PRD 0036: Codex Auth Redaction Policy #132

Merged
didericis merged 3 commits from prd-0036-codex-auth-redaction into main 2026-06-02 04:14:31 -04:00
3 changed files with 236 additions and 31 deletions
+45 -22
View File
@@ -187,8 +187,10 @@ def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
out[key] = inner if isinstance(inner, list) else []
elif isinstance(inner, bool):
out[key] = inner
elif isinstance(inner, (dict, list)):
out[key] = _redact_claims(inner)
elif isinstance(inner, dict):
out[key] = {}
elif isinstance(inner, list):
out[key] = []
else:
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
return out
@@ -237,28 +239,49 @@ def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict:
def _redact_codex_auth(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> object:
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower == "auth_mode" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
out[key] = inner
elif lower == "openai_api_key":
out[key] = None
elif lower == "tokens":
out[key] = _redact_token_block(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
else:
out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
return out
def _redact_token_block(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
tokens = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in tokens.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower in {"access_token", "id_token"}:
out[key] = _dummy_jwt_from_host(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif lower == "account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
# Current Codex uses this non-secret selected account id
# while egress owns the real bearer token.
out[key] = inner
else:
out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
return out
def _redact_unknown_auth_value(value: object) -> object:
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
if isinstance(value, dict):
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in value.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower == "openai_api_key":
out[key] = None
elif lower == "tokens":
out[key] = _redact_codex_auth(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif lower in {"access_token", "id_token"}:
out[key] = _dummy_jwt_from_host(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif "token" in lower or "secret" in lower or lower.endswith("_key"):
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
elif lower == "account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
out[key] = inner
elif lower in {"account_id", "user_id", "email"}:
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
else:
out[key] = _redact_codex_auth(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
return out
return {}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_redact_codex_auth(v, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts) for v in value]
return value
return []
if value is None:
return None
return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
# PRD 0036: Codex Auth Redaction Policy
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #129
## Summary
Make Codex host-auth redaction explicit and fixture-driven so dummy
`auth.json` generation cannot accidentally preserve future sensitive fields.
Keep forwarding only the short-lived host access token through egress, while the
guest receives a non-secret auth file whose schema remains useful to Codex.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/codex_auth.py` reads the host Codex auth file, extracts the access
token for egress, and writes a dummy guest `auth.json`. The code redacts JWT
claims and auth JSON fields with a mix of schema-specific handling and generic
placeholder behavior.
That is safer than copying raw auth, but it is still coverage-sensitive. If
Codex adds a new field that carries a token, session identifier, refresh secret,
or account metadata and the field name does not match current heuristics, the
dummy auth file could preserve more information than intended. Because this is
credential-adjacent code, the desired behavior should be allowlist-oriented and
backed by explicit fixtures.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- Define a durable redaction policy for Codex `auth.json`:
- host access token is read for egress only.
- guest dummy auth contains no bearer, refresh, session, or secret values.
- selected non-secret fields may be preserved only when needed by Codex.
- Prefer explicit per-field preservation over broad heuristic pass-through.
- Add representative fixture tests for current Codex auth shapes.
- Add regression tests for unknown nested fields, sensitive-looking field names,
lists, dictionaries, and JWT custom claims.
- Preserve dummy token expiration alignment with the host access token.
- Keep existing errors for missing, invalid, non-device, or expired auth.
## Non-goals
- No change to the egress credential-forwarding contract.
- No attempt to refresh Codex tokens inside the bottle.
- No copying of refresh tokens or raw host auth into the guest.
- No dependency on a Codex SDK or external schema package.
- No user-facing CLI changes.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/codex_auth.py` redaction helpers.
- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_codex_auth.py`.
- Small documentation comments that distinguish preserved non-secret fields from
redacted credential material.
Out of scope:
- Provider provisioning outside Codex auth file generation.
- Egress route construction for Codex.
- Runtime calls to Codex/OpenAI services.
## Design
Treat the dummy guest `auth.json` as a deliberately synthesized compatibility
file, not as a redacted copy of the host file. The implementation may continue
to start from the host object for convenience, but preserved fields should be
controlled by explicit allowlists at known schema locations.
At the top level, preserve only `auth_mode`, replace `OPENAI_API_KEY` /
`openai_api_key` with `null`, and synthesize the `tokens` block. Unknown scalar
top-level fields become placeholders, unknown lists become empty lists, and
unknown dictionaries become empty objects.
In token blocks, replace `access_token` and `id_token` with dummy JWTs, preserve
the selected non-secret `account_id`, and redact every other token-block field
with the same placeholder / empty container policy. Refresh, session, and future
token values are never copied to the guest.
