docs/prds/0012-stuck-agent-recovery-flow.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ A real stuck agent recovers end-to-end in each of the three categories: a **cred
 
 - Live attach or in-place mutation of running containers. The whole design exists to avoid this.
 - Agent-to-agent communication. Re-stated from the project's existing non-goals; the recovery flow is human→agent only.
-- Auditing or forensic replay of agent runs. Git/forge history is the audit log; this PRD does not add a separate run log.
+- Auditing or forensic replay of agent runs. Git/Gitea history is the audit log; this PRD does not add a separate run log.
 - Reducing time-to-unstuck below some target. Faster than kill-and-restart is implicit, but no specific SLO is in scope.
 
 ## Stuck categories

docs/research/agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md

@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ In priority order:
    npm even if it captures something. Also disable Sentry error
    reporting via `DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING=1`.
 
-3. **Generalize the same proxy to forge tokens.** Add a manifest
+3. **Generalize the same proxy to Git-host tokens.** Add a manifest
    field along the lines of
-   `forge: { kind: "gitea", url, tokenRef }` so a per-bottle token
+   `git_host: { kind: "gitea", url, tokenRef }` so a per-bottle token
    reference resolves at launch, the proxy starts as root before
    `node` is exec'd, and `tea` plus git HTTPS remotes are
    pre-configured to point at the proxy. Use

docs/research/secret-minimization-over-dlp.md

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ telemetry to `statsig.anthropic.com` — are documented in
 [`agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md`](agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md)
 §Anthropic / Claude Code.
 
-**Forge-API gate (Gitea / GitHub / GitLab).** Holds the PAT;
+**Git-host-API gate (Gitea / GitHub / GitLab).** Holds the PAT;
 exposes a narrow REST surface. Token auth on all three is
 stateless `Authorization`-header injection — no CSRF, no request
 signing, no per-request nonce — so one proxy generalizes by
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ Add a `secret: true` flag (or a `secrets:` sibling of `env:`) that:
   AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY").
 - Refuses to launch if `egress.allowlist` contains any host that
   is not source-controlled by the user (heuristic: not on a
-  built-in `KNOWN_FORGE_HOSTS` list).
+  built-in `KNOWN_GIT_HOSTS` list).
 - Forces an explicit acknowledgement that a credential is being
   placed into the bottle rather than behind a gate.
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ In priority order:
    ([`agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md`](agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md)
    §Recommended). Removes the highest-value secret and closes the
    passthrough hole as a side effect.
-2. **Forge-API gate** (same doc, same section — one proxy
+2. **Git-host-API gate** (same doc, same section — one proxy
    generalizes across Gitea / GitHub / GitLab by config).
 3. **Egress data budget** in pipelock — small lift, large damage
    bound.