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Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis-claude c527841d55 fix(ci): use absolute github.workspace paths for coverage artifact upload/download
test / integration-docker (pull_request) Successful in 13s
tracker-policy-pr / check-pr (pull_request) Successful in 15s
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31s
test / integration-firecracker (pull_request) Successful in 3m11s
test / coverage (pull_request) Failing after 1m44s
test / publish-infra (pull_request) Has been skipped
The delphi-ci runner resolves relative paths in upload-artifact and
download-artifact from a different CWD than run: shell steps, so
'.coverage.unit' etc. were never found. Using ${{ github.workspace }}
gives an absolute path that does not depend on the JS action's CWD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 04:53:33 +00:00
didericis-claude 5940b75bb7 ci: artifact-based coverage and local Firecracker candidate flow
test / integration-docker (pull_request) Successful in 12s
tracker-policy-pr / check-pr (pull_request) Successful in 8s
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 33s
test / integration-firecracker (pull_request) Successful in 3m13s
test / coverage (pull_request) Failing after 1m45s
test / publish-infra (pull_request) Has been skipped
Each test job now runs once under coverage and uploads a small .coverage.*
artifact. The coverage job combines them on ubuntu-latest — no test reruns,
no KVM dependency. The infra candidate is built directly on the KVM runner,
eliminating the build-infra job and the ~70 s upload + ~83 s combined
download. For PRs, no rootfs artifact is transferred at all. Main-branch
pushes upload the tested rootfs and matching dropbear so publish-infra
publishes the byte-identical artifact. relative_files = True in .coveragerc
lets coverage files from different runners combine without path remapping.

Closes #446
2026-07-21 04:04:30 +00:00
43 changed files with 268 additions and 2165 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
[run]
branch = True
source = .
# Store paths relative to the project root so .coverage.* files produced on
# different runners (ubuntu-latest vs self-hosted KVM) can be combined by the
# coverage job without a [paths] remapping section.
relative_files = True
[report]
# Coverage policy: see docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md.
+99 -112
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,12 @@
# tests/canaries/ — upstream regression canaries; run on a separate
# schedule (see canaries.yml), not here
#
# Integration tests run once per backend in separate jobs. Each job sets
# BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND explicitly so the test suite uses the right backend.
# Backends that aren't available on the runner fail the preflight step
# rather than silently skipping inside the test output.
# Each test job runs once under coverage and uploads a small .coverage.*
# artifact. The `coverage` job combines them — no test reruns, no KVM
# dependency on that job. For main-branch pushes only, the tested rootfs
# and matching dropbear are uploaded so `publish-infra` can publish the
# byte-identical artifact that was tested. PRs avoid the ~194 MB rootfs
# transfer entirely.
name: test
@@ -40,53 +42,6 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
stage-firecracker-inputs:
runs-on: [self-hosted, kvm]
# Same guard as the other KVM-runner jobs: don't spin the privileged
# runner for fork PRs (this only copies a non-secret static binary, but
# keep the posture consistent — build-infra/integration/coverage all
# depend on it, so gating here gates the whole Firecracker chain).
if: >-
github.event_name == 'push' ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository)
steps:
- name: Stage the provisioned static dropbear
run: |
mkdir -p firecracker-inputs
cp /var/cache/bot-bottle-fc/dropbear firecracker-inputs/dropbear
- name: Upload Firecracker build inputs
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: firecracker-inputs
path: firecracker-inputs/
build-infra:
needs: stage-firecracker-inputs
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Download Firecracker build inputs
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: firecracker-inputs
path: firecracker-inputs
- name: Build infra candidate from this checkout
env:
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_DROPBEAR: ${{ github.workspace }}/firecracker-inputs/dropbear
run: python3 -m bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.publish_infra --output infra-candidate
- name: Upload infra candidate
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: infra-candidate
path: infra-candidate/
unit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
@@ -101,11 +56,17 @@ jobs:
- name: Install dev requirements
run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run unit tests
run: python3 -m coverage run -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v
- name: Run unit tests with coverage
run: python3 -m coverage run --data-file=.coverage.unit -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v
- name: Report unit coverage
run: python3 -m coverage report -m
run: python3 -m coverage report --data-file=.coverage.unit -m
- name: Upload unit coverage artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-unit
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.coverage.unit
integration-docker:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -115,6 +76,9 @@ jobs:
# No actions/setup-python (see the note in the `unit` job); the
# container's system Python 3.12 runs the stdlib test suite directly.
- name: Install coverage
run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages coverage
- name: Show environment
run: |
python3 --version
@@ -124,10 +88,16 @@ jobs:
echo "docker not on PATH — integration tests will skip"
fi
- name: Run integration tests (docker)
- name: Run integration tests (docker) with coverage
env:
BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND: docker
run: python3 -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
run: python3 -m coverage run --data-file=.coverage.docker -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
- name: Upload docker coverage artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-docker
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.coverage.docker
# Integration tests against the Firecracker backend. Runs on a self-hosted
# KVM runner (label `kvm`) where /dev/kvm and the TAP/nft pool are available.
@@ -137,9 +107,16 @@ jobs:
#
# Runner prerequisites (provision once; see README "Firecracker on Linux"):
# `firecracker` on PATH, `/dev/kvm` accessible, cached kernel +
# static dropbear, and the pool as a persistent systemd unit.
# static dropbear at /var/cache/bot-bottle-fc/dropbear, and the pool as a
# persistent systemd unit.
#
# The infra candidate is built here directly (no artifact download) to
# eliminate the ~70 s ubuntu-latest upload + ~83 s combined download that
# the old build-infra → integration-firecracker + coverage chain incurred.
# For main-branch pushes the tested rootfs and matching dropbear are
# uploaded so publish-infra can publish the byte-identical artifact; PRs
# skip those uploads entirely.
integration-firecracker:
needs: build-infra
runs-on: [self-hosted, kvm]
if: >-
github.event_name == 'push' ||
@@ -159,49 +136,58 @@ jobs:
# range overlap; it prints the exact `backend setup` fix.
python3 cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker
- name: Download the candidate built from this checkout
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: infra-candidate
path: infra-candidate
- name: Build infra candidate from this checkout
env:
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_DROPBEAR: /var/cache/bot-bottle-fc/dropbear
run: python3 -m bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.publish_infra --output infra-candidate
- name: Replace the persistent infra VM with the candidate
run: python3 -c 'from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker import infra_vm; infra_vm.stop()'
# No dev-requirements install: the integration suite runs on stdlib
# `unittest` (pylint/pyright are lint.yml's concern, not this job's),
# and the self-hosted runner's Nix python env has no `pip` module
# (`python3 -m pip` → "No module named pip"). Nothing to install.
- name: Run integration tests (firecracker)
# No dev-requirements install: `coverage` is already provided by the
# self-hosted runner's Nix python env, and that env has no `pip`
# module to install into anyway.
- name: Run integration tests (firecracker) with coverage
env:
BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND: firecracker
BOT_BOTTLE_INFRA_ARTIFACT_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/infra-candidate
run: python3 -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
run: python3 -m coverage run --data-file=.coverage.firecracker -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
# Combined unit+integration coverage + the diff-coverage gate (the hard
# gate: new/changed lines >= 90%). See docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md.
- name: Upload firecracker coverage artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-firecracker
path: ${{ github.workspace }}/.coverage.firecracker
# Only upload the large rootfs artifact on main-branch pushes;
# PRs avoid the ~194 MB transfer. publish-infra only runs on main
# and downloads these to publish the byte-identical tested rootfs.
- name: Upload tested rootfs (main branch only)
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: infra-candidate
path: infra-candidate/
- name: Upload dropbear for publish verification (main branch only)
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: firecracker-inputs
path: /var/cache/bot-bottle-fc/dropbear
# Combined coverage gate: aggregates .coverage.* artifacts uploaded by each
# test job, then runs the diff-coverage gate (new/changed lines >= 90%).
#
# This runs on a self-hosted KVM runner (label `kvm`), NOT ubuntu-latest,
# because the Firecracker backend's subprocess/VM orchestration
# (launch/boot/SSH/isolation-probe) is covered by the integration suite,
# and that suite needs `/dev/kvm` + the provisioned TAP/nft pool — which a
# container-based runner doesn't have. On such a runner the firecracker
# integration test skips and its ~230 orchestration lines read as
# uncovered, so the gate can't pass there.
# Runs on ubuntu-latest — no KVM needed, no test reruns. Coverage files use
# relative_files = True (.coveragerc) so they combine cleanly across runners.
#
# Restricted to the same events as integration-firecracker (same-repo PRs,
# push, workflow_dispatch) for the same security reason.
#
# See #414 for the planned follow-up: artifact-based coverage combination
# (run tests once in their respective jobs, combine .coverage files here).
#
# build-infra creates one candidate from the checkout. This job boots that
# same candidate after integration-firecracker has exercised it; the main
# push path publishes the identical bytes only after every required job.
# Restricted to the same events as integration-firecracker: it depends on
# that job's coverage artifact and skips for fork PRs alongside it.
coverage:
needs: [build-infra, integration-firecracker]
needs: [unit, integration-docker, integration-firecracker]
timeout-minutes: 15
runs-on: [self-hosted, kvm]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: >-
github.event_name == 'push' ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
@@ -213,29 +199,29 @@ jobs:
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Preflight — Firecracker host is ready
run: |
command -v firecracker >/dev/null || {
echo "firecracker not on PATH — provision the runner (README: Firecracker on Linux)"; exit 1; }
test -e /dev/kvm || { echo "/dev/kvm missing — KVM not available on this runner"; exit 1; }
# `backend status` exits non-zero unless the TAP pool is up + no
# range overlap; it prints the exact `backend setup` fix.
python3 cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker
- name: Install coverage
run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages coverage
- name: Download the candidate already exercised by integration
- name: Download unit coverage artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: infra-candidate
path: infra-candidate
name: coverage-unit
path: ${{ github.workspace }}
- name: Download docker coverage artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-docker
path: ${{ github.workspace }}
- name: Download firecracker coverage artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: coverage-firecracker
path: ${{ github.workspace }}
# No dev-requirements install: `coverage` is already provided by the
# self-hosted runner's Nix python env, and that env has no `pip`
# module to install into anyway. `scripts/coverage.sh` +
# `diff_coverage.py` need only `coverage` (not pylint/pyright).
- name: Combined coverage (unit + integration, incl. firecracker)
env:
BOT_BOTTLE_CI_INFRA_ARTIFACT_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/infra-candidate
run: PYTHON=python3 bash scripts/coverage.sh critical
run: PYTHON=python3 bash scripts/coverage.sh aggregate critical
- name: Diff-coverage gate (changed lines >= 90%)
run: |
@@ -243,14 +229,14 @@ jobs:
python3 scripts/diff_coverage.py --base origin/main --min 90
publish-infra:
needs: [stage-firecracker-inputs, build-infra, unit, integration-docker, integration-firecracker, coverage]
needs: [unit, integration-docker, integration-firecracker, coverage]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
steps:
- name: Checkout the tested revision
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Download the tested candidate
- name: Download the tested rootfs
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: infra-candidate
@@ -258,9 +244,10 @@ jobs:
# publish_infra re-derives the version from the checkout to confirm the
# bundle matches before uploading, and the version hashes the dropbear
# bytes. Stage the SAME dropbear build-infra used, or the recheck
# computes a "<missing>"-dropbear version and rejects the candidate.
- name: Download the staged dropbear (matches build-infra's version)
# bytes. Download the SAME dropbear integration-firecracker used, or
# the recheck computes a "<missing>"-dropbear version and rejects the
# candidate.
- name: Download the staged dropbear (matches build's version)
uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
with:
name: firecracker-inputs
-16
View File
@@ -75,22 +75,6 @@ On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI
Use `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker ./cli.py start <agent>` on hosts where neither Apple Container nor KVM is available and Docker is the desired backend.
> **Experimental containers-in-bottle spike (#392):** a bottle may set
> `docker_access: true`. On the macOS backend this starts a guest-local,
> rootless **podman** service after the bottle is registered, exposing its
> Docker-compatible API socket — the agent still uses `docker` and `docker
> compose`. It does not mount Docker Desktop's socket or add outer VM
> capabilities. Rootless Docker was tried first and does not work here at
> all: Apple Container's capability bounding set omits `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`,
> which the kernel requires to write a multi-range `uid_map`. See
> [`docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md`](docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md).
>
> The tradeoff to understand before enabling it: podman avoids that
> requirement by falling back to a single-UID mapping, so nested containers
> provide **no isolation from the agent itself** — `root` inside a nested
> container is the agent user outside it. Nested containers are a build/test
> convenience, not a security boundary. The bottle remains the boundary.
### Firecracker on Linux
On Linux, a KVM-capable host defaults to the Firecracker backend. It needs:
@@ -142,19 +142,11 @@ def launch_consolidated(
def teardown_consolidated(
bottle_id: str,
*,
orchestrator_url: str,
gateway_name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
timeout: float | None = None,
bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str, gateway_name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
) -> None:
"""Deregister the bottle and remove its git-gate state from the gateway.
