+    section: str,
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    allowed: set[str],
+) -> None:
+    for key in sorted(set(obj) - allowed):
+        raise ValueError(f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} is unsupported")
+
+
+def _required_dict(
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    section: str,
+    key: str,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    value = obj.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a mapping")
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_bool(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> bool:
+    value = obj.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(value, bool):
+        raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a boolean")
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_int(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> int:
+    value = obj.get(key)
+    if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
+        raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "an integer")
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_str(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> str:
+    value = obj.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a string")
+    return value
+
+
+def _required_str_list(
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    section: str,
+    key: str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    value = obj.get(key)
+    if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(v, str) for v in value):
+        raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a list of strings")
+    return value
+
+
+def _optional_str_list(
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    section: str,
+    key: str,
+) -> list[str]:
+    if key not in obj:
+        return []
+    return _required_str_list(obj, section, key)
+
+
+def _optional_bool(
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    section: str,
+    key: str,
+) -> bool | None:
+    if key not in obj:
+        return None
+    return _required_bool(obj, section, key)
+
+
+def _optional_str(
+    obj: dict[str, object],
+    section: str,
+    key: str,
+) -> str | None:
+    if key not in obj:
+        return None
+    return _required_str(obj, section, key)
+
+
+def _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    _reject_unknown_keys("config", cfg, _PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS)
+    normalized: dict[str, object] = {
+        "version": _required_int(cfg, "config", "version"),
+        "mode": _required_str(cfg, "config", "mode"),
+        "enforce": _required_bool(cfg, "config", "enforce"),
+        "api_allowlist": _required_str_list(cfg, "config", "api_allowlist"),
+    }
+
+    if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
+        spd = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "seed_phrase_detection")
+        _reject_unknown_keys("seed_phrase_detection", spd, {"enabled"})
+        normalized["seed_phrase_detection"] = {
+            "enabled": _required_bool(spd, "seed_phrase_detection", "enabled"),
+        }
+
+    fp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "forward_proxy")
+    _reject_unknown_keys("forward_proxy", fp, {"enabled"})
+    normalized["forward_proxy"] = {
+        "enabled": _required_bool(fp, "forward_proxy", "enabled"),
+    }
+
+    dlp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "dlp")
+    _reject_unknown_keys("dlp", dlp, {"include_defaults", "scan_env"})
+    normalized["dlp"] = {
+        "include_defaults": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "include_defaults"),
+        "scan_env": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "scan_env"),
+    }
+
+    rbs = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "request_body_scanning")
+    _reject_unknown_keys(
+        "request_body_scanning",
+        rbs,
+        {"action", "scan_headers", "header_mode"},
+    )
+    normalized_rbs: dict[str, object] = {
+        "action": _required_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "action"),
+    }
+    scan_headers = _optional_bool(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "scan_headers")
+    if scan_headers is not None:
+        normalized_rbs["scan_headers"] = scan_headers
+    header_mode = _optional_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "header_mode")
+    if header_mode is not None:
+        normalized_rbs["header_mode"] = header_mode
+    normalized["request_body_scanning"] = normalized_rbs
+
+    if "tls_interception" in cfg:
+        tls = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "tls_interception")
+        _reject_unknown_keys(
+            "tls_interception",
+            tls,
+            {"enabled", "ca_cert", "ca_key", "passthrough_domains"},
+        )
+        normalized["tls_interception"] = {
+            "enabled": _required_bool(tls, "tls_interception", "enabled"),
+            "ca_cert": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_cert"),
+            "ca_key": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_key"),
+            "passthrough_domains": _optional_str_list(
+                tls, "tls_interception", "passthrough_domains",
+            ),
+        }
+
+    if "ssrf" in cfg:
+        ssrf = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "ssrf")
+        _reject_unknown_keys("ssrf", ssrf, {"ip_allowlist"})
+        normalized["ssrf"] = {
+            "ip_allowlist": _required_str_list(ssrf, "ssrf", "ip_allowlist"),
+        }
+
+    return normalized
+
+
 def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
     """Render a pipelock config dict (as produced by
     `pipelock_build_config`) as YAML. Hand-rolled so we don't take a
@@ -222,31 +403,38 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
     def _bool(b: object) -> str:
         return "true" if b else "false"
 
+    cfg = _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg)
     lines: list[str] = []
     lines.append(f"version: {cfg['version']}")
     lines.append(f"mode: {cfg['mode']}")
     lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cfg['enforce'])}")
     lines.append("")
     lines.append("api_allowlist:")
-    for h in cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]):
+    api_allowlist = cfg["api_allowlist"]
+    assert isinstance(api_allowlist, list)
+    for h in api_allowlist:
         lines.append(f'  - "{h}"')
     lines.append("")
     if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
         lines.append("seed_phrase_detection:")
-        spd = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["seed_phrase_detection"])
+        spd = cfg["seed_phrase_detection"]
+        assert isinstance(spd, dict)
         lines.append(f"  enabled: {_bool(spd['enabled'])}")
         lines.append("")
     lines.append("forward_proxy:")
-    fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"])
+    fp = cfg["forward_proxy"]
+    assert isinstance(fp, dict)
     lines.append(f"  enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
     lines.append("")
     lines.append("dlp:")
-    dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"])
+    dlp = cfg["dlp"]
+    assert isinstance(dlp, dict)
     lines.append(f"  include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
     lines.append(f"  scan_env: {_bool(dlp['scan_env'])}")
     lines.append("")
     lines.append("request_body_scanning:")
-    rbs = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["request_body_scanning"])
+    rbs = cfg["request_body_scanning"]
+    assert isinstance(rbs, dict)
     lines.append(f'  action: "{rbs["action"]}"')
     if "scan_headers" in rbs:
         lines.append(f"  scan_headers: {_bool(rbs['scan_headers'])}")
@@ -255,11 +443,13 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
     if "tls_interception" in cfg:
         lines.append("")
         lines.append("tls_interception:")
-        tls = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["tls_interception"])
+        tls = cfg["tls_interception"]
+        assert isinstance(tls, dict)
         lines.append(f"  enabled: {_bool(tls['enabled'])}")
         lines.append(f'  ca_cert: "{tls["ca_cert"]}"')
         lines.append(f'  ca_key: "{tls["ca_key"]}"')
-        passthrough = cast(list[str], tls.get("passthrough_domains", []))
+        passthrough = tls["passthrough_domains"]
+        assert isinstance(passthrough, list)
         if passthrough:
             lines.append("  passthrough_domains:")
             for d in passthrough:
@@ -267,9 +457,12 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
     if "ssrf" in cfg:
         lines.append("")
         lines.append("ssrf:")
-        ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
+        ssrf = cfg["ssrf"]
+        assert isinstance(ssrf, dict)
         lines.append("  ip_allowlist:")
-        for ip in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
+        ip_allowlist = ssrf["ip_allowlist"]
+        assert isinstance(ip_allowlist, list)
+        for ip in ip_allowlist:
             lines.append(f'    - "{ip}"')
     return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
 
@@ -319,7 +512,11 @@ class PipelockProxy:
     (`PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER` / `PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER`)."""
 
     def prepare(
-        self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path
+        self,
+        bottle: Bottle,
+        slug: str,
+        stage_dir: Path,
+        provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
     ) -> PipelockProxyPlan:
         """Write the pipelock yaml config (mode 600) under `stage_dir`
         and return the plan for launch. Pure host-side, no docker
@@ -342,6 +539,7 @@ class PipelockProxy:
             bottle,
             ca_cert_path=PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
             ca_key_path=PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
+            provider_routes=provider_routes,
         )
         yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
         yaml_path.chmod(0o600)

bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ sick daemon."
 
 Daemon subset is env-driven. The compose renderer narrows it via
 `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress,pipelock` for bottles that
-don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all four.
+don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all daemons.
 
 Stdlib-only by design — adding supervisord/s6/runit for four
 daemons is heavier than this script.
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ _DAEMONS: tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...] = (
          "--listen", "0.0.0.0:8888"),
     ),
     _DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sh", "/git-gate-entrypoint.sh")),
+    _DaemonSpec("git-http", ("python3", "/app/git_http_backend.py")),
     _DaemonSpec("supervise", ("python3", "/app/supervise_server.py")),
 )
 
@@ -162,6 +163,10 @@ class _Supervisor:
         # Names of children that have been logged as having exited
         # so we only log each death once across watch-loop ticks.
         self._logged_dead: set[str] = set()
+        # Signal handlers add daemon names here and return quickly.
+        # The main watch loop drains the set, so repeated restart
+        # requests for one daemon coalesce into one restart.
+        self._restart_requested: set[str] = set()
 
     def start_all(self) -> None:
         for spec in self.specs:
@@ -172,6 +177,7 @@ class _Supervisor:
         if self.shutdown_at is not None:
             return
         self.shutdown_at = time.monotonic()
+        self._restart_requested.clear()
         _log(f"shutting down ({reason}); forwarding SIGTERM")
         for _, p in self.procs:
             if p.poll() is None:
@@ -180,6 +186,24 @@ class _Supervisor:
                 except ProcessLookupError:
                     pass
 
+    def request_restart(self, daemon_name: str) -> bool:
+        """Queue a daemon restart for the main loop to process.
+
+        Signal handlers use this non-blocking path instead of doing
+        subprocess lifecycle work directly. Requests coalesce by
+        daemon name: one pending restart is enough to make the daemon
+        reread the latest config from disk.
+
+        Returns True iff a daemon by that name is known to the
+        supervisor and shutdown has not started."""
+        if self.shutdown_at is not None:
+            _log(f"restart {daemon_name} skipped; supervisor is shutting down")
+            return False
+        if not any(spec.name == daemon_name for spec, _ in self.procs):
+            return False
+        self._restart_requested.add(daemon_name)
+        return True
+
     def tick(self) -> bool:
         """One iteration of the watch loop. Returns True when every
         child has exited and the supervisor can return.
@@ -187,6 +211,8 @@ class _Supervisor:
         A child dying unexpectedly is logged but does NOT initiate
         shutdown — see the module docstring's failure-policy
         section. Shutdown is signal-driven only."""
+        self._drain_restart_requests()
+
         for spec, p in self.procs:
             rc = p.poll()
             if rc is None or spec.name in self._logged_dead:
@@ -219,14 +245,37 @@ class _Supervisor:
                             except ProcessLookupError:
                                 pass
 
-        return all(p.poll() is not None for _, p in self.procs)
+        done = all(p.poll() is not None for _, p in self.procs)
+        if done:
+            for _, p in self.procs:
+                if p.stdout is not None:
+                    p.stdout.close()
+        return done
 
     def exit_code(self) -> int:
-        """Worst child returncode wins. On graceful shutdown every
+        """Positive child failures win; otherwise report success.
-        child is signal-killed (negative returncode) and max()
+
-        returns 0; if some child crashed nonzero before the signal
+        Python represents signal-terminated children as negative
-        the operator gets that code on container exit."""
+        return codes. A signal-only graceful shutdown should not leak
-        return max((p.returncode for _, p in self.procs), default=0)
+        that platform-specific detail into the container exit status,
+        but a positive crash before shutdown should remain visible."""
+        positives = [
+            p.returncode for _, p in self.procs
+            if p.returncode is not None and p.returncode > 0
+        ]
+        return max(positives, default=0)
+
+    def _drain_restart_requests(self) -> None:
+        if self.shutdown_at is not None:
+            self._restart_requested.clear()
+            return
+        requested = tuple(sorted(self._restart_requested))
+        self._restart_requested.clear()
+        for daemon_name in requested:
+            if self.shutdown_at is not None:
+                self._restart_requested.clear()
+                return
+            self.restart_daemon(daemon_name)
 
     def forward_signal(self, sig: int, daemon_name: str) -> bool:
         """Forward a signal to one named child. Used by the SIGHUP
@@ -291,6 +340,8 @@ class _Supervisor:
                     except ProcessLookupError:
                         pass
                     p.wait()
+            if p.stdout is not None:
+                p.stdout.close()
             self._logged_dead.discard(daemon_name)
             new_proc = _spawn(spec)
             self.procs[idx] = (spec, new_proc)
@@ -322,7 +373,7 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
     # supervisor restarts the pipelock daemon in place (other
     # daemons keep running — specifically supervise, whose MCP
     # socket would drop on a whole-container `docker restart`).
-    signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.restart_daemon("pipelock"))
+    signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.request_restart("pipelock"))
 
     while not sup.tick():
         time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL)

bot_bottle/supervise_server.py

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import json
 import os
 import socketserver
 import sys
+import time
 import typing
 import urllib.error
 import urllib.parse
@@ -63,6 +64,10 @@ ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND = -32601
 ERR_INVALID_PARAMS = -32602
 ERR_INTERNAL = -32603
 
+DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
+MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 0.05
+EGRESS_LIST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
+
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class JsonRpcRequest:
@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ def _validate_and_bundle_egress_route(
 class ServerConfig:
     bottle_slug: str
     queue_dir: Path
+    response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
 
 
 def handle_initialize(_params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
@@ -442,7 +448,7 @@ def handle_list_egress_routes(
     })
     opener = urllib.request.build_opener(proxy_handler)
     try:
-        with opener.open(_sv.EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL, timeout=5) as resp:
+        with opener.open(_sv.EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL, timeout=EGRESS_LIST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as resp:
             body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
     except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as e:
         return {
@@ -520,7 +526,20 @@ def handle_tools_call(
         f"for bottle {config.bottle_slug}; waiting for operator...\n"
     )
     sys.stderr.flush()
-    response = _sv.wait_for_response(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + config.response_timeout_seconds
+    try:
+        response = _sv.wait_for_response(
+            config.queue_dir,
+            proposal.id,
+            poll_interval=MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
+            deadline=deadline,
+        )
+    except TimeoutError:
+        text = format_pending_response_text(config.response_timeout_seconds)
+        return {
+            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
+            "isError": False,
+        }
     _sv.archive_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
 
     text = format_response_text(response)
@@ -542,6 +561,16 @@ def format_response_text(response: "_sv.Response") -> str:
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
+def format_pending_response_text(timeout_seconds: float) -> str:
+    return "\n".join([
+        "status: pending",
+        (
+            "notes: operator response timed out after "
+            f"{timeout_seconds:g}s; proposal remains queued"
+        ),
+    ])
+
+
 # --- HTTP transport --------------------------------------------------------
 
 
@@ -654,10 +683,15 @@ def serve(
     queue_dir: Path,
     port: int = _sv.SUPERVISE_PORT,
     bind: str = "0.0.0.0",
+    response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
 ) -> typing.NoReturn:
     queue_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     server = MCPServer((bind, port), MCPHandler)
-    server.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug=bottle_slug, queue_dir=queue_dir)
+    server.config = ServerConfig(
+        bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
+        queue_dir=queue_dir,
+        response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
+    )
     sys.stderr.write(
         f"supervise listening on {bind}:{port}; "
         f"slug={bottle_slug!r}; queue={queue_dir}; "
@@ -682,9 +716,37 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     queue_dir = Path(os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR", _sv.QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER))
     port = int(os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_PORT", str(_sv.SUPERVISE_PORT)))
     bind = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BIND", "0.0.0.0")
-    serve(bottle_slug=bottle_slug, queue_dir=queue_dir, port=port, bind=bind)
+    try:
+        response_timeout_seconds = _response_timeout_from_env(os.environ)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: {e}\n")
+        return 2
+    serve(
+        bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
+        queue_dir=queue_dir,
+        port=port,
+        bind=bind,
+        response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
+    )
     return 0  # serve() does not return
 
 
+def _response_timeout_from_env(env: typing.Mapping[str, str]) -> float:
+    raw = env.get("SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "").strip()
+    if not raw:
+        return DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+    try:
+        value = float(raw)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS must be a positive number"
+        ) from e
+    if value <= 0:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS must be a positive number"
+        )
+    return value
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv))

bot_bottle/util.py

@@ -5,9 +5,18 @@ level deeper, under their backend package."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import ipaddress
 import os
 
 
+def is_ip_literal(value: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(value)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
 def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
     """Expand a leading '~' to $HOME. Leaves paths without a leading
     tilde unchanged. Falls back to the empty string if $HOME is unset

bot_bottle/workspace.py

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"""Backend-neutral plan for porting the operator workspace."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Protocol
+
+
+WORKSPACE_DIRNAME = "workspace"
+DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_OWNER = "node:node"
+DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE = "755"
+
+
+class WorkspaceSpec(Protocol):
+    copy_cwd: bool
+    user_cwd: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkspacePlan:
+    """Resolved workspace contract shared by all bottle backends."""
+
+    enabled: bool
+    host_path: Path
+    guest_home: str
+    guest_path: str
+    workdir: str
+    owner: str = DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_OWNER
+    mode: str = DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE
+    copy_contents: bool = True
+    copy_git: bool = True
+    has_host_git_dir: bool = False
+
+
+def workspace_plan(spec: WorkspaceSpec, *, guest_home: str) -> WorkspacePlan:
+    """Resolve the in-bottle workspace path from CLI intent."""
+    host_path = Path(spec.user_cwd).expanduser()
+    if spec.copy_cwd:
+        guest_path = f"{guest_home.rstrip('/')}/{WORKSPACE_DIRNAME}"
+        workdir = guest_path
+    else:
+        guest_path = guest_home
+        workdir = guest_home
+    return WorkspacePlan(
+        enabled=spec.copy_cwd,
+        host_path=host_path,
+        guest_home=guest_home,
+        guest_path=guest_path,
+        workdir=workdir,
+        has_host_git_dir=(host_path / ".git").is_dir(),
+    )

docs/INDEX.md

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-Research notes live in `research/`. Product requirement docs live in `prds/`.

docs/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Docs
+
+How this project records what it builds and why — and a guide to
+picking the right document for what you're capturing.
+
+## When to write which document
+
+| Artifact | For |
+|---|---|
+| **PRD** (`docs/prds/`) | A feature: what to build, scope, success criteria. |
+| **Research note** (`docs/research/`) | A landscape/tradeoff investigation. |
+| **Decision record** (`docs/decisions/`) | A decision that isn't itself a feature — a policy, a convention, a "we will / won't do this," or a load-bearing choice made inside a larger PRD that deserves to be discoverable on its own. |
+
+A decision that's fully specified by a PRD doesn't need duplicating in
+a decision record. Write one when the *decision* would otherwise be
+buried in prose, lost in an issue thread, or have no in-repo home at
+all (small requests that don't merit a PRD; non-feature choices like
+merge strategy or a trust posture).

docs/decisions/0001-merge-prs-with-rebase.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# ADR 0001: Merge PRs with rebase, not merge commits
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-05-28
+- **Deciders:** didericis
+
+## Context
+
+PRs need a merge strategy. Gitea offers merge-commit, squash, rebase,
+and rebase-merge. The project uses [Conventional
+Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/) enforced by a
+`commit-msg` hook, and PRDs typically land as a multi-commit PR where
+each commit is meaningful on its own (e.g. PR #95: a `docs(prd)` commit,
+a `feat(manifest)` implementation commit, and a `docs(manifest)`
+commit). The history should stay readable and the individual
+conventional commits should survive onto `main`.
+
+## Decision
+
+Merge PRs with **rebase** (Gitea's `rebase` style; `Do: "rebase"` via
+the API). The branch's commits are replayed onto `main` with no merge
+commit, producing a linear history that preserves each commit verbatim.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- **Linear history**, no merge bubbles; `git log --oneline` reads as a
+  straight sequence of conventional commits.
+- **Each commit is preserved** (unlike squash, which would collapse the
+  PRD/impl/docs commits into one and lose the staged structure).
+- **Commit SHAs are rewritten at merge.** The replayed commits on `main`
+  get new SHAs, and the source branch is deleted, so a link to a file
+  by *branch name* (`/src/branch/<feature>/…`) dies at merge. This is
+  why links to not-yet-merged files are pinned to a **commit SHA**
+  (`/src/commit/<sha>/…`), which stays reachable via the retained
+  `refs/pull/<n>/head` ref. See
+  `docs/research/issue-tracking-vs-in-repo-decision-history.md`.
+- **Trade-off accepted:** without a merge commit, the "these commits
+  landed together as PR #N" grouping is not recorded in git itself — it
+  lives in forge state (the PR). That is a mild concession against the
+  keep-history-in-the-repo posture; the conventional-commit scopes and
+  PRD references in the messages keep changes traceable without it.
+
+## Links
+
+- `docs/research/issue-tracking-vs-in-repo-decision-history.md` — the
+  commit-pinning consequence above.
+- Observed practice: PRs #92, #93 merged with rebase; #95 to follow.

docs/decisions/0002-agent-identity-claimed-not-vouched.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# ADR 0002: Agent-set git identity is claimed, not vouched
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-05-28
+- **Deciders:** didericis
+
+## Context
+
+PRD 0027 lifts `git.user` (name/email) to the agent layer, so an agent
+file may declare its own commit identity. Agent files can live in
+`$CWD/.bot-bottle/agents/` — i.e. they can be supplied by a cloned,
+less-trusted repository. That raises the question of whether a
+repo-supplied agent setting its own git identity is a security concern,
+and whether agent identity should be gated differently for `$CWD`
+agents than for `$HOME` agents.
+
+This record exists because the decision is a **trust posture** worth
+finding on its own, separate from the feature PRD that introduced it.
+The full analysis lives in PRD 0027; the decision is summarized here.
+
+## Decision
+
+Allow agents to set `git.user`, and treat an agent-declared identity as
+**claimed, not vouched**. No `$CWD`-vs-`$HOME` gating on the identity
+field. `git.remotes` stays bottle-only (home-only).
+
+## Consequences
+
+- A cloned repo's agent file can present any commit author name/email,
+  including one that reads like a real person's. This is accepted: git
+  authorship is **not a credential** (push auth is the bottle's remote
+  key/token), is **already forgeable** from inside the bottle at runtime
+  (`git config user.email …`), and was never a trust anchor.
+- If attribution integrity ever matters, the answer is commit
+  **signing** (SSH/GPG), not the author field — so this decision closes
+  no door that was open.
+- `git.remotes` is deliberately *not* lifted to the agent layer: it
+  carries credentials and host trust (IdentityFile, KnownHostKey) and
+  remains a bottle-only, home-only concern.
+- Revisit if a future change ever makes commit identity load-bearing
+  (e.g. enforced signing keyed on author), at which point gating
+  `$CWD`-supplied identities would matter.
+
+## Links
+
+- PRD 0027 (`docs/prds/0027-agent-git-user-identity.md`) — full trust
+  analysis and schema.
+- Issue #94, PR #95 — the feature this decision was made for.

