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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/egress_addon.py
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PRD 0062: supervisor override for egress token blocks
When the outbound DLP catches a token, route the block through the
existing supervisor approval queue instead of returning 403 outright.
The egress proxy holds the request open until the operator answers, then
remembers an approved value for the life of the proxy so the request --
and later ones carrying it -- flow through. Fails closed on rejection,
timeout, malformed response, or when supervise is disabled.

- ScanResult.matched carries the raw matched substring (sidecar-only;
  never logged or written to the proposal). scan_outbound and the token
  detectors take a safe_tokens set and skip approved values, continuing
  past a safelisted match so a second secret in the same request is
  still caught.
- New egress-token-allow proposal tool, written directly to the queue by
  the addon (the gitleaks-allow pattern from PRD 0061). build_token_allow
  _payload renders host/method/path/detector reason + redacted context.
- Async request hook polls the queue without stalling the proxy event
  loop; EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 300) bounds the wait.
- Supervisor TUI renders egress-token-allow like gitleaks-allow: report
  only, modify unavailable, approval requires a recorded reason.
- Unit tests for the matched/safe-tokens plumbing, payload builder, tool
  constant round-trip, and TUI paths; README + PRD 0062.

Closes #261.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HnvBjPZC5V7qeQpFbQdDmS
2026-06-24 16:12:50 -04:00

