feat(orchestrator): durable launch-broker secret via TrustDomain (#468 )

Chunk 2 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's **durable secret** gap and replace chunk 1's BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET stopgap. - trust_domain.py: two new domains. LAUNCH_BROKER holds the durable HS256 key both the orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share for the broker's launch JWT — a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, so a restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key. HOST_CONTROLLER is the separate domain for the controller's own lifecycle endpoints, keyed by a key the orchestrator never holds (its role is `host`, deliberately outside control-plane ROLES). LaunchBrokerProvisioning is the fail-closed seam. - orchestrator_auth.py: ROLE_HOST, outside ROLES. - paths.py: key-file + env-var constants for both domains. Key resolution is split by owner (addresses codex review on #497): broker_secret(allow_host_file=...) — the host controller / dev-harness (True) may mint/read the durable host key file it owns; the GUEST orchestrator (--broker http, default False) must be *injected* the key and fails closed if it isn't. A guest that fell back to the host file would mint a process-local key unrelated to the host controller's, so startup would succeed but every launch would 401 — this prevents that silent divergence. Tested: domain boundary + separation, provisioning fail-closed, and broker_secret env-only (guest) vs host-file (host) resolution. pyright clean; pylint 9.86. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(secret): authenticate bottled-secret encryption (#468 )
2026-07-26 20:36:46 +00:00 · 2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00 · 2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00 · 2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00 · 2026-07-26 13:32:41 -04:00 · 2026-07-26 13:32:41 -04:00
66 changed files with 1619 additions and 8415 deletions
@@ -4,13 +4,6 @@ on:
  push:
    paths:
      - "**.py"
-      - "Dockerfile*"
-      - "bot_bottle/contrib/*/Dockerfile"
-      - "bot_bottle/contrib/*/package.json"
-      - "bot_bottle/contrib/*/package-lock.json"
-      - "bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS"
-      - "requirements.gateway.*"
-      - "image-build-args.json"
      - ".pylintrc"
      - ".gitea/workflows/lint.yml"

@@ -20,9 +13,6 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v3

-      - name: Enforce immutable image inputs
-        run: python3 scripts/check_image_inputs.py
-
      # No actions/setup-python: the runner image already ships Python 3.12,
      # and older act_runner engines mishandle setup-python's PATH. Install
      # into the ephemeral job container's system Python — the pylint/pyright
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-# Manually refresh the committed package locks and the pinned Codex installer
-# checksum after deliberately changing a direct version in the source files.
-#
-# The job uploads the generated files for review; it never commits or pushes.
-
-name: refresh-image-locks
-
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  push:
-    paths:
-      - 'requirements.gateway.in'
-      - 'bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package.json'
-      - 'bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package.json'
-      - 'bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile'
-      - 'image-build-args.json'
-      - '.gitea/workflows/refresh-image-locks.yml'
-
-permissions:
-  code: read
-
-jobs:
-  refresh:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Resolve image runtime versions
-        id: runtimes
-        run: |
-          python3 - <<'PY' >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          import json
-          import re
-          inputs = json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))
-          for output, name in (
-              ("python-version", "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"),
-              ("node-version", "NODE_BASE_IMAGE"),
-          ):
-              match = re.search(r":(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)-", inputs[name])
-              if match is None:
-                  raise SystemExit(f"cannot resolve runtime version from {name}")
-              print(f"{output}={match.group(1)}")
-          PY
-
-      - name: Use the image Python version
-        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
-        with:
-          python-version: '${{ steps.runtimes.outputs.python-version }}'
-
-      - name: Use the image Node version
-        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '${{ steps.runtimes.outputs.node-version }}'
-
-      - name: Compile gateway Python lock
-        run: |
-          python3 -m venv /tmp/image-lock-tools
-          /tmp/image-lock-tools/bin/python -m pip install \
-            pip==25.2 \
-            pip-tools==7.5.1
-          /tmp/image-lock-tools/bin/python -m piptools compile \
-            --generate-hashes \
-            --output-file requirements.gateway.lock \
-            requirements.gateway.in
-
-      - name: Resolve provider npm locks
-        run: |
-          for provider in claude pi; do
-            (
-              cd "bot_bottle/contrib/$provider"
-              npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund
-            )
-          done
-          python3 scripts/complete_npm_lock_integrity.py \
-            bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package-lock.json \
-            bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package-lock.json
-
-      - name: Refresh pinned Codex archive checksums
-        run: |
-          CODEX_VERSION=$(
-            sed -n 's/^ARG CODEX_VERSION=//p' bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile
-          )
-          test -n "$CODEX_VERSION"
-          curl -fsSL \
-            "https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/download/rust-v${CODEX_VERSION}/codex-package_SHA256SUMS" \
-            -o bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS
-
-      - name: Upload refreshed inputs
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
-        with:
-          name: image-input-locks
-          path: |
-            requirements.gateway.lock
-            bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package-lock.json
-            bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package-lock.json
-            bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS
@@ -22,14 +22,11 @@ on:
      - 'scripts/**/*.py'
      - 'scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh'
      - 'Dockerfile*'
-      - 'image-build-args.json'
      - 'pyproject.toml'
      - 'requirements-dev.txt'
-      - 'requirements.gateway.*'
      - '.coveragerc'
      - '.dockerignore'
      - '.gitea/workflows/test.yml'
-      - '.gitea/workflows/refresh-image-locks.yml'
      - '.gitea/workflows/pre-release-test.yml'
  pull_request:
    paths:
@@ -46,14 +43,11 @@ on:
      - 'scripts/**/*.py'
      - 'scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh'
      - 'Dockerfile*'
-      - 'image-build-args.json'
      - 'pyproject.toml'
      - 'requirements-dev.txt'
-      - 'requirements.gateway.*'
      - '.coveragerc'
      - '.dockerignore'
      - '.gitea/workflows/test.yml'
-      - '.gitea/workflows/refresh-image-locks.yml'
      - '.gitea/workflows/pre-release-test.yml'

 jobs:
@@ -143,114 +137,6 @@ jobs:
          name: coverage-docker
          path: coverage-docker.dat

-  image-input-builds:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Verify shared bases cover supported architectures
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          python_ref=$(python3 -c \
-            'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"])')
-          node_ref=$(python3 -c \
-            'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["NODE_BASE_IMAGE"])')
-          docker_cli_ref=$(python3 -c \
-            'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE"])')
-          test -n "$python_ref"
-          test -n "$node_ref"
-          test -n "$docker_cli_ref"
-          for ref in "$python_ref" "$node_ref" "$docker_cli_ref"; do
-            docker buildx imagetools inspect --raw "$ref" |
-              python3 -c '
-          import json
-          import sys
-          manifest = json.load(sys.stdin)
-          platforms = {
-              (item["platform"]["os"], item["platform"]["architecture"])
-              for item in manifest["manifests"]
-              if item.get("platform", {}).get("os") != "unknown"
-          }
-          required = {("linux", "amd64"), ("linux", "arm64")}
-          missing = required - platforms
-          if missing:
-              raise SystemExit(f"base manifest lacks supported platforms: {missing}")
-          '
-          done
-
-      - name: Verify Codex archives for all supported architectures
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          codex_version=$(
-            sed -n 's/^ARG CODEX_VERSION=//p' bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile
-          )
-          test -n "$codex_version"
-          tmp=$(mktemp -d)
-          trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
-          for target in \
-            aarch64-unknown-linux-musl \
-            x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
-          do
-            asset="codex-package-${target}.tar.gz"
-            expected=$(
-              awk -v asset="$asset" '$2 == asset { print $1 }' \
-                bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS
-            )
-            test -n "$expected"
-            curl -fsSL \
-              "https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/download/rust-v${codex_version}/${asset}" \
-              -o "$tmp/$asset"
-            echo "$expected  $tmp/$asset" | sha256sum -c -
-            tar -tzf "$tmp/$asset" > "$tmp/$asset.contents"
-            grep -Fx 'bin/codex' "$tmp/$asset.contents"
-            grep -Fx 'bin/codex-code-mode-host' "$tmp/$asset.contents"
-            grep -Fx 'codex-package.json' "$tmp/$asset.contents"
-          done
-
-      - name: Build and smoke-test all supported images
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          suffix="${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-${GITHUB_RUN_NUMBER:-image-inputs}}"
-          orchestrator="bot-bottle-orchestrator-inputs:${suffix}"
-          gateway="bot-bottle-gateway-inputs:${suffix}"
-          orchestrator_fc="bot-bottle-orchestrator-fc-inputs:${suffix}"
-          claude="bot-bottle-claude-inputs:${suffix}"
-          codex="bot-bottle-codex-inputs:${suffix}"
-          pi="bot-bottle-pi-inputs:${suffix}"
-          python_base=$(python3 -c \
-            'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"])')
-          node_base=$(python3 -c \
-            'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["NODE_BASE_IMAGE"])')
-
-          docker build --build-arg "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE=$python_base" \
-            -t "$orchestrator" -f Dockerfile.orchestrator .
-          orchestrator_id=$(docker image inspect --format '{{.Id}}' "$orchestrator")
-          case "$orchestrator_id" in sha256:*) ;; *) exit 1 ;; esac
-          orchestrator_base="bot-bottle-orchestrator-inputs:sha256-${orchestrator_id#sha256:}"
-          docker image tag "$orchestrator_id" "$orchestrator_base"
-          test "$(
-            docker image inspect --format '{{.Id}}' "$orchestrator_base"
-          )" = "$orchestrator_id"
-          docker build --build-arg "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE=$python_base" \
-            -t "$gateway" -f Dockerfile.gateway .
-          docker build \
-            --build-arg "ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE=$orchestrator_base" \
-            -t "$orchestrator_fc" -f Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc .
-          docker build --build-arg "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=$node_base" \
-            -t "$claude" -f bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile .
-          docker build --build-arg "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=$node_base" \
-            -t "$codex" -f bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile .
-          docker build --build-arg "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=$node_base" \
-            -t "$pi" -f bot_bottle/contrib/pi/Dockerfile .
-
-          docker run --rm --entrypoint python3 "$orchestrator" -c \
-            'import bot_bottle.orchestrator'
-          docker run --rm --entrypoint mitmdump "$gateway" --version
-          docker run --rm "$claude" claude --version
-          docker run --rm "$codex" codex --version
-          docker run --rm "$pi" pi --version
-
  coverage:
    needs: [unit, integration-docker]
    timeout-minutes: 15
@@ -36,23 +36,11 @@
 #   9420  git-gate smart HTTP (VM-backend agent-facing transport)
 #   9100  supervise (MCP HTTP)

-# Based on an exact `python:3.12.13-slim-trixie` multi-architecture manifest
-# rather than the
+# Based on `python:3.12-slim` (Debian trixie) rather than the
 # `mitmproxy/mitmproxy` image (Debian bookworm), matching the trixie base the
 # orchestrator image needs for buildah (Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc). mitmproxy
 # is pip-installed to the same effect as the upstream image.
-ARG PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE}
-
-# Freeze apt's package universe as well as the base filesystem. Without a
-# snapshot, the same Dockerfile resolves different package versions over time.
-ARG DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=20260724T000000Z
-RUN sed -i \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
+FROM python:3.12-slim

 # Runtime system deps:
 #   git supplies the `git daemon` subcommand (no separate package)
@@ -60,19 +48,16 @@ RUN sed -i \
 #   openssh-client supplies the upstream SSH transport the
 #     pre-receive hook uses to forward accepted refs.
 #   ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS.
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
 && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
      git openssh-client ca-certificates \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

 # mitmdump (the egress data plane). The upstream mitmproxy image baked
-# this in; on the plain python base we install a fully resolved lock whose
-# distributions are all hash-verified. Its CA dir is set explicitly via
-# `--set confdir=` in
+# this in; on the plain python base we pip-install the same pinned
+# version. Its CA dir is set explicitly via `--set confdir=` in
 # egress-entrypoint.sh, so it doesn't depend on a `mitmproxy` home user.
-COPY requirements.gateway.lock /tmp/requirements.gateway.lock
-RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes \
-      -r /tmp/requirements.gateway.lock
+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir mitmproxy==11.1.3

 # gitleaks (the pre-receive hook's secret scanner). Installed from its
 # official release, pinned by version + SHA256 and verified — rather than
@@ -16,12 +16,9 @@
 # secret-dense control plane on a minimal dependency surface is the point
 # (PRD 0070's "secret concentration").
 #
-# Shares an exact multi-architecture Python/trixie manifest with the gateway
-# image. The version-qualified tag keeps the human-readable upstream version;
-# the digest makes the bytes immutable.
+# Shares the trixie `python:3.12-slim` base with the gateway image.

-ARG PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE}
+FROM python:3.12-slim

 WORKDIR /app

@@ -12,21 +12,10 @@
 # bare microVM (no fuse-overlayfs / overlay module / subuid maps). The trixie
 # base (from Dockerfile.orchestrator's python:3.12-slim) carries buildah 1.39,
 # which parses the Dockerfile heredocs agent images use (bookworm's 1.28 can't).
-# Matches image_builder. There is deliberately no default: the build coordinator
-# passes the exact local image ID returned by `docker image inspect`, so this
-# stage cannot silently resolve a stale `:latest` tag.
-ARG ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE}
+# Matches image_builder.
+FROM bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest

-ARG DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=20260724T000000Z
-RUN sed -i \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
-
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
 && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
      buildah crun netavark aardvark-dns \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -4,8 +4,5 @@
 include Dockerfile.gateway
 include Dockerfile.orchestrator
 include Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc
-include image-build-args.json
-include requirements.gateway.in
-include requirements.gateway.lock
 include nix/firecracker-netpool.nix
 include scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh
@@ -96,11 +96,6 @@ class DockerGateway(Gateway):
                str(context)]
        if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"):
            argv.insert(2, "--no-cache")
-        for name, value in resources.image_build_args(
-            self._dockerfile,
-            context=context,
-        ).items():
-            argv[-1:-1] = ["--build-arg", f"{name}={value}"]
        proc = run_docker(argv)
        if proc.returncode != 0:
            raise GatewayError(f"gateway image build failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
@@ -131,11 +131,6 @@ class DockerOrchestrator(Orchestrator):
                str(self._repo_root)]
        if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"):
            argv.insert(2, "--no-cache")
-        for name, value in resources.image_build_args(
-            self._dockerfile,
-            context=self._repo_root,
-        ).items():
-            argv[-1:-1] = ["--build-arg", f"{name}={value}"]
        proc = run_docker(argv)
        if proc.returncode != 0:
            raise GatewayError(
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import shutil
 import subprocess
 from typing import Iterator

-from ... import resources
 from ...log import die, info
 from ...util import slugify as _slugify

@@ -120,13 +119,7 @@ def docker_cp(src: str, dest: str) -> None:
            f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}")


-def build_image(
-    ref: str,
-    context: str,
-    *,
-    dockerfile: str = "",
-    build_args: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> None:
+def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
    """Invokes `docker build` every call. Layer cache makes no-change
    rebuilds cheap; running every time means Dockerfile edits land
    without manual `docker rmi`.
@@ -146,61 +139,10 @@ def build_image(
        args.append("--no-cache")
    if dockerfile:
        args.extend(["-f", dockerfile])
-    effective_build_args = resources.image_build_args(
-        dockerfile,
-        context=context,
-    ) if dockerfile else {}
-    effective_build_args.update(build_args or {})
-    for name, value in effective_build_args.items():
-        args.extend(["--build-arg", f"{name}={value}"])
    args.append(context)
    subprocess.run(args, check=True)