Both steps are idempotent so this is safe from a cleanup trap."""
from ...orchestrator.config_store import DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
OrchestratorClient(
orchestrator_url,
timeout=timeout if timeout is not None else DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
deprovision_git_gate(DockerGatewayTransport(gateway_name), bottle_id)
+1 -5
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ from .compose import (
write_compose_file,
)
from .consolidated_compose import consolidated_agent_compose
from ...orchestrator.config_store import resolve_teardown_timeout
from .consolidated_launch import launch_consolidated, teardown_consolidated
from ...orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
@@ -134,14 +133,11 @@ def launch(
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()
ctx = launch_consolidated(
plan.egress_plan, git_gate_plan, image_ref=plan.image, tokens=token_values,
)
stack.callback(
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id,
orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
timeout=teardown_timeout,
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id, orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
)
# Step 4: install the SHARED gateway CA into the agent (replaces the
@@ -91,18 +91,12 @@ def launch_consolidated(
)
def teardown_consolidated(
bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str, timeout: float | None = None,
) -> None:
def teardown_consolidated(bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str) -> None:
"""Deregister the bottle and remove its git-gate state from the gateway
VM. Both steps are idempotent so this is safe from a cleanup trap. Does
NOT stop the infra VM — it's a persistent per-host singleton shared by
every bottle."""
from ...orchestrator.config_store import DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
OrchestratorClient(
orchestrator_url,
timeout=timeout if timeout is not None else DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
deprovision_git_gate(infra_vm.gateway_transport(), bottle_id)
-3
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from . import firecracker_vm, image_builder, isolation_probe, netpool, util
from .bottle import FirecrackerBottle
from .bottle_plan import FirecrackerBottlePlan
from ...orchestrator.config_store import resolve_teardown_timeout
from .consolidated_launch import (
launch_consolidated,
teardown_consolidated,
@@ -113,7 +112,6 @@ def launch(
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()
ctx = launch_consolidated(
plan.egress_plan, git_gate_plan,
guest_ip=slot.guest_ip,
@@ -123,7 +121,6 @@ def launch(
stack.callback(
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id,
orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
timeout=teardown_timeout,
)
# Step 5: install the SHARED gateway CA (replaces the per-bottle CA).
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ class MacosContainerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# bottle is registered. See launch.py's stamp for why it lives here and not
# only in the exec-time proxy env.
identity_token: str = ""
docker_access: bool = False
@property
def container_name(self) -> str:
@@ -36,12 +36,9 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from ...egress import EgressPlan
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ...log import info
from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient, OrchestratorClientError
from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
from ...orchestrator.registration import registration_inputs
from ..docker.gateway_provision import deprovision_git_gate, provision_git_gate
from . import util as container_mod
from .enumerate import CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX, EnumerationError, enumerate_active
from .gateway import GATEWAY_NETWORK
from .gateway_provision import AppleGatewayTransport
from .infra import MacosInfraService, OrchestratorStartError
@@ -92,32 +89,6 @@ def ensure_gateway(
)
def live_source_ips(network: str) -> list[str]:
"""Every running agent container's address on `network`.
The reconciliation input: the orchestrator lives inside the infra
container and cannot enumerate the host's containers, so the host has to
tell it which bottles are actually up. Containers that have not been
assigned an address yet contribute nothing the reap's grace window, not
this list, is what protects an in-flight launch.
Raises `EnumerationError` when the live set cannot be determined
authoritatively: either the container listing fails or any individual
inspect fails. Callers must skip reconciliation in that case to avoid
unregistering healthy bottles."""
ips: list[str] = []
for agent in enumerate_active():
name = f"{CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX}{agent.slug}"
ip = container_mod.inspect_container_network_ip(name, network)
if ip is None:
raise EnumerationError(
f"container inspect {name!r} failed; live set is not authoritative"
)
if ip:
ips.append(ip)
return ips
def register_agent(
egress_plan: EgressPlan,
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan,
@@ -132,16 +103,6 @@ def register_agent(
container it is the attribution key the gateway resolves policy by.
Raises on failure; the caller tears down."""
client = OrchestratorClient(endpoint.orchestrator_url)
# Self-heal before registering: a launcher that died hard (SIGKILL, closed
# terminal, host sleep) never ran its teardown callback, leaving an active
# row with no container. vmnet recycles addresses, so such a row can
# collide with this bottle's — and `by_source_ip` fail-closes on ambiguity,
# which would resolve no policy at all and deny every host. Best-effort: a
# reconciliation failure must not block an otherwise-fine launch.
try:
client.reconcile(live_source_ips(endpoint.network))
except (OrchestratorClientError, EnumerationError) as e:
info(f"registry reconciliation skipped: {e}")
inputs = registration_inputs(egress_plan)
reg = client.register_bottle(
source_ip, image_ref=image_ref, policy=inputs.policy,
@@ -163,17 +124,11 @@ def register_agent(
)
def teardown_consolidated(
bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str, timeout: float | None = None,
) -> None:
def teardown_consolidated(bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str) -> None:
"""Deregister the bottle and remove its git-gate state from the gateway.
Both steps are idempotent so this is safe from a cleanup trap. Does NOT
stop the gateway it's a persistent per-host singleton."""
from ...orchestrator.config_store import DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
OrchestratorClient(
orchestrator_url,
timeout=timeout if timeout is not None else DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
deprovision_git_gate(AppleGatewayTransport(), bottle_id)
@@ -181,7 +136,6 @@ __all__ = [
"GatewayEndpoint",
"LaunchContext",
"ensure_gateway",
"live_source_ips",
"register_agent",
"teardown_consolidated",
"ConsolidatedLaunchError",
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-"
_INFRA_NAMES = frozenset({INFRA_NAME})
class EnumerationError(RuntimeError):
"""container list failed; the resulting live set is not authoritative."""
def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
result = subprocess.run(
["container", "list", "--quiet"],
@@ -31,10 +27,7 @@ def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise EnumerationError(
f"container list failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}"
)
return []
out: list[ActiveAgent] = []
for name in sorted(line.strip() for line in result.stdout.splitlines()):
if not name.startswith(CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX) or name in _INFRA_NAMES:
+5 -26
View File
@@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ from .gateway_hosts import (
refresh_gateway_host,
set_gateway_host,
)
from . import rootless_podman
from .bottle_plan import MacosContainerBottlePlan
from ...orchestrator.config_store import resolve_teardown_timeout
from .consolidated_launch import (
GatewayEndpoint,
ensure_gateway,
@@ -144,7 +142,6 @@ def launch(
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()
ctx = register_agent(
plan.egress_plan,
plan.git_gate_plan,
@@ -156,7 +153,6 @@ def launch(
stack.callback(
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id,
orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
timeout=teardown_timeout,
)
info(
f"agent {plan.container_name} registered "
@@ -172,10 +168,6 @@ def launch(
# token above, so — unlike the run-time env — the plan CAN carry it.
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, identity_token=ctx.identity_token)
exec_env = {
**_identity_proxy_env(endpoint, ctx.identity_token),
**rootless_podman.guest_env(plan.docker_access),
}
bottle = MacosContainerBottle(
plan.container_name,
teardown,
@@ -189,16 +181,10 @@ def launch(
),
terminal_color=plan.spec.color,
agent_workdir=plan.workspace_plan.workdir,
exec_env=exec_env,
exec_env=_identity_proxy_env(endpoint, ctx.identity_token),
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
if plan.docker_access:
rootless_podman.prepare_guest_devices(
plan.container_name, container_mod.exec_container_as_root,
)
rootless_podman.start(bottle)
yield bottle
finally:
teardown()
@@ -210,22 +196,15 @@ def _build_images(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
committed = read_committed_image(plan.slug)
if committed and container_mod.image_exists(committed):
info(f"using committed image {committed!r}")
plan = dataclasses.replace(
return dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_provision=dataclasses.replace(
plan.agent_provision, image=committed,
),
)
else:
container_mod.build_image(
plan.image, _REPO_DIR, dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path,
)
if plan.docker_access:
image = rootless_podman.build_image(plan.image, container_mod.build_image)
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_provision=dataclasses.replace(plan.agent_provision, image=image),
)
container_mod.build_image(
plan.image, _REPO_DIR, dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path,
)
return plan
@@ -44,5 +44,4 @@ def resolve_plan(
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_provision=agent_provision_plan,
docker_access=manifest.bottle.docker_access,
)
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
uid="$(id -u)"
if [ "$uid" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "refusing to run rootless podman as root" >&2
exit 1
fi
for command in podman docker fuse-overlayfs slirp4netns; do
command -v "$command" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "missing rootless podman prerequisite: $command" >&2
exit 1
}
done
# The inverse of the rootless-Docker check, and the whole point of the podman
# variant: a subordinate range would push podman onto newuidmap, which cannot
# write a multi-range uid_map without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in this guest. An empty
# range keeps it on the single-UID self-mapping an unprivileged process may
# write itself.
if grep -q "^$(id -un):" /etc/subuid 2>/dev/null; then
echo "unexpected subordinate UID range for $(id -un): podman would" >&2
echo "require CAP_SYS_ADMIN via newuidmap in this guest" >&2
exit 1
fi
for device in /dev/fuse /dev/net/tun; do
[ -r "$device" ] && [ -w "$device" ] || {
echo "device $device is not readable/writable by $(id -un)" >&2
exit 1
}
done
export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR="${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR:-/tmp/bot-bottle-podman-run}"
config="$HOME/.config/containers"
mkdir -p "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" "$config"
chmod 700 "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
# ignore_chown_errors is required, not incidental: with a single-UID mapping
# there is no second UID for image layers to be chowned to, so layers that
# record other owners would otherwise fail to extract.
cat > "$config/storage.conf" <<'CONF'
[storage]
driver="overlay"
[storage.options.overlay]
mount_program="/usr/bin/fuse-overlayfs"
ignore_chown_errors="true"
CONF
# No cgroup delegation reaches this guest, so asking podman to manage cgroups
# fails; events_logger=file avoids the journald socket that is equally absent.
cat > "$config/containers.conf" <<'CONF'
[containers]
cgroups="disabled"
[engine]
cgroup_manager="cgroupfs"
events_logger="file"
CONF
# Registry pulls egress through the bottle's proxy like everything else. The
# token-bearing proxy URL is already in the agent's environment; persisting it
# inside this disposable VM does not broaden its authority.
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
proxy = os.environ.get("HTTPS_PROXY") or os.environ.get("https_proxy", "")
no_proxy = os.environ.get("NO_PROXY") or os.environ.get("no_proxy", "")
config = {"proxies": {"default": {
"httpProxy": proxy,
"httpsProxy": proxy,
"noProxy": no_proxy,
}}}
path = Path.home() / ".docker" / "config.json"
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(json.dumps(config), encoding="utf-8")
path.chmod(0o600)
PY
if docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
exit 0
fi
log=/tmp/bot-bottle-rootless-podman.log
nohup podman system service --time=0 \
"unix://$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/podman.sock" \
>"$log" 2>&1 </dev/null &
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
"""Experimental rootless podman bootstrap for Apple-container bottles.
The service and every nested container remain inside the existing per-bottle
VM. This module refuses to compensate for missing prerequisites with outer
capabilities, a privileged container, or a host Docker socket.
Podman is used rather than rootless Docker for one specific reason: Apple
Container's capability bounding set omits `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, which the kernel
requires to write a multi-range `uid_map` via `newuidmap`. Rootless Docker
has no path that avoids that write. Podman does with no subordinate UID
range configured it falls back to a single-UID self-mapping, which an
unprivileged process may write itself. See
`docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md`.
That fallback is why `build_image` *removes* the agent user's `/etc/subuid`
and `/etc/subgid` entries instead of adding them: their presence is precisely
what would send podman down the `newuidmap` path that cannot work here.
