feat(control-plane): role-scoped signed tokens so the gateway can't drive operator routes

Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret
that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a
supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) —
the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller.

Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens
(compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency):

  * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway`
    (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher).
  * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch`
    gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/
    {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated,
    403 wrong role).
  * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into
    `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key.
  * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the
    gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra
    container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key.

Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s);
Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants
full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/workflows/test.yml

@@ -103,16 +103,14 @@ jobs:
       - name: Install coverage
         run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages coverage
 
-      # Fail loudly if the backend this job promises isn't actually usable,
-      # rather than letting every test silently `unittest.skip` and the job
-      # go green on zero coverage. `backend status` prints a clear per-check
-      # summary (docker on PATH, daemon reachable) and exits non-zero when a
-      # prerequisite is missing — the same readiness check the skip guards
-      # gate on via `has_backend`.
-      - name: Preflight — Docker backend is ready
+      - name: Show environment
         run: |
           python3 --version
-          python3 cli.py backend status --backend=docker
+          if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            docker version || true
+          else
+            echo "docker not on PATH — integration tests will skip"
+          fi
 
       - name: Run integration tests (docker) with coverage
         env:

Dockerfile.gateway

@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@
 #   /git-gate-entrypoint.sh              docker-cp'd at start time
 #   /git-gate/creds/*                    docker-cp'd at start time
 #   /git/*                               bare repos, populated at runtime
-#   /run/supervise/bot-bottle.db         bind-mounted at run time
 #   /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/          mitmproxy CA dir
+# (No bot-bottle.db mount: the data plane reaches the supervise queue over the
+#  control-plane RPC and never opens the DB — PRD 0070 / issue #469.)
 #
 # Exposed ports inside the container:
 #   9099  egress (mitmproxy, agent-facing HTTPS proxy)

bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py

@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ backend field; the host picks.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import enum
 import os
 import shlex
 import sys
@@ -60,12 +59,6 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from .freeze import CommitCancelled, Freezer, get_freezer
 
 
-class BackendStatus(enum.IntEnum):
-    """Return codes for BottleBackend.status(). READY == 0 so callsites
-    can compare against 0 or the named constant interchangeably."""
-    READY = 0
-
-
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class BottleSpec:
     """CLI-supplied intent. Backend-agnostic — each backend's prepare
@@ -618,18 +611,12 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
 
     @classmethod
     @abstractmethod
-    def status(cls, *, quiet: bool = False) -> int:
+    def status(cls) -> int:
         """Report whether this backend's prerequisites are satisfied on
         the host — binaries, daemon reachability, network pool, range
-        conflicts, etc. Returns BackendStatus.READY (0) when the backend
-        is ready to launch and non-zero when something is missing.
-
-        When quiet=False (default) prints a human-readable summary to
-        stderr. When quiet=True returns the status code silently —
-        useful for cheap programmatic checks.
-
-        Invoked by `./cli.py backend status [--backend=…]` (quiet=False)
-        and by is_backend_ready() (caller-controlled)."""
+        conflicts, etc. Prints a human-readable summary; returns 0 when
+        the backend is ready to launch and non-zero when something is
+        missing. Invoked by `./cli.py backend status [--backend=…]`."""
 
     @classmethod
     @abstractmethod
@@ -824,29 +811,6 @@ def has_backend(name: str) -> bool:
     return backends[name].is_available()
 
 
-def is_backend_available(name: str) -> bool:
-    """Cheap availability check: is the backend's binary on PATH?
-
-    Suitable for cleanup enumeration and auto-selection — does NOT probe
-    the daemon or network pool. Use is_backend_ready() for a full
-    readiness check before launching tests."""
-    return has_backend(name)
-
-
-def is_backend_ready(name: str, *, quiet: bool = False) -> bool:
-    """Full readiness check: passes all of the backend's status() checks.
-
-    When quiet=False the backend prints diagnostic output explaining what
-    is missing — intended for test-suite guards that run at discovery time
-    so the operator sees a concrete failure reason for each skip.
-
-    Returns False for unknown backend names."""
-    backends = _get_backends()
-    if name not in backends:
-        return False
-    return backends[name].status(quiet=quiet) == BackendStatus.READY
-
-
 def enumerate_active_agents() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
     """All currently-running agents, across every available
     backend. Used by CLI `list active` and the dashboard's agents
@@ -871,7 +835,6 @@ def enumerate_active_agents() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
 
 __all__ = [
     "ActiveAgent",
-    "BackendStatus",
     "Bottle",
     "BottleBackend",
     "BottleCleanupPlan",
@@ -884,7 +847,5 @@ __all__ = [
     "get_bottle_backend",
     "get_freezer",
     "has_backend",
-    "is_backend_available",
-    "is_backend_ready",
     "known_backend_names",
 ]

bot_bottle/backend/docker/backend.py

@@ -20,8 +20,7 @@ infrastructure: CA install and git copy-in.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import shutil
-import io
-from contextlib import contextmanager, redirect_stderr
+from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Generator, Sequence
 
@@ -61,11 +60,8 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
         return _setup.setup()
 
     @classmethod
-    def status(cls, *, quiet: bool = False) -> int:
+    def status(cls) -> int:
         from . import setup as _setup
-        if quiet:
-            with redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
-                return _setup.status()
         return _setup.status()
 
     @classmethod

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/backend.py

@@ -8,8 +8,7 @@ fail-closed nftables egress boundary. Selected by
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import io
-from contextlib import contextmanager, redirect_stderr
+from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Generator, Sequence
 
@@ -53,11 +52,8 @@ class FirecrackerBottleBackend(
         return _setup.setup()
 
     @classmethod
-    def status(cls, *, quiet: bool = False) -> int:
+    def status(cls) -> int:
         from . import setup as _setup
-        if quiet:
-            with redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
-                return _setup.status()
         return _setup.status()
 
     @classmethod

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/infra_vm.py

@@ -493,10 +493,11 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT=/var/lib/bot-bottle python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator \\
 # Gateway data plane, multi-tenant: each request resolves source-IP ->
 # policy against the local control plane. The VM backend reaches git over
 # git-http (9420), so the git:// daemon (git-gate, needs a per-bottle
-# entrypoint the consolidated model doesn't use) is left out.
+# entrypoint the consolidated model doesn't use) is left out. No
+# SUPERVISE_DB_PATH: the data plane reaches the supervise queue over the
+# control-plane RPC and never opens bot-bottle.db (PRD 0070 / #469).
 BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=egress,git-http,supervise \\
 BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT} \\
-SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=/var/lib/bot-bottle/db/bot-bottle.db \\
     python3 -m bot_bottle.gateway_init &
 
 # Reap as PID 1; children are backgrounded, so `wait` blocks.

bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/backend.py

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import io
-from contextlib import contextmanager, redirect_stderr
+from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Generator, Sequence
 
@@ -44,11 +43,8 @@ class MacosContainerBottleBackend(
         return _setup.setup()
 
     @classmethod
-    def status(cls, *, quiet: bool = False) -> int:
+    def status(cls) -> int:
         from . import setup as _setup
-        if quiet:
-            with redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
-                return _setup.status()
         return _setup.status()
 
     @classmethod

bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/infra.py

@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ from ...orchestrator.lifecycle import (
     OrchestratorStartError,
     source_hash,
 )
+from ...control_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, mint
 from ...paths import (
+    CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
     CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
     HOST_DB_FILENAME,
     host_control_plane_token,
@@ -100,10 +102,12 @@ def _init_script(port: int) -> str:
         f"( cd {_SRC_IN_CONTAINER} && BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT={_DB_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER} "
         f"python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator --host 0.0.0.0 --port {port} "
         "--broker stub ) &\n"
-        # Gateway data plane, multi-tenant against the local control plane.
+        # Gateway data plane, multi-tenant against the local control plane. No
+        # SUPERVISE_DB_PATH: the data plane reaches the supervise queue over the
+        # control-plane RPC and never opens bot-bottle.db (PRD 0070 / #469).
         f"( cd /app && BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS={_GATEWAY_DAEMONS} "
         f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:{port} "
-        f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={_DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER} python3 -m bot_bottle.gateway_init ) &\n"
+        f"python3 -m bot_bottle.gateway_init ) &\n"
         "while : ; do wait ; done\n"
     )
 
@@ -235,18 +239,26 @@ class MacosInfraService:
             # Baked onto the container so `_source_current` can detect a real
             # control-plane code change and recreate.
             "--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_SOURCE_HASH={current_hash}",
-            # The control-plane secret, for BOTH the control plane (to require
-            # it) and the gateway's PolicyResolver (to present it) — they share
-            # this one container. Bare `--env NAME` inherits the value from the
-            # run process below, so the secret never lands on argv or in
-            # `container inspect`'s command line. The agent runs in a SEPARATE
-            # container that is never given this var, which is the whole point.
+            # The control-plane signing key (control plane: verifies tokens) and
+            # the pre-minted `gateway` JWT (the gateway's PolicyResolver: presents
+            # it) — they share this one container, and gateway_init scopes each to
+            # its process so a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key
+            # (issue #469 review). Bare `--env NAME` inherits the value from the
+            # run process below, so neither lands on argv or in `container
+            # inspect`'s command line. The agent runs in a SEPARATE container that
+            # is never given these vars, which is the whole point.
             "--env", CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
+            "--env", CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
             "--entrypoint", "sh",
             self.image,
             "-c", _init_script(self.port),
         ]
-        run_env = {**os.environ, CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV: host_control_plane_token()}
+        _signing_key = host_control_plane_token()
+        run_env = {
+            **os.environ,
+            CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV: _signing_key,
+            CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV: mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _signing_key),
+        }
         result = container_mod.run_container_argv(argv, env=run_env)
         if result.returncode != 0:
             raise OrchestratorStartError(

bot_bottle/control_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Role-scoped control-plane credentials (issue #469 review follow-up).
+
+The control plane no longer trusts a single shared bearer secret for every
+route. Instead the orchestrator holds a *signing key* and issues short,
+HMAC-signed tokens (compact HS256 JWTs) that embed a **role** naming the kind
+of caller:
+
+  * ``gateway`` — the data plane (egress / git-gate / supervise). Restricted to
+    the agent-facing routes it actually needs (``/resolve``,
+    ``/supervise/propose``, ``/supervise/poll``).
+  * ``cli`` — the host operator / launcher. Full access to the mutating and
+    operator routes (launch/teardown, policy, ``/supervise/respond``, …).
+
+Only the orchestrator (and the host CLI, which shares the host trust domain)
+holds the signing key; the gateway is handed a pre-minted ``gateway`` token it
+cannot rewrite into a ``cli`` token. So a compromised data-plane process can no
+longer approve its own supervise proposals or drive operator routes — it can
+only present the ``gateway`` role it was issued (control_plane rejects it on
+operator routes with 403).
+
+Stdlib-only (HMAC-SHA256 over a JSON payload); no JWT dependency — the project
+carries no runtime pip deps. Tokens are **signed, not encrypted** (the role is
+not a secret) and **long-lived** (parity with the static token they replace;
+the security win is the unforgeable role claim, not rotation).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import binascii
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+
+ROLE_GATEWAY = "gateway"
+ROLE_CLI = "cli"
+ROLES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_CLI})
+
+_ALG = "HS256"
+
+
+def _b64url_encode(raw: bytes) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def _b64url_decode(text: str) -> bytes:
+    padded = text + "=" * (-len(text) % 4)
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii"))
+
+
+def _sign(secret: str, signing_input: str) -> str:
+    mac = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), signing_input.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256)
+    return _b64url_encode(mac.digest())
+
+
+# The fixed, canonical JOSE header — the same for every token we mint.
+_HEADER_SEGMENT = _b64url_encode(
+    json.dumps({"alg": _ALG, "typ": "JWT"}, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+)
+
+
+def mint(role: str, secret: str) -> str:
+    """A compact HS256 token asserting `role`, signed with `secret`.
+
+    Raises ValueError for an unknown role (mint only what the control plane will
+    accept) or an empty signing key (an unsigned credential is never valid)."""
+    if role not in ROLES:
+        raise ValueError(f"unknown control-plane role {role!r}")
+    if not secret:
+        raise ValueError("cannot mint a control-plane token without a signing key")
+    payload = _b64url_encode(json.dumps({"role": role}, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8"))
+    signing_input = f"{_HEADER_SEGMENT}.{payload}"
+    return f"{signing_input}.{_sign(secret, signing_input)}"
+
+
+def verify(token: str, secret: str) -> str | None:
+    """The role a valid `token` carries, or None if it is malformed, wrongly
+    signed, or names an unknown role. Constant-time signature check; rejects any
+    header whose alg isn't HS256 (no alg-confusion / `none`)."""
+    if not token or not secret:
+        return None
+    parts = token.split(".")
+    if len(parts) != 3:
+        return None
+    header_b64, payload_b64, sig = parts
+    expected = _sign(secret, f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}")
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
+        return None
+    try:
+        header = json.loads(_b64url_decode(header_b64))
+        payload = json.loads(_b64url_decode(payload_b64))
+    except (ValueError, binascii.Error):
+        return None
+    if not isinstance(header, dict) or header.get("alg") != _ALG:
+        return None
+    role = payload.get("role") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    return role if isinstance(role, str) and role in ROLES else None
+
+
+__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]

bot_bottle/egress_addon.py

@@ -40,8 +40,13 @@ from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (
     scan_inbound,
     scan_outbound,
 )
-from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv
-from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver
+from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
+from bot_bottle.supervise_types import (
+    STATUS_APPROVED,
+    STATUS_MODIFIED,
+    STATUSES,
+    TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
+)
 
 
 INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
@@ -314,8 +319,15 @@ class EgressAddon:
         flow.request.headers.pop("Proxy-Authorization", None)
         flow.request.headers.pop(IDENTITY_HEADER, None)
         conn = flow.client_conn
-        if not token and conn is not None:
-            token = self._conn_tokens.get(getattr(conn, "id", ""), "")
+        conn_id = getattr(conn, "id", "") if conn is not None else ""
+        if not token and conn_id:
+            token = self._conn_tokens.get(conn_id, "")
+        # Remember the token per connection so a later token-block on this flow
+        # can attribute its supervise proposal by (source_ip, identity_token)
+        # over RPC — plain-HTTP requests carry it here, HTTPS tunnels captured
+        # it at CONNECT (http_connect); both land in `_conn_tokens`.
+        if token and conn_id:
+            self._conn_tokens[conn_id] = token
         return token
 
     def http_connect(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
@@ -592,42 +604,48 @@ class EgressAddon:
             redact_tokens(request_path, env=env),
             result,
         )
-        proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
-            bottle_slug=slug,
-            tool=_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
-            proposed_file=payload,
-            justification=_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION,
-            current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(payload),
-        )
+        # Attribute the proposal by (source_ip, identity_token) over the control
+        # plane — the data plane no longer opens bot-bottle.db (PRD 0070 / #469).
+        # source_ip + token come from this bottle's connection; `slug` is kept
+        # only for its own DLP safelist.
+        conn = flow.client_conn
+        source_ip = conn.peername[0] if conn is not None and conn.peername else ""
+        token = self._conn_tokens.get(getattr(conn, "id", ""), "") if conn is not None else ""
         try:
-            _sv.write_proposal(proposal)
-        except OSError as e:
+            proposal_id = self._resolver.propose_supervise(
+                source_ip, token,
+                tool=TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
+                proposed_file=payload,
+                justification=_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION,
+            )
+        except PolicyResolveError as e:
             sys.stderr.write(
                 f"egress: could not queue token-allow proposal: {e}; "
                 "blocking request\n"
             )
+            proposal_id = None
+        if proposal_id is None:
             self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
             return False
 
         sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
             "event": "egress_token_supervise",
             "reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
-            "proposal": proposal.id,
+            "proposal": proposal_id,
             **self._req_ctx(flow),
         }) + "\n")
 
-        response = await self._await_token_response(proposal.id, slug)
-        _sv.archive_proposal(slug, proposal.id)
+        response = await self._await_token_response(proposal_id, source_ip, token)
 
-        if response is not None and response.status in (
-            _sv.STATUS_APPROVED, _sv.STATUS_MODIFIED,
+        if response is not None and response.get("status") in (
+            STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED,
         ):
             self._safe_tokens_for(slug).add(result.matched)
             if self._flow_log(flow) >= LOG_BLOCKS:
                 sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
                     "event": "egress_token_allowed",
                     "reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
-                    "proposal": proposal.id,
+                    "proposal": proposal_id,
                     **self._req_ctx(flow),
                 }) + "\n")
             return True
@@ -645,19 +663,23 @@ class EgressAddon:
     async def _await_token_response(
         self,
         proposal_id: str,
-        slug: str,
-    ) -> "_sv.Response | None":
-        """Poll the DB for the operator's response without blocking the
-        proxy event loop. Returns the Response, or None on timeout."""
+        source_ip: str,
+        token: str,
+    ) -> "dict[str, object] | None":
+        """Poll the control plane for the operator's decision without blocking
+        the proxy event loop. Returns the terminal `{status, ...}` payload once
+        decided, or None on timeout. A transient orchestrator error (or a
+        `pending`/`unknown` status) is retried until the deadline, then fails
+        closed — the caller blocks the request."""
         loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
         deadline = loop.time() + self._token_allow_timeout
         while True:
             try:
-                return _sv.read_response(slug, proposal_id)
-            except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError):
-                # Not written yet, or a partial/malformed write — retry until
-                # the deadline, then fail closed.
-                pass
+                result = self._resolver.poll_supervise(source_ip, token, proposal_id)
+            except PolicyResolveError:
+                result = None
+            if result is not None and result.get("status") in STATUSES:
+                return result
             if loop.time() >= deadline:
                 return None
             await asyncio.sleep(TOKEN_ALLOW_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)

bot_bottle/gateway_init.py

@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ class _DaemonSpec:
 _EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)
 _READY_GATED_DAEMONS: tuple[str, ...] = ("git-gate", "git-http")
 