In JWT payloads, preserve only claims that are known to be non-secret and
required for Codex behavior. Unknown scalar claims become placeholders, unknown
lists become empty lists, and unknown objects become empty objects.
For the OpenAI auth claim, preserve only currently necessary non-secret values
such as plan type, selected account id, and boolean localhost state. Everything
else is placeholder, empty object, or empty list according to the policy.
Tests should use fixture auth objects that include both current expected fields
and intentionally hostile future-looking fields such as `session_context`,
`bearer`, `refreshSecret`, nested `token_value`, and opaque arrays. The dummy
output must not contain the original secret strings.
## Testing Strategy
- Existing `tests/unit/test_codex_auth.py` should continue to pass.
- Add tests that assert original access/refresh/session strings do not appear in
`codex_dummy_auth_json`.
- Add tests for nested JWT and auth-claim redaction behavior.
- Add tests that the dummy access/id token `exp` still matches the host access
token expiry.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_codex_auth`
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
None.
+80 -9
View File
@@ -18,10 +18,14 @@ from bot_bottle.log import Die
def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
return _jwt_with_payload({"exp": exp})
def _jwt_with_payload(payload: dict) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc({'exp': exp})}.sig"
return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc(payload)}.sig"
def _jwt_payload(token: str) -> dict:
@@ -154,16 +158,10 @@ class TestCodexHostAccessToken(unittest.TestCase):
)
def test_dummy_auth_keeps_required_account_claim_shape(self):
def jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc(payload)}.sig"
self._write({
"auth_mode": "chatgpt",
"tokens": {
"access_token": jwt({
"access_token": _jwt_with_payload({
"exp": 2000000000,
"https://api.openai.com/auth": {
"chatgpt_plan_type": "plus",
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ class TestCodexHostAccessToken(unittest.TestCase):
"email_verified": True,
},
}),
"id_token": jwt({
"id_token": _jwt_with_payload({
"exp": 2000000000,
"email": "real@example.invalid",
"email_verified": True,
@@ -202,6 +200,79 @@ class TestCodexHostAccessToken(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle@example.invalid", profile["email"])
self.assertTrue(profile["email_verified"])
def test_dummy_auth_redacts_unknown_future_auth_fields(self):
secrets = [
"top-session-secret",
"top-nested-secret",
"refresh-secret",
"session-token-secret",
"jwt-custom-secret",
"jwt-nested-secret",
"jwt-list-secret",
"id-token-secret",
"auth-claim-secret",
"auth-claim-nested-secret",
"top-list-secret",
"token-nested-secret",
"token-list-secret",
]
self._write({
"auth_mode": "chatgpt",
"session_context": "top-session-secret",
"future_nested": {"value": "top-nested-secret"},
"future_list": ["top-list-secret"],
"tokens": {
"access_token": _jwt_with_payload({
"exp": 2000000000,
"custom_session": "jwt-custom-secret",
"future_nested": {"value": "jwt-nested-secret"},
"future_list": ["jwt-list-secret"],
"https://api.openai.com/auth": {
"chatgpt_plan_type": "plus",
"chatgpt_account_id": "acct-real",
"session_context": "auth-claim-secret",
"nested": {"value": "auth-claim-nested-secret"},
},
}),
"id_token": _jwt_with_payload({
"exp": 2000000000,
"opaque": "id-token-secret",
}),
"refresh_token": "refresh-secret",
"session_token": "session-token-secret",
"future_object": {"value": "token-nested-secret"},
"future_list": ["token-list-secret"],
"account_id": "acct-host",
},
})
dummy_json = codex_dummy_auth_json(
{"CODEX_HOME": str(self.home)},
now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
)
for secret in secrets:
self.assertNotIn(secret, dummy_json)
dummy = json.loads(dummy_json)
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["session_context"])
self.assertEqual({}, dummy["future_nested"])
self.assertEqual([], dummy["future_list"])
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["tokens"]["refresh_token"])
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", dummy["tokens"]["session_token"])
self.assertEqual({}, dummy["tokens"]["future_object"])
self.assertEqual([], dummy["tokens"]["future_list"])
access_payload = _jwt_payload(dummy["tokens"]["access_token"])
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle-placeholder",
access_payload["custom_session"],
)
self.assertEqual({}, access_payload["future_nested"])
self.assertEqual([], access_payload["future_list"])
auth = access_payload["https://api.openai.com/auth"]
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-placeholder", auth["session_context"])
self.assertEqual({}, auth["nested"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()