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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/policy_resolver.py
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feat(control-plane): role-scoped signed tokens so the gateway can't drive operator routes
Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret
that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a
supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) —
the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller.

Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens
(compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency):

  * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway`
    (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher).
  * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch`
    gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/
    {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated,
    403 wrong role).
  * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into
    `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key.
  * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the
    gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra
    container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key.

Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s);
Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants
full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 05:22:56 +00:00

199 lines
9.6 KiB
Python

"""Gateway-side per-client policy resolver (PRD 0070).
The consolidated gateway serves every bottle from one process, so for each
request it must apply the *calling* bottle's policy, selected by the source
IP the attribution invariant makes unspoofable. This resolves that policy
from the orchestrator's control plane (`POST /resolve`), keyed on the
`(source_ip, identity_token)` pair.
**Always fresh — no cache.** The resolver is called rarely enough that a
round-trip doesn't matter, and correctness matters more than speed: every
resolve reflects the orchestrator's *current* view, so a revocation, a
policy change, or a bottle teardown the orchestrator knows about is honored
immediately rather than lingering for a cache TTL. (If this ever becomes a
hot path, add caching with orchestrator-driven invalidation — not a blind
TTL.)
**Fail-closed:** an unattributed client (the orchestrator answers `403`)
resolves to `None`, and the caller (the egress addon, git-gate) must then
deny — exactly as an unknown bottle should be treated. Orchestrator
*errors* (unreachable / unexpected status) raise, so the caller can fail
closed too rather than silently serving stale or empty policy.
The resolved value is the policy blob the orchestrator stores verbatim; the
consumer parses it (e.g. the egress addon's `load_config`). This module is
stdlib-only and free of bot-bottle imports.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2.0
# The role-scoped `gateway` token this data plane presents on every control-plane
# call, read from the env the launcher injects into the gateway (a pre-minted
# signed JWT — the gateway never holds the signing key, so it can't forge a
# higher-privilege `cli` token). Constant + env-var name are duplicated here
# rather than imported because this module is COPYed flat into the gateway image,
# free of bot-bottle imports — same rationale as IDENTITY_HEADER in egress_addon
# / git_http_backend.
CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-control-auth"
CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"
def _control_auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
"""The auth header to send, or {} when no token is configured (an open
control plane, e.g. Firecracker behind its nft boundary — sending nothing
is correct there and harmlessly ignored)."""
token = os.environ.get(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, "").strip()
return {CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: token} if token else {}
class PolicyResolveError(RuntimeError):
"""The orchestrator was unreachable or returned an unexpected status —
distinct from a clean `403` (unattributed), which returns None."""
class PolicyResolver:
"""Resolves each client's policy from the orchestrator, fresh per call."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
self._timeout = timeout
def _post_json(self, path: str, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""POST `payload` to control-plane `path`, returning the JSON object body
— or None when the orchestrator answers `403` (unattributed / fail
closed). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an unreachable / unexpected-status
/ malformed response so every caller can fail closed. Shared by
`_post_resolve` and the supervise propose/poll RPCs."""
body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{self._base}{path}", data=body, method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", **_control_auth_headers()},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
data = json.loads(resp.read())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
if e.code == 403:
return None # unattributed → fail closed (caller denies)
raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} returned HTTP {e.code}") from e
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} unreachable or malformed: {e}") from e
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
def _post_resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""The orchestrator's `/resolve` payload for this client, or None if
unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an
unreachable / unexpected-status / malformed response so every caller
can fail closed. Shared by `resolve` and `resolve_bottle_id`."""
return self._post_json(
"/resolve", {"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token},
)
def propose_supervise(
self,
source_ip: str,
identity_token: str,
*,
tool: str,
proposed_file: str,
justification: str,
) -> str | None:
"""Queue a supervise proposal on the control plane and return its
`proposal_id`. The orchestrator attributes the proposal to the calling
bottle by `(source_ip, identity_token)` — exactly like `/resolve` — so a
bottle can only ever queue its *own* proposals. Returns None when the
pair is unattributed (a clean `403`); raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
orchestrator can't be reached, so the data-plane caller fails closed
(blocks / refuses) rather than silently dropping the proposal."""
payload = self._post_json("/supervise/propose", {
"source_ip": source_ip,
"identity_token": identity_token,
"tool": tool,
"proposed_file": proposed_file,
"justification": justification,
})
if payload is None:
return None
proposal_id = payload.get("proposal_id")
return proposal_id if isinstance(proposal_id, str) and proposal_id else None
def poll_supervise(
self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""Poll a queued proposal for the operator's decision, **non-blocking**.
Attributed by `(source_ip, identity_token)` so a bottle can only read its
*own* proposal's response. Returns `{"status": ...}` where status is one
of the terminal decisions (`approved`/`modified`/`rejected`, carrying
`notes` + `final_file`), `pending` (queued, no decision yet), or
`unknown` (no such queued proposal for this bottle). Returns None when
unattributed; raises `PolicyResolveError` if unreachable."""
return self._post_json("/supervise/poll", {
"source_ip": source_ip,
"identity_token": identity_token,
"proposal_id": proposal_id,
})
def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
"""The calling bottle's policy blob, or None if unattributed. Always
fetches from the orchestrator so revocations / changes / teardowns
are honored immediately.
`identity_token` is optional *transitionally* — omitting it resolves
by source IP alone (the network-layer attribution, sound by
construction on Firecracker's `/31`+nft, weaker elsewhere). The
consolidated end state makes the token mandatory so the app-layer
defense is always enforced, not silently degraded; that flips at the
`/resolve` boundary once identity-token *delivery* lands (a PRD 0070
open question — we can't require what the agent can't yet present).
Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the orchestrator can't be reached."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None
policy = payload.get("policy")
return policy if isinstance(policy, str) else ""
def resolve_bottle_id(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
"""The calling bottle's id, or None if unattributed. This is the
source-IP-keyed identity the git-gate uses to select the bottle's
repo namespace (there is no per-bottle policy blob to parse — the
bottle *is* the namespace). Same fail-closed contract as `resolve`."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None
bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
return bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None
def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict[str, str]]:
"""The policy blob, bottle id, **and per-bottle egress auth tokens** in
a single `/resolve` — so the egress addon gets everything it needs
(policy for routing, bottle id for the supervise queue/safelist, tokens
to inject upstream auth) in one round-trip. Returns `(None, None, {})`
when unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
orchestrator can't be reached, so the caller still fails closed."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None, None, {}
policy = payload.get("policy")
bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
raw = payload.get("tokens")
tokens = {
k: v for k, v in raw.items() if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, str)
} if isinstance(raw, dict) else {}
return (
policy if isinstance(policy, str) else "",
bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None,
tokens,
)
__all__ = ["PolicyResolver", "PolicyResolveError"]