-def image_id(ref: str) -> str:
-    """Return the exact content-addressed ID for a local image.
-
-    This is used when one locally built image is another Dockerfile's base:
-    passing the ID prevents a mutable tag from being resolved between builds.
-    """
-    result = run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Id}}", ref])
-    image = result.stdout.strip()
-    if result.returncode != 0 or not image.startswith("sha256:"):
-        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
-        die(f"could not resolve exact image ID for {ref!r}: {detail or '<no detail>'}")
-    return image
-
-
-def pinned_local_image_ref(ref: str) -> str:
-    """Give a local image a content-derived tag and verify the tag resolves
-    back to the same image ID.
-
-    BuildKit treats a bare ``sha256:...`` ID in ``FROM`` as a registry
-    repository name. A tag whose complete suffix is the local image ID remains
-    resolvable by BuildKit, while the post-tag inspection keeps the handoff
-    fail-closed.
-    """
-    image = image_id(ref)
-    digest = image.removeprefix("sha256:")
-    if len(digest) != 64 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in digest):
-        die(f"could not derive a local base tag from invalid image ID {image!r}")
-
-    repository = ref.split("@", 1)[0]
-    last_slash = repository.rfind("/")
-    last_colon = repository.rfind(":")
-    if last_colon > last_slash:
-        repository = repository[:last_colon]
-    pinned_ref = f"{repository}:sha256-{digest}"
-
-    result = run_docker(["docker", "image", "tag", image, pinned_ref])
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
-        die(f"could not tag exact local image {image}: {detail or '<no detail>'}")
-    if image_id(pinned_ref) != image:
-        die(f"content-derived local tag {pinned_ref!r} did not resolve to {image}")
-    return pinned_ref
-
-
 def verify_agent_image(image: str, argv: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
    """Run `argv` inside a throwaway container of a freshly built agent
    image and die loudly if it fails, instead of shipping an image
@@ -19,14 +19,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import fcntl
 import hashlib
 import os
-import shlex
 import shutil
 import subprocess
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Generator

-from ... import resources
 from ...log import die, info
 from . import util
 from .infra import FirecrackerInfraService
@@ -57,11 +55,6 @@ def _rootfs_digest(dockerfile: Path) -> str:
    h = hashlib.sha256()
    h.update(_dockerfile_hash(dockerfile).encode())
    h.update(b"\0")
-    for name, value in resources.image_build_args(dockerfile).items():
-        h.update(name.encode())
-        h.update(b"=")
-        h.update(value.encode())
-        h.update(b"\0")
    h.update(util._GUEST_INIT.encode())
    return h.hexdigest()[:16]

@@ -154,13 +147,7 @@ def _build_in_infra(
        if prep.returncode != 0:
            die(f"preparing build dir in the infra VM failed: {prep.stderr.strip()}")
        _send_dockerfile(key, ip, dockerfile, ctx)
-        _buildah_build(
-            key,
-            ip,
-            ctx,
-            tag,
-            resources.image_build_args(dockerfile),
-        )
+        _buildah_build(key, ip, ctx, tag)
        _smoke_test(key, ip, tag, smoke_ctr, smoke_test)
        _stream_rootfs(key, ip, tag, export_ctr, base)
    finally:
@@ -197,26 +184,15 @@ def _send_dockerfile(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, dockerfile: Path, ctx: st
            f"{proc.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()}")


-def _buildah_build(
-    private_key: Path,
-    guest_ip: str,
-    ctx: str,
-    tag: str,
-    build_args: dict[str, str],
-) -> None:
+def _buildah_build(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, ctx: str, tag: str) -> None:
    # Stream buildah's step-by-step output straight to our stderr (like the
    # docker backend's `docker build`), so a long first build (base pull +
    # apt/npm installs) shows live progress instead of a silent wait. The
    # remote stderr is where buildah writes its `STEP i/n` lines.
    info(f"buildah build {tag} in the infra VM (streaming output)")
-    arg_flags = " ".join(
-        f"--build-arg {shlex.quote(f'{name}={value}')}"
-        for name, value in build_args.items()
-    )
    rc = _ssh_streamed(
        private_key, guest_ip,
-        f"buildah build {_BUILD_FLAGS} {arg_flags} "
-        f"-t {tag} -f {ctx}/Dockerfile {ctx}/ctx",
+        f"buildah build {_BUILD_FLAGS} -t {tag} -f {ctx}/Dockerfile {ctx}/ctx",
        timeout=_BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
    )
    if rc != 0:
@@ -49,17 +49,9 @@ _ARTIFACT_FORMAT = "1"
 # from its own generic package; the Dockerfiles baked into each differ (only the
 # orchestrator rootfs carries buildah), so the versions are hashed separately.
 ROLES = ("orchestrator", "gateway")
-_BUILD_INPUTS = {
-    "orchestrator": (
-        "image-build-args.json",
-        "Dockerfile.orchestrator",
-        "Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc",
-    ),
-    "gateway": (
-        "image-build-args.json",
-        "Dockerfile.gateway",
-        "requirements.gateway.lock",
-    ),
+_DOCKERFILES = {
+    "orchestrator": ("Dockerfile.orchestrator", "Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc"),
+    "gateway": ("Dockerfile.gateway",),
 }

 _DEFAULT_BASE = "https://gitea.dideric.is"
@@ -109,7 +101,7 @@ def infra_artifact_version(
        h.update(str(path.relative_to(repo_root)).encode())
        h.update(b"\0")
        h.update(path.read_bytes())
-    for name in _BUILD_INPUTS[role]:
+    for name in _DOCKERFILES[role]:
        h.update(name.encode())
        h.update(b"\0")
        h.update((repo_root / name).read_bytes())
@@ -133,15 +133,10 @@ def build_infra_images_with_docker() -> None:
    root = str(resources.build_root())
    docker_mod.build_image(
        _ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE, root, dockerfile="Dockerfile.orchestrator")
-    orchestrator_base = docker_mod.pinned_local_image_ref(_ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE)
    docker_mod.build_image(
        _GATEWAY_IMAGE, root, dockerfile="Dockerfile.gateway")
    docker_mod.build_image(
-        _ORCHESTRATOR_FC_IMAGE,
-        root,
-        dockerfile="Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc",
-        build_args={"ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE": orchestrator_base},
-    )
+        _ORCHESTRATOR_FC_IMAGE, root, dockerfile="Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc")


 def build_rootfs_dir(role: str) -> Path:
@@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ def _layer_nested_containers(
    """
    if not plan.nested_containers:
        return agent_image
-    pinned_base = container_mod.pinned_local_image_ref(agent_image)
-    derived = f"{pinned_base}{nested_containers_mod.IMAGE_SUFFIX}"
+    derived = f"{agent_image}{nested_containers_mod.IMAGE_SUFFIX}"
    if plan.spec.image_policy == "cached":
        if not container_mod.image_exists(derived):
            die(
@@ -117,10 +116,7 @@ def _layer_nested_containers(
            )
        info(f"using cached nested-container image {derived!r}")
        return derived
-    return nested_containers_mod.build_image(
-        pinned_base,
-        container_mod.build_image,
-    )
+    return nested_containers_mod.build_image(agent_image, container_mod.build_image)


@contextmanager
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ _GUEST_DEVICES = ("/dev/fuse", "/dev/net/tun")


 def build_image(
-    pinned_base: str,
+    base_image: str,
    build: Callable[..., None],
 ) -> str:
    """Layer the nested-container tooling onto an already-built agent image.
@@ -66,15 +66,14 @@ def build_image(
    # TODO(#394): replace this hand-rolled Dockerfile with a docker-layer
    # abstraction once that infrastructure exists.
    """
-    image = f"{pinned_base}{IMAGE_SUFFIX}"
+    image = f"{base_image}{IMAGE_SUFFIX}"
    init_script = Path(__file__).with_name("nested-containers-init.sh")
    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bot-bottle-nested-containers.") as tmp:
        context = Path(tmp)
        shutil.copy2(init_script, context / "nested-containers-init.sh")
        (context / "Dockerfile").write_text(
-            "ARG DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE\n"
-            "FROM ${DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE} AS docker_cli\n"
-            f"FROM {pinned_base}\n"
+            "FROM docker:28-cli AS docker_cli\n"
+            f"FROM {base_image}\n"
            "USER root\n"
            "COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/bin/docker /usr/local/bin/docker\n"
            "COPY --from=docker_cli /usr/local/libexec/docker/cli-plugins/"
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import time
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Iterable

-from ... import resources
 from ...log import die, info


@@ -61,13 +60,7 @@ def dns_server() -> str:
    return _host_ipv4_dns() or _DEFAULT_DNS


-def build_image(
-    ref: str,
-    context: str,
-    *,
-    dockerfile: str = "",
-    build_args: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> None:
+def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
    """Build an OCI image with Apple's BuildKit-backed `container build`.

    Set `BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE=1` (the `start --no-cache` flag) to force
@@ -90,13 +83,6 @@ def build_image(
        if not os.path.isabs(dockerfile):
            dockerfile = os.path.join(context, dockerfile)
        args.extend(["-f", dockerfile])
-    effective_build_args = resources.image_build_args(
-        dockerfile,
-        context=context,
-    ) if dockerfile else {}
-    effective_build_args.update(build_args or {})
-    for name, value in effective_build_args.items():
-        args.extend(["--build-arg", f"{name}={value}"])
    args.append(context)
    subprocess.run(args, check=True)

@@ -682,40 +668,6 @@ def image_id(ref: str) -> str:
    raise AssertionError("unreachable")


-def pinned_local_image_ref(ref: str) -> str:
-    """Tag a local image with its complete content ID for a stable ``FROM``.
-
-    Agent images are immediately used as bases for the optional
-    nested-containers layer. A content-derived tag prevents another concurrent
-    build from moving the provider's ordinary ``:latest`` tag between those
-    two builds.
-    """
-    image = image_id(ref)
-    digest = image.removeprefix("sha256:")
-    if len(digest) != 64 or any(char not in "0123456789abcdef" for char in digest):
-        die(f"could not derive a local base tag from invalid image ID {image!r}")
-    repository = ref.split("@", 1)[0]
-    last_slash = repository.rfind("/")
-    last_colon = repository.rfind(":")
-    if last_colon > last_slash:
-        repository = repository[:last_colon]
-    pinned_ref = f"{repository}:sha256-{digest}"
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        [_CONTAINER, "image", "tag", image, pinned_ref],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    if result.returncode != 0:
-        die(
-            f"could not tag exact local image {image}: "
-            f"{(result.stderr or result.stdout or '').strip() or '<no detail>'}"
-        )
-    if image_id(pinned_ref) != image:
-        die(f"content-derived local tag {pinned_ref!r} did not resolve to {image}")
-    return pinned_ref
-
-
 def image_created_at(ref: str) -> datetime | None:
    """Return the image creation timestamp as an aware UTC datetime, or None
    when the field is absent or unparseable (e.g. FROM-scratch images, images
@@ -8,17 +8,9 @@
 # Layer ordering is deliberate: the npm install lives in its own layer so
 # changes to the rest of the repo (or to the CMD) don't bust it.

-# Version-qualified Node LTS, pinned to its multi-architecture manifest.
-ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}
-
-ARG DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=20260724T000000Z
-RUN sed -i \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
+# Current Node LTS; slim variant keeps the image small while still
+# providing apt-get for any future additions.
+FROM node:22-trixie-slim

 # Install runtime system deps. claude-code shells out to git for several
 # features (status checks, commits, PR creation) — without git in the
@@ -28,7 +20,7 @@ RUN sed -i \
 # HTTPS_PROXY-aware tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out
 # to it) works against egress's bumped TLS without the agent needing
 # local DNS.
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
  git \
  ca-certificates \
@@ -43,17 +35,15 @@ RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
 # (claude-code is a Node CLI), but is convenient for the agent to
 # shell out to for ad-hoc scripts. Kept on its own layer so it can
 # be moved to a downstream image if the base ever needs to shrink.
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

-# Install from the committed npm lock. `npm ci` verifies every registry
-# artifact against its lockfile integrity and refuses dependency drift.
-COPY bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package.json \
-     bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package-lock.json /opt/claude/
-RUN cd /opt/claude \
-  && npm ci --omit=dev --no-fund --no-audit \
-  && ln -s /opt/claude/node_modules/.bin/claude /usr/local/bin/claude \
+# Install claude-code globally. Pinned to the version verified in the v1
+# build (`claude --version` returns 2.1.126). Bump deliberately when
+# rolling forward; an unpinned install would mean rebuilds silently pick
+# up new behavior.
+RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.172 \
  && npm cache clean --force

 # Git reads both ~/.gitconfig and ~/.config/git/config. Keep its XDG config
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "bot-bottle-claude-image",
-  "lockfileVersion": 3,
-  "requires": true,
-  "packages": {
-    "": {
-      "name": "bot-bottle-claude-image",
-      "dependencies": {
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code": "2.1.172"
-      }
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code/-/claude-code-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-SfwC+5fQcmNbvvm+1vLiZbfUxt0PQz9lbXapj9+FI+XY/2e+3zgteBM4JFEXBjULZj1DtZXHmKtAROUrMM9GZg==",
-      "hasInstallScript": true,
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN README.md",
-      "bin": {
-        "claude": "bin/claude.exe"
-      },
-      "engines": {
-        "node": ">=18.0.0"
-      },
-      "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-arm64": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-x64": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64-musl": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64-musl": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-arm64": "2.1.172",
-        "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-x64": "2.1.172"
-      }
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-arm64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-arm64/-/claude-code-darwin-arm64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-pBRgDo8PAgbt2aE4oc6ZrKdOa/Ax36RAduhLCaI8NWD3a0RDb5mETzQciQLwnuenk0bs27vIRh9Yg1jAYG/0+A==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "arm64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "darwin"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-x64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-darwin-x64/-/claude-code-darwin-x64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-vSgibgeCyvCFiLJSXu/sgcd3L/tUjSiS/tfS9rJLXUjElw8satMJhA5pqPUiBmKMflOWKMufbZgzXvLx+OhvFw==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "x64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "darwin"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64/-/claude-code-linux-arm64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Ql7AbyaXnlA6NwDUaQGO7ZZis21rMjYjbKzpksMCvY35CmsJqanYgbYSn/rE83u/tZpKo+NqOv+bWEDSzsZ02w==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "arm64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "linux"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64-musl": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-arm64-musl/-/claude-code-linux-arm64-musl-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Pa9mGGmp8QCRC2j1cgcWRRkwsK1x4bPsS3CcLRd936Op0k5et62tD3qIYhUPQOIxeuxe9Tt/y7lX1cx7JTDxyA==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "arm64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "linux"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64/-/claude-code-linux-x64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-RYCY9EHkmtoAlwBKcWRzGIhuus+GM2CIVCfU81cTQAwDcCHunoBeFn3NqAcFV1VKb4dk9TRarAmQcWMKJrpPig==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "x64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "linux"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64-musl": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-linux-x64-musl/-/claude-code-linux-x64-musl-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-1NflAnV/MqIlD4rzlGDVsJgGK2xJ2ldVd5pkcbu7PsDJBW5dzKYVa4PmD0715K8Yiji8jQovh/nhIo6gYyTfVQ==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "x64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "linux"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-arm64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-arm64/-/claude-code-win32-arm64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-Gj8mIbHDDSGWnoriqB1Jt1uH6cvNBFDQBtIYarCcv0fs+QGCEP6qm2GIaKqxAbwkUaLT0sCW/7+ukvkNdSltuQ==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "arm64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "win32"
-      ]
-    },
-    "node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-x64": {
-      "version": "2.1.172",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@anthropic-ai/claude-code-win32-x64/-/claude-code-win32-x64-2.1.172.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-OkheFwagiCEKaO2Sb0j3JTO1NrcR3zTlFik/AN+yQPefhUIGP6vHQDbBG5ksuFe+Dyd9s+P95OUh8WDhccb+Ng==",
-      "cpu": [
-        "x64"
-      ],
-      "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
-      "optional": true,
-      "os": [
-        "win32"
-      ]
-    }
-  }
-}
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "bot-bottle-claude-image",
-  "private": true,
-  "dependencies": {
-    "@anthropic-ai/claude-code": "2.1.172"
-  }
-}
@@ -3,22 +3,9 @@
 # Mirrors the default Claude image shape: Node LTS, git/network tooling,
 # non-root node user, and the provider CLI installed for that user.

-ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}
+FROM node:22-trixie-slim

-# Remote-control requires the standalone package layout. Keep this exact release
-# in sync with the committed upstream archive checksums.
-ARG CODEX_VERSION=0.145.0
-
-ARG DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=20260724T000000Z
-RUN sed -i \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
-
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
  git \
  ca-certificates \
@@ -32,7 +19,7 @@ RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
 # (codex is a Node CLI), but is convenient for the agent to shell
 # out to for ad-hoc scripts. Kept on its own layer so it can be
 # moved to a downstream image if the base ever needs to shrink.
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

@@ -43,29 +30,10 @@ WORKDIR /home/node

 ENV PATH="/home/node/.local/bin:${PATH}"

-# Install the exact standalone release archive selected by the target
-# architecture. The checksum list is copied from the immutable upstream release
-# and committed so a rebuild cannot silently accept changed release bytes.
-COPY --chown=node:node bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS /tmp/codex-package_SHA256SUMS
-RUN case "$(dpkg --print-architecture)" in \
-      amd64) codex_target=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl ;; \
-      arm64) codex_target=aarch64-unknown-linux-musl ;; \
-      *) echo "unsupported Codex architecture: $(dpkg --print-architecture)" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
-    esac \
-  && codex_asset="codex-package-${codex_target}.tar.gz" \
-  && codex_sha256="$(awk -v asset="${codex_asset}" '$2 == asset { print $1 }' /tmp/codex-package_SHA256SUMS)" \
-  && test -n "${codex_sha256}" \
-  && curl -fsSL \
-      "https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/download/rust-v${CODEX_VERSION}/${codex_asset}" \
-      -o "/tmp/${codex_asset}" \
-  && echo "${codex_sha256}  /tmp/${codex_asset}" | sha256sum -c - \
-  && codex_release="/home/node/.codex/packages/standalone/releases/${CODEX_VERSION}-${codex_target}" \
-  && mkdir -p "${codex_release}" /home/node/.local/bin \
-  && tar -xzf "/tmp/${codex_asset}" -C "${codex_release}" \
-  && ln -s bin/codex "${codex_release}/codex" \
-  && ln -s "${codex_release}" /home/node/.codex/packages/standalone/current \
-  && ln -s /home/node/.codex/packages/standalone/current/bin/codex /home/node/.local/bin/codex \
-  && rm "/tmp/${codex_asset}" \
-  && test "$(codex --version)" = "codex-cli ${CODEX_VERSION}"
+# Remote-control support requires the standalone Codex install layout
+# under ~/.codex/packages/standalone/current. The npm package can run
+# the TUI, but remote-control commands expect this installer-owned path.
+RUN mkdir -p /home/node/.codex \
+  && curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh

 CMD ["codex"]
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-54f79a05aba6f9abf8ef988abcae8bf2fcefba20beb549b4ff2b3acdb2cb6f54  codex-package-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz
-71a28d362c96ac9829bf8203a2c71be451aeb726adb843167fdaf0eae8fe7dd9  codex-package-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz
@@ -2,18 +2,9 @@
 #
 # Node LTS, git/network tooling, and the Pi coding-agent CLI installed globally.

-ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE
-FROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}
+FROM node:22-trixie-slim

-ARG DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=20260724T000000Z
-RUN sed -i \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian-security|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|http://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      -e "s|https://deb.debian.org/debian|http://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}|g" \
-      /etc/apt/sources.list.d/debian.sources
-
-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
  git \
  ca-certificates \
@@ -24,10 +15,13 @@ RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
  && ln -s /usr/bin/fdfind /usr/local/bin/fd \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

-RUN apt-get -o Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false update \
+RUN apt-get update \
  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
  && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

+RUN npm install -g --ignore-scripts --no-fund --no-audit @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent \
+  && npm cache clean --force
+
 RUN install -d -o node -g node -m 755 /home/node/.config /home/node/.config/git \
  && mkdir -p /home/node/.pi/agent \
  /home/node/.pi/context-mode/sessions \
@@ -40,15 +34,10 @@ RUN install -d -o node -g node -m 755 /home/node/.config /home/node/.config/git
 USER node
 WORKDIR /home/node

-# Pi discovers npm packages from its agent directory. Installing the CLI and
-# extensions together from the committed lock makes all direct and transitive
-# package versions deterministic, with npm integrity verification.
-COPY --chown=node:node bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package.json \
-     bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package-lock.json /home/node/.pi/agent/
-RUN cd /home/node/.pi/agent \
-  && npm ci --omit=dev --no-fund --no-audit \
-  && npm cache clean --force
-
-ENV PATH="/home/node/.pi/agent/node_modules/.bin:${PATH}"
+RUN pi install npm:@harms-haus/pi-cwd \
+  && pi install npm:pi-web-access \
+  && pi install npm:context-mode \
+  && pi install npm:pi-subagents \
+  && pi install npm:pi-mcp-adapter

 CMD ["pi"]
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "bot-bottle-pi-image",
-  "private": true,
-  "dependencies": {
-    "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent": "0.81.1",
-    "@earendil-works/pi-agent-core": "0.81.1",
-    "@earendil-works/pi-ai": "0.81.1",
-    "@earendil-works/pi-tui": "0.81.1",
-    "@harms-haus/pi-cwd": "1.0.0",
-    "context-mode": "1.0.169",
-    "pi-mcp-adapter": "2.11.0",
-    "pi-subagents": "0.35.1",
-    "pi-web-access": "0.13.0"
-  }
-}
@@ -252,27 +252,6 @@ cat > "$refs_file"

 zero=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

-# Phase 0: reject Gitea AGit review refs before scanning or forwarding.
-# A push to refs/for/*, refs/draft/*, or refs/for-review/* asks Gitea to
-# open a pull request backed by a server-managed refs/pull/<n>/head rather
-# than an ordinary refs/heads/* branch. That breaks the git-gate workflow:
-# follow-up commits can't be pushed back through the branch, and Gitea
-# rejects later direct updates to the generated review ref. Fail the whole
-# push here (before any gitleaks scan or upstream forward) so the caller
-# pushes a real branch and opens the PR against it instead. Deletions
-# (new == zero) stay allowed so stale AGit refs can still be cleaned up.
-while IFS=' ' read -r old new ref; do
-  [ -z "$ref" ] && continue
-  [ "$new" = "$zero" ] && continue
-  case "$ref" in
-    refs/for/*|refs/draft/*|refs/for-review/*)
-      echo "git-gate: refusing AGit review ref $ref" >&2
-      echo "git-gate: push to refs/heads/<branch> and open a branch-backed pull request instead" >&2
-      exit 1
-      ;;
-  esac
-done < "$refs_file"
-
 supervise_gitleaks_allow() {
  log_opts=$1
  ref=$2
@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ from pathlib import Path

 from .. import log
 from .store.store_manager import StoreManager
-from .broker import LaunchBroker, StubBroker
+from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+from .broker import StubBroker, SubmitBroker
+from .broker_client import BrokerClient
+from .host_server import DEFAULT_PORT, broker_secret
 from .server import make_server
 from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
 from .store.registry_store import RegistryStore, default_db_path
@@ -34,8 +37,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
        help=f"registry DB path (default: {default_db_path()})",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
-        "--broker", choices=("stub", "docker"), default="stub",
-        help="launch broker: 'stub' records requests; 'docker' runs containers",
+        "--broker", choices=("stub", "docker", "http"), default="stub",
+        help="launch broker: 'stub' records requests; 'docker' runs containers "
+             "in-process; 'http' relays signed requests to a host control server",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--host-controller-url", default=f"http://127.0.0.1:{DEFAULT_PORT}",
+        help="host control server URL (used only with --broker http)",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args(argv)

@@ -47,11 +55,27 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
    # operator reaches it over HTTP (never a second, disconnected DB).
    StoreManager(registry.db_path).migrate()

-    # An ephemeral signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its
-    # broker (verifier). 'stub' records launches instead of starting
-    # anything; 'docker' runs real containers (firecracker drops in later).
-    secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
-    broker: LaunchBroker = DockerBroker(secret) if args.broker == "docker" else StubBroker(secret)
+    # A signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its broker (verifier).
+    # 'stub' records launches instead of starting anything; 'docker' runs real
+    # containers in-process; 'http' relays signed requests to a separate host
+    # control server, which verifies and launches. For 'stub'/'docker' the secret
+    # is ephemeral (signer and verifier share this process). For 'http' it must be
+    # the SAME key the host controller holds — and this process is the *guest*
+    # (signer), so it must be given that key by injection, NOT mint its own
+    # process-local one (which would diverge from the host's and 401 every launch).
+    broker: SubmitBroker
+    if args.broker == "http":
+        secret = broker_secret()  # env-injected only; no host-file fallback here
+        if secret is None:
+            parser.error(
+                f"--broker http requires the launch-broker key injected as "
+                f"${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV} (the host controller owns/mints it); the "
+                "orchestrator must not mint its own or it would diverge from the host's"
+            )
+        broker = BrokerClient(args.host_controller_url)
+    else:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        broker = DockerBroker(secret) if args.broker == "docker" else StubBroker(secret)
    orchestrator = OrchestratorCore(registry, broker, secret)

    server = make_server(orchestrator, host=args.host, port=args.port)
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import json
 import secrets
 import time
 from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Protocol

 _JWT_HEADER = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}
 _ALLOWED_OPS = ("launch", "teardown")
@@ -37,7 +38,21 @@ _ALLOWED_OPS = ("launch", "teardown")
 class BrokerAuthError(Exception):
    """A broker request failed provenance or schema verification —
    bad/absent signature, malformed token, or a payload that doesn't match
-    the fixed launch-request shape. Fail-closed: the broker must not act."""
+    the fixed launch-request shape. Fail-closed: the broker must not act.
+
+    A **definite** negative: nothing was launched, so a caller may safely roll
+    back as if the op never happened."""
+
+
+class BrokerUnavailableError(Exception):
+    """A brokered request could not be carried to a verdict: the broker (or the
+    wire to it) was unreachable, timed out, or dropped the response.
+
+    Crucially **ambiguous** — unlike `BrokerAuthError`, the op MAY already have
+    taken effect on the backend before the response was lost, so a caller must
+    NOT assume it did nothing (e.g. must not roll a registry row back as if no
+    launch happened, which would orphan a running container). Only the in-process
+    brokers never raise this; the out-of-process `BrokerClient` does."""


@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -123,6 +138,16 @@ def verify_request(token: str, secret: bytes) -> LaunchRequest:

 # --- the broker itself ------------------------------------------------------

+class SubmitBroker(Protocol):
+    """The single method `OrchestratorCore` depends on: verify a signed token and
+    perform its op, returning the verified request. Both the in-process
+    `LaunchBroker` and the out-of-process `BrokerClient` (which relays the token
+    to the host control server) satisfy it structurally, so the core is unchanged
+    whether the backend is local or a real host service."""
+
+    def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest: ...
+
+
 class LaunchBroker(abc.ABC):
    """Verifies a signed request came from the orchestrator, then performs
    the backend-native launch/teardown. Subclasses implement `_launch` /
@@ -168,7 +193,9 @@ class StubBroker(LaunchBroker):

