didericis 21054212d4 feat(mitmproxy): wire the sidecar into the bottle launch lifecycle
Second step of PRD 0005. The mitmproxy sidecar from the previous
commit now actually runs alongside pipelock when a bottle launches.

- BottleBackend gains a non-abstract provision_ca with a default
  no-op so non-Docker backends aren't forced to implement TLS
  interception. provision() orchestrates ca → prompt → skills → ssh
  → git; CA goes first so trust is set up before anything else runs
  inside the agent.

- DockerBottlePlan gains `mitmproxy_plan: MitmproxyProxyPlan`. The
  prepare step builds it alongside the existing pipelock plan; no
  new manifest schema or host-side scratch files.

- DockerBottleBackend grows self._mitm, threads it through prepare
  and launch. Mirror of the existing self._proxy pattern.

- launch.py brings the mitmproxy sidecar up between pipelock and
  the agent container, passing pipelock's service-name URL via
  env. ExitStack callback handles teardown in reverse order.

- The agent's HTTPS_PROXY / HTTP_PROXY now point at mitmproxy (not
  pipelock directly). Three new -e flags inject the CA trust trio
  (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE) at
  docker run time; Docker propagates those into docker exec so the
  claude process sees them without per-exec threading.

- New provisioner backend/docker/provision/ca.py extracts the CA
  cert from the running mitmproxy sidecar, copies it into the agent
  at /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/claude-bottle-mitm.crt, runs
  update-ca-certificates, and emits a stderr line with the SHA-256
  fingerprint (stdlib ssl + hashlib; no subprocess).

Cleanup needs no change — `docker ps --filter name=^claude-bottle-`
already catches the new claude-bottle-mitm-<slug> containers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 13:38:51 -04:00
2026-05-07 22:45:36 -04:00

claude-bottle logo

claude-bottle

test

Run multiple Claude Code agents on your own machine, each scoped to its own secrets, skills, and egress allowlist.

Why "claude-bottle"?

Each container is a bottle; Claude is the genie inside. The genie's powers are exactly what the manifest grants it — a specific set of skills, a specific set of secrets, and a specific set of hosts it can reach — nothing more. You uncork one bottle per agent (./cli.py start <agent>), many bottles run in parallel, and each is scoped to its task. When the session ends the bottle is destroyed and the genie does not persist.

Goals

  • Scope each agent to the minimum credentials and network egress its task actually needs
  • Run multiple agents in parallel, isolated from each other
  • Keep code, credentials, and agent activity on infrastructure I control — no third-party agent runtime

Security model

Each agent runs in its own bottle: its own container, its own internal Docker network, and its own pipelock sidecar. Bottles don't share state, don't talk to each other, and only get the env vars, skills, SSH identities, and egress hosts the manifest grants them — nothing more. Any one agent only has the access it needs to do its job.

The bottle limits both what an agent can see and where it can send it. Each bottle gets only the secrets and SSH identities the manifest grants it — a Gitea token but not a GitHub token, a deploy key but not a personal SSH key — so even a compromised or misbehaving agent only handles credentials it was already trusted with for its job. Egress flows through pipelock, which constrains where those credentials can travel: an agent with a Gitea token can reach gitea.dideric.is, not arbitrary attacker-controlled hosts. The same constraint blocks DNS-over-HTTPS as an exfil channel — a DoH resolver like cloudflare-dns.com would have to be on the allowlist for the agent to reach it at all. The container itself adds a layer between the agent and the host, but the v1 design leans more on secret minimization and egress allowlisting than on the container as a hardened boundary. On Linux hosts where gVisor is registered with Docker, claude-bottle auto-detects it and launches every bottle under runsc for a userspace syscall barrier — no manifest configuration required. The broader v2 discussion lives in docs/research/stronger-isolation-alternatives.md.

The egress proxy and OAuth-token handling below are the load-bearing pieces of v1.

Quickstart

Requires Docker on the host and a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token in your shell env.

./cli.py start <agent>   # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude

The container is removed automatically when the session ends. If the script is killed with SIGKILL the exit trap won't fire and the container may be left running; remove it with docker rm -f <container-name>.

Manifest

Agents and the bottles they run in are declared in claude-bottle.json in your project root or $HOME (both files merge if present, with project entries overriding home entries on key conflict).

{
  "bottles": {
    "gitea-dev": {
      "env": {
        "GITEA_TOKEN":     "?paste your Gitea API token",
        "GITHUB_TOKEN":    "${GH_PAT}",
        "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "didericis"
      },

      "ssh": [
        {
          "Host":         "gitea",
          "Hostname":     "gitea.dideric.is",
          "User":         "git",
          "Port":         30009,
          "IdentityFile": "/Users/didericis/.ssh/id_ed25519_gitea",
          "KnownHostKey": "gitea.dideric.is ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."
        }
      ],

      // Egress is forced through a per-agent
      // [pipelock](https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) sidecar
      // on a Docker `--internal` network — without the proxy the agent
      // has no route off-box. The effective allowlist is the union of
      // baked-in defaults (api.anthropic.com, claude.ai, ...) and the
      // hostnames listed here. Pipelock also runs DLP scanning and
      // detects URL-embedded high-entropy secrets. The resolved
      // allowlist is shown in the y/N preflight before launch.
      "egress": {
        "allowlist": [
          "github.com",
          "registry.npmjs.org",
          "pypi.org"
        ]
      }
    }
  },

  "agents": {
    "gitea-helper": {
      "bottle": "gitea-dev",
      "skills": ["init-prd"],
      "prompt": "You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects."
    }
  }
}

Comments are illustrative; the file itself must be valid JSON. See claude-bottle.example.json for a working starting point. Pipelock's design lives in docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md and the rationale in docs/research/pipelock-assessment.md.

Auth: OAuth token, not API key

claude-bottle authenticates claude inside the container with the same Pro/Max subscription you already use on the host, via a long-lived OAuth token. No ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is needed.

Why a token instead of mounting ~/.claude.json: on macOS, Claude Code stores OAuth credentials in the encrypted Keychain, not in ~/.claude.json. Mounting that file into a Linux container does not carry the credentials with it. Linux hosts keep credentials in ~/.claude/.credentials.json, but to keep the launcher portable claude-bottle uses the env-var path on every host.

One-time setup on the host:

claude setup-token   # browser login, prints a ~1-year OAuth token

Stash the token in your shell env (e.g. ~/.zshrc or a secret manager) as CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN:

export CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN="<token>"

cli.py automatically forwards it to every container as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN via docker run -e — no manifest wiring required, and the value is never written to disk or placed on argv.

Inside the container, claude picks up CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN and authenticates against your subscription. Caveats: the token is bound to your subscription tier (Pro/Max/Team/Enterprise), it does not work with claude --bare (which only reads ANTHROPIC_API_KEY), and if it leaks, regenerate via claude setup-token again. Reference: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/authentication.

Trademarks

claude-bottle is an independent project and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Anthropic, PBC. "Claude" and "Claude Code" are trademarks of Anthropic, PBC; the project name uses "claude" descriptively to indicate that the tool runs Claude Code inside a sandbox.

License

Copyright 2026 Eric Bauerfeld

Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See LICENSE for the full text.

S
Description
Lightweight, self-hosted sandbox for AI coding agents that protects against prompt-injected or misbehaving agents: all egress traffic is TLS-inspected and secret-scanned, and credentials are injected at the proxy so the agent never sees them. No third-party platform in the loop, no trust required.
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