docs/decisions/0003-system-prompts-stay-user-directed.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# ADR 0003: Keep agent system prompts user-directed, not auto-generated from config
+
+- **Status:** Accepted
+- **Date:** 2026-05-29
+- **Deciders:** didericis
+
+## Context
+
+A bottle already declares exactly what an agent can reach: egress routes
+(allowlisted hosts + auth) and git config (remotes + identity). We
+considered deriving an agent's system prompt — or a section of it —
+automatically from those configs, so an agent would be told up front
+what it has access to (e.g. "you can reach `gitea.dideric.is` over the
+git remote and its API"). The question surfaced while hand-writing that
+exact line into the `claude-implementer` prompt.
+
+## Decision
+
+System prompts stay **user-directed** — authored by the operator. We do
+not auto-generate prompt content from a bottle's egress / git config.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- The operator controls what the agent is *told* about its environment,
+  independently of what the bottle *grants*. Sometimes we may want to
+  withhold that information from the agent directly — keep the prompt
+  silent about an allowlisted host even though egress permits it.
+- The agent can still infer its access on its own (attempt a request,
+  read its env, `git remote -v`, the gitconfig), so auto-injection is a
+  convenience, not a capability the agent depends on.
+- Cost accepted: operators must restate access in the prompt when they
+  want the agent to know it (as we did for the Gitea instance), and the
+  prompt can drift from the config. That decoupling of "what the bottle
+  grants" from "what the agent is told" is the point.
+- Revisit if keeping prompts in sync with configs becomes a real pain.
+  An *opt-in* helper that emits a capability summary the operator
+  chooses to include would honor this decision; silent auto-injection
+  would not.
+
+## Links
+
+- ADR 0002 (`0002-agent-identity-claimed-not-vouched.md`) — related
+  agent-trust posture (what the agent is granted vs. what it can claim).

docs/decisions/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Decision records
+
+Short, durable records of decisions — one file per decision. This is a
+lightweight [Architecture Decision Record](https://adr.github.io/)
+practice: capture *what was decided and why* in a versioned file so the
+reasoning lives in the clone, not in a Gitea issue thread or a chat log
+that disappears when the host does.
+
+See `docs/research/issue-tracking-vs-in-repo-decision-history.md` for
+the rationale behind keeping decision history in-repo, and
+[`docs/README.md`](../README.md) for when to write a decision record
+vs. a PRD or research note.
+
+## Format
+
+One Markdown file per decision, numbered sequentially and zero-padded
+(`0001-…`, `0002-…`), matching the PRD numbering style. Keep it short —
+the discipline is writing it down, not the ceremony.
+
+```markdown
+# ADR 0000: <short imperative title>
+
+- **Status:** Proposed | Accepted | Superseded by ADR NNNN
+- **Date:** YYYY-MM-DD
+- **Deciders:** <who>
+
+## Context
+What forced the decision; the constraints in play.
+
+## Decision
+What we decided, stated plainly.
+
+## Consequences
+What follows — the good, and the costs/trade-offs accepted.
+
+## Links
+PRDs, research notes, issues/PRs. Gitea links are convenience
+pointers; the reasoning above must stand without them.
+```
+
+The records are the index: `ls docs/decisions/` or skim the titles.
+No hand-maintained list to keep in sync.

docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md

@@ -83,12 +83,7 @@ for a declared upstream:
 - **Manifest field.** `bottle.git` — a list of git remotes the
   bottle is allowed to talk to, each with the credential the gate
   uses to push upstream. The agent gets no parallel `bottle.ssh`
-  entry for those upstreams. Each entry may also carry an
+  entry for those upstreams.
-  `ExtraHosts: { hostname: ip }` map, surfaced to the gate as
-  `--add-host` so the gate can resolve upstreams whose public DNS
-  doesn't point at the reachable IP (e.g. Tailscale-only hosts).
-  The agent-side `insteadOf` rewrite keys off the original hostname,
-  so the manifest's `Upstream` URL stays human-readable.
 - **Agent-side URL rewrite.** Provisioner emits `~/.gitconfig`
   with `[url "<gate-url>"] insteadOf = <real-url>` so every git
   operation against the declared upstream (push, fetch, clone,

docs/prds/0009-remove-ssh-gate.md

@@ -88,8 +88,7 @@ the unused path.
 - **Pipelock interaction.** Drop the SSH-derived branch from
   pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist` build. With no `bottle.ssh`
   there is no per-upstream IP carve-out to render; git-gate
-  has its own egress network and pulls in upstream resolution
+  has its own egress network.
-  via `ExtraHosts` plus DNS.
 - **Tests.** Delete the ssh-gate unit + integration suites,
   the ssh fixtures in `tests/fixtures.py`, and the
   shadow-route assertions in `test_manifest_git.py`. Adjust

docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md

@@ -274,8 +274,6 @@ git:
       Name: bot-bottle
       Upstream: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
       IdentityFile: ~/.ssh/gitea-delos-2.pem
-      ExtraHosts:
-        gitea.dideric.is: 100.78.141.42
       KnownHostKey: ssh-rsa AAAAB3...
 egress:
   allowlist:

docs/prds/0012-stuck-agent-recovery-flow.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ A real stuck agent recovers end-to-end in each of the three categories: a **cred
 
 - Live attach or in-place mutation of running containers. The whole design exists to avoid this.
 - Agent-to-agent communication. Re-stated from the project's existing non-goals; the recovery flow is human→agent only.
-- Auditing or forensic replay of agent runs. Git/forge history is the audit log; this PRD does not add a separate run log.
+- Auditing or forensic replay of agent runs. Git/Gitea history is the audit log; this PRD does not add a separate run log.
 - Reducing time-to-unstuck below some target. Faster than kill-and-restart is implicit, but no specific SLO is in scope.
 
 ## Stuck categories

docs/prds/0025-bottle-extends.md

@@ -39,6 +39,41 @@ trust boundary*: only `$HOME` bottles can declare it, only `$HOME`
 bottles can be its target. Cloned repos still cannot author
 bottle-equivalent config.
 
+## Alternatives considered
+
+The question raised in issue #88 was *where composition should live*.
+Three points in that design space, recorded here so the decision
+stands on its own without the issue thread:
+
+1. **Duplicate bottles (status quo).** Copy `dev.md` to `staging.md`
+   and edit. Zero new mechanism, but every shared field drifts: a
+   route added to `dev` is silently missing from `staging`. This is
+   the pain that prompted #88.
+
+2. **Agent-side `bottle_config:` override (the original #88
+   proposal).** Let an agent file carry an inline block that merges
+   over its referenced bottle. Ergonomically attractive — one file,
+   no second bottle — but it **breaks the trust boundary**: agent
+   files can come from `$CWD/.bot-bottle/agents/` in a cloned repo, so
+   a clone could redeclare egress routes, env mappings, and git
+   remotes — i.e. grant itself bottle-equivalent authority over
+   credentials and network egress. The home-only-bottle invariant
+   exists precisely to stop this.
+
+3. **Bottle-side `extends:` (chosen).** Move composition to the
+   bottle layer, where it inherits the home-only property for free:
+   only `$HOME` bottles can declare `extends:`, and only `$HOME`
+   bottles can be its target. Identical duplication relief to option
+   2, none of its trust erosion. The cost is that an override requires
+   a (home-owned) child bottle rather than an inline agent block —
+   which is the *point*: the override authority stays in `$HOME`.
+
+`extends:` wins because it solves the duplication pain entirely on the
+trusted side of the agent-vs-bottle boundary. (PRD 0027 later lifts a
+deliberately narrow, non-credential field — `git.user` — to the agent
+layer, on the separate reasoning that commit identity is not a
+capability; egress, credentials, and remotes stay bottle-only.)
+
 ## Goals / Success Criteria
 
 - Add `extends: <bottle-name>` to the bottle frontmatter schema.
@@ -58,9 +93,9 @@ bottle-equivalent config.
 
 ## Non-goals
 
-- **No agent-side `bottle_config:`.** That's the design issue #88
+- **No agent-side `bottle_config:`.** Option 2 under "Alternatives
-  considered and weighed against; this PRD is the alternative
+  considered" — weighed and rejected on trust grounds. Don't
-  picked in the issue's design discussion. Don't reintroduce it.
+  reintroduce it.
 - **No additive list merges** (e.g., `routes: append` keyword).
   The `extends:` design uses full-replace for list-valued fields
   (see "Merge rules"); if a use case shows up that genuinely
@@ -126,8 +161,7 @@ expectation. (Same model as shell `export` precedence.)
 `git.remotes` is also keyed, so it follows dict-style inheritance:
 children can override one host without restating every remote. The
 remote entry is replaced as a whole on host collision because
-`Upstream`, `IdentityFile`, `KnownHostKey`, and `ExtraHosts` are
+`Upstream`, `IdentityFile`, and `KnownHostKey` are tightly coupled.
-tightly coupled.
 
 The `git.user` dataclass-overlay (each non-empty field wins
 individually) is so a parent can declare `git.user.name` and a
@@ -167,7 +201,7 @@ Bottles continue to be loaded from `$HOME/.bot-bottle/bottles/`
 only (`Manifest.from_md_dirs` is unchanged). The `extends:` field
 references another file in that same directory. No cwd-readable
 file gains the ability to declare or modify bottle config — the
-attack surface from issue #88's comment thread stays closed.
+attack surface from option 2 ("Alternatives considered") stays closed.
 
 If a future change ever introduces cwd-loaded bottles, the
 `extends:` resolver should be gated to forbid a `$CWD` bottle

docs/prds/0026-agent-provider-templates.md

@@ -86,7 +86,10 @@ agent_provider:
 
 ## Open questions
 
-- The initial Codex auth role is `codex_auth`; it provides a non-secret `OPENAI_API_KEY` placeholder to the agent while egress holds the real token.
+- `codex_auth` is retained as a placeholder marker for follow-up Codex
+  credential-injection work. The Codex template should not inject an
+  `OPENAI_API_KEY` placeholder; Codex bottles use device/ChatGPT login
+  state instead.
 - Existing state-folder transcript capture is Claude-specific and should remain gated to Claude until the follow-up state/transcript refactor.
 
 ## References

docs/prds/0028-git-gate-new-branch-scan-scope.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# PRD 0028: git-gate new-branch push scan scope
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-05-29
+- **Issue:** #106
+
+## Summary
+
+git-gate's pre-receive hook scans the **entire ancestry** of a *new*
+branch for secrets, so any pre-existing finding in repo history blocks
+every new-branch push. Scope the scan to the commits a push actually
+introduces (`$new --not --all`) so a push is gated on what *it* adds,
+not on what's already on the gate/upstream. Also harden the forward
+`ssh` against hangs. Net: new branches can be pushed through the gate
+again, with no loss of leak-detection coverage.
+
+## Problem
+
+In `git_gate_render_hook()` (`bot_bottle/git_gate.py`) the pre-receive
+hook chooses the gitleaks revision range per ref:
+
+```sh
+if [ "$old" = "$zero" ]; then
+  log_opts="$new"          # new branch: `git log <new>` = the FULL ancestry
+else
+  log_opts="$old..$new"    # existing branch: just the pushed delta
+fi
+gitleaks git --log-opts="$log_opts" ...   # exit 1 if ANY finding in range
+```
+
+For a **new** ref there is no `old` to diff against, so the hook passes
+`$new`, which `git log` expands to every commit reachable from the new
+tip. This repo's history contains 11 deliberately secret-shaped strings
+(demo manifests, `docs/demo.tape`, and the pipelock/sandbox-escape
+integration tests that exist *to exercise* the DLP). gitleaks reports
+`438 commits scanned … leaks found: 11`, the hook `exit 1`s, and the
+push is rejected. Confirmed live against issue #106's bottle: the
+branch never lands in the bare repo and is never forwarded.
+
+Consequence: **no new branch can ever be pushed through git-gate** as
+long as a single historical finding exists — which is permanent.
+
+Two adjacent problems surfaced while diagnosing #106:
+
+- The rejection is **invisible to the client** — over the `git://` +
+  smolmachines forward it presented as a ~75s silent hang, not a
+  `remote: git-gate: gitleaks rejected …` message.
+- The forward `ssh` lacks `BatchMode`/`ConnectTimeout`, so an
+  unreachable upstream or a prompt would hang the hook indefinitely.
+  (Not the cause of #106 — the forward itself works — but a latent
+  hang risk.)
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A new-branch push is scanned **only for the commits it introduces**
+  (reachable from `$new`, not from any ref the gate already has).
+- A new branch that adds no new findings **pushes successfully**, even
+  though historical fixtures still trip a full-history scan.
+- A new branch that *does* introduce a finding is **still rejected**.
+- No reduction in leak coverage for the commits a push actually brings
+  to the upstream (see "Security analysis").
+- Forward `ssh` fails fast (`BatchMode=yes` + `ConnectTimeout`) instead
+  of hanging on a prompt/unreachable upstream.
+- Existing git-gate unit + integration tests stay green; new tests lock
+  the scoped-scan behaviour.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Scrubbing the historical fixture findings.** They're intentional
+  test/demo inputs; scoping the scan resolves the practical problem
+  without rewriting history.
+- **Relaxing the existing-branch path.** `$old..$new` already scans the
+  delta; this PRD only fixes the new-ref branch (and optionally unifies
+  on `--not --all`, see Open questions).
+- **The client-visibility fix is investigation-gated.** Surfacing the
+  rejection over the `git://` + smolmachines path may need separate work
+  (sideband relay); tracked here but may land as a follow-up rather than
+  block the scan-scope fix.
+
+## Design
+
+### Scoped scan
+
+Replace the new-ref range with one that excludes everything the gate
+already knows:
+
+```sh
+if [ "$new" = "$zero" ]; then
+  continue                      # deletion: nothing to scan (unchanged)
+elif [ "$old" = "$zero" ]; then
+  log_opts="$new --not --all"   # new branch: only commits new to the gate
+else
+  log_opts="$old..$new"         # existing branch: the pushed delta
+fi
+```
+
+`git log $new --not --all` = commits reachable from the pushed tip but
+**not** reachable from any ref already in the gate's bare repo.
+
+### Security analysis (why excluding "already-on-the-gate" is safe)
+
+Commits enter the gate's bare repo by exactly two paths:
+
+1. **mirror-fetch from the upstream** — the bare repo is
+   `remote add --mirror=fetch origin`, and the access-hook fetches the
+   upstream before every upload-pack; and
+2. **a push through the gate** — which is gitleaks-scanned before it is
+   forwarded.
+
+Therefore every commit reachable from a gate ref is *already on the
+upstream* or *was already scanned when pushed*. A commit excluded by
+`--not --all` cannot be a new secret arriving at the upstream via this
+push:
+
+- if it's already upstream, re-scanning changes nothing — the content is
+  already there and blocking this branch wouldn't remove it; and
+- if it arrived via an earlier push, it was already scanned.
+
+The only commits that can carry a *new* secret upstream are the ones the
+push introduces — exactly the set `$new --not --all` scans. An agent
+cannot pre-seed a secret commit as "already known" to dodge the scan: it
+can't write refs into the bare repo except by pushing (which scans), and
+the mirror refs come only from the trusted upstream.
+
+**Invariant this relies on:** the bare repo's refs are populated *only*
+by upstream mirror-fetch and gitleaks-gated pushes. That holds in the
+current design (nothing writes refs out-of-band); revisit if that
+changes.
+
+### Forward ssh hardening
+
+Add `-o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=<n>` to the hook's `ssh_cmd` so
+a prompt or unreachable upstream fails fast with a clear error instead
+of hanging the receive-pack.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+1. **PRD (this commit).**
+2. **Hook scan scope + ssh hardening.** Edit `git_gate_render_hook()`:
+   the new-ref range → `$new --not --all`; add `BatchMode`/`ConnectTimeout`
+   to `ssh_cmd`. Unit tests in `test_git_gate.py` asserting the rendered
+   hook uses the scoped range for new refs and the hardened ssh flags.
+3. **Integration coverage.** A new-branch push carrying no new finding
+   succeeds through a gate whose history contains a fixture finding; a
+   new-branch push that introduces a finding is still rejected.
+4. **(Optional / follow-up) client visibility.** Make a gitleaks/forward
+   rejection reach the client as a `remote:` error over the git:// +
+   smolmachines path.
+
+## Testing strategy
+
+- **Unit (must):** rendered-hook assertions — new-ref uses
+  `$new --not --all`, existing-ref still `$old..$new`, deletion still
+  skipped; ssh_cmd carries `BatchMode=yes` + a `ConnectTimeout`.
+- **Integration (should):** against a real gate seeded with a
+  fixture-bearing history, a clean new branch forwards to the upstream;
+  a new branch with a planted secret is rejected. Skips cleanly on hosts
+  that can't run the bundle (same shape as the existing git-gate
+  integration test).
+
+## Open questions
+
+- **Unify both branches on `--not --all`?** It's also more robust than
+  `$old..$new` for non-fast-forward/force pushes (which can skip commits
+  off the direct path). Tempting to use it for the existing-ref case
+  too; deferred to keep this change tight, but worth a follow-up.
+- **Client visibility mechanism.** Whether the silent-hang is a git
+  daemon sideband-relay issue or specific to the smolmachines forward
+  needs a focused repro before committing to a fix.

docs/prds/0029-codex-host-credentials-egress.md

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+# PRD 0029: Provider auth credentials through egress
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-05-29
+- **Issue:** #109
+
+## Summary
+
+Allow provider bottles to inject host credentials into the egress
+sidecar without exposing them to the agent. Codex uses
+`agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` for ChatGPT/device-login
+access tokens. Claude uses `agent_provider.auth_token` to name the host
+env var holding its OAuth token, which egress injects on
+`api.anthropic.com` requests.
+
+## Problem
+
+Codex bottles can reach OpenAI hosts after they are added to egress, but
+requests to Codex's ChatGPT-backed API endpoints still fail with HTTP
+403 when the egress route is unauthenticated. The egress proxy strips
+agent-originated `Authorization` headers and only re-injects auth for
+routes that declare an egress-owned token. Bare `api.openai.com` or
+`chatgpt.com` routes therefore forward Codex requests without the
+ChatGPT bearer token.
+
+Copying the host `~/.codex/auth.json` into the agent would solve auth
+mode detection but would also put access and refresh material inside the
+agent sandbox. That cuts against bot-bottle's credential minimization
+model: provider credentials should live in the sidecar boundary when
+possible, not in the agent.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A Codex bottle with host ChatGPT auth can call Codex's
+  `api.openai.com` and `chatgpt.com` endpoints through egress.
+- Host credential forwarding happens only when the bottle declares
+  `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials: true`.
+- The agent container does not receive `OPENAI_API_KEY`,
+  `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN`, or real `tokens.access_token` /
+  `tokens.refresh_token` values.
+- The agent container receives only a dummy Codex `auth.json` that
+  preserves the host auth-mode shape, keeps the selected ChatGPT
+  account id, and replaces credential values with placeholders.
+- Egress route files remain non-secret: they contain only host/path/auth
+  slot metadata, never token values.
+- Missing, API-key, malformed, or expired host Codex auth fails
+  launch with a clear operator-facing message.
+- Existing Claude OAuth placeholder behavior remains unchanged.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Refreshing Codex tokens in the sidecar. The first cut reads the host's
+  current access token at launch; operators can restart after host Codex
+  refreshes auth.
+- Copying host `~/.codex/auth.json` credentials into the agent.
+- Allowing arbitrary host credential forwarding beyond the two providers
+  covered here (Codex ChatGPT/device-login and Claude OAuth).
+- Hot-applying new authenticated Codex routes to an existing running
+  sidecar. The current hot-apply path cannot safely populate new token
+  env slots in an already-running container.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- Add `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` to the bottle manifest
+  schema, defaulting to `false`.
+- Support the flag for `agent_provider.template: codex`.
+- Add `agent_provider.auth_token` to the bottle manifest schema.
+- Support the field for `agent_provider.template: claude`: the named
+  host env var is forwarded only into the egress sidecar as the Bearer
+  token for `api.anthropic.com`, and a placeholder
+  `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is set in the agent so the Claude Code CLI
+  starts without a real credential.
+- Remove the `claude_code_oauth` egress route role, which previously
+  required operators to declare the OAuth route manually. The provisioner
+  now injects it from `auth_token`.
+- Read host Codex auth from `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` when `CODEX_HOME` is
+  set, otherwise from `~/.codex/auth.json`.
+- Extract only `tokens.access_token` for egress injection.
+- Generate a dummy agent-side `auth.json` from the host auth file's
+  mode and key shape, without copying real token values.
+- Validate that host auth is not API-key mode and the access token is
+  present, JWT-shaped, and not expired.
+- Add or upgrade `api.openai.com` and `chatgpt.com` egress routes to
+  inject that access token via a shared `EGRESS_TOKEN_N` sidecar env
+  slot.
+- Pass the extracted token only into the sidecar compose/run
+  environment, alongside other egress token values.
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- Sidecar-owned refresh using `tokens.refresh_token`.
+- Sharing full Codex auth state with the agent.
+- Supporting host credential forwarding for non-Codex providers.
+
+## Design
+
+### Manifest
+
+Extend `agent_provider`:
+
+```yaml
+agent_provider:
+  template: codex
+  forward_host_credentials: true
+```
+
+The field defaults to `false`. If set on a non-Codex provider, manifest
+validation should reject it until that provider has a concrete,
+credential-minimizing implementation.
+
+### Host auth extraction
+
+At prepare/launch time, when the flag is enabled for Codex:
+
+1. Resolve the host Codex home directory from `$CODEX_HOME`, falling
+   back to `~/.codex`.
+2. Parse `auth.json`.
+3. Require user/device auth mode rather than API-key auth.
+4. Require a non-empty `tokens.access_token`.
+5. Parse the JWT payload enough to require an `exp` claim in the future.
+6. Return only the access token value to the launch path.
+
+Errors should name the missing or invalid condition and point the
+operator at `codex login --device-auth`, without printing token values.
+
+### Egress route
+
+When forwarding host Codex credentials, the effective egress route table
+should contain authenticated `api.openai.com` and `chatgpt.com` routes.
+If the bottle already declares either host as a bare-pass route, upgrade
+it in the effective route table rather than requiring a duplicate
+manifest entry. If the bottle already declares an authenticated route for
+either host, fail rather than guessing whether to override
+operator-provided auth, unless that route already uses the synthetic
+Codex host credential token reference.
+
+The rendered route should look like any other egress-owned auth route:
+
+```yaml
+routes:
+  - host: "api.openai.com"
+    auth_scheme: "Bearer"
+    token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_N"
+  - host: "chatgpt.com"
+    auth_scheme: "Bearer"
+    token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_N"
+```
+
+The access token value is supplied through the sidecar process
+environment for that `EGRESS_TOKEN_N` slot. It must not be written to
+`routes.yaml`, compose files, env files, logs, or user-facing output.
+
+### Data flow
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["Host ~/.codex/auth.json"] --> L["bot-bottle launch"]
+    L -->|access token only| S["egress sidecar env"]
+    L -->|dummy auth.json only| A
+    A["Codex agent"] -->|HTTPS via proxy, auth stripped| E["egress"]
+    E -->|Bearer injected from env| C["api.openai.com / chatgpt.com"]
+```
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+1. **PRD first.** Land this document as the first commit on the feature
+   branch.
+2. **Manifest schema.** Add `forward_host_credentials`, validation, and
+   unit tests.
+3. **Host Codex auth reader.** Add a small stdlib-only helper for
+   parsing and validating host Codex auth without printing values.
+4. **Effective egress route.** Add/upgrade the Codex API routes when the
+   flag is enabled, and add tests for bare route upgrade,
+   missing-route insertion, and authenticated-route conflict.
+5. **Agent auth marker.** Provision a dummy Codex `auth.json` into the
+   agent home so Codex selects the host's user/device auth branch while
+   real credentials stay in egress.
+6. **Launch wiring.** Pass the host access token into the egress sidecar
+   env for Docker and smolmachines without exposing it to the agent.
+7. **Docs and tests.** Update README examples and run the unit suite.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Should a later version support sidecar refresh using the host refresh
+  token, or should restart-on-expiry remain the policy?
+- Should telemetry hosts such as `ab.chatgpt.com` stay blocked by
+  default even when Codex ChatGPT auth is enabled?
+
+## References
+
+- Gitea issue #109: Codex ChatGPT auth should inject host access token
+  via egress.
+- PRD 0017: Egress-proxy — universal MITM with path filtering + auth
+  injection.
+- PRD 0026: Agent provider templates.

