feat(provision): install pipelock CA into the agent + add curl
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Second step of PRD 0006. With pipelock now doing the bumping, the
agent's TLS library has to trust pipelock's per-bottle CA — or
every CONNECT to api.anthropic.com is a self-signed-cert error.

- BottleBackend.provision gains a non-abstract `provision_ca`
  with a default no-op (so non-Docker backends aren't forced to
  implement TLS interception) and orchestrates
  ca → prompt → skills → ssh → git. CA install runs first so the
  agent's trust store is rebuilt before anything else in the
  agent makes a TLS call.

- New backend/docker/provision/ca.py: docker-cp's the CA cert
  into the agent at /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/...,
  `update-ca-certificates`, then emits a one-line stderr log
  with the SHA-256 fingerprint (stdlib `ssl` + `hashlib`; no
  subprocess for crypto). Module-level constants AGENT_CA_PATH
  and AGENT_CA_BUNDLE are imported by launch.py so the env
  trio set at docker run time matches the paths the provisioner
  writes.

- launch.py: rebinds `plan` after `dataclasses.replace`s on the
  pipelock proxy plan so provision_ca (which reads
  `plan.proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path`) sees the populated CA
  paths. Three new -e flags on the agent's docker run for the
  NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE trio.

- Dockerfile: adds curl to the apt-get install line. curl
  natively respects HTTPS_PROXY and sends CONNECT directly —
  the agent doesn't need OS-level DNS for external hostnames
  (pipelock resolves them on its side of the bumped tunnel).
  This is the "simple HTTPS request" path the earlier turn
  needed and Node's stdlib https.request couldn't provide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-12 14:50:20 -04:00
parent 3755e66abe
commit 86a9b499bc
5 changed files with 126 additions and 14 deletions
+4 -2
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@@ -19,9 +19,11 @@ FROM node:22-slim
# clarity in case the base ever drops it. socat is the privileged
# forwarder for the in-container ssh-agent (see claude_bottle/ssh.py): the agent
# runs as root and rejects non-root connections, so socat sits between
# node and the agent socket.
# node and the agent socket. curl is here so any HTTPS_PROXY-aware
# tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out to it) works
# against pipelock's bumped TLS without the agent needing local DNS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install claude-code globally. Pinned to the version verified in the v1
+23 -11
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@@ -204,24 +204,36 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
"""Build/run the bottle and yield a handle; tear down on exit."""
def provision(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy host-side files (prompt, skills, SSH keys, .git) into
the running bottle. Called from `launch` after the container/
machine is up. `target` identifies the running instance in
backend-specific terms (Docker: resolved container name; fly:
machine id). Returns the in-container prompt path if a prompt
was provisioned, else None — the Bottle handle uses it to
decide whether to add --append-system-prompt-file to claude's
argv.
"""Copy host-side files (CA cert, prompt, skills, SSH keys,
.git) into the running bottle. Called from `launch` after the
container/machine is up. `target` identifies the running
instance in backend-specific terms (Docker: resolved
container name; fly: machine id). Returns the in-container
prompt path if a prompt was provisioned, else None — the
Bottle handle uses it to decide whether to add
--append-system-prompt-file to claude's argv.
Default orchestration: prompt → skills → ssh → git. Subclasses
typically don't override this; they implement the four
sub-methods below."""
Default orchestration: ca → prompt → skills → ssh → git.
CA install runs first so the agent's trust store is rebuilt
before anything inside the agent makes a TLS call. Subclasses
typically don't override this; they implement the sub-methods
below."""
self.provision_ca(plan, target)
prompt_path = self.provision_prompt(plan, target)
self.provision_skills(plan, target)
self.provision_ssh(plan, target)
self.provision_git(plan, target)
return prompt_path
def provision_ca(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Install pipelock's per-bottle CA into the agent's trust
store so the agent trusts the bumped CONNECT cert pipelock
presents. Default impl is a no-op so backends that don't
yet support TLS interception (every backend except Docker
today) aren't forced to implement it. The Docker backend
overrides to docker-cp the cert in and run
`update-ca-certificates`."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_prompt(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the running bottle. Returns the
+4
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import DockerBottleCleanupPlan
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .pipelock import DockerPipelockProxy
from .provision import ca as _ca