+# The control-plane signing key is the orchestrator's alone — verifying tokens.
+# The data-plane daemons instead hold the pre-minted `gateway` JWT they present.
+# Scoping each to its process (even in the combined infra container) keeps a
+# compromised data-plane daemon from reading the key and minting a `cli` token
+# (issue #469 review). Values match paths.CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV /
+# CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV; hardcoded here so this supervisor stays import-light.
+_SIGNING_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN"
+_GATEWAY_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"
+
 # Daemons that must be requested explicitly via BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS
 # and are NOT started in the default (env-var-unset) case. The orchestrator
 # only runs in the combined infra container, never in a standalone gateway.
@@ -61,16 +70,24 @@ _OPT_IN_DAEMONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"orchestrator"})
 
 
 def _env_for_daemon(name: str, base_env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Egress sees the full bundle env. Everyone else gets a copy
-    with `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` (and any other future egress-only
-    credential slots) stripped. Returns a fresh dict — callers
-    can mutate without affecting `base_env`."""
-    if name == "egress":
-        return dict(base_env)
-    return {
-        k: v for k, v in base_env.items()
-        if not any(k.startswith(p) for p in _EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES)
-    }
+    """Per-daemon env, scoped to what each process legitimately needs.
+    Returns a fresh dict — callers can mutate without affecting `base_env`.
+
+      * `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` upstream-auth slots go to egress only.
+      * the control-plane signing key goes to the orchestrator only.
+      * the pre-minted `gateway` JWT goes to the data-plane daemons only (the
+        orchestrator verifies tokens, it never presents one)."""
+    env = dict(base_env)
+    if name != "egress":
+        env = {
+            k: v for k, v in env.items()
+            if not any(k.startswith(p) for p in _EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES)
+        }
+    if name == "orchestrator":
+        env.pop(_GATEWAY_JWT_ENV, None)
+    else:
+        env.pop(_SIGNING_KEY_ENV, None)
+    return env
 
 
 # The orchestrator is listed first so it starts before the gateway daemons,

bot_bottle/git_gate_render.py

@@ -272,21 +272,27 @@ supervise_gitleaks_allow() {
 
   proposal_id=$(
     PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" GITLEAKS_ALLOW_REF="$ref" python3 - "$report_file" <<'PY'
-import datetime
-import hashlib
 import json
 import os
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
 
+# Queue over the control-plane RPC — the git-gate data plane no longer opens
+# bot-bottle.db (PRD 0070 / issue #469). Attribution is by (source_ip,
+# identity_token), resolved server-side, so the proposal lands under the
+# calling bottle exactly as a direct write once did.
 try:
-    import supervise as _sv
+    from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver, PolicyResolveError
+    from bot_bottle.supervise_types import TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW
 except ImportError:
-    from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv
+    from policy_resolver import PolicyResolver, PolicyResolveError
+    from supervise_types import TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW
 
 report_path = Path(sys.argv[1])
-slug = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", "")
-if not slug:
+source_ip = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP", "")
+token = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_IDENTITY_TOKEN", "")
+orch_url = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL", "")
+if not source_ip or not orch_url:
     sys.exit(2)
 
 try:
@@ -323,19 +329,21 @@ for i, finding in enumerate(raw, 1):
     ])
 
 payload = "\n".join(lines).rstrip() + "\n"
-proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
-    bottle_slug=slug,
-    tool=_sv.TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
-    proposed_file=payload,
-    justification=(
-        "git-gate found gitleaks findings hidden by # gitleaks:allow; "
-        "approve only for dummy test fixtures or confirmed false positives"
-    ),
-    current_file_hash=hashlib.sha256(payload.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(),
-    now=datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc),
-)
-_sv.write_proposal(proposal)
-print(proposal.id)
+try:
+    proposal_id = PolicyResolver(orch_url).propose_supervise(
+        source_ip, token,
+        tool=TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
+        proposed_file=payload,
+        justification=(
+            "git-gate found gitleaks findings hidden by # gitleaks:allow; "
+            "approve only for dummy test fixtures or confirmed false positives"
+        ),
+    )
+except PolicyResolveError:
+    sys.exit(4)
+if not proposal_id:
+    sys.exit(2)
+print(proposal_id)
 PY
   )
   rc=$?
@@ -348,7 +356,6 @@ PY
     return 1
   fi
 
-  slug=${SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG:-}
   timeout=${SUPERVISE_GITLEAKS_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:-300}
   case "$timeout" in
     ''|*[!0-9]*)
@@ -360,20 +367,30 @@ PY
   echo "git-gate: approve with './cli.py supervise' to continue this push" >&2
   waited=0
   while [ "$waited" -lt "$timeout" ]; do
-    status=$(PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" python3 - "$slug" "$proposal_id" <<'PY'
+    status=$(PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" python3 - "$proposal_id" <<'PY'
+import os
 import sys
 
+# Non-blocking poll over the control plane. A decided proposal is archived
+# server-side on read, so no separate archive step is needed here.
 try:
-    import supervise as _sv
+    from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver, PolicyResolveError
 except ImportError:
-    from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv
+    from policy_resolver import PolicyResolver, PolicyResolveError
 
-slug = sys.argv[1]
+source_ip = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP", "")
+token = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_IDENTITY_TOKEN", "")
+orch_url = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL", "")
 try:
-    response = _sv.read_response(slug, sys.argv[2])
-except FileNotFoundError:
+    result = PolicyResolver(orch_url).poll_supervise(source_ip, token, sys.argv[1])
+except PolicyResolveError:
     sys.exit(2)
-print(response.status)
+if result is None:
+    sys.exit(2)
+status = result.get("status", "")
+if status in ("pending", "unknown"):
+    sys.exit(2)
+print(status)
 PY
     )
     rc=$?
@@ -385,16 +402,6 @@ PY
     if [ -n "$status" ]; then
       case "$status" in
         approved|modified)
-          PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" python3 - "$slug" "$proposal_id" <<'PY' || true
-import sys
-
-try:
-    import supervise as _sv
-except ImportError:
-    from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv
-
-_sv.archive_proposal(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2])
-PY
           echo "git-gate: supervisor approved # gitleaks:allow for $ref" >&2
           return 0
           ;;

bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py

@@ -167,11 +167,14 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             "SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port),  # type: ignore
             "SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
         })
-        # Attribute the gitleaks-allow supervise proposal (written by
+        # Attribute the gitleaks-allow supervise proposal (queued by
         # receive-pack's pre-receive hook, a child of the CGI we spawn below) to
-        # the calling bottle. The namespaced root is `<base>/<bottle_id>`, so its
-        # final component is the bottle id — the same per-bottle key egress uses.
-        env["SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG"] = sandbox_root.name
+        # the calling bottle. The hook queues over the control-plane RPC (PRD
+        # 0070 / issue #469), which re-resolves the bottle from these — the same
+        # (source_ip, identity_token) pair that selected the namespaced root
+        # above — so it can only ever queue its own proposals.
+        env["SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP"] = self.client_address[0]
+        env["SUPERVISE_IDENTITY_TOKEN"] = self.headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "")
         for header, variable in (
             ("accept", "HTTP_ACCEPT"),
             ("content-encoding", "HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING"),

bot_bottle/orchestrator/client.py

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import urllib.request
 from collections.abc import Iterable
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
+from ..control_auth import ROLE_CLI, mint
 from ..paths import host_control_plane_token
 from .control_plane import CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER
 
@@ -25,12 +26,14 @@ DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
 
 
 def _host_auth_token() -> str:
-    """The per-host control-plane secret, or "" if it can't be read. "" means
-    'send no auth header' — correct against an open (unconfigured) control
-    plane, and harmlessly rejected by a secured one."""
+    """A freshly minted `cli`-role token, signed with the host control-plane
+    key, or "" if the key can't be read. The host CLI shares the orchestrator's
+    trust domain, so it holds the signing key and mints its own operator token;
+    "" means 'send no auth header' — correct against an open (unconfigured)
+    control plane, and harmlessly rejected by a secured one."""
     try:
-        return host_control_plane_token()
-    except OSError:
+        return mint(ROLE_CLI, host_control_plane_token())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
         return ""
 
 

bot_bottle/orchestrator/control_plane.py

@@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ vsock / unix-socket portability caveats):
     POST   /supervise/respond         -> 200 {"responded": true} | 409  (operator)
                                          body: {"proposal_id","bottle_slug",
                                                 "decision", ["notes"],["final_file"]}
+    POST   /supervise/propose         -> 201 {"proposal_id"} | 403  (agent)
+                                         body: {"source_ip","identity_token",
+                                                "tool","proposed_file","justification"}
+    POST   /supervise/poll            -> 200 {"status", ["notes"],["final_file"]} | 403
+                                         body: {"source_ip","identity_token",
+                                                "proposal_id"}
+
+The `/supervise/propose` + `/supervise/poll` pair is the **agent** half of the
+supervise flow: the data plane (supervise / egress / git-gate) queues a
+proposal and polls for its response over RPC instead of opening `bot-bottle.db`
+directly. Both attribute the caller by `(source_ip, identity_token)` exactly
+like `/resolve`, so a bottle can only ever queue or read its own proposals.
 
 `POST /bottles` / `DELETE` drive the full launch lifecycle: they mint (or
 tear down) the bottle in the registry AND broker the backend-native launch
@@ -41,7 +53,6 @@ returned only once, to the caller that launches the bottle.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import hmac
 import http.server
 import json
 import os
@@ -50,20 +61,40 @@ import sys
 import typing
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit
 
+from ..control_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLES, verify
 from ..paths import CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV
+from ..supervise_types import TOOLS
 from .service import Orchestrator
 
 # JSON body payload type (parsed request / rendered response).
 Json = dict[str, object]
 
-# The request header carrying the per-host control-plane secret. Every route
-# except `GET /health` requires it (see `dispatch`). The trusted callers hold
-# the secret (the gateway's PolicyResolver, the host CLI's OrchestratorClient);
-# an agent that can merely *reach* the port cannot present it, so it can't
-# enumerate bottles, rewrite policy, read injected upstream tokens, or approve
-# its own supervise proposals.
+# The request header carrying the caller's role-scoped control-plane token (a
+# signed JWT naming the caller's role — see control_auth). The role gates which
+# routes the caller may reach: the data plane holds a `gateway` token good only
+# for the agent-facing lookups; the host CLI holds a `cli` token for the
+# operator/mutating routes. An agent that can merely *reach* the port holds no
+# token at all, and a compromised gateway holds only `gateway` — neither can
+# drive the operator routes (approve proposals, rewrite policy, read tokens).
 CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-control-auth"
 
+# The routes the data plane (role `gateway`) is allowed to reach — exactly the
+# per-request lookups PolicyResolver makes. Every other authenticated route is
+# operator-only. `cli` is a superset role: it may reach any route.
+_GATEWAY_ROUTES: frozenset[tuple[str, str]] = frozenset({
+    ("POST", "/resolve"),
+    ("POST", "/supervise/propose"),
+    ("POST", "/supervise/poll"),
+})
+
+
+def _allowed_roles(method: str, route: str) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """The roles permitted on `(method, route)`: `gateway` or `cli` on the
+    data-plane routes, `cli`-only everywhere else."""
+    if (method, route) in _GATEWAY_ROUTES:
+        return ROLES
+    return frozenset({ROLE_CLI})
+
 
 def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
     """Parse a JSON object body. Raises ValueError for non-objects / bad JSON."""
@@ -76,28 +107,33 @@ def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
 
 
 def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
-    orch: Orchestrator, method: str, path: str, body: bytes, *, authorized: bool = True,
+    orch: Orchestrator, method: str, path: str, body: bytes, *, role: str | None = ROLE_CLI,
 ) -> tuple[int, Json]:
     """Route one control-plane request to a (status, payload) pair. Pure —
     no I/O beyond the orchestrator — so it is fully testable without a socket.
 
-    `authorized` is whether the request presented the control-plane secret (or
-    no secret is configured — see `ControlPlaneServer`). Every route except
-    `GET /health` requires it: the source-IP + identity-token checks inside
-    `/resolve` and `/attribute` authenticate the *bottle* a request is about,
-    not the *caller*, so without this gate any agent that can reach the port
-    could rewrite another bottle's policy, read the injected upstream tokens,
-    or approve its own supervise proposals. Defaults True so unit tests of the
-    routing logic don't have to thread it through."""
+    `role` is the caller's verified control-plane role (`gateway` or `cli`), or
+    None for an unauthenticated request; an open-mode server (no signing key
+    configured — see `ControlPlaneServer`) passes `cli`. Every route except
+    `GET /health` requires a role: a missing role is 401, and a role that
+    doesn't cover the route is 403 — so a `gateway` data-plane token can reach
+    `/resolve` + `/supervise/{propose,poll}` but not the operator routes
+    (rewrite policy, read injected tokens, approve its own supervise proposals).
+    The source-IP + identity-token checks inside `/resolve` and `/attribute`
+    authenticate the *bottle* a request is about, not the *caller*, so this role
+    gate is what protects the caller-privileged routes. Defaults `cli` so unit
+    tests of the routing logic don't have to thread it through."""
     route = urlsplit(path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
 
     if method == "GET" and route == "/health":
         return 200, {"status": "ok"}
 
-    if not authorized:
-        # Everything below is a trusted-caller operation. Deny before touching
-        # the registry / broker / supervise store.
+    # Role gate — every route below is a trusted-caller operation. Deny before
+    # touching the registry / broker / supervise store.
+    if role is None:
         return 401, {"error": "control-plane authentication required"}
+    if role not in _allowed_roles(method, route):
+        return 403, {"error": "insufficient role for this route"}
 
     if method == "GET" and route == "/gateway":
         return 200, orch.gateway_status()
@@ -235,6 +271,56 @@ def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
             return 200, {"responded": True}
         return 409, {"error": err}
 
+    if method == "POST" and route == "/supervise/propose":
+        # Agent half: queue a proposal, attributed to the caller resolved from
+        # (source_ip, identity_token) — never a caller-supplied slug — so the
+        # data plane can't forge attribution. Fail-closed 403 when unattributed.
+        try:
+            data = _parse_json_object(body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
+        source_ip = data.get("source_ip")
+        token = data.get("identity_token")
+        tool = data.get("tool")
+        proposed_file = data.get("proposed_file")
+        justification = data.get("justification")
+        if not isinstance(source_ip, str) or not source_ip:
+            return 400, {"error": "source_ip (string) is required"}
+        if not isinstance(tool, str) or tool not in TOOLS:
+            return 400, {"error": f"tool (string) must be one of {TOOLS}"}
+        if not isinstance(proposed_file, str) or not proposed_file:
+            return 400, {"error": "proposed_file (string) is required"}
+        if not isinstance(justification, str) or not justification:
+            return 400, {"error": "justification (string) is required"}
+        rec = orch.resolve(source_ip, token if isinstance(token, str) else "")
+        if rec is None:
+            return 403, {"error": "unattributed"}
+        proposal_id = orch.supervise_queue_proposal(
+            rec.bottle_id, tool=tool, proposed_file=proposed_file,
+            justification=justification,
+        )
+        return 201, {"proposal_id": proposal_id}
+
+    if method == "POST" and route == "/supervise/poll":
+        # Agent half: non-blocking read of the caller's own proposal decision.
+        # Attributed like /propose, and scoped to the resolved bottle id, so a
+        # guessed proposal_id can never read another bottle's response.
+        try:
+            data = _parse_json_object(body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
+        source_ip = data.get("source_ip")
+        token = data.get("identity_token")
+        proposal_id = data.get("proposal_id")
+        if not isinstance(source_ip, str) or not source_ip:
+            return 400, {"error": "source_ip (string) is required"}
+        if not isinstance(proposal_id, str) or not proposal_id:
+            return 400, {"error": "proposal_id (string) is required"}
+        rec = orch.resolve(source_ip, token if isinstance(token, str) else "")
+        if rec is None:
+            return 403, {"error": "unattributed"}
+        return 200, orch.supervise_poll_response(rec.bottle_id, proposal_id)
+
     if method == "POST" and route == "/resolve":
         # The per-request lookup the multi-tenant gateway makes: returns the
         # bottle's policy. Requires a matching (source_ip, identity_token)
@@ -280,10 +366,10 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
         assert isinstance(server, ControlPlaneServer)
         length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
         body = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
-        authorized = server.is_authorized(self.headers.get(CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER, ""))
+        role = server.role_for(self.headers.get(CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER, ""))
         try:
             status, payload = dispatch(
-                server.orchestrator, method, self.path, body, authorized=authorized)
+                server.orchestrator, method, self.path, body, role=role)
         except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — the control plane must stay up
             sys.stderr.write(f"orchestrator: {method} {self.path} failed: {e!r}\n")
             sys.stderr.flush()
@@ -311,22 +397,24 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 class ControlPlaneServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
     """Threading HTTP server that carries the orchestrator for its handlers.
 