docs/prds/0030-deduplicate-egress-token-resolution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+# PRD 0030: Deduplicate egress token resolution across backends
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #118
+
+## Summary
+
+Eliminate the duplicated egress token resolution block — which resolved
+manifest-declared tokens and the Codex host credential — by moving
+provider-specific token reading into `AgentProvisionPlan.provisioned_env`
+at prepare time, and having both backends merge that map into `os.environ`
+before calling the now-generic `egress_resolve_token_values`.
+
+## Problem
+
+The same logic block appeared in two places:
+
+- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py` (~line 183): inline inside
+  `launch()`, building `token_values` before `compose_up`.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py` (~line 422): the private
+  `_resolve_token_env` helper, called before `_bundle.start_bundle`.
+
+Both blocks:
+1. Short-circuit to `{}` when there are no egress routes.
+2. Call `egress_resolve_token_values(token_env_map, host_env)` to
+   resolve ordinary manifest-declared token refs.
+3. Check `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` and, when true,
+   call `codex_host_access_token` and slot the result into any
+   `token_env` whose `token_ref` is `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`.
+
+The duplication means any change to step 3 must be applied twice.
+PRD 0029, which introduced `forward_host_credentials`, already had to
+wire both backends; the next change would too. This is a near-certain
+future sync bug.
+
+`egress_resolve_token_values` also carried a sentinel `continue` skip
+for `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`, which tied an otherwise generic
+egress helper to a Codex-specific contract.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- The `forward_host_credentials` resolution logic exists in exactly one
+  place in the codebase.
+- Both `docker/launch.py` and `smolmachines/launch.py` call
+  `egress_resolve_token_values` with no provider-specific arguments.
+- `egress_resolve_token_values` is fully generic — it neither knows nor
+  cares about provider identity or the `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`
+  sentinel.
+- No behaviour change for either backend.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Changes to token resolution semantics. This is a pure refactor.
+- Adding support for any new credential type or provider.
+- Consolidating any other backend differences beyond this one block.
+
+## Design
+
+### `AgentProvisionPlan.provisioned_env`
+
+Add `provisioned_env: dict[str, str]` (default empty) to
+`AgentProvisionPlan`. This map holds host-side secrets that the
+provisioning stage resolved and that egress needs injected into the
+sidecar environ.
+
+When `forward_host_credentials=True` for Codex, `agent_provision_plan`
+calls `codex_host_access_token(host_env)` and stores the result under
+`CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`. This is already the prepare-time
+stage where `write_codex_dummy_auth_file` runs, so the access-token
+read is colocated with all other Codex-specific provisioning.
+
+### Backend call sites
+
+Both backends merge `provisioned_env` over `os.environ` before calling
+`egress_resolve_token_values`:
+
+```python
+effective_env = {**dict(os.environ), **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
+token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env)
+```
+
+`provisioned_env` values take precedence over same-named host env vars,
+so the Codex token slot resolves from the map written at prepare time
+rather than from a raw `os.environ` lookup.
+
+### `egress_resolve_token_values`
+
+Remove the `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF` sentinel `continue` skip.
+The function now resolves every slot in `token_env_map` from `host_env`
+without special-casing any key name. The `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`
+key is present in `effective_env` (injected by `provisioned_env`) exactly
+when it is needed.
+
+## Implementation
+
+- `bot_bottle/agent_provider.py`: add `provisioned_env` field; populate
+  it for Codex when `forward_host_credentials=True`.
+- `bot_bottle/egress.py`: remove sentinel skip; remove
+  `egress_resolve_token_values_with_provider` (the intermediate function
+  that was introduced and then superseded by this design); drop the
+  `codex_auth` import.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py`: replace the provider-aware
+  resolution block with the `effective_env` merge.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py`: same replacement in
+  `_resolve_token_env`.
+- `tests/unit/test_agent_provider.py`: add tests verifying
+  `provisioned_env` is populated (or empty) for Codex with and without
+  `forward_host_credentials`.
+- `tests/unit/test_egress.py`: remove `TestResolveTokenValuesWithProvider`;
+  replace the sentinel-skip test with a test verifying the Codex token
+  ref resolves normally when present in `host_env`.
+
+## References
+
+- Issue #118: Deduplicate egress token resolution across backends.
+- Issue #117: Complexity hotspots in launch, egress, and auth paths
+  (source of the finding).
+- PRD 0029: Provider auth credentials through egress (introduced the
+  duplicated block).

docs/prds/0031-split-merge-provider-route.md

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+# PRD 0031: Simplify egress route merge and consolidate Route types
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #120
+
+## Summary
+
+Replace `_merge_provider_route`'s five-case nested conditional with a
+flat provisioned-wins merge, and make the mapping between the host-side
+`EgressRoute` and the addon's `Route` explicit in one place. Covers the
+two remaining open tasks from the #117 hotspot review.
+
+## Problem
+
+### 1. `_merge_provider_route` branching
+
+`_merge_provider_route` in `bot_bottle/egress.py` handles five distinct
+cases in a single function with interleaved conditions:
+
+1. **append-new** — host not in manifest; append a fresh route.
+2. **upgrade-bare** — host found, no existing auth; adopt provider auth.
+3. **no-op** — host found, same auth; return unchanged.
+4. **tls-passthrough upgrade** — same as no-op but provider sets
+   `tls_passthrough=True`; flip the flag on the existing route.
+5. **conflict-die** — host found, different auth; hard error.
+
+Cases 3 and 4 share a block with no-op as the invisible fall-through.
+`_find_or_alloc_token_env` is duplicated between cases 2 and 1. In-place
+replacements spell out every `EgressRoute` field explicitly, so a new
+field added to the dataclass silently drops its value in any replacement
+site that wasn't updated.
+
+The root cause of the complexity is that the current merge tries to be
+cooperative: it lets manifest routes coexist with provider routes and
+attempts to upgrade bare manifest entries. This makes sense if the
+manifest is authoritative, but the actual intended hierarchy is the
+opposite — provider routes claim their hosts outright and the manifest
+fills in what's left.
+
+### 2. Three-way Route type fragmentation
+
+`EgressRoute` (in `egress.py`) and `egress_addon_core.Route` are
+separate dataclasses with overlapping but not identical field sets:
+
+| Field | `EgressRoute` | addon `Route` |
+|---|---|---|
+| `host` | ✓ | ✓ |
+| `path_allowlist` | ✓ | ✓ |
+| `auth_scheme` | ✓ | ✓ |
+| `token_env` | ✓ | ✓ |
+| `token_ref` | ✓ (host-side) | — |
+| `roles` | ✓ (host-side) | — |
+| `tls_passthrough` | ✓ (pipelock concern) | — |
+
+`egress_render_routes` serialises `EgressRoute` fields to YAML; the
+addon's `load_routes` deserialises that YAML into `Route` objects. If a
+field is added to `EgressRoute` that should appear in the YAML, both
+`egress_render_routes` and `_parse_one` must be updated consistently.
+The render function spells the field list out inline with no reference
+to the addon's parser, so divergence is silent until runtime.
+
+`egress_addon_core.Route` cannot be replaced by `EgressRoute` — the
+addon file is copied flat into the sidecar container image (`/app/`) and
+has no access to the `bot_bottle` package. The types must stay separate;
+the risk is that they drift.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `egress_routes_for_bottle` implements a flat provisioned-wins merge:
+  provider routes claim their hosts; manifest routes for unclaimed hosts
+  append. No upgrade logic, no conflict detection.
+- Token slot assignment is a single pass over the merged list, not
+  interleaved with the merge.
+- `egress_render_routes` uses a single `_route_to_yaml_fields` helper
+  that explicitly lists the addon-visible fields, creating one place
+  where the `EgressRoute`→`Route` mapping is spelled out.
+- All existing `TestProviderRouteMerge` and `TestRenderRoutes` tests
+  pass (adjusting assertions for any semantics changes described below).
+- No behaviour change for existing manifests that don't trigger the
+  conflict-die or upgrade-bare paths.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Merging `EgressRoute` and `egress_addon_core.Route` into one class
+  (impossible: addon runs in a stdlib-only container environment).
+- Changing what the addon does with a route once it has one.
+- Changing `decide()` or `is_git_push_request()` in `egress_addon_core`
+  — those are already pure functions with good separation.
+
+## Design
+
+### Merge: provisioned wins
+
+The new hierarchy: **provisioned routes own their hosts; manifest routes
+fill the gaps.**
+
+```
+provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
+
+effective = list(provider_routes)
+effective += [r for r in manifest_routes if r.host.lower() not in provisioned_hosts]
+```
+
+Token slot assignment runs as a final pass over `effective` in order:
+
+```python
+def _assign_token_slots(
+    routes: list[EgressRoute],
+) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
+    slot_for_ref: dict[str, str] = {}
+    out: list[EgressRoute] = []
+    for r in routes:
+        if r.auth_scheme and r.token_ref and not r.token_env:
+            token_env = slot_for_ref.get(r.token_ref)
+            if token_env is None:
+                token_env = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{len(slot_for_ref)}"
+                slot_for_ref[r.token_ref] = token_env
+            r = dataclasses.replace(r, token_env=token_env)
+        out.append(r)
+    return tuple(out)
+```
+
+This replaces `_merge_provider_route`, `_find_or_alloc_token_env`, and
+the slot-assignment loop inside `egress_manifest_routes`.
+
+#### Semantics change
+
+Under the old design, a manifest route for a provisioned host with a
+*different* `auth_scheme` or `token_ref` raised a hard error. Under
+provisioned-wins, the manifest entry is silently dropped. Operators who
+relied on the conflict error to catch misconfigurations should audit
+their manifests, but in practice this path was only reachable when a
+manifest declared auth for `api.openai.com` or `chatgpt.com` with a
+token ref other than `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF` while also
+enabling `forward_host_credentials` — an unlikely combination.
+
+Similarly, the "upgrade-bare" path (provider adopts a bare manifest
+route's `path_allowlist`) is dropped: a provisioned host takes the
+provider route's fields wholesale, and the manifest's `path_allowlist`
+for that host is ignored.
+
+### Route type mapping: `_route_to_yaml_fields`
+
+Add a pure function in `egress.py`:
+
+```python
+def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: EgressRoute) -> dict:
+    """Return the addon-visible fields for one route.
+
+    This is the single authoritative mapping between `EgressRoute`
+    (host-side) and `egress_addon_core.Route` (sidecar-side). If a
+    field is added to `Route` that must appear in the YAML, add it
+    here and in `egress_addon_core._parse_one` together."""
+    fields: dict = {"host": r.host}
+    if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
+        fields["auth_scheme"] = r.auth_scheme
+        fields["token_env"] = r.token_env
+    if r.path_allowlist:
+        fields["path_allowlist"] = list(r.path_allowlist)
+    return fields
+```
+
+`egress_render_routes` delegates to it:
+
+```python
+for r in routes:
+    f = _route_to_yaml_fields(r)
+    lines.append(f'  - host: "{f["host"]}"')
+    if "auth_scheme" in f:
+        lines.append(f'    auth_scheme: "{f["auth_scheme"]}"')
+        lines.append(f'    token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
+    if "path_allowlist" in f:
+        lines.append("    path_allowlist:")
+        for p in f["path_allowlist"]:
+            lines.append(f'      - "{p}"')
+```
+
+The docstring on `_route_to_yaml_fields` is the explicit callout to
+update both it and `_parse_one` together when the schema changes.
+
+### `egress_manifest_routes` / `egress_routes_for_bottle`
+
+`egress_manifest_routes` becomes a pure lifter with no slot assignment:
+it reads each manifest route entry and returns an `EgressRoute` with
+`token_env=""` (the slot to be filled later). The function's docstring
+currently promises slot assignment; that promise moves to
+`egress_routes_for_bottle`.
+
+`egress_routes_for_bottle` becomes:
+
+```python
+def egress_routes_for_bottle(
+    bottle: Bottle,
+    provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
+) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
+    manifest = egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
+    provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
+    merged = list(provider_routes) + [
+        r for r in manifest if r.host.lower() not in provisioned_hosts
+    ]
+    return _assign_token_slots(merged)
+```
+
+### Mitmproxy request logic
+
+`egress_addon_core.decide()` and `is_git_push_request()` are already
+pure functions; `egress_addon.EgressAddon.request()` is the minimal
+mitmproxy glue (read host/path/headers from flow → call pure functions
+→ apply result to flow). This split is already clean and requires no
+structural change in this PRD.
+
+## Test impact
+
+- **`TestProviderRouteMerge`**: the `test_provider_route_upgrades_bare_manifest_route`
+  test asserts that a provider route preserves a bare manifest route's
+  `path_allowlist`. Under provisioned-wins that `path_allowlist` is
+  dropped. Update the test to reflect the new semantics.
+- **`test_provider_route_conflicts_with_different_authed_manifest_route`**:
+  the conflict-die case no longer exists. Remove this test.
+- All other merge and render tests should pass without modification.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+1. **PRD (this commit).** Sets the design.
+2. **Merge refactor.** Replace `_merge_provider_route` and
+   `_find_or_alloc_token_env` with `_assign_token_slots` and the
+   flat provisioned-wins logic in `egress_routes_for_bottle`. Strip
+   slot assignment from `egress_manifest_routes`.
+3. **Render consolidation.** Add `_route_to_yaml_fields`; update
+   `egress_render_routes` to use it.
+4. **Test updates.** Adjust `TestProviderRouteMerge` for the semantics
+   changes above; confirm all render tests pass.
+
+## References
+
+- Issue #120: Refactor `_merge_provider_route` (expanded to include
+  Route type fragmentation).
+- Issue #117: Complexity hotspots — source of both findings.
+- PRD 0030: Deduplicate egress token resolution (prior egress cleanup).

docs/prds/0032-smolmachines-launch-decomposition.md

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+# PRD 0032: Decompose smolmachines launch and harden bringup sequencing
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #122
+
+## Summary
+
+Split `launch()` into named per-step helpers, replace the empirical
+`time.sleep(1.5)` with a readiness poll, and file-lock loopback alias
+allocation. Addresses the three actionable issues from the #117 hotspot
+review of `smolmachines/launch.py`.
+
+## Problem
+
+### 1. `launch()` step ordering
+
+`launch()` in `smolmachines/launch.py` is 207 lines. Seven sequenced
+steps are marked by numbered inline comments (`# 1. Reserve a loopback
+alias`, `# 2. Mint per-bottle CAs`, ...) — the sequencing is
+load-bearing (CA paths must be filled before the bundle spec is built;
+the bundle must be running before port discovery; the VM must be created
+before the allowlist is patched), but the dependencies are enforced only
+by linear ordering within one function. Adding a new daemon, changing
+the port-forward strategy, or debugging a bringup failure requires
+reading the whole function to understand what state each step produces.
+Each step is also not individually testable without mocking the entire
+surrounding context.
+
+### 2. `time.sleep(1.5)` for libkrun exec-channel race
+
+After `machine_start`, back-to-back `machine_exec` calls occasionally
+hit a SIGKILL in libkrun's exec channel at ~100ms. The sleep is
+documented as "1.5s is empirically enough; provisioning already takes
+seconds so the wait is amortized." The failure mode if the sleep is
+insufficient: the filesystem-repair exec (`chown -R node:node /home/node`)
+is SIGKILLed silently, and the agent later bails with `ENOENT`/`EPERM`
+when Claude Code tries to write to `~/.claude.json`. A poll-until-ready
+loop is more robust than a fixed duration: it exits as soon as the exec
+channel is up, fails loudly with a timeout if the VM never becomes
+responsive, and is self-documenting about what it is waiting for.
+
+### 3. Loopback alias allocation is not concurrent-safe
+
+`loopback_alias.allocate()` reads docker container state to determine
+which aliases are already in use, then returns the lowest free alias.
+There is no lock between that read and the bundle's `docker run` (which
+creates the container that will appear in future `docker ps` output). Two
+simultaneous bottle launches can both see the same alias as free and
+claim it, causing both bundles to bind on the same loopback IP. On macOS,
+where users occasionally start multiple agents in quick succession, this
+is a realistic failure mode.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Removing `force_allowlist` / the `--allow-cidr` DB patch. That is a
+  workaround for a smolvm 0.8.0 bug; removal is a one-liner when smolvm
+  honors the CLI flag upstream.
+- Changing the ephemeral registry / crane detour in `local_registry.py`.
+  Required by Docker Desktop's network topology.
+- Changing `_ensure_smolmachine`'s cache design. Cache invalidation by
+  docker image ID works; issue #111 tracks a separate stale-sidecar
+  concern.
+
+## Design
+
+### 1. Decompose `launch()` into named helpers
+
+Extract six focused helpers. `launch()` becomes a coordinator that calls
+them in order, passing the `ExitStack` for teardown registration:
+
+```
+_allocate_resources(plan, stack) → (loopback_ip, network)
+```
+Reserve the loopback alias, create the docker bridge network, register
+teardown callbacks for both.
+
+```
+_mint_certs(plan) → plan
+```
+Pipelock TLS init (always). Egress TLS init when `plan.egress_plan.routes`
+is non-empty. Returns the plan with CA paths filled via
+`dataclasses.replace`.
+
+```
+_start_bundle(plan, network, loopback_ip, stack) → plan
+```
+Build the `BundleLaunchSpec`, resolve token env, start the bundle
+container, register teardown. Returns the plan with `bundle_spec` updated
+(or unchanged if no plan field carries it — callers consume `bundle_spec`
+directly from this call's return value if needed).
+
+```
+_discover_urls(plan, loopback_ip) → plan
+```
+Look up host-side ports for the published container ports; assemble
+`agent_proxy_url`, `agent_git_gate_host`, `agent_supervise_url`; stamp
+them onto the plan and into `guest_env`.
+
+```
+_launch_vm(plan, agent_from_path, stack) → None
+```
+`machine_create` + `force_allowlist` + `machine_start`. Register
+`machine_stop` and `machine_delete` teardown callbacks on the stack.
+
+```
+_init_vm(plan) → None
+```
+Filesystem-repair exec (`chown`/`chmod`) followed by
+`_wait_exec_ready()`.
+
+`launch()` reduces to:
+
+```python
+loopback_ip, network = _allocate_resources(plan, stack)
+plan = _mint_certs(plan)
+plan = _start_bundle(plan, network, loopback_ip, stack)
+plan = _discover_urls(plan, loopback_ip)
+agent_from_path = _ensure_smolmachine(plan.agent_image_ref,
+                                      dockerfile=plan.agent_dockerfile_path)
+_launch_vm(plan, agent_from_path, stack)
+_init_vm(plan)
+prompt_path = provision(plan, plan.machine_name)
+yield SmolmachinesBottle(...)
+```
+
+Each helper's inputs and outputs are explicit; each is independently
+testable with a minimal set of mocks.
+
+### 2. Replace `time.sleep(1.5)` with `_wait_exec_ready`
+
+Add to `smolvm.py`:
+
+```python
+def wait_exec_ready(name: str, *, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll until `machine exec true` exits 0 or `timeout` elapses.
+    Replaces a fixed sleep after machine_start for the libkrun
+    exec-channel warm-up race."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    delay = 0.1
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        r = machine_exec(name, ["true"])
+        if r.returncode == 0:
+            return
+        remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
+        if remaining <= 0:
+            break
+        time.sleep(min(delay, remaining))
+        delay = min(delay * 2, 0.5)
+    die(
+        f"smolvm machine {name!r}: exec channel not ready after "
+        f"{timeout:.0f}s — VM may have failed to boot."
+    )
+```
+
+`_init_vm` calls `wait_exec_ready` after the chown/chmod exec instead of
+`time.sleep(1.5)`. The `time` import in `launch.py` is removed.
+
+### 3. File-lock loopback alias allocation
+
+Add to `loopback_alias.py`:
+
+```python
+import fcntl
+
+_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH = Path.home() / ".cache" / "bot-bottle" / "smolmachines.lock"
+
+def allocate(slug: str) -> str:
+    if not _is_macos():
+        return "127.0.0.1"
+    _ALLOC_LOCK_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w") as lf:
+        fcntl.flock(lf, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        return _allocate_locked(slug)
+
+def _allocate_locked(slug: str) -> str:
+    in_use = _aliases_in_use()
+    for ip in _pool_addresses():
+        if ip not in in_use:
+            return ip
+    die(...)
+    return ""
+```
+
+The lock is held only for the duration of `_aliases_in_use()` + the
+`allocate` return. The bundle's `docker run` runs after the lock is
+released. This is sufficient: once `docker run` returns, the container
+is visible in docker state and future `allocate()` calls will see it.
+The remaining window (lock released → container appears in docker state)
+is narrowed from "the entire bringup sequence" to "a single subprocess
+call," making a collision between two concurrent launches effectively
+impossible in practice.
+
+The lock is a no-op on Linux (the `_is_macos()` early-return fires
+before the lock path is opened).
+
+## Test impact
+
+- Unit tests for each extracted helper can mock one subprocess boundary
+  at a time (smolvm, docker, pipelock TLS init) without wiring the full
+  `launch()` ExitStack.
+- `wait_exec_ready` needs a test with `machine_exec` stubbed to return
+  non-zero N times before 0 — verifies the backoff loop and the timeout
+  die path.
+- `allocate` tests are unchanged in shape; the lock is acquired and
+  released within the call so tests don't need to be aware of it.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+1. **PRD (this commit).** Sets the design.
+2. **Decompose `launch()`.**
+3. **Replace sleep with `wait_exec_ready`.**
+4. **File-lock `allocate()`.**
+5. **Tests.** Unit tests for each helper; `wait_exec_ready` backoff + timeout.
+
+## References
+
+- Issue #122: Decompose smolmachines launch and harden bringup sequencing.
+- Issue #117: Complexity hotspots — source of the smolmachines/launch.py finding.
+- Issue #111: Smolmachine sidecar doesn't reliably get refreshed (separate, not addressed here).

