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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/orchestrator/gateway.py
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fix(security): authenticate the orchestrator control plane (issue #400 Critical)
The control plane had no caller authentication — dispatch() routed every
request straight through, and the only guards anywhere were the
(source_ip, identity_token) checks inside /resolve and /attribute, which
authenticate the *bottle* a request is about, not the *caller*. On the
consolidated backends the agent shares a network with the control-plane port
(macOS: the infra container runs 8099 on the agent's --internal network;
docker: the orchestrator container sits on the shared gateway network), so a
prompt-injected agent could GET /bottles (enumerate siblings + policies),
PUT /bottles/<id>/policy (rewrite its own egress allowlist to allow-all),
POST /resolve (read the injected upstream credentials it's never meant to
see), and POST /supervise/respond (self-approve its own proposals). Every
README guarantee collapsed to the agent's discretion.

Fix: a per-host control-plane secret required on every route but GET /health,
compared with hmac.compare_digest. It is held only by the trusted callers and
never handed to an agent:
- minted + persisted 0600 at <root>/control-plane-token (paths.host_control_plane_token);
- injected as $BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN into the orchestrator + gateway
  containers via bare `--env NAME` (value inherited from the launch process,
  so it never lands on argv or in `container/docker inspect`);
- presented by the gateway's PolicyResolver (reads the env) on /resolve, and by
  the host CLI's OrchestratorClient (reads the host file) on every call.

The agent container is never given the env var or the host file, so from a
bottle every /bottles*, /resolve, /attribute, and /supervise/* call now
returns 401 — closing the enumeration, allowlist-rewrite, credential-lift, and
self-approval. The existing (source_ip, identity_token) checks stay as
defense-in-depth.

Enforced when configured: macOS + docker inject the secret (→ enforced). With
no secret set the server runs open and warns loudly at startup — a
fail-visible fallback for the unit suite and for Firecracker, whose
port-scoped nft already blocks agents from 8099 (wiring the secret into its
infra-VM init is a clean fast-follow, left out here to avoid churning the
prebuilt-artifact hash).

Verified end-to-end on real Apple Container: infra comes up healthy, the host
CLI (with the secret) lists bottles while an unauthenticated GET /bottles gets
401, all five issue-#400 attacks from inside the agent get 401, and egress
policy still works (200 allowed / 403 denied) — proving the gateway
authenticates to /resolve with the secret. 1829 unit tests pass, pyright
clean, pylint 9.91.