The agent still talks to `docker` and `docker compose`; those speak to
podman's Docker-compatible API socket, so nothing in the agent's habits
changes.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import shlex
import shutil
import tempfile
import time
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable
from ...log import die, info
_INIT = "/usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init"
_RUNTIME_DIR = "/tmp/bot-bottle-podman-run"
_SOCKET = f"{_RUNTIME_DIR}/podman.sock"
_LOG = "/tmp/bot-bottle-rootless-podman.log"
READY_RETRIES = 30
# Apple Container creates both device nodes 0600 root:root, so the agent user
# cannot open them: /dev/fuse blocks the fuse-overlayfs storage driver and
# /dev/net/tun blocks slirp4netns, which rootless podman uses for the default
# bridge network that stock compose files expect. Relaxing the modes needs no
# capability the bottle does not already hold — unlike CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which is
# what killed the rootless-Docker approach.
_GUEST_DEVICES = ("/dev/fuse", "/dev/net/tun")
def build_image(
base_image: str,
build: Callable[..., None],
) -> str:
"""Layer spike-only tooling on an already-built provider image."""
image = f"{base_image}-rootless-podman"
init_script = Path(__file__).with_name("rootless-podman-init.sh")
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bot-bottle-rootless-podman.") as tmp:
context = Path(tmp)
shutil.copy2(init_script, context / "rootless-podman-init.sh")
(context / "Dockerfile").write_text(
"FROM docker:28-cli AS docker_cli\n"
f"FROM {base_image}\n"
"USER root\n"
"COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/bin/docker /usr/local/bin/docker\n"
"COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/"
"docker-compose /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-compose\n"
"RUN apt-get update \\\n"
" && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends podman "
"fuse-overlayfs slirp4netns uidmap \\\n"
" && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \\\n"
# Deliberate: an empty subordinate range keeps podman on the
# single-UID mapping that needs no CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Adding ranges
# here would reintroduce the newuidmap failure this spike exists
# to route around.
" && sed -i '/^node:/d' /etc/subuid /etc/subgid\n"
"COPY rootless-podman-init.sh "
"/usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init\n"
"RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init\n"
"USER node\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
build(image, str(context), dockerfile=str(context / "Dockerfile"))
return image
def guest_env(enabled: bool) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Environment consumed by the Docker CLI inside an enabled bottle."""
if not enabled:
return {}
return {
"DOCKER_HOST": f"unix://{_SOCKET}",
"XDG_RUNTIME_DIR": _RUNTIME_DIR,
}
def prepare_guest_devices(container_name: str, exec_as_root: Callable[..., None]) -> None:
"""Make /dev/fuse and /dev/net/tun openable by the agent user.
Runs as root inside the bottle because the agent must not be able to
re-mode device nodes itself. No outer capability is involved.
"""
exec_as_root(
container_name,
["sh", "-c", f"chmod 0666 {' '.join(_GUEST_DEVICES)}"],
)
def start(bottle: object) -> None:
"""Start and verify the unprivileged service through the bottle exec API."""
info("starting experimental rootless podman service")
result = bottle.exec(shlex.quote(_INIT)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
die(f"rootless podman bootstrap failed: {detail or '<no output>'}")
for _ in range(READY_RETRIES):
result = bottle.exec("docker info >/dev/null 2>&1") # type: ignore[attr-defined]
if result.returncode == 0:
info("rootless podman service is ready")
return
time.sleep(0.2)
logs = bottle.exec( # type: ignore[attr-defined]
f"tail -n 80 {_LOG} 2>/dev/null || true"
)
die(
"rootless podman did not become ready without additional outer "
f"privileges:\n{(logs.stdout or logs.stderr or '<no log>').strip()}"
)
__all__ = ["build_image", "guest_env", "prepare_guest_devices", "start"]
@@ -572,41 +572,6 @@ def try_container_ipv4_on_network(name: str, network: str) -> str:
return ""
def inspect_container_network_ip(name: str, network: str) -> str | None:
"""IP of `name` on `network`, distinguishing inspect failure from "not yet".
Returns:
- the IP string when the container has one on `network`
- "" when inspect succeeds but no address is assigned yet (in-flight DHCP)
- None when the inspect command itself fails (authoritative list impossible)
"""
result = subprocess.run(
[_CONTAINER, "inspect", name],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
return None
try:
data = json.loads(result.stdout or "[]")
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return None
if isinstance(data, list):
data = data[0] if data else {}
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return None
status = data.get("status")
networks = status.get("networks") if isinstance(status, dict) else None
if not isinstance(networks, list):
return ""
for entry in networks:
if not isinstance(entry, dict) or entry.get("network") != network:
continue
raw = entry.get("ipv4Address")
if isinstance(raw, str) and raw:
return raw.split("/", 1)[0]
return ""
def wait_container_ipv4_on_network(
name: str, network: str, *, timeout: float = 15.0, poll: float = 0.25,
) -> str:
-1
View File
@@ -379,7 +379,6 @@ class EgressAddon:
env,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
deny_reason=config.deny_reason,
)
if decision.action == "block":
+6 -45
View File
@@ -89,14 +89,6 @@ LOG_FULL = 2 # log block/warn events + full request and response bodies
class Config:
routes: tuple[Route, ...]
log: int = LOG_OFF
# Why this Config is a deny-all, when it is one for a reason *other* than
# the bottle's own policy genuinely not listing the host. A deny-all is
# indistinguishable from "policy loaded, host not allowed" at the decision
# point — both are simply "no matching route" — so without this the
# operator sees `host X is not in the allowlist` and goes hunting for a
# missing route that was never the problem. Empty for a normally-parsed
# policy; `decide` prefers it over the allowlist wording when set.
deny_reason: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -413,40 +405,16 @@ class PolicyResolverLike(typing.Protocol):
...
# Deny-all explanations. Each names the *actual* failure so an operator isn't
# sent looking for a missing egress route when the bottle never had a policy
# to begin with — the failure mode that made a bricked registration read like
# a misconfigured allowlist.
DENY_UNATTRIBUTED = (
"egress: this request was not attributed to any bottle, so no egress "
"policy applies and every host is denied. Either the bottle's registry "
"row is missing/ambiguous (torn down, or another bottle claimed its "
"source IP), or the request carried no matching identity token — check "
"that the caller's proxy URL includes it. This is not an allowlist problem."
)
DENY_UNPARSEABLE = (
"egress: this bottle's egress policy could not be parsed, so it is being "
"treated as deny-all. Fix the bottle's egress.routes; every host is denied "
"until it loads."
)
DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR = (
"egress: the orchestrator could not be reached to resolve this bottle's "
"egress policy, so every host is denied (fail-closed). Check that the "
"control plane is up; this is not an allowlist problem."
)
def _config_from_policy(policy: "str | None") -> "Config":
"""Parse a resolved policy blob into a Config, fail-closed: None / empty /
unparseable all become a deny-all Config (no routes every request
blocked). Each deny-all carries the reason it is one, so the block message
names the real fault instead of blaming the allowlist."""
blocked)."""
if not policy:
return Config(routes=(), deny_reason=DENY_UNATTRIBUTED)
return Config(routes=()) # unattributed or empty → deny-all
try:
return load_config(policy)
except ValueError:
return Config(routes=(), deny_reason=DENY_UNPARSEABLE)
return Config(routes=()) # unparseable policy → deny
def resolve_client_config(
@@ -460,7 +428,7 @@ def resolve_client_config(
try:
policy = resolver.resolve(client_ip, identity_token)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
return Config(routes=(), deny_reason=DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR)
return Config(routes=()) # orchestrator unreachable/errored → deny
return _config_from_policy(policy)
@@ -489,7 +457,7 @@ def resolve_client_context(
client_ip, identity_token,
)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
return Config(routes=(), deny_reason=DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR), "", {}
return Config(routes=()), "", {} # orchestrator unreachable/errored → deny
return _config_from_policy(policy), (bottle_id or ""), tokens
@@ -604,16 +572,12 @@ def decide(
*,
request_method: str = "GET",
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
deny_reason: str = "",
) -> Decision:
"""`deny_reason` is `Config.deny_reason`: when the deny-all came from a
missing/unparseable policy rather than the bottle's own allowlist, report
that instead of implying a route is merely absent."""
route = match_route(routes, request_host)
if route is None:
return Decision(
action="block",
reason=deny_reason or (
reason=(
f"egress: host {request_host!r} is not in the "
f"bottle's egress.routes allowlist. Declare a "
f"route for it or remove the request."
@@ -888,9 +852,6 @@ __all__ = [
"is_git_push_request",
"is_git_fetch_request",
"load_config",
"DENY_UNATTRIBUTED",
"DENY_UNPARSEABLE",
"DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR",
"resolve_client_config",
"resolve_client_context",
"PolicyResolverLike",
-11
View File
@@ -44,9 +44,6 @@ class ManifestBottle:
# daemon that exposes egress MCP tools to the agent. Set
# `supervise: false` to skip the gateway.
supervise: bool = True
# Experimental guest-local container engine (issue #392). Backends must
# implement this without granting access to a host/shared daemon.
docker_access: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object) -> "ManifestBottle":
@@ -126,15 +123,7 @@ class ManifestBottle:
f"(was {type(supervise_raw).__name__})"
)
docker_access_raw = d.get("docker_access", False)
if not isinstance(docker_access_raw, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' docker_access must be a boolean "
f"(was {type(docker_access_raw).__name__})"
)
return cls(
env=env, agent_provider=agent_provider, git=git,
git_user=git_user, egress=egress, supervise=supervise_raw,
docker_access=docker_access_raw,
)
-8
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ def _merge_two_bottles_runtime(base: "ManifestBottle", override: "ManifestBottle
git_user=merged_git_user,
egress=merged_egress,
supervise=override.supervise,
docker_access=override.docker_access,
)
@@ -207,7 +206,6 @@ def _fold_two_bottles(
git_user=merged_git_user,
egress=merged_egress,
supervise=later.supervise,
docker_access=later.docker_access,
), merged_repos_raw
@@ -268,11 +266,6 @@ def _merge_bottles(
merged_supervise = (
child.supervise if "supervise" in child_raw else parent.supervise
)
merged_docker_access = (
child.docker_access
if "docker_access" in child_raw
else parent.docker_access
)
validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
return ManifestBottle(
@@ -282,7 +275,6 @@ def _merge_bottles(
git_user=merged_git_user,
egress=merged_egress,
supervise=merged_supervise,
docker_access=merged_docker_access,
)
+1 -4
View File
@@ -16,10 +16,7 @@ _FILENAME_RX = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$")
# sets dies with a "did you mean" pointer: typos should not silently
# ghost into an empty config.
BOTTLE_KEYS = frozenset(
{
"env", "extends", "agent_provider", "git-gate", "egress", "supervise",
"docker_access",
}
{"env", "extends", "agent_provider", "git-gate", "egress", "supervise"}
)
AGENT_KEYS_REQUIRED: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL = frozenset({"bottle", "skills", "git-gate"})
-15
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from collections.abc import Iterable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from ..paths import host_control_plane_token
@@ -148,20 +147,6 @@ class OrchestratorClient:
raise OrchestratorClientError(f"teardown {bottle_id}: HTTP {status}")
return True
def reconcile(
self, live_source_ips: Iterable[str], *, grace_seconds: float | None = None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Drop registry rows for bottles that are no longer running
(`POST /reconcile`), returning the reaped bottle ids. `live_source_ips`
is the caller's enumeration of its live bottles — the orchestrator
can't see the backend from inside the infra container."""
body: dict[str, object] = {"live_source_ips": list(live_source_ips)}
if grace_seconds is not None:
body["grace_seconds"] = grace_seconds
payload = self._ok("POST", "/reconcile", body)
reaped = payload.get("reaped")
return [r for r in reaped if isinstance(r, str)] if isinstance(reaped, list) else []
def set_policy(self, bottle_id: str, policy: str) -> bool:
"""Live-reload a bottle's policy (`PUT /bottles/<id>/policy`). False on
404 (unknown bottle)."""
-107
View File
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
"""Per-host orchestrator configuration store (settings in bot-bottle.db).
