fix(git-gate): make the gateway access-hook executable regardless of copy transport
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Cloning/fetching from the git-gate on the Apple-container backend failed with
"empty reply from server" (curl exit 52). Root cause: the git-http handler
crashed on every upload-pack with
PermissionError: [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/etc/git-gate/access-hook'
The access-hook is exec'd directly, so it needs the x bit. prepare() stages it
0o700 and trusted the gateway copy to carry that mode. `docker cp` does; the
Apple `container cp` (AppleGatewayTransport) does not, landing the hook 0o644 →
EACCES. The unhandled exception killed the handler thread, closing the socket
with no HTTP response — which the client sees as the opaque empty reply.
- provision_git_gate now `chmod +x`es the access-hook on the gateway side after
the copy, so it's executable under every transport (docker/apple/firecracker).
- git-http handler wraps the access-hook subprocess.run: an OSError /
SubprocessError (un-execable, timed out) now fails closed with a 503 instead
of crashing the thread into an empty reply — a gate that can't run its hook
should deny, visibly.
- Updates the now-misleading "docker cp preserves source mode" comment in
git_gate.prepare().
Regression tests: provisioning applies +x to the access-hook; the handler
returns 503 (not an empty reply) when the hook can't be exec'd.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit was merged in pull request #403.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -94,6 +94,12 @@ def provision_git_gate(
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transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", "/etc/git-gate"])
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transport.cp_into(str(plan.hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/pre-receive")
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transport.cp_into(str(plan.access_hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/access-hook")
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# The access-hook is exec'd directly (not via `sh`), so it needs the x bit.
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# Set it here rather than trusting the copy to carry the staged 0o700:
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# `docker cp` preserves source mode, but the Apple `container cp` does not,
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# landing the hook 0o644 → EACCES when the git-http handler tries to exec it.
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# chmod on the gateway side is backend-neutral and fixes every transport.
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transport.exec(["chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"])
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creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
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transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
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for u in plan.upstreams:
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@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
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access_hook = stage_dir / "git_gate_access_hook.sh"
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access_hook.write_text(git_gate_render_access_hook())
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# 0o700 (not 0o600): git daemon execs --access-hook directly,
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# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. docker cp
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# preserves source mode into the container.
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# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. The gateway copy
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# does not necessarily preserve this mode (`docker cp` does, the
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# Apple `container cp` does not), so provision_git_gate re-applies
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# +x on the gateway side — see backend/docker/gateway_provision.py.
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access_hook.chmod(0o700)
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upstreams_with_files: list[GitGateUpstream] = []
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for u in upstreams:
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@@ -148,12 +148,24 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
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"GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook",
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)
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peer = self.client_address[0]
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hook = subprocess.run(
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[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
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capture_output=True,
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check=False,
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timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
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)
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try:
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hook = subprocess.run(
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[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
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capture_output=True,
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check=False,
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timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
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)
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except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
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# The access-hook couldn't be run (missing, not executable,
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# timed out, …). Fail closed with a real HTTP error rather
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# than letting the exception kill the handler thread — an
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# unhandled exception closes the socket with no response, which
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# the client sees as an opaque "empty reply from server".
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self.log_message(
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"access-hook could not run for %s: %s", parsed.path, exc,
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)
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self.send_error(503, "git-gate access-hook unavailable")
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return
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if hook.returncode != 0:
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detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
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"utf-8", errors="replace",
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@@ -69,6 +69,18 @@ class TestProvisionGitGate(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertEqual(1, len(exec_scripts))
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self.assertIn("repo=/git/bottle1/${name}.git", exec_scripts[0][-1])
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def test_makes_access_hook_executable_on_the_gateway(self) -> None:
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# Regression: the access-hook is exec'd directly, so it needs the x
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# bit. The copy alone can't be trusted to carry the staged 0o700
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# (`docker cp` preserves mode, the Apple `container cp` does not),
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# so provisioning must re-apply +x on the gateway side.
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calls: list[list[str]] = []
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with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
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provision_git_gate(DockerGatewayTransport("gw"), "bottle1", _plan(_up("foo")))
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self.assertIn(
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["docker", "exec", "gw", "chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"], calls,
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)
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def test_omits_known_hosts_copy_when_absent(self) -> None:
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calls: list[list[str]] = []
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with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
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@@ -364,6 +364,48 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertIn("access-hook denied", logged)
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self.assertIn("exit=2", logged)
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def test_access_hook_that_cannot_run_fails_closed_503(self):
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"""Regression: when the access-hook can't be exec'd (missing / not
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executable — a PermissionError from subprocess.run), the handler must
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fail closed with a real HTTP status instead of letting the exception
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kill the thread, which closes the socket with no response and the
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client sees an opaque "empty reply from server"."""
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from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
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import io
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import sys
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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root = Path(tmp)
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(root / "repo.git").mkdir()
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old_root = os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT")
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os.environ["GIT_PROJECT_ROOT"] = str(root)
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self.addCleanup(self._restore_env, old_root)
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server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), GitHttpHandler)
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thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
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thread.start()
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self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
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self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
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with mock.patch(
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"bot_bottle.git_http_backend.subprocess.run",
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side_effect=PermissionError(13, "Permission denied"),
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):
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buf = io.StringIO()
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with mock.patch.object(sys, "stdout", buf):
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req = urllib.request.Request(
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f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
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"/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
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method="GET",
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)
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try:
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urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
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self.fail("expected HTTPError 503")
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: # type: ignore
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self.assertEqual(503, e.code)
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self.assertIn("access-hook could not run", buf.getvalue())
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@staticmethod
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def _restore_env(value: str | None) -> None:
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if value is None:
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