docs/prds/0033-manifest-schema-boundaries.md

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+# PRD 0033: Manifest Schema Boundaries
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #125
+
+## Summary
+
+Split the manifest loader's schema validation, filesystem loading, `extends:`
+resolution, and compatibility passthrough policy into named internal boundaries
+without changing the public manifest format. The goal is to make
+`bot_bottle/manifest.py` cheaper to extend and review while preserving the
+strict validation behavior that keeps manifest mistakes visible.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/manifest.py` has become a broad schema surface. It owns dataclass
+models, per-field validators, per-section unknown-key policy, Markdown
+frontmatter loading, two-pass bottle inheritance, merge semantics, and
+effective agent-to-bottle overlays in one file. The logic is deterministic and
+well covered, but the number of concerns makes schema changes expensive:
+reviewers have to re-derive loader behavior, parse-time validation, and
+post-parse composition rules together.
+
+One specific coupling is especially easy to miss: agent Markdown files are
+allowed to double as Claude Code subagent files, so the manifest parser accepts
+and ignores Claude Code frontmatter fields such as `name`, `description`,
+`model`, `color`, and `memory`. That compatibility rule is encoded as a
+passthrough allowlist alongside bot-bottle's own agent schema. If Claude Code
+adds a frontmatter field and users start sharing files between
+`~/.claude/agents/` and `.bot-bottle/agents/`, bot-bottle raises
+`ManifestError` until the local passthrough policy is updated.
+
+The current shape is workable, but it creates unnecessary risk for future
+manifest features. A new field can accidentally mix parsing, inheritance, and
+compatibility concerns in the same edit, or update one entry path
+(`from_json_obj`) without matching the Markdown path (`from_md_dirs`).
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Preserve the existing public manifest schema and runtime behavior.
+- Keep `Manifest`, `Bottle`, `Agent`, `GitEntry`, `GitUser`, `AgentProvider`,
+  `EgressRoute`, `EgressConfig`, and `PipelockRoutePolicy` import-compatible
+  from `bot_bottle.manifest`.
+- Move Markdown file discovery and frontmatter loading behind a small internal
+  loader boundary with tests that show `$HOME` bottles, `$HOME` agents, `$CWD`
+  agent overrides, and ignored `$CWD` bottles still behave as before.
+- Move bottle `extends:` resolution and merge rules behind a named internal
+  resolver boundary with tests for inheritance, replacement, cycle detection,
+  missing parents, and per-field `git.user` overlays.
+- Centralize top-level allowed-key policy for bottle and agent schemas so
+  unknown-key errors remain strict and the allowed set is visible in one place
+  per schema.
+- Make Claude Code passthrough fields a named compatibility policy with focused
+  tests that distinguish accepted passthrough keys from bot-bottle schema keys
+  and true typos.
+- Keep both entry points, `Manifest.from_json_obj` and
+  `Manifest.from_md_dirs`, covered by tests for shared validation and shared
+  inheritance behavior.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No manifest format changes.
+- No migration away from Markdown frontmatter or the stdlib-only YAML subset
+  parser.
+- No dependency on Pydantic, PyYAML, JSON Schema, or another schema framework.
+- No relaxation of strict unknown-key validation for bot-bottle fields.
+- No provider-specific workspace, auth, launch, or egress changes.
+- No user-facing CLI behavior changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- Internal module organization for manifest loading and composition.
+- Validator helpers or schema-policy helpers that reduce duplicated
+  unknown-key and type-checking logic.
+- Focused regression tests around the two existing load paths.
+- Documentation comments that clarify compatibility policy where it is encoded.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Renaming public dataclass fields or changing their capitalization.
+- Reworking callers outside the manifest boundary except for import updates
+  that are mechanically required by an internal split.
+- Adding new manifest fields.
+- Changing how `bot-bottle.json` legacy-file errors are reported.
+
+## Design
+
+Keep `bot_bottle.manifest` as the public facade. Existing imports should
+continue to work from that module, even if implementation moves into internal
+modules such as:
+
+- `bot_bottle/manifest_model.py` for dataclasses and field-level parsing.
+- `bot_bottle/manifest_loader.py` for filesystem layout, Markdown
+  frontmatter loading, stale legacy-file checks, and `$CWD` override rules.
+- `bot_bottle/manifest_extends.py` for raw-bottle inheritance, cycle checks,
+  and merge semantics.
+- `bot_bottle/manifest_schema.py` for allowed-key sets, passthrough policy,
+  and small validation helpers.
+
+The exact filenames are not required. The required boundary is conceptual:
+raw input loading, schema validation, bottle inheritance, and effective
+agent-to-bottle overlays should be separable when reading and testing the code.
+
+`Manifest.from_json_obj` should continue to accept a raw JSON-like dict and
+feed the same raw bottle resolver used by Markdown loading. `Manifest.from_md_dirs`
+should perform only filesystem discovery and Markdown parsing before passing
+the same raw sections into the same validator/composer path. That shared path
+prevents a future schema field from working in one entry point but not the
+other.
+
+Claude Code passthrough fields should be represented as an explicit
+compatibility allowlist, named as such, and documented near the agent schema
+policy. The parser should still ignore those fields after validation. Tests
+should cover every passthrough field currently accepted and at least one
+unknown field that remains an error.
+
+The `extends:` resolver should remain raw-dict based until after inheritance is
+resolved. Merge rules stay unchanged:
+
+- scalar fields use child value when present.
+- `env` merges by key with child values winning.
+- `git.remotes` merges by upstream host, with child entries replacing duplicate
+  hosts and explicit empty maps clearing inherited remotes.
+- `git.user` overlays per field.
+- `egress` remains full-replace when declared by the child.
+- cycles, missing parents, and self-reference remain `ManifestError`s.
+
+## Implementation Chunks
+
+1. Add focused characterization tests for agent allowed keys, Claude Code
+   passthrough fields, and parity between `from_json_obj` and Markdown loading.
+2. Extract allowed-key and compatibility policy helpers while keeping
+   `bot_bottle.manifest` as the import surface.
+3. Extract raw Markdown loading into a loader boundary and rerun existing
+   PRD 0011 tests unchanged.
+4. Extract bottle inheritance and merge rules into a resolver boundary and
+   rerun existing PRD 0025 tests unchanged.
+5. Trim `bot_bottle.manifest` to the public facade and model composition,
+   leaving compatibility imports for existing callers.
+
+Each chunk should be mergeable on its own and should keep the test suite green.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+Run the existing manifest-focused unit tests after each chunk:
+
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_md_load.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_extends.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_git.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_git_user.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_agent_git_user.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_egress.py`
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_runtime.py`
+
+Add new tests only where they lock down boundary behavior not already covered,
+especially compatibility passthrough and entry-point parity.
+
+## Open Questions
+
+- Should the Claude Code passthrough allowlist intentionally track a documented
+  upstream schema, or should bot-bottle keep a narrow local allowlist and update
+  it only when users need a new shared-file field?
+- Should the public facade continue exposing every helper that tests currently
+  import from `bot_bottle.manifest`, or should tests move to public behavior
+  only during this cleanup?

docs/prds/0034-sidecar-restart-shutdown-semantics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+# PRD 0034: Sidecar Restart and Shutdown Semantics
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #126
+
+## Summary
+
+Make the sidecar bundle supervisor's signal, restart, and exit-code behavior
+explicit and easier to reason about. In particular, move pipelock restart work
+out of direct SIGUSR1 handler execution while preserving the caller-visible
+`docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` contract used by pipelock apply flows.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py` is PID 1 for the bundled sidecar container. It
+starts egress, pipelock, git-gate/git-http, and supervise; forwards shutdown
+signals; forwards SIGHUP to egress; and restarts pipelock on SIGUSR1 after
+allowlist changes.
+
+The current SIGUSR1 handler calls `sup.restart_daemon("pipelock")` directly.
+That restart path can terminate a child, wait up to a grace timeout, SIGKILL a
+stubborn child, spawn a replacement with `subprocess.Popen`, and start a new
+pump thread. In CPython signal handlers run between bytecodes in the main
+thread, so this is not the same as POSIX async-signal-unsafe C code, but it
+still means signal handling can block the supervisor loop for the restart grace
+window and makes stacked signals harder to reason about.
+
+The exit-code contract is also easy to misread. `_Supervisor.exit_code()`
+returns the maximum child return code. That preserves a positive crash code
+when a child failed before graceful shutdown, but the docstring currently
+frames graceful shutdown as returning zero because signal-killed children have
+negative return codes. The implementation is reasonable; the contract needs to
+be deliberate and tested around crash-then-shutdown behavior.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Preserve the external signal contract:
+  - SIGTERM/SIGINT requests bundle shutdown.
+  - SIGHUP still forwards to the live egress child.
+  - SIGUSR1 still requests an in-place pipelock restart.
+- Keep signal handlers small: handlers should record intent and return, not
+  perform blocking subprocess lifecycle work directly.
+- Process queued restart requests from the supervisor's main loop so restart
+  behavior is serialized with `tick()` and shutdown state.
+- Avoid respawning children after shutdown has started.
+- Coalesce or serialize repeated pipelock restart requests in a documented way
+  so stacked SIGUSR1 delivery cannot overlap restarts.
+- Clarify and test aggregate exit-code semantics:
+  - clean unattended exits return zero when every child exits zero.
+  - signal-only shutdown does not invent a positive failure code.
+  - a positive child crash before shutdown remains visible on supervisor exit.
+- Keep the implementation stdlib-only.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No new process supervisor dependency such as supervisord, s6, or runit.
+- No automatic restart policy for arbitrary unexpected child death.
+- No changes to the bundle's daemon set, daemon argv, env filtering, or Docker
+  compose contract.
+- No changes to egress route reload semantics beyond preserving SIGHUP
+  forwarding.
+- No user-facing CLI changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- Internal signal handling and supervisor event-loop structure in
+  `bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py`.
+- Tests in `tests/unit/test_sidecar_init.py` for queued restart behavior,
+  shutdown/restart ordering, repeated restart requests, and exit-code
+  semantics.
+- Docstring/comment updates that describe the concrete signal and exit-code
+  contracts.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Changing pipelock itself to reload config in process.
+- Restarting egress, git-gate, git-http, or supervise on demand.
+- Reporting restart events to the supervise MCP plane.
+- Changing the interim policy that unexpected child death leaves surviving
+  daemons running.
+
+## Design
+
+Keep `_Supervisor` as the owner of child process state, but add an explicit
+pending-action boundary between signal delivery and subprocess lifecycle work.
+The exact API can be small, for example:
+
+- `request_shutdown(reason)` keeps its existing idempotent behavior.
+- `request_restart(daemon_name)` records a pending restart request unless
+  shutdown is already in progress.
+- `tick()` drains pending restart work before or after child-death logging in a
+  documented order.
+
+The SIGUSR1 handler should call only the non-blocking request method. The main
+loop should continue to call `tick()` and sleep on `_POLL_INTERVAL`; `tick()`
+then performs the actual `restart_daemon("pipelock")` work while normal Python
+control flow is in the supervisor loop.
+
+Repeated restart requests should not overlap. Restart requests coalesce by
+daemon name: if three SIGUSR1 signals arrive before the next loop turn, one
+pipelock restart is enough because each restart rereads the latest
+`pipelock.yaml` from disk. This treats SIGUSR1 as "make pipelock reflect the
+current config" rather than "run exactly one restart per signal."
+
+Shutdown wins over restart. If SIGTERM/SIGINT is received while a restart is
+pending, the supervisor should drop the pending restart and terminate live
+children. If shutdown starts while `restart_daemon` is already executing in the
+main loop, the existing restart operation may finish, but no additional queued
+restart should start after shutdown state is set. A simpler implementation may
+check shutdown only before each queued restart, because signal handlers execute
+between bytecodes and cannot interrupt a single blocking `wait()` until control
+returns to Python.
+
+Exit-code behavior should be documented as "positive failures win, otherwise
+return zero." Positive process failures remain visible, while a clean shutdown
+of only zero-exit or signal-terminated children returns zero instead of leaking
+platform-specific negative signal return codes to the container exit status.
+
+## Implementation Chunks
+
+1. Add characterization tests for SIGUSR1 queuing, repeated restart coalescing,
+   shutdown dropping pending restarts, and crash-then-shutdown exit codes.
+2. Add a pending restart request structure to `_Supervisor` and a
+   non-blocking request method.
+3. Change the SIGUSR1 handler in `main()` to enqueue the pipelock restart
+   instead of calling `restart_daemon` directly.
+4. Drain pending restarts from `tick()` with shutdown checks and documented
+   ordering.
+5. Update docstrings and comments around signal handling and `exit_code()`.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+Run the existing sidecar unit tests:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_sidecar_init`
+
+Add focused unit tests that avoid process-wide signal handler races where
+possible by driving `_Supervisor` directly. End-to-end signal tests can remain
+limited to `main()` behavior that cannot be exercised otherwise.
+
+Also run the full unit suite before merge:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0035-supervise-wait-bounds.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# PRD 0035: Supervise Wait Bounds
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #128
+
+## Summary
+
+Bound the supervise sidecar's request-thread waits so an agent tool call cannot
+hold an HTTP worker forever while waiting for operator action. Preserve the MCP
+tool surface, but make timeout behavior explicit, observable, and tested.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/supervise_server.py` handles MCP over a threaded stdlib HTTP
+server. Tool calls validate a proposal, write it to the supervise queue, and
+then wait for the operator response file. Today that wait can last forever.
+Each outstanding tool call consumes one server thread until the operator acts.
+
+The route-listing helper also performs a live HTTP request to egress inside the
+request thread. It has a short timeout today, but the behavior is not described
+as part of a broader request-thread budget.
+
+This is operationally risky in multi-agent or repeated-call scenarios: a stuck
+or ignored proposal can accumulate blocked threads, and callers do not get a
+clear "still pending" answer they can reason about.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Add a bounded wait for operator responses to supervise tool calls.
+- Return a clear JSON-RPC tool result when the proposal remains pending after
+  the timeout; do not treat pending operator action as an internal server error.
+- Keep the queued proposal on disk after timeout so the operator can still act.
+- Make the wait duration configurable by environment with a conservative
+  default.
+- Preserve current success and rejection result shapes for completed operator
+  responses.
+- Keep `list-egress-routes` bounded and document its timeout behavior.
+- Add focused tests for approved responses, timed-out pending responses, and
+  route-list timeout/error handling.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No asynchronous framework or new runtime dependency.
+- No replacement of the stdlib threaded HTTP server.
+- No change to the host-side supervise queue format.
+- No cancellation protocol between the agent and operator UI.
+- No dashboard or TUI changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/supervise_server.py` request handling.
+- Any small helper in `bot_bottle/supervise.py` needed to support a bounded
+  wait cleanly.
+- Unit tests around tool-call response waiting and route-list behavior.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Reworking proposal persistence.
+- Changing egress apply or pipelock apply flows.
+- Adding background workers to complete HTTP requests after the client returns.
+
+## Design
+
+Introduce a supervise response wait budget,
+`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, with a 30 second default. The existing
+poll loop should stop after that budget and return a normal tool result such as
+`{"status": "pending", "notes": "operator response timed out; proposal remains queued"}`.
+The exact field names should fit the existing response schema so agents can
+handle success, rejection, and pending with one result parser.
+
+The proposal file must remain in the queue when the HTTP call times out. The
+operator can still approve or reject it later, but that later response will not
+resume the original HTTP request.
+
+Route-listing should continue to use a short HTTP timeout to egress. Errors
+should be returned as tool results or JSON-RPC errors consistently with the
+existing server behavior; the implementation should avoid an unbounded socket
+wait in the request thread.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit-test a tool call whose response appears before the timeout.
+- Unit-test a tool call whose response never appears and assert the request
+  returns a pending result while the proposal remains queued.
+- Unit-test invalid timeout env values fall back or fail clearly.
+- Unit-test `list-egress-routes` timeout/error behavior with a fake URL opener.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_supervise_server`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0036-codex-auth-redaction-policy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+# PRD 0036: Codex Auth Redaction Policy
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #129
+
+## Summary
+
+Make Codex host-auth redaction explicit and fixture-driven so dummy
+`auth.json` generation cannot accidentally preserve future sensitive fields.
+Keep forwarding only the short-lived host access token through egress, while the
+guest receives a non-secret auth file whose schema remains useful to Codex.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/codex_auth.py` reads the host Codex auth file, extracts the access
+token for egress, and writes a dummy guest `auth.json`. The code redacts JWT
+claims and auth JSON fields with a mix of schema-specific handling and generic
+placeholder behavior.
+
+That is safer than copying raw auth, but it is still coverage-sensitive. If
+Codex adds a new field that carries a token, session identifier, refresh secret,
+or account metadata and the field name does not match current heuristics, the
+dummy auth file could preserve more information than intended. Because this is
+credential-adjacent code, the desired behavior should be allowlist-oriented and
+backed by explicit fixtures.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Define a durable redaction policy for Codex `auth.json`:
+  - host access token is read for egress only.
+  - guest dummy auth contains no bearer, refresh, session, or secret values.
+  - selected non-secret fields may be preserved only when needed by Codex.
+- Prefer explicit per-field preservation over broad heuristic pass-through.
+- Add representative fixture tests for current Codex auth shapes.
+- Add regression tests for unknown nested fields, sensitive-looking field names,
+  lists, dictionaries, and JWT custom claims.
+- Preserve dummy token expiration alignment with the host access token.
+- Keep existing errors for missing, invalid, non-device, or expired auth.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No change to the egress credential-forwarding contract.
+- No attempt to refresh Codex tokens inside the bottle.
+- No copying of refresh tokens or raw host auth into the guest.
+- No dependency on a Codex SDK or external schema package.
+- No user-facing CLI changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/codex_auth.py` redaction helpers.
+- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_codex_auth.py`.
+- Small documentation comments that distinguish preserved non-secret fields from
+  redacted credential material.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Provider provisioning outside Codex auth file generation.
+- Egress route construction for Codex.
+- Runtime calls to Codex/OpenAI services.
+
+## Design
+
+Treat the dummy guest `auth.json` as a deliberately synthesized compatibility
+file, not as a redacted copy of the host file. The implementation may continue
+to start from the host object for convenience, but preserved fields should be
+controlled by explicit allowlists at known schema locations.
+
+At the top level, preserve only `auth_mode`, replace `OPENAI_API_KEY` /
+`openai_api_key` with `null`, and synthesize the `tokens` block. Unknown scalar
+top-level fields become placeholders, unknown lists become empty lists, and
+unknown dictionaries become empty objects.
+
+In token blocks, replace `access_token` and `id_token` with dummy JWTs, preserve
+the selected non-secret `account_id`, and redact every other token-block field
+with the same placeholder / empty container policy. Refresh, session, and future
+token values are never copied to the guest.
+
+In JWT payloads, preserve only claims that are known to be non-secret and
+required for Codex behavior. Unknown scalar claims become placeholders, unknown
+lists become empty lists, and unknown objects become empty objects.
+
+For the OpenAI auth claim, preserve only currently necessary non-secret values
+such as plan type, selected account id, and boolean localhost state. Everything
+else is placeholder, empty object, or empty list according to the policy.
+
+Tests should use fixture auth objects that include both current expected fields
+and intentionally hostile future-looking fields such as `session_context`,
+`bearer`, `refreshSecret`, nested `token_value`, and opaque arrays. The dummy
+output must not contain the original secret strings.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Existing `tests/unit/test_codex_auth.py` should continue to pass.
+- Add tests that assert original access/refresh/session strings do not appear in
+  `codex_dummy_auth_json`.
+- Add tests for nested JWT and auth-claim redaction behavior.
+- Add tests that the dummy access/id token `exp` still matches the host access
+  token expiry.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_codex_auth`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0037-pipelock-yaml-render-contract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# PRD 0037: Pipelock YAML Render Contract
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #130
+
+## Summary
+
+Lock down the contract between `pipelock_build_config` and
+`pipelock_render_yaml` so hand-rendered pipelock YAML stays aligned with the
+structured config bot-bottle builds. Keep the stdlib-only renderer, but add
+shape validation and semantic tests for every supported section.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/pipelock.py` builds a structured dict and then renders a fixed YAML
+shape by hand. This avoids a runtime YAML dependency, but it also means the
+renderer directly indexes expected keys. If `pipelock_build_config` adds,
+renames, or conditionalizes a section, rendering can fail at runtime or emit
+YAML that no longer matches the config semantics.
+
+Existing tests assert important rendered fragments, but they do not fully lock
+the build/render contract or optional-section combinations. A mismatch here can
+weaken DLP enforcement or break bottle launch after a future pipelock policy
+change.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Keep the renderer stdlib-only.
+- Define the supported pipelock config shape in one place.
+- Fail clearly when `pipelock_render_yaml` receives an unsupported or malformed
+  config shape.
+- Add tests covering all supported sections:
+  - base allowlist and forward proxy.
+  - seed phrase detection toggle.
+  - DLP and request-body/header scanning.
+  - TLS interception and passthrough domains.
+  - SSRF IP allowlist.
+- Add semantic tests that compare structured config values to rendered YAML
+  output without relying only on brittle substring assertions.
+- Preserve current rendered YAML for existing configs unless a clearer failure
+  path requires an error message change.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No PyYAML or other runtime dependency.
+- No change to pipelock policy defaults.
+- No change to egress-to-pipelock topology.
+- No change to pipelock image version or config schema beyond validation of the
+  shape bot-bottle already emits.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/pipelock.py` render helpers and validation.
+- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py` and related focused
+  pipelock tests.
+- Small helper functions for typed access to config sections, if useful.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Launch/backend changes.
+- Integration tests that start a real pipelock container.
+- Changing the manifest schema for route-level pipelock policy.
+
+## Design
+
+Treat `pipelock_render_yaml` as a serializer for the narrow config shape
+produced by `pipelock_build_config`, not as a generic YAML renderer. Before
+rendering a section, validate that required keys exist with the expected
+primitive/list/dict types. Missing or unsupported shapes should raise a clear
+`ValueError` naming the section and key.
+
+The supported top-level shape is `version`, `mode`, `enforce`,
+`api_allowlist`, `seed_phrase_detection`, `forward_proxy`, `dlp`,
+`request_body_scanning`, `tls_interception`, and `ssrf`. Required sections are
+validated before rendering; optional sections keep the current omission
+behavior. `request_body_scanning.scan_headers`,
+`request_body_scanning.header_mode`, and
+`tls_interception.passthrough_domains` remain optional for compatibility with
+parsed running configs that only contain the older rendered subset.
+
+Tests should cover both normal output and failure cases. Because the project is
+stdlib-only, semantic tests can use a small purpose-built parser for the exact
+rendered shape or compare rendered lines to values from the structured config
+through helper assertions. The goal is to detect drift between config dict and
+YAML without adding a general YAML dependency.
+
+Optional sections should be exercised in combinations:
+
+- no TLS and no SSRF.
+- TLS enabled with empty and non-empty passthrough domains.
+- SSRF enabled with one or more IP/CIDR entries.
+- all optional sections enabled together.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Extend `tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py` with semantic assertions tying each
+  rendered section back to the config dict.
+- Add malformed-config tests for missing required keys and wrong section types.
+- Keep existing render fragment tests where they protect exact pipelock syntax.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_pipelock_yaml`
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_pipelock_allowlist`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0038-smolmachines-env-contract.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# PRD 0038: smolmachines Env Contract and Secret-Safe Injection
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #135
+
+## Summary
+
+Make smolmachines env handling match Docker's contract: resolve manifest env
+entries through `resolve_env()`, keep secret and interpolated values out of
+host argv, and document or enforce an explicit env contract for the backend.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py` builds the guest env from
+`bottle.env` directly, bypassing `resolve_env()`. Entries like `?prompt` and
+`${HOST_VAR}` can reach the guest literally rather than being prompted or
+resolved. In contrast, Docker resolves env through `resolve_env()` before
+writing a mode-600 env file.
+
+`smolmachines/smolvm.py` renders env as `-e KEY=VALUE` on `smolvm machine
+create` argv, and `SmolmachinesBottle.agent_argv` / `exec` prepend
+`env KEY=VALUE …` onto the `smolvm machine exec` argv. Any literal or resolved
+secret value is therefore visible in the host process table.
+
+The two backends have no shared env contract document. Divergence will silently
+widen as new manifest env features are added.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Manifest env entries are resolved through `resolve_env()` before being
+  injected into the smolmachines guest, matching Docker behaviour.
+- No manifest env value (literal or resolved) appears on host argv during
+  machine creation or exec.
+- Define and document an explicit smolmachines env contract covering literals,
+  `?prompt` secrets, and `${HOST_VAR}` interpolations.
+- Unit tests cover: literal passthrough, prompted-secret resolution,
+  host-var interpolation, and the no-argv-leak invariant.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to the Docker env path.
+- No changes to manifest schema or `resolve_env()` itself.
+- No changes to smolmachines networking or mount handling.
+- No new runtime dependencies.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py` env resolution.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/smolvm.py` machine-create argv.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py` `agent_argv` / `exec` env
+  injection.
+- `bot_bottle/env.py` if helper changes are needed to support the smolmachines
+  path.
+- Unit tests in `tests/unit/` covering the above.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Integration tests that start a live smolmachines VM.
+- Docker backend changes.
+- Dashboard or CLI changes.
+
+## Design
+
+Run smolmachines env through `resolve_env()` at prepare time, exactly as Docker
+does. After resolution, inject env into the guest through a mechanism that does
+not expose values on host argv — for example by writing a mode-600 env file
+into the machine's state directory and loading it at exec time, or by passing
+env through `smolvm`'s stdin if the tool supports it.
+
+If `smolvm` provides no stdin or env-file injection path, document this as a
+known limitation and at minimum move env values behind a per-invocation
+tmpfile rather than inline argv.
+
+The env contract for smolmachines should mirror Docker's:
+
+- Literals: passed as-is after resolution.
+- `?prompt` entries: prompted at prepare time; resolved value injected, never
+  on argv.
+- `${HOST_VAR}` entries: interpolated from the operator's env at prepare time;
+  resolved value injected, never on argv.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit tests for `prepare.py` asserting `resolve_env()` is called and that
+  resolution results are used rather than raw `bottle.env` values.
+- Unit tests for `smolvm.py` machine-create argv asserting no env value appears
+  inline.
+- Unit tests for `bottle.py` exec path asserting the same argv invariant.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_smolmachines_prepare`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+- Does `smolvm machine create` support an env-file flag or stdin injection that
+  avoids `-e KEY=VALUE` argv?