-    Holds the per-host control-plane secret (from `$BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN`,
-    injected by the launcher into this container only). When a secret is set,
-    every route but `/health` requires it; when it is unset the server runs
-    **open** and says so loudly at startup — a fail-visible fallback for tests
-    and any backend that hasn't wired the secret yet (e.g. Firecracker, whose
-    nft boundary already blocks agents from the control-plane port)."""
+    Holds the per-host control-plane *signing key* (from
+    `$BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN`, injected by the launcher into the
+    orchestrator process only) and verifies each request's role-scoped token
+    against it. When a key is set, every route but `/health` requires a valid
+    token whose role covers the route; when it is unset the server runs **open**
+    (full `cli` access) and says so loudly at startup — a fail-visible fallback
+    for tests and any backend that hasn't wired the key yet (e.g. Firecracker,
+    whose nft boundary already blocks agents from the control-plane port)."""
 
     daemon_threads = True
     allow_reuse_address = True
 
     def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], orchestrator: Orchestrator) -> None:
         self.orchestrator = orchestrator
-        self._auth_token = os.environ.get(CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV, "").strip()
-        if not self._auth_token:
+        self._signing_key = os.environ.get(CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV, "").strip()
+        if not self._signing_key:
             sys.stderr.write(
-                "orchestrator: WARNING — no control-plane secret "
+                "orchestrator: WARNING — no control-plane signing key "
                 f"(${CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV}); running WITHOUT caller "
                 "authentication. Any client that can reach this port can drive "
                 "it. Backends that put the control plane on an agent-reachable "
@@ -335,13 +423,15 @@ class ControlPlaneServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
             sys.stderr.flush()
         super().__init__(address, Handler)
 
-    def is_authorized(self, presented: str) -> bool:
-        """True iff the request may proceed past `/health`: either no secret is
-        configured (open mode) or the presented header matches it. Constant-time
-        compare so a wrong token leaks nothing timing-wise."""
-        if not self._auth_token:
-            return True
-        return hmac.compare_digest(presented, self._auth_token)
+    def role_for(self, presented: str) -> str | None:
+        """The role the request is authorized as, or None if unauthenticated.
+        Open mode (no signing key) grants full `cli` access — the fail-visible
+        fallback. Otherwise verify the presented signed token; a missing/invalid
+        token yields None (→ 401), a valid one yields its `gateway`/`cli`
+        role (→ per-route 401/403 in `dispatch`)."""
+        if not self._signing_key:
+            return ROLE_CLI
+        return verify(presented, self._signing_key)
 
 
 def make_server(

bot_bottle/orchestrator/gateway.py

@@ -22,19 +22,13 @@ import os
 import time
 from pathlib import Path
 
+from ..control_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, mint
 from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
 from ..paths import (
-    CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
+    CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
     host_control_plane_token,
-    host_db_path,
     host_gateway_ca_dir,
 )
-from ..supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER
-
-# The host DB dir is bind-mounted here so the gateway's supervise daemon
-# writes its queued proposals into the ONE host DB (the same file the
-# orchestrator container opens and the operator reaches over HTTP).
-_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = os.path.dirname(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER)
 
 # The gateway's mitmproxy writes its CA a beat after the container starts, so
 # reads poll for it rather than assuming it's there on a fresh launch.
@@ -75,14 +69,6 @@ GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.gateway"
 _REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
 
 
-def _host_db_dir() -> str:
-    """The host DB directory (created if missing), for the gateway's
-    supervise-DB bind-mount."""
-    db_dir = host_db_path().parent
-    db_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-    return str(db_dir)
-
-
 def rotate_gateway_ca(ca_dir: Path | None = None) -> list[Path]:
     """Delete the persisted mitmproxy CA so the next gateway start mints a
     fresh one — the explicit, deliberate CA-rollover path (issue #450).
@@ -255,11 +241,10 @@ class DockerGateway(Gateway):
             # container recreation AND docker volume pruning (agents trust it)
             # — see host_gateway_ca_dir / issue #450.
             "--volume", f"{host_gateway_ca_dir()}:{MITMPROXY_HOME}",
-            # Share the one host DB: the supervise daemon queues proposals
-            # into the same file the orchestrator (and the operator, over
-            # HTTP) reads — no second, disconnected DB in the container.
-            "--volume", f"{_host_db_dir()}:{_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}",
-            "--env", f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
+            # No DB mount: the data plane (egress / supervise / git-gate) reaches
+            # the supervise queue over the control-plane RPC and never opens
+            # bot-bottle.db, so the gateway container gets no file handle on it
+            # (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
         ]
         for port in self._host_port_bindings:
             argv += ["--publish", f"0.0.0.0:{port}:{port}"]
@@ -268,11 +253,14 @@ class DockerGateway(Gateway):
         # policy against the control plane per request (guaranteed non-empty by
         # the check above).
         argv += ["--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL={self._orchestrator_url}"]
-        # ...and present the control-plane secret on those /resolve calls (the
-        # control plane requires it). Bare `--env NAME` keeps the value off argv
-        # / `docker inspect`; only the gateway (not the agent) is given it.
-        argv += ["--env", CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV]
-        run_env[CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV] = host_control_plane_token()
+        # ...presenting a role-scoped `gateway` token (a signed JWT minted from
+        # the host signing key) on those calls. The gateway never receives the
+        # signing key — only this pre-minted token, which it cannot rewrite into
+        # a `cli` token, so a compromised data-plane process can't drive the
+        # operator routes (issue #469 review). Bare `--env NAME` keeps the value
+        # off argv / `docker inspect`; only the gateway (not the agent) is given it.
+        argv += ["--env", CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV]
+        run_env[CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV] = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, host_control_plane_token())
         argv.append(self.image_ref)
         proc = run_docker(argv, env=run_env)
         if proc.returncode != 0:

bot_bottle/orchestrator/lifecycle.py

@@ -22,21 +22,21 @@ import urllib.request
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from .. import log
+from ..control_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, mint
 from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
 from ..paths import (
+    CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
     CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
     bot_bottle_root,
     host_control_plane_token,
     host_gateway_ca_dir,
 )
-from ..supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER
 from .gateway import (
     GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE,
     GATEWAY_IMAGE,
     GATEWAY_NETWORK,
     GatewayError,
     MITMPROXY_HOME,
-    _host_db_dir,
 )
 
 DEFAULT_PORT = 8099
@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ _INFRA_DAEMONS = "egress,git-http,supervise,orchestrator"
 # container. Separate from /app so the gateway's baked scripts
 # (egress_addon.py, egress-entrypoint.sh) are not overlaid.
 _SRC_IN_CONTAINER = "/bot-bottle-src"
-# Bot-bottle host-root bind-mount inside the container (DB + state).
+# Bot-bottle host-root bind-mount inside the container (DB + state). The
+# orchestrator control plane opens bot-bottle.db under here (via BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT
+# -> host_db_path()); it is the ONLY process in the container with a file
+# handle on it (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
 _ROOT_IN_CONTAINER = "/bot-bottle-root"
 
-# The supervise daemon writes proposals into the host DB directory.
-_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = os.path.dirname(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER)
-
 _HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS = 0.25
 _HEALTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 1.0
 
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ class OrchestratorService:
         so a later `ensure_running` can detect a real code change."""
         self._ensure_network()
         run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self._infra_name])
+        _signing_key = host_control_plane_token()
         proc = run_docker([
             "docker", "run", "--detach",
             "--name", self._infra_name,
@@ -202,9 +203,6 @@ class OrchestratorService:
             # recreation AND docker volume pruning (issue #450): every agent
             # trusts this one CA, so a fresh one would break all running bottles.
             "--volume", f"{host_gateway_ca_dir()}:{MITMPROXY_HOME}",
-            # Shared supervise DB (same file the operator reads over HTTP).
-            "--volume", f"{_host_db_dir()}:{_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}",
-            "--env", f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
             # Live control-plane source, mounted to a path that does not
             # overlay the gateway's baked /app scripts.
             "--volume", f"{self._repo_root}:{_SRC_IN_CONTAINER}:ro",
@@ -214,16 +212,23 @@ class OrchestratorService:
             # Orchestrator registry DB on the host (sole writer: control plane).
             "--volume", f"{self._host_root}:{_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER}",
             "--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT={_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER}",
-            # Control-plane secret: required by the orchestrator (to enforce)
-            # and by the gateway daemons (to present on /resolve calls).
+            # Control-plane signing key (orchestrator: verifies tokens) + the
+            # pre-minted `gateway` JWT (data-plane daemons: present it). gateway_init
+            # scopes each to its process, so a compromised data-plane daemon never
+            # sees the key and can't mint a `cli` token (issue #469 review).
             "--env", CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
+            "--env", CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
             # Gateway daemons reach the orchestrator over loopback at its
             # fixed internal port (DEFAULT_PORT), independent of self.port.
             "--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:{DEFAULT_PORT}",
             # Opt the orchestrator into gateway_init's supervise tree.
             "--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS={_INFRA_DAEMONS}",
             self.image,
-        ], env={**os.environ, CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV: host_control_plane_token()})
+        ], env={
+            **os.environ,
+            CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV: _signing_key,
+            CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV: mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _signing_key),
+        })
         if proc.returncode != 0:
             raise OrchestratorStartError(
                 f"infra container failed to start: {proc.stderr.strip()}"

bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py

@@ -31,16 +31,23 @@ from .gateway import Gateway
 from ..supervise import (
     AuditEntry,
     COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
+    POLL_STATUS_PENDING,
+    POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN,
+    Proposal,
     Response,
     STATUS_APPROVED,
     STATUS_MODIFIED,
     STATUS_REJECTED,
     TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
     TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
+    archive_proposal,
     list_all_pending_proposals,
     read_proposal,
+    read_response,
     render_diff,
+    sha256_hex,
     write_audit_entry,
+    write_proposal,
     write_response,
 )
 
@@ -188,6 +195,60 @@ class Orchestrator:
     # The orchestrator owns the single DB *and* the live policy, so operator
     # decisions are applied here, server-side, and reached over HTTP by the
     # host TUI (no direct-DB access, one path for every backend).
+    #
+    # The *agent* half of the queue (queue a proposal, poll for its response)
+    # is served here too (PRD 0070): the data plane no longer opens the DB, so
+    # supervise_server / egress / git-gate reach the queue over the control
+    # plane. Both are keyed on the caller's orchestrator-resolved bottle id —
+    # never a caller-supplied slug — so a bottle can only queue or read its own
+    # proposals even if the data plane is compromised.
+
+    def supervise_queue_proposal(
+        self, bottle_id: str, *, tool: str, proposed_file: str, justification: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        """Queue an agent-side proposal under `bottle_id` and return its id.
+
+        `bottle_id` is the caller resolved from `(source_ip, identity_token)` by
+        the control plane, so the proposal is attributed to the calling bottle,
+        not to anything the (possibly hostile) data plane asserts. The
+        proposed-file self-hash is computed here so the agent never supplies it."""
+        proposal = Proposal.new(
+            bottle_slug=bottle_id,
+            tool=tool,
+            proposed_file=proposed_file,
+            justification=justification,
+            current_file_hash=sha256_hex(proposed_file),
+        )
+        write_proposal(proposal)
+        return proposal.id
+
+    def supervise_poll_response(self, bottle_id: str, proposal_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
+        """Non-blocking poll of one of `bottle_id`'s queued proposals.
+
+        Returns `{"status": ...}`: a terminal decision (`approved`/`modified`/
+        `rejected`, with `notes` + `final_file`) once the operator has responded,
+        `pending` while it's still queued undecided, or `unknown` when no such
+        queued proposal exists for this bottle (wrong id, or already resolved and
+        read). A decided proposal is archived here — the same terminal step the
+        data plane used to run after reading the response — so `pending`
+        proposals stay visible to the operator until decided *and* polled.
+
+        Reads are scoped to `bottle_id` (the queue key), so a caller can never
+        read another bottle's proposal even with a guessed id."""
+        try:
+            response = read_response(bottle_id, proposal_id)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            try:
+                read_proposal(bottle_id, proposal_id)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                return {"status": POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN}
+            return {"status": POLL_STATUS_PENDING}
+        archive_proposal(bottle_id, proposal_id)
+        return {
+            "status": response.status,
+            "notes": response.notes,
+            "final_file": response.final_file,
+        }
 
     def supervise_pending(self) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
         """All pending proposals across bottles, FIFO, as JSON dicts

bot_bottle/paths.py

@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@ HOST_DB_FILENAME = "bot-bottle.db"
 # trusted callers (control plane, gateway, host CLI) and never handed to an
 # agent, so an agent that can reach the control-plane port still can't drive it.
 CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_FILENAME = "control-plane-token"
+# The env var carrying the control-plane *signing key* — held only by the
+# orchestrator (to verify tokens) and the host CLI (to mint its own), never by
+# the data plane. Same value as the host token file; the name is unchanged for
+# backward compatibility with existing launchers.
 CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN"
+# The env var carrying the data plane's pre-minted `gateway`-role token (a
+# signed JWT the launcher mints from the signing key). The gateway presents this
+# on /resolve + /supervise/{propose,poll}; it never holds the signing key, so it
+# cannot forge a higher-privilege `cli` token (issue #469 review).
+CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"
 
 # The host directory holding the gateway's persistent mitmproxy CA. Bind-mounted
 # into the infra/gateway container at mitmproxy's confdir so the self-generated
@@ -124,6 +133,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "HOST_DB_FILENAME",
     "CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_FILENAME",
     "CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV",
+    "CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
     "GATEWAY_CA_DIRNAME",
     "bot_bottle_root",
     "host_db_path",

bot_bottle/policy_resolver.py

@@ -34,21 +34,22 @@ import urllib.request
 
 DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2.0
 
-# The control-plane secret this gateway presents on every /resolve call, read
-# from the env the launcher injects into the gateway container. The control
-# plane requires it (orchestrator/control_plane.py). Constant + env-var name are
-# duplicated here rather than imported because this module is COPYed flat into
-# the gateway image, free of bot-bottle imports — same rationale as
-# IDENTITY_HEADER in egress_addon / git_http_backend.
+# The role-scoped `gateway` token this data plane presents on every control-plane
+# call, read from the env the launcher injects into the gateway (a pre-minted
+# signed JWT — the gateway never holds the signing key, so it can't forge a
+# higher-privilege `cli` token). Constant + env-var name are duplicated here
+# rather than imported because this module is COPYed flat into the gateway image,
+# free of bot-bottle imports — same rationale as IDENTITY_HEADER in egress_addon
+# / git_http_backend.
 CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-control-auth"
-CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN"
+CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"
 
 
 def _control_auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
-    """The auth header to send, or {} when no secret is configured (an open
+    """The auth header to send, or {} when no token is configured (an open
     control plane, e.g. Firecracker behind its nft boundary — sending nothing
     is correct there and harmlessly ignored)."""
-    token = os.environ.get(CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV, "").strip()
+    token = os.environ.get(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, "").strip()
     return {CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: token} if token else {}
 
 
@@ -64,28 +65,80 @@ class PolicyResolver:
         self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
         self._timeout = timeout
 
+    def _post_json(self, path: str, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object] | None:
+        """POST `payload` to control-plane `path`, returning the JSON object body
+        — or None when the orchestrator answers `403` (unattributed / fail
+        closed). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an unreachable / unexpected-status
+        / malformed response so every caller can fail closed. Shared by
+        `_post_resolve` and the supervise propose/poll RPCs."""
+        body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self._base}{path}", data=body, method="POST",
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", **_control_auth_headers()},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
+                data = json.loads(resp.read())
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+            if e.code == 403:
+                return None  # unattributed → fail closed (caller denies)
+            raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} returned HTTP {e.code}") from e
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
+            raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} unreachable or malformed: {e}") from e
+        return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+
     def _post_resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> dict[str, object] | None:
         """The orchestrator's `/resolve` payload for this client, or None if
         unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an
         unreachable / unexpected-status / malformed response so every caller
         can fail closed. Shared by `resolve` and `resolve_bottle_id`."""
-        body = json.dumps(
-            {"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token}
-        ).encode()
-        req = urllib.request.Request(
-            f"{self._base}/resolve", data=body, method="POST",
-            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", **_control_auth_headers()},
+        return self._post_json(
+            "/resolve", {"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token},
         )
-        try:
-            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
-                payload = json.loads(resp.read())
-        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
-            if e.code == 403:
-                return None  # unattributed → fail closed (caller denies)
-            raise PolicyResolveError(f"/resolve returned HTTP {e.code}") from e
-        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
-            raise PolicyResolveError(f"/resolve unreachable or malformed: {e}") from e
-        return payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
+
+    def propose_supervise(
+        self,
+        source_ip: str,
+        identity_token: str,
+        *,
+        tool: str,
+        proposed_file: str,
+        justification: str,
+    ) -> str | None:
+        """Queue a supervise proposal on the control plane and return its
+        `proposal_id`. The orchestrator attributes the proposal to the calling
+        bottle by `(source_ip, identity_token)` — exactly like `/resolve` — so a
+        bottle can only ever queue its *own* proposals. Returns None when the
+        pair is unattributed (a clean `403`); raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
+        orchestrator can't be reached, so the data-plane caller fails closed
+        (blocks / refuses) rather than silently dropping the proposal."""
+        payload = self._post_json("/supervise/propose", {
+            "source_ip": source_ip,
+            "identity_token": identity_token,
+            "tool": tool,
+            "proposed_file": proposed_file,
+            "justification": justification,
+        })
+        if payload is None:
+            return None
+        proposal_id = payload.get("proposal_id")
+        return proposal_id if isinstance(proposal_id, str) and proposal_id else None
+
+    def poll_supervise(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, object] | None:
+        """Poll a queued proposal for the operator's decision, **non-blocking**.
+        Attributed by `(source_ip, identity_token)` so a bottle can only read its
+        *own* proposal's response. Returns `{"status": ...}` where status is one
+        of the terminal decisions (`approved`/`modified`/`rejected`, carrying
+        `notes` + `final_file`), `pending` (queued, no decision yet), or
+        `unknown` (no such queued proposal for this bottle). Returns None when
+        unattributed; raises `PolicyResolveError` if unreachable."""
+        return self._post_json("/supervise/poll", {
+            "source_ip": source_ip,
+            "identity_token": identity_token,
+            "proposal_id": proposal_id,
+        })
 
     def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
         """The calling bottle's policy blob, or None if unattributed. Always

bot_bottle/supervise.py

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from .supervise_types import (
     ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT,
     AuditEntry,
+    POLL_STATUS_PENDING,
+    POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN,
     Proposal,
     Response,
     STATUSES,
@@ -257,6 +259,8 @@ __all__ = [
     "STATUS_APPROVED",
     "STATUS_MODIFIED",
     "STATUS_REJECTED",
+    "POLL_STATUS_PENDING",
+    "POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN",
     "SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME",
     "SUPERVISE_PORT",
     "Supervise",

bot_bottle/supervise_server.py

@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@ config changes when stuck. The tools are `egress-allow`,
 Each queued proposal tool call:
 
   1. Validates the proposed file syntactically.
-  2. Writes a Proposal to the host SQLite database.
-  3. Blocks polling for a matching Response row, up to a short grace
-     window (`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, default 30s).
+  2. Queues a Proposal over the control-plane RPC (`POST /supervise/propose`),
+     which attributes it to the calling bottle by (source_ip, identity_token)
+     and writes it to the one orchestrator-owned SQLite database. This daemon
+     never opens `bot-bottle.db` itself (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
+  3. Polls the control plane (`POST /supervise/poll`) for a matching Response,
+     up to a short grace window (`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`,
+     default 30s).
   4. On a decision within the window, returns the operator's
      `{status, notes}`. On timeout, returns `status: pending` **with the
      proposal id** and leaves the proposal queued — the flow is
@@ -24,8 +28,8 @@ without holding an HTTP request open.
 One shared server fronts every bottle (PRD 0070) and attributes each
 proposal to the calling bottle by source IP, resolved from the orchestrator
 — an unattributed or unreachable source fails closed. BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL
-is mandatory: there is no fixed-slug single-tenant fallback. SUPERVISE_DB_PATH
-points at the bind-mounted host database.
+is mandatory: there is no fixed-slug single-tenant fallback, and the queue is
+reached only over that control-plane RPC (no direct database handle).
 
