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The shared gateway self-generates a mitmproxy CA that every bottle installs to trust its TLS interception. It was persisted on a Docker named volume, which survives `docker rm` but is silently wiped by `docker volume prune` / `docker system prune --volumes` during routine host maintenance. When that happens the gateway mints a fresh CA on restart, and every already-running bottle fails the TLS handshake even after it re-resolves and reconnects to the moved gateway — a re-attachment blocker distinct from #443/#445. Move CA persistence to a host bind-mount under the app-data root (`bot_bottle_root()/gateway-ca`, via `host_gateway_ca_dir()`), mirroring how the shared DB and control-plane token already live on the host. Docker never prunes a path under the root, and it stays inspectable + rotatable from the host. mitmproxy already adopts an existing CA and generates one only on first run, so the bind-mount gives adopt-existing/generate-on-first-run for free. Add an explicit rollover path: `rotate_gateway_ca()` clears the persisted CA so the next start remints it, and `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator.rotate_ca` wires that together with dropping the running gateway container (whose mitmproxy still holds the old CA in memory). Rotation stays an operator action — it doesn't auto-re-provision running bottles, which re-attach to pick up the new anchor. Scope: the Docker infra/gateway path (the "infra container" in the report). The macOS (`container`-only volume) and Firecracker (VM-attached ext4) backends persist the CA differently and are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>