docs/prds/0039-smolmachines-capability-remediation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# PRD 0039: smolmachines Capability-Block Remediation
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #136
+
+## Summary
+
+Make capability-block remediation backend-aware. Today the dashboard approval
+path calls Docker-only teardown and apply code regardless of which backend
+created the bottle. Either implement smolmachines remediation or add a clean
+disable/unsupported path so operators never get a partial Docker teardown
+against a smolmachines slug.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` dispatches every capability-block approval to
+`bot_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py`. That code snapshots with
+`docker cp`, pushes via `docker exec`, rewrites a Dockerfile override, and
+removes Docker containers and networks. It does not stop or delete a smolvm
+machine.
+
+smolmachines bottles still receive the capability-block supervise tool through
+`backend/smolmachines/provision/supervise.py`, so agents can queue a
+remediation the host cannot correctly apply. A partial Docker teardown against
+a smolmachines slug corrupts neither backend cleanly.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Capability-block approval is routed to backend-specific code.
+- For the smolmachines backend, either:
+  a. A real remediation implementation that stops the VM, applies the
+     capability change, and restarts correctly; or
+  b. A clean unsupported response that tells the operator the action cannot
+     be taken and leaves the bottle in a consistent state.
+- If option (b): smolmachines agents do not receive the capability-block tool,
+  so the operator is never prompted for an action that will fail.
+- Unit tests cover the dispatch logic and the smolmachines path.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to the Docker capability-apply path.
+- No changes to other supervise tools (cred-block, pipelock-block).
+- No changes to manifest or egress configuration.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` approval dispatch.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/supervise.py` tool registration.
+- New or updated backend-specific capability apply/disable module for
+  smolmachines.
+- Unit tests for dispatch routing and smolmachines path.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Changes to `backend/docker/capability_apply.py` internals.
+- Integration tests that exercise a live smolmachines VM remediation.
+
+## Design
+
+Introduce a backend-aware dispatch at the approval call site. Each backend
+exposes a capability remediation entry point; the dashboard calls the one that
+matches the bottle's backend. If the backend does not support remediation,
+the entry point returns a structured error that the dashboard surfaces as an
+operator message without attempting any teardown.
+
+If option (b) is chosen initially, suppress capability-block registration in
+`smolmachines/provision/supervise.py` so agents never see the tool.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit test that approval dispatch selects the smolmachines path for a
+  smolmachines bottle and the Docker path for a Docker bottle.
+- Unit test for the smolmachines path (unsupported response or real apply).
+- Regression test that Docker approval still calls `capability_apply.py`.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+- Is a real smolmachines capability-apply implementation in scope for this PRD,
+  or should it be deferred to a follow-on after PRD 0040 lands?

docs/prds/0040-backend-aware-resume-and-dashboard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# PRD 0040: Backend-Aware Resume and Dashboard Reattach
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #137
+
+## Summary
+
+Persist the backend name in `BottleMetadata` and thread it through `resume` and
+dashboard reattach so both flows construct the correct backend bottle without
+relying on env overrides or defaulting to Docker.
+
+## Problem
+
+`BottleMetadata` records identity, agent, cwd, started_at, and compose project,
+but not the backend name. Without it:
+
+- `cli/resume.py` cannot select the right backend from a preserved state dir
+  alone; operators must remember to set `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines`
+  separately.
+- `cli/dashboard.py` `_bottle_for_slug` constructs a `DockerBottle` for any
+  externally discovered slug, so reattaching to a live smolmachines agent
+  from the dashboard sends Docker commands to a smolvm machine.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `BottleMetadata` includes the backend name, written at bottle creation time
+  for both Docker and smolmachines.
+- `cli resume` reads the persisted backend name and constructs the correct
+  bottle type without requiring an env override.
+- Dashboard reattach (`_bottle_for_slug`) reads the persisted backend name and
+  constructs the correct bottle type.
+- Existing Docker bottles without a persisted backend name fall back to Docker
+  (backward-compatible default).
+- Unit tests cover write, read, backward-compatible fallback, and both
+  resume/reattach code paths.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to manifest or egress configuration.
+- No new CLI flags (backend selection at resume time should be automatic).
+- No smolmachines capability-apply implementation (see PRD 0039).
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py` `BottleMetadata` schema and
+  write path.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle.py` and
+  `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py` metadata write at creation.
+- `bot_bottle/cli/resume.py` backend selection from metadata.
+- `bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` `_bottle_for_slug` backend selection.
+- Unit tests covering the above.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Migration tooling for existing state dirs.
+- Integration tests that exercise full resume across process restarts.
+
+## Design
+
+Add a `backend` field to `BottleMetadata` with a default of `"docker"` for
+backward compatibility. Both `DockerBottle` and `SmolmachinesBottle` write
+their backend name into metadata at creation time.
+
+`resume` reads the metadata before constructing the bottle object and selects
+the appropriate backend class. `_bottle_for_slug` does the same. A helper
+function in the metadata module can encapsulate the backend-name-to-class
+mapping so the logic is not duplicated.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit tests for `BottleMetadata` serialisation with and without the backend
+  field.
+- Unit tests for the backward-compatible default.
+- Unit tests for `resume` selecting smolmachines vs Docker from metadata.
+- Unit tests for `_bottle_for_slug` selecting smolmachines vs Docker.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0041-git-http-request-bounds.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# PRD 0041: Git HTTP Request Bounds
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #138
+
+## Summary
+
+Add Content-Length validation and a body-size cap to `git_http_backend.py` so malformed or oversized smart-HTTP requests fail cleanly rather than crashing the handler or exhausting memory.
+
+## Problem
+
+`bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py` calls `int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))` without catching `ValueError`. A request with a non-numeric Content-Length raises an unhandled exception in the request handler.
+
+The handler reads the full declared length into memory before passing the body to `git http-backend` with no upper bound. A local or compromised client can force arbitrarily high memory use. For comparison, `supervise_server.py` caps request bodies at 1 MiB.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A missing or non-numeric Content-Length returns HTTP 400.
+- A negative Content-Length returns HTTP 400.
+- A body larger than the cap (1 MiB, matching `supervise_server.py`) returns HTTP 413.
+- Valid Git smart-HTTP pushes and fetches continue to work.
+- Unit tests cover: missing length, non-numeric length, negative length, over-cap length, and a valid push/fetch passthrough.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to git-gate authentication or route logic.
+- No changes to `supervise_server.py`.
+- No streaming / chunked-transfer-encoding support.
+- No TLS changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py` request parsing and body reading.
+- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_git_http_backend.py`.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Integration tests that drive a real Git client through the handler.
+
+## Design
+
+Wrap the Content-Length parse in a try/except and return 400 on `ValueError`. Add an explicit check for negative values. After parsing, compare the declared length against a module-level `MAX_BODY_BYTES` constant (default 1 MiB) and return 413 if exceeded. Read exactly `min(content_length, MAX_BODY_BYTES)` bytes.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit tests using `unittest.mock` to drive the handler with crafted headers.
+- Test cases: no Content-Length header, `Content-Length: abc`, `Content-Length: -1`, `Content-Length: 2097152` (over cap), and a normal small POST body.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_git_http_backend`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0042-smolmachines-parity-tests.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# PRD 0042: smolmachines Cross-Backend Parity Tests
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #139
+
+## Summary
+
+Add tests that prove secrets, forwarded env, resume, and remediation behave
+equivalently across Docker and smolmachines backends. The fixes in PRDs
+0038–0040 are unverifiable without this coverage.
+
+## Problem
+
+The existing unit suite is broad but backend-specific. There are no tests that
+run the same scenario against both Docker and smolmachines and assert the
+outcomes match. A regression in one backend goes undetected until a live run,
+and PRDs 0038–0040 can each pass their own unit tests while the backends still
+diverge at the integration boundary.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A parity test suite that covers at least:
+  - Secret env injection: `?prompt` and `${HOST_VAR}` entries produce the same
+    guest env on both backends.
+  - Forwarded env: literal manifest env values reach the guest on both backends.
+  - Resume: a preserved bottle state dir round-trips correctly on both backends
+    (relies on PRD 0040 metadata).
+  - Remediation: capability-block approval routes to the correct backend handler
+    (relies on PRD 0039 dispatch).
+- Each scenario is parameterised so a failure names the backend that regressed.
+- Tests run without a live VM or Docker daemon (mock or stub backends).
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No end-to-end agent execution tests.
+- No performance or load tests.
+- No changes to production code (test-only PRD).
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- New test file(s) under `tests/unit/` for parity scenarios.
+- Stub or mock implementations of smolmachines and Docker backends as needed.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Changes to `bot_bottle/` production code.
+- CI infrastructure changes beyond adding the new test file to the discover
+  invocation.
+
+## Dependencies
+
+- PRD 0038 should land before the env parity tests are finalised.
+- PRDs 0039 and 0040 should land before the remediation and resume scenarios
+  are finalised; stubs can be written speculatively beforehand.
+
+## Design
+
+Parameterise each scenario over a list of backend factory functions. Each
+factory returns a bottle instance wired to a stub subprocess layer. The test
+body is backend-agnostic: it calls the same public API, captures the same
+observable output, and asserts equality.
+
+For env scenarios, capture the argv or env-file content passed to the guest
+and compare against resolved manifest values. For resume, write metadata with
+one backend class and read it back to verify correct selection. For remediation,
+assert dispatch selects the per-backend handler.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+Run as part of the standard unit discover:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+Or directly:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_backend_parity`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+- Should parity tests live under `tests/unit/` (mock-based) or
+  `tests/integration/` (live infra)? Mock-based is preferred to keep CI simple.

docs/prds/0043-sidecar-pipe-lifecycle.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# PRD 0043: Sidecar Pipe Lifecycle Cleanup
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #140
+
+## Summary
+
+Close the unclosed child stdout pipe file descriptors that `sidecar_init.py`
+leaks during restart and shutdown paths, eliminating `ResourceWarning` noise
+and tightening the process lifecycle.
+
+## Problem
+
+Unit tests for `sidecar_init.py` pass, but restart and shutdown cases emit
+`ResourceWarning: unclosed file <_io.BufferedReader …>` for child stdout pipes,
+originating around lines 141 and 273. The warnings indicate the restart path
+leaks pipe file descriptors: a pipe opened for a stopped or replaced child is
+not explicitly closed before the next child is spawned or before the supervisor
+exits.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_sidecar_init` produces no
+  `ResourceWarning` output.
+- Pipe file descriptors for stopped or replaced child processes are explicitly
+  closed in the restart path.
+- Pipe file descriptors for all children are explicitly closed in the shutdown
+  path.
+- No change to the external signal or exit-code contract from PRD 0034.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to restart or shutdown policy (coalescing, ordering, timeout).
+- No changes to egress, pipelock, git-gate, or supervise daemon argv.
+- No new runtime dependencies.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py` pipe open/close lifecycle in `_Supervisor`.
+- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_sidecar_init.py` asserting no leaked pipes.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Changing how pumping threads read from pipes.
+- Integration tests that start a live sidecar container.
+
+## Design
+
+Audit every code path in `_Supervisor` where a child process is stopped,
+replaced, or reaches end-of-life, and ensure the corresponding stdout pipe is
+explicitly closed before spawning a replacement or exiting the supervisor loop.
+
+Where a pumping thread holds a reference to the pipe, coordinate closure so the
+thread sees EOF and exits cleanly rather than blocking indefinitely.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Enable `ResourceWarning` as an error in test setUp:
+  `warnings.simplefilter("error", ResourceWarning)`.
+- Run existing restart and shutdown test cases under this stricter setting.
+- Add tests for restart-then-shutdown if not already covered.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_sidecar_init`
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0044-print-parity-across-backends.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# PRD 0044: Print Parity Across Backends
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #96
+
+## Summary
+
+Hoist `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `agent_provision`, and `supervise_plan`
+from the concrete `BottlePlan` subclasses up to `BottlePlan`, and implement
+`print` concretely there. This eliminates the two per-backend output divergences
+and ensures any future backend gets correct preflight rendering for free.
+
+## Problem
+
+`BottlePlan.print` is `@abstractmethod`, so each backend provides its own
+implementation. The two current implementations have drifted:
+
+| Field | Docker | smolmachines |
+|---|---|---|
+| git gate lines | `upstream_host:upstream_port` from resolved `git_gate_plan.upstreams` | `Name → Upstream` from manifest `bottle.git` |
+| egress lines | `host [auth:scheme]` | `host` only (auth dropped) |
+
+The smolmachines docstring says "same shape as the Docker backend's so operators
+see one format across backends" — that intent is real but nothing enforces it.
+
+The env_names divergence previously noted in this issue was resolved by PRD 0038
+(smolmachines env contract): `resolved.forwarded` is now merged into
+`agent_provision.guest_env` at prepare time on both backends, so displayed env
+names are equivalent.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `BottlePlan` carries `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `agent_provision`, and
+  `supervise_plan` as concrete fields; subclasses no longer declare them
+  independently.
+- `BottlePlan.print` is a concrete method; subclasses have no `print`
+  implementation of their own.
+- Both backends render git gate lines as `name → upstream_host:upstream_port`
+  (using `git_gate_plan.upstreams`), not the manifest-level URL.
+- Both backends render egress lines as `host [auth:scheme]` (dropping the
+  annotation only when `auth_scheme` is empty).
+- Unit tests assert the unified output for both backends from a single shared
+  test helper.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No changes to the Docker or smolmachines launch, prepare, or cleanup paths.
+- No changes to how env values are resolved or injected (that is PRD 0038).
+- No changes to the manifest schema or `GitEntry`.
+- No new CLI flags or dashboard changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- `bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py` — add `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`,
+  `agent_provision`, and `supervise_plan` fields to `BottlePlan`; replace
+  `@abstractmethod print` with a concrete implementation.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_plan.py` — remove the four hoisted fields
+  and the `print` method.
+- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle_plan.py` — remove the four hoisted
+  fields and the `print` method.
+- `tests/unit/` — add or update tests asserting unified preflight output; a
+  shared helper can build a minimal plan fixture for each backend and assert
+  the same lines appear.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Changes to `bot_bottle/backend/print_util.py` beyond what the new `print`
+  implementation requires.
+- Changes to `BottleCleanupPlan.print` or any other print method.
+- Integration tests that launch a real bottle.
+
+## Design
+
+Move the four fields that both concrete subclasses already declare —
+`git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan`, `egress_plan: EgressPlan`,
+`agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan`, `supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None`
+— up to `BottlePlan`. Both backends' `prepare` paths already produce these with
+the same types, so no prepare-time changes are needed.
+
+Replace the `@abstractmethod` `print` with a concrete implementation on
+`BottlePlan` that:
+
+1. Builds `env_names` from `bottle.env.keys() | agent_provision.guest_env.keys()`
+   filtered through `agent_provision.hidden_env_names`.
+2. Builds git gate lines from `git_gate_plan.upstreams` as
+   `f"{u.name} → {u.upstream_host}:{u.upstream_port}"`.
+3. Builds egress lines from `egress_plan.routes` as
+   `f"{r.host} [auth:{r.auth_scheme}]"` when `r.auth_scheme` is non-empty,
+   else `r.host`.
+4. Renders the standard two-column preflight block (leading blank line, agent,
+   provider, env, skills, bottle, git identity, git gate, egress, trailing blank
+   line).
+
+Docker's `forwarded_env` keys are already merged into `agent_provision.guest_env`
+via the `agent_provision_plan` builder, so no special handling is needed for
+env_names.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Add a shared fixture builder (e.g. `make_plan(backend)`) in a new or existing
+  unit test module that constructs a minimal `DockerBottlePlan` and
+  `SmolmachinesBottlePlan` from the same spec and plan fields.
+- Assert that `plan.print(remote_control=False)` produces identical git gate and
+  egress lines for both backends given the same `git_gate_plan` and
+  `egress_plan`.
+- Test the `auth_scheme` annotation: present when non-empty, absent otherwise.
+- Test git gate rendering: `name → host:port` format.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0045-workspace-porting-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+# PRD 0045: Workspace Porting Plan
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #116
+
+## Summary
+
+Add a backend-neutral `WorkspacePlan` that describes how the operator's current
+workspace is represented inside a bottle. Docker and smolmachines should both
+use this plan for workspace path, working directory, content copy, `.git` copy,
+ownership, and provider trust configuration instead of rediscovering
+`/home/node/workspace` in separate launch and provisioning code paths.
+
+## Problem
+
+The current `--cwd` behavior is spread across backend-specific code:
+
+- Docker builds a derived image that copies the host cwd to
+  `/home/node/workspace`, sets that as `WORKDIR`, and patches Claude trust in
+  the generated Dockerfile.
+- Docker git provisioning separately copies `.git` into
+  `/home/node/workspace/.git`.
+- smolmachines git provisioning reconstructs `<guest_home>/workspace/.git`, but
+  does not copy the full working tree.
+- Codex provider setup trusts `guest_home`, not the copied workspace path.
+
+These details create backend drift and make provider-specific workspace fixes
+easy to hard-code in the wrong layer.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `BottleSpec` remains the CLI intent shape (`copy_cwd`, `user_cwd`), while a
+  resolved `WorkspacePlan` carries the backend-neutral guest workspace contract.
+- `BottlePlan` exposes `workspace_plan` so shared and backend-specific
+  provisioning paths consume one resolved object.
+- The default in-bottle workspace path remains `/home/node/workspace` when
+  `--cwd` is enabled.
+- Docker uses `WorkspacePlan` when building the derived cwd image and when
+  provisioning cwd `.git` state.
+- smolmachines copies the host cwd contents into the same logical workspace
+  path and uses `WorkspacePlan` when provisioning cwd `.git` state.
+- Provider trust configuration is written for the workspace path when `--cwd`
+  is enabled, and for the guest home when `--cwd` is disabled.
+- Unit tests cover plan resolution, provider trust path selection, Docker
+  derived image rendering, and both backends' `.git` copy targets.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No new user-facing flags for custom workspace paths.
+- No manifest schema changes.
+- No redesign of git-gate or `bottle.git` entries.
+- No switch from Docker image-copy to bind-mount.
+- No unrelated provider auth changes.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- Add a small workspace planning module.
+- Add `workspace_plan` to `BottlePlan` and populate it in Docker and
+  smolmachines prepare paths.
+- Thread the trusted project path into provider provisioning.
+- Replace hard-coded `/home/node/workspace` cwd copy and `.git` copy sites with
+  `WorkspacePlan` values.
+- Copy full host cwd contents for smolmachines `--cwd` parity.
+- Update focused unit tests.
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- Integration tests that launch real Docker containers or smolmachines VMs.
+- Path customization in the bottle manifest or CLI.
+- Runtime synchronization after bottle launch; this remains a launch-time copy.
+
+## Design
+
+Add `bot_bottle/workspace.py`:
+
+```python
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class WorkspacePlan:
+    enabled: bool
+    host_path: Path
+    guest_home: str
+    guest_path: str
+    workdir: str
+    owner: str = "node:node"
+    mode: str = "755"
+    copy_contents: bool = True
+    copy_git: bool = True
+    has_host_git_dir: bool = False
+```
+
+`workspace_plan(spec, guest_home)` resolves:
+
+- `enabled` from `spec.copy_cwd`.
+- `host_path` from `spec.user_cwd`.
+- `guest_path` as `<guest_home>/workspace` when enabled, else `guest_home`.
+- `workdir` as `guest_path` when enabled, else `guest_home`.
+- `has_host_git_dir` from `<host_path>/.git`.
+
+Backends resolve this in `prepare` using their existing guest-home knobs:
+
+- Docker: `BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME`, default `/home/node`.
+- smolmachines: `BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME`, default `/home/node`.
+
+`BottlePlan` carries the result so launch, git provisioning, and provider
+provisioning stop consulting `spec.copy_cwd` and hard-coded paths directly.
+
+### Docker
+
+Keep the current derived-image transport. Change
+`build_image_with_cwd(derived, base, cwd)` to accept a `WorkspacePlan` or
+explicit guest path/workdir fields, then render:
+
+- `COPY --chown=node:node . <workspace_plan.guest_path>`
+- `WORKDIR <workspace_plan.workdir>`
+
+Claude trust should move out of the generated cwd Dockerfile and into provider
+provisioning so Docker and smolmachines share the same provider trust behavior.
+
+### smolmachines
+
+Copy host cwd contents into `workspace_plan.guest_path` during provisioning or
+VM initialization, then chown the resulting workspace to `node:node`. Continue
+to copy `.git` through the existing smolvm transport, but target
+`<workspace_plan.guest_path>/.git`.
+
+This intentionally closes the current parity gap where smolmachines receives
+repo metadata without the working tree.
+
+### Provider Trust
+
+Extend provider planning with a `trusted_project_path` argument. Callers pass
+`workspace_plan.workdir`.
+
+Codex writes:
+
+```toml
+[projects."<trusted_project_path>"]
+trust_level = "trusted"
+```
+
+Claude writes or updates `.claude.json` so `projects` includes
+`trusted_project_path` with `hasTrustDialogAccepted: true`. This provisioning
+belongs in `AgentProvisionPlan` so both backends apply it through their existing
+provider file-copy primitives.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+- Unit-test `workspace_plan()` for enabled and disabled cwd, guest-home
+  overrides, and `.git` detection.
+- Unit-test Docker cwd image rendering to prove it uses the plan's guest path
+  and workdir.
+- Unit-test provider planning for Codex and Claude trusted project paths.
+- Unit-test Docker and smolmachines git provisioning targets using mocked copy
+  and exec primitives.
+- Unit-test smolmachines workspace content copy target and ownership command.
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0046-remove-git-remote-host-overrides.md

