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bot-bottle/claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py
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feat(provision): install pipelock CA into the agent + add curl
Second step of PRD 0006. With pipelock now doing the bumping, the
agent's TLS library has to trust pipelock's per-bottle CA — or
every CONNECT to api.anthropic.com is a self-signed-cert error.

- BottleBackend.provision gains a non-abstract `provision_ca`
  with a default no-op (so non-Docker backends aren't forced to
  implement TLS interception) and orchestrates
  ca → prompt → skills → ssh → git. CA install runs first so the
  agent's trust store is rebuilt before anything else in the
  agent makes a TLS call.

- New backend/docker/provision/ca.py: docker-cp's the CA cert
  into the agent at /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/...,
  `update-ca-certificates`, then emits a one-line stderr log
  with the SHA-256 fingerprint (stdlib `ssl` + `hashlib`; no
  subprocess for crypto). Module-level constants AGENT_CA_PATH
  and AGENT_CA_BUNDLE are imported by launch.py so the env
  trio set at docker run time matches the paths the provisioner
  writes.

- launch.py: rebinds `plan` after `dataclasses.replace`s on the
  pipelock proxy plan so provision_ca (which reads
  `plan.proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path`) sees the populated CA
  paths. Three new -e flags on the agent's docker run for the
  NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE trio.

- Dockerfile: adds curl to the apt-get install line. curl
  natively respects HTTPS_PROXY and sends CONNECT directly —
  the agent doesn't need OS-level DNS for external hostnames
  (pipelock resolves them on its side of the bumped tunnel).
  This is the "simple HTTPS request" path the earlier turn
  needed and Node's stdlib https.request couldn't provide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 14:50:20 -04:00

162 lines
6.2 KiB
Python

"""Launch step for the Docker bottle backend.
`launch` is a context manager: builds the image(s), creates the per-
agent networks, brings up the pipelock sidecar, starts the agent
container, then runs the provision step. Teardown is sequenced via an
ExitStack so callbacks fire in reverse-order of registration even if
something raises mid-bring-up.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...log import die, info
from . import network as network_mod
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .pipelock import DockerPipelockProxy, pipelock_proxy_url, pipelock_tls_init
from .provision.ca import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
@contextmanager
def launch(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
proxy: DockerPipelockProxy,
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Docker bottle. Teardown on exit.
`provision` is the backend's provision orchestrator (passed in so
this module stays free of backend-class plumbing)."""
stack = ExitStack()
def teardown() -> None:
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException:
# Teardown must not raise; swallow so the caller's
# __exit__ path can still propagate the original error.
pass
try:
docker_mod.build_image(plan.image, _REPO_DIR)
if plan.derived_image:
docker_mod.build_image_with_cwd(
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.spec.user_cwd
)
internal_network = network_mod.network_create_internal(plan.slug)
stack.callback(network_mod.network_remove, internal_network)
egress_network = network_mod.network_create_egress(plan.slug)
stack.callback(network_mod.network_remove, egress_network)
# Per-bottle ephemeral CA for pipelock's TLS interception
# (PRD 0006). One-shot pipelock container writes ca.pem +
# ca-key.pem under plan.stage_dir; .start docker-cp's them
# into the sidecar. The private key never leaves the host
# stage dir, which start.py's outer finally `shutil.rmtree`s
# after the sidecar is torn down.
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.stage_dir)
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
# Re-bind the outer plan so provision_ca (which runs later
# from `provision(plan, container)`) can read the populated
# CA paths off plan.proxy_plan.
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan)
pipelock_name = proxy.start(plan.proxy_plan)
stack.callback(proxy.stop, pipelock_name)
container = _run_agent_container(plan, internal_network)
stack.callback(docker_mod.force_remove_container, container)
prompt_path = provision(plan, container)
yield DockerBottle(container, teardown, prompt_path)
finally:
teardown()
def _run_agent_container(plan: DockerBottlePlan, internal_network: str) -> str:
"""Build the `docker run` argv and execute it, handling name-
conflict races by incrementing the suffix (unless the name was
user-pinned). Returns the resolved container name."""
proxy_url = pipelock_proxy_url(plan.slug)
docker_args: list[str] = [
"--rm", "-d",
"--name", plan.container_name,
"--network", internal_network,
"-e", f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", "NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1",
# CA trust trio for the agent process. Docker propagates
# run-time env into `docker exec`, so `claude` sees these
# without per-exec threading. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS points at
# the cert file (Node appends it to its bundled roots);
# SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE point at the system
# bundle that `update-ca-certificates` rebuilds in
# provision_ca.
"-e", f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
"-e", f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
"-e", f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
if plan.use_runsc:
docker_args.extend(["--runtime", "runsc"])
if plan.env_file.stat().st_size > 0:
docker_args.extend(["--env-file", str(plan.env_file)])
for name in plan.forwarded_env:
docker_args.extend(["-e", name])
docker_args.extend([plan.runtime_image, "sleep", "infinity"])
info(f"starting container {plan.container_name} from {plan.runtime_image}")
# Inject forwarded values (secrets, interpolated host vars, the
# renamed OAuth token) into the docker-run child's env so the
# `-e NAME` flags above pick them up — without touching our own
# os.environ or putting values on argv.
child_env: dict[str, str] = {**os.environ, **plan.forwarded_env}
name_idx = docker_args.index("--name") + 1
for candidate in docker_mod.container_name_candidates(plan.container_name):
docker_args[name_idx] = candidate
run_result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", *docker_args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=child_env,
check=False,
)
if run_result.returncode == 0:
return candidate
err_text = run_result.stderr
if plan.container_name_pinned or "is already in use" not in err_text:
sys.stderr.write(err_text + "\n")
die(f"docker run failed for container '{candidate}'")
info(f"name conflict on {candidate}; retrying with next candidate")
die(
f"could not find a free container name after "
f"{plan.container_name}-{docker_mod.MAX_CONTAINER_SUFFIX} retries; "
f"clean up old containers"
)