Refs #400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 05:15:16 -04:00

267 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""The consolidated per-host gateway (PRD 0070).
The core consolidation win: **one** persistent gateway per host, shared by
every bottle, instead of a gateway per bottle. It's safe to share
because the attribution invariant (source IP + identity token, see
`registry`) lets the gateway attribute each request to the right bottle —
so per-bottle policy lives in one long-lived process keyed on who's calling.
`Gateway` is the backend-neutral lifecycle contract (mirrors `LaunchBroker`):
ensure the single instance is up, report it, tear it down. `DockerGateway`
is the docker implementation; a firecracker gateway VM slots in later.
The defining behaviour is **idempotent singleton**: `ensure_running` starts
the instance if absent and is a no-op if it's already up, so N bottle
launches never spawn N gateways.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import abc
import os
import time
from pathlib import Path
from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
from ..paths import (
CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV,
host_control_plane_token,
host_db_path,
)
from ..supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER
# The host DB dir is bind-mounted here so the gateway's supervise daemon
# writes its queued proposals into the ONE host DB (the same file the
# orchestrator container opens and the operator reaches over HTTP).
_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = os.path.dirname(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER)
# The gateway's mitmproxy writes its CA a beat after the container starts, so
# reads poll for it rather than assuming it's there on a fresh launch.
_CA_POLL_SECONDS = 0.5
DEFAULT_CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
GATEWAY_NAME = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway"
GATEWAY_LABEL = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway=1"
# The single user-defined network the gateway and every agent bottle share.
# Agents attach here with a pinned IP and reach the gateway's egress /
# git-http / supervise ports by its address — no host port publishing, and
# the source IP the gateway attributes by is the address on this network.
GATEWAY_NETWORK = "bot-bottle-gateway"
# mitmproxy's CA dir in the bundle. A persistent named volume here keeps the
# gateway's self-generated CA STABLE across container recreation — every agent
# installs this one CA to trust the shared gateway's TLS interception, so it
# must not rotate when the gateway restarts.
MITMPROXY_HOME = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy"
GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME = "bot-bottle-gateway-mitmproxy"
GATEWAY_CA_CERT = f"{MITMPROXY_HOME}/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem"
# The gateway data-plane image + its Dockerfile. Kept as a local constant
# rather than imported from the backend layer, which would drag
# the whole backend layer into the lean orchestrator (see #359); unify when
# that lands. Env override matches the backend's BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_IMAGE.
GATEWAY_IMAGE = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_IMAGE", "bot-bottle-gateway:latest")
GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.gateway"
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
def _host_db_dir() -> str:
"""The host DB directory (created if missing), for the gateway's
supervise-DB bind-mount."""
db_dir = host_db_path().parent
db_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return str(db_dir)
class GatewayError(Exception):
"""The shared gateway failed to build/start/stop (non-zero `docker` exit)."""
class Gateway(abc.ABC):
"""Lifecycle of the single per-host gateway. Backend-neutral."""
name: str
def ensure_built(self) -> None:
"""Ensure the gateway's image / rootfs exists, building it if needed.
Default: nothing to build (e.g. a stub or a pre-pulled image)."""
return
@abc.abstractmethod
def ensure_running(self) -> None:
"""Start the gateway if it isn't already up. Idempotent: a no-op
when it's already running (that's the whole point — one per host).
Assumes the image exists — call `ensure_built()` first."""
@abc.abstractmethod
def is_running(self) -> bool:
"""True iff the gateway instance is currently up."""
@abc.abstractmethod
def stop(self) -> None:
"""Remove the gateway. Idempotent — absent is success."""
class DockerGateway(Gateway):
"""The consolidated gateway as a single, fixed-name Docker container.
`image_ref` defaults to the gateway data-plane image; `ensure_built`
builds it from `Dockerfile.gateway` when it's missing. (Note: slice 5
builds + launches the bundle container; wiring its per-bottle,
source-IP-keyed config is a later slice — see PRD 0070.)"""
def __init__(
self,
image_ref: str = GATEWAY_IMAGE,
*,
name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
network: str = GATEWAY_NETWORK,
orchestrator_url: str = "",
build_context: Path | None = None,
dockerfile: str | None = GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE,
host_port_bindings: tuple[int, ...] = (),
) -> None:
self.image_ref = image_ref
self.name = name
self.network = network
# The control-plane URL the gateway's data plane resolves per bottle
# against — reached by container name over docker DNS on the shared
# network (container↔container, no host firewall). Empty → single-tenant.
self._orchestrator_url = orchestrator_url
self._build_context = build_context or _REPO_ROOT
self._dockerfile = dockerfile
# Ports published on the host (0.0.0.0). Used by the Firecracker
# backend's dev-harness gateway so VMs can reach it via their TAP link;
# Docker's DNAT + the nft `ct status dnat accept` rule handle the rest.
self._host_port_bindings = host_port_bindings
def image_exists(self) -> bool:
return run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", self.image_ref]).returncode == 0