Co-tenants the shared `bot-bottle.db` via the `DbStore` framework. Settings
are readable by the host launch path directly (no HTTP round-trip to the
orchestrator), so they take effect even before the orchestrator is reachable.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sqlite3
from pathlib import Path
from ..db_store import DbStore
from ..migrations import TableMigrations
from ..paths import host_db_path
TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS"
DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
_MIGRATIONS = TableMigrations(
"orchestrator_config",
[
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS orchestrator_config (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
teardown_timeout_seconds REAL
)
""",
],
)
class OrchestratorConfigStore(DbStore):
"""Orchestrator settings in the shared host DB."""
def __init__(self, db_path: Path | None = None) -> None:
super().__init__(db_path or host_db_path(), _MIGRATIONS)
def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
conn = super()._connect()
conn.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=5000")
return conn
def get_teardown_timeout_seconds(self) -> float | None:
"""Return the configured teardown timeout, or None if not set."""
try:
with self._connection() as conn:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT teardown_timeout_seconds FROM orchestrator_config WHERE id = 1"
).fetchone()
except sqlite3.OperationalError:
return None
return row["teardown_timeout_seconds"] if row else None
def set_teardown_timeout_seconds(self, value: float) -> None:
"""Persist the teardown timeout."""
with self._connection() as conn:
conn.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO orchestrator_config"
" (id, teardown_timeout_seconds) VALUES (1, ?)",
(value,),
)
self._chmod()
def delete_teardown_timeout_seconds(self) -> bool:
"""Clear the stored teardown timeout. Returns True if a value existed."""
with self._connection() as conn:
cur = conn.execute(
"UPDATE orchestrator_config SET teardown_timeout_seconds = NULL"
" WHERE id = 1 AND teardown_timeout_seconds IS NOT NULL"
)
return cur.rowcount > 0
def resolve_teardown_timeout(db_path: Path | None = None) -> float:
"""Return the teardown timeout to use, in priority order:
1. ``BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`` env var
2. ``teardown_timeout_seconds`` in the orchestrator config DB
3. ``DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`` (30 s)
"""
raw = os.environ.get(TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV, "").strip()
if raw:
try:
value = float(raw)
if value > 0:
return value
except ValueError:
pass
store = OrchestratorConfigStore(db_path)
if not store.is_migrated():
store.migrate()
db_value = store.get_teardown_timeout_seconds()
if db_value is not None and db_value > 0:
return db_value
return DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
__all__ = [
"OrchestratorConfigStore",
"resolve_teardown_timeout",
"TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV",
"DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
]
-24
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ vsock / unix-socket portability caveats):
PUT /bottles/<bottle_id>/policy -> 200 {"updated": true} | 404 (live reload)
body: {"policy"}
DELETE /bottles/<bottle_id> -> 200 {"torn_down": true} | 404 (teardown)
POST /reconcile -> 200 {"reaped": [bottle_id, ...]}
body: {"live_source_ips": [...],
["grace_seconds"]}
POST /attribute -> 200 {"bottle_id"} | 403
POST /resolve -> 200 {"bottle_id","policy"} | 403
body: {"source_ip","identity_token"}
@@ -144,27 +141,6 @@ def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
return 200, {"torn_down": True}
return 404, {"error": "no such bottle"}
if method == "POST" and route == "/reconcile":
# Host-driven self-heal: the caller enumerates its live bottles (only
# the host can see the backend) and the orchestrator drops rows for
# every other active bottle. Trusted-caller only — an agent that could
# reach this would be able to unregister its neighbours.
try:
data = _parse_json_object(body)
except ValueError as e:
return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
raw_ips = data.get("live_source_ips")
if not isinstance(raw_ips, list):
return 400, {"error": "live_source_ips (list of strings) is required"}
live = [ip for ip in raw_ips if isinstance(ip, str) and ip]
grace = data.get("grace_seconds")
kwargs = (
{"grace_seconds": float(grace)}
if isinstance(grace, (int, float)) and not isinstance(grace, bool)
else {}
)
return 200, {"reaped": orch.reconcile(live, **kwargs)}
if method == "POST" and route == "/attribute":
try:
data = _parse_json_object(body)
-72
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ import hmac
import secrets
import sqlite3
import time
from collections.abc import Iterable
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
@@ -43,12 +42,6 @@ from ..paths import host_db_path
# 256 bits of urandom, URL-safe — unguessable per-bottle identity token.
IDENTITY_TOKEN_BYTES = 32
# How recently a row must have been registered to be exempt from
# `reap_absent`. Covers the window between `container run` and the address
# becoming visible to another launch's enumeration, so reconciliation never
# reaps a bottle that is still coming up.
DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS = 120.0
def new_identity_token() -> str:
"""A fresh per-bottle identity token (PRD 0070 attribution defence)."""
@@ -232,70 +225,6 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
).fetchall()
return [_row_to_record(r) for r in rows]
def reap_absent(
self,
live_source_ips: Iterable[str],
*,
grace_seconds: float = DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS,
now: float | None = None,
) -> list[BottleRecord]:
"""Delete active rows whose source IP is not held by a live bottle.
A row only ever leaves the registry two ways: an explicit
`teardown_bottle` (the launcher's cleanup callback) or the supersede
sweep in `register`. Neither runs when the launching CLI dies hard
SIGKILL, a closed terminal, a host sleep/crash so the row outlives
its container. That orphan is not inert: source IPs are recycled by
the backend's DHCP, and `by_source_ip` fail-closes on ambiguity, so a
leftover row at a reused address can brick the *next* bottle that
lands on it (no policy resolved -> every host denied, reported to the
agent as "not in the allowlist"). Reconciling against the live set at
launch keeps the registry from accumulating those landmines.
Restores the invariant the data plane needs: **at most one active row
per live address, and none at all for a dead one.** Two cases, because
a dead bottle's address may already have been handed to a live one:
* no live bottle holds the address every row there is an orphan;
* a live bottle holds it but several rows claim it the newest
registration is authoritative and the rest are orphans, the same
rule `register`'s same-IP supersede sweep applies. Without this
second case a recycled address stays ambiguous, which is exactly
the state that resolves no policy.
`grace_seconds` protects an in-flight launch: registration happens
moments after `container run`, and a concurrent launch's address may
not be visible to the caller's enumeration yet. Rows younger than the
grace window are never reaped, so reconciliation can't race a bottle
that is still coming up. Returns the deleted records."""
live = {ip for ip in live_source_ips if ip}
cutoff = (time.time() if now is None else now) - grace_seconds
with self._connection() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM orchestrator_bottles WHERE state = 'active'",
).fetchall()
by_ip: dict[str, list[BottleRecord]] = {}
for row in rows:
rec = _row_to_record(row)
by_ip.setdefault(rec.source_ip, []).append(rec)
candidates: list[BottleRecord] = []
for ip, recs in by_ip.items():
if ip not in live:
candidates.extend(recs)
continue
# Keep the newest claim on a live address; supersede the rest.
recs.sort(key=lambda r: r.created_at)
candidates.extend(recs[:-1])
doomed = [r for r in candidates if r.created_at <= cutoff]
for rec in doomed:
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM orchestrator_bottles WHERE bottle_id = ?",
(rec.bottle_id,),
)
if doomed:
self._chmod()
return doomed
def by_source_ip(self, source_ip: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Network-layer attribution: the single active bottle at this source
IP, or None if unknown or ambiguous (more than one a
@@ -333,5 +262,4 @@ __all__ = [
"new_identity_token",
"default_db_path",
"IDENTITY_TOKEN_BYTES",
"DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS",
]
+1 -30
View File
@@ -13,20 +13,15 @@ Launch lifecycle:
and returns the record. If the broker rejects/fails, the registry entry
is rolled back so a failed launch leaves no orphan.
* `teardown_bottle` sends a signed teardown request, then deregisters.
* `reconcile` sweeps rows whose bottle is no longer running the
self-heal for the teardown paths that never got to run (a hard-killed
launcher), since an orphan row at a recycled source IP bricks the next
bottle that lands on it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from collections.abc import Iterable
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from .broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, sign_request
from .registry import DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS, BottleRecord, RegistryStore
from .registry import BottleRecord, RegistryStore
from .gateway import Gateway
from ..supervise import (
AuditEntry,
@@ -122,30 +117,6 @@ class Orchestrator:
self._tokens.pop(bottle_id, None)
return True
def reconcile(
self,
live_source_ips: Iterable[str],
*,
grace_seconds: float = DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS,
) -> list[str]:
"""Drop registry rows for bottles that are no longer running, and
forget their in-memory egress tokens. Returns the reaped bottle ids.
The caller supplies the live set because only the host can enumerate
its own containers the orchestrator runs *inside* the infra
container and has no view of the backend. Deliberately does not
broker a teardown: the container is already gone, so there is nothing
to stop, and a broker error must not stop the sweep from clearing
the row that would otherwise brick the next bottle at that address.
See `RegistryStore.reap_absent` for why orphans accumulate and why
they are harmful rather than merely untidy."""
reaped = self.registry.reap_absent(
live_source_ips, grace_seconds=grace_seconds)
for rec in reaped:
self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
return [rec.bottle_id for rec in reaped]
def tokens_for(self, bottle_id: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""The bottle's in-memory egress auth tokens (env_name -> value), or
empty. The gateway injects these per request; they are never
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# PRD prd-new: CI artifact-based coverage and local Firecracker candidate flow
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** Claude
- **Created:** 2026-07-21
- **Issue:** #446
## Summary
Restructure the CI test pipeline to run each test suite exactly once, upload
small `.coverage.*` artifacts, and combine them in a lightweight aggregation
job. Move the infra build onto the KVM runner so the ~194 MB rootfs never
crosses the network for PRs. On main-branch pushes, publish the byte-identical
rootfs that was tested.
## Motivation
The prior pipeline had two redundant costs:
1. **Duplicate artifact transfers.** `build-infra` (ubuntu-latest) built and
uploaded the ~194 MB rootfs; `integration-firecracker` downloaded it; the
`coverage` job downloaded it a second time. Combined download overhead: ~83
seconds per run, plus the ~70-second upload.
2. **Duplicate test execution.** `integration-firecracker` ran the Firecracker
integration suite; `coverage` ran the entire unit + integration suite again
on the same KVM runner to collect coverage data. Every line of Firecracker
code was tested twice per CI run.
## Goals
- Each test suite (unit, integration-docker, integration-firecracker) executes
exactly once per workflow run.
- PRs incur no large artifact transfers — the rootfs stays on the KVM runner.
- Main-branch pushes publish a byte-for-byte identical rootfs to the one that
passed the integration tests.
- Concurrent workflow runs cannot cross-publish candidates (naturally enforced
by Gitea Actions' per-run artifact scoping).
- Failed or cancelled runs block publication (enforced by the `needs:` chain on
`publish-infra`).
## Non-goals
- Changing test semantics or the coverage policy (ADR 0004).
- Removing the KVM runner guard on `integration-firecracker` and `coverage`.
- Changing how `publish_infra.py` builds or uploads the rootfs.
## Design
### Job graph
```
unit ──────────────────────────────────┐
integration-docker ────────────────────┤──► coverage ──► publish-infra (main only)
integration-firecracker (KVM) ─────────┘
```
### `unit`
Unchanged except: `coverage run` writes `--data-file=.coverage.unit`; the file
is uploaded as the `coverage-unit` artifact.
### `integration-docker`
Adds a `coverage` install step. `coverage run` writes `--data-file=.coverage.docker`;
the file is uploaded as `coverage-docker`.
### `integration-firecracker` (KVM runner)
Replaces the old `stage-firecracker-inputs``build-infra` → download chain:
1. Builds the infra candidate locally with
`BOT_BOTTLE_FC_DROPBEAR=/var/cache/bot-bottle-fc/dropbear`.
2. Boots the candidate and runs integration tests with coverage, writing
`.coverage.firecracker`.
3. Uploads the small `coverage-firecracker` artifact unconditionally.
4. On main-branch pushes only, uploads the rootfs as `infra-candidate` and the
dropbear as `firecracker-inputs` so `publish-infra` can verify and publish
the byte-identical artifact.
### `coverage`
Moves from a KVM runner to `ubuntu-latest`. No tests are re-executed:
1. Downloads `coverage-unit`, `coverage-docker`, and `coverage-firecracker`.
2. Runs `scripts/coverage.sh aggregate critical`, which calls
`coverage combine` then `coverage report`.
3. Runs the diff-coverage gate (`scripts/diff_coverage.py`).
Coverage files use `relative_files = True` (`.coveragerc`) so they combine
cleanly across runners with different absolute workspace paths.
### `publish-infra`
Depends on all four predecessor jobs (unchanged gate). Downloads `infra-candidate`
and `firecracker-inputs` that were uploaded by `integration-firecracker` on
main — the same byte sequence that passed the integration tests.
### Eliminated jobs
- `stage-firecracker-inputs`: existed only to copy the dropbear to ubuntu-latest
for `build-infra`. No longer needed.
- `build-infra`: the infra candidate is now built on the KVM runner in
`integration-firecracker`.
### Script changes
`scripts/coverage.sh` gains an `aggregate` mode (`coverage.sh aggregate [critical]`)
that combines pre-existing `.coverage.*` files instead of re-running tests.
The existing run mode (`coverage.sh [critical]`) is preserved for local dev.
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
# Egress proxy OOMs on large downloads
Found on 2026-07-21 while running the rootless-podman spike
(`docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md`). Recorded
rather than fixed — the fix is a security-relevant decision, not a
mechanical patch.
## Summary
A single large HTTPS download through the gateway kills the egress
proxy. `mitmdump` buffers whole response bodies so the DLP detectors can
scan them, grows past the gateway container's memory limit, and is
OOM-killed by the cgroup. Nothing restarts it.
Two properties make this worse than a failed download:
- **The gateway is a per-host singleton.** Every bottle shares it, so
one bottle's download takes egress away from all of them.
- **There is no restart on death.** The gateway supervisor is
`while : ; do wait ; done`; a killed daemon stays dead until the infra
container is recreated.
So ordinary agent activity — pulling a container image, downloading a
model or dataset, fetching a large tarball — is a denial of service
against every other bottle on the host. No malice required, though it is
trivially reachable on purpose.
## Evidence
Triggered by `docker compose up` pulling `quay.io/fedora/python-312`
(two layers, ~82MB and ~83MB) inside a bottle. The pull itself
succeeded; the *next* request failed:
```
initializing source docker://quay.io/fedora/python-312:latest:
pinging container registry quay.io: Get "https://quay.io/v2/":
proxyconnect tcp: dial tcp 192.168.128.39:9099: connect: connection refused
```
From the gateway's `dmesg`:
```
python3 invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x100cca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE), order=0
oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_MEMCG,
oom_memcg=/container/bot-bottle-mac-infra,
task_memcg=/container/bot-bottle-mac-infra,task=mitmdump,pid=118
Memory cgroup out of memory: Killed process 118 (mitmdump)
total-vm:1391936kB, anon-rss:997768kB
```
~1GB RSS against a 1024MB container. Note the amplification: ~165MB of
layers produced ~1GB of resident memory, so the buffering is several
copies deep (encoded body, decoded body, and the text conversion the
regex detectors scan).