 Speaks MCP over HTTP+JSON-RPC. Methods handled:
 
@@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ import socketserver
 import sys
 import time
 import typing
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
+from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from bot_bottle.constants import IDENTITY_HEADER
 from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (
@@ -312,7 +316,9 @@ def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class ServerConfig:
-    bottle_slug: str
+    # No bottle_slug: the calling bottle is attributed per request by the
+    # control plane from (source_ip, identity_token), so nothing on this daemon
+    # is keyed by a single slug (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
     response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
 
 
@@ -331,14 +337,22 @@ def handle_tools_list(_params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
 def handle_tools_call(
     params: dict[str, object],
     config: ServerConfig,
+    *,
+    resolver: "PolicyResolver",
+    source_ip: str,
+    identity_token: str,
 ) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Validates the proposal, writes it to the queue, blocks waiting
-    for a Response, returns the result wrapped in MCP `content`.
+    """Validates the proposal, queues it over the control-plane RPC, polls for
+    a Response through the grace window, and returns the result wrapped in MCP
+    `content`.
 
-    `list-egress-routes` never reaches here — the handler answers it from
-    the calling bottle's resolved policy before dispatching (see
-    `MCPHandler._dispatch`); this path is the queued, operator-approved
-    `egress-allow` / `egress-block` tools."""
+    The queue lives behind the orchestrator now — `propose_supervise` attributes
+    the proposal to the calling bottle by `(source_ip, identity_token)` and
+    `poll_supervise` reads only that bottle's own responses, so this daemon
+    never opens `bot-bottle.db`. `list-egress-routes` never reaches here — the
+    handler answers it from the calling bottle's resolved policy before
+    dispatching (see `MCPHandler._dispatch`); this path is the queued,
+    operator-approved `egress-allow` / `egress-block` tools."""
     name = params.get("name")
     if not isinstance(name, str):
         raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
@@ -366,59 +380,100 @@ def handle_tools_call(
     else:
         raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {name!r}")
 
-    proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
-        bottle_slug=config.bottle_slug,
-        tool=name,
-        proposed_file=proposed_file,
-        justification=justification,
-        current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(proposed_file),
+    proposal_id = _queue_proposal(
+        resolver, source_ip, identity_token,
+        tool=name, proposed_file=proposed_file, justification=justification,
     )
-    try:
-        _sv.write_proposal(proposal)
-    except OSError as e:
-        raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to write proposal to queue: {e}") from e
     sys.stderr.write(
-        f"supervise: queued proposal {proposal.id} ({name}) "
-        f"for bottle {config.bottle_slug}; waiting for operator...\n"
+        f"supervise: queued proposal {proposal_id} ({name}); waiting for operator...\n"
     )
     sys.stderr.flush()
-    deadline = time.monotonic() + config.response_timeout_seconds
-    try:
-        response = _sv.wait_for_response(
-            config.bottle_slug,
-            proposal.id,
-            poll_interval=MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
-            deadline=deadline,
-        )
-    except TimeoutError:
-        text = format_pending_response_text(proposal.id, config.response_timeout_seconds)
-        return {
-            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
-            "isError": False,
-        }
-    try:
-        _sv.archive_proposal(config.bottle_slug, proposal.id)
-    except OSError as e:
-        raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to archive proposal: {e}") from e
 
-    text = format_response_text(response)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + config.response_timeout_seconds
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        response = _poll_response(resolver, source_ip, identity_token, proposal_id)
+        if response is not None:
+            return {
+                "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_response_text(response)}],
+                "isError": response.status == _sv.STATUS_REJECTED,
+            }
+        time.sleep(MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
+
+    text = format_pending_response_text(proposal_id, config.response_timeout_seconds)
     return {
         "content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
-        "isError": response.status == _sv.STATUS_REJECTED,
+        "isError": False,
     }
 
 
+def _queue_proposal(
+    resolver: "PolicyResolver",
+    source_ip: str,
+    identity_token: str,
+    *,
+    tool: str,
+    proposed_file: str,
+    justification: str,
+) -> str:
+    """Queue a proposal over the control plane and return its id, mapping the
+    resolver's fail-closed outcomes to internal errors so `do_POST` returns a
+    clean -32603 rather than leaking the cause to the agent."""
+    try:
+        proposal_id = resolver.propose_supervise(
+            source_ip, identity_token,
+            tool=tool, proposed_file=proposed_file, justification=justification,
+        )
+    except PolicyResolveError as e:
+        raise _RpcInternalError(f"orchestrator unreachable, cannot queue proposal: {e}") from e
+    if proposal_id is None:
+        raise _RpcInternalError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
+    return proposal_id
+
+
+def _poll_response(
+    resolver: "PolicyResolver", source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
+) -> "_sv.Response | None":
+    """One non-blocking control-plane poll for `proposal_id`'s decision. Returns
+    the operator's Response once decided, or None while it is still pending
+    (or `unknown` — treated as still-waiting so a transient blip degrades to the
+    pending-timeout path rather than a spurious error mid grace window)."""
+    try:
+        result = resolver.poll_supervise(source_ip, identity_token, proposal_id)
+    except PolicyResolveError as e:
+        raise _RpcInternalError(f"orchestrator unreachable, cannot poll proposal: {e}") from e
+    if result is None:
+        raise _RpcInternalError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
+    if result.get("status") in _sv.STATUSES:
+        return _response_from_poll(proposal_id, result)
+    return None
+
+
+def _response_from_poll(proposal_id: str, result: "dict[str, object]") -> "_sv.Response":
+    """Build a Response from a decided `/supervise/poll` payload."""
+    final_file = result.get("final_file")
+    return _sv.Response(
+        proposal_id=proposal_id,
+        status=str(result.get("status")),
+        notes=str(result.get("notes") or ""),
+        final_file=final_file if isinstance(final_file, str) else None,
+    )
+
+
 def handle_check_proposal(
     params: dict[str, object],
-    config: ServerConfig,
+    *,
+    resolver: "PolicyResolver",
+    source_ip: str,
+    identity_token: str,
 ) -> dict[str, object]:
     """Non-blocking poll of a queued proposal's decision, by id.
 
     Never creates a Proposal (so `check-proposal` isn't in `TOOLS`); it only
-    reads the queue. Resolution order mirrors the synchronous path's terminal
-    step — a decided proposal is archived here exactly as `handle_tools_call`
-    archives it after `wait_for_response`, so `pending` proposals stay visible
-    to the operator until they're both decided *and* polled."""
+    reads the queue over the control-plane RPC, attributed by
+    `(source_ip, identity_token)` so it can only read *this* bottle's own
+    proposals. The orchestrator archives a decided proposal on read — the same
+    terminal step the synchronous path triggers — so `pending` proposals stay
+    visible to the operator until they're both decided *and* polled."""
     args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
     if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
         raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call 'arguments' must be an object")
@@ -431,25 +486,24 @@ def handle_check_proposal(
     proposal_id = proposal_id.strip()
 
     try:
-        response = _sv.read_response(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        # No decision yet — distinguish "still queued" from "unknown id".
-        try:
-            _sv.read_proposal(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            return {
-                "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_unknown_proposal_text(proposal_id)}],
-                "isError": True,
-            }
+        result = resolver.poll_supervise(source_ip, identity_token, proposal_id)
+    except PolicyResolveError as e:
+        raise _RpcInternalError(f"orchestrator unreachable, cannot poll proposal: {e}") from e
+    if result is None:
+        raise _RpcInternalError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
+    status = result.get("status")
+
+    if status == _sv.POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
+        return {
+            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_unknown_proposal_text(proposal_id)}],
+            "isError": True,
+        }
+    if status == _sv.POLL_STATUS_PENDING:
         return {
             "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_still_pending_text(proposal_id)}],
             "isError": False,
         }
-
-    try:
-        _sv.archive_proposal(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-    except OSError as e:
-        raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to archive proposal: {e}") from e
+    response = _response_from_poll(proposal_id, result)
     return {
         "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_response_text(response)}],
         "isError": response.status == _sv.STATUS_REJECTED,
@@ -591,16 +645,34 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             # — silently dropping base routes like api.anthropic.com on approval.
             if req.params.get("name") == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
                 return self._resolved_routes_payload()
+            resolver = self._resolver_or_fail()
+            source_ip = self.client_address[0]
+            token = self._identity_token()
             # `check-proposal` is a non-blocking read of the calling bottle's
-            # own queue — attributed by source IP like a proposal, but it
-            # never queues or blocks.
+            # own queue — attributed by (source_ip, identity_token) like a
+            # proposal, but it never queues or blocks.
             if req.params.get("name") == _sv.TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL:
-                return handle_check_proposal(req.params, self._attributed_config(config))
-            # Attribute the proposal to the source-IP-resolved bottle, so the one
-            # shared server queues each bottle's proposal under its own slug.
-            return handle_tools_call(req.params, self._attributed_config(config))
+                return handle_check_proposal(
+                    req.params, resolver=resolver,
+                    source_ip=source_ip, identity_token=token,
+                )
+            # The control plane attributes the proposal to the source-IP + token
+            # resolved bottle, so the one shared queue holds each bottle's
+            # proposal under its own id — no slug is asserted by this daemon.
+            return handle_tools_call(
+                req.params, config, resolver=resolver,
+                source_ip=source_ip, identity_token=token,
+            )
         raise _RpcClientError(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, f"method not found: {method}")
 
+    def _identity_token(self) -> str:
+        """The agent's per-bottle identity token from the request header (the
+        MCP client sends it via `mcp add --header`), or empty. The control plane
+        requires the (source_ip, token) pair, so a missing/wrong token
+        fail-closes there."""
+        headers = getattr(self, "headers", None)
+        return headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "") if headers is not None else ""
+
     def _resolver_or_fail(self) -> "PolicyResolver":
         """This server's policy resolver. A server started without one is a
         misconfiguration, not a tenancy mode — fail closed rather than
@@ -612,40 +684,18 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 
     def _resolved_routes_payload(self) -> dict[str, object]:
         """The calling bottle's live egress routes as the `list-egress-routes`
-        JSON payload, resolved by (source_ip, identity token). Fail-closed like
-        `_attributed_config`: an unattributed source or an unreachable
-        orchestrator yields an empty route list (never another bottle's),
-        courtesy of `resolve_client_context`."""
+        JSON payload, resolved by (source_ip, identity token). Fail-closed: an
+        unattributed source or an unreachable orchestrator yields an empty route
+        list (never another bottle's), courtesy of `resolve_client_context`."""
         resolver = self._resolver_or_fail()
-        headers = getattr(self, "headers", None)
-        token = headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "") if headers is not None else ""
         conf, _slug, _tokens = resolve_client_context(
-            resolver, self.client_address[0], token,
+            resolver, self.client_address[0], self._identity_token(),
         )
         body = json.dumps(
             {"routes": [route_to_yaml_dict(r) for r in conf.routes]}, indent=2,
         )
         return {"content": [{"type": "text", "text": body}], "isError": False}
 
-    def _attributed_config(self, config: ServerConfig) -> ServerConfig:
-        """The ServerConfig with `bottle_slug` bound to *this request's* bottle:
-        the bottle id attributed from the source IP — **fail-closed**, an
-        unattributed or unreachable source raises so no proposal is queued under
-        the wrong (or empty) slug."""
-        resolver = self._resolver_or_fail()
-        # The agent's MCP client sends the identity token as a request header
-        # (provisioned via `mcp add --header`); the orchestrator requires the
-        # (source_ip, token) pair, so a missing/wrong token fail-closes below.
-        headers = getattr(self, "headers", None)
-        token = headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "") if headers is not None else ""
-        try:
-            bottle_id = resolver.resolve_bottle_id(self.client_address[0], token)
-        except PolicyResolveError as e:
-            raise _RpcInternalError(f"orchestrator unreachable, cannot attribute: {e}") from e
-        if not bottle_id:
-            raise _RpcInternalError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
-        return replace(config, bottle_slug=bottle_id)
-
     def _write_jsonrpc(self, body: bytes) -> None:
         self.send_response(200)
         self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
@@ -668,10 +718,10 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 class MCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
     allow_reuse_address = True
     daemon_threads = True
-    config: ServerConfig = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="")
-    # Set by `serve`; every proposal is attributed to the source-IP-resolved
-    # bottle. The class default is a placeholder — a server without a resolver
-    # fails closed per request (see `_resolver_or_fail`).
+    config: ServerConfig = ServerConfig()
+    # Set by `serve`; every proposal is attributed to the source-IP + token
+    # resolved bottle by the control plane. A server without a resolver fails
+    # closed per request (see `_resolver_or_fail`).
     policy_resolver: "PolicyResolver | None" = None
 
 
@@ -686,12 +736,9 @@ def serve(
     response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
 ) -> typing.NoReturn:
     server = MCPServer((bind, port), MCPHandler)
-    # bottle_slug is a placeholder: every request's proposal is attributed to
-    # the source-IP-resolved bottle (see MCPHandler._attributed_config).
-    server.config = ServerConfig(
-        bottle_slug="",
-        response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
-    )
+    # Every request's proposal is attributed to the source-IP + token resolved
+    # bottle by the control plane (see MCPHandler._dispatch).
+    server.config = ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds)
     server.policy_resolver = resolver
     sys.stderr.write(
         f"supervise listening on {bind}:{port}; multi-tenant; "

bot_bottle/supervise_types.py

@@ -37,6 +37,15 @@ STATUS_MODIFIED = "modified"
 STATUS_REJECTED = "rejected"
 STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = (STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED, STATUS_REJECTED)
 
+# Non-terminal markers the control-plane supervise-poll RPC returns when a
+# proposal has no operator decision yet (`PENDING`) or no queued proposal with
+# that id exists for the calling bottle (`UNKNOWN`). They are never a
+# `Response.status` — only the poll wire contract (see
+# `Orchestrator.supervise_poll_response`) — so they are deliberately outside
+# `STATUSES`.
+POLL_STATUS_PENDING = "pending"
+POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
+
 ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT = "operator-edit"
 
 
@@ -157,6 +166,8 @@ __all__ = [
     "STATUS_APPROVED",
     "STATUS_MODIFIED",
     "STATUS_REJECTED",
+    "POLL_STATUS_PENDING",
+    "POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN",
     "TOOLS",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",

docs/ci.md

@@ -1,23 +1,13 @@
 # CI
 
 The test workflow lives at [`.gitea/workflows/test.yml`](../.gitea/workflows/test.yml).
-It runs the unit suite plus one integration job per backend
-(`integration-docker`, `integration-firecracker`) on:
+It runs `tests/run_tests.py` (full suite — unit + integration) on:
 
 - every push to a branch with an open pull request, and
 - every push to `main`.
 
-Each integration job selects its backend via `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` and
-runs a **preflight** (`./cli.py backend status --backend=<name>`) that
-prints a clear per-check readiness summary and fails the job when the
-backend is missing — so absent infrastructure is visible at the job level
-rather than hidden among per-test `unittest.skip` lines. The skip guards in
-[`tests/_backend.py`](../tests/_backend.py) gate on the same readiness
-check (`bot_bottle.backend.has_backend`): backend-agnostic tests use
-`skip_unless_selected_backend_available()` and run through whichever
-backend is selected (checking, e.g., Linux + `/dev/kvm` for Firecracker
-rather than unrelated Docker availability); Docker-implementation tests use
-`skip_unless_backend("docker")` and no-op under a non-Docker run.
+Integration tests need Docker on the runner; they skip cleanly via
+`tests/_docker.skip_unless_docker` when no daemon is reachable.
 