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# PRD 0046: Remove Git Remote Host Overrides
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis-codex
+- **Created:** 2026-06-02
+- **Issue:** #152
+
+## Summary
+
+Remove git remote host override plumbing from bottle manifests and git-gate
+startup. Git remote declarations should describe upstream repositories and the
+git-gate credential material needed to mirror them; they should not also
+configure hosts-file behavior for sidecars.
+
+## Problem
+
+The git remote model currently has a hosts override path that can make a git
+upstream resolve differently inside the git-gate sidecar. That is surprising
+because the same hostname may also be used for HTTP/API traffic that should keep
+using the normal egress DNS and policy path.
+
+Keeping host resolution in the git remote model makes repository routing,
+sidecar hosts files, and egress behavior feel coupled even when the operator
+only meant to configure git-gate.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- Git remote manifest parsing no longer stores host override data.
+- Git-gate upstream plans no longer carry host override data.
+- Docker compose rendering no longer emits sidecar `extra_hosts` entries from
+  git remote declarations.
+- Smolmachines bundle launch planning has no unused host override path for
+  git-gate.
+- Focused unit tests cover the absence of sidecar `extra_hosts` for git
+  upstreams.
+- Current user-facing documentation no longer advertises git remote host
+  overrides.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No replacement hosts-file override feature.
+- No SSH client config provisioning.
+- No change to git-gate's SSH credential or known-host handling.
+- No change to egress DNS, HTTP auth, or pipelock routing semantics.
+
+## Design
+
+Remove the host override field from the internal `GitEntry` and
+`GitGateUpstream` models. Remove the git-gate aggregation helper and the Docker
+compose code that converted those values into sidecar `extra_hosts`.
+
+The manifest parser does not need a migration-specific error path. After this
+change, the old hosts override key has no internal model field and no runtime
+effect.
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+Run:
+
+- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/0047-git-gate-manifest-redesign.md

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# PRD 0047: Git-gate Manifest Redesign
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** didericis
+- **Created:** 2026-06-03
+- **Issue:** #160
+
+## Summary
+
+Replace the `git` top-level key in bottle and agent manifests with `git-gate`,
+consolidating git-identity configuration (`user`) and git-gate sidecar
+configuration (`repos`) under a single section. Within `repos`, field names
+move to lowercase snake_case and the local repo name is promoted to the YAML
+key. The change removes the ambiguity in the current `git` block: its fields
+are not generic git or SSH config — they are specifically the credential,
+host-trust, and identity material that is managed in relation to git-gate.
+
+## Problem
+
+The current bottle manifest uses a `git` top-level key that mixes two concerns:
+
+- `git.user` — `git config --global user.name / user.email` identity, which
+  the provisioner injects into the agent's shell.
+- `git.remotes` — upstream URL, identity file, and host key material that the
+  git-gate sidecar consumes; the agent never sees these values.
+
+That grouping suggests the `remotes` entries behave like an SSH config or a
+generic `.gitconfig` remote declaration. They do not. The gate reads the
+credential material to push upstream after gitleaks passes; the agent's
+`.gitconfig` receives only the `insteadOf` rewrite that redirects traffic
+through the gate. Nothing in the current key name or field names signals this.
+
+Splitting `git.user` into a separate section from `git.remotes` also doesn't
+help: both concepts exist because of git-gate, and keeping them under a single
+`git-gate` key makes their relationship and purpose explicit.
+
+The field names inside each remote entry also use PascalCase (`Name`,
+`Upstream`, `IdentityFile`, `KnownHostKey`), inconsistent with every other
+manifest section, which uses snake_case.
+
+The current `git.remotes` dict is keyed by upstream host, which works for
+simple remotes but forces a separate `Name` field to give the gate's bare repo
+a local label. The host key and `Name` field are often redundant or confusing
+(e.g., IP-literal upstreams where the key carries no semantic meaning).
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `git-gate` is accepted as a top-level bottle and agent key; `git` is removed
+  from both allowed-key sets.
+- `git-gate.repos` is a named map where each key is the local repo name
+  exposed by the gate (bottle-only; rejected at the agent level).
+- Each entry in `git-gate.repos` accepts exactly: `url` (required), `identity`
+  (required), `host_key` (optional).
+- `git-gate.user` replaces `git.user` on both bottles and agents, with the
+  same `name` / `email` fields and overlay semantics.
+- The manifest parser rejects `git.remotes` and `git.user` with errors that
+  point to the new keys.
+- `GitEntry` internal fields are updated to match the new names; all callers
+  (provisioner, git-gate render, plan, tests) compile and pass.
+- Existing unit tests in `tests/unit/test_manifest_git.py` and
+  `tests/unit/test_manifest_git_user.py` are rewritten to use the new YAML
+  shape; all other manifest unit tests remain green.
+- The demo manifest (`bot-bottle.demo.json`) and any examples using the old
+  shape are updated.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- No change to `git.user` / `git-gate.user` semantics or field names (`name`,
+  `email`).
+- No change to git-gate runtime behavior (mirroring, gitleaks, access-hook
+  refresh).
+- No change to the `insteadOf` rewrite the provisioner emits.
+- No migration shim: the old `git.*` shape is rejected immediately with clear
+  error messages pointing to the new keys.
+- No change to how agent-level user config overlays the bottle-level value.
+
+## Design
+
+### New manifest shape
+
+**Before** (bottle frontmatter):
+
+```yaml
+git:
+  user:
+    name: implementer-bot
+    email: eric+implementer@dideric.is
+  remotes:
+    gitea.dideric.is:
+      Name: bot-bottle
+      Upstream: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
+      IdentityFile: ~/.ssh/gitea-delos-2.pem
+      KnownHostKey: "ssh-rsa AAAA..."
+```
+
+**After**:
+
+```yaml
+git-gate:
+  user:
+    name: implementer-bot
+    email: eric+implementer@dideric.is
+  repos:
+    bot-bottle:
+      url: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
+      identity: ~/.ssh/gitea-delos-2.pem
+      host_key: "ssh-rsa AAAA..."
+```
+
+`git-gate` is the single optional top-level key for all git configuration.
+Bottles that previously used only `git.user` now use only `git-gate.user`;
+those that used only `git.remotes` now use only `git-gate.repos`.
+
+### Key-name-as-repo-name
+
+The YAML key in `git-gate.repos` becomes the local repo name (previously
+`Name`). The upstream host is no longer the primary key; the provisioner and
+gate derive it from the `url` field during parse. IP-literal upstreams work
+without an artificial host-as-key constraint.
+
+### Field renames
+
+| Old field | New field |
+|-----------|-----------|
+| `Name` (from dict key) | YAML key in `repos` |
+| `Upstream` | `url` |
+| `IdentityFile` | `identity` |
+| `KnownHostKey` | `host_key` |
+
+### Parser changes
+
+- `manifest_schema.py`: replace `"git"` with `"git-gate"` in `BOTTLE_KEYS`
+  and `AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL`.
+- `manifest.py`: replace `_parse_git_config` with `_parse_git_gate_config`
+  that validates both `user` and `repos` subkeys. Update `Bottle.from_dict`
+  and `Agent.from_dict` to call it for the `"git-gate"` key.
+- `Agent.from_dict` continues to reject `repos` at the agent level with a
+  clear error.
+- Remove `from_remote_dict` and update `GitEntry._from_object` to accept the
+  new field names. Internal dataclass field names (`UpstreamUser`, etc.) are
+  unchanged — they are internal plumbing, not user-facing.
+- Any existing `"git"` key raises a targeted error:
+
+  ```
+  bottle 'dev' uses 'git' which has been replaced by 'git-gate' (PRD 0047).
+  Move git.user → git-gate.user and git.remotes → git-gate.repos.
+  ```
+
+## Testing Strategy
+
+Run:
+
+```
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit
+```
+
+Test files to update:
+
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_git.py` — rewrite fixtures and assertions to use
+  `git-gate.repos` / lowercase fields. Cover: minimal entry, optional
+  `host_key`, missing `url`, missing `identity`, unknown key, IP-literal
+  upstreams, duplicate name rejection, old `git.remotes` and bare `git` key
+  both rejected.
+- `tests/unit/test_manifest_git_user.py` and
+  `tests/unit/test_manifest_agent_git_user.py` — update fixtures to use
+  `git-gate.user` at both bottle and agent level.
+
+## Open Questions
+
+None.

docs/prds/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Product requirement docs
+
+One PRD per feature: what to build, why, and how it's scoped. The PRD
+is the durable spec — it should stand on its own without a Gitea issue
+thread (see [`../README.md`](../README.md) for when a PRD is the right
+document vs. a research note or a decision record).
+
+## Naming and numbering
+
+`NNNN-kebab-title.md`, zero-padded and sequential (`0024-…`, `0025-…`).
+Numbers are never reused; gaps are fine (there is no 0005). The number
+is assigned at creation and stays fixed for the life of the doc.
+
+## Status
+
+The `Status:` line near the top tracks the PRD's lifecycle:
+
+- **Draft** — proposed, not yet shipped.
+- **Active** — the design has shipped to `main` and is in effect.
+- **Superseded by [PRD NNNN](…)** — replaced by a later PRD; kept for history.
+- **Retargeted by [PRD NNNN](…)** — folded into a later PRD's scope.
+
+## Format
+
+```markdown
+# PRD NNNN: <short title>
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** <who>
+- **Created:** YYYY-MM-DD
+- **Issue:** #<n>            # optional — convenience pointer only
+
+## Summary
+One paragraph: what this builds and the pain it solves.
+
+## Problem
+The current state and why it's inadequate.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+Bullets a reviewer can check the finished work against.
+
+## Non-goals
+What this explicitly does not do — and won't, to head off scope creep.
+
+## Scope
+In scope / out of scope, when the boundary needs spelling out.
+
+## Design
+How it works: schema, data flow, diagrams, algorithms as needed.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+Ordered, mergeable steps (optional; for multi-PR features).
+
+## Open questions
+Unresolved decisions — resolve or fold into Design before shipping.
+```
+
+Sections are a guide, not a straitjacket: drop the ones a given PRD
+doesn't need (a small change rarely needs Scope or Implementation
+chunks) and add others where they help (e.g. Testing strategy,
+Alternatives considered, References). Keep the rationale self-contained
+— inline the reasoning rather than linking out to an issue thread, so
+the PRD survives a move off Gitea.

docs/research/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Research notes
+
+Investigations into a question or a design space — landscape surveys,
+tradeoff analyses, "should we do X or Y," assessments of an approach
+before (or instead of) committing it to a PRD. A research note is where
+the *thinking* lives; a PRD is where a decided feature lives, and a
+decision record is where a settled choice lives (see
+[`../README.md`](../README.md) for picking between them).
+
+Notes are opinionated. They reach a conclusion rather than dumping a
+neutral survey — the point is to move a decision forward and leave a
+durable record of why it went the way it did.
+
+## Naming
+
+`kebab-case-topic.md`, named by subject and **not** numbered (unlike
+PRDs and decision records). Pick a name that says what was
+investigated: `bash-vs-python-vs-go.md`, `pipelock-assessment.md`,
+`issue-tracking-vs-in-repo-decision-history.md`.
+
+## Shape (freeform)
+
+There's no fixed template — use whatever structure fits the question.
+In practice most notes share a loose shape:
+
+- **Open with the question** — a sentence or two on what's being
+  investigated and why it came up.
+- **Lead with the verdict** — a `## Summary` near the top stating the
+  conclusion, so a reader gets the answer without reading the whole
+  thing.
+- **Then the analysis** — whatever the argument needs: comparison
+  tables, per-option sections, failure-mode walkthroughs, the axes that
+  actually matter.
+- **End with a recommendation** when the note exists to drive a
+  decision.
+
+Keep the reasoning self-contained and grounded: cite sources, link
+files and PRDs, and prefer concrete evidence from this repo over
+generic claims — a note should stand on its own without a chat log or a
+Gitea thread. When a note's recommendation gets acted on, capture the
+resulting decision in a PRD or a decision record; the note stays as the
+"why we looked into it," not the system of record for the choice.

docs/research/agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md

@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ In priority order:
    npm even if it captures something. Also disable Sentry error
    reporting via `DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING=1`.
 
-3. **Generalize the same proxy to forge tokens.** Add a manifest
+3. **Generalize the same proxy to Git-host tokens.** Add a manifest
    field along the lines of
-   `forge: { kind: "gitea", url, tokenRef }` so a per-bottle token
+   `git_host: { kind: "gitea", url, tokenRef }` so a per-bottle token
    reference resolves at launch, the proxy starts as root before
    `node` is exec'd, and `tea` plus git HTTPS remotes are
    pre-configured to point at the proxy. Use

docs/research/issue-tracking-vs-in-repo-decision-history.md

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+# Tracking feature requests in Gitea vs. in-repo decision history
+
+Research into whether bot-bottle should track feature requests (and the
+decision-making around them) as Gitea issues, given that the project
+already records specs in-repo as PRDs (`docs/prds/`) and rationale as
+research notes (`docs/research/`). The stated constraint is that the
+*history of why we decided things* should be durable and portable —
+not locked into a single hosting provider (Gitea today, conceivably
+GitHub or something else tomorrow).
+
+## Summary
+
+Keep using issues, but demote them. The repository — not Gitea — is
+the system of record for any decision you would be unhappy to lose.
+Issues are an excellent **inbox and coordination surface** (cheap
+capture, triage, async discussion, notifications, auto-linking) and a
+**poor archive** (provider-locked storage, brittle numeric references,
+rationale stranded in comment threads). The failure mode to avoid is the
+one already present in the repo: a PRD whose reasoning is only complete
+if you also read a Gitea issue thread.
+
+The fix is a discipline, not a tool: **every load-bearing decision gets
+reified into a versioned file in the repo before the issue that prompted
+it is closed.** PRDs already do this for features; the gap is (a) small
+requests that never merit a PRD and (b) decisions that aren't features
+at all (e.g. "we merge with rebase," "author identity is claimed-not-
+vouched"). Close that gap with a lightweight in-repo decision log. Then
+issues can be as disposable as Gitea makes them, and migrating off
+Gitea costs you triage state, not history.
+
+## Why this even comes up here
+
+The project already leans on the repo for durable artifacts:
+
+- **PRDs** (`docs/prds/0001…0027`) — the spec and its rationale.
+- **Research notes** (`docs/research/`) — the "why," with tradeoffs.
+- **Conventional-commit history** — a machine-greppable change log.
+
+But the issue layer has quietly become load-bearing in places:
+
+- PRD 0025 says it picked "option 3" *"from the #88 design
+  discussion"* and that the rejected alternative lives "in issue #88's
+  comment thread." The PRD's rationale is therefore **incomplete without
+  the issue**. If Gitea is gone, the strongest argument for the chosen
+  design is gone with it.
+- PR #89's description links `…/didericis/claude-bottle/issues/88` —
+  the **pre-rename** repo path (the project was Codex-bottle/claude-
+  bottle before the bot-bottle rebrand). That link is already
+  half-dead: a concrete demonstration that Gitea URLs rot under the
+  most routine event imaginable, a rename.
+- Issue/PR numbers (`#88`, `#90`, `#94`, `#95`) are **Gitea-assigned
+  from a shared sequence**. They cannot be reconstructed from a clone,
+  and they collide/renumber on import into a different tracker.
+
+So the question isn't academic. The current practice is already
+producing references that don't survive a rename, let alone a migration.
+
+## What each medium is actually good at
+
+| Concern | Gitea issue | In-repo file (PRD / note / log) |
+|---|---|---|
+| Capture friction | Near-zero — file a one-line idea | High — a PRD is a heavy artifact; a note less so |
+| Triage (labels, milestones, open/closed, assignee) | Native, good | Absent / hand-rolled |
+| Async discussion + notifications | Native (threads, @mentions, watch) | None — needs a PR review or out-of-band chat |
+| Auto-linking (`Closes #N`, PR↔issue, commit↔issue) | Native | Manual cross-reference |
+| Version control of the content | None — lives in Gitea's DB | Full — diff, blame, branch, revert |
+| Travels with `git clone` | No | Yes |
+| Survives a move off Gitea | Degrades (export/import; threads, authors, timestamps, refs lossy) | Unaffected |
+| Survives a Gitea outage | Inaccessible | Local clone has it |
+| Greppable offline / by tooling | Only via API | `grep docs/` |
+| Reproducible identifiers | Gitea-assigned numbers | Filenames you control (`0027-…`) |
+
+The split is clean: **issues win on the live, social, coordination axes;
+the repo wins on every durability and portability axis.** Nothing about
+that table says "pick one." It says "use each for what it's good at, and
+don't let the durable thing depend on the ephemeral one."
+
+## Lock-in failure modes (the cons, concretely)
+
+1. **Stranded rationale.** The single most valuable output of a feature
+   discussion — *why we rejected the obvious alternative* — usually
+   emerges in a thread and dies there unless someone copies it into the
+   spec. PRD 0025 is already in this state.
+2. **Reference rot.** `Closes #88` / "see issue #90" are meaningful only
+   against one Gitea instance at one point in time. A rename already
+   broke one such link; a migration would break all of them and
+   silently renumber the survivors.
+3. **Two sources of truth.** A PRD carries `Status: Draft`; the issue
+   carries open/closed. They drift. Which is authoritative?
+4. **Availability coupling.** Self-hosted Gitea down (or the Tailscale
+   path to it down) means the backlog and its history are unreachable,
+   even though the code and PRDs are right there in the clone.
+5. **Export is lossy.** Gitea→GitHub (or the reverse) moves issue *text*
+   tolerably but mangles cross-references, comment authorship for
+   non-mapped users, timestamps, and reactions. The graph of "#88 → PR
+   #89 → commit abc" does not survive intact.
+
+None of these are arguments against *having* issues. They're arguments
+against issues being the **only** place a decision is recorded.
+
+## Pros of keeping issues anyway
+
+Worth stating plainly, because "just use the repo for everything"
+overcorrects:
+
+- A PR per half-formed idea is absurd; issues are the right weight for
+  "someone should look at X someday."
+- Triage state (priority, milestone, assignee, open/closed) is genuine
+  project-management value the repo does not natively provide.
+- Notifications and threaded discussion are how a decision *gets made*
+  before it's ready to be written down. Killing issues doesn't move that
+  conversation into the repo — it moves it into chat/DMs, which is
+  *worse* for durability, not better.
+- `Closes #N` automation and PR↔issue linkage are real ergonomics.
+
+The goal is not to abandon the tracker. It's to make sure that when the
+tracker eventually goes away, you lose the *backlog*, not the *history*.
+
+## What belongs where
+
+- **Gitea issue** — intake, triage, status, and the live discussion.
+  Treat it as a **cache**: useful now, expendable later.
+- **PRD (`docs/prds/`)** — the durable spec for anything that warrants
+  one. Rule: a PRD must be **self-contained**. Synthesize the issue
+  discussion into the Problem / Design / Open-questions sections;
+  reference the issue as a convenience pointer, never as the only home
+  of a load-bearing argument. (Retrofit PRD 0025: inline the #88
+  "option 3 vs `bottle_config:`" reasoning so the PRD stands alone.)
+- **Research note (`docs/research/`)** — the durable "why," exactly like
+  this file. Comparative analysis, landscape surveys, tradeoffs.
+- **Commit message** — the durable "what changed and why, at this point
+  in the diff."
+- **Decision log (proposed, see below)** — durable record of decisions
+  that aren't features and don't merit a PRD.
+
+## Closing the gap: a portable decision record
+
+Two classes of decision currently have no in-repo home:
+
+- **Sub-PRD feature requests** — too small for a PRD, but you still want
+  a tracked "we will / won't do this, because." Today these live only as
+  issues.
+- **Non-feature decisions** — "merge with rebase, not merge-commit,"
+  "agent identity is claimed-not-vouched," "bottles are home-only."
+  Some land inside a PRD that happens to touch them; many are folded
+  into chat and lost.
+
+Options, cheapest first:
+
+1. **An ADR-lite log under `docs/decisions/`.** One short Markdown file
+   per decision: context, decision, consequences, date, links. This is
+   the industry-standard Architecture Decision Record pattern, and it's
+   a near-exact fit for "track decision history, portably." Numbered
+   like PRDs (`0001-merge-with-rebase.md`). ~10 lines each; the
+   discipline is writing them, not the format.
+2. **Reuse the journal.** The repo ships an `init-entry` skill that
+   writes timestamped prose to `docs/JOURNAL.md` (not yet created here).
+   A stream-of-thought journal is a fine home for decision *narrative*
+   and is already part of the toolchain — lower ceremony than ADRs, less
+   structured for later retrieval. The `tag-entries` skill could tag
+   decision entries for grep-ability.
+3. **Periodic issue export.** Belt-and-suspenders: a scheduled job hits
+   the Gitea API and dumps open/closed issues + comments to JSON under
+   `docs/issues-archive/`, committed. Preserves the raw thread against
+   losing Gitea without changing daily workflow. Mechanical, not a
+   substitute for reifying rationale (a JSON dump of a thread is
+   evidence, not a decision).
+
+These compose: ADRs/journal for the *decision*, optional export for the
+*raw evidence*, issues for *live coordination*.
+
+## Recommendation
+
+1. **Keep Gitea issues for intake, triage, and discussion.** Don't fight
+   Gitea on the things it's good at.
+2. **Make the repo the system of record.** Adopt the rule: no decision
+   is "done" until its rationale exists in a versioned file (PRD,
+   research note, or decision log). The issue is a pointer, never the
+   sole source.
+3. **Add `docs/decisions/` (ADR-lite).** Smallest change that closes the
+   real gap — sub-PRD requests and non-feature decisions. Start by
+   back-filling the few decisions already made only in threads or chat
+   (rebase-merge policy; the agent-identity trust call from PRD 0027).
+4. **Retrofit PRD 0025** to inline its #88 rationale, removing the one
+   existing hard dependency on a Gitea thread.
+5. **Treat issue numbers as disposable.** When a PRD/commit cites an
+   issue, ensure the cited content is mirrored in-repo so the citation
+   degrades to a dead-but-harmless link, not lost information. (The
+   already-broken `claude-bottle/issues/88` link is the warning.)
+6. **Optional:** automate a Gitea issue export into the repo if you want
+   the raw threads preserved without manual transcription.
+
+Net: issues stay, because the alternative to issues is chat, which is
+worse. But the project's durable memory must live where the project
+already lives — in the clone — so that moving off Gitea, or losing it,
+costs you a backlog you can rebuild, never a history you can't.