Afterwards the gateway container was still running and healthy-looking —
orchestrator, supervise, and git-http all alive — with no `mitmdump`
process at all, and it stayed that way until the container was
recreated. A liveness check on the container would not have caught this.
## Reproduction
1. Launch any bottle with an egress route to a host serving a large file.
2. Download >~150MB over HTTPS through the proxy.
3. `dmesg | grep -i oom` inside `bot-bottle-mac-infra`, and note that no
`mitmdump` process remains.
Beware a false negative when checking: truncating the process listing
(`cut -c1-45`) cuts before the binary name, because `mitmdump` runs as
`/usr/local/bin/python3.12 /usr/local/bin/mitmdump …`.
## Fix options, not yet chosen
1. **Restart dead daemons.** Smallest change and strictly an
improvement: an OOM then degrades one download instead of removing
egress for every bottle. Does not stop the OOM.
2. **Cap the scanned body size.** Above a threshold, stop buffering —
either skip the scan or stream it. This is the root-cause fix and a
security decision: a size threshold is exactly the hole an exfiltrator
would aim for, so "skip above N" trades a DoS for a covert channel.
Streaming with a bounded window keeps coverage, at more complexity.
3. **Raise the gateway's memory limit.** Moves the threshold; does not
remove it.
Worth noting that (1) and (2) are complementary — the restart gap is
worth closing regardless of how the memory behaviour is resolved.
@@ -1,353 +0,0 @@
# Rootless Docker inside Apple Container bottles
Spike branch: `spike/rootless-docker-macos` (`a4d8461`)
## Summary
**Negative result.** Rootless Docker cannot run inside an Apple
Container bottle without granting the bottle `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. This is a
kernel constraint on writing multi-range `uid_map`, not a packaging gap
we can close with a better init script, a different base image, or more
careful `/etc/subuid` handling.
The spike was built on the premise — stated in
`bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/rootless_docker.py` — that it would
*"deliberately refuse to compensate for missing prerequisites with outer
capabilities, a privileged container, or a host Docker socket."* That
premise is exactly what the experiment falsified. The two ways forward
are to abandon the premise (add `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` to the bottle, and with
it most of the isolation the bottle exists to provide) or to abandon
rootless Docker.
Recommendation: abandon rootless Docker. Podman does not have this
problem — see [Podman is not blocked by
this](#podman-is-not-blocked-by-this) below.
## Local environment
Tested on 2026-07-21:
```console
$ sw_vers
ProductName: macOS
ProductVersion: 26.5.1
BuildVersion: 25F80
$ container --version
container CLI version 1.0.0 (build: release, commit: ee848e3)
$ uname -a # inside the bottle
Linux ... 6.18.15 #1 SMP Tue Mar 17 01:36:53 UTC 2026 aarch64 GNU/Linux
```
## The failure
`tests/integration/test_macos_rootless_docker_spike.py` builds the
image, launches the bottle, and dies in `rootless_docker.start`:
```
+ exec rootlesskit --net=slirp4netns --mtu=65520 ... dockerd-rootless.sh
[rootlesskit:parent] error: failed to setup UID/GID map:
newuidmap 1100 [0 1000 1 1 100000 65536] failed:
newuidmap: write to uid_map failed: Operation not permitted
```
## Why it fails
Every prerequisite you would normally suspect is present and correct in
the guest:
| Check | Result |
| --- | --- |
| `/usr/bin/newuidmap` | `-rwsr-xr-x root root` — setuid bit intact, survived the OCI export |
| `/` mount options | `rw,relatime`**not** `nosuid` |
| `NoNewPrivs` | `0` |
| `Seccomp` | `0`, no filters |
| `/etc/subuid`, `/etc/subgid` | `node:100000:65536` in both |
| user namespace | `user:[4026531837]`, identical to pid 1 — the *initial* userns |
| `unshare -U -r true` | succeeds |
| `/proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces` | `4505` |
The one thing that is missing is in the capability bounding set that
Apple Container gives the container:
```
CapBnd: 00000000a80425fb
= chown, dac_override, fowner, fsetid, kill, setgid, setuid, setpcap,
net_bind_service, net_raw, sys_chroot, mknod, audit_write, setfcap
```
No `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. That is the whole story, and the chain is:
1. The kernel's `map_write()` gates writing a `uid_map` on
`file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)` — capability over the
**new** user namespace, evaluated against the credentials that opened
`/proc/<pid>/uid_map`.
2. `newuidmap` is setuid-root, so it runs with euid 0 — but its
capability sets are clamped by the bounding set, which has no
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.
3. `cap_capable()` has a shortcut that grants *all* capabilities when
the caller's userns is the new namespace's parent **and**
`ns->owner == cred->euid`. It does not apply: the namespace was
created by `node` (uid 1000) while `newuidmap` runs as euid 0.
4. So the check falls through to the effective-set test in the initial
userns, which fails. `EPERM`.
Note that the single-line unprivileged path (`unshare -U -r`) works
precisely because it does not go through `newuidmap` and does not need
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. Only the multi-range subuid mapping that rootless
Docker requires does.
This is the same constraint that makes upstream's `dind-rootless` image
require `--privileged`. It is not specific to Apple Container, except
that Apple Container gives us no bounding set that includes
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` by default.
## It does work with the capability — which is the point
Adding the capability clears the failure immediately, and exposes one
further, much smaller blocker: `/dev/net/tun` exists (the kernel has
tun; `/proc/misc` lists `200 tun`) but Apple Container creates it
`crw------- root root`, so uid 1000 cannot open it and `slirp4netns`
fails with `open: Permission denied`. A `chmod 0666 /dev/net/tun` as
root inside the bottle fixes that, and needs no capability beyond what
the bottle already has.
With both applied by hand, the daemon comes up completely:
```console
$ container run --rm -u root --cap-add CAP_SYS_ADMIN \
bot-bottle-claude:latest-rootless-docker sh -c '...'
Server Version: 20.10.24+dfsg1
Storage Driver: fuse-overlayfs
Cgroup Driver: none
Cgroup Version: 2
API listen on /tmp/rt/docker.sock
```
So `rootless-docker-init.sh` and `rootless_docker.py` are *correct*.
The spike did not fail on a bug. It failed on its own premise.
Two secondary findings from that run, relevant if anyone revisits this:
- Debian's `docker.io` package pins Docker **20.10** (EOL), not the 28.x
implied by the `docker:28-cli` compose plugin the image copies in.
- `Cgroup Driver: none` — no resource limits on nested containers.
## Why we should not just add the capability
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN` is close to a superset of "root" in practical terms —
mount, `pivot_root`, namespace manipulation, and a long tail of
subsystem-specific powers. Granting it to the agent bottle would
undercut the containment argument the rest of the backend is built
around, including the deliberately narrow choices immediately adjacent
to it in `launch.py` (`--cap-drop CAP_NET_RAW`, no `NET_ADMIN`, a
host-only agent network). Trading all of that for nested `docker
compose` is a bad exchange.
## Podman is not blocked by this
Sanity-checked on the same host, same kernel, same runtime, so the
comparison is apples to apples:
| Scenario | Result |
| --- | --- |
| Podman rootless, `/etc/subuid` populated | **Fails identically**`newuidmap: write to uid_map failed: Operation not permitted` |
| Podman rootless, no subuid ranges, `--network=host` | **Works**, no added capabilities |
| Podman rootless, no subuid ranges, default netns, `/dev/net/tun` at `0600` | Fails — `slirp4netns: open("/dev/net/tun"): Permission denied` |
| Podman rootless, no subuid ranges, default netns, `/dev/net/tun` at `0666` | **Works**, no added capabilities |
The difference is that podman degrades gracefully when no subuid range
is available: it falls back to a single-UID self-mapping, which an
unprivileged process may write itself, so `newuidmap` is never invoked
and `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` is never needed. Docker's rootless mode has no
equivalent fallback.
The cost of that fallback is real and should be weighed before building
on it: with a single-UID mapping, every UID inside a nested container
collapses onto the bottle's own uid 1000. There is no UID separation
between the agent and anything it runs — `root` in a nested container is
the agent user outside it. It also requires `ignore_chown_errors` on the
storage driver. Whether that is acceptable depends on whether the bottle
boundary (which is unchanged) or the nested-container boundary (which is
effectively nil) is the one we are relying on.
## What the podman spike then needed
The podman implementation that replaced the Docker one on this branch
turned up two more device-node blockers of the same shape as
`/dev/net/tun` — Apple Container creates the node, but 0600 root:root:
- **`/dev/fuse`** — blocks the `fuse-overlayfs` storage driver
(`fuse: failed to open /dev/fuse: Permission denied`). Without it the
only working driver is `vfs`, which copies whole layers per container.
- **`/dev/net/tun`** — blocks `slirp4netns`, which rootless podman uses
for the default bridge network.
Both are fixed by `chmod 0666` as root inside the bottle, which needs no
capability the bottle does not already hold. This is categorically
different from the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` requirement: it is a permission on a
node that already exists, not an outer privilege grant.
One design note worth recording: the agent-facing surface stays `docker`
and `docker compose`, pointed at podman's Docker-compatible API socket
via `DOCKER_HOST`. Setting `netns="host"` in `containers.conf` does *not*
propagate through that compat API — stock `docker run` and compose files
request bridge networking explicitly — so slirp4netns (and therefore the
`/dev/net/tun` chmod) is required for ordinary compose files to work at
all. Host networking remains available per-workload via
`--network=host`.
Verified working in a bottle with zero added capabilities: fuse-overlayfs
storage, the compat API socket, `docker run` on both bridge and host
networking, and published ports.
### Nested pulls collide with our own egress DLP
The first live run got podman up and `docker compose` running, then
failed on the image pull:
```
web Pulling
initializing source docker://python:3.12-alpine: reading manifest ...
StatusCode: 403, egress DLP: Generic Bearer JWT found in body
```
This is bot-bottle's own egress scanner, not a podman problem. The
Docker registry auth flow carries a bearer JWT *by protocol*, and the
`token_patterns` detector's `Generic Bearer JWT` rule
(`Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{50,}`) matches it on every pull. Any bottle
that pulls images will hit this.
The fix is per-route detector scoping, which the egress config already
supports — drop `token_patterns` on the registry hosts and keep
`known_secrets`:
```json
{"host": "registry-1.docker.io",
"dlp": {"outbound_detectors": ["known_secrets"]}}
```
That is the right trade rather than a grudging one: `known_secrets`
matches the bottle's *actual* credential values, so real exfil through a
registry host is still caught. `token_patterns` on a registry route only
ever produces protocol noise.
Worth generalising later: any manifest enabling `docker_access` needs
this on its registry routes, so it probably belongs in a shared
registry-route snippet rather than being copy-pasted per bottle.
### And then registry auth collides with the Authorization strip
With DLP scoped, the pull failed differently: `unauthorized:
authentication required`. This one is architectural.
`egress_addon.py` strips agent-set `Authorization` unconditionally
before forwarding — deliberately, so an agent cannot smuggle a
credential out in a header the DLP detectors don't recognise. A route
may carry gateway-injected auth instead, but only from a *static* token
in an env var (`auth_scheme` + `token_env`).
Docker registry auth doesn't fit that shape. The client fetches a
short-lived, per-repository-scope bearer token from `auth.docker.io` and
presents it to `registry-1.docker.io`. There is no static token to
inject, and the token the client legitimately obtained is stripped.
Measured inside a bottle, by hand:
| Step | Result |
| --- | --- |
| Fetch token from `auth.docker.io` | 200, 5409-byte token body |
| Manifest request **with** that valid token | 401 |
| Manifest request with **no** Authorization | 401 — identical |
A valid token behaves exactly like sending none, which is direct
evidence the header never arrives. Any nested-container workflow that
pulls from a registry is blocked on this, so it is not a detail that can
be deferred: pulling base images is most of what nested containers are
for.
### Registries that skip the token dance work today
Not every registry needs the stripped header. Measured directly:
| Registry | Manifest request with no `Authorization` |
| --- | --- |
| `quay.io` | 200 |
| `mcr.microsoft.com` | 200 |
| `registry.k8s.io` | 307 (redirect, no auth) |
| `ghcr.io` | 401 |
| `registry-1.docker.io` | 401 |
So "just add the registry to the bottle config" genuinely works — for
quay, MCR, registry.k8s.io, or any unauthenticated internal registry.
Docker Hub and GHCR are the ones that need the strip resolved. The
acceptance test uses quay for exactly this reason.
