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Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) — the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller. Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens (compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency): * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway` (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher). * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch` gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/ {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated, 403 wrong role). * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key. * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key. Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s); Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
87 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
"""Unit: role-scoped control-plane tokens (issue #469 review)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import json
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import unittest
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from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLES, mint, verify
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_KEY = "test-key"
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def _b64(obj: object) -> str:
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return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
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json.dumps(obj).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
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class TestMintVerify(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_round_trip_each_role(self) -> None:
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for role in ROLES:
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self.assertEqual(role, verify(mint(role, _KEY), _KEY))
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def test_gateway_and_cli_are_distinct(self) -> None:
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_GATEWAY, verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), _KEY))
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), _KEY))
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def test_wrong_key_rejected(self) -> None:
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self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), "other-key"))
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def test_tampered_signature_rejected(self) -> None:
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tok = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY)
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self.assertIsNone(verify(tok[:-1] + ("A" if tok[-1] != "A" else "B"), _KEY))
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def test_tampered_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
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header, _payload, sig = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY).split(".")
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forged = f"{header}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}.{sig}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
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def test_alg_none_rejected(self) -> None:
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# An unsigned "alg: none" token must never verify.
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tok = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}."
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self.assertIsNone(verify(tok, _KEY))
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def test_validly_signed_but_wrong_alg_rejected(self) -> None:
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# Alg-confusion: even a *correctly signed* token whose header claims a
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# non-HS256 alg must be rejected.
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from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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signing_input = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
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def test_validly_signed_but_undecodable_rejected(self) -> None:
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# A correct signature over a header that isn't valid base64/JSON still
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# fails closed rather than raising.
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from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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signing_input = f"!!!not-base64!!!.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
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def test_malformed_tokens_rejected(self) -> None:
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for bad in ("", "a", "a.b", "a.b.c.d", "not-base64.$$.$$"):
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self.assertIsNone(verify(bad, _KEY))
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def test_empty_key_never_verifies(self) -> None:
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self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), ""))
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def test_unknown_role_in_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
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header, _p, _s = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY).split(".")
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# Re-sign a token carrying an unknown role — a valid signature but a
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# role the control plane doesn't recognise must still be rejected.
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from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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payload = _b64({"role": "root"})
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signing_input = f"{header}.{payload}"
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forged = f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
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def test_mint_rejects_unknown_role(self) -> None:
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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mint("root", _KEY)
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def test_mint_rejects_empty_key(self) -> None:
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, "")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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unittest.main()
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