 A small subset of integration tests skip when running specifically
 under Gitea Actions (`GITEA_ACTIONS=true`), because `act_runner` runs

docs/prds/0070-per-host-orchestrator.md

@@ -299,11 +299,14 @@ and integrate a console against.
   the data plane and the console reach state through the control-plane RPC,
   never a direct file handle.** No agent-facing component gets the file, so
   none can forge attribution. (This supersedes the earlier `ro`-mount idea.)
-  - *Transitional caveat:* today the per-bottle **supervise gateway
-    rw-bind-mounts `bot-bottle.db`** to write proposals — exactly the
-    pattern the orchestrator removes (supervise consolidates into the
-    orchestrator; gateway writes become RPC calls). Until that lands, don't
-    put the attribution registry behind a data-plane-writable mount.
+  This rule is now **in force** across the data plane (issue #469): the
+  supervise daemon, the egress addon, and the git-gate pre-receive hook queue
+  proposals and poll for their responses over the agent-side supervise RPC
+  (`POST /supervise/propose` + `POST /supervise/poll`, attributed by
+  `(source_ip, identity_token)` exactly like `/resolve`), so a bottle can only
+  ever queue or read its own proposals. The gateway/data-plane containers no
+  longer bind-mount the DB directory or carry `SUPERVISE_DB_PATH`; the
+  orchestrator is the sole opener of the one file.
 
 Implementation note for the VM slices: SQLite **WAL** over a guest share
 (virtiofs/9p) is finicky (the `-shm`/`-wal` files need real mmap/locking),

tests/README.md

@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
 
 Plain-Python test suite using stdlib `unittest`. No external
 dependencies. Unit tests run anywhere Python 3 is present; integration
-tests run through the backend named by `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` (default
-`docker`) and skip cleanly when that backend isn't available on the host.
+tests need Docker and skip cleanly otherwise.
 