 __all__ = [
    "BrokerAuthError",
+    "BrokerUnavailableError",
    "LaunchRequest",
+    "SubmitBroker",
    "LaunchBroker",
    "StubBroker",
    "sign_request",
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+"""Orchestrator-side broker transport (issue #468, chunk 1).
+
+The signer's half of the launch-broker transport gap. `BrokerClient` satisfies
+the exact `submit(token)` contract `OrchestratorCore` already depends on (see
+`broker.SubmitBroker`), but instead of verifying and launching in-process it POSTs
+the signed token to the host control server over HTTP (stdlib `urllib`, like
+`orchestrator/client.py`). Because it is drop-in for that interface, wiring a real
+out-of-process backend does not change the core: it still signs a request and
+calls `submit()`; only the wire is new.
+
+A provenance/schema rejection from the host controller (HTTP 401) is re-raised as
+the same `BrokerAuthError` the in-process broker raises, so the launch path's
+rollback-on-failure (`OrchestratorCore.launch_bottle`) behaves identically whether
+the broker is local or remote.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from .broker import BrokerAuthError, BrokerUnavailableError, LaunchRequest
+
+DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
+
+
+class BrokerClientError(RuntimeError):
+    """The host control server *responded*, but with an unexpected status other
+    than the fail-closed 401 (which surfaces as `BrokerAuthError`) — e.g. a 502
+    backend failure or a malformed body. A definite negative: the host processed
+    the request and it did not launch. (A *no-response* failure — unreachable /
+    timeout / dropped — is the ambiguous `BrokerUnavailableError` instead.)"""
+
+
+class BrokerClient:
+    """Drop-in `submit(token)` that relays a signed request to the host control
+    server. Holds no secret — provenance rides entirely in the signed token, so a
+    caller that can reach this client still cannot forge a launch."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
+        self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self._timeout = timeout
+
+    def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest:
+        """POST the signed token to the host controller and return the request it
+        verified and acted on.
+
+        Raises `BrokerAuthError` on a fail-closed 401 (bad provenance/schema —
+        the same exception the in-process broker raises); `BrokerClientError` if
+        the host *responds* with any other non-success status or a malformed
+        body (a definite negative); or `BrokerUnavailableError` if no response is
+        obtained (unreachable / timeout / dropped) — the **ambiguous** case, where
+        the host may already have acted, so the caller must not roll back."""
+        data = json.dumps({"token": token}).encode()
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self._base}/broker", data=data, method="POST",
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
+                return _request_from(_json_object(resp.read()))
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+            detail = _error_detail(e)
+            if e.code == 401:
+                raise BrokerAuthError(
+                    detail or "host controller rejected the request"
+                ) from e
+            raise BrokerClientError(
+                f"POST /broker: HTTP {e.code} {detail}".rstrip()
+            ) from e
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as e:
+            # No usable response — unreachable, timed out, or the connection
+            # dropped mid-exchange. Ambiguous: the request may already have
+            # launched the bottle, so this is NOT a definite failure.
+            raise BrokerUnavailableError(f"POST /broker: {e}") from e
+
+
+def _json_object(raw: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Parse a JSON object, tolerating an empty or malformed body (→ {}), like
+    the orchestrator client — a bad body becomes a clean 'missing field' error
+    downstream rather than an opaque JSON crash."""
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    try:
+        obj = json.loads(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        return {}
+    return obj if isinstance(obj, dict) else {}
+
+
+def _error_detail(e: urllib.error.HTTPError) -> str:
+    """The `error` string from a structured error response, best-effort — an
+    error body may be absent or unreadable, in which case there is no detail."""
+    try:
+        detail = _json_object(e.read()).get("error", "")
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — the error body is advisory only
+        return ""
+    return detail if isinstance(detail, str) else ""
+
+
+def _request_from(payload: dict[str, object]) -> LaunchRequest:
+    """Reconstruct the verified `LaunchRequest` the controller echoed, so the
+    returned value matches the in-process broker's (which returns the request it
+    acted on). A missing op/bottle_id means a malformed response."""
+    op = payload.get("op")
+    bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
+    if not isinstance(op, str) or not isinstance(bottle_id, str) or not bottle_id:
+        raise BrokerClientError("host controller response missing op/bottle_id")
+    source_ip = payload.get("source_ip")
+    image_ref = payload.get("image_ref")
+    slot = payload.get("slot")
+    return LaunchRequest(
+        op=op,
+        bottle_id=bottle_id,
+        source_ip=source_ip if isinstance(source_ip, str) else "",
+        image_ref=image_ref if isinstance(image_ref, str) else "",
+        slot=slot if isinstance(slot, int) and not isinstance(slot, bool) else None,
+    )
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "BrokerClient",
+    "BrokerClientError",
+    "DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+"""Host control server (issue #468) — the launch broker as a real host service.
+
+Chunk 1 of the host-control-server stack closes the **transport** gap the PRD
+opens with: today `LaunchBroker.submit(token)` is an in-process method call from
+`OrchestratorCore`, and a real host service needs it reachable over the wire.
+This module is that service — the single privileged host component — reached over
+**HTTP** (the universal transport 0070 chose), mirroring the orchestrator control
+plane's shape (`orchestrator/server.py`): a pure `dispatch()` for socket-free
+testing, wrapped by a thin stdlib `http.server` adapter.
+
+    GET  /health  -> 200 {"status": "ok"}
+    POST /broker  -> 200 {"op", "bottle_id", "source_ip", "image_ref", "slot"}
+                     400 (bad body) | 401 (bad provenance/schema) | 502 (backend)
+                     body: {"token": "<signed launch/teardown JWT>"}
+
+Only the **signed token** crosses the wire; the server holds the shared HS256
+secret and a real `LaunchBroker` (e.g. `DockerBroker`) and runs the existing
+`verify_request` + `_launch`/`_teardown` path behind the endpoint, so nothing
+free-form ever reaches it. Provenance/schema failures are fail-closed 401s that
+never touch the backend (`LaunchBroker.submit` verifies before acting), and a
+backend launch failure is a 502 the caller must surface — neither takes the
+controller down.
+
+The signed launch token *is* the endpoint's authentication (its provenance is the
+whole point of the JWS), so `/broker` needs no separate caller credential; the
+host controller's own lifecycle endpoints, which do, arrive with the `host`-role
+tokens of the separate `HOST_CONTROLLER` trust domain in a later chunk.
+
+The shared signing secret is the durable **launch-broker `TrustDomain` key**
+(#468/#476): a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, provisioned to
+the orchestrator (signer) and this server (verifier). A backend launcher injects
+it via `$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`; a host-side dev-harness process reads the
+key file directly. Durability is the point — a restarted orchestrator re-verifies
+against the same key, so re-adoption works.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import http.server
+import json
+import os
+import socketserver
+import sys
+import typing
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from .. import log
+from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+from ..trust_domain import LAUNCH_BROKER
+from .broker import BrokerAuthError, LaunchBroker
+from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
+
+# JSON body payload type (parsed request / rendered response).
+Json = dict[str, object]
+
+# Default host-controller port. Distinct from the orchestrator control plane
+# (8099) — a separate privileged component listening on its own socket.
+DEFAULT_PORT = 8091
+
+# Cap on the request body. A signed broker request is tiny, so rejecting anything
+# larger *before reading it* keeps a caller that can merely reach the socket (no
+# signed token needed) from exhausting memory or a handler thread with a huge
+# Content-Length — the signed token, not mere reachability, is the authority.
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+# Per-request socket timeout, bounding how long a stalled / slow-loris caller can
+# hold a handler thread on this privileged listener.
+REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15
+
+
+def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
+    """Parse a JSON object body. Raises ValueError for non-objects / bad JSON."""
+    if not body:
+        return {}
+    obj = json.loads(body)  # raises json.JSONDecodeError (a ValueError)
+    if not isinstance(obj, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request body must be a JSON object")
+    return obj
+
+
+def broker_secret(
+    environ: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None, *, allow_host_file: bool = False,
+) -> bytes | None:
+    """The shared launch-broker HS256 secret, as this process should use it.
+
+    Always prefers the key injected into this process's env
+    (`$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`). `allow_host_file` decides the fallback when
+    it is absent, and the distinction is a security boundary:
+
+    - **Host-side** processes — the host controller and the host dev-harness — pass
+      ``allow_host_file=True`` to read (minting on first use) the durable host key
+      file (``bot_bottle_root()/launch-broker-key``) they legitimately own.
+    - The **guest orchestrator** (``--broker http``) keeps the default ``False``.
+      It runs inside a container/VM whose ``bot_bottle_root()`` is process-local,
+      so minting a file there would silently create a key UNRELATED to the host
+      controller's — startup would succeed but every launch would be rejected 401.
+      It must instead be *given* the key by its launcher, and fail closed (None)
+      if it wasn't, rather than diverge.
+
+    None when no key is available (a guest with no injection, or an unwritable
+    host root)."""
+    key = LAUNCH_BROKER.key_from_env(environ)
+    if not key and allow_host_file:
+        try:
+            key = LAUNCH_BROKER.signing_key()  # host-canonical, minted on first use
+        except OSError:
+            return None
+    return key.encode("utf-8") if key else None
+
+
+def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
+    broker: LaunchBroker, method: str, path: str, body: bytes,
+) -> tuple[int, Json]:
+    """Route one host-control request to a (status, payload) pair. Pure — the
+    only side effect is the broker's own backend launch — so routing is testable
+    without a socket.
+
+    Total by design: a provenance/schema failure becomes 401 and a backend launch
+    failure becomes 502 rather than raising, so one bad request can neither act
+    on the backend nor take the controller down for the next caller."""
+    route = urlsplit(path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+
+    if method == "GET" and route == "/health":
+        return 200, {"status": "ok"}
+
+    if method == "POST" and route == "/broker":
+        try:
+            data = _parse_json_object(body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
+        token = data.get("token")
+        if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+            return 400, {"error": "token (string) is required"}
+        try:
+            req = broker.submit(token)
+        except BrokerAuthError as e:
+            # Fail-closed: bad signature, malformed token, or off-schema payload.
+            # `submit` verifies before acting, so nothing was launched.
+            return 401, {"error": f"broker auth failed: {e}"}
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — a backend launch failure (docker
+            # down, image gone) is operational, not a control-plane bug; the
+            # caller must see it as a distinct 502, and the server must stay up.
+            return 502, {"error": f"backend launch failed: {e}"}
+        return 200, {
+            "op": req.op,
+            "bottle_id": req.bottle_id,
+            "source_ip": req.source_ip,
+            "image_ref": req.image_ref,
+            "slot": req.slot,
+        }
+
+    return 404, {"error": "not found"}
+
+
+class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Thin stdlib adapter: read the body, call `dispatch`, write JSON."""
+
+    # Socket timeout per request (applied by StreamRequestHandler.setup) so a
+    # stalled caller can't pin a handler thread on this privileged listener.
+    timeout = REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
+    # Quiet by default; opt back into stdlib access logging with
+    # BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_DEBUG (the controller has its own logging).
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None:  # noqa: A002
+        if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_DEBUG"):
+            super().log_message(format, *args)
+
+    def _serve(self, method: str) -> None:
+        """Read the request body (bounded), dispatch it, and write the JSON
+        reply. A dispatch that raises (it shouldn't — dispatch is total) still
+        returns a 500 rather than dropping the connection."""
+        server = self.server
+        assert isinstance(server, HostControlServer)
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        except ValueError:
+            self._reply(400, {"error": "invalid Content-Length"})
+            return
+        if length < 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            # Reject before reading: nothing legitimate is this big, so an
+            # oversized declared length is a bug or a resource-exhaustion attempt.
+            self._reply(413, {"error": "request body too large"})
+            return
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
+        try:
+            status, payload = dispatch(server.broker, method, self.path, body)
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — the controller must stay up
+            sys.stderr.write(f"host controller: {method} {self.path} failed: {e!r}\n")
+            sys.stderr.flush()
+            status, payload = 500, {"error": f"internal error: {e}"}
+        self._reply(status, payload)
+
+    def _reply(self, status: int, payload: typing.Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
+        """Write one JSON response with an explicit Content-Length."""
+        data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        self._serve("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        self._serve("POST")
+
+
+class HostControlServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
+    """Threading HTTP server that carries the launch broker for its handlers.
+
+    The broker holds the shared signing secret and performs the backend-native
+    launch/teardown; the server itself keeps no secret of its own — provenance
+    rides entirely in each request's signed token."""
+
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], broker: LaunchBroker) -> None:
+        self.broker = broker
+        super().__init__(address, Handler)
+
+
+def make_host_server(
+    broker: LaunchBroker, host: str = "127.0.0.1", port: int = DEFAULT_PORT
+) -> HostControlServer:
+    """Build (but do not start) a host control server. `port=0` binds an
+    ephemeral port — read `server.server_address` for the actual one."""
+    return HostControlServer((host, port), broker)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Run the host control server as a plain process (dev-harness).
+
+        python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server [--host H] [--port P]
+
+    Fail-closed: without the launch-broker key the server can verify no request's
+    provenance, so it refuses to start rather than run a launcher that accepts
+    unsigned input. As the host-side owner of the key, it may mint/read the host
+    key file (`allow_host_file=True`)."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server")
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="bind address")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="bind port (0 = ephemeral)")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    secret = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+    if secret is None:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            f"host controller: refusing to start without the launch-broker key "
+            f"(${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV}, or a writable host root to mint it) — it "
+            "could verify no request's provenance and would relay unsigned "
+            "launches to the backend\n"
+        )
+        sys.stderr.flush()
+        return 2
+
+    broker = DockerBroker(secret)
+    server = make_host_server(broker, host=args.host, port=args.port)
+    bound_host, bound_port = server.server_address[0], server.server_address[1]
+    log.info(
+        "host control server listening",
+        context={"host": bound_host, "port": bound_port},
+    )
+    try:
+        server.serve_forever()
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        log.info("host controller shutting down")
+    finally:
+        server.server_close()
+    return 0
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "dispatch",
+    "Handler",
+    "HostControlServer",
+    "make_host_server",
+    "broker_secret",
+    "main",
+    "Json",
+    "DEFAULT_PORT",
+]
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import json
 from collections.abc import Iterable
 from datetime import datetime, timezone

-from .broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, sign_request
+from .broker import BrokerUnavailableError, LaunchRequest, SubmitBroker, sign_request
 from .store.registry_store import DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS, BottleRecord, RegistryStore
 from .supervisor import (
    AuditEntry,
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
    def __init__(
        self,
        registry: RegistryStore,
-        broker: LaunchBroker,
+        broker: SubmitBroker,
        sign_secret: bytes,
        supervisor: Supervisor | None = None,
    ) -> None:
@@ -111,14 +111,23 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
            image_ref=image_ref,
            slot=slot,
        )
-        launched = False
        try:
            self._broker.submit(sign_request(req, self._secret))
-            launched = True
-        finally:
-            if not launched:
-                self.registry.deregister(rec.bottle_id)
-                self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
+        except BrokerUnavailableError:
+            # Ambiguous delivery failure (timeout / dropped response): the broker
+            # may already have launched the bottle before the response was lost.
+            # Do NOT deregister — that would orphan a running container with no
+            # registry row (reconcile reaps rows, never containers). Keep the row
+            # so reconcile reaps it iff the bottle is not actually live; surface
+            # the error so the caller knows the launch is unconfirmed.
+            raise
+        except Exception:
+            # A definite failure — a fail-closed rejection, a backend launch
+            # error, or the host reporting it did not launch: nothing is running,
+            # so roll the registry entry back to leave no orphan.
+            self.registry.deregister(rec.bottle_id)
+            self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
+            raise
        return rec

    def teardown_bottle(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
@@ -12,12 +12,22 @@ reattachment path reads ENV_VAR_SECRET from the running agent container via
 ``POST /bottles/<id>/reprovision_gateway``; the orchestrator decrypts the
 stored rows and re-populates ``_tokens``.

-Encryption scheme: HMAC-SHA256 used as a PRF in CTR mode (stdlib-only,
-no external deps). Each value is encrypted independently. The output blob is
-``nonce (16 bytes) || ciphertext`` encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding).
+Encryption scheme: HMAC-SHA256 used as a PRF in CTR mode, **authenticated**
+encrypt-then-MAC (stdlib-only, no external deps). Each value is encrypted
+independently. The output blob is ``nonce (16 bytes) || ciphertext || tag
+(32 bytes)`` encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding).

    keystream_block_i = HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce || i.to_bytes(4, "big"))
    ciphertext_i      = plaintext_i XOR keystream_block_i[:len(plaintext_i)]
+    mac_key           = HMAC-SHA256(key, "bottled-secret-mac-v1")
+    tag               = HMAC-SHA256(mac_key, nonce || ciphertext)
+
+The tag is what makes a **wrong key deterministically detectable**: without it,
+CTR decryption with the wrong key yields garbage that only fails when it isn't
+valid UTF-8 (so ``reprovision`` would sometimes "succeed" with a wrong
+ENV_VAR_SECRET and inject garbage egress tokens). The MAC key is derived from
+the ENV_VAR_SECRET by a domain-separated HMAC so the same key never both
+generates the keystream and signs the tag with the same message shape.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -29,6 +39,7 @@ import secrets

 _KEY_BYTES = 32    # 256-bit key from ENV_VAR_SECRET
 _NONCE_BYTES = 16  # 128-bit random nonce per encrypt call
+_TAG_BYTES = 32    # HMAC-SHA256 authentication tag
 _BLOCK = 32        # HMAC-SHA256 output width == one keystream block

 # Env-var name the agent container receives at startup.
@@ -50,45 +61,58 @@ def _keystream(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, block_index: int) -> bytes:
    ).digest()


+def _tag(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, ciphertext: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """The authentication tag over ``nonce || ciphertext``, keyed by a MAC
+    subkey domain-separated from the keystream key."""
+    mac_key = hmac.new(key, b"bottled-secret-mac-v1", hashlib.sha256).digest()
+    return hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ciphertext, hashlib.sha256).digest()
+
+
+def _ctr(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, data: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """CTR keystream XOR — its own inverse, so it both encrypts and decrypts."""
+    out = bytearray()
+    for i in range(0, len(data), _BLOCK):
+        chunk = data[i : i + _BLOCK]
+        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
+        out.extend(b ^ k for b, k in zip(chunk, ks))
+    return bytes(out)
+
+
 def encrypt_value(secret_b64: str, plaintext: str) -> str:
    """Encrypt a single string value with *secret_b64* (the ENV_VAR_SECRET).

-    Returns a URL-safe base64 blob ``nonce || ciphertext`` suitable for
+    Returns a URL-safe base64 blob ``nonce || ciphertext || tag`` suitable for
    the ``bottled_agent_secrets.value`` column."""
    key = _b64dec(secret_b64)
-    pt = plaintext.encode()
    nonce = secrets.token_bytes(_NONCE_BYTES)
-    ct = bytearray()
-    for i in range(0, len(pt), _BLOCK):
-        chunk = pt[i : i + _BLOCK]
-        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
-        ct.extend(p ^ k for p, k in zip(chunk, ks))
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce + bytes(ct)).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+    ct = _ctr(key, nonce, plaintext.encode())
+    tag = _tag(key, nonce, ct)
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce + ct + tag).rstrip(b"=").decode()


 def decrypt_value(secret_b64: str, blob_b64: str) -> str:
    """Decrypt a blob produced by :func:`encrypt_value`.