Resolving it for Docker Hub means picking one of:
1. **Per-route opt-in to preserve client Authorization.** Smallest
change. Note the compounding effect on exactly these routes: the DLP
scoping above already removed `token_patterns` there, so a
preserved-auth registry route is one where the agent may send bearer
tokens that neither the strip nor the pattern detector inspects.
`known_secrets` still applies, so the bottle's real credentials are
still caught.
2. **A registry-aware gateway** that performs the token dance itself and
injects the result. Preserves the invariant fully; materially more
work, and it makes the gateway speak a specific registry protocol.
3. **Pre-seed images at provision time** (host-side `container image
save` into podman storage), so bottles never pull at runtime.
Preserves the invariant, and limits nested containers to
pre-approved images — which fits the custody positioning, at the cost
of no ad-hoc `docker pull`.
4. **Stop.** Nested containers are not supported on this backend.
### Podman 4.3.1 silently swallows container exit codes
Debian bookworm — which the current agent base image is built on —
ships podman 4.3.1. Through its Docker-compatible API, `docker run`
returns 0 no matter what the container did:
| Command | podman 4.3.1 | podman 5.4.2 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `docker run … sh -c 'exit 7'` (compat API) | **0** | 7 |
| `docker run … sh -c 'exit 0'` (compat API) | 0 | 0 |
| `podman run … sh -c 'exit 7'` (native) | 7 | 7 |
This is worse than a broken feature: every failing command an agent runs
via `docker run` reports success. A test suite, a build step, or a CI
script inside a bottle would pass while failing. It also silently
defeated the acceptance test's egress-containment assertion, which is
why that assertion now checks an in-band marker rather than an exit
code.
Podman 5.4.2 (Debian trixie) fixes it, but needs two packages that
bookworm's podman does not: `passt` (podman 5's default network tool)
and `nftables` (netavark shells out to `nft`; without it every run fails
with `unable to upgrade to tcp, received 500`). With both installed,
exit codes propagate correctly and the compat API behaves.
The open question this leaves is where podman 5 comes from, since the
agent base is bookworm-based:
1. **Move the agent images to Debian trixie.** Trixie is current stable.
Correct, and the blast radius is every bottle, not just this feature.
2. **Drop the compat socket and use podman natively** (`podman-docker`
provides a `docker` shim; compose comes from `podman-compose`).
Native podman propagates exit codes correctly even on 4.3.1. Contained
to this feature, at the cost of `docker compose` becoming
`docker-compose`/`podman-compose`.
3. **Ship bookworm's podman 4.3.1 with the compat socket** — not viable.
Silent false success is a correctness bug agents cannot see.
## Recommendation
1. Do not revive rootless Docker on this backend. This document is the
record of why.
2. Nested containers, if wanted, come from podman under the
single-mapping constraint — with the explicit understanding that the
nested-container boundary carries no security weight. `root` in a
nested container is the agent user outside it.
3. Nested containers are therefore a build/test convenience. The bottle
remains the security boundary, exactly as it was.
+28 -8
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Combined unit + integration coverage (see docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md).
#
# Runs the unit suite, then appends the integration suite (which skips
# cleanly when Docker / the backend CLIs are unavailable), and prints one
# combined report. The integration suite is what scores the subprocess /
# backend orchestration modules, so the number here is the policy's
# yardstick — not the unit-only badge.
# Two modes:
#
# Usage:
# scripts/coverage.sh # combined report
# scripts/coverage.sh critical # also report just the critical modules
# scripts/coverage.sh [critical]
# Run mode (default, for local dev): executes the unit suite then the
# integration suite under coverage and prints a combined report.
#
# scripts/coverage.sh aggregate [critical]
# Aggregate mode (used by CI): combines pre-existing .coverage.* files
# produced by individual test jobs and prints a combined report. No tests
# are re-executed; no KVM or Docker dependency.
#
# Pass "critical" as the last argument in either mode to also report just the
# critical modules (ADR 0004 target: 90%).
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
@@ -21,6 +25,22 @@ PY="${PYTHON:-python3}"
# README "core coverage" badge can't drift; comma-join it for --include.
CRITICAL=$(grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' scripts/critical-modules.txt | paste -sd, -)
if [ "${1:-}" = "aggregate" ]; then
# Aggregate mode: combine .coverage.* artifacts already in the workspace.
echo "== combining coverage artifacts ==" >&2
"$PY" -m coverage combine
echo "== combined report ==" >&2
"$PY" -m coverage report -m
if [ "${2:-}" = "critical" ]; then
echo "== critical modules (ADR 0004 target: 90%) ==" >&2
"$PY" -m coverage report --include="$CRITICAL"
fi
exit 0
fi
# Run mode (default): execute both suites under coverage in this process.
rm -f .coverage
echo "== unit ==" >&2
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
"""Live-Mac acceptance spike for guest-local rootless podman (issue #392).
Run explicitly on an Apple Silicon/macOS 26 host:
BOT_BOTTLE_ROOTLESS_PODMAN_SPIKE=1 \
python3 -m unittest tests.integration.test_macos_rootless_podman_spike -v
The opt-in is deliberate: ordinary Linux CI cannot execute Apple Container.
Podman rather than Docker because Apple Container's capability bounding set
omits CAP_SYS_ADMIN; see
docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md. The agent-facing
surface is still `docker` and `docker compose`, which talk to podman's
Docker-compatible API socket.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import platform
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
@unittest.skipUnless(
platform.system() == "Darwin"
and os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_ROOTLESS_PODMAN_SPIKE") == "1",
"requires an explicit live-Mac rootless-podman spike run",
)
class TestMacosRootlessPodmanSpike(unittest.TestCase):
def test_compose_stays_inside_registered_bottle(self) -> None:
workspace = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="rootless-podman-spike."))
stage = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="rootless-podman-stage."))
try:
(workspace / "index.html").write_text("bottle-compose-ok\n")
(workspace / "compose.yaml").write_text(
"services:\n"
" web:\n"
" image: quay.io/prometheus/busybox\n"
" working_dir: /workspace\n"
" command: httpd -f -p 8000 -h /workspace\n"
" volumes: ['.:/workspace']\n"
" ports: ['18080:8000']\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
manifest = ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {"dev": {
"docker_access": True,
# A deliberately tiny image. Pulling a ~165MB one
# OOM-kills the shared egress proxy, which buffers whole
# response bodies to scan them — a real defect, but a
# separate one from what this test covers. See the
# research note.
#
# quay.io deliberately, not Docker Hub: the egress proxy
# strips agent-set Authorization (so an agent cannot
# smuggle a credential out in a header), and Docker Hub
# requires a client-fetched, per-scope bearer token that
# the strip therefore removes. quay serves manifests with
# no Authorization at all, so a plain route is enough.
#
# token_patterns is still scoped off: registry traffic
# carries bearer JWTs by protocol and trips the generic
# rule. known_secrets stays on — it matches the bottle's
# own credentials, which is the detector that catches
# real exfil.
"egress": {"routes": [
{"host": "quay.io", "dlp": {
"outbound_detectors": ["known_secrets"],
}},
{"host": "cdn01.quay.io", "dlp": {
"outbound_detectors": ["known_secrets"],
}},
]},
}},
"agents": {"spike": {
"bottle": "dev", "skills": [], "prompt": "",
}},
})
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name="spike",
copy_cwd=True,
user_cwd=str(workspace),
)
backend = get_bottle_backend("macos-container")
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
workdir = plan.workspace_plan.workdir
checks = (
"docker info >/dev/null && docker compose version && "
f"cd {workdir} && docker compose up -d --wait && "
"curl --fail --silent http://127.0.0.1:18080/ | "
"grep -q bottle-compose-ok"
)
result = bottle.exec(checks)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"stdout={result.stdout!r}\nstderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# podman's compat API reports rootlessness through its own
# native endpoint; the Docker-shaped SecurityOptions field does
# not carry it.
inspect = bottle.exec(
"podman info --format '{{.Host.Security.Rootless}}'"
)
self.assertIn("true", inspect.stdout.lower())
self.assertEqual(
0,
bottle.exec(
"test \"$(id -u)\" -ne 0"
).returncode,
"the podman service must not be running as bottle root",
)
self.assertNotEqual(
0,
bottle.exec("test -S /var/run/docker.sock").returncode,
"spike must never expose a host/rootful Docker socket",
)
# Asserted on an in-band marker, not on `docker run`'s exit
# code: podman 4.3.1's Docker-compat API swallows the
# container's status and returns 0 for everything, so an
# exit-code assertion here passes whether egress was blocked
# or wide open. That silent false pass is worse than no check
# at all, and it is exactly this check — the one proving a
# nested container cannot escape the egress path.
#
# busybox ships wget, so a failure here means egress was
# refused rather than the binary being absent.
direct = bottle.exec(
"docker run --rm --env HTTP_PROXY= --env HTTPS_PROXY= "
"--env http_proxy= --env https_proxy= "
"quay.io/prometheus/busybox sh -c "
"'wget -T 4 -qO- https://evil.example.com/ "
"&& echo ESCAPED || echo CONTAINED'"
)
self.assertIn(
"CONTAINED", direct.stdout,
"an inner container obtained direct, unproxied egress: "
f"stdout={direct.stdout!r} stderr={direct.stderr!r}",
)
self.assertNotIn("ESCAPED", direct.stdout)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(workspace, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(stage, ignore_errors=True)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+1 -60
View File
@@ -4,14 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import unittest
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (
DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR,
DENY_UNATTRIBUTED,
DENY_UNPARSEABLE,
decide,
resolve_client_config,
resolve_client_context,
)
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import resolve_client_config, resolve_client_context
from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError
@@ -115,55 +108,3 @@ class TestResolveClientContext(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestDenyReasonNamesTheRealFault(unittest.TestCase):
"""A deny-all must not masquerade as a missing allowlist entry.
Regression: an unregistered bottle resolves no policy, so *every* host is
denied but the block message said `host X is not in the allowlist`,
which reads as a config problem and sends the operator hunting for a route
that was never missing. The structural reason wins over that wording.
"""
def _reason(self, resolver: object, host: str = "chatgpt.com") -> str:
cfg = resolve_client_config(resolver, "10.243.0.1") # type: ignore[arg-type]
return decide(cfg.routes, host, "/v1/x", {}, deny_reason=cfg.deny_reason).reason
def test_unattributed_says_unattributed_not_allowlist(self) -> None:
reason = self._reason(_FakeResolver(result=None))
self.assertEqual(DENY_UNATTRIBUTED, reason)
# The misleading claim is the one that must be gone: the host was
# never "not in the allowlist" — there was no allowlist at all.
self.assertNotIn("is not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist", reason)
# Both causes must be named. `/resolve` fail-closes on a missing row
# *and* on a token mismatch, and the message pointing only at the row
# sent us hunting for a deregistered bottle that was registered fine.
self.assertIn("registry row", reason)
self.assertIn("identity token", reason)
def test_resolver_error_says_orchestrator_unreachable(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(DENY_RESOLVER_ERROR, self._reason(_FakeResolver(raises=True)))
def test_unparseable_policy_says_so(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
DENY_UNPARSEABLE, self._reason(_FakeResolver(result="routes: notalist\n")))
def test_a_real_allowlist_miss_keeps_the_allowlist_wording(self) -> None:
"""The message only changes for structural deny-alls — a loaded policy
that genuinely lacks the host still points at the allowlist."""
reason = self._reason(_FakeResolver(result='routes:\n - host: "api.example.com"\n'))
self.assertIn("is not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist", reason)
self.assertIn("chatgpt.com", reason)
def test_allowed_host_is_still_forwarded(self) -> None:
cfg = resolve_client_config(
_FakeResolver(result='routes:\n - host: "api.example.com"\n'), "10.243.0.1")
decision = decide(
cfg.routes, "api.example.com", "/v1/x", {}, deny_reason=cfg.deny_reason)
self.assertEqual("forward", decision.action)
def test_a_parsed_policy_carries_no_deny_reason(self) -> None:
cfg = resolve_client_config(
_FakeResolver(result='routes:\n - host: "api.example.com"\n'), "10.243.0.1")
self.assertEqual("", cfg.deny_reason)
+1 -103
View File
@@ -87,8 +87,7 @@ class TestRegisterAgent(unittest.TestCase):
*, source_ip: str = "192.168.128.9",
):
with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.provision_git_gate", provision or Mock()), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.live_source_ips", return_value=[]):
patch(f"{_MOD}.provision_git_gate", provision or Mock()):
return register_agent(
_egress_plan(), _git_plan(),
source_ip=source_ip, endpoint=_endpoint(), image_ref="img:1",
@@ -135,104 +134,3 @@ class TestTeardown(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestLiveSourceIps(unittest.TestCase):
"""The reconciliation input: the host enumerates its own bottles because
the orchestrator, inside the infra container, cannot see the backend."""
def _agents(self, *slugs: str) -> list[Mock]:
return [Mock(slug=s) for s in slugs]
def test_maps_slugs_to_container_addresses(self) -> None:
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.consolidated_launch import live_source_ips
with patch(f"{_MOD}.enumerate_active", return_value=self._agents("a", "b")), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.container_mod.inspect_container_network_ip",
side_effect=["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"]) as ip:
got = live_source_ips("net0")
self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"], got)
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-a", ip.call_args_list[0].args[0])
def test_containers_without_an_address_are_skipped(self) -> None:
"""A container that hasn't been given a DHCP address yet contributes
nothing the reap's grace window, not this list, protects it."""
