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bot-bottle/tests/unit/test_policy_resolver.py
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feat(control-plane): role-scoped signed tokens so the gateway can't drive operator routes
Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret
that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a
supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) —
the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller.

Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens
(compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency):

  * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway`
    (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher).
  * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch`
    gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/
    {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated,
    403 wrong role).
  * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into
    `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key.
  * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the
    gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra
    container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key.

Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s);
Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants
full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 05:22:56 +00:00

183 lines
8.1 KiB
Python

"""Unit tests for the gateway-side PolicyResolver (PRD 0070). HTTP mocked."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import unittest
import urllib.error
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import (
CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER,
CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
PolicyResolveError,
PolicyResolver,
_control_auth_headers,
)
_URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.policy_resolver.urllib.request.urlopen"
def _resp(payload: object) -> MagicMock:
"""A urlopen() return value: a context manager whose read() yields JSON."""
m = MagicMock()
m.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode()
return m
def _http_error(code: int) -> urllib.error.HTTPError:
return urllib.error.HTTPError("http://x/resolve", code, "err", {}, None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
class TestControlAuthHeaders(unittest.TestCase):
def test_sends_the_gateway_jwt_when_configured(self) -> None:
with patch.dict("os.environ", {CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV: "gateway.jwt.tok"}):
self.assertEqual({CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: "gateway.jwt.tok"}, _control_auth_headers())
def test_sends_nothing_when_unset(self) -> None:
import os
with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
os.environ.pop(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, None)
self.assertEqual({}, _control_auth_headers())
class TestPolicyResolver(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.r = PolicyResolver("http://orch:8080")
def test_resolve_returns_policy(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"bottle_id": "b1", "policy": "P"})):
self.assertEqual("P", self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok"))
def test_resolve_always_fetches_fresh(self) -> None:
# No cache — every resolve hits the orchestrator so revocations /
# policy changes are honored immediately.
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"policy": "P"})) as m:
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok")
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok")
self.assertEqual(2, m.call_count)
def test_unattributed_403_is_none_fail_closed(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.resolve("10.243.0.9", "tok"))
def test_other_http_error_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(500)):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok")
def test_unreachable_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok")
def test_missing_policy_field_is_empty(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"bottle_id": "b1"})):
self.assertEqual("", self.r.resolve("10.243.0.1", "tok"))
def test_posts_source_ip_and_token(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"policy": "P"})) as m:
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.7", "the-token")
req = m.call_args.args[0]
self.assertTrue(req.full_url.endswith("/resolve"))
sent = json.loads(req.data)
self.assertEqual("10.243.0.7", sent["source_ip"])
self.assertEqual("the-token", sent["identity_token"])
def test_resolve_without_token_sends_empty(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"policy": "P"})) as m:
self.r.resolve("10.243.0.7") # token optional
self.assertEqual("", json.loads(m.call_args.args[0].data)["identity_token"])
def test_resolve_bottle_id_returns_id(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"bottle_id": "b1", "policy": "P"})):
self.assertEqual("b1", self.r.resolve_bottle_id("10.243.0.1", "tok"))
def test_resolve_bottle_id_403_is_none_fail_closed(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.resolve_bottle_id("10.243.0.9", "tok"))
def test_resolve_bottle_id_missing_field_is_none(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"policy": "P"})):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.resolve_bottle_id("10.243.0.1", "tok"))
def test_resolve_bottle_id_error_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(500)):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.resolve_bottle_id("10.243.0.1", "tok")
def test_resolve_policy_and_bottle_id_one_call(self) -> None:
payload = {"bottle_id": "b1", "policy": "P", "tokens": {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "s"}}
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(payload)) as m:
self.assertEqual(
("P", "b1", {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "s"}),
self.r.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id("10.243.0.1", "t"),
)
self.assertEqual(1, m.call_count) # policy + id + tokens from a single /resolve
def test_resolve_policy_and_bottle_id_403_is_none_none_empty(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
self.assertEqual((None, None, {}), self.r.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id("10.243.0.9"))
def test_resolve_policy_and_bottle_id_error_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id("10.243.0.1")
# --- supervise agent RPCs (issue #469) ---------------------------------
def test_propose_supervise_returns_id_and_posts_payload(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"proposal_id": "p-7"})) as m:
pid = self.r.propose_supervise(
"10.243.0.7", "the-token",
tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="routes:\n", justification="j",
)
self.assertEqual("p-7", pid)
req = m.call_args.args[0]
self.assertTrue(req.full_url.endswith("/supervise/propose"))
sent = json.loads(req.data)
self.assertEqual("10.243.0.7", sent["source_ip"])
self.assertEqual("the-token", sent["identity_token"])
self.assertEqual("egress-allow", sent["tool"])
self.assertEqual("routes:\n", sent["proposed_file"])
def test_propose_supervise_unattributed_is_none(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.propose_supervise(
"10.9.9.9", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j"))
def test_propose_supervise_missing_id_is_none(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({})):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.propose_supervise(
"10.243.0.1", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j"))
def test_propose_supervise_unreachable_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.propose_supervise(
"10.243.0.1", "t", tool="egress-allow", proposed_file="x", justification="j")
def test_poll_supervise_returns_status(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(
{"status": "approved", "notes": "ok", "final_file": None})
) as m:
result = self.r.poll_supervise("10.243.0.7", "tok", "p-7")
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("approved", result["status"])
req = m.call_args.args[0]
self.assertTrue(req.full_url.endswith("/supervise/poll"))
self.assertEqual("p-7", json.loads(req.data)["proposal_id"])
def test_poll_supervise_unattributed_is_none(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(403)):
self.assertIsNone(self.r.poll_supervise("10.9.9.9", "t", "p-7"))
def test_poll_supervise_unreachable_raises(self) -> None:
with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
with self.assertRaises(PolicyResolveError):
self.r.poll_supervise("10.243.0.1", "t", "p-7")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()