    Returns the original plaintext string. Raises ``ValueError`` for malformed
-    input or a key mismatch (wrong key produces garbage, not an error, unless
-    the plaintext is non-UTF-8 — treat all such failures as wrong key)."""
+    input, a **wrong key**, or a tampered ciphertext — all caught by the
+    authentication tag before any plaintext is returned, so a wrong
+    ENV_VAR_SECRET is rejected deterministically (never a garbage token)."""
    key = _b64dec(secret_b64)
    try:
        blob = _b64dec(blob_b64)
    except Exception as exc:
        raise ValueError(f"invalid ciphertext blob: {exc}") from exc
-    if len(blob) < _NONCE_BYTES:
+    if len(blob) < _NONCE_BYTES + _TAG_BYTES:
        raise ValueError("ciphertext blob too short")
-    nonce, ciphertext = blob[:_NONCE_BYTES], blob[_NONCE_BYTES:]
-    pt = bytearray()
-    for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), _BLOCK):
-        chunk = ciphertext[i : i + _BLOCK]
-        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
-        pt.extend(c ^ k for c, k in zip(chunk, ks))
+    nonce = blob[:_NONCE_BYTES]
+    tag = blob[-_TAG_BYTES:]
+    ciphertext = blob[_NONCE_BYTES:-_TAG_BYTES]
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(tag, _tag(key, nonce, ciphertext)):
+        raise ValueError("ciphertext failed authentication (wrong key or tampered)")
    try:
-        return bytes(pt).decode()
-    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f"decryption produced non-UTF-8 output (wrong key?): {exc}") from exc
+        return _ctr(key, nonce, ciphertext).decode()
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:  # pragma: no cover - authenticated, so unreachable
+        raise ValueError(f"decryption produced non-UTF-8 output: {exc}") from exc


 __all__ = ["ENV_VAR_SECRET_NAME", "new_env_var_secret", "encrypt_value", "decrypt_value"]
@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ ROLE_GATEWAY = "gateway"
 ROLE_CLI = "cli"
 ROLES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_CLI})

+# The host controller's own lifecycle role (#468). Deliberately OUTSIDE `ROLES`:
+# it belongs to a separate trust domain (`HOST_CONTROLLER`) signed by a key the
+# orchestrator never holds, so the orchestrator's control-plane key can neither
+# mint nor accept it — the orchestrator must not be able to forge the credential
+# used to start and stop it.
+ROLE_HOST = "host"
+
 _ALG = "HS256"


@@ -103,4 +110,4 @@ def verify(token: str, secret: str, *, roles: frozenset[str] = ROLES) -> str | N
    return role if isinstance(role, str) and role in roles else None


-__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]
+__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLE_HOST", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]
@@ -47,6 +47,22 @@ ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN"
 # cannot forge a higher-privilege `cli` token (issue #469 review).
 ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT"

+# The durable launch-broker signing key: the HS256 secret the orchestrator
+# (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share to sign/verify launch
+# requests (#468). A host-canonical key file (minted 0600 on first use) so it
+# survives orchestrator restarts — re-adoption re-verifies against the same key —
+# instead of the ephemeral per-process secret of the in-process broker.
+LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME = "launch-broker-key"
+LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY"
+# The host controller's OWN key, for its lifecycle endpoints (the direct
+# cli -> host controller path that starts/stops the orchestrator). Separate from
+# the launch-broker key and never held by the orchestrator: the controller starts
+# and stops the orchestrator, so the orchestrator must not be able to mint the
+# credentials used to drive it (#468/#476).
+HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME = "host-controller-key"
+HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY"
+HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT"
+
 # The host directory holding the gateway's persistent mitmproxy CA. Bind-mounted
 # into the infra/gateway container at mitmproxy's confdir so the self-generated
 # CA survives container recreation — every agent installs this one CA to trust
@@ -142,6 +158,11 @@ __all__ = [
    "ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME",
    "ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV",
    "ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
    "GATEWAY_CA_DIRNAME",
    "bot_bottle_root",
    "host_db_path",
@@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 import fcntl
 import hashlib
-import json
 import os
-import re
 import shutil
 import tempfile
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -39,11 +37,9 @@ _BUNDLED = _PKG / "_resources"                   # wheel-shipped copies
 # the two lists in sync (``test_resources`` guards that every entry exists).
 BUNDLED_RESOURCES: tuple[str, ...] = (
    "pyproject.toml",
-    "image-build-args.json",
    "Dockerfile.gateway",
    "Dockerfile.orchestrator",
    "Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc",
-    "requirements.gateway.lock",
    "nix/firecracker-netpool.nix",
    "scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh",
 )
@@ -51,12 +47,6 @@ BUNDLED_RESOURCES: tuple[str, ...] = (
 # Present at a checkout root, never in a bare installed package — the cheap
 # tell for which layout we're in.
 _CHECKOUT_MARKER = "Dockerfile.gateway"
-_IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS_FILE = "image-build-args.json"
-_CENTRAL_BUILD_ARG_NAMES = frozenset({
-    "DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE",
-    "NODE_BASE_IMAGE",
-    "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE",
-})


 class ResourceError(RuntimeError):
@@ -88,69 +78,6 @@ def dockerfile(name: str) -> Path:
    return build_root() / name


-def image_build_args(
-    dockerfile_path: str | Path,
-    *,
-    context: str | Path | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Return centralized arguments declared by ``dockerfile_path``.
-
-    Base-image arguments deliberately have no Dockerfile defaults. Their
-    digest-pinned values live in one repository input file and every supported
-    build path calls this helper before invoking its OCI builder. Explicit
-    caller-supplied arguments may still override this returned mapping.
-    """
-    path = Path(dockerfile_path)
-    if not path.is_absolute() and context is not None:
-        path = Path(context) / path
-    try:
-        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    except OSError:
-        # Generic callers and tests may build an ephemeral Dockerfile outside
-        # bot-bottle. The builder will report a genuinely missing file.
-        return {}
-    declared = set(re.findall(
-        r"(?m)^\s*ARG\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*$",
-        text,
-    ))
-    wanted = declared & _CENTRAL_BUILD_ARG_NAMES
-    if not wanted:
-        return {}
-    # Generated Dockerfiles (notably the macOS nested-container layer) live in
-    # temporary build contexts. Resolve their declaration there, but take the
-    # centralized values from that context only when it carries its own input
-    # file; otherwise use bot-bottle's staged build root.
-    context_root = Path(context) if context is not None else None
-    root = (
-        context_root
-        if context_root is not None
-        and (context_root / _IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS_FILE).is_file()
-        else build_root()
-    )
-    inputs_path = root / _IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS_FILE
-    try:
-        inputs = json.loads(inputs_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        raise ResourceError(
-            f"cannot read centralized image build arguments from {inputs_path}: {exc}"
-        ) from exc
-    if not isinstance(inputs, dict):
-        raise ResourceError(f"{inputs_path} must contain a JSON object")
-    missing = wanted - inputs.keys()
-    if missing:
-        raise ResourceError(
-            f"{inputs_path} lacks required image build arguments: "
-            f"{', '.join(sorted(missing))}"
-        )
-    invalid = [name for name in wanted if not isinstance(inputs[name], str)]
-    if invalid:
-        raise ResourceError(
-            f"{inputs_path} has non-string image build arguments: "
-            f"{', '.join(sorted(invalid))}"
-        )
-    return {name: inputs[name] for name in sorted(wanted)}
-
-
 def nix_netpool_module() -> Path:
    """Absolute path to the firecracker netpool NixOS module."""
    return build_root() / "nix" / "firecracker-netpool.nix"
@@ -29,8 +29,13 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping
 from dataclasses import dataclass

 from . import orchestrator_auth
-from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY
+from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
 from .paths import (
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
    ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
    ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV,
    ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME,
@@ -99,6 +104,40 @@ CONTROL_PLANE = TrustDomain(
 )


+# The launch-broker domain (#468): durable key material for the broker's own
+# signed launch requests (`broker.py`'s HS256 launch JWT), shared by the
+# orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier). Unlike
+# `CONTROL_PLANE` it mints no role tokens — the broker's provenance is the launch
+# JWT, not a role token — so its `roles` set is empty and it is used only as a
+# provider of durable, host-canonical key material (`signing_key` / `key_from_env`).
+# The durability is the point: the key survives orchestrator restarts, so a
+# restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key instead of the
+# ephemeral per-process secret the in-process broker used.
+LAUNCH_BROKER = TrustDomain(
+    name="launch-broker",
+    key_filename=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    roles=frozenset(),
+    key_env=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
+    token_env="",
+)
+
+# The host controller's own domain (#468) — the SECOND domain #476 reserves. Its
+# key, which the orchestrator never holds, signs the `host`-role tokens the CLI
+# presents on the host controller's lifecycle endpoints (start / restart / status
+# of the orchestrator itself). Keeping it separate from `CONTROL_PLANE` is the
+# whole point: the host controller starts and stops the orchestrator, so the
+# orchestrator must not be able to mint the credentials used to drive it. (The
+# lifecycle endpoints themselves arrive in a later chunk; the domain is
+# established here alongside the durable launch-broker key.)
+HOST_CONTROLLER = TrustDomain(
+    name="host-controller",
+    key_filename=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    roles=frozenset({ROLE_HOST}),
+    key_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
+    token_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
+)
+
+
@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
    """The one seam every backend launcher uses to provision control-plane auth,
@@ -132,9 +171,56 @@ class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
        return self.domain.mint(ROLE_GATEWAY)


