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The Firecracker infra VM started the control plane with no signing key, so it ran open and granted every unauthenticated caller the `cli` role. The nft boundary only fences off the separate agent VM — the egress / supervise / git-http daemons run in this same VM and reach the orchestrator over 127.0.0.1, so a compromised data-plane daemon could still drive the operator routes (approve its own supervise proposals, rewrite policy, read injected tokens). Generate the signing key on the persistent volume, hand it only to the orchestrator process, mint a `gateway` JWT for the data-plane daemons, and mirror the key back to the host token file so the CLI signs `cli` tokens the VM verifies — the same per-process scoping the docker / macOS launchers use. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>