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The codebase used "control plane" both as an architectural role term AND
as an identifier alias for the orchestrator component, producing
duplicate names for one thing (control_plane_url vs orchestrator_url,
CONTROL_PLANE_PORT, host_control_plane_token, …). Going forward the
concrete component is always named for what it is — Gateway or
Orchestrator — and the plane vocabulary is reserved for prose (module
descriptions, the security argument).
Renamed (identifiers + the in-repo env/wire/file string values, all
setters/getters are in this repo so the change is atomic):
ControlPlaneServer -> OrchestratorServer
control_plane_url -> orchestrator_url
probe_control_plane_url -> probe_orchestrator_url
host_control_plane_token -> host_orchestrator_token
CONTROL_PLANE_PORT -> ORCHESTRATOR_PORT
CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV/FILE -> ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV/FILENAME
BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN-> BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN
control-plane-token (file) -> orchestrator-token
control_auth (module) -> orchestrator_auth (stays top-level;
the gateway imports it and must not
import the orchestrator/ package)
CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER -> ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_HEADER
x-bot-bottle-control-auth -> x-bot-bottle-orchestrator-auth
CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV -> ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV
BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT -> BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT
_control_auth_headers -> _orchestrator_auth_headers
Prose plane-terms ("control plane", "data plane") are preserved,
including the test name test_data_plane_daemons_get_jwt_not_key (it
names the security invariant). Gateway and orchestrator verified to
agree on the renamed wire header; full unit suite green (2243).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
87 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
"""Unit: role-scoped control-plane tokens (issue #469 review)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import json
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import unittest
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLES, mint, verify
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_KEY = "test-key"
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def _b64(obj: object) -> str:
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return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
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json.dumps(obj).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
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class TestMintVerify(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_round_trip_each_role(self) -> None:
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for role in ROLES:
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self.assertEqual(role, verify(mint(role, _KEY), _KEY))
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def test_gateway_and_cli_are_distinct(self) -> None:
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_GATEWAY, verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), _KEY))
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), _KEY))
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def test_wrong_key_rejected(self) -> None:
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self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY), "other-key"))
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def test_tampered_signature_rejected(self) -> None:
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tok = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY)
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self.assertIsNone(verify(tok[:-1] + ("A" if tok[-1] != "A" else "B"), _KEY))
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def test_tampered_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
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header, _payload, sig = mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, _KEY).split(".")
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forged = f"{header}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}.{sig}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
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def test_alg_none_rejected(self) -> None:
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# An unsigned "alg: none" token must never verify.
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tok = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}."
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self.assertIsNone(verify(tok, _KEY))
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def test_validly_signed_but_wrong_alg_rejected(self) -> None:
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# Alg-confusion: even a *correctly signed* token whose header claims a
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# non-HS256 alg must be rejected.
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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signing_input = f"{_b64({'alg': 'none', 'typ': 'JWT'})}.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
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def test_validly_signed_but_undecodable_rejected(self) -> None:
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# A correct signature over a header that isn't valid base64/JSON still
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# fails closed rather than raising.
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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signing_input = f"!!!not-base64!!!.{_b64({'role': 'cli'})}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}", _KEY))
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def test_malformed_tokens_rejected(self) -> None:
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for bad in ("", "a", "a.b", "a.b.c.d", "not-base64.$$.$$"):
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self.assertIsNone(verify(bad, _KEY))
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def test_empty_key_never_verifies(self) -> None:
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self.assertIsNone(verify(mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY), ""))
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def test_unknown_role_in_payload_rejected(self) -> None:
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header, _p, _s = mint(ROLE_CLI, _KEY).split(".")
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# Re-sign a token carrying an unknown role — a valid signature but a
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# role the control plane doesn't recognise must still be rejected.
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import _sign # noqa: PLC0415
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payload = _b64({"role": "root"})
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signing_input = f"{header}.{payload}"
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forged = f"{signing_input}.{_sign(_KEY, signing_input)}"
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self.assertIsNone(verify(forged, _KEY))
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def test_mint_rejects_unknown_role(self) -> None:
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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mint("root", _KEY)
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def test_mint_rejects_empty_key(self) -> None:
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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mint(ROLE_GATEWAY, "")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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unittest.main()
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