+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LaunchBrokerProvisioning:
+    """The seam that provisions the host-side launch broker's durable keys (#468),
+    the counterpart to `ControlPlaneProvisioning`. Both the orchestrator (signer)
+    and the host control server (verifier) receive the SAME launch-broker key
+    (carry it in `broker_domain.key_env`); the host controller ALSO receives its
+    own lifecycle key (`controller_domain.key_env`) the orchestrator never holds.
+
+    Fail-closed like the control-plane seam: minting returns "" only if the host
+    root is unwritable, and an empty launch-broker key would leave the verifier
+    unable to authenticate any launch — so we raise rather than hand back a key
+    that would make the host controller reject (or, if a caller defaulted it,
+    accept) unsigned input."""
+
+    broker_domain: TrustDomain = LAUNCH_BROKER
+    controller_domain: TrustDomain = HOST_CONTROLLER
+
+    def broker_key(self) -> str:
+        """The durable launch-broker key both the orchestrator and the host
+        control server must receive (in `broker_domain.key_env`). Raises rather
+        than return ""."""
+        key = self.broker_domain.signing_key()
+        if not key:
+            raise ProvisioningError(
+                f"refusing to provision the {self.broker_domain.name} broker "
+                "without a signing key: the host controller could then verify no "
+                "launch request's provenance"
+            )
+        return key
+
+    def controller_key(self) -> str:
+        """The host controller's own lifecycle key — provisioned ONLY to the host
+        controller (in `controller_domain.key_env`), never to the orchestrator, so
+        the orchestrator cannot mint the `host`-role tokens that start and stop
+        it. Raises rather than return ""."""
+        key = self.controller_domain.signing_key()
+        if not key:
+            raise ProvisioningError(
+                f"refusing to provision the {self.controller_domain.name} without "
+                "a signing key: its lifecycle endpoints would authenticate no one"
+            )
+        return key
+
+
 __all__ = [
    "ProvisioningError",
    "TrustDomain",
    "CONTROL_PLANE",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER",
    "ControlPlaneProvisioning",
+    "LaunchBrokerProvisioning",
 ]
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-# Container image build inputs
-
-Bot-bottle's supported images are intended to rebuild from the same declared
-inputs on Linux amd64 and arm64. The repository enforces four layers of
-immutability:
-
- Python, Node, and nested-container Docker CLI base images are required,
-  defaultless Docker build arguments.
-  Their version-qualified tags and multi-platform OCI index digests live
-  together in `image-build-args.json`; every supported builder reads that
-  file and passes only the arguments its Dockerfile declares.
- Debian packages resolve from the same dated `snapshot.debian.org` archive in
-  every image that runs `apt-get install`. The snapshot endpoint uses HTTP so a
-  fresh image does not need a host-specific TLS interception CA; APT still
-  authenticates the repository metadata and package hashes with Debian's
-  signed Release files.
- Gateway Python dependencies install from `requirements.gateway.lock` with
-  `pip --require-hashes`; provider npm packages install with `npm ci` from
-  committed lockfiles.
- The Codex standalone archive is fetched from the exact `CODEX_VERSION`
-  release and checked against the committed upstream
-  `codex-package_SHA256SUMS` before extraction.
-  The standalone layout is retained because Codex remote control requires it.
-
-`Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc` is the one intentionally dynamic `FROM`. It has no
-default value: the Firecracker build coordinator resolves the freshly built
-orchestrator's local `sha256:` image ID, creates a local tag containing the
-complete ID, verifies that tag resolves to the same ID, and supplies the
-content-derived reference as `ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE`. This accommodates
-BuildKit, which treats a bare image ID in `FROM` as a registry repository.
-
-## Refreshing inputs
-
-Make refreshes on a feature branch and review them like an application
-dependency update:
-
-1. For a Python or Node base update, select a version-qualified tag and update
-   its one digest-pinned value in `image-build-args.json`. Confirm the index
-   still contains `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64`.
-2. For Debian packages, advance `DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT` to one fixed UTC timestamp in
-   every Dockerfile that uses apt. Do not use the moving Debian mirrors.
-3. Change direct Python versions in `requirements.gateway.in`, direct npm
-   versions in the provider's `package.json`, or `CODEX_VERSION` in the Codex
-   Dockerfile. Direct versions must be exact—no ranges, dist-tags, or
-   unversioned package names.
-4. Push the feature branch or manually run the `refresh-image-locks` workflow.
-   It regenerates the four derived files with the image's exact Python and Node
-   versions and uploads them as the `image-input-locks` artifact. It never
-   writes to the branch, so a refresh cannot race with developer pushes.
-5. Download the artifact, replace the four committed files, review the lock
-   diff, and let both normal CI and `image-input-builds` pass.
-   The latter checks both base architectures, builds every supported image,
-   exercises the exact local Firecracker base-ID handoff, and runs each
-   provider CLI's version smoke test.
-
-Run the fast policy check locally at any point:
-
-```sh
-python3 scripts/check_image_inputs.py
-```
-
-The check rejects mutable or `latest` bases, moving apt repositories,
-network-to-shell installers, unlocked npm/Pi installs, non-exact direct
-dependencies, missing npm integrity values, and unhashed gateway Python
-requirements.
-
-Image signing and attestation are tracked separately in issue #339; this policy
-covers deterministic and integrity-checked build inputs.
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+# PRD prd-new: Host control server
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** Claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-26
+- **Issue:** #468
+
+## Summary
+
+Promote the in-process launch broker into a standalone **host control
+server**: the single privileged component on the host. Both the CLI and the
+orchestrator drive it over HTTP; it brokers agent launches, owns the
+orchestrator's own lifecycle, and is the sole writer of host-durable state (the
+tamper-evident audit record). This closes the three gaps between today's
+well-formed broker *contract* ([`orchestrator/broker.py`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/broker.py))
+and a real out-of-process service — transport, durable provisioned secret,
+and a disciplined op vocabulary — and splits host state by
+owner and lifetime. The prize: **the CLI no longer needs the Docker socket**,
+which is what finally lets a dedicated Gitea runner user drop the
+root-equivalent `docker` group (PRD 0070, "Relationship to other work").
+
+## Problem
+
+Container launches run directly from a short-lived CLI process against the
+Docker socket. That socket is root-equivalent, so every host that launches
+bottles hands root to whoever invokes the CLI — including a CI runner user we
+want to keep unprivileged. PRD 0070 already argues for replacing the fat socket
+with a **thin, structured, auditable** launch broker, and the contract for that
+broker exists and is tested in-process. But it is *only* in-process:
+`LaunchBroker.submit(token)` is a method call from
+`OrchestratorCore.launch_bottle` ([`service.py:116`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py)),
+and `DockerBroker` is on no production path — every backend starts the
+orchestrator with `--broker stub` ([`__main__.py:54`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/__main__.py)).
+
+Three gaps stand between that scaffold and a host service:
+
+1. **No transport.** `submit` is an in-process call. A real service needs a
+   `BrokerClient` that POSTs the signed token and a host-side HTTP server that
+   verifies and acts.
+2. **The signing secret is ephemeral and self-generated.**
+   [`__main__.py:53`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/__main__.py) does
+   `secrets.token_bytes(32)` and hands the *same value* to signer and verifier —
+   viable only because they share a process. A separate daemon needs the secret
+   provisioned out of band and durable across orchestrator restarts.
+3. **The op vocabulary is `launch` / `teardown` only.** Everything else
+   host-privileged still lives in the CLI, so the schema has to grow — carefully,
+   since PRD 0070's security argument rests on "structured requests only, static
+   flags + ids."
+
+Separately, host state has no clear owner. `OrchestratorCore.reconcile` takes
+`live_source_ips` as a parameter *only because the orchestrator cannot see the
+backend* ([`service.py:137`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py)); the
+egress traffic log is written to the container's stderr; and there is no durable,
+tamper-evident home for the audit record that survives orchestrator destruction.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A standalone host control server that the CLI and orchestrator reach over
+  **HTTP**, with three entry paths working end to end:
+  - `web console -(iroh)-> orchestrator -(http)-> host controller -> launch`
+  - `cli -(http)-> orchestrator -(http)-> host controller -> launch`
+  - `cli -(http)-> host controller` — start / restart / status of the
+    orchestrator **itself** (the bootstrap/recovery path #391 targets).
+- The launch op is expressed as a **signed JWT of static flags + ids only**,
+  verified against a closed schema.
+- The signing secret is **provisioned out of band and durable** across
+  orchestrator restarts (a `TrustDomain` per #476, with a key the orchestrator
+  never holds for the host controller's *own* endpoints).
+- Host-privileged operations move off the CLI to the control server; **the CLI
+  no longer opens the Docker socket** for bottle operations.
+- `Orchestrator.reconcile` no longer takes `live_source_ips` — live-bottle
+  enumeration becomes an internal control-server call.
+- Host-durable state lands as an **append-only, hash-chained JSONL** audit log
+  owned solely by the host controller; operational state stays SQLite owned
+  solely by the orchestrator.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Removing standing privilege.** This converts on-demand privilege (a CLI the
+  user invokes) into standing privilege (a daemon under launchd/systemd). The
+  win is that the privilege is *narrower* (structured requests vs. a raw socket),
+  not that it disappears. "Always running" is an accepted new property.
+- **Asymmetric signing.** We stay HS256 — see Design / "Signing stays
+  symmetric."
+- **Integrity against a live compromised orchestrator.** Host-location of the
+  audit log does not buy this: the orchestrator makes the decisions being audited
+  and can forge or omit entries wherever the file lives. An off-box copy is the
+  answer, tracked separately.
+- **A single unified DB for all state.** Impossible over a guest-kernel share
+  (SQLite locking is not coherent); state is split by owner and lifetime instead.
+- **The generic `SecretProvider` (#355)** and **remote terminal design (#478)** —
+  both ride the same door but are their own work.
+
+## Design
+
+### Topology
+
+The host controller is the sole privileged component. The orchestrator becomes a
+client of it for launches, and the CLI becomes a client of it for *both* bottle
+operations (indirectly, through the orchestrator) and orchestrator lifecycle
+(directly, for bootstrap/recovery — startup can't route through the thing being
+started).
+
+```
+web console ─(iroh)─▶ orchestrator ─┐
+                                    ├─(http, signed JWT)─▶ host controller ─▶ launch
+cli ────────(http)──▶ orchestrator ─┘
+cli ────────(http, bearer)──────────────────────────────▶ host controller   (orchestrator lifecycle)
+```
+
+### Transport: `BrokerClient` + host server
+
+`LaunchBroker.submit(token)` keeps its exact signature and semantics; only the
+*wire* changes. A new `BrokerClient` implements the same submit contract by
+POSTing the signed token to the host controller (stdlib `urllib`, like the
+existing [`orchestrator/client.py`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/client.py)),
+and the host controller's launch handler is the existing `verify_request` +
+`_launch`/`_teardown` path, now reached over HTTP instead of a method call. The
+in-process `StubBroker` stays for the dev-harness and tests; `DockerBroker`'s
+`_launch`/`_teardown` bodies move behind the server unchanged. Because the client
+satisfies the same interface `OrchestratorCore` already depends on, the core does
+not change to gain a real backend.
+
+### Signing stays symmetric (HS256)
+
+PRD 0070 nominally specifies asymmetric; the code is HS256 and we keep it.
+Asymmetric matters when the verifier is *less* privileged than the signer — here
+it is the reverse: the host controller (verifier) is strictly more privileged
+than the orchestrator (signer), and a controller that could forge orchestrator
+requests gains nothing, since it is already the component that launches. Staying
+symmetric also honors the no-runtime-deps policy (stdlib has no Ed25519). This
+matches the reasoning already inlined in `broker.py`'s module docstring.
+
+### Replay protection is out of scope (tracked in #494)
+
+Once the launch token travels over a wire, a captured token could be replayed —
+`sign_request` already emits `jti`/`iat` but `verify_request` reads neither, so
+there is no expiry window or `jti` cache today. Enforcing that (an `iat` window +
+a self-trimming `jti` cache) is a pure in-process change that lands independently
+of this work, and it is deferred to **#494** rather than gating the MVP of the
+host control server. Nothing here depends on it; it can merge before or after.
+
+### Op vocabulary and the "ids + static flags" rule (gap 3)
+
+Each op moved off the CLI widens the privileged surface, so growth is governed by
+one explicit rule, enforced in `verify_request`'s schema check:
+
+> A broker op carries **only ids and enumerated static flags** — a bottle id, a
+> pool slot, a **content-addressed** image ref chosen from a fixed set, an op
+> name from a closed vocabulary. Never a free-form path, argv, command, or