 ## Layout
 
 ```
 tests/
   fixtures.py                       # JSON manifest builders (shared)
-  _backend.py                       # backend selection + skip guards (shared)
+  _docker.py                        # docker-availability skip helper (shared)
   unit/
     test_egress.py
     test_egress_addon_core.py
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/canaries -v
 ## Adding a test
 
 1. Pick the directory: `tests/unit/` for a pure unit test,
-   `tests/integration/` for one that needs a backend.
+   `tests/integration/` for one that needs Docker.
 2. Filename: `test_<topic>.py`.
 3. Boilerplate:
    ```python
@@ -89,19 +88,5 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/canaries -v
    if __name__ == "__main__":
        unittest.main()
    ```
-4. Skip guards live in `tests._backend` and gate on the backend's own
-   readiness check, `bot_bottle.backend.has_backend` — the same probe
-   behind `./cli.py backend status`:
-   - Backend-agnostic tests (go through `get_bottle_backend()`) decorate
-     the class with `@skip_unless_selected_backend_available()` — the test
-     runs against whichever backend `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` selects and skips
-     unless that backend is available (checking, e.g., Linux + `/dev/kvm`
-     for Firecracker rather than unrelated Docker availability).
-   - Backend-specific tests (exercise `DockerBroker`, `DockerGateway`,
-     `backend.docker.*`, …) decorate with `@skip_unless_backend("docker")`
-     so they no-op under a run targeting a different backend.
-
-   Each CI integration job runs `./cli.py backend status --backend=<name>`
-   as a preflight, which prints a clear per-check summary and exits non-zero
-   when the backend is missing — so absent infrastructure fails the job
-   instead of hiding among per-test `unittest.skip` lines.
+4. For Docker-dependent tests, decorate the class with
+   `@skip_unless_docker()` from `tests._docker`.

tests/_backend.py

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-"""Backend selection + readiness-aware skip guards for the integration suite.
-
-Each integration test targets the backend named by ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND``
-(default ``docker``) and gates on that backend's full readiness check —
-``is_backend_ready()`` (equivalent to ``./cli.py backend status``), not just
-a binary-on-PATH probe. When the backend is not ready, diagnostic output is
-printed during test discovery so the operator sees a concrete reason for each
-skip.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import unittest
-
-from bot_bottle.backend import is_backend_ready
-
-# Default when ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`` is unset. Docker preserves the historical
-# Docker-backed CI path (and mirrors the pin in ``test_sandbox_escape``).
-DEFAULT_BACKEND = "docker"
-
-
-def selected_backend() -> str:
-    """The backend this test run targets, from ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND``.
-
-    Mirrors the CLI's env selector; unset means ``docker`` so an
-    unconfigured run behaves exactly as the suite did before backends were
-    pluggable.
-    """
-    return os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND") or DEFAULT_BACKEND
-
-
-def skip_unless_backend(backend: str):
-    """Skip a backend-specific test unless the selected backend matches AND
-    that backend is fully ready.
-
-    Docker-implementation tests (``DockerBroker``, ``DockerGateway``,
-    ``backend.docker.*``) use ``skip_unless_backend("docker")`` so they no-op
-    under a run targeting a different backend instead of testing Docker
-    internals that run doesn't exercise — the guard reads
-    ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`` rather than "is Docker installed".
-
-    When the backend is not ready, ``status()`` output is printed so the
-    operator sees a concrete diagnostic for each skipped test module.
-    """
-    sel = selected_backend()
-    if sel != backend:
-        return unittest.skip(
-            f"backend {backend!r} not selected (BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND={sel})"
-        )
-    return unittest.skipUnless(
-        is_backend_ready(backend, quiet=False),
-        f"{backend} backend not ready",
-    )
-
-
-def skip_unless_selected_backend_available():
-    """Skip a backend-agnostic test unless the *selected* backend is fully ready.
-
-    The test then runs through whichever backend ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`` names,
-    gated on that backend's full status() check (e.g. daemon reachable, TAP
-    pool present for Firecracker) rather than just a binary-on-PATH probe.
-
-    When the backend is not ready, ``status()`` output is printed so the
-    operator sees a concrete diagnostic for each skipped test module.
-    """
-    backend = selected_backend()
-    return unittest.skipUnless(
-        is_backend_ready(backend, quiet=False),
-        f"selected backend {backend!r} not ready",
-    )

tests/_docker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+"""Docker availability check used by integration tests."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import unittest
+
+
+def docker_available() -> bool:
+    if os.environ.get("SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS"):
+        return False
+    if shutil.which("docker") is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        return (
+            subprocess.run(
+                ["docker", "info"],
+                stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+                check=False,
+                timeout=5,
+            ).returncode
+            == 0
+        )
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+        return False
+
+
+def skip_unless_docker(reason: str = "docker unreachable"):
+    return unittest.skipUnless(docker_available(), reason)
+
+
+def skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker(
+    reason: str = "neither Docker nor Firecracker selected",
+):
+    """Skip a backend-agnostic test unless one supported backend can run.
+
+    Firecracker does not require the host Docker daemon. The KVM coverage job
+    deliberately sets ``SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS`` to exclude Docker-only integration
+    classes while still exercising this path.
+    """
+    firecracker_selected = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND") == "firecracker"
+    return unittest.skipUnless(firecracker_selected or docker_available(), reason)

tests/integration/test_gateway_image.py

@@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ import os
 import subprocess
 import unittest
 
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 
 _IMAGE = "bot-bottle-gateway-test:chunk1"
 _DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.gateway"
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 @unittest.skipIf(
     os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
     "skipped under act_runner: multi-stage build pulls a 200+MB "

tests/integration/test_multitenant_isolation.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.docker.gateway_net import next_free_ip
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import GATEWAY_IMAGE, GATEWAY_NAME, GATEWAY_NETWORK
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.lifecycle import OrchestratorService
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 # One upstream reachable under two names; reflects the Authorization header so
 # the probe can see exactly what the gateway injected (or didn't).
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ _PROBE_SRC = (
 )
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 @unittest.skipIf(
     os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
     "skipped under act_runner: the orchestrator container bind-mounts the repo "

tests/integration/test_orchestrator_docker_broker.py

@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ import unittest
 
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import LaunchRequest, sign_request
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.docker_broker import DockerBroker, container_name
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 IMAGE = "busybox"
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 class TestDockerBrokerIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)

tests/integration/test_orchestrator_docker_control_plane_auth.py

@@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ import tempfile
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 
+from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, mint
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.lifecycle import OrchestratorService
 from bot_bottle.paths import host_control_plane_token
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 # Fixed (not per-run-suffixed) so repeated runs reuse the same layer-cached
 # image instead of leaking a new dangling tag on every invocation.
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ _TEST_GATEWAY_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-gateway:itest"
 _TEST_INFRA_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-infra:itest"
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 @unittest.skipIf(
     os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
     "skipped under act_runner: the orchestrator container bind-mounts the repo "
@@ -85,7 +86,11 @@ class TestDockerControlPlaneAuthIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
             host_root=host_root,
         )
         cls.svc.ensure_running()
-        cls.token = host_control_plane_token()
+        # The control plane now verifies role-scoped signed tokens, not the raw
+        # key. Mint one of each role from the host signing key (issue #469 review).
+        signing_key = host_control_plane_token()
+        cls.cli_token = mint(ROLE_CLI, signing_key)
+        cls.gateway_token = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, signing_key)
 
     @staticmethod
     def _teardown_docker(
@@ -136,11 +141,17 @@ class TestDockerControlPlaneAuthIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         status, _ = self._request("GET", "/bottles", token="not-the-real-secret")
         self.assertEqual(401, status)
 
-    def test_bottles_accepts_the_real_token(self) -> None:
-        status, payload = self._request("GET", "/bottles", token=self.token)
+    def test_bottles_accepts_the_cli_token(self) -> None:
+        status, payload = self._request("GET", "/bottles", token=self.cli_token)
         self.assertEqual(200, status)
         self.assertEqual([], payload["bottles"])
 
+    def test_bottles_rejects_the_gateway_token(self) -> None:
+        """A compromised gateway holds only a `gateway` token — it must not be
+        able to enumerate bottles (an operator route) with it (issue #469)."""
+        status, _ = self._request("GET", "/bottles", token=self.gateway_token)
+        self.assertEqual(403, status)
+
     def test_resolve_rejects_a_caller_with_no_token(self) -> None:
         """The credential-lift attack from issue #400: an agent could POST
         /resolve directly and read back the upstream tokens it's never meant
@@ -148,6 +159,13 @@ class TestDockerControlPlaneAuthIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         status, _ = self._request("POST", "/resolve")
         self.assertEqual(401, status)
 
+    def test_resolve_accepts_the_gateway_token(self) -> None:
+        """The gateway's own token DOES reach /resolve: with an empty body it
+        gets 400 (missing source_ip) rather than the 401 a rejected caller sees
+        — proving the role gate let the gateway token through."""
+        status, _ = self._request("POST", "/resolve", token=self.gateway_token)
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)  # past the role gate; body validation fails
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/integration/test_orchestrator_docker_gateway.py

@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ import subprocess
 import unittest
 
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 IMAGE = "busybox"
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 class TestDockerGatewayIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.name = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway-itest-" + secrets.token_hex(4)

tests/integration/test_orchestrator_docker_gateway_build.py

@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ import subprocess
 import unittest
 
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 IMAGE = "busybox"
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 class TestDockerGatewayImageExists(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_image_exists_true_for_present_false_for_absent(self) -> None:
         # Ensure the tiny image is present (build_if_missing is disabled here

tests/integration/test_orphan_cleanup.py

@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.docker.network import (
     network_create_internal,
     network_remove,
 )
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 
-@skip_unless_backend("docker")
+@skip_unless_docker()
 class TestOrphanCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):
         self.slug = f"cb-test-orphan-{os.getpid()}"

tests/integration/test_sandbox_escape.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
 from bot_bottle.bottle_state import cleanup_state
 from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
-from tests._backend import skip_unless_selected_backend_available
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker
 
 
 # Secrets planted in the bottle env as literals (agents substitute via
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ _DUMMY_HOST_KEY = (
 )
 
 
-@skip_unless_selected_backend_available()
+@skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()
 @unittest.skipIf(
     os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true"
     and os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND") != "firecracker",

tests/unit/test_backend_skip_guards.py

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the backend-aware skip guards in ``tests/_backend.py``.
-
-The guards delegate their readiness check to
-``bot_bottle.backend.is_backend_ready`` (the probe behind ``./cli.py backend
-status``); here that probe is mocked so the unit job asserts the
-selection/skip logic without either backend present on the runner.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from tests._backend import (
-    selected_backend,
-    skip_unless_backend,
-    skip_unless_selected_backend_available,
-)
-
-
-def _skipped(decorated: type) -> bool:
-    return getattr(decorated, "__unittest_skip__", False)
-
-
-def _new_case() -> type:
-    return type("Case", (unittest.TestCase,), {})
-
-
-class TestSelectedBackend(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_defaults_to_docker_when_unset(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
-            self.assertEqual("docker", selected_backend())
-
-    def test_reads_env(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker"}, clear=True):
-            self.assertEqual("firecracker", selected_backend())
-
-
-class TestSkipUnlessBackend(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_skips_when_other_backend_selected(self):
-        # A different backend is selected — no host probe needed, skip.
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker"}, clear=True), \
-                patch("tests._backend.is_backend_ready") as has:
-            decorated = skip_unless_backend("docker")(_new_case())
-        self.assertTrue(_skipped(decorated))
-        has.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_runs_when_selected_and_available(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "docker"}, clear=True), \
-                patch("tests._backend.is_backend_ready", return_value=True):
-            decorated = skip_unless_backend("docker")(_new_case())
-        self.assertFalse(_skipped(decorated))
-
-    def test_skips_when_selected_but_unavailable(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "docker"}, clear=True), \
-                patch("tests._backend.is_backend_ready", return_value=False):
-            decorated = skip_unless_backend("docker")(_new_case())
-        self.assertTrue(_skipped(decorated))
-
-
-class TestSkipUnlessSelectedBackendAvailable(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_runs_when_selected_backend_available(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker"}, clear=True), \
-                patch("tests._backend.is_backend_ready", return_value=True) as has:
-            decorated = skip_unless_selected_backend_available()(_new_case())
-        self.assertFalse(_skipped(decorated))
-        has.assert_called_once_with("firecracker", quiet=False)
-
-    def test_skips_when_selected_backend_unavailable(self):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker"}, clear=True), \
-                patch("tests._backend.is_backend_ready", return_value=False):
-            decorated = skip_unless_selected_backend_available()(_new_case())
-        self.assertTrue(_skipped(decorated))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_control_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+"""Unit: role-scoped control-plane tokens (issue #469 review)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import json
+import unittest
+
+from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLES, mint, verify
+
+_KEY = "test-key"
+
+
+def _b64(obj: object) -> str:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(obj).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+
+
+class TestMintVerify(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_round_trip_each_role(self) -> None:
+        for role in ROLES:
+            self.assertEqual(role, verify(mint(role, _KEY), _KEY))
+
+    def test_gateway_and_cli_are_distinct(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_GATEWAY, verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), _KEY))
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), _KEY))
+
+    def test_wrong_key_rejected(self) -> None:
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), "other-key"))
+
+    def test_tampered_signature_rejected(self) -> None:
+        tok = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY)
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(tok[:-1] + ("A" if tok[-1] != "A" else "B"), _KEY))
+
+    def test_tampered_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
+        header, _payload, sig = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY).split(".")
+        forged = f"{header}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}.{sig}"
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
+
+    def test_alg_none_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # An unsigned "alg: none" token must never verify.
+        tok = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}."
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(tok, _KEY))
+
+    def test_validly_signed_but_wrong_alg_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # Alg-confusion: even a *correctly signed* token whose header claims a
+        # non-HS256 alg must be rejected.
+        from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign  # noqa: PLC0415
+        signing_input = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
+
+    def test_validly_signed_but_undecodable_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # A correct signature over a header that isn't valid base64/JSON still
+        # fails closed rather than raising.
+        from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign  # noqa: PLC0415
+        signing_input = f"!!!not-base64!!!.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
+
+    def test_malformed_tokens_rejected(self) -> None:
+        for bad in ("", "a", "a.b", "a.b.c.d", "not-base64.$$.$$"):
+            self.assertIsNone(verify(bad, _KEY))
+
+    def test_empty_key_never_verifies(self) -> None:
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), ""))
+
+    def test_unknown_role_in_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
+        header, _p, _s = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY).split(".")
+        # Re-sign a token carrying an unknown role — a valid signature but a
+        # role the control plane doesn't recognise must still be rejected.
+        from bot_bottle.control_auth import _sign  # noqa: PLC0415
+        payload = _b64({"role": "root"})
+        signing_input = f"{header}.{payload}"
+        forged = f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}"
+        self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
+
+    def test_mint_rejects_unknown_role(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            mint("root", _KEY)
+
+    def test_mint_rejects_empty_key(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, "")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_docker_test_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Tests for integration-test backend selection helpers."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker
+
+
+class TestSkipUnlessDockerOrFirecracker(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_firecracker_runs_when_docker_tests_are_disabled(self):
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker", "SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS": "1"},
+            clear=True,
+        ):
+            decorated = skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()(type("Case", (), {}))
+
+        self.assertFalse(getattr(decorated, "__unittest_skip__", False))
+
+    def test_non_firecracker_still_skips_when_docker_tests_are_disabled(self):
+        with patch.dict(
+            os.environ,
+            {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "docker", "SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS": "1"},
+            clear=True,
+        ):
+            decorated = skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()(type("Case", (), {}))
+
+        self.assertTrue(getattr(decorated, "__unittest_skip__", False))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_egress_addon_request_flow.py

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (  # noqa: E402
     Route,
     route_to_yaml_dict,
 )
+from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError  # noqa: E402
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -266,7 +267,48 @@ def _config_to_policy(config: Config) -> str:
     }) + "\n"
 
 
-class _StaticResolver:
+class _SuperviseRpcFake:
+    """Mixin adding the control-plane supervise RPCs to a fake resolver, now
+    that the egress data plane queues/polls proposals over RPC instead of
+    opening the DB (issue #469). `supervise_status` is the operator's eventual
+    decision (None models a timeout — poll stays `pending`); `propose_error`
+    models an unreachable orchestrator. `propose_calls` records what was queued
+    so a test can assert the proposal was attributed by the caller's source IP."""
+
+    supervise_status: "str | None" = None
+    propose_error: bool = False
+    poll_error: bool = False
+
+    @property
+    def propose_calls(self) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+        if not hasattr(self, "_propose_calls"):
+            self._propose_calls: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        return self._propose_calls
+
+    def propose_supervise(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, *,
+        tool: str, proposed_file: str, justification: str,
+    ) -> str:
+        del proposed_file, justification
+        self.propose_calls.append(
+            {"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token, "tool": tool}
+        )
+        if self.propose_error:
+            raise PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
+        return "prop-1"
+
+    def poll_supervise(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, object]:
+        del source_ip, identity_token, proposal_id
+        if self.poll_error:
+            raise PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
+        if self.supervise_status is None:
+            return {"status": "pending"}
+        return {"status": self.supervise_status, "notes": "", "final_file": None}
+
+
+class _StaticResolver(_SuperviseRpcFake):
     """Fake orchestrator resolver that serves one Config (+ optional bottle id
     and per-bottle tokens) for every client — the host-test stand-in for a
     bottle's policy now that egress is resolver-only."""
@@ -323,7 +365,7 @@ def _with_client_ip(flow: _Flow, ip: str) -> _Flow:
     return flow
 
 
-class _CtxResolver:
+class _CtxResolver(_SuperviseRpcFake):
     """Fake orchestrator resolver: maps source IP -> bottle id, and grants the
     same allow-list to any attributed bottle (unattributed -> deny)."""
 
@@ -516,70 +558,47 @@ class TestOutboundDlpPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
-def _fake_sv(response_status: str | None) -> types.SimpleNamespace:
-    """Stand-in for the `supervise` module the adapter queues proposals to.
-
-    `response_status` of None models a timeout (read_response never returns a
-    decision); a status string models the operator's eventual answer."""
-    def _new_proposal(**_kw: Any) -> Any:
-        return types.SimpleNamespace(id="prop-1")
-
-    def _sha256_hex(_payload: Any) -> str:
-        return "hash"
-
-    def _noop(*_args: Any) -> None:
-        return None
-
-    def _read_response(_slug: Any, _pid: Any) -> Any:
-        if response_status is None:
-            raise OSError("not written yet")  # forces poll -> timeout
-        return types.SimpleNamespace(status=response_status)
-
-    ns = types.SimpleNamespace()
-    ns.STATUS_APPROVED = "approved"
-    ns.STATUS_MODIFIED = "modified"
-    ns.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW = "egress_token_allow"
-    ns.Proposal = types.SimpleNamespace(new=_new_proposal)
-    ns.sha256_hex = _sha256_hex
-    ns.write_proposal = _noop
-    ns.archive_proposal = _noop
-    ns.read_response = _read_response
-    return ns
-
-
 class TestSuperviseBranch(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _supervised_addon(self) -> EgressAddon:
+    def _supervised_addon(self, status: str | None) -> EgressAddon:
         addon = _addon(Config(routes=(Route(host="api.example.com"),)), slug="test-bottle")
         addon._token_allow_timeout = 0.05
+        cast(Any, addon._resolver).supervise_status = status
         return addon
 
     def test_operator_approval_allows_token_and_forwards(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._supervised_addon()
+        addon = self._supervised_addon("approved")
         flow = _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", _fake_sv("approved")):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         self.assertIsNone(flow.response)  # forwarded after approval
         # Approval lands in the calling bottle's safelist (keyed by slug).
         self.assertIn(_OPENAI_KEY, addon._safe_tokens_for("test-bottle"))
 
     def test_operator_rejection_blocks(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._supervised_addon()
+        addon = self._supervised_addon("rejected")
         flow = _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", _fake_sv("rejected")):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         assert flow.response is not None
         self.assertEqual(403, flow.response.status_code)
         self.assertIn("rejected", flow.response.get_text())
 
     def test_supervise_timeout_blocks(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._supervised_addon()
+        addon = self._supervised_addon(None)  # poll stays pending -> timeout
         flow = _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", _fake_sv(None)):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         assert flow.response is not None
         self.assertEqual(403, flow.response.status_code)
         self.assertIn("timed out", flow.response.get_text())
 
+    def test_poll_error_during_wait_times_out_and_blocks(self) -> None:
+        # A transient orchestrator error on each poll is retried until the
+        # deadline, then fails closed (blocked) — never forwarded unsupervised.
+        addon = self._supervised_addon("approved")
+        cast(Any, addon._resolver).poll_error = True
+        flow = _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
+        assert flow.response is not None
+        self.assertEqual(403, flow.response.status_code)
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Inbound DLP on responses
@@ -772,19 +791,14 @@ class TestRedactSurfaces(unittest.TestCase):
 
 
 class TestSuperviseWriteFailure(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_write_proposal_oserror_blocks(self) -> None:
+    def test_propose_rpc_error_blocks(self) -> None:
+        # An unreachable orchestrator (propose RPC raises) fails closed: the
+        # request is blocked rather than forwarded unsupervised.
         addon = _addon(Config(routes=(Route(host="api.example.com"),)), slug="test-bottle")
         addon._token_allow_timeout = 0.05
+        cast(Any, addon._resolver).propose_error = True
         flow = _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
-
-        fake = _fake_sv("approved")
-
-        def _raise(_p: Any) -> None:
-            raise OSError("disk full")
-
-        fake.write_proposal = _raise
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", fake):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         assert flow.response is not None
         self.assertEqual(403, flow.response.status_code)
 
@@ -844,22 +858,23 @@ class TestSuperviseMultiTenant(unittest.TestCase):
     """Consolidated gateway: supervise proposals + the DLP safelist are keyed
     per bottle, resolved by source IP (PRD 0070)."""
 
-    def _consolidated_addon(self) -> EgressAddon:
+    def _consolidated_addon(self, status: str | None = "approved") -> EgressAddon:
         # Static config is empty; the resolver supplies each bottle's config.
         addon = _addon(Config(routes=()))
-        addon._resolver = cast(Any, _CtxResolver({"10.0.0.1": "bottle-a", "10.0.0.2": "bottle-b"}))
+        resolver = _CtxResolver({"10.0.0.1": "bottle-a", "10.0.0.2": "bottle-b"})
+        resolver.supervise_status = status
+        addon._resolver = cast(Any, resolver)
         addon._token_allow_timeout = 0.05
         return addon
 
     def test_approval_is_scoped_to_the_calling_bottle(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._consolidated_addon()
+        addon = self._consolidated_addon("approved")
         # bottle-a (10.0.0.1) sends the token; the operator approves.
         flow = _with_client_ip(
             _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}")),
             "10.0.0.1",
         )
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", _fake_sv("approved")):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         self.assertIsNone(flow.response)  # forwarded after approval
         # The approval lands ONLY in bottle-a's safelist — never bottle-b's.
