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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/orchestrator/broker.py
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refactor(orchestrator): rename Sidecar -> Gateway for the consolidated data plane
Retire "sidecar" for the consolidated per-host path (PRD 0070 naming
decision): the orchestrator is the umbrella/control plane, and the
egress/git/supervise data-plane unit it runs is the "gateway".

- git mv sidecar.py -> gateway.py and the two integration + one unit test
  files; DockerSidecar->DockerGateway, Sidecar->Gateway,
  SidecarError->GatewayError, SIDECAR_*->GATEWAY_*, ensure_sidecar->
  ensure_gateway, sidecar_status->gateway_status, container name
  bot-bottle-orch-sidecar->bot-bottle-orch-gateway.
- Prose rename across broker/registry/egress/policy_resolver + PRD 0070.
- Preserved: the image name bot-bottle-sidecars, the
  BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE env var, Dockerfile.sidecars, and PRD 0069's
  own stage-name cross-references (that doc still uses "sidecar").

No behavior change. Full unit suite green (1679 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-13 18:12:17 -04:00

177 lines
6.1 KiB
Python

"""Launch broker contract (PRD 0070).
A VM/container can't spawn its own host-network siblings, so the
orchestrator brokers agent launches through a small privileged component.
The request it sends is:
* **structured** — static flags + ids only (bottle id, pool slot, a
content-addressed image ref), never a free-form path or argv, so a
request can't be coerced into launching an arbitrary payload; and
* **signed** — wrapped as a compact JWS/JWT the broker verifies before
acting, so a *compromised co-located component* (an agent-facing
gateway, say) can't forge a launch. This is the concrete form of the
"structured requests only" rule in the PRD security review.
Signing is **HS256** over a secret shared by the orchestrator (signer) and
the broker (verifier) — appropriate here because both are trusted host
components provisioned together; the secret is exactly what an
agent-facing component does not have. (Stdlib only — the project takes no
runtime deps; a cross-host deployment could swap in an asymmetric alg.)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import abc
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import secrets
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
_JWT_HEADER = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}
_ALLOWED_OPS = ("launch", "teardown")
class BrokerAuthError(Exception):
"""A broker request failed provenance or schema verification —
bad/absent signature, malformed token, or a payload that doesn't match
the fixed launch-request shape. Fail-closed: the broker must not act."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LaunchRequest:
"""The structured, un-coercible launch/teardown request. Ids + flags
only — `image_ref` is a content-addressed id, never a path/argv."""
op: str # one of _ALLOWED_OPS
bottle_id: str
source_ip: str = ""
image_ref: str = ""
slot: int | None = None
# --- minimal JWS/JWT (HS256), stdlib only ----------------------------------
def _b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
def _b64url_decode(text: str) -> bytes:
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(text + "=" * (-len(text) % 4))
def _mac(signing_input: str, secret: bytes) -> str:
digest = hmac.new(secret, signing_input.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
return _b64url(digest)
def sign_request(req: LaunchRequest, secret: bytes) -> str:
"""Serialize `req` to signed-JWT form. Adds a per-signature `jti`
(replay id) and `iat` (issued-at)."""
claims: dict[str, object] = {
"op": req.op,
"bottle_id": req.bottle_id,
"source_ip": req.source_ip,
"image_ref": req.image_ref,
"slot": req.slot,
"jti": secrets.token_hex(8),
"iat": int(time.time()),
}
header = _b64url(json.dumps(_JWT_HEADER, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
payload = _b64url(json.dumps(claims, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
signing_input = f"{header}.{payload}"
return f"{signing_input}.{_mac(signing_input, secret)}"
def verify_request(token: str, secret: bytes) -> LaunchRequest:
"""Verify the signature and the request shape; return the parsed
request. Raises `BrokerAuthError` on any failure (fail-closed)."""
parts = token.split(".")
if len(parts) != 3:
raise BrokerAuthError("malformed token")
header_b, payload_b, sig = parts
if not hmac.compare_digest(_mac(f"{header_b}.{payload_b}", secret), sig):
raise BrokerAuthError("bad signature")
try:
header = json.loads(_b64url_decode(header_b))
claims = json.loads(_b64url_decode(payload_b))
except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
raise BrokerAuthError("malformed token payload") from e
if not isinstance(header, dict) or header.get("alg") != "HS256":
raise BrokerAuthError("unexpected header/alg")
if not isinstance(claims, dict):
raise BrokerAuthError("claims are not an object")
op = claims.get("op")
bottle_id = claims.get("bottle_id")
source_ip = claims.get("source_ip", "")
image_ref = claims.get("image_ref", "")
slot = claims.get("slot")
if (
not isinstance(op, str) or op not in _ALLOWED_OPS
or not isinstance(bottle_id, str) or not bottle_id
or not isinstance(source_ip, str) or not isinstance(image_ref, str)
or not (slot is None or isinstance(slot, int))
):
raise BrokerAuthError("request does not match the launch-request schema")
return LaunchRequest(
op=op, bottle_id=bottle_id, source_ip=source_ip, image_ref=image_ref, slot=slot
)
# --- the broker itself ------------------------------------------------------
class LaunchBroker(abc.ABC):
"""Verifies a signed request came from the orchestrator, then performs
the backend-native launch/teardown. Subclasses implement `_launch` /
`_teardown`; verification is shared and fail-closed."""
def __init__(self, secret: bytes) -> None:
self._secret = secret
def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest:
"""Verify `token` and perform its op. Returns the verified request;
raises `BrokerAuthError` if provenance/shape fails."""
req = verify_request(token, self._secret)
if req.op == "launch":
self._launch(req)
else:
self._teardown(req)
return req
@abc.abstractmethod
def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
...
@abc.abstractmethod
def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
...
class StubBroker(LaunchBroker):
"""Dev-harness broker: records verified requests without launching
anything. Exercises the full sign -> verify -> act contract in-process."""
def __init__(self, secret: bytes) -> None:
super().__init__(secret)
self.launched: list[LaunchRequest] = []
self.torn_down: list[LaunchRequest] = []
def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
self.launched.append(req)
def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
self.torn_down.append(req)
__all__ = [
"BrokerAuthError",
"LaunchRequest",
"LaunchBroker",
"StubBroker",
"sign_request",
"verify_request",
]