+> caller-supplied filesystem location. If an operation cannot be expressed that
+> way, it does not become a broker op.
+
+Operations that fit and move off the CLI (all today in
+`backend/*/consolidated_launch.py`, driven by a short-lived CLI process):
+
+| Op | What it does | Fits the rule because |
+|---|---|---|
+| `launch` / `teardown` | existing | ids + slot + image ref |
+| `orchestrator.ensure_running` | start the infra container | no arguments |
+| `orchestrator.{start,restart,status}` | lifecycle (the #391 path) | no arguments |
+| `list_live` | enumerate running bottles for reconcile | no arguments; returns ids/IPs |
+| `allocate_ip` | `next_free_ip` over `_network_container_ips` | no arguments; returns an IP |
+| `provision_git_gate` | `cp`/`exec` a per-bottle deploy key into the gateway | bottle id + key handle, no path |
+| `reprovision` | `docker exec printenv <ENV_VAR_SECRET>` on a live agent | bottle id + secret *name* |
+
+Image **builds** stay with the orchestrator for v1 (PRD 0070 §Memory: builds run
+control-plane-side; a dedicated slim build unit is later, #468-adjacent), so no
+`build` broker op is added here.
+
+With `list_live` as an internal control-server call, `Orchestrator.reconcile`'s
+`live_source_ips` parameter goes away — the tell PRD 0070 called out that the
+orchestrator couldn't see the backend disappears with it.
+
+### Secret provisioning (gap 2)
+
+The shared HS256 secret becomes a durable, out-of-band artifact via the
+**`TrustDomain`** seam (#476,
+[`trust_domain.py`](../../bot_bottle/trust_domain.py)):
+
+- The **launch-broker secret** is a `TrustDomain` whose key
+  (`host_signing_key(<file>)`, minted 0600 on first use, durable under
+  `bot_bottle_root()`) is provisioned to the orchestrator (signer) and the host
+  controller (verifier). Durability across orchestrator restarts is what makes
+  re-adoption work — a restart re-verifies against the same key.
+- The **host controller's own lifecycle endpoints** (the direct `cli -> host
+  controller` path) get a **separate** `TrustDomain` key the orchestrator never
+  holds — exactly the second domain #476's PRD reserves. The orchestrator must
+  not be able to mint the credentials used to start and stop it.
+
+This reuses the seam #476 landed rather than re-deriving provisioning per
+backend (the PR #471 bug class).
+
+### One daemon, structurally separate handlers (open decision 1)
+
+The audit writer and the broker live in **one daemon** for install simplicity,
+but with **no shared parsing** and **different credentials per handler**:
+
+- the **launch** handler requires the signed launch **JWT** (provenance +
+  un-coercible schema);
+- the **audit-append** handler takes a plain **bearer token** and writes to the
+  JSONL log.
+
+This does not defend against orchestrator compromise (it holds both creds) — it
+stops a bug in the boring audit path from reaching the privileged launch path.
+The launcher stays small enough to audit line-by-line, per PRD 0070.
+
+### State ownership: split by owner and lifetime
+
+A single mounted DB is impossible — SQLite locking is not coherent across guest
+kernels over a share, which is why the macOS backend already uses a container-only
+volume (`INFRA_DB_VOLUME`). So state splits three ways (depends on #469, which
+gets `bot-bottle.db` off the data plane first):
+
+| Owner | State | Home | Shape |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Orchestrator** | `orchestrator_bottles` registry; `bottled_agent_secrets` (encrypted egress tokens); `supervise_proposals` / `supervise_responses` | volume nothing else mounts (generalizing the macOS design) | **SQLite** — mutable, transactional, queried |
+| **Host controller** | supervise audit entries; egress traffic log (today → container stderr); host-side config | host filesystem, survives orchestrator/volume destruction | **JSONL** — append-only |
+| **Gateway** | none | — | after #469 the data plane holds no DB state |
+
+The historical record is **JSONL, not SQLite**, because it is append-only, never
+updated, never transactionally queried: `O_APPEND` writes are atomic, there is no
+locking protocol to get wrong, hash-chaining for tamper-evidence is cheap, and it
+survives container-runtime volume pruning (the #450 lesson) and stays readable
+without the orchestrator running. Both halves of "the audit record" — supervise
+decisions and the egress traffic log — land in the one place.
+
+The orchestrator is **sole mounter and sole writer** of its SQLite volume; the
+host controller is **sole writer** of the JSONL log, over the authenticated
+audit-append channel.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+Ordered, each independently mergeable:
+
+1. **`BrokerClient` + host launch server** over HTTP, reusing `verify_request`
+   and the existing `DockerBroker` bodies. Wire `OrchestratorCore` to a
+   `BrokerClient` behind a flag; keep `StubBroker` for the dev-harness. Closes
+   gap 1.
+2. **Durable secret via `TrustDomain`** — provision the launch-broker key to
+   signer + verifier; add the host controller's own lifecycle `TrustDomain`.
+   Closes gap 2.
+3. **Grow the op vocabulary** one op at a time (`list_live` first — it also
+   removes `reconcile`'s `live_source_ips`), each behind the ids + static-flags
+   rule. Closes gap 3.
+4. **JSONL audit log** — the host-controller-owned, hash-chained historical
+   record with the plain-bearer audit-append handler; redirect the egress traffic
+   log into it.
+5. **Drop the Docker socket from the CLI** once every host-privileged op it used
+   is a broker op — the payoff that unblocks the unprivileged Gitea runner user.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Schema-width rule enforcement.** The "ids + static flags" rule is stated;
+   should `verify_request` reject unknown claim keys outright (strict schema) to
+   keep the surface from drifting? Leaning yes.
+2. **Audit-append back-pressure.** What the audit handler does if the JSONL sink
+   is unavailable (fail-closed vs. buffer) — resolve before shipping chunk 5.
+
+## References
+
+- **PRD 0070** — the contract, the launch broker, and the state tiers this
+  implements.
+- **#469** — get `bot-bottle.db` off the data plane (lands underneath this).
+- **#476** ([`prd-new-control-plane-auth-provisioning`](prd-new-control-plane-auth-provisioning.md))
+  — the `TrustDomain` seam this plugs the host controller's key into.
+- **#391** — backend-agnostic orchestrator restart (the bootstrap path).
+- **#494** — enforce broker replay protection (`iat` window + `jti` cache); split
+  out of this PRD as an independent in-process change.
+- **#386** — prebuilt images from the Gitea OCI registry (the fixed image set the
+  broker validates against).
+- **#355** — generic `SecretProvider`.
+- **#478** — remote terminal design.
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE": "docker:28-cli@sha256:625d9431a9f54c5a2bc90f24f0e1c3d55b1349fd857dd85035f98c2c9acbdd4d",
-  "NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:22.23.1-trixie-slim@sha256:e6d9a389d34ff9678438af985c9913fbd1eb6ed36e80fea56644f4b4f6dd70ba",
-  "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE": "python:3.12.13-slim-trixie@sha256:57cd7c3a7a273101a6485ba99423ee568157882804b1124b4dd04266317710de"
-}
@@ -38,13 +38,8 @@ include = ["bot_bottle*"]
 bot_bottle = [
    "gateway/egress/entrypoint.sh",
    "contrib/claude/Dockerfile",
-    "contrib/claude/package.json",
-    "contrib/claude/package-lock.json",
    "contrib/codex/Dockerfile",
-    "contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS",
    "contrib/pi/Dockerfile",
-    "contrib/pi/package.json",
-    "contrib/pi/package-lock.json",
    "backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env",
    "backend/macos_container/nested-containers-init.sh",
 ]
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Runtime-only third-party dependency for Dockerfile.gateway.
-#
-# Regenerate requirements.gateway.lock with the image-input refresh workflow;
-# Dockerfile.gateway installs the lock with --require-hashes.
-mitmproxy==11.1.3
@@ -1,837 +0,0 @@
-#
-# This file is autogenerated by pip-compile with Python 3.12
-# by the following command:
-#
-#    pip-compile --generate-hashes --output-file=requirements.gateway.lock requirements.gateway.in
-#
-aioquic==1.2.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:1de513772fd04ff38028fdf748a9e2dec33d7aa2fbf67fda3011d9a85b620c54 \
-    --hash=sha256:2466499759b31ea4f1d17f4aeb1f8d4297169e05e3c1216d618c9757f4dd740d \
-    --hash=sha256:358e2b9c1e0c24b9933094c3c2cf990faf44d03b64d6f8ff79b4b3f510c6c268 \
-    --hash=sha256:3976b75e82d83742c8b811e38d273eda2ca7f81394b6a85da33a02849c5f1d9d \
-    --hash=sha256:3e23964dfb04526ade6e66f5b7cd0c830421b8138303ab60ba6e204015e7cb0b \
-    --hash=sha256:43ae3b11d43400a620ca0b4b4885d12b76a599c2cbddba755f74bebfa65fe587 \
-    --hash=sha256:6371c3afa1036294e1505fdbda8c147bc41c5b6709a47459e8c1b4eec41a86ef \
-    --hash=sha256:6e418c92898a0af306e6f1b6a55a0d3d2597001c57a7b1ba36cf5b47bf41233b \
-    --hash=sha256:6fe683943ea3439dd0aca05ff80e85a552d4b39f9f34858c76ac54c205990e88 \
-    --hash=sha256:7dcc212bb529900757d8e99a76198b42c2a978ce735a1bfca394033c16cfc33c \
-    --hash=sha256:81650d59bef05c514af2cfdcb2946e9d13367b745e68b36881d43630ef563d38 \
-    --hash=sha256:84d733332927b76218a3b246216104116f766f5a9b2308ec306cd017b3049660 \
-    --hash=sha256:8e600da7aa7e4a7bc53ee8f45fd66808032127ae00938c119ac77d66633b8961 \
-    --hash=sha256:910d8c91da86bba003d491d15deaeac3087d1b9d690b9edc1375905d8867b742 \
-    --hash=sha256:bb917143e7a4de5beba1e695fa89f2b05ef080b450dea07338cc67a9c75e0a4d \
-    --hash=sha256:c22689c33fe4799624aed6faaba0af9e6ea7d31ac45047745828ee68d67fe1d9 \
-    --hash=sha256:c332cffa3c2124e5db82b2b9eb2662bd7c39ee2247606b74de689f6d3091b61a \
-    --hash=sha256:cbe7167b2faee887e115d83d25332c4b8fa4604d5175807d978cb4fe39b4e36e \
-    --hash=sha256:cd75015462ca5070a888110dc201f35a9f4c7459f9201b77adc3c06013611bb8 \
-    --hash=sha256:e2c3c127cc3d9eac7a6d05142036bf4b2c593d750a115a2fa42c1f86cbe8c0a0 \
-    --hash=sha256:e3dcfb941004333d477225a6689b55fc7f905af5ee6a556eb5083be0354e653a \
-    --hash=sha256:e7ce10198f8efa91986ad8ac83fa08e50972e0aacde45bdaf7b9365094e72c0c \
-    --hash=sha256:f209ad5edbff8239e994c189dc74428420957448a190f4343faee4caedef4eee \
-    --hash=sha256:f81e7946f09501a7c27e3f71b84a455e6bf92346fb5a28ef2d73c9d564463c63 \
-    --hash=sha256:f91263bb3f71948c5c8915b4d50ee370004f20a416f67fab3dcc90556c7e7199 \
-    --hash=sha256:fcc1eb083ed9f8d903482e375281c8c26a5ed2b6bee5ee2be3f13275d8fdb146
-    # via mitmproxy
-argon2-cffi==23.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:879c3e79a2729ce768ebb7d36d4609e3a78a4ca2ec3a9f12286ca057e3d0db08 \
-    --hash=sha256:c670642b78ba29641818ab2e68bd4e6a78ba53b7eff7b4c3815ae16abf91c7ea
-    # via mitmproxy
-argon2-cffi-bindings==25.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:1db89609c06afa1a214a69a462ea741cf735b29a57530478c06eb81dd403de99 \
-    --hash=sha256:1e021e87faa76ae0d413b619fe2b65ab9a037f24c60a1e6cc43457ae20de6dc6 \
-    --hash=sha256:21378b40e1b8d1655dd5310c84a40fc19a9aa5e6366e835ceb8576bf0fea716d \
-    --hash=sha256:2630b6240b495dfab90aebe159ff784d08ea999aa4b0d17efa734055a07d2f44 \
-    --hash=sha256:3c6702abc36bf3ccba3f802b799505def420a1b7039862014a65db3205967f5a \
-    --hash=sha256:3d3f05610594151994ca9ccb3c771115bdb4daef161976a266f0dd8aa9996b8f \
-    --hash=sha256:473bcb5f82924b1becbb637b63303ec8d10e84c8d241119419897a26116515d2 \
-    --hash=sha256:5acb4e41090d53f17ca1110c3427f0a130f944b896fc8c83973219c97f57b690 \
-    --hash=sha256:5d588dec224e2a83edbdc785a5e6f3c6cd736f46bfd4b441bbb5aa1f5085e584 \
-    --hash=sha256:6dca33a9859abf613e22733131fc9194091c1fa7cb3e131c143056b4856aa47e \
-    --hash=sha256:7aef0c91e2c0fbca6fc68e7555aa60ef7008a739cbe045541e438373bc54d2b0 \
-    --hash=sha256:84a461d4d84ae1295871329b346a97f68eade8c53b6ed9a7ca2d7467f3c8ff6f \
-    --hash=sha256:87c33a52407e4c41f3b70a9c2d3f6056d88b10dad7695be708c5021673f55623 \
-    --hash=sha256:8b8efee945193e667a396cbc7b4fb7d357297d6234d30a489905d96caabde56b \
-    --hash=sha256:a1c70058c6ab1e352304ac7e3b52554daadacd8d453c1752e547c76e9c99ac44 \
-    --hash=sha256:a98cd7d17e9f7ce244c0803cad3c23a7d379c301ba618a5fa76a67d116618b98 \
-    --hash=sha256:aecba1723ae35330a008418a91ea6cfcedf6d31e5fbaa056a166462ff066d500 \
-    --hash=sha256:b0fdbcf513833809c882823f98dc2f931cf659d9a1429616ac3adebb49f5db94 \
-    --hash=sha256:b55aec3565b65f56455eebc9b9f34130440404f27fe21c3b375bf1ea4d8fbae6 \
-    --hash=sha256:b957f3e6ea4d55d820e40ff76f450952807013d361a65d7f28acc0acbf29229d \
-    --hash=sha256:ba92837e4a9aa6a508c8d2d7883ed5a8f6c308c89a4790e1e447a220deb79a85 \
-    --hash=sha256:c4f9665de60b1b0e99bcd6be4f17d90339698ce954cfd8d9cf4f91c995165a92 \
-    --hash=sha256:c87b72589133f0346a1cb8d5ecca4b933e3c9b64656c9d175270a000e73b288d \
-    --hash=sha256:d3e924cfc503018a714f94a49a149fdc0b644eaead5d1f089330399134fa028a \
-    --hash=sha256:da0c79c23a63723aa5d782250fbf51b768abca630285262fb5144ba5ae01e520 \
-    --hash=sha256:e2fd3bfbff3c5d74fef31a722f729bf93500910db650c925c2d6ef879a7e51cb
-    # via argon2-cffi
-asgiref==3.8.1 \
-    --hash=sha256:3e1e3ecc849832fe52ccf2cb6686b7a55f82bb1d6aee72a58826471390335e47 \
-    --hash=sha256:c343bd80a0bec947a9860adb4c432ffa7db769836c64238fc34bdc3fec84d590
-    # via mitmproxy
-attrs==26.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:c647aa4a12dfbad9333ca4e71fe62ddc36f4e63b2d260a37a8b83d2f043ac309 \
-    --hash=sha256:d03ceb89cb322a8fd706d4fb91940737b6642aa36998fe130a9bc96c985eff32
-    # via service-identity
-blinker==1.9.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:b4ce2265a7abece45e7cc896e98dbebe6cead56bcf805a3d23136d145f5445bf \
-    --hash=sha256:ba0efaa9080b619ff2f3459d1d500c57bddea4a6b424b60a91141db6fd2f08bc
-    # via flask
-brotli==1.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:03d20af184290887bdea3f0f78c4f737d126c74dc2f3ccadf07e54ceca3bf208 \
-    --hash=sha256:0541e747cce78e24ea12d69176f6a7ddb690e62c425e01d31cc065e69ce55b48 \
-    --hash=sha256:069a121ac97412d1fe506da790b3e69f52254b9df4eb665cd42460c837193354 \
-    --hash=sha256:0737ddb3068957cf1b054899b0883830bb1fec522ec76b1098f9b6e0f02d9419 \
-    --hash=sha256:0b63b949ff929fbc2d6d3ce0e924c9b93c9785d877a21a1b678877ffbbc4423a \
-    --hash=sha256:0c6244521dda65ea562d5a69b9a26120769b7a9fb3db2fe9545935ed6735b128 \
-    --hash=sha256:11d00ed0a83fa22d29bc6b64ef636c4552ebafcef57154b4ddd132f5638fbd1c \
-    --hash=sha256:141bd4d93984070e097521ed07e2575b46f817d08f9fa42b16b9b5f27b5ac088 \
-    --hash=sha256:19c116e796420b0cee3da1ccec3b764ed2952ccfcc298b55a10e5610ad7885f9 \
