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Podman avoids the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement that makes rootless Docker impossible here: with no subordinate UID range configured it falls back to a single-UID self-mapping, which an unprivileged process may write itself, so newuidmap is never invoked. The image build therefore strips /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid entries rather than adding them. The agent-facing surface is unchanged — docker and docker compose talk to podman's Docker-compatible API socket. Two device nodes need relaxing as root inside the bottle (0666 on /dev/fuse and /dev/net/tun); both already exist and neither needs a capability the bottle lacks, unlike CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Verified live on macOS 26 / Apple Container 1.0.0: service starts with zero added capabilities, compose pulls and serves from the workspace on a published port, and a nested container cannot reach the network outside the egress path. Known limitation, not yet addressed: the agent base image is Debian bookworm, whose podman 4.3.1 swallows container exit codes through the compat API (docker run returns 0 regardless). podman 5.4.2 on trixie fixes it; the base bump is a separate PR. The acceptance test asserts on an in-band marker rather than an exit code so it cannot false-pass in the meantime. Nested containers give no isolation from the agent itself — root inside one is the agent user outside it. They are a build/test convenience; the bottle remains the security boundary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GnMp8SUGH57hZX7192Rv2F
133 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
133 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
"""Experimental rootless podman bootstrap for Apple-container bottles.
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The service and every nested container remain inside the existing per-bottle
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VM. This module refuses to compensate for missing prerequisites with outer
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capabilities, a privileged container, or a host Docker socket.
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Podman is used rather than rootless Docker for one specific reason: Apple
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Container's capability bounding set omits `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, which the kernel
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requires to write a multi-range `uid_map` via `newuidmap`. Rootless Docker
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has no path that avoids that write. Podman does — with no subordinate UID
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range configured it falls back to a single-UID self-mapping, which an
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unprivileged process may write itself. See
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`docs/research/rootless-docker-in-apple-container-spike.md`.
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That fallback is why `build_image` *removes* the agent user's `/etc/subuid`
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and `/etc/subgid` entries instead of adding them: their presence is precisely
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what would send podman down the `newuidmap` path that cannot work here.
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The agent still talks to `docker` and `docker compose`; those speak to
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podman's Docker-compatible API socket, so nothing in the agent's habits
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changes.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import shlex
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import shutil
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import tempfile
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import time
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Callable
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from ...log import die, info
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_INIT = "/usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init"
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_RUNTIME_DIR = "/tmp/bot-bottle-podman-run"
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_SOCKET = f"{_RUNTIME_DIR}/podman.sock"
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_LOG = "/tmp/bot-bottle-rootless-podman.log"
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READY_RETRIES = 30
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# Apple Container creates both device nodes 0600 root:root, so the agent user
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# cannot open them: /dev/fuse blocks the fuse-overlayfs storage driver and
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# /dev/net/tun blocks slirp4netns, which rootless podman uses for the default
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# bridge network that stock compose files expect. Relaxing the modes needs no
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# capability the bottle does not already hold — unlike CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which is
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# what killed the rootless-Docker approach.
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_GUEST_DEVICES = ("/dev/fuse", "/dev/net/tun")
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def build_image(
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base_image: str,
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build: Callable[..., None],
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) -> str:
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"""Layer spike-only tooling on an already-built provider image."""
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image = f"{base_image}-rootless-podman"
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init_script = Path(__file__).with_name("rootless-podman-init.sh")
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bot-bottle-rootless-podman.") as tmp:
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context = Path(tmp)
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shutil.copy2(init_script, context / "rootless-podman-init.sh")
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(context / "Dockerfile").write_text(
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"FROM docker:28-cli AS docker_cli\n"
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f"FROM {base_image}\n"
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"USER root\n"
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"COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/bin/docker /usr/local/bin/docker\n"
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"COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/"
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"docker-compose /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/docker-compose\n"
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"RUN apt-get update \\\n"
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" && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends podman "
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"fuse-overlayfs slirp4netns uidmap \\\n"
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" && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \\\n"
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# Deliberate: an empty subordinate range keeps podman on the
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# single-UID mapping that needs no CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Adding ranges
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# here would reintroduce the newuidmap failure this spike exists
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# to route around.
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" && sed -i '/^node:/d' /etc/subuid /etc/subgid\n"
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"COPY rootless-podman-init.sh "
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"/usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init\n"
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"RUN chmod 0755 /usr/local/libexec/bot-bottle/rootless-podman-init\n"
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"USER node\n",
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encoding="utf-8",
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)
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build(image, str(context), dockerfile=str(context / "Dockerfile"))
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return image
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def guest_env(enabled: bool) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Environment consumed by the Docker CLI inside an enabled bottle."""
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if not enabled:
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return {}
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return {
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"DOCKER_HOST": f"unix://{_SOCKET}",
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"XDG_RUNTIME_DIR": _RUNTIME_DIR,
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}
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def prepare_guest_devices(container_name: str, exec_as_root: Callable[..., None]) -> None:
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"""Make /dev/fuse and /dev/net/tun openable by the agent user.
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Runs as root inside the bottle because the agent must not be able to
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re-mode device nodes itself. No outer capability is involved.
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"""
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exec_as_root(
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container_name,
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["sh", "-c", f"chmod 0666 {' '.join(_GUEST_DEVICES)}"],
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)
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def start(bottle: object) -> None:
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"""Start and verify the unprivileged service through the bottle exec API."""
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info("starting experimental rootless podman service")
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result = bottle.exec(shlex.quote(_INIT)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
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if result.returncode != 0:
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detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
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die(f"rootless podman bootstrap failed: {detail or '<no output>'}")
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for _ in range(READY_RETRIES):
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result = bottle.exec("docker info >/dev/null 2>&1") # type: ignore[attr-defined]
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if result.returncode == 0:
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info("rootless podman service is ready")
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return
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time.sleep(0.2)
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logs = bottle.exec( # type: ignore[attr-defined]
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f"tail -n 80 {_LOG} 2>/dev/null || true"
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)
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die(
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"rootless podman did not become ready without additional outer "
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f"privileges:\n{(logs.stdout or logs.stderr or '<no log>').strip()}"
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)
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__all__ = ["build_image", "guest_env", "prepare_guest_devices", "start"]
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