from .provision import git as _git
from .provision import prompt as _prompt
from .provision import skills as _skills
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
with _launch.launch(plan, proxy=self._proxy, provision=self.provision) as bottle:
yield bottle
def provision_ca(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, target)
def provision_prompt(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> str | None:
return _prompt.provision_prompt(plan, target)
+16 -1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .pipelock import DockerPipelockProxy, pipelock_proxy_url, pipelock_tls_init
from .provision.ca import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
@@ -77,7 +78,11 @@ def launch(
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
pipelock_name = proxy.start(proxy_plan)
# Re-bind the outer plan so provision_ca (which runs later
# from `provision(plan, container)`) can read the populated
# CA paths off plan.proxy_plan.
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan)
pipelock_name = proxy.start(plan.proxy_plan)
stack.callback(proxy.stop, pipelock_name)
container = _run_agent_container(plan, internal_network)
@@ -102,6 +107,16 @@ def _run_agent_container(plan: DockerBottlePlan, internal_network: str) -> str:
"-e", f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", "NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1",
# CA trust trio for the agent process. Docker propagates
# run-time env into `docker exec`, so `claude` sees these
# without per-exec threading. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS points at
# the cert file (Node appends it to its bundled roots);
# SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE point at the system
# bundle that `update-ca-certificates` rebuilds in
# provision_ca.
"-e", f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
"-e", f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
"-e", f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
if plan.use_runsc:
docker_args.extend(["--runtime", "runsc"])
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
"""Install pipelock's per-bottle CA into the agent container's trust
store (PRD 0006).
By the time this provisioner runs, `pipelock_tls_init` has generated
a fresh CA into `plan.stage_dir/pipelock-ca/` and the pipelock sidecar
is up with `tls_interception: { enabled: true }` referencing the
in-container CA paths. This step makes the agent trust certs signed
by that CA so the agent's TLS handshake with the bumped CONNECT
succeeds.
Cert lands on Debian's standard source path
(`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/`); `update-ca-certificates`
rebuilds `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`, which is what curl,
Python `ssl`, and OpenSSL-based tools all read by default. The env
trio set on the agent's `docker run` covers Node
(`NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`) and Python `requests` /
`SSL_CERT_FILE`-honoring libraries that don't load the system
bundle.
The fingerprint is computed via stdlib (`ssl.PEM_cert_to_DER_cert`
+ `hashlib.sha256`) and logged once to stderr. The private key
stays on the host (under `stage_dir`) until teardown wipes the
stage dir; nothing in the agent ever sees it."""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import ssl
import subprocess
from ....log import info
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
# Debian-family path for sources that `update-ca-certificates` reads.
# Bundle path is what the command rebuilds and what every standard
# TLS consumer in the image reads.
AGENT_CA_PATH = "/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/claude-bottle-pipelock-ca.crt"
AGENT_CA_BUNDLE = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
def provision_ca(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy pipelock's CA cert into the agent, rebuild the trust
bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the agent container is up."""
container = target
cert_host_path = plan.proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path
if not cert_host_path or not cert_host_path.is_file():
# Defensive: provision runs after launch wires CA paths
# onto the plan via dataclasses.replace; an empty path here
# would mean that wiring was skipped.
from ....log import die
die(
f"pipelock CA cert missing at {cert_host_path or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called pipelock_tls_init and re-bound "
f"the plan before provision"
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", str(cert_host_path), f"{container}:{AGENT_CA_PATH}"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "chmod", "644", AGENT_CA_PATH],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "update-ca-certificates"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
# Stdlib SHA-256 of the cert's DER bytes — the standard
# fingerprint form. Never the private key.
der = ssl.PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(cert_host_path.read_text())
fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(der).hexdigest()
info(f"pipelock ca fingerprint: sha256:{fingerprint[:32]}...")