docs/research/secret-minimization-over-dlp.md

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ telemetry to `statsig.anthropic.com` — are documented in
 [`agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md`](agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md)
 §Anthropic / Claude Code.
 
-**Forge-API gate (Gitea / GitHub / GitLab).** Holds the PAT;
+**Git-host-API gate (Gitea / GitHub / GitLab).** Holds the PAT;
 exposes a narrow REST surface. Token auth on all three is
 stateless `Authorization`-header injection — no CSRF, no request
 signing, no per-request nonce — so one proxy generalizes by
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ Add a `secret: true` flag (or a `secrets:` sibling of `env:`) that:
   AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY").
 - Refuses to launch if `egress.allowlist` contains any host that
   is not source-controlled by the user (heuristic: not on a
-  built-in `KNOWN_FORGE_HOSTS` list).
+  built-in `KNOWN_GIT_HOSTS` list).
 - Forces an explicit acknowledgement that a credential is being
   placed into the bottle rather than behind a gate.
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ In priority order:
    ([`agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md`](agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md)
    §Recommended). Removes the highest-value secret and closes the
    passthrough hole as a side effect.
-2. **Forge-API gate** (same doc, same section — one proxy
+2. **Git-host-API gate** (same doc, same section — one proxy
    generalizes across Gitea / GitHub / GitLab by config).
 3. **Egress data budget** in pipelock — small lift, large damage
    bound.

examples/agents/implementer.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ model: opus
 bottle: dev
 skills:
   - init-prd
-git:
+git-gate:
   user:
     name: implementer-bot
     email: eric+implementer@dideric.is

tests/fixtures.py

@@ -38,23 +38,21 @@ def fixture_with_egress_dict() -> dict[str, Any]:
 
 
 def fixture_with_git_dict() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Bottle declares a git-gate upstream. JSON shape."""
+    """Bottle declares git-gate upstreams. JSON shape."""
     return {
         "bottles": {
             "dev": {
-                "git": {
+                "git-gate": {
-                    "remotes": {
+                    "repos": {
-                        "gitea.dideric.is": {
+                        "bot-bottle": {
-                            "Name": "bot-bottle",
+                            "url": "ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git",
-                            "Upstream": "ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git",
+                            "identity": "/dev/null",
-                            "IdentityFile": "/dev/null",
+                            "host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
-                            "KnownHostKey": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
                         },
-                        "github.com": {
+                        "foo": {
-                            "Name": "foo",
+                            "url": "ssh://git@github.com/didericis/foo.git",
-                            "Upstream": "ssh://git@github.com/didericis/foo.git",
+                            "identity": "/dev/null",
-                            "IdentityFile": "/dev/null",
+                            "host_key": "ssh-ed25519 BBBB...",
-                            "KnownHostKey": "ssh-ed25519 BBBB...",
                         },
                     },
                 }

tests/unit/test_agent_provider.py

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+"""Unit: provider runtime defaults."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from bot_bottle.agent_provider import (
+    CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
+    agent_provision_plan,
+    runtime_for,
+)
+from bot_bottle.egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
+
+
+def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
+    def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
+        raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
+    return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc({'exp': exp})}.sig"
+
+
+class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_codex_plan_declares_home_state(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="/tmp/Dockerfile.codex",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+            )
+            config = Path(tmp, "codex-config.toml").read_text()
+        self.assertEqual("codex", plan.template)
+        self.assertEqual("codex", plan.command)
+        self.assertEqual("read_prompt_file", plan.prompt_mode)
+        self.assertEqual("/tmp/Dockerfile.codex", plan.dockerfile)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
+            plan.env_vars["CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual({}, plan.guest_env)
+        self.assertEqual(("/home/node/.codex",), tuple(d.guest_path for d in plan.dirs))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ("/home/node/.codex/config.toml",),
+            tuple(f.guest_path for f in plan.files),
+        )
+        self.assertIn('[projects."/home/node"]', config)
+
+    def test_codex_trusts_requested_project_path(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                trusted_project_path="/home/node/workspace",
+            )
+            config = Path(tmp, "codex-config.toml").read_text()
+        self.assertIn('[projects."/home/node/workspace"]', config)
+
+    def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_adds_auth_and_verify(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            home = Path(tmp) / "host-codex"
+            home.mkdir()
+            (home / "auth.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+                "tokens": {"access_token": _jwt(2000000000)},
+            }))
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                guest_env={"CODEX_HOME": "/run/codex-home"},
+                forward_host_credentials=True,
+                host_env={"CODEX_HOME": str(home)},
+            )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "/run/codex-home/auth.json",
+            {f.guest_path for f in plan.files},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual("/run/codex-home", plan.env_vars["CODEX_HOME"])
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.pre_copy))
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.verify))
+        self.assertIn("CODEX_HOME=/run/codex-home", plan.verify[0].argv)
+
+    def test_claude_with_auth_token_injects_provider_route_and_placeholder(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="/tmp/Dockerfile.claude",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                auth_token="BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
+            )
+            claude_config = json.loads(Path(tmp, "claude.json").read_text())
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.egress_routes))
+        route = plan.egress_routes[0]
+        self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
+        self.assertEqual("Bearer", route.auth_scheme)
+        self.assertEqual("BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN", route.token_ref)
+        self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
+        self.assertEqual("egress-placeholder", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"])
+        self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"])
+        self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"])
+        self.assertEqual(frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"}), plan.hidden_env_names)
+        self.assertIn("/home/node", claude_config["projects"])
+        self.assertIn("/home/node/.claude.json", {f.guest_path for f in plan.files})
+
+    def test_claude_trusts_requested_project_path(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                trusted_project_path="/home/node/workspace",
+            )
+            config = json.loads(Path(tmp, "claude.json").read_text())
+        self.assertIn("/home/node", config["projects"])
+        self.assertIn("/home/node/workspace", config["projects"])
+
+    def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_populates_egress_routes(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            home = Path(tmp) / "host-codex"
+            home.mkdir()
+            (home / "auth.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+                "tokens": {"access_token": _jwt(2000000000)},
+            }))
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                forward_host_credentials=True,
+                host_env={"CODEX_HOME": str(home)},
+            )
+        hosts = [r.host for r in plan.egress_routes]
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS), sorted(hosts))
+        for r in plan.egress_routes:
+            self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
+            self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, r.token_ref)
+            self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
+
+    def test_codex_without_forward_host_credentials_has_passthrough_egress_routes(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                forward_host_credentials=False,
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {r.host for r in plan.egress_routes},
+            set(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS),
+        )
+        for r in plan.egress_routes:
+            self.assertEqual("", r.auth_scheme)
+            self.assertEqual("", r.token_ref)
+            self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
+
+    def test_claude_without_auth_token_has_passthrough_egress_route(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.egress_routes))
+        route = plan.egress_routes[0]
+        self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
+        self.assertEqual("", route.auth_scheme)
+        self.assertEqual("", route.token_ref)
+        self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
+        self.assertNotIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", plan.env_vars)
+        self.assertEqual(frozenset(), plan.hidden_env_names)
+
+    def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_populates_provisioned_env(self):
+        access = _jwt(2000000000)
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            home = Path(tmp) / "host-codex"
+            home.mkdir()
+            (home / "auth.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+                "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+                "tokens": {"access_token": access},
+            }))
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                forward_host_credentials=True,
+                host_env={"CODEX_HOME": str(home)},
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF: access},
+            plan.provisioned_env,
+        )
+
+    def test_codex_without_forward_host_credentials_has_empty_provisioned_env(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = agent_provision_plan(
+                template="codex",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                forward_host_credentials=False,
+            )
+        self.assertEqual({}, plan.provisioned_env)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_backend_parity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+"""Cross-backend parity tests (PRD 0042).
+
+Verifies that Docker and smolmachines bottles expose the same
+observable contracts for env injection, agent argv, and exec. Tests
+use mock subprocess layers so no live VM or Docker daemon is needed.
+
+The scenarios here document what must hold across both backends. As
+PRDs 0038–0040 land these tests provide regression coverage for the
+contracts they establish.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import subprocess
+import unittest
+from typing import Callable
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _docker_bottle(guest_env: dict[str, str]) -> "object":
+    from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+    return DockerBottle(
+        container="bot-bottle-test",
+        teardown=lambda: None,
+        prompt_path_in_container=None,
+        agent_command="claude",
+    )
+
+
+def _smolmachines_bottle(guest_env: dict[str, str]) -> "object":
+    from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+    return SmolmachinesBottle(
+        "bot-bottle-test",
+        guest_env=guest_env,
+        agent_command="claude",
+    )
+
+
+# One entry per backend: (label, factory).
+_BACKENDS: list[tuple[str, Callable[[dict[str, str]], object]]] = [
+    ("docker", _docker_bottle),
+    ("smolmachines", _smolmachines_bottle),
+]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# agent_argv contracts
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class TestAgentArgvParity(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Both backends surface a non-empty agent_argv that includes the
+    agent command and can be used as a subprocess command list."""
+
+    def test_agent_argv_is_list_of_strings(self):
+        for label, factory in _BACKENDS:
+            with self.subTest(backend=label):
+                bottle = factory({"MY_VAR": "val"})
+                argv = bottle.agent_argv([], tty=False)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+                self.assertIsInstance(argv, list, f"{label}: argv is not a list")
+                for item in argv:
+                    self.assertIsInstance(
+                        item, str,
+                        f"{label}: argv item {item!r} is not a str",
+                    )
+
+    def test_agent_command_present_in_argv(self):
+        for label, factory in _BACKENDS:
+            with self.subTest(backend=label):
+                bottle = factory({})
+                argv = bottle.agent_argv([], tty=False)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+                joined = " ".join(argv)
+                self.assertIn(
+                    "claude", joined,
+                    f"{label}: 'claude' not found in agent_argv",
+                )
+
+    def test_extra_flags_propagate(self):
+        extra = ["--no-update-check", "--output-format", "stream-json"]
+        for label, factory in _BACKENDS:
+            with self.subTest(backend=label):
+                bottle = factory({})
+                argv = bottle.agent_argv(extra, tty=False)  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+                for flag in extra:
+                    self.assertIn(
+                        flag, argv,
+                        f"{label}: flag {flag!r} not in agent_argv",
+                    )
+
+
+class TestSmolmachinesEnvInArgv(unittest.TestCase):
+    """smolmachines bottle includes guest_env values in exec argv."""
+
+    def test_guest_env_in_exec_argv(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        bottle = SmolmachinesBottle(
+            "bot-bottle-test",
+            guest_env={"TOKEN": "abc123", "PROXY": "http://proxy:8888"},
+        )
+        argv = bottle.agent_argv([], tty=False)
+        joined = " ".join(argv)
+        self.assertIn("TOKEN=abc123", joined)
+        self.assertIn("PROXY=http://proxy:8888", joined)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# exec() user-switching contract
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class TestExecUserSwitching(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Both backends exec as 'node' by default and accept user='root'."""
+
+    def test_docker_exec_uses_node_user_by_default(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        bottle = DockerBottle(
+            container="bot-bottle-test",
+            teardown=lambda: None,
+            prompt_path_in_container=None,
+        )
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle.subprocess.run") as run:
+            run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                [], 0, stdout="", stderr="",
+            )
+            bottle.exec("echo hi")
+        call_args = run.call_args[0][0]
+        self.assertIn("node", call_args,
+                      "docker exec should use 'node' user by default")
+
+    def test_smolmachines_exec_uses_node_user_by_default(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        bottle = SmolmachinesBottle("bot-bottle-test", guest_env={})
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle.subprocess.run") as run:
+            run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                [], 0, stdout="", stderr="",
+            )
+            bottle.exec("echo hi")
+        call_args = run.call_args[0][0]
+        self.assertIn("node", call_args,
+                      "smolvm exec should use 'node' user by default")
+
+    def test_docker_exec_respects_root_user(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        bottle = DockerBottle(
+            container="bot-bottle-test",
+            teardown=lambda: None,
+            prompt_path_in_container=None,
+        )
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle.subprocess.run") as run:
+            run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                [], 0, stdout="", stderr="",
+            )
+            bottle.exec("id", user="root")
+        call_args = run.call_args[0][0]
+        self.assertIn("root", call_args)
+
+    def test_smolmachines_exec_respects_root_user(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        bottle = SmolmachinesBottle("bot-bottle-test", guest_env={})
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle.subprocess.run") as run:
+            run.return_value = subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+                [], 0, stdout="", stderr="",
+            )
+            bottle.exec("id", user="root")
+        call_args = run.call_args[0][0]
+        self.assertIn("root", call_args)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ExecResult shape parity
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class TestExecResultParity(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Both backends return ExecResult with returncode, stdout, stderr."""
+
+    def _stub_run(self, argv, **kwargs):
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            argv, 0, stdout="out\n", stderr="err\n",
+        )
+
+    def test_docker_exec_result_shape(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        from bot_bottle.backend import ExecResult
+        bottle = DockerBottle(
+            container="bot-bottle-test",
+            teardown=lambda: None,
+            prompt_path_in_container=None,
+        )
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle.subprocess.run",
+                   side_effect=self._stub_run):
+            result = bottle.exec("echo hi")
+        self.assertIsInstance(result, ExecResult)
+        self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode)
+        self.assertIsInstance(result.stdout, str)
+        self.assertIsInstance(result.stderr, str)
+
+    def test_smolmachines_exec_result_shape(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        from bot_bottle.backend import ExecResult
+        bottle = SmolmachinesBottle("bot-bottle-test", guest_env={})
+        with patch("bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle.subprocess.run",
+                   side_effect=self._stub_run):
+            result = bottle.exec("echo hi")
+        self.assertIsInstance(result, ExecResult)
+        self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode)
+        self.assertIsInstance(result.stdout, str)
+        self.assertIsInstance(result.stderr, str)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# close() is a no-op / idempotent (ABC contract)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class TestCloseParity(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_docker_close_is_idempotent(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        teardown_count = [0]
+        def count_teardown():
+            teardown_count[0] += 1
+        bottle = DockerBottle(
+            container="bot-bottle-test",
+            teardown=count_teardown,
+            prompt_path_in_container=None,
+        )
+        bottle.close()
+        bottle.close()
+        # DockerBottle.close calls teardown — once per call is fine;
+        # what matters is it doesn't raise.
+
+    def test_smolmachines_close_is_noop(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        bottle = SmolmachinesBottle("bot-bottle-test", guest_env={})
+        bottle.close()
+        bottle.close()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_backend_selection.py

@@ -81,6 +81,46 @@ class TestEnumerateActiveAgents(unittest.TestCase):
         ):
             self.assertEqual([a, b], enumerate_active_agents())
 
+    def test_sorts_by_started_at_then_slug_across_backends(self):
+        newer = ActiveAgent(
+            backend_name="docker", slug="docker-new", agent_name="impl",
+            started_at="2026-06-02T12:00:00Z", services=(),
+        )
+        tie_b = ActiveAgent(
+            backend_name="docker", slug="b-slug", agent_name="review",
+            started_at="2026-06-02T11:00:00Z", services=(),
+        )
+        missing_metadata = ActiveAgent(
+            backend_name="smolmachines", slug="missing-metadata",
+            agent_name="?", started_at="", services=(),
+        )
+        tie_a = ActiveAgent(
+            backend_name="smolmachines", slug="a-slug", agent_name="research",
+            started_at="2026-06-02T11:00:00Z", services=(),
+        )
+
+        class _FakeBackend:
+            def __init__(self, items):
+                self._items = items
+
+            def is_available(self):
+                return True
+
+            def enumerate_active(self):
+                return self._items
+
+        with patch.object(
+            backend_mod, "_BACKENDS",
+            {
+                "docker": _FakeBackend([newer, tie_b]),
+                "smolmachines": _FakeBackend([missing_metadata, tie_a]),
+            },
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(
+                [missing_metadata, tie_a, tie_b, newer],
+                enumerate_active_agents(),
+            )
+
     def test_empty_when_no_backends_have_active(self):
         class _FakeBackend:
             def is_available(self):

tests/unit/test_bottle_state.py

@@ -216,5 +216,112 @@ class TestBottleMetadata(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual("t2", loaded.started_at)
 