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.consolidated_launch import live_source_ips
with patch(f"{_MOD}.enumerate_active", return_value=self._agents("a", "b")), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.container_mod.inspect_container_network_ip",
side_effect=["", "10.0.0.2"]):
self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.2"], live_source_ips("net0"))
def test_container_list_failure_raises(self) -> None:
"""If container list fails, the live set is not authoritative and
reconciliation must be skipped."""
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.consolidated_launch import live_source_ips
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.enumerate import EnumerationError
with patch(f"{_MOD}.enumerate_active",
side_effect=EnumerationError("container list failed")):
with self.assertRaises(EnumerationError):
live_source_ips("net0")
def test_per_container_inspect_failure_raises(self) -> None:
"""If any individual inspect fails, the live set is not authoritative."""
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.consolidated_launch import live_source_ips
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.enumerate import EnumerationError
with patch(f"{_MOD}.enumerate_active", return_value=self._agents("a", "b")), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.container_mod.inspect_container_network_ip",
side_effect=["10.0.0.1", None]):
with self.assertRaises(EnumerationError):
live_source_ips("net0")
class TestRegisterAgentReconciles(unittest.TestCase):
"""Registration self-heals the registry first: an orphan row at a recycled
address makes attribution ambiguous, which resolves no policy at all and
denies every host for the bottle being launched."""
def _register(self, client: Mock) -> None:
with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.provision_git_gate"), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.live_source_ips", return_value=["10.0.0.7"]):
register_agent(
_egress_plan(), _git_plan(),
source_ip="10.0.0.7", endpoint=_endpoint(),
)
def test_reconciles_before_registering(self) -> None:
client = _client()
calls: list[str] = []
def _reconcile(*_args: object, **_kwargs: object) -> list[str]:
calls.append("reconcile")
return []
def _register_bottle(*_args: object, **_kwargs: object) -> RegisteredBottle:
calls.append("register")
return RegisteredBottle("b1", "tok")
client.reconcile.side_effect = _reconcile
client.register_bottle.side_effect = _register_bottle
self._register(client)
self.assertEqual(["reconcile", "register"], calls)
client.reconcile.assert_called_once_with(["10.0.0.7"])
def test_a_reconcile_failure_does_not_block_the_launch(self) -> None:
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClientError
client = _client()
client.reconcile.side_effect = OrchestratorClientError("unreachable")
self._register(client)
client.register_bottle.assert_called_once()
def test_enumeration_error_does_not_block_the_launch(self) -> None:
"""A partial container listing must not abort the launch — skip
reconciliation and proceed, just as with an unreachable orchestrator."""
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.enumerate import EnumerationError
client = _client()
with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.provision_git_gate"), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.live_source_ips",
side_effect=EnumerationError("container list failed")):
register_agent(
_egress_plan(), _git_plan(),
source_ip="10.0.0.7", endpoint=_endpoint(),
)
client.register_bottle.assert_called_once()
+2 -4
View File
@@ -66,10 +66,8 @@ class TestMacosContainerEnumerate(unittest.TestCase):
agents = self._enumerate("bot-bottle-mac-infra\nbot-bottle-dev-abc\n")
self.assertEqual(["dev-abc"], [a.slug for a in agents])
def test_raises_when_the_cli_fails(self):
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.enumerate import EnumerationError
with self.assertRaises(EnumerationError):
self._enumerate("", returncode=1)
def test_empty_when_the_cli_fails(self):
self.assertEqual([], self._enumerate("", returncode=1))
if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.launch import (
_agent_run_argv,
_identity_proxy_env,
)
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.rootless_podman import guest_env
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
_BOTTLE = "bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.bottle"
@@ -77,7 +76,6 @@ def _plan(
),
agent_git_gate_url=agent_git_gate_url,
agent_supervise_url=agent_supervise_url,
docker_access=False,
))
@@ -180,18 +178,6 @@ class TestIdentityTokenDelivery(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("--env", argv)
class TestRootlessPodmanEnvironment(unittest.TestCase):
def test_disabled_bottle_gets_no_docker_environment(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual({}, guest_env(False))
def test_enabled_bottle_uses_only_guest_local_socket(self) -> None:
env = guest_env(True)
self.assertEqual(
"unix:///tmp/bot-bottle-podman-run/podman.sock", env["DOCKER_HOST"],
)
self.assertNotIn("/var/run/docker.sock", " ".join(env.values()))
class TestPlanIdentityToken(unittest.TestCase):
"""git-gate's gitconfig extraHeader and the supervise MCP --header read
`getattr(plan, "identity_token", "")` at provision time and both bypass the
-44
View File
@@ -334,50 +334,6 @@ class TestInspectDigests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual({}, util.container_env("x"))
class TestInspectContainerNetworkIp(unittest.TestCase):
"""inspect_container_network_ip must distinguish inspect failure (None)
from 'no DHCP address yet' (""), which is the invariant live_source_ips
relies on to skip reconciliation on partial snapshots."""
_NETWORK = "bot-bottle-mac-gateway"
def _inspect(self, stdout: str, returncode: int = 0) -> str | None:
cp = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=[], returncode=returncode, stdout=stdout, stderr="",
)
with patch.object(util.subprocess, "run", return_value=cp):
return util.inspect_container_network_ip("bot-bottle-abc", self._NETWORK)
def _entry(self, ip: str = "192.168.128.5") -> str:
return (
f'[{{"status":{{"networks":['
f'{{"network":"{self._NETWORK}","ipv4Address":"{ip}"}}'
f']}}}}]'
)
def test_returns_ip_when_inspect_succeeds(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual("192.168.128.5", self._inspect(self._entry()))
def test_strips_cidr_prefix(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual("192.168.128.5", self._inspect(self._entry("192.168.128.5/24")))
def test_returns_empty_string_when_no_address_assigned_yet(self) -> None:
no_ip = f'[{{"status":{{"networks":[{{"network":"{self._NETWORK}","ipv4Address":""}}]}}}}]'
self.assertEqual("", self._inspect(no_ip))
def test_returns_empty_string_when_network_list_absent(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual("", self._inspect('[{"status":{}}]'))
def test_returns_none_on_nonzero_exit(self) -> None:
self.assertIsNone(self._inspect("", returncode=1))
def test_returns_none_on_malformed_json(self) -> None:
self.assertIsNone(self._inspect("not-json"))
def test_returns_none_on_unexpected_json_shape(self) -> None:
self.assertIsNone(self._inspect("null"))
class TestWaitContainerIpv4(unittest.TestCase):
def test_returns_address_once_dhcp_assigns_it(self):
with patch.object(util, "try_container_ipv4_on_network", side_effect=["", "", "192.168.128.4"]), \
-147
View File
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
"""Unit coverage for the fail-closed macOS rootless-podman spike."""
from __future__ import annotations
import unittest
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import cast
from unittest.mock import patch
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container import rootless_podman
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container import launch as launch_mod
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.bottle_plan import MacosContainerBottlePlan
class _Bottle:
def __init__(self, results: list[SimpleNamespace]) -> None:
self.results = results
self.commands: list[str] = []
def exec(self, command: str) -> SimpleNamespace:
self.commands.append(command)
return self.results.pop(0)
def _result(returncode: int, *, stdout: str = "", stderr: str = "") -> SimpleNamespace:
return SimpleNamespace(returncode=returncode, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _AgentProvision:
image: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _Plan:
slug: str
image: str
dockerfile_path: str
docker_access: bool
agent_provision: _AgentProvision
class TestRootlessPodmanStart(unittest.TestCase):
def test_bootstraps_then_waits_for_guest_local_service(self) -> None:
bottle = _Bottle([_result(0), _result(1), _result(0)])
with patch.object(rootless_podman.time, "sleep"):
rootless_podman.start(bottle)
self.assertIn("rootless-podman-init", bottle.commands[0])
self.assertEqual(2, bottle.commands.count("docker info >/dev/null 2>&1"))
def test_bootstrap_failure_is_fatal_without_privilege_fallback(self) -> None:
bottle = _Bottle([_result(1, stderr="slirp4netns missing")])
with patch.object(rootless_podman, "die", side_effect=RuntimeError) as die:
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
rootless_podman.start(bottle)
self.assertIn("slirp4netns missing", die.call_args.args[0])
self.assertEqual(1, len(bottle.commands))
def test_timeout_reports_guest_log(self) -> None:
bottle = _Bottle(
[_result(0)]
+ [_result(1) for _ in range(rootless_podman.READY_RETRIES)]
+ [_result(0, stdout="operation not permitted")]
)
with patch.object(rootless_podman.time, "sleep"), \
patch.object(rootless_podman, "die", side_effect=RuntimeError) as die:
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
rootless_podman.start(bottle)
self.assertIn("operation not permitted", die.call_args.args[0])
class TestRootlessPodmanDevices(unittest.TestCase):
def test_relaxes_only_the_two_blocked_device_nodes_as_root(self) -> None:
calls: list[tuple[str, list[str]]] = []
rootless_podman.prepare_guest_devices(
"bottle-1", lambda name, argv: calls.append((name, argv)),
)
self.assertEqual(1, len(calls))
name, argv = calls[0]
self.assertEqual("bottle-1", name)
self.assertIn("chmod 0666 /dev/fuse /dev/net/tun", argv[-1])
class TestRootlessPodmanImage(unittest.TestCase):
def test_layers_tooling_without_changing_base_image(self) -> None:
calls: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = []
def build(image: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str) -> None:
calls.append((image, context, dockerfile))
text = Path(dockerfile).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("FROM agent:base", text)
self.assertIn("podman fuse-overlayfs slirp4netns uidmap", text)
self.assertIn("USER node", text)
self.assertTrue((Path(context) / "rootless-podman-init.sh").is_file())
image = rootless_podman.build_image("agent:base", build)
self.assertEqual("agent:base-rootless-podman", image)
self.assertEqual("agent:base-rootless-podman", calls[0][0])
def test_strips_subordinate_ranges_so_podman_avoids_newuidmap(self) -> None:
"""The single-UID fallback is the entire reason podman works here.
A subordinate range would send podman down the newuidmap path, which
cannot write a multi-range uid_map without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an Apple
Container guest the failure that killed the rootless-Docker spike.
"""
seen: list[str] = []
def build(image: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str) -> None:
seen.append(Path(dockerfile).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
rootless_podman.build_image("agent:base", build)
text = seen[0]
self.assertIn("sed -i '/^node:/d' /etc/subuid /etc/subgid", text)
self.assertNotIn("subuid", text.replace(
"sed -i '/^node:/d' /etc/subuid /etc/subgid", "",
))
def test_launch_builds_base_then_rootless_variant(self) -> None:
plan = cast(MacosContainerBottlePlan, cast(object, _Plan(
slug="dev-abc",
image="agent:base",
dockerfile_path="/repo/Dockerfile",
docker_access=True,
agent_provision=_AgentProvision(image="agent:base"),
)))
with patch.object(launch_mod, "read_committed_image", return_value=None), \
patch.object(launch_mod.container_mod, "build_image") as build, \
patch.object(
launch_mod.rootless_podman,
"build_image",
return_value="agent:base-rootless-podman",
) as build_rootless:
result = launch_mod._build_images(plan) # pylint: disable=protected-access
build.assert_called_once_with(
"agent:base", launch_mod._REPO_DIR, # pylint: disable=protected-access
dockerfile="/repo/Dockerfile",
)
build_rootless.assert_called_once_with("agent:base", build)
self.assertEqual("agent:base-rootless-podman", result.agent_provision.image)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-6
View File
@@ -56,12 +56,6 @@ class TestMergeBottlesRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
result = merge_bottles_runtime([base, override])
self.assertFalse(result.supervise)
def test_docker_access_later_wins(self):
result = merge_bottles_runtime([
_bottle(docker_access=False), _bottle(docker_access=True),
])
self.assertTrue(result.docker_access)
def test_three_bottles_merged_left_to_right(self):
b1 = _bottle(env={"A": "1", "B": "1", "C": "1"})
b2 = _bottle(env={"B": "2", "C": "2"})
+1 -8
View File
@@ -44,20 +44,13 @@ class TestBottleValidation(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
ManifestBottle.from_dict("b", {"supervise": "yes"})
def test_docker_access_not_bool(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
ManifestBottle.from_dict("b", {"docker_access": "yes"})
def test_removed_runtime_field(self) -> None:
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
ManifestBottle.from_dict("b", {"runtime": "runsc"})
def test_valid_minimal(self) -> None:
b = ManifestBottle.from_dict(
"b", {"supervise": False, "docker_access": True, "env": {"X": "1"}},
)
b = ManifestBottle.from_dict("b", {"supervise": False, "env": {"X": "1"}})
self.assertFalse(b.supervise)
self.assertTrue(b.docker_access)
self.assertEqual({"X": "1"}, dict(b.env))
-29
View File
@@ -104,32 +104,3 @@ class TestHealthAndPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.c = OrchestratorClient("http://orch:8080")
def test_posts_live_ips_and_returns_reaped(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": ["b1", "b2"]})) as m:
got = self.c.reconcile(["10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.3"])
self.assertEqual(["b1", "b2"], got)
sent = json.loads(m.call_args.args[0].data)
self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.3"], sent["live_source_ips"])
self.assertNotIn("grace_seconds", sent) # omitted -> server default
def test_grace_seconds_is_forwarded_when_given(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": []})) as m:
self.c.reconcile([], grace_seconds=30)
self.assertEqual(30, json.loads(m.call_args.args[0].data)["grace_seconds"])
def test_malformed_reaped_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": ["ok", 5, None]})):
self.assertEqual(["ok"], self.c.reconcile([]))
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {})):
self.assertEqual([], self.c.reconcile([]))
def test_error_status_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(500)):
with self.assertRaises(OrchestratorClientError):
self.c.reconcile([])
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
"""Unit: OrchestratorConfigStore and resolve_teardown_timeout.