         # A global set here would be the cross-tenant leak this slice closes.
@@ -867,22 +882,19 @@ class TestSuperviseMultiTenant(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, addon._safe_tokens_for("bottle-b"))
 
     def test_proposal_is_attributed_to_the_source_ip_bottle(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._consolidated_addon()
-        seen: list[str] = []
-        fake = _fake_sv("approved")
-
-        def _capture(**kw: Any) -> Any:
-            seen.append(kw["bottle_slug"])
-            return types.SimpleNamespace(id="p")
-
-        fake.Proposal = types.SimpleNamespace(new=_capture)
+        addon = self._consolidated_addon("approved")
         flow = _with_client_ip(
             _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}")),
             "10.0.0.2",
         )
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", fake):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
-        self.assertEqual(["bottle-b"], seen)  # proposal keyed by the resolved bottle
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
+        # The addon forwards the caller's source IP to the control plane, which
+        # attributes the proposal server-side by (source_ip, identity_token) —
+        # the addon never asserts a slug. The resolved bottle keys the safelist.
+        calls = cast(Any, addon._resolver).propose_calls
+        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.2"], [c["source_ip"] for c in calls])
+        self.assertIn(_OPENAI_KEY, addon._safe_tokens_for("bottle-b"))
+        self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, addon._safe_tokens_for("bottle-a"))
 
     def test_auth_token_injected_from_resolved_tokens(self) -> None:
         # The bottle's upstream token comes from /resolve (in-memory on the
@@ -925,16 +937,17 @@ class TestSuperviseMultiTenant(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIsNotNone(flow.response)  # blocked — token unset
 
     def test_unattributed_source_ip_cannot_supervise(self) -> None:
-        addon = self._consolidated_addon()
+        addon = self._consolidated_addon("approved")
         # 10.9.9.9 is not in the resolver map -> deny-all config, empty slug.
         flow = _with_client_ip(
             _Flow(_Request(host="api.example.com", method="POST", body=f"k={_OPENAI_KEY}")),
             "10.9.9.9",
         )
-        with patch.object(_ea_mod, "_sv", _fake_sv("approved")):
-            _run_request(addon, flow)
+        _run_request(addon, flow)
         self.assertIsNotNone(flow.response)  # blocked (no route, no supervise)
         self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, addon._safe_tokens_for(""))
+        # Never even reached the queue — no route means no supervise proposal.
+        self.assertEqual([], cast(Any, addon._resolver).propose_calls)
 
 
 class TestMultiTenantInboundDlp(unittest.TestCase):

tests/unit/test_gateway_init.py

@@ -64,6 +64,30 @@ class TestEnvForDaemon(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn("X", self._BASE)
 
 
+class TestControlPlaneEnvScoping(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The control-plane signing key stays with the orchestrator; the pre-minted
+    `gateway` JWT goes to the data-plane daemons (issue #469 review). Scoping
+    them per-process keeps a compromised data-plane daemon from reading the key
+    and minting a higher-privilege token, even in the combined infra container."""
+
+    _BASE = {
+        "PATH": "/usr/bin",
+        "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN": "sk-x",
+        "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT": "gw-jwt",
+    }
+
+    def test_orchestrator_gets_key_not_jwt(self):
+        env = _env_for_daemon("orchestrator", self._BASE)
+        self.assertEqual("sk-x", env["BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN"])
+        self.assertNotIn("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT", env)
+
+    def test_data_plane_daemons_get_jwt_not_key(self):
+        for name in ("egress", "git-gate", "git-http", "supervise"):
+            env = _env_for_daemon(name, self._BASE)
+            self.assertNotIn("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN", env, name)
+            self.assertEqual("gw-jwt", env["BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"], name)
+
+
 class TestSelectedDaemons(unittest.TestCase):
     """Env-var subset filtering. The compose renderer is the source
     of truth for which daemons are wired; the supervisor just

tests/unit/test_git_gate.py

@@ -213,22 +213,25 @@ class TestHookRender(unittest.TestCase):
         # the suppressed findings for human approval.
         self.assertIn("--ignore-gitleaks-allow", hook)
         self.assertIn("--report-format=json", hook)
-        self.assertIn("tool=_sv.TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW", hook)
-        self.assertIn("_sv.write_proposal", hook)
-        self.assertIn("_sv.read_response", hook)
-        self.assertIn("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", hook)
+        # The hook queues + polls over the control-plane RPC — it no longer
+        # opens the DB directly (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
+        self.assertIn("tool=TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW", hook)
+        self.assertIn("propose_supervise", hook)
+        self.assertIn("poll_supervise", hook)
+        self.assertIn("SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP", hook)
+        self.assertIn("SUPERVISE_IDENTITY_TOKEN", hook)
         self.assertIn("supervisor approved # gitleaks:allow", hook)
         self.assertIn("supervisor rejected # gitleaks:allow", hook)
 
     def test_inline_gitleaks_allow_python_imports_work_in_gateway_layout(self):
         hook = git_gate_render_hook()
-        # The gateway image copies supervise.py flat under /app, while
-        # host-side tests import it through the bot_bottle package.
-        # Hooks execute from the bare repo directory, so the embedded
-        # Python must include /app and support both import layouts.
+        # The gateway image copies the package modules flat under /app, while
+        # host-side tests import them through the bot_bottle package. Hooks
+        # execute from the bare repo directory, so the embedded Python must
+        # include /app and support both import layouts.
         self.assertIn('PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}"', hook)
-        self.assertIn("import supervise as _sv", hook)
-        self.assertIn("from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv", hook)
+        self.assertIn("from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver", hook)
+        self.assertIn("from policy_resolver import PolicyResolver", hook)
 
     def test_inline_gitleaks_allow_fails_closed_without_supervisor(self):
         hook = git_gate_render_hook()

tests/unit/test_git_http_backend.py

@@ -112,11 +112,13 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
             ).strip()
             self.assertEqual(head, cloned)
 
-    def test_consolidated_push_stamps_bottle_slug_for_the_hook(self):
-        # In consolidated mode the backend attributes the push by source IP and
-        # stamps SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG=<bottle_id> into the CGI env, so the
-        # gitleaks-allow pre-receive hook queues its proposal under the right
-        # bottle. The hook here just records what it received.
+    def test_consolidated_push_stamps_supervise_attribution_for_the_hook(self):
+        # In consolidated mode the backend attributes the push by (source IP,
+        # identity token) and stamps SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP + SUPERVISE_IDENTITY_TOKEN
+        # into the CGI env, so the gitleaks-allow pre-receive hook can queue its
+        # proposal over the control-plane RPC (which re-resolves the bottle from
+        # exactly that pair — PRD 0070 / issue #469). The hook here just records
+        # the source IP it received.
         from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
 
         bottle_id = "bottleab12"
@@ -130,10 +132,10 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
                 ["git", "-C", str(bare), "config", "http.receivepack", "true"],
                 check=True,
             )
-            capture = root / "slug-capture"
+            capture = root / "source-ip-capture"
             hook = bare / "hooks" / "pre-receive"
             hook.write_text(
-                f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' \"${{SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG:-UNSET}}\" > "
+                f"#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' \"${{SUPERVISE_SOURCE_IP:-UNSET}}\" > "
                 f"{capture}\ncat >/dev/null\nexit 0\n"
             )
             hook.chmod(0o755)
@@ -166,7 +168,7 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
                 ["git", "push", url, "HEAD:refs/heads/main"],
                 cwd=work, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5,
             )
-            self.assertEqual(bottle_id, capture.read_text())
+            self.assertEqual("127.0.0.1", capture.read_text())
 
     def test_post_forwards_git_cgi_headers(self):
         from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_client.py

@@ -7,15 +7,30 @@ import unittest
 import urllib.error
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
+from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, verify
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import (
     OrchestratorClient,
     OrchestratorClientError,
     RegisteredBottle,
+    _host_auth_token,
 )
 
 _URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.urllib.request.urlopen"
 
 
+class TestHostAuthToken(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_mints_a_cli_token_from_the_host_key(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.host_control_plane_token",
+                   return_value="signing-key"):
+            tok = _host_auth_token()
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, verify(tok, "signing-key"))
+
+    def test_returns_empty_when_key_unreadable(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.host_control_plane_token",
+                   side_effect=OSError("no host root")):
+            self.assertEqual("", _host_auth_token())
+
+
 def _resp(status: int, payload: object) -> MagicMock:
     m = MagicMock()
     inner = m.__enter__.return_value

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_control_plane.py

@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@ from contextlib import closing
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest.mock import patch
 
+from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, mint
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import StubBroker
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.control_plane import dispatch, make_server
-from bot_bottle.orchestrator.registry import RegistryStore
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.registry import BottleRecord, RegistryStore
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.service import Orchestrator
 from bot_bottle.store_manager import StoreManager
 from bot_bottle.supervise import (
@@ -285,45 +286,71 @@ class TestServerRoundTrip(unittest.TestCase):
 
 
 class TestControlPlaneAuth(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The per-host control-plane secret (issue #400): every route but /health
-    is a trusted-caller op an agent must not be able to drive just because it
-    can reach the port."""
+    """Role-scoped control-plane tokens (issue #400 / #469 review): every route
+    but /health needs a valid token, and the token's role gates which routes it
+    reaches — a `gateway` data-plane token can't drive the operator routes."""
+
+    _OPERATOR_ROUTES = [
+        ("GET", "/bottles", b""),
+        ("POST", "/bottles", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1"})),
+        ("PUT", "/bottles/x/policy", _body({"policy": "routes: []"})),
+        ("DELETE", "/bottles/x", b""),
+        ("POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": []})),
+        ("POST", "/attribute", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1", "identity_token": "t"})),
+        ("GET", "/supervise/proposals", b""),
+        ("POST", "/supervise/respond",
+         _body({"proposal_id": "p", "bottle_slug": "s", "decision": "a"})),
+    ]
 
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
         self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
         self.orch = _orchestrator(Path(self._tmp.name) / "r.db")
 
-    def test_health_is_public_even_unauthorized(self) -> None:
-        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "GET", "/health", b"", authorized=False)
+    def test_health_is_public_even_unauthenticated(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "GET", "/health", b"", role=None)
         self.assertEqual(200, status)
 
-    def test_unauthorized_denies_every_other_route(self) -> None:
-        for method, path, body in [
-            ("GET", "/bottles", b""),
-            ("POST", "/bottles", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1"})),
-            ("PUT", "/bottles/x/policy", _body({"policy": "routes: []"})),
-            ("DELETE", "/bottles/x", b""),
-            ("POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": []})),
+    def test_unauthenticated_denies_every_other_route(self) -> None:
+        routes = self._OPERATOR_ROUTES + [
             ("POST", "/resolve", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1", "identity_token": "t"})),
-            ("POST", "/attribute", _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.1", "identity_token": "t"})),
-            ("GET", "/supervise/proposals", b""),
-            ("POST", "/supervise/respond", _body({"proposal_id": "p", "bottle_slug": "s", "decision": "approve"})),
-        ]:
-            status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, method, path, body, authorized=False)
-            self.assertEqual(401, status, f"{method} {path} should be 401 unauthorized")
+            ("POST", "/supervise/propose",
+             _body({"source_ip": "1", "tool": "egress-allow", "proposed_file": "x", "justification": "j"})),
+            ("POST", "/supervise/poll", _body({"source_ip": "1", "proposal_id": "p"})),
+        ]
+        for method, path, body in routes:
+            status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, method, path, body, role=None)
+            self.assertEqual(401, status, f"{method} {path} should be 401 unauthenticated")
+
+    def test_gateway_role_denied_on_operator_routes(self) -> None:
+        # A compromised data-plane process holds only a `gateway` token — it must
+        # not reach the operator routes (approve proposals, rewrite policy, …).
+        for method, path, body in self._OPERATOR_ROUTES:
+            status, payload = dispatch(self.orch, method, path, body, role=ROLE_GATEWAY)
+            self.assertEqual(403, status, f"{method} {path} should be 403 for gateway")
+            self.assertIn("insufficient role", str(payload.get("error")))
+
+    def test_gateway_role_allowed_on_data_routes(self) -> None:
+        # The gateway CAN reach its own lookups. Register a bottle so /resolve
+        # returns 200 rather than a 403 — proving the role gate let it through.
+        rec = self.orch.registry.register("10.0.0.9", policy="routes: []", metadata="")
+        status, _ = dispatch(
+            self.orch, "POST", "/resolve",
+            _body({"source_ip": "10.0.0.9", "identity_token": rec.identity_token}),
+            role=ROLE_GATEWAY)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
 
     def test_deny_happens_before_the_registry_is_touched(self) -> None:
-        """An unauthorized DELETE must not tear a bottle down. 401, and the
+        """An unauthenticated DELETE must not tear a bottle down. 401, and the
         bottle is still there."""
         rec = self.orch.registry.register("10.0.0.9", policy="", metadata="")
         status, _ = dispatch(
-            self.orch, "DELETE", f"/bottles/{rec.bottle_id}", b"", authorized=False)
+            self.orch, "DELETE", f"/bottles/{rec.bottle_id}", b"", role=None)
         self.assertEqual(401, status)
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.orch.registry.get(rec.bottle_id))
 
-    def _server_with_secret(self, secret: str):
-        with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN": secret}):
+    def _server_with_key(self, signing_key: str):
+        with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN": signing_key}):
             server = make_server(self.orch, "127.0.0.1", 0)
         self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
         threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
@@ -340,25 +367,29 @@ class TestControlPlaneAuth(unittest.TestCase):
         except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
             return e.code
 
-    def test_configured_server_enforces_the_header_over_http(self) -> None:
-        base = self._server_with_secret("s3cret-admin")
+    def test_configured_server_enforces_roles_over_http(self) -> None:
+        key = "test-key"
+        base = self._server_with_key(key)
+        gateway_tok = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, key)
+        cli_tok = mint(ROLE_CLI, key)
         # /health is public — no header needed.
         self.assertEqual(200, self._status(f"{base}/health"))
-        # /bottles requires the secret.
+        # /bottles (operator) needs a valid cli token.
         self.assertEqual(401, self._status(f"{base}/bottles"))
         self.assertEqual(401, self._status(f"{base}/bottles", header="wrong"))
-        self.assertEqual(200, self._status(f"{base}/bottles", header="s3cret-admin"))
+        self.assertEqual(403, self._status(f"{base}/bottles", header=gateway_tok))
+        self.assertEqual(200, self._status(f"{base}/bottles", header=cli_tok))
 
     def test_unconfigured_server_runs_open(self) -> None:
-        """No secret set (tests / nft-protected Firecracker): open mode, so the
-        existing round-trip and unit behavior are unchanged."""
+        """No signing key set (tests / nft-protected Firecracker): open mode
+        grants full cli access, so existing round-trip behavior is unchanged."""
         with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
             import os
             os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN", None)
             server = make_server(self.orch, "127.0.0.1", 0)
         self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
-        self.assertTrue(server.is_authorized(""))
-        self.assertTrue(server.is_authorized("anything"))
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, server.role_for(""))
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, server.role_for("anything"))
 
 
 class TestDispatchSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -426,6 +457,149 @@ class TestDispatchSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("no such proposal", str(payload["error"]))
 
 
+class TestDispatchSuperviseAgentRpc(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The agent half — `/supervise/propose` + `/supervise/poll` — attributed by
+    (source_ip, identity_token) like /resolve, so a bottle can only ever queue
+    or read its own proposals (PRD 0070 / issue #469)."""
+
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        root = Path(self._tmp.name)
+        db = root / "db" / "bot-bottle.db"
+        db.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+        self._env = patch.dict("os.environ", {
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT": str(root),
+            "SUPERVISE_DB_PATH": str(db),
+        })
+        self._env.start()
+        self.store = RegistryStore(db)
+        self.store.migrate()
+        StoreManager(db).migrate()
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        self.orch = Orchestrator(self.store, StubBroker(secret), secret)
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self._env.stop()
+        self._tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _register(self, source_ip: str = "10.243.0.9", slug: str = "demo"):
+        return self.store.register(
+            source_ip, metadata=json.dumps({"slug": slug}), policy="routes: []\n")
+
+    def _propose(self, rec: BottleRecord, proposed: str = "routes:\n  - host: g.com\n"):
+        return dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/propose", _body({
+            "source_ip": rec.source_ip, "identity_token": rec.identity_token,
+            "tool": TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "proposed_file": proposed, "justification": "need it",
+        }))
+
+    def _poll(self, rec: BottleRecord, proposal_id: str):
+        return dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/poll", _body({
+            "source_ip": rec.source_ip, "identity_token": rec.identity_token,
+            "proposal_id": proposal_id,
+        }))
+
+    def test_propose_queues_under_the_resolved_bottle(self) -> None:
+        rec = self._register()
+        status, payload = self._propose(rec)
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        pid = payload["proposal_id"]
+        assert isinstance(pid, str) and pid
+        _, listing = dispatch(self.orch, "GET", "/supervise/proposals", b"")
+        proposals = listing["proposals"]
+        assert isinstance(proposals, list)
+        self.assertEqual(pid, proposals[0]["id"])
+        # Queued under the orchestrator-resolved bottle id, never a caller slug.
+        self.assertEqual(rec.bottle_id, proposals[0]["bottle_slug"])
+
+    def test_propose_unattributed_is_403(self) -> None:
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/propose", _body({
+            "source_ip": "10.9.9.9", "identity_token": "wrong",
+            "tool": TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "proposed_file": "x\n", "justification": "j",
+        }))
+        self.assertEqual(403, status)
+        self.assertIn("unattributed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+    def test_propose_rejects_unknown_tool(self) -> None:
+        rec = self._register()
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/propose", _body({
+            "source_ip": rec.source_ip, "identity_token": rec.identity_token,
+            "tool": "not-a-tool", "proposed_file": "x\n", "justification": "j",
+        }))
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_poll_pending_then_decided_then_archived(self) -> None:
+        rec = self._register()
+        _, proposed = self._propose(rec)
+        pid = proposed["proposal_id"]
+        assert isinstance(pid, str)
+
+        status, poll = self._poll(rec, pid)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("pending", poll["status"])
+
+        # Operator decides server-side.
+        dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/respond", _body({
+            "proposal_id": pid, "bottle_slug": rec.bottle_id,
+            "decision": "approve", "notes": "ok",
+        }))
+        _, decided = self._poll(rec, pid)
+        self.assertEqual("approved", decided["status"])
+        self.assertEqual("ok", decided["notes"])
+
+        # The decided poll archived it: gone from pending, and a re-poll is
+        # 'unknown' rather than replaying the decision forever.
+        _, listing = dispatch(self.orch, "GET", "/supervise/proposals", b"")
+        self.assertEqual([], listing["proposals"])
+        _, again = self._poll(rec, pid)
+        self.assertEqual("unknown", again["status"])
+
+    def test_poll_cannot_read_another_bottles_proposal(self) -> None:
+        rec_a = self._register("10.0.0.1", "a")
+        rec_b = self._register("10.0.0.2", "b")
+        _, proposed = self._propose(rec_a)
+        pid = proposed["proposal_id"]
+        assert isinstance(pid, str)
+        # b polls a's proposal id: scoped to b's own queue → never a's response.
+        status, poll = self._poll(rec_b, pid)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("unknown", poll["status"])
+
+    # --- request validation (400) + fail-closed (403) ----------------------
+
+    def test_propose_invalid_json_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/propose", b"{not json")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_propose_missing_fields_are_400(self) -> None:
+        rec = self._register()
+        base = {
+            "source_ip": rec.source_ip, "identity_token": rec.identity_token,
+            "tool": TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "proposed_file": "routes:\n", "justification": "j",
+        }
+        for drop in ("source_ip", "proposed_file", "justification"):
+            body = {k: v for k, v in base.items() if k != drop}
+            status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/propose", _body(body))
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, drop)
+
+    def test_poll_invalid_json_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/poll", b"{not json")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_poll_missing_fields_are_400(self) -> None:
+        rec = self._register()
+        for body in ({"identity_token": rec.identity_token, "proposal_id": "p"},
+                     {"source_ip": rec.source_ip, "identity_token": rec.identity_token}):
+            status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/poll", _body(body))
+            self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_poll_unattributed_is_403(self) -> None:
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/supervise/poll", _body({
+            "source_ip": "10.9.9.9", "identity_token": "wrong", "proposal_id": "p",
+        }))
+        self.assertEqual(403, status)
+        self.assertIn("unattributed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()
 

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_gateway.py

@@ -124,13 +124,11 @@ class TestDockerGateway(unittest.TestCase):
         src = ca_mounts[0].rsplit(":", 1)[0]
         self.assertTrue(src.endswith("/" + GATEWAY_CA_DIRNAME), src)
         self.assertTrue(Path(src).is_absolute(), src)
-        # Shares the ONE host DB: the supervise daemon queues into the same
-        # file the orchestrator + operator (over HTTP) use.
-        self.assertTrue(any(
-            a.startswith("SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=") and a.endswith("/run/supervise/bot-bottle.db")
-            for a in runs[0]))
-        self.assertTrue(any(
-            a.endswith(":/run/supervise") for a in runs[0]))
+        # No DB handle on the data plane: the supervise queue is reached over
+        # the control-plane RPC, so the gateway container carries neither the
+        # DB bind-mount nor SUPERVISE_DB_PATH (PRD 0070 / issue #469).
+        self.assertFalse(any(a.startswith("SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=") for a in runs[0]))
+        self.assertFalse(any(a.endswith(":/run/supervise") for a in runs[0]))
         # Data plane resolves policy against the orchestrator control plane.
         self.assertIn(f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL={_ORCH_URL}", runs[0])
 

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_service.py

@@ -323,6 +323,43 @@ class TestOrchestratorSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertFalse(ok)
         self.assertIn("no longer registered", err)
 
+    # --- agent half: queue + poll (issue #469) -----------------------------
+
+    def test_queue_proposal_then_poll_pending(self) -> None:
+        bottle_id = self._register("demo", "routes: []\n")
+        pid = self.orch.supervise_queue_proposal(
+            bottle_id, tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+            proposed_file="routes:\n  - host: google.com\n", justification="need it")
+        # Visible to the operator, keyed by the bottle id.
+        pending = self.orch.supervise_pending()
+        self.assertEqual([pid], [p["id"] for p in pending])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {"status": "pending"}, self.orch.supervise_poll_response(bottle_id, pid))
+
+    def test_poll_returns_decision_and_archives(self) -> None:
+        bottle_id = self._register("demo", "routes: []\n")
+        pid = self.orch.supervise_queue_proposal(
+            bottle_id, tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+            proposed_file="routes:\n  - host: google.com\n", justification="need it")
+        self.orch.supervise_respond(
+            pid, bottle_slug=bottle_id, decision="approve", notes="ok")
+        decided = self.orch.supervise_poll_response(bottle_id, pid)
+        self.assertEqual("approved", decided["status"])
+        self.assertEqual("ok", decided["notes"])
+        # Archived on read → gone from pending, and a re-poll is 'unknown'.
+        self.assertEqual([], self.orch.supervise_pending())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {"status": "unknown"}, self.orch.supervise_poll_response(bottle_id, pid))
+
+    def test_poll_unknown_for_other_bottle(self) -> None:
+        bottle_id = self._register("demo", "routes: []\n")
+        pid = self.orch.supervise_queue_proposal(
+            bottle_id, tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+            proposed_file="routes:\n  - host: google.com\n", justification="j")
+        # A different bottle id can't read demo's proposal (scoped by queue key).
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {"status": "unknown"}, self.orch.supervise_poll_response("other-bottle", pid))
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_policy_resolver.py

@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ import unittest
 import urllib.error
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
-from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
+from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import (
+    CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER,
+    CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
+    PolicyResolveError,
+    PolicyResolver,
+    _control_auth_headers,
+)
 
 _URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.policy_resolver.urllib.request.urlopen"
 
@@ -23,6 +29,18 @@ def _http_error(code: int) -> urllib.error.HTTPError:
     return urllib.error.HTTPError("http://x/resolve", code, "err", {}, None)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
 
 
+class TestControlAuthHeaders(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_sends_the_gateway_jwt_when_configured(self) -> None:
+        with patch.dict("os.environ", {CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV: "gateway.jwt.tok"}):
+            self.assertEqual({CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: "gateway.jwt.tok"}, _control_auth_headers())
+
+    def test_sends_nothing_when_unset(self) -> None:
+        import os
+        with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
+            os.environ.pop(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, None)
+            self.assertEqual({}, _control_auth_headers())
+
+