448 lines
17 KiB
Python

"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_addon.py` inside the
egress container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import signal
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
LOG_BLOCKS,
LOG_FULL,
Config,
ScanResult,
build_inbound_scan_text,
build_outbound_scan_text,
build_token_allow_payload,
decide,
decide_git_fetch,
is_git_fetch_request,
is_git_push_request,
load_config,
match_route,
outbound_scan_headers,
route_to_yaml_dict,
scan_inbound,
scan_outbound,
)
try:
from dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
try:
import supervise as _sv # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
# Seconds the egress proxy holds a token-blocked request open waiting for the
# operator's supervisor decision (PRD 0062), overridable via env.
DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300.0
# Filesystem poll cadence while awaiting the operator's response.
TOKEN_ALLOW_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 0.5
# Fixed operator guidance attached to every token-allow proposal.
_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION = (
"egress DLP blocked an outbound request carrying a detected token. "
"Approve only if this value is a false positive or a credential this "
"request legitimately needs; the value is then allowed for the life of "
"this bottle's egress proxy."
)
class EgressAddon:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.config: Config = Config(routes=())
# Tokens the operator has approved this session (PRD 0062). In-memory
# only — a restart re-prompts. Mutated only from the asyncio loop that
# runs the addon hooks, so no lock is needed.
self.safe_tokens: set[str] = set()
self._supervise_queue_dir = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR", "").strip()
self._supervise_slug = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", "").strip()
self._token_allow_timeout = _token_allow_timeout_from_env(os.environ)
self._reload(initial=True)
self._install_sighup()
def _supervise_available(self) -> bool:
return bool(self._supervise_queue_dir and self._supervise_slug)
def _reload(self, *, initial: bool = False) -> None:
try:
text = Path(self.routes_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
new_config = load_config(text)
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
tag = "boot" if initial else "SIGHUP"
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: {tag} load failed: {e}\n"
)
if initial:
self.config = Config(routes=())
return
self.config = new_config
log_label = ("off", "blocks", "full")[self.config.log]
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: loaded {len(self.config.routes)} route(s): "
f"{', '.join(r.host for r in self.config.routes)}"
f" [log={log_label}]\n"
)
def _install_sighup(self) -> None:
if not hasattr(signal, "SIGHUP"):
return
def handler(signum: int, frame: object) -> None:
del signum, frame
self._reload()
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, handler)
def _serve_introspection(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, path: str) -> None:
if path == "/allowlist":
payload = json.dumps(
{"routes": [route_to_yaml_dict(r) for r in self.config.routes]},
indent=2,
).encode("utf-8")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
200, payload,
{"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
return
flow.response = http.Response.make(
404,
f"egress introspection: no such endpoint {path!r}".encode(),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
def _req_ctx(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
}
def _block(
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
reason: str,
ctx: dict[str, object] | None = None,
) -> None:
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
entry: dict[str, object] = {"event": "egress_block", "reason": reason}
if ctx:
entry.update(ctx)
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps(entry) + "\n")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_request",
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
"headers": dict(flow.request.headers),
"body": flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_response",
"host": flow.request.pretty_host,
"status": flow.response.status_code,
"headers": dict(flow.response.headers),
"body": flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
# DLP outbound scan BEFORE stripping auth — catches tokens the
# agent tried to smuggle in any header, path, query param, or body.
# Hostname is included to catch DNS-tunnelling exfiltration attempts.
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
# Re-scan after each operator approval so a second, un-approved
# token in the same request is still caught (PRD 0062).
while True:
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
query,
outbound_scan_headers(route, dict(flow.request.headers)),
body,
)
dlp_result = scan_outbound(
route, scan_text, os.environ, safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens,
)
if dlp_result is None or dlp_result.severity != "block":
break
# Token blocks (a match with a safelist-able value) can be
# routed to the operator; structural blocks (CRLF, matched="")
# and any block when supervise is disabled stay hard 403s.
if dlp_result.matched and self._supervise_available():
approved = await self._supervise_token_block(
flow, request_path, dlp_result,
)
if approved:
continue # re-scan; matched value now in safe_tokens
return # _supervise_token_block wrote the 403 response
ctx = self._req_ctx(flow)
if dlp_result.context:
ctx = {**ctx, "context": dlp_result.context}
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {dlp_result.reason}", ctx=ctx)
return
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
self._block(
flow,
"egress: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
"git-gate's pre-receive hook).",
ctx=self._req_ctx(flow),
)
return
if is_git_fetch_request(request_path, query):
git_decision = decide_git_fetch(
self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host,
)
if git_decision.action == "block":
self._block(
flow,
git_decision.reason,
ctx=self._req_ctx(flow),
)
return
# Strip agent-set Authorization after DLP scan so smuggled tokens
# are caught above; the route may inject sidecar-owned auth below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Build headers mapping for match evaluation
req_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()}
decision = decide(
self.config.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
)
if decision.action == "block":
self._block(flow, decision.reason, ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
return
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_request(flow)
async def _supervise_token_block(
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
request_path: str,
result: ScanResult,
) -> bool:
"""Route a token DLP block to the operator's supervisor queue and wait.
Returns True if the operator approved (the matched value is added to
`self.safe_tokens` and the caller re-scans); False if the request must
be blocked (a 403 response has been written to `flow`)."""
host = flow.request.pretty_host
payload = build_token_allow_payload(
redact_tokens(host, env=os.environ),
flow.request.method,
redact_tokens(request_path, env=os.environ),
result,
)
proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
bottle_slug=self._supervise_slug,
tool=_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
proposed_file=payload,
justification=_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION,
current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(payload),
)
queue_dir = Path(self._supervise_queue_dir)
try:
_sv.write_proposal(queue_dir, proposal)
except OSError as e:
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: could not queue token-allow proposal: {e}; "
"blocking request\n"
)
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
return False
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_token_supervise",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
"proposal": proposal.id,
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
response = await self._await_token_response(queue_dir, proposal.id)
_sv.archive_proposal(queue_dir, proposal.id)
if response is not None and response.status in (
_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, _sv.STATUS_MODIFIED,
):
self.safe_tokens.add(result.matched)
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_token_allowed",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
"proposal": proposal.id,
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
return True
if response is None:
reason = (
f"egress DLP: {result.reason}; supervisor approval timed out "
f"after {self._token_allow_timeout:g}s"
)
else:
reason = f"egress DLP: {result.reason}; supervisor rejected the request"
self._block(flow, reason, ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
return False
async def _await_token_response(
self,
queue_dir: Path,
proposal_id: str,
) -> "_sv.Response | None":
"""Poll the queue dir for the operator's response without blocking the
proxy event loop. Returns the Response, or None on timeout."""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
deadline = loop.time() + self._token_allow_timeout
while True:
try:
return _sv.read_response(queue_dir, proposal_id)
except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError):
# Not written yet, or a partial/malformed write — retry until
# the deadline, then fail closed.
pass
if loop.time() >= deadline:
return None
await asyncio.sleep(TOKEN_ALLOW_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP inbound scan on response headers and body."""
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
if flow.response is None:
return
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_response(flow)
resp_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()}
body = flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or ""
scan_text = build_inbound_scan_text(resp_headers, body)
if not scan_text:
return
result = scan_inbound(route, scan_text)
if result is None:
return
resp_ctx: dict[str, object] = {
**self._req_ctx(flow),
"response_status": flow.response.status_code,
}
if result.context:
resp_ctx = {**resp_ctx, "context": result.context}
if result.severity == "block":
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=resp_ctx)
elif result.severity == "warn" and self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_warn",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
**resp_ctx,
})
+ "\n"
)
def websocket_message(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP scan on WebSocket frames.
Outbound frames (from_client) are scanned for credential leakage;
inbound frames are scanned for prompt injection. On a block the
entire connection is killed — there is no HTTP response surface to
write to after the upgrade.
"""
if flow.websocket is None: # type: ignore[union-attr]
return
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
message = flow.websocket.messages[-1] # type: ignore[union-attr]
content = message.content.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if message.from_client:
result = scan_outbound(
route, content, os.environ, safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens,
)
if result is not None and result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
flow.kill() # type: ignore[union-attr]
else:
result = scan_inbound(route, content)
if result is not None:
if result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
flow.kill() # type: ignore[union-attr]
elif result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
def _token_allow_timeout_from_env(env: "os._Environ[str]") -> float:
"""Read EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS; fall back to the default on an
unset or invalid value (a bad value should not wedge egress at boot)."""
raw = env.get("EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
value = 0.0
if value <= 0:
sys.stderr.write(
"egress: invalid EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS="
f"{raw!r}; using default {DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:g}s\n"
)
return DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
return value
addons = [EgressAddon()]