Also verifies the lifecycle ordering invariant: resolve_teardown_timeout()
must be called before launch_consolidated() / register_agent() so that a
resolver failure cannot leave an orphaned registration with no teardown
callback.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import inspect
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from types import ModuleType
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.config_store import (
DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV,
OrchestratorConfigStore,
resolve_teardown_timeout,
)
class TestOrchestratorConfigStore(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db = Path(self._tmp.name) / "test.db"
self.store = OrchestratorConfigStore(self.db)
self.store.migrate()
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def test_get_returns_none_when_not_set(self) -> None:
self.assertIsNone(self.store.get_teardown_timeout_seconds())
def test_set_and_get_roundtrip(self) -> None:
self.store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(42.5)
self.assertEqual(42.5, self.store.get_teardown_timeout_seconds())
def test_set_overwrites_existing_value(self) -> None:
self.store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(10.0)
self.store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(20.0)
self.assertEqual(20.0, self.store.get_teardown_timeout_seconds())
def test_delete_clears_value_and_returns_true(self) -> None:
self.store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(30.0)
deleted = self.store.delete_teardown_timeout_seconds()
self.assertTrue(deleted)
self.assertIsNone(self.store.get_teardown_timeout_seconds())
def test_delete_absent_returns_false(self) -> None:
self.assertFalse(self.store.delete_teardown_timeout_seconds())
def test_is_migrated_true_after_migrate(self) -> None:
self.assertTrue(self.store.is_migrated())
def test_is_migrated_false_before_migrate(self) -> None:
store = OrchestratorConfigStore(Path(self._tmp.name) / "new.db")
self.assertFalse(store.is_migrated())
class TestResolveTeardownTimeout(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db = Path(self._tmp.name) / "cfg.db"
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
os.environ.pop(TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV, None)
def test_returns_default_when_nothing_configured(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db),
)
def test_env_var_overrides_default(self) -> None:
os.environ[TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV] = "99"
self.assertEqual(99.0, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_env_var_overrides_db_value(self) -> None:
store = OrchestratorConfigStore(self.db)
store.migrate()
store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(55.0)
os.environ[TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV] = "77"
self.assertEqual(77.0, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_db_value_overrides_default(self) -> None:
store = OrchestratorConfigStore(self.db)
store.migrate()
store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(42.0)
self.assertEqual(42.0, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_invalid_env_var_falls_through_to_default(self) -> None:
os.environ[TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV] = "not-a-number"
self.assertEqual(DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_non_positive_env_var_falls_through_to_default(self) -> None:
os.environ[TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_ENV] = "0"
self.assertEqual(DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_non_positive_db_value_falls_through_to_default(self) -> None:
store = OrchestratorConfigStore(self.db)
store.migrate()
store.set_teardown_timeout_seconds(0.0)
self.assertEqual(DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db))
def test_migrates_db_on_first_call(self) -> None:
result = resolve_teardown_timeout(self.db)
self.assertEqual(DEFAULT_TEARDOWN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, result)
self.assertTrue(OrchestratorConfigStore(self.db).is_migrated())
class TestTeardownTimeoutResolvedBeforeRegistration(unittest.TestCase):
"""Ordering invariant: if resolve_teardown_timeout() raises, the bottle
must not yet be registered no orphaned state can result."""
def _src(self, module: ModuleType) -> str:
return inspect.getsource(module)
def test_docker_resolves_timeout_before_launch_consolidated(self) -> None:
from bot_bottle.backend.docker import launch
src = self._src(launch)
resolve_at = src.index("teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()")
launch_at = src.index("ctx = launch_consolidated(")
self.assertLess(resolve_at, launch_at)
def test_firecracker_resolves_timeout_before_launch_consolidated(self) -> None:
from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker import launch
src = self._src(launch)
resolve_at = src.index("teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()")
launch_at = src.index("ctx = launch_consolidated(")
self.assertLess(resolve_at, launch_at)
def test_macos_resolves_timeout_before_register_agent(self) -> None:
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container import launch
src = self._src(launch)
resolve_at = src.index("teardown_timeout = resolve_teardown_timeout()")
register_at = src.index("ctx = register_agent(")
self.assertLess(resolve_at, register_at)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -8,13 +8,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import secrets
import sqlite3
import tempfile
import threading
import unittest
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from contextlib import closing
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
@@ -266,7 +264,6 @@ class TestControlPlaneAuth(unittest.TestCase):
("POST", "/bottles", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1"})),
("PUT", "/bottles/x/policy", _body({"policy": "routes: []"})),
("DELETE", "/bottles/x", b""),
("POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": []})),
("POST", "/resolve", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1", "identity_token": "t"})),
("POST", "/attribute", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1", "identity_token": "t"})),
("GET", "/supervise/proposals", b""),
@@ -390,56 +387,3 @@ class TestDispatchSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestReconcileRoute(unittest.TestCase):
"""`POST /reconcile` — the host tells the orchestrator which bottles are
actually up, since the orchestrator can't see the backend from inside the
infra container."""
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.orch = _orchestrator(Path(self._tmp.name) / "r.db")
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _old(self, source_ip: str) -> str:
rec = self.orch.registry.register(source_ip)
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.orch.registry.db_path)) as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE orchestrator_bottles SET created_at = 0.0 WHERE bottle_id = ?",
(rec.bottle_id,))
conn.commit()
return rec.bottle_id
def test_reaps_absent_and_reports_ids(self) -> None:
dead = self._old("10.0.0.1")
alive = self._old("10.0.0.2")
status, payload = dispatch(
self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": ["10.0.0.2"]}))
self.assertEqual(200, status)
self.assertEqual([dead], payload["reaped"])
self.assertIsNone(self.orch.registry.get(dead))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.orch.registry.get(alive))
def test_missing_live_source_ips_is_400(self) -> None:
status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({}))
self.assertEqual(400, status)
def test_grace_seconds_is_honoured(self) -> None:
"""A grace window wide enough to cover the row protects it."""
self.orch.registry.register("10.0.0.3")
status, payload = dispatch(
self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile",
_body({"live_source_ips": [], "grace_seconds": 3600}))
self.assertEqual(200, status)
self.assertEqual([], payload["reaped"])
def test_non_string_entries_are_ignored(self) -> None:
dead = self._old("10.0.0.4")
status, payload = dispatch(
self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile",
_body({"live_source_ips": [None, 7, "10.0.0.9"]}))
self.assertEqual(200, status)
self.assertEqual([dead], payload["reaped"])
-80
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import sqlite3
import tempfile
import time
import unittest
from contextlib import closing
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.registry import (
@@ -171,81 +169,3 @@ class TestRegistryStore(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestReapAbsent(unittest.TestCase):
"""`reap_absent` — the self-heal for rows whose bottle is gone.
An orphan is not merely untidy: source IPs get recycled, and
`by_source_ip` fail-closes on ambiguity, so a leftover row at a reused
address resolves *no* policy for the next bottle that lands there and
every host it asks for is denied.
"""
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.db = Path(self._tmp.name) / "registry.db"
self.store = RegistryStore(self.db)
self.store.migrate()
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _aged(self, source_ip: str, *, age: float) -> BottleRecord:
"""Register a bottle and backdate it past the grace window."""
rec = self.store.register(source_ip)
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.db)) as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE orchestrator_bottles SET created_at = ? WHERE bottle_id = ?",
(time.time() - age, rec.bottle_id),
)
conn.commit()
return rec
def test_reaps_row_with_no_live_container(self) -> None:
gone = self._aged("10.243.0.9", age=600)
reaped = self.store.reap_absent([])
self.assertEqual([gone.bottle_id], [r.bottle_id for r in reaped])
self.assertIsNone(self.store.get(gone.bottle_id))
def test_keeps_row_whose_ip_is_live(self) -> None:
alive = self._aged("10.243.0.9", age=600)
self.assertEqual([], self.store.reap_absent(["10.243.0.9"]))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(alive.bottle_id))
def test_grace_window_protects_an_in_flight_launch(self) -> None:
"""A bottle registered moments ago is never reaped, even though the
caller's enumeration didn't see its address yet."""
fresh = self.store.register("10.243.0.10")
self.assertEqual([], self.store.reap_absent([]))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(fresh.bottle_id))
def test_reaping_the_orphan_unbricks_the_reused_address(self) -> None:
"""The regression this exists for: an orphan at an address that vmnet
later hands to a new bottle makes `by_source_ip` ambiguous, so the new
bottle resolves no policy at all."""
orphan = self._aged("10.243.0.11", age=600)
# A new bottle lands on the recycled address. Force the row in directly
# so `register`'s own supersede sweep doesn't mask the ambiguity.
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.db)) as conn:
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO orchestrator_bottles "
"(bottle_id, source_ip, identity_token, state, created_at, metadata, policy) "
"VALUES ('newbottle', '10.243.0.11', 'tok-new', 'active', ?, '', 'routes: []')",
(time.time(),),
)
conn.commit()
self.assertIsNone(self.store.by_source_ip("10.243.0.11")) # bricked
reaped = self.store.reap_absent(["10.243.0.11"], grace_seconds=60)
self.assertEqual([orphan.bottle_id], [r.bottle_id for r in reaped])
rec = self.store.by_source_ip("10.243.0.11")
assert rec is not None
self.assertEqual("newbottle", rec.bottle_id)
def test_ignores_empty_ips_in_the_live_set(self) -> None:
gone = self._aged("10.243.0.12", age=600)
self.assertEqual(
[gone.bottle_id],
[r.bottle_id for r in self.store.reap_absent(["", "10.243.0.99"])],
)
-54
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import json
import secrets
import sqlite3
import tempfile
import unittest
from contextlib import closing
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
@@ -306,55 +304,3 @@ class TestOrchestratorSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
class TestOrchestratorReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
"""`reconcile` — drop rows for bottles that are no longer running."""
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
self.db = Path(self._tmp.name) / "r.db"
self.store = RegistryStore(self.db)
self.store.migrate()
self.broker = StubBroker(self.secret)
self.orch = Orchestrator(self.store, self.broker, self.secret)
def tearDown(self) -> None:
self._tmp.cleanup()
def _age_all(self, seconds: float) -> None:
"""Backdate every row past the reap grace window."""
with closing(sqlite3.connect(self.db)) as conn:
conn.execute(
"UPDATE orchestrator_bottles SET created_at = created_at - ?", (seconds,))
conn.commit()
def test_reaps_dead_bottle_and_forgets_its_tokens(self) -> None:
dead = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1", tokens={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "s3cret"})
live = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.2", tokens={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "keep"})
self._age_all(600)
self.assertEqual([dead.bottle_id], self.orch.reconcile(["10.243.0.2"]))
self.assertIsNone(self.store.get(dead.bottle_id))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(live.bottle_id))
# The in-memory egress credential goes with the row.
self.assertEqual({}, self.orch.tokens_for(dead.bottle_id))
self.assertEqual({"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "keep"}, self.orch.tokens_for(live.bottle_id))
def test_reconcile_does_not_broker_a_teardown(self) -> None:
"""The container is already gone — there is nothing to stop, and a
broker error must not stop the sweep clearing the row."""
self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1")
self._age_all(600)
self.broker.launched.clear()
self.orch.reconcile([])
self.assertEqual([], self.broker.torn_down)
def test_reconcile_keeps_everything_when_all_are_live(self) -> None:
a = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1")
b = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.2")
self._age_all(600)
self.assertEqual([], self.orch.reconcile(["10.243.0.1", "10.243.0.2"]))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(a.bottle_id))
self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(b.bottle_id))