def ensure_built(self) -> None:
"""Build the bundle image from its Dockerfile, **cache-aware** — cheap
(a cache check) when nothing changed, a real rebuild when the flat
sources (egress addon / git-http / policy_resolver / supervise) moved.
This deliberately builds every time rather than build-if-missing: the
per-bottle model kept the image fresh via compose's `build:` on up, and
a stale image silently runs the OLD single-tenant daemons. No-op only
when no dockerfile is configured (a pre-pulled image). BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE
forces a full rebuild (parity with `start --no-cache`)."""
if self._dockerfile is None:
return
argv = ["docker", "build", "-t", self.image_ref,
"-f", str(self._build_context / self._dockerfile),
str(self._build_context)]
if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"):
argv.insert(2, "--no-cache")
proc = run_docker(argv)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway image build failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
def is_running(self) -> bool:
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "ps",
"--filter", f"name=^{self.name}$",
"--filter", "status=running",
"--format", "{{.Names}}",
])
return self.name in proc.stdout.split()
def _running_image_is_current(self) -> bool:
"""True iff the running gateway was created from the *current*
`image_ref`. When `ensure_built` rebuilds the image (a source change),
the running container is still the OLD image running the OLD flat
daemons — so this is how a rebuild actually takes effect: a mismatch
means recreate."""
running = run_docker(["docker", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Image}}", self.name])
current = run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Id}}", self.image_ref])
if running.returncode != 0 or current.returncode != 0:
return True # can't compare → don't churn a working container
return running.stdout.strip() == current.stdout.strip()
def _ensure_network(self) -> None:
"""Create the shared gateway network if it doesn't exist. Idempotent —
a concurrent create loses harmlessly (the loser sees 'already exists').
Docker picks the subnet; the launcher reads it back to allocate IPs."""
if run_docker(["docker", "network", "inspect", self.network]).returncode == 0:
return
proc = run_docker(["docker", "network", "create", self.network])
if proc.returncode != 0 and "already exists" not in proc.stderr:
raise GatewayError(
f"gateway network {self.network} failed to create: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def ensure_running(self) -> None:
# Recreate when the running container's image is stale (a rebuild),
# so source changes to the gateway's flat daemons take effect — not
# just when the container is absent.
if self.is_running() and self._running_image_is_current():
return
self._ensure_network()
# Clear any stale (stopped OR outdated-image) container holding the
# fixed name, then start fresh. `rm --force` on an absent name is a
# tolerated no-op.
run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self.name])
argv = [
"docker", "run", "--detach",
"--name", self.name,
"--label", GATEWAY_LABEL,
"--network", self.network,
# Persist the self-generated CA so it survives restarts (agents
# trust it) — see GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME.
"--volume", f"{GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME}:{MITMPROXY_HOME}",
# Share the one host DB: the supervise daemon queues proposals
# into the same file the orchestrator (and the operator, over
# HTTP) reads — no second, disconnected DB in the container.
"--volume", f"{_host_db_dir()}:{_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}",
"--env", f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
]
for port in self._host_port_bindings:
argv += ["--publish", f"0.0.0.0:{port}:{port}"]
run_env = dict(os.environ)
if self._orchestrator_url:
# Makes the gateway's egress / git / supervise daemons multi-tenant:
# each request resolves source-IP -> policy against the control plane.
argv += ["--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL={self._orchestrator_url}"]
# ...and presents the control-plane secret on those /resolve calls
# (the control plane requires it). Bare `--env NAME` keeps the value
# off argv / `docker inspect`; only the gateway (not the agent) is
# given it. Only needed in multi-tenant mode, where /resolve is used.
argv += ["--env", CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV]
run_env[CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV] = host_control_plane_token()
argv.append(self.image_ref)
proc = run_docker(argv, env=run_env)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway failed to start: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
def ca_cert_pem(self, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> str:
"""The gateway's CA certificate (PEM) that agents install to trust its
TLS interception. mitmproxy generates it a moment after the container
starts, so this **polls** for it (up to `timeout`) rather than assuming
it's already there on a fresh gateway — raising only if it never
appears."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while True:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "exec", self.name, "cat", GATEWAY_CA_CERT])
if proc.returncode == 0 and proc.stdout.strip():
return proc.stdout
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise GatewayError(
f"gateway CA cert not available after {timeout:g}s: "
f"{proc.stderr.strip() or 'empty'}"
)
time.sleep(_CA_POLL_SECONDS)
def stop(self) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self.name])
if proc.returncode != 0 and "No such container" not in proc.stderr:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway failed to stop: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
__all__ = [
"Gateway", "DockerGateway", "GatewayError",
"GATEWAY_NAME", "GATEWAY_LABEL", "GATEWAY_IMAGE", "GATEWAY_NETWORK",
"GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME", "GATEWAY_CA_CERT",
]