 class TestPolicyResolver(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.r = PolicyResolver("http://orch:8080")
@@ -106,6 +124,59 @@ class TestPolicyResolver(unittest.TestCase):
             with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
                 self.r.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id("10.243.0.1")
 
+    # --- supervise agent RPCs (issue #469) ---------------------------------
+
+    def test_propose_supervise_returns_id_and_posts_payload(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"proposal_id": "p-7"})) as m:
+            pid = self.r.propose_supervise(
+                "10.243.0.7", "the-token",
+                tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="routes:\n", justification="j",
+            )
+        self.assertEqual("p-7", pid)
+        req = m.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertTrue(req.full_url.endswith("/supervise/propose"))
+        sent = json.loads(req.data)
+        self.assertEqual("10.243.0.7", sent["source_ip"])
+        self.assertEqual("the-token", sent["identity_token"])
+        self.assertEqual("egress-allow", sent["tool"])
+        self.assertEqual("routes:\n", sent["proposed_file"])
+
+    def test_propose_supervise_unattributed_is_none(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
+            self.assertIsNone(self.r.propose_supervise(
+                "10.9.9.9", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j"))
+
+    def test_propose_supervise_missing_id_is_none(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({})):
+            self.assertIsNone(self.r.propose_supervise(
+                "10.243.0.1", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j"))
+
+    def test_propose_supervise_unreachable_raises(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
+            with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
+                self.r.propose_supervise(
+                    "10.243.0.1", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j")
+
+    def test_poll_supervise_returns_status(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(
+            {"status": "approved", "notes": "ok", "final_file": None})
+        ) as m:
+            result = self.r.poll_supervise("10.243.0.7", "tok", "p-7")
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("approved", result["status"])
+        req = m.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertTrue(req.full_url.endswith("/supervise/poll"))
+        self.assertEqual("p-7", json.loads(req.data)["proposal_id"])
+
+    def test_poll_supervise_unattributed_is_none(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
+            self.assertIsNone(self.r.poll_supervise("10.9.9.9", "t", "p-7"))
+
+    def test_poll_supervise_unreachable_raises(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
+            with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
+                self.r.poll_supervise("10.243.0.1", "t", "p-7")
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_supervise_server.py

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
-"""Unit: supervise daemon MCP server (PRD 0013)."""
+"""Unit: supervise daemon MCP server (PRD 0013, PRD 0070).
+
+The daemon no longer opens bot-bottle.db: it queues proposals and polls for
+their responses over the control-plane RPC (issue #469). These tests drive the
+handlers with `_FakeSuperviseResolver`, an in-process stand-in for
+`PolicyResolver.propose_supervise` / `poll_supervise` backed by the real queue
+store — so the operator-response and archive contracts are still exercised
+end-to-end, just through the RPC seam instead of a direct file handle."""
 
 import http.client
 import json
@@ -8,7 +15,6 @@ import time
 import types
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import patch
 
 from tests.unit import use_bottle_root
 
@@ -44,6 +50,95 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise_server import (
     validate_proposed_file,
 )
 
+# Fixed caller identity for the handler tests. The control plane attributes by
+# (source_ip, identity_token); the fake resolver ignores them and answers for a
+# fixed bottle, since attribution itself is covered by the orchestrator tests.
+_SRC = "10.0.0.7"
+_TOK = "tok"
+
+
+class _FakeSuperviseResolver:
+    """Stand-in for `PolicyResolver`'s supervise RPCs, backed by the real queue
+    store (as the orchestrator is). `bottle_id=None` models an unattributed
+    caller (a clean 403 → None); `raises=True` models an unreachable
+    orchestrator (`PolicyResolveError`)."""
+
+    def __init__(
+        self, bottle_id: str | None = "dev", raises: bool = False, policy: str = "",
+        poll_raises: bool = False, poll_none: bool = False,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.bottle_id = bottle_id
+        self.raises = raises
+        self._policy = policy
+        # propose succeeds, but the later poll fails — models an orchestrator
+        # that becomes unreachable (poll_raises) or unattributes mid-flight
+        # (poll_none) after the proposal was queued.
+        self.poll_raises = poll_raises
+        self.poll_none = poll_none
+
+    def propose_supervise(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, *,
+        tool: str, proposed_file: str, justification: str,
+    ) -> str | None:
+        del source_ip, identity_token
+        if self.raises:
+            raise supervise_server.PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
+        if self.bottle_id is None:
+            return None
+        proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
+            bottle_slug=self.bottle_id, tool=tool, proposed_file=proposed_file,
+            justification=justification, current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(proposed_file),
+        )
+        _sv.write_proposal(proposal)
+        return proposal.id
+
+    def poll_supervise(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
+    ) -> dict[str, object] | None:
+        del source_ip, identity_token
+        if self.raises or self.poll_raises:
+            raise supervise_server.PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
+        if self.bottle_id is None or self.poll_none:
+            return None
+        try:
+            response = _sv.read_response(self.bottle_id, proposal_id)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            try:
+                _sv.read_proposal(self.bottle_id, proposal_id)
+            except FileNotFoundError:
+                return {"status": _sv.POLL_STATUS_UNKNOWN}
+            return {"status": _sv.POLL_STATUS_PENDING}
+        _sv.archive_proposal(self.bottle_id, proposal_id)
+        return {
+            "status": response.status, "notes": response.notes,
+            "final_file": response.final_file,
+        }
+
+    # Used by list-egress-routes (`_resolved_routes_payload`), unchanged path.
+    def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
+        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
+    ) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict[str, str]]:
+        del source_ip, identity_token
+        if self.raises:
+            raise supervise_server.PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
+        return self._policy, self.bottle_id, {}
+
+
+def _tools_call(
+    resolver: object, params: dict[str, object],
+    config: "ServerConfig | None" = None,
+) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return handle_tools_call(
+        params, config or ServerConfig(),
+        resolver=resolver, source_ip=_SRC, identity_token=_TOK,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+
+def _check(resolver: object, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
+    return handle_check_proposal(
+        params, resolver=resolver, source_ip=_SRC, identity_token=_TOK,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
 
 # --- Validation ------------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -111,32 +206,35 @@ class TestRpcErrorTaxonomy(unittest.TestCase):
             validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "routes: nope\n")
 
     def test_unknown_tool_in_tools_call_is_client_error(self):
-        config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev")
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call({"name": "no-such-tool", "arguments": {}}, config)
+            _tools_call(_FakeSuperviseResolver(), {"name": "no-such-tool", "arguments": {}})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
 
-class TestRpcInternalErrorOnIoFailure(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_write_proposal_os_error_raises_internal(self):
-        config = ServerConfig(
-            bottle_slug="dev",
-        )
-        with patch.object(_sv, "write_proposal", side_effect=OSError("disk full")), \
-                self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "x",
-                    },
-                },
-                config,
-            )
+class TestRpcInternalErrorOnRpcFailure(unittest.TestCase):
+    """A queue RPC that can't reach the orchestrator (or returns unattributed)
+    surfaces as ERR_INTERNAL — the daemon fails closed rather than leaking the
+    cause to the agent."""
+
+    _ARGS: dict[str, object] = {
+        "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+        "arguments": {
+            "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+            "justification": "x",
+        },
+    }
+
+    def test_unreachable_orchestrator_raises_internal(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _tools_call(_FakeSuperviseResolver(raises=True), self._ARGS)
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
         self.assertIsNotNone(cm.exception.__cause__)
 
+    def test_unattributed_source_raises_internal(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _tools_call(_FakeSuperviseResolver(bottle_id=None), self._ARGS)
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
+
 
 # --- JSON-RPC parsing ------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -265,8 +363,8 @@ class TestHandleToolsList(unittest.TestCase):
 class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):
         self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="supervise-server-test.")
-        self._home_patch = self._patch_home(Path(self._tmp.name))
-        self.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev")
+        self._home_patch = use_bottle_root(Path(self._tmp.name) / ".bot-bottle")
+        self.resolver = _FakeSuperviseResolver("dev")
         _qs.QueueStore("dev").migrate()
         _as.AuditStore().migrate()
 
@@ -274,12 +372,9 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
         self._home_patch()
         self._tmp.cleanup()
 
-    def _patch_home(self, fake_home: Path):
-        return use_bottle_root(fake_home / ".bot-bottle")
-
     def _respond_when_proposal_appears(self, status: str, notes: str = "") -> threading.Thread:
         """Background thread: poll the queue for a fresh proposal, write a
-        matching response. Returns the thread so the test can join it."""
+        matching response — the operator half, out of band."""
         def runner():
             for _ in range(200):
                 pending = _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")
@@ -298,16 +393,13 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_call_round_trips_through_queue(self):
         responder = self._respond_when_proposal_appears(_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="lgtm")
         try:
-            result = handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "need example.com",
-                    },
+            result = _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
+                "arguments": {
+                    "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+                    "justification": "need example.com",
                 },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            })
         finally:
             responder.join()
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
@@ -318,16 +410,13 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_allow_round_trips_through_queue(self):
         responder = self._respond_when_proposal_appears(_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="ok")
         try:
-            result = handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "need example.com",
-                    },
+            result = _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "arguments": {
+                    "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+                    "justification": "need example.com",
                 },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            })
         finally:
             responder.join()
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
@@ -338,94 +427,70 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_rejected_response_sets_isError(self):
         responder = self._respond_when_proposal_appears(_sv.STATUS_REJECTED, notes="nope")
         try:
-            result = handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "needed for tests",
-                    },
+            result = _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "arguments": {
+                    "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+                    "justification": "needed for tests",
                 },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            })
         finally:
             responder.join()
         self.assertTrue(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
 
     def test_invalid_tool_name_raises(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {"name": "not-a-tool", "arguments": {}},
-                self.config,
-            )
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {"name": "not-a-tool", "arguments": {}})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
     def test_missing_justification_raises(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError):
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {"routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n"},
-                },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "arguments": {"routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n"},
+            })
 
     def test_missing_name_raises(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call({"arguments": {}}, self.config)
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {"arguments": {}})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
     def test_arguments_must_be_object(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": [],
-                },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "arguments": []})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
         self.assertIn("must be an object", cm.exception.message)
 
     def test_capability_block_call_raises_unknown_tool(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": "capability-block",
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
-                        "justification": "need git",
-                    },
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": "capability-block",
+                "arguments": {
+                    "dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
+                    "justification": "need git",
                 },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            })
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
         self.assertIn("unknown tool", cm.exception.message)
 
     def test_archives_proposal_after_response(self):
         responder = self._respond_when_proposal_appears(_sv.STATUS_APPROVED)
         try:
-            handle_tools_call(
-                {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "x",
-                    },
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "arguments": {
+                    "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+                    "justification": "x",
                 },
-                self.config,
-            )
+            })
         finally:
             responder.join()
-        # No pending proposals left after archive.
+        # No pending proposals left after the decided poll archives it.
         self.assertEqual([], _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev"))
 
     def test_pending_response_times_out_without_archive(self):
-        config = ServerConfig(
-            bottle_slug="dev",
-            response_timeout_seconds=0.05,
-        )
-        result = handle_tools_call(
+        result = _tools_call(
+            self.resolver,
             {
                 "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
                 "arguments": {
@@ -433,15 +498,33 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
                     "justification": "need egress",
                 },
             },
-            config,
+            ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
         )
-
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
         text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
         self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
         self.assertIn("proposal remains queued", text)
         self.assertEqual(1, len(_sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")))
 
+    _ALLOW: dict[str, object] = {
+        "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+        "arguments": {"routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n", "justification": "x"},
+    }
+
+    def test_poll_unreachable_after_queue_raises_internal(self):
+        # Proposal queues, then the orchestrator becomes unreachable on poll.
+        self.resolver.poll_raises = True
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, self._ALLOW, ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=5))
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
+
+    def test_poll_unattributed_after_queue_raises_internal(self):
+        # Proposal queues, then poll comes back unattributed (fail-closed).
+        self.resolver.poll_none = True
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _tools_call(self.resolver, self._ALLOW, ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=5))
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
+
 
 class TestResponseTimeoutEnv(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_unset_uses_default(self):
@@ -510,7 +593,7 @@ class TestHttpEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
         self.port = s.getsockname()[1]
         s.close()
         self.server = MCPServer(("127.0.0.1", self.port), MCPHandler)
-        self.server.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev")
+        self.server.config = ServerConfig()
         self.thread = threading.Thread(
             target=self.server.serve_forever, daemon=True,
         )
@@ -552,23 +635,21 @@ class TestHttpEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         self.assertEqual(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, result["error"]["code"])  # type: ignore[index]
 
-    def test_internal_error_returns_err_internal_over_http(self):
-        with patch.object(
-            supervise_server._sv, "write_proposal",
-            side_effect=OSError("disk full"),
-        ):
-            result = self._post_jsonrpc({
-                "jsonrpc": "2.0",
-                "id": 99,
-                "method": "tools/call",
-                "params": {
-                    "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                    "arguments": {
-                        "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
-                        "justification": "x",
-                    },
+    def test_no_resolver_fails_closed_over_http(self):
+        # The test server has no policy_resolver wired, so a proposal tools/call
+        # fails closed with ERR_INTERNAL rather than queuing anything.
+        result = self._post_jsonrpc({
+            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+            "id": 99,
+            "method": "tools/call",
+            "params": {
+                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "arguments": {
+                    "routes_yaml": "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+                    "justification": "x",
                 },
-            })
+            },
+        })
         self.assertIn("error", result)
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, result["error"]["code"])  # type: ignore[index]
 
@@ -583,72 +664,23 @@ class TestHttpEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
             conn.close()
 
 
-class _FakeResolver:
-    def __init__(
-        self,
-        bottle_id: str | None = None,
-        raises: bool = False,
-        policy: str = "",
-    ) -> None:
-        self._bottle_id = bottle_id
-        self._raises = raises
-        self._policy = policy
-        self.calls: list[str] = []
-
-    def resolve_bottle_id(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
-        del identity_token
-        self.calls.append(source_ip)
-        if self._raises:
-            # Raise the exact class supervise_server catches (it imports
-            # policy_resolver flat inside the bundle, package-side in tests).
-            raise supervise_server.PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
-        return self._bottle_id
-
-    def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
-        self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
-    ) -> "tuple[str, str | None, dict[str, str]]":
-        del identity_token
-        self.calls.append(source_ip)
-        if self._raises:
-            raise supervise_server.PolicyResolveError("orchestrator down")
-        return self._policy, self._bottle_id, {}
-
-
 def _handler(resolver: object) -> MCPHandler:
     """A bare MCPHandler wired with a server (carrying the resolver) and a
-    client address, enough to exercise `_attributed_config` off-socket."""
+    client address, enough to exercise the resolver-backed paths off-socket."""
     h: MCPHandler = MCPHandler.__new__(MCPHandler)
     h.server = types.SimpleNamespace(policy_resolver=resolver)  # type: ignore[assignment]
     h.client_address = ("10.0.0.7", 4321)
+    h.headers = {}  # type: ignore[assignment]
     return h
 
 
-class TestAttributedConfig(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Each proposal is attributed to the calling bottle by source IP (PRD
-    0070); a server without a resolver fails closed rather than queuing under an
-    unattributed slug."""
+class TestResolverFailClosed(unittest.TestCase):
+    """A dispatch without a resolver is a misconfiguration, not a tenancy mode
+    — fail closed rather than queue (or list) anything (PRD 0070)."""
 
-    def test_missing_resolver_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+    def test_missing_resolver_raises(self) -> None:
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError):
-            _handler(None)._attributed_config(ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev"))
-
-    def test_consolidated_binds_source_ip_bottle(self) -> None:
-        r = _FakeResolver(bottle_id="bottle-x")
-        cfg = _handler(r)._attributed_config(ServerConfig(bottle_slug="ignored"))
-        self.assertEqual("bottle-x", cfg.bottle_slug)  # resolved slug wins
-        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.7"], r.calls)
-
-    def test_unattributed_source_fails_closed(self) -> None:
-        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError):
-            _handler(_FakeResolver(bottle_id=None))._attributed_config(
-                ServerConfig(bottle_slug="x")
-            )
-
-    def test_resolver_error_fails_closed(self) -> None:
-        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError):
-            _handler(_FakeResolver(raises=True))._attributed_config(
-                ServerConfig(bottle_slug="x")
-            )
+            _handler(None)._resolver_or_fail()
 
 
 class TestResolvedRoutesPayload(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -664,7 +696,7 @@ class TestResolvedRoutesPayload(unittest.TestCase):
             "  - host: www.google.com\n"
         )
         payload = _handler(
-            _FakeResolver(bottle_id="b1", policy=policy)
+            _FakeSuperviseResolver(bottle_id="b1", policy=policy)
         )._resolved_routes_payload()
         assert payload is not None
         self.assertFalse(payload["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
@@ -676,7 +708,7 @@ class TestResolvedRoutesPayload(unittest.TestCase):
         # resolve_client_context swallows resolver errors → deny-all (empty),
         # never another bottle's routes.
         payload = _handler(
-            _FakeResolver(raises=True)
+            _FakeSuperviseResolver(raises=True)
         )._resolved_routes_payload()
         assert payload is not None
         data = json.loads(payload["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
@@ -698,7 +730,7 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):
         self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="supervise-nonblock-test.")
         self._home_patch = use_bottle_root(Path(self._tmp.name) / ".bot-bottle")
-        self.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev")
+        self.resolver = _FakeSuperviseResolver("dev")
         _qs.QueueStore("dev").migrate()
         _as.AuditStore().migrate()
 
@@ -717,9 +749,6 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
         _sv.write_proposal(p)
         return p
 
-    def _check(self, proposal_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {"proposal_id": proposal_id}}, self.config)
-
     # --- pending response carries the id ---
 
     def test_pending_text_includes_id_and_pointer(self):
@@ -730,12 +759,13 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
 
     def test_tools_call_timeout_returns_pending_with_id_and_stays_queued(self):
         # No responder → the grace window expires → pending, not blocked forever.
-        result = handle_tools_call(
+        result = _tools_call(
+            self.resolver,
             {
                 "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
                 "arguments": {"routes_yaml": self._ROUTES, "justification": "x"},
             },
-            ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
+            ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
         )
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
         text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
@@ -749,7 +779,7 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_check_returns_approved_and_archives(self):
         p = self._seed_proposal()
         _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=p.id, status=_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="ok"))
-        result = self._check(p.id)
+        result = _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": p.id}})
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])
         text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
         self.assertIn("status: approved", text)
@@ -760,13 +790,13 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_check_rejected_sets_isError(self):
         p = self._seed_proposal()
         _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=p.id, status=_sv.STATUS_REJECTED, notes="no"))
-        result = self._check(p.id)
+        result = _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": p.id}})
         self.assertTrue(result["isError"])
         self.assertIn("status: rejected", result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
 
     def test_check_pending_when_no_decision_yet(self):
         p = self._seed_proposal()
-        result = self._check(p.id)
+        result = _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": p.id}})
         self.assertFalse(result["isError"])
         text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
         self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
@@ -774,40 +804,53 @@ class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(1, len(_sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")))  # not archived
 
     def test_check_unknown_id_is_error(self):
-        result = self._check("no-such-proposal")
+        result = _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": "no-such-proposal"}})
         self.assertTrue(result["isError"])
         self.assertIn("status: unknown", result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
 
+    def test_check_poll_unreachable_raises_internal(self):
+        self.resolver.poll_raises = True
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": "p"}})
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
+
+    def test_check_poll_unattributed_raises_internal(self):
+        self.resolver.poll_none = True
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
+            _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": "p"}})
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
+
     def test_check_missing_id_raises(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {}}, self.config)
+            _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {}})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
     def test_check_empty_id_raises(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {"proposal_id": "   "}}, self.config)
+            _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": "   "}})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
     def test_check_arguments_must_be_object(self):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": []}, self.config)
+            _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": []})
         self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
 
     def test_full_nonblocking_round_trip(self):
         # 1. tools/call times out → pending with id
-        result = handle_tools_call(
+        result = _tools_call(
+            self.resolver,
             {
                 "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
                 "arguments": {"routes_yaml": self._ROUTES, "justification": "x"},
             },
-            ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
+            ServerConfig(response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
         )
         pid = _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")[0].id
         self.assertIn(pid, result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
         # 2. operator decides out-of-band
         _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=pid, status=_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="ok"))
         # 3. agent resumes by polling — no re-proposing
-        poll = self._check(pid)
+        poll = _check(self.resolver, {"arguments": {"proposal_id": pid}})
         self.assertFalse(poll["isError"])
         self.assertIn("status: approved", poll["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
         self.assertEqual([], _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev"))  # resolved + archived