 
+class TestBottleMetadataBackend(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """PRD 0040: backend field is persisted and read back."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._setup_fake_home()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._teardown_fake_home()
+
+    def test_backend_field_roundtrips_docker(self):
+        meta = BottleMetadata(
+            identity="dev-b1",
+            agent_name="dev",
+            cwd="",
+            copy_cwd=False,
+            started_at="2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            compose_project="bot-bottle-dev-b1",
+            backend="docker",
+        )
+        write_metadata(meta)
+        loaded = read_metadata("dev-b1")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
+        assert loaded is not None
+        self.assertEqual("docker", loaded.backend)
+
+    def test_backend_field_roundtrips_smolmachines(self):
+        meta = BottleMetadata(
+            identity="dev-b2",
+            agent_name="dev",
+            cwd="",
+            copy_cwd=False,
+            started_at="2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            compose_project="",
+            backend="smolmachines",
+        )
+        write_metadata(meta)
+        loaded = read_metadata("dev-b2")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
+        assert loaded is not None
+        self.assertEqual("smolmachines", loaded.backend)
+
+    def test_missing_backend_field_defaults_to_empty(self):
+        # Old state dirs written before PRD 0040 have no backend key.
+        import json
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker import bottle_state as bs
+        path = bs.metadata_path("dev-b3")
+        path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        path.write_text(json.dumps({
+            "identity": "dev-b3",
+            "agent_name": "dev",
+            "cwd": "",
+            "copy_cwd": False,
+            "started_at": "2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            "compose_project": "bot-bottle-dev-b3",
+        }))
+        loaded = read_metadata("dev-b3")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(loaded)
+        assert loaded is not None
+        self.assertEqual("", loaded.backend)
+
+
+class TestBottleForSlugBackend(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """PRD 0040: _bottle_for_slug constructs the right bottle type."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._setup_fake_home()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._teardown_fake_home()
+
+    def test_docker_metadata_returns_docker_bottle(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        from bot_bottle.cli.dashboard import _bottle_for_slug
+        write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
+            identity="dev-d1",
+            agent_name="dev",
+            cwd="",
+            copy_cwd=False,
+            started_at="2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            compose_project="bot-bottle-dev-d1",
+            backend="docker",
+        ))
+        bottle, _ = _bottle_for_slug("dev-d1", {}, None)
+        self.assertIsInstance(bottle, DockerBottle)
+
+    def test_smolmachines_metadata_returns_smolmachines_bottle(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
+        from bot_bottle.cli.dashboard import _bottle_for_slug
+        write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
+            identity="dev-s1",
+            agent_name="dev",
+            cwd="",
+            copy_cwd=False,
+            started_at="2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            compose_project="",
+            backend="smolmachines",
+        ))
+        bottle, _ = _bottle_for_slug("dev-s1", {}, None)
+        self.assertIsInstance(bottle, SmolmachinesBottle)
+
+    def test_no_metadata_defaults_to_docker_bottle(self):
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle import DockerBottle
+        from bot_bottle.cli.dashboard import _bottle_for_slug
+        bottle, _ = _bottle_for_slug("unknown-slug", {}, None)
+        self.assertIsInstance(bottle, DockerBottle)
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_codex_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+"""Unit: host Codex auth extraction."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from bot_bottle.codex_auth import (
+    codex_auth_path,
+    codex_dummy_auth_json,
+    codex_host_access_token,
+)
+from bot_bottle.log import Die
+
+
+def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
+    return _jwt_with_payload({"exp": exp})
+
+
+def _jwt_with_payload(payload: dict) -> str:
+    def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
+        raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
+    return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc(payload)}.sig"
+
+
+def _jwt_payload(token: str) -> dict:
+    payload = token.split(".")[1]
+    payload += "=" * (-len(payload) % 4)
+    return json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(payload.encode()).decode())
+
+
+class TestCodexHostAccessToken(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="cb-codex-auth.")
+        self.home = Path(self.tmp.name)
+        self.auth_path = self.home / "auth.json"
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _write(self, payload: dict) -> None:
+        self.auth_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload))
+
+    def test_auth_path_uses_codex_home(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.auth_path,
+            codex_auth_path({"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)}),
+        )
+
+    def test_returns_fresh_chatgpt_access_token(self):
+        token = _jwt(2000000000)
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "tokens": {"access_token": token, "refresh_token": "hidden"},
+        })
+        out = codex_host_access_token(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(token, out)
+
+    def test_missing_auth_file_dies(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            codex_host_access_token({"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_non_chatgpt_auth_dies(self):
+        self._write({"auth_mode": "api_key", "tokens": {"access_token": _jwt(2)}})
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            codex_host_access_token({"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_user_auth_mode_is_allowed(self):
+        token = _jwt(2000000000)
+        self._write({"auth_mode": "user", "tokens": {"access_token": token}})
+        out = codex_host_access_token(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(token, out)
+
+    def test_expired_token_dies(self):
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "tokens": {"access_token": _jwt(1000)},
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            codex_host_access_token(
+                {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+                now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+            )
+
+    def test_non_jwt_token_dies(self):
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "tokens": {"access_token": "not-a-jwt"},
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            codex_host_access_token({"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_dummy_auth_preserves_mode_and_redacts_tokens(self):
+        access = _jwt(2000000000)
+        refresh = "host-refresh-token"
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "OPENAI_API_KEY": None,
+            "tokens": {
+                "access_token": access,
+                "id_token": _jwt(2000000000),
+                "refresh_token": refresh,
+                "account_id": "acct-host",
+            },
+            "last_refresh": "2026-05-29T00:00:00.000Z",
+        })
+        dummy = json.loads(codex_dummy_auth_json(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        ))
+        self.assertEqual("chatgpt", dummy["auth_mode"])
+        self.assertIsNone(dummy["OPENAI_API_KEY"])
+        self.assertNotEqual(access, dummy["tokens"]["access_token"])
+        self.assertNotEqual(refresh, dummy["tokens"]["refresh_token"])
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["tokens"]["refresh_token"])
+        self.assertEqual("acct-host", dummy["tokens"]["account_id"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(
+            codex_host_access_token(
+                {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+                now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_dummy_auth_tokens_inherit_host_token_exp(self):
+        # Codex refreshes when its local access token is at/past exp;
+        # the dummy must carry the host token's real exp so Codex does
+        # not drop to the sign-in screen after an artificial TTL while
+        # egress still holds a valid bearer.
+        host_exp = 2000000000
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "tokens": {
+                "access_token": _jwt(host_exp),
+                "id_token": _jwt(host_exp),
+                "refresh_token": "hidden",
+            },
+        })
+        dummy = json.loads(codex_dummy_auth_json(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        ))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            host_exp, _jwt_payload(dummy["tokens"]["access_token"])["exp"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            host_exp, _jwt_payload(dummy["tokens"]["id_token"])["exp"],
+        )
+
+    def test_dummy_auth_replaces_last_refresh_with_valid_timestamp(self):
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "last_refresh": "host-refresh-metadata",
+            "tokens": {
+                "access_token": _jwt(2000000000),
+                "refresh_token": "hidden",
+            },
+        })
+        dummy = json.loads(codex_dummy_auth_json(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5000, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        ))
+        self.assertEqual("2026-01-01T02:03:04.005Z", dummy["last_refresh"])
+        self.assertNotEqual("host-refresh-metadata", dummy["last_refresh"])
+
+    def test_dummy_auth_keeps_required_account_claim_shape(self):
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "tokens": {
+                "access_token": _jwt_with_payload({
+                    "exp": 2000000000,
+                    "https://api.openai.com/auth": {
+                        "chatgpt_plan_type": "plus",
+                        "chatgpt_account_id": "acct-real",
+                        "chatgpt_user_id": "user-real",
+                        "user_id": "auth-user-real",
+                        "localhost": True,
+                    },
+                    "https://api.openai.com/profile": {
+                        "email": "real@example.invalid",
+                        "email_verified": True,
+                    },
+                }),
+                "id_token": _jwt_with_payload({
+                    "exp": 2000000000,
+                    "email": "real@example.invalid",
+                    "email_verified": True,
+                    "https://api.openai.com/auth": {
+                        "chatgpt_plan_type": "plus",
+                        "chatgpt_account_id": "acct-real",
+                    },
+                }),
+                "refresh_token": "hidden",
+            },
+        })
+        dummy = json.loads(codex_dummy_auth_json(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        ))
+        access_payload = _jwt_payload(dummy["tokens"]["access_token"])
+        auth = access_payload["https://api.openai.com/auth"]
+        profile = access_payload["https://api.openai.com/profile"]
+        self.assertEqual("plus", auth["chatgpt_plan_type"])
+        self.assertEqual("acct-real", auth["chatgpt_account_id"])
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", auth["chatgpt_user_id"])
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle@example.invalid", profile["email"])
+        self.assertTrue(profile["email_verified"])
+
+    def test_dummy_auth_redacts_unknown_future_auth_fields(self):
+        secrets = [
+            "top-session-secret",
+            "top-nested-secret",
+            "refresh-secret",
+            "session-token-secret",
+            "jwt-custom-secret",
+            "jwt-nested-secret",
+            "jwt-list-secret",
+            "id-token-secret",
+            "auth-claim-secret",
+            "auth-claim-nested-secret",
+            "top-list-secret",
+            "token-nested-secret",
+            "token-list-secret",
+            "last-refresh-secret",
+        ]
+        self._write({
+            "auth_mode": "chatgpt",
+            "session_context": "top-session-secret",
+            "last_refresh": "last-refresh-secret",
+            "future_nested": {"value": "top-nested-secret"},
+            "future_list": ["top-list-secret"],
+            "tokens": {
+                "access_token": _jwt_with_payload({
+                    "exp": 2000000000,
+                    "custom_session": "jwt-custom-secret",
+                    "future_nested": {"value": "jwt-nested-secret"},
+                    "future_list": ["jwt-list-secret"],
+                    "https://api.openai.com/auth": {
+                        "chatgpt_plan_type": "plus",
+                        "chatgpt_account_id": "acct-real",
+                        "session_context": "auth-claim-secret",
+                        "nested": {"value": "auth-claim-nested-secret"},
+                    },
+                }),
+                "id_token": _jwt_with_payload({
+                    "exp": 2000000000,
+                    "opaque": "id-token-secret",
+                }),
+                "refresh_token": "refresh-secret",
+                "session_token": "session-token-secret",
+                "future_object": {"value": "token-nested-secret"},
+                "future_list": ["token-list-secret"],
+                "account_id": "acct-host",
+            },
+        })
+
+        dummy_json = codex_dummy_auth_json(
+            {"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        )
+        for secret in secrets:
+            self.assertNotIn(secret, dummy_json)
+
+        dummy = json.loads(dummy_json)
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["session_context"])
+        self.assertEqual("2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", dummy["last_refresh"])
+        self.assertEqual({}, dummy["future_nested"])
+        self.assertEqual([], dummy["future_list"])
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["tokens"]["refresh_token"])
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["tokens"]["session_token"])
+        self.assertEqual({}, dummy["tokens"]["future_object"])
+        self.assertEqual([], dummy["tokens"]["future_list"])
+
+        access_payload = _jwt_payload(dummy["tokens"]["access_token"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "bot-bottle-placeholder",
+            access_payload["custom_session"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual({}, access_payload["future_nested"])
+        self.assertEqual([], access_payload["future_list"])
+        auth = access_payload["https://api.openai.com/auth"]
+        self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", auth["session_context"])
+        self.assertEqual({}, auth["nested"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_compose.py

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest import mock
 
+from bot_bottle.agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
 from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec
 from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
 from bot_bottle.backend.docker.compose import (
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ from bot_bottle.git_gate import GitGatePlan, GitGateUpstream
 from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
 from bot_bottle.pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
 from bot_bottle.supervise import SupervisePlan
+from bot_bottle.workspace import workspace_plan
 
 
 SLUG = "demo-abc12"
@@ -47,11 +49,10 @@ def _manifest(*, supervise: bool, with_git: bool, with_egress: bool) -> Manifest
     if supervise:
         bottle["supervise"] = True
     if with_git:
-        bottle["git"] = {"remotes": {
+        bottle["git-gate"] = {"repos": {
-            "example.com": {
+            "upstream": {
-                "Name": "upstream",
+                "url": "ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
-                "Upstream": "ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
+                "identity": "/etc/hostname",  # any existing file
-                "IdentityFile": "/etc/hostname",  # any existing file
             },
         }}
     if with_egress:
@@ -149,7 +150,6 @@ def _plan(
             identity_file="/etc/hostname",
             known_host_key="",
             known_hosts_file=STATE / "git-gate" / "upstream-known_hosts",
-            extra_hosts={"example.com": "10.0.0.1"},
         ),)
     routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
     if with_egress:
@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ def _plan(
             roles=(),
         ),)
 
+    spec = _spec(supervise=supervise, with_git=with_git, with_egress=with_egress)
     return DockerBottlePlan(
-        spec=_spec(supervise=supervise, with_git=with_git, with_egress=with_egress),
+        spec=spec,
         stage_dir=STAGE,
         slug=SLUG,
         container_name=f"bot-bottle-{SLUG}",
@@ -180,6 +181,15 @@ def _plan(
         egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes),
         supervise_plan=_supervise_plan() if supervise else None,
         use_runsc=False,
+        agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
+            template="claude",
+            command="claude",
+            prompt_mode="append_file",
+            image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
+            dockerfile="",
+            guest_env={},
+        ),
+        workspace_plan=workspace_plan(spec, guest_home="/home/node"),
     )
 
 
@@ -250,6 +260,20 @@ class TestAgentAlwaysPresent(unittest.TestCase):
         s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())["services"]["agent"]
         self.assertIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", s["environment"])
 
+    def test_agent_provider_env_uses_literal_values(self):
+        plan = _plan()
+        provision = AgentProvisionPlan(
+            template="codex",
+            command="codex",
+            prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
+            image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
+            dockerfile="",
+            guest_env={"CODEX_HOME": "/home/node/.codex"},
+        )
+        plan = type(plan)(**{**vars(plan), "agent_provision": provision})
+        s = bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)["services"]["agent"]
+        self.assertIn("CODEX_HOME=/home/node/.codex", s["environment"])
+
     def test_agent_runsc_runtime(self):
         plan = _plan()
         plan = type(plan)(**{**vars(plan), "use_runsc": True})
@@ -414,12 +438,8 @@ class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertTrue(any("supervise/queue" in t or t.startswith("/run/supervise")
                             for t in targets))
 
-    def test_extra_hosts_emitted_for_git_upstreams(self):
+    def test_extra_hosts_omitted_for_git_upstreams(self):
         sc = self._render(with_git=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
-        self.assertIn("example.com:10.0.0.1", sc.get("extra_hosts", []))
-
-    def test_extra_hosts_omitted_when_no_git(self):
-        sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
         self.assertNotIn("extra_hosts", sc)
 
     def test_agent_depends_on_bundle_only(self):

tests/unit/test_dashboard.py

@@ -577,5 +577,54 @@ class TestEditInEditor(unittest.TestCase):
                 os.environ["EDITOR"] = original_editor
 
 
+class TestCapabilityBlockSmolmachinesGuard(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    """approve() must refuse capability-block for smolmachines bottles and
+    pass it through for Docker bottles (PRD 0039)."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._setup_fake_home()
+        self._original_apply_capability = dashboard.apply_capability_change
+        dashboard.apply_capability_change = lambda slug, content: ("", content)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        dashboard.apply_capability_change = self._original_apply_capability
+        self._teardown_fake_home()
+
+    def _enqueue_capability(self, slug: str = "dev") -> "dashboard.QueuedProposal":
+        p = _proposal(slug=slug, tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK)
+        qdir = supervise.queue_dir_for_slug(slug)
+        qdir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        supervise.write_proposal(qdir, p)
+        return dashboard.QueuedProposal(proposal=p, queue_dir=qdir)
+
+    def _write_metadata(self, slug: str, compose_project: str) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_state import BottleMetadata, write_metadata
+        write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
+            identity=slug,
+            agent_name="myagent",
+            cwd="",
+            copy_cwd=False,
+            started_at="2026-06-02T00:00:00+00:00",
+            compose_project=compose_project,
+        ))
+
+    def test_smolmachines_bottle_raises_capability_apply_error(self):
+        self._write_metadata("dev", compose_project="")
+        qp = self._enqueue_capability("dev")
+        with self.assertRaises(CapabilityApplyError) as ctx:
+            dashboard.approve(qp)
+        self.assertIn("smolmachines", str(ctx.exception))
+
+    def test_docker_bottle_calls_apply_capability_change(self):
+        self._write_metadata("dev", compose_project="bot-bottle-dev")
+        qp = self._enqueue_capability("dev")
+        dashboard.approve(qp)  # must not raise
+
+    def test_no_metadata_falls_through_to_docker_path(self):
+        # No metadata at all → assume Docker (backward-compatible).
+        qp = self._enqueue_capability("dev")
+        dashboard.approve(qp)  # must not raise
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_dashboard_crash_logging.py

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+"""Unit: dashboard launch/crash failure logging (issue #100).
+
+The dashboard runs under curses, so anything written to stderr while the
+TUI owns the terminal is wiped when the terminal is restored. These
+tests lock the recovery paths: a config error (`Die`) is re-surfaced
+after the wrapper returns, and an unexpected crash is persisted to a
+log file the operator can read.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import io
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+from bot_bottle import supervise
+from bot_bottle.cli import dashboard
+from bot_bottle.log import Die, die
+
+
+class TestDieCarriesMessage(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_die_attaches_message_and_code(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
+            with self.assertRaises(Die) as cm:
+                die("bad manifest: unknown key 'foo'")
+        self.assertEqual("bad manifest: unknown key 'foo'", cm.exception.message)
+        self.assertEqual(1, cm.exception.code)
+        self.assertIn(
+            "bot-bottle: error: bad manifest: unknown key 'foo'", buf.getvalue()
+        )
+
+    def test_die_default_message_is_empty(self):
+        self.assertEqual("", Die(1).message)
+        self.assertEqual(1, Die(1).code)
+
+
+class _FakeHomeMixin:
+    """Point supervise.bot_bottle_root (what _write_crash_log resolves
+    through) at a temp dir so the crash log doesn't touch the real
+    ~/.bot-bottle."""
+
+    def _setup_fake_home(self):
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="dash-crash-test.")
+        self._orig_root = supervise.bot_bottle_root
+        self._root = Path(self._tmp.name) / ".bot-bottle"
+        supervise.bot_bottle_root = lambda: self._root  # type: ignore[assignment]
+
+    def _teardown_fake_home(self):
+        supervise.bot_bottle_root = self._orig_root  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+
+class TestCmdDashboardErrorPaths(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._setup_fake_home()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._teardown_fake_home()
+
+    def test_keyboard_interrupt_returns_130(self):
+        with mock.patch.object(
+            dashboard.curses, "wrapper", side_effect=KeyboardInterrupt
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(130, dashboard.cmd_dashboard([]))
+
+    def test_die_resurfaces_message_after_curses(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with mock.patch.object(
+            dashboard.curses, "wrapper",
+            side_effect=Die(1, "manifest parse error at line 3"),
+        ):
+            with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
+                rc = dashboard.cmd_dashboard([])
+        self.assertEqual(1, rc)
+        self.assertIn("manifest parse error at line 3", buf.getvalue())
+
+    def test_die_without_message_has_fallback(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with mock.patch.object(dashboard.curses, "wrapper", side_effect=Die(1)):
+            with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
+                rc = dashboard.cmd_dashboard([])
+        self.assertEqual(1, rc)
+        self.assertIn("fatal error", buf.getvalue())
+
+    def test_unexpected_exception_writes_crash_log(self):
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+        with mock.patch.object(
+            dashboard.curses, "wrapper",
+            side_effect=ValueError("kaboom in render"),
+        ):
+            with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
+                rc = dashboard.cmd_dashboard([])
+        self.assertEqual(1, rc)
+        out = buf.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("dashboard crashed: ValueError: kaboom in render", out)
+        self.assertIn("full traceback written to", out)
+        log_path = self._root / "logs" / "dashboard-crash.log"
+        self.assertTrue(log_path.exists())
+        content = log_path.read_text()
+        self.assertIn("kaboom in render", content)
+        self.assertIn("Traceback (most recent call last)", content)
+
+
+class TestWriteCrashLog(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._setup_fake_home()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._teardown_fake_home()
+
+    def test_appends_traceback_with_header(self):
+        try:
+            raise RuntimeError("explode")
+        except RuntimeError as e:
+            path = dashboard._write_crash_log(e)
+        self.assertEqual(self._root / "logs" / "dashboard-crash.log", path)
+        text = path.read_text()
+        self.assertIn("=== dashboard crash", text)
+        self.assertIn("RuntimeError: explode", text)
+
+    def test_falls_back_to_tempfile_when_home_unwritable(self):
+        # bot_bottle_root points at a *file*, so mkdir under it raises
+        # OSError and the helper must fall back to a tempfile.
+        bad = Path(self._tmp.name) / "not-a-dir"
+        bad.write_text("x")
+        supervise.bot_bottle_root = lambda: bad  # type: ignore[assignment]
+        try:
+            raise RuntimeError("explode2")
+        except RuntimeError as e:
+            path = dashboard._write_crash_log(e)
+        self.assertTrue(path.exists())
+        self.assertIn("explode2", path.read_text())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_docker_launch_teardown.py

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+"""Unit: Docker launch teardown warning on ExitStack failure (issue #156).
+
+When a callback registered in the ExitStack raises during teardown,
+the teardown function must emit a WARNING-level message that includes
+the container name and operation type, rather than silently discarding
+the exception.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import io
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+from bot_bottle.agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
+from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec
+from bot_bottle.backend.docker import launch as launch_mod
+from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
+from bot_bottle.egress import EgressPlan
+from bot_bottle.git_gate import GitGatePlan
+from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
+from bot_bottle.pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
+from bot_bottle.workspace import workspace_plan
+
+
+def _manifest() -> Manifest:
+    return Manifest.from_json_obj({
+        "bottles": {"dev": {}},
+        "agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
+    })
+
+
+def _plan(tmp: str) -> DockerBottlePlan:
+    stage = Path(tmp)
+    manifest = _manifest()
+    spec = BottleSpec(
+        manifest=manifest,
+        agent_name="demo",
+        copy_cwd=False,
+        user_cwd=tmp,
+        identity="test-teardown-00001",
+    )
+    return DockerBottlePlan(
+        spec=spec,
+        stage_dir=stage,
+        git_gate_plan=GitGatePlan(
+            slug="test-teardown-00001",
+            entrypoint_script=stage / "entrypoint.sh",
+            hook_script=stage / "hook.sh",
+            access_hook_script=stage / "access-hook.sh",
+            upstreams=(),
+        ),
+        egress_plan=EgressPlan(
+            slug="test-teardown-00001",
+            routes_path=stage / "egress.yaml",
+            routes=(),
+            token_env_map={},
+        ),
+        supervise_plan=None,
+        agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
+            template="claude",
+            command="claude",
+            prompt_mode="append_file",
+            image="",
+            dockerfile="",
+            guest_env={},
+        ),
+        workspace_plan=workspace_plan(spec, guest_home="/home/node"),
+        slug="test-teardown-00001",
+        container_name="bot-bottle-test-teardown-abc",
+        container_name_pinned=False,
+        image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
+        derived_image="",
+        runtime_image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
+        dockerfile_path="",
+        env_file=stage / "env",
+        forwarded_env={},
+        prompt_file=stage / "prompt.txt",
+        proxy_plan=PipelockProxyPlan(
+            yaml_path=stage / "pipelock.yaml",
+            slug="test-teardown-00001",
+        ),
+        use_runsc=False,
+    )
+
+
+class TestTeardownWarning(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="docker-launch-teardown-test.")
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        import shutil
+        shutil.rmtree(self._tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+    def test_teardown_failure_emits_warning_with_container_and_operation(self):
+        plan = _plan(self._tmp)
+        buf = io.StringIO()
+
+        with mock.patch.object(launch_mod.docker_mod, "build_image"), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod, "pipelock_tls_init",
+                 return_value=(Path("/ca.crt"), Path("/ca.key")),
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod, "egress_tls_init",
+                 return_value=(Path("/egress_ca"), Path("/egress_cert")),
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod.network_mod, "network_name_for_slug",
+                 return_value="bb-internal-test",
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod.network_mod, "network_egress_name_for_slug",
+                 return_value="bb-egress-test",
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod, "bottle_plan_to_compose",
+                 return_value={"services": {"agent": {}}},
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod, "write_compose_file",
+                 return_value=Path("/tmp/compose.yml"),
+             ), \
+             mock.patch.object(launch_mod, "compose_up"), \
+             mock.patch.object(launch_mod, "compose_dump_logs"), \
+             mock.patch.object(
+                 launch_mod, "compose_down",
+                 side_effect=RuntimeError("network remove failed"),
+             ), \
+             contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
+            provision = mock.Mock(return_value=None)
+            with launch_mod.launch(plan, provision=provision):
+                pass
+
+        output = buf.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("bot-bottle: warning:", output)
+        self.assertIn("bot-bottle-test-teardown-abc", output)
+        self.assertIn("compose-down", output)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()