-    --hash=sha256:1ab4fbee0b2d9098c74f3057b2bc055a8bd92ccf02f65944a241b4349229185a \
-    --hash=sha256:1ae56aca0402a0f9a3431cddda62ad71666ca9d4dc3a10a142b9dce2e3c0cda3 \
-    --hash=sha256:1b2c248cd517c222d89e74669a4adfa5577e06ab68771a529060cf5a156e9757 \
-    --hash=sha256:1e9a65b5736232e7a7f91ff3d02277f11d339bf34099a56cdab6a8b3410a02b2 \
-    --hash=sha256:224e57f6eac61cc449f498cc5f0e1725ba2071a3d4f48d5d9dffba42db196438 \
-    --hash=sha256:22fc2a8549ffe699bfba2256ab2ed0421a7b8fadff114a3d201794e45a9ff578 \
-    --hash=sha256:23032ae55523cc7bccb4f6a0bf368cd25ad9bcdcc1990b64a647e7bbcce9cb5b \
-    --hash=sha256:2333e30a5e00fe0fe55903c8832e08ee9c3b1382aacf4db26664a16528d51b4b \
-    --hash=sha256:2954c1c23f81c2eaf0b0717d9380bd348578a94161a65b3a2afc62c86467dd68 \
-    --hash=sha256:2a24c50840d89ded6c9a8fdc7b6ed3692ed4e86f1c4a4a938e1e92def92933e0 \
-    --hash=sha256:2de9d02f5bda03d27ede52e8cfe7b865b066fa49258cbab568720aa5be80a47d \
-    --hash=sha256:2feb1d960f760a575dbc5ab3b1c00504b24caaf6986e2dc2b01c09c87866a943 \
-    --hash=sha256:30924eb4c57903d5a7526b08ef4a584acc22ab1ffa085faceb521521d2de32dd \
-    --hash=sha256:316cc9b17edf613ac76b1f1f305d2a748f1b976b033b049a6ecdfd5612c70409 \
-    --hash=sha256:32d95b80260d79926f5fab3c41701dbb818fde1c9da590e77e571eefd14abe28 \
-    --hash=sha256:38025d9f30cf4634f8309c6874ef871b841eb3c347e90b0851f63d1ded5212da \
-    --hash=sha256:39da8adedf6942d76dc3e46653e52df937a3c4d6d18fdc94a7c29d263b1f5b50 \
-    --hash=sha256:3c0ef38c7a7014ffac184db9e04debe495d317cc9c6fb10071f7fefd93100a4f \
-    --hash=sha256:3d7954194c36e304e1523f55d7042c59dc53ec20dd4e9ea9d151f1b62b4415c0 \
-    --hash=sha256:3ee8a80d67a4334482d9712b8e83ca6b1d9bc7e351931252ebef5d8f7335a547 \
-    --hash=sha256:4093c631e96fdd49e0377a9c167bfd75b6d0bad2ace734c6eb20b348bc3ea180 \
-    --hash=sha256:43395e90523f9c23a3d5bdf004733246fba087f2948f87ab28015f12359ca6a0 \
-    --hash=sha256:43ce1b9935bfa1ede40028054d7f48b5469cd02733a365eec8a329ffd342915d \
-    --hash=sha256:4410f84b33374409552ac9b6903507cdb31cd30d2501fc5ca13d18f73548444a \
-    --hash=sha256:494994f807ba0b92092a163a0a283961369a65f6cbe01e8891132b7a320e61eb \
-    --hash=sha256:4d4a848d1837973bf0f4b5e54e3bec977d99be36a7895c61abb659301b02c112 \
-    --hash=sha256:4ed11165dd45ce798d99a136808a794a748d5dc38511303239d4e2363c0695dc \
-    --hash=sha256:4f3607b129417e111e30637af1b56f24f7a49e64763253bbc275c75fa887d4b2 \
-    --hash=sha256:510b5b1bfbe20e1a7b3baf5fed9e9451873559a976c1a78eebaa3b86c57b4265 \
-    --hash=sha256:524f35912131cc2cabb00edfd8d573b07f2d9f21fa824bd3fb19725a9cf06327 \
-    --hash=sha256:587ca6d3cef6e4e868102672d3bd9dc9698c309ba56d41c2b9c85bbb903cdb95 \
-    --hash=sha256:58d4b711689366d4a03ac7957ab8c28890415e267f9b6589969e74b6e42225ec \
-    --hash=sha256:5b3cc074004d968722f51e550b41a27be656ec48f8afaeeb45ebf65b561481dd \
-    --hash=sha256:5dab0844f2cf82be357a0eb11a9087f70c5430b2c241493fc122bb6f2bb0917c \
-    --hash=sha256:5e55da2c8724191e5b557f8e18943b1b4839b8efc3ef60d65985bcf6f587dd38 \
-    --hash=sha256:5eeb539606f18a0b232d4ba45adccde4125592f3f636a6182b4a8a436548b914 \
-    --hash=sha256:5f4d5ea15c9382135076d2fb28dde923352fe02951e66935a9efaac8f10e81b0 \
-    --hash=sha256:5fb2ce4b8045c78ebbc7b8f3c15062e435d47e7393cc57c25115cfd49883747a \
-    --hash=sha256:6172447e1b368dcbc458925e5ddaf9113477b0ed542df258d84fa28fc45ceea7 \
-    --hash=sha256:6967ced6730aed543b8673008b5a391c3b1076d834ca438bbd70635c73775368 \
-    --hash=sha256:6974f52a02321b36847cd19d1b8e381bf39939c21efd6ee2fc13a28b0d99348c \
-    --hash=sha256:6c3020404e0b5eefd7c9485ccf8393cfb75ec38ce75586e046573c9dc29967a0 \
-    --hash=sha256:6c6e0c425f22c1c719c42670d561ad682f7bfeeef918edea971a79ac5252437f \
-    --hash=sha256:70051525001750221daa10907c77830bc889cb6d865cc0b813d9db7fefc21451 \
-    --hash=sha256:7905193081db9bfa73b1219140b3d315831cbff0d8941f22da695832f0dd188f \
-    --hash=sha256:7bc37c4d6b87fb1017ea28c9508b36bbcb0c3d18b4260fcdf08b200c74a6aee8 \
-    --hash=sha256:7c4855522edb2e6ae7fdb58e07c3ba9111e7621a8956f481c68d5d979c93032e \
-    --hash=sha256:7e4c4629ddad63006efa0ef968c8e4751c5868ff0b1c5c40f76524e894c50248 \
-    --hash=sha256:7eedaa5d036d9336c95915035fb57422054014ebdeb6f3b42eac809928e40d0c \
-    --hash=sha256:7f4bf76817c14aa98cc6697ac02f3972cb8c3da93e9ef16b9c66573a68014f91 \
-    --hash=sha256:81de08ac11bcb85841e440c13611c00b67d3bf82698314928d0b676362546724 \
-    --hash=sha256:832436e59afb93e1836081a20f324cb185836c617659b07b129141a8426973c7 \
-    --hash=sha256:861bf317735688269936f755fa136a99d1ed526883859f86e41a5d43c61d8966 \
-    --hash=sha256:87a3044c3a35055527ac75e419dfa9f4f3667a1e887ee80360589eb8c90aabb9 \
-    --hash=sha256:890b5a14ce214389b2cc36ce82f3093f96f4cc730c1cffdbefff77a7c71f2a97 \
-    --hash=sha256:89f4988c7203739d48c6f806f1e87a1d96e0806d44f0fba61dba81392c9e474d \
-    --hash=sha256:8bf32b98b75c13ec7cf774164172683d6e7891088f6316e54425fde1efc276d5 \
-    --hash=sha256:8dadd1314583ec0bf2d1379f7008ad627cd6336625d6679cf2f8e67081b83acf \
-    --hash=sha256:901032ff242d479a0efa956d853d16875d42157f98951c0230f69e69f9c09bac \
-    --hash=sha256:9011560a466d2eb3f5a6e4929cf4a09be405c64154e12df0dd72713f6500e32b \
-    --hash=sha256:906bc3a79de8c4ae5b86d3d75a8b77e44404b0f4261714306e3ad248d8ab0951 \
-    --hash=sha256:919e32f147ae93a09fe064d77d5ebf4e35502a8df75c29fb05788528e330fe74 \
-    --hash=sha256:91d7cc2a76b5567591d12c01f019dd7afce6ba8cba6571187e21e2fc418ae648 \
-    --hash=sha256:929811df5462e182b13920da56c6e0284af407d1de637d8e536c5cd00a7daf60 \
-    --hash=sha256:949f3b7c29912693cee0afcf09acd6ebc04c57af949d9bf77d6101ebb61e388c \
-    --hash=sha256:a090ca607cbb6a34b0391776f0cb48062081f5f60ddcce5d11838e67a01928d1 \
-    --hash=sha256:a1fd8a29719ccce974d523580987b7f8229aeace506952fa9ce1d53a033873c8 \
-    --hash=sha256:a37b8f0391212d29b3a91a799c8e4a2855e0576911cdfb2515487e30e322253d \
-    --hash=sha256:a3daabb76a78f829cafc365531c972016e4aa8d5b4bf60660ad8ecee19df7ccc \
-    --hash=sha256:a469274ad18dc0e4d316eefa616d1d0c2ff9da369af19fa6f3daa4f09671fd61 \
-    --hash=sha256:a599669fd7c47233438a56936988a2478685e74854088ef5293802123b5b2460 \
-    --hash=sha256:a743e5a28af5f70f9c080380a5f908d4d21d40e8f0e0c8901604d15cfa9ba751 \
-    --hash=sha256:a77def80806c421b4b0af06f45d65a136e7ac0bdca3c09d9e2ea4e515367c7e9 \
-    --hash=sha256:a7e53012d2853a07a4a79c00643832161a910674a893d296c9f1259859a289d2 \
-    --hash=sha256:a93dde851926f4f2678e704fadeb39e16c35d8baebd5252c9fd94ce8ce68c4a0 \
-    --hash=sha256:aac0411d20e345dc0920bdec5548e438e999ff68d77564d5e9463a7ca9d3e7b1 \
-    --hash=sha256:ae15b066e5ad21366600ebec29a7ccbc86812ed267e4b28e860b8ca16a2bc474 \
-    --hash=sha256:aea440a510e14e818e67bfc4027880e2fb500c2ccb20ab21c7a7c8b5b4703d75 \
-    --hash=sha256:af6fa6817889314555aede9a919612b23739395ce767fe7fcbea9a80bf140fe5 \
-    --hash=sha256:b760c65308ff1e462f65d69c12e4ae085cff3b332d894637f6273a12a482d09f \
-    --hash=sha256:be36e3d172dc816333f33520154d708a2657ea63762ec16b62ece02ab5e4daf2 \
-    --hash=sha256:c247dd99d39e0338a604f8c2b3bc7061d5c2e9e2ac7ba9cc1be5a69cb6cd832f \
-    --hash=sha256:c5529b34c1c9d937168297f2c1fde7ebe9ebdd5e121297ff9c043bdb2ae3d6fb \
-    --hash=sha256:c8146669223164fc87a7e3de9f81e9423c67a79d6b3447994dfb9c95da16e2d6 \
-    --hash=sha256:c8fd5270e906eef71d4a8d19b7c6a43760c6abcfcc10c9101d14eb2357418de9 \
-    --hash=sha256:ca63e1890ede90b2e4454f9a65135a4d387a4585ff8282bb72964fab893f2111 \
-    --hash=sha256:caf9ee9a5775f3111642d33b86237b05808dafcd6268faa492250e9b78046eb2 \
-    --hash=sha256:cb1dac1770878ade83f2ccdf7d25e494f05c9165f5246b46a621cc849341dc01 \
-    --hash=sha256:cdad5b9014d83ca68c25d2e9444e28e967ef16e80f6b436918c700c117a85467 \
-    --hash=sha256:cdbc1fc1bc0bff1cef838eafe581b55bfbffaed4ed0318b724d0b71d4d377619 \
-    --hash=sha256:ceb64bbc6eac5a140ca649003756940f8d6a7c444a68af170b3187623b43bebf \
-    --hash=sha256:d0c5516f0aed654134a2fc936325cc2e642f8a0e096d075209672eb321cff408 \
-    --hash=sha256:d143fd47fad1db3d7c27a1b1d66162e855b5d50a89666af46e1679c496e8e579 \
-    --hash=sha256:d192f0f30804e55db0d0e0a35d83a9fead0e9a359a9ed0285dbacea60cc10a84 \
-    --hash=sha256:d2b35ca2c7f81d173d2fadc2f4f31e88cc5f7a39ae5b6db5513cf3383b0e0ec7 \
-    --hash=sha256:d342778ef319e1026af243ed0a07c97acf3bad33b9f29e7ae6a1f68fd083e90c \
-    --hash=sha256:d487f5432bf35b60ed625d7e1b448e2dc855422e87469e3f450aa5552b0eb284 \
-    --hash=sha256:d7702622a8b40c49bffb46e1e3ba2e81268d5c04a34f460978c6b5517a34dd52 \
-    --hash=sha256:db85ecf4e609a48f4b29055f1e144231b90edc90af7481aa731ba2d059226b1b \
-    --hash=sha256:de6551e370ef19f8de1807d0a9aa2cdfdce2e85ce88b122fe9f6b2b076837e59 \
-    --hash=sha256:e1140c64812cb9b06c922e77f1c26a75ec5e3f0fb2bf92cc8c58720dec276752 \
-    --hash=sha256:e4fe605b917c70283db7dfe5ada75e04561479075761a0b3866c081d035b01c1 \
-    --hash=sha256:e6a904cb26bfefc2f0a6f240bdf5233be78cd2488900a2f846f3c3ac8489ab80 \
-    --hash=sha256:e79e6520141d792237c70bcd7a3b122d00f2613769ae0cb61c52e89fd3443839 \
-    --hash=sha256:e84799f09591700a4154154cab9787452925578841a94321d5ee8fb9a9a328f0 \
-    --hash=sha256:e93dfc1a1165e385cc8239fab7c036fb2cd8093728cbd85097b284d7b99249a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:efa8b278894b14d6da122a72fefcebc28445f2d3f880ac59d46c90f4c13be9a3 \
-    --hash=sha256:f0d8a7a6b5983c2496e364b969f0e526647a06b075d034f3297dc66f3b360c64 \
-    --hash=sha256:f0db75f47be8b8abc8d9e31bc7aad0547ca26f24a54e6fd10231d623f183d089 \
-    --hash=sha256:f296c40e23065d0d6650c4aefe7470d2a25fffda489bcc3eb66083f3ac9f6643 \
-    --hash=sha256:f31859074d57b4639318523d6ffdca586ace54271a73ad23ad021acd807eb14b \
-    --hash=sha256:f66b5337fa213f1da0d9000bc8dc0cb5b896b726eefd9c6046f699b169c41b9e \
-    --hash=sha256:f733d788519c7e3e71f0855c96618720f5d3d60c3cb829d8bbb722dddce37985 \
-    --hash=sha256:fce1473f3ccc4187f75b4690cfc922628aed4d3dd013d047f95a9b3919a86596 \
-    --hash=sha256:fd5f17ff8f14003595ab414e45fce13d073e0762394f957182e69035c9f3d7c2 \
-    --hash=sha256:fdc3ff3bfccdc6b9cc7c342c03aa2400683f0cb891d46e94b64a197910dc4064
-    # via mitmproxy
-certifi==2026.7.22 \
-    --hash=sha256:62f22742b58a1a33014a2b6b706588a8d7e2a88ae7bd1a6ebe8c992928483775 \
-    --hash=sha256:741e2c3b351ddf169a738da9f2c048608ff7f2c5cc02f1ebc6b118bb090d5d55
-    # via
-    #   aioquic
-    #   mitmproxy
-cffi==2.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:02cb7ff33ded4f1532476731f89ede53e2e488a8e6205515a82144246ffa7dcc \
-    --hash=sha256:03e9810d18c646077e501f661b682fbf5dee4676048527ca3cffe66faa9960dd \
-    --hash=sha256:0520e1f4c35f44e209cbbb421b67eec42e6a157f59444dfb6058874ff3610e5d \
-    --hash=sha256:0582a58f3051372229ca8e7f5f589f9e5632678208d8636fea3676711fdf7fe5 \
-    --hash=sha256:0611e7ebf90573a535ebdc33ae9da222d037853983e13359f580fab781ca017f \
-    --hash=sha256:0a42c688d19fca6e095a53c6a6e2295a5b050a8b289f109adab02a9e61a25de6 \
-    --hash=sha256:0a96b74cda968eebbad56d973efe5098974f0a9fb323865bf99ea1fd24e3e64c \
-    --hash=sha256:10537b1df4967ca26d21e5072d7d54188354483b91dc75058968d3f0cf13fbda \
-    --hash=sha256:11b3fb55f4f8ad92274ed26705f65d8f91457de71f5380061eb6d125a768fecd \
-    --hash=sha256:15faec4adfff450819f3aee0e2e02c812de6edb88203aa58807955db2003472a \
-    --hash=sha256:164bff1657b2a74f0b6d54e11c9b375bc97b931f2ca9c43fcf875838da1570dd \
-    --hash=sha256:1854b724d00f6654c742097d5387569021be12d3a0f770eae1df8f8acfcc6acd \
-    --hash=sha256:19c54ac121cad98450b4896fa9a43ee0180d57bc4bc911a33db6cab1efab6cd3 \
-    --hash=sha256:1b96bfe2c4bd825681b7d311ad6d9b7280a091f43e8f63da5729638083cd3bfb \
-    --hash=sha256:1e9f50d192a3e525b15a75ab5114e442d83d657b7ec29182a991bc9a88fd3a66 \
-    --hash=sha256:1ff3456eab0d889592d1936d6125bbfbc7ae4d3354a700f8bd80450a66445d4d \
-    --hash=sha256:2282cd5e38aa8accd03e99d1256af8411c84cdbee6a89d841b563fdbd1f3e50f \
-    --hash=sha256:276f20fffd7b396e12516ba8edf9509210ac248cbbc5acbc39cd512f9f59ebe6 \
-    --hash=sha256:2b71d409cccee78310ab5dec549aed052aaea483346e282c7b02362596e01bb0 \
-    --hash=sha256:2e9dabb9abcb7ad15938c7196ad5c1718a4e6d33cc79b4c0209bdb64c4a54a5c \
-    --hash=sha256:30b65779d598c370374fefabf138d456fd6f3216bfa7bedfab1ba82025b0cd93 \
-    --hash=sha256:33eb1ad83ebe8f313e0df035c406227d55a79456704a863fad9842136af5ad7d \
-    --hash=sha256:35aaea0c7ee0e58a5cd8c2fd1a48fdf7ece0d2699b7ecdda08194e9ce5dd9b3d \
-    --hash=sha256:3681e031db29958a7502f5c0c9d6bbc4c36cb20f7b104086fa642d1799631ff8 \
-    --hash=sha256:379de10ce1ba048b1448599d1b37b24caee16309d1ac98d3982fc997f768700b \
-    --hash=sha256:37f525a7e7e50c017fdebe58b787be310ad59357ae43a053943a6e1a6c526001 \
-    --hash=sha256:3b926723c13eba9f81d2ef3820d63aeceec3b2d4639906047bf675cb8a7a500d \
-    --hash=sha256:3d7f118b5adbfdfead90c25822690b02bc8074fba949bb7858bec4ebd55adb43 \
-    --hash=sha256:46b1c8db8f6122420f32d02fffb924c2fe9bc772d228c7c711748fff56aabb2b \
-    --hash=sha256:47ff3a8bfd8cb9da1af7524b965127095055654c177fcfc7578debcb015eecd0 \
-    --hash=sha256:4d433a51f1870e43a13b6732f92aaf540ff77c2015097c78556f75a2d6c030e0 \
-    --hash=sha256:4f26194e3d95e06501b942642855aed4f953d55e95d7d01b7c4483db3ecff458 \
-    --hash=sha256:510aeeeac94811b138077451da1fb18b308a5feab47dd2b603af55804155e1c8 \
-    --hash=sha256:5972433ad71a9e46516584ef60a0fda12d9dc459938d1539c3ddecf9bdc1368d \
-    --hash=sha256:5ecbd0499275d57506d397eebe1981cee87b47fcd9ef5c22cab7ed7644a39a94 \
-    --hash=sha256:6274dcb2d15cef48daa73ed1be5a40d501d74dccd0cd6db364776d12cb6ba022 \
-    --hash=sha256:63960549e4f8dc41e31accb97b975abaecfc44c03e396c093a6436763c2ea7db \
-    --hash=sha256:64c753a0f87a256020004f37a1c8c02c480e725f910f0b2a0f3f07debd1b2479 \
-    --hash=sha256:6af371f3767faeffc6ac1ef57cdfd25844403e9d3f476c5537caee499de96376 \
-    --hash=sha256:6ca4919c6e4f89aa99c42510b42cf54596892c00b3f9077f6bdd1505e24b9c8d \
-    --hash=sha256:6d194185eabd279f1c05ebe3504265ddfc5ad2b58d0714f7db9f01da592e9eb6 \
-    --hash=sha256:702c436735fbe99d59ada02a1f65cfc0d31c0ee8b7290912f8fbc5cd1e4b16c3 \
-    --hash=sha256:716ff8ec22f20b4d988b12884086bcef0fc99737043e503f7a3935a6be99b1ea \
-    --hash=sha256:762f99479dcb369f60ab9017ad4ab97a36a1dd7c1ee5a3b15db0f4b8659120cd \
-    --hash=sha256:7762faa47e8ff7eb80bd261d9a7d8eea2d8baa69de5e95b70c1f338bbe712f02 \
-    --hash=sha256:78474632761faa0fb96f30b1c928c84ebcf68713cbb80d15bab09dfe61640fde \
-    --hash=sha256:799416bae98336e400981ff6e532d67d5c709cfb30afb79865a1315f94b0e224 \
-    --hash=sha256:7d034dcffa09e9a46c93fa3a3be402096cb5354ac6e41ab8e5cc9cd8b642ad76 \
-    --hash=sha256:7d28dff1db6764108bc30788d85d61c876beff416d9a49cb9dd7c5a9f34f5804 \
-    --hash=sha256:7d3538f9c0e50670f4deb93dbb696576e60590369cae2faf7de681e597a8a1f1 \
-    --hash=sha256:7d5980a3433d4b71a5e120f9dd551403d7824e31e2e67124fe2769c404c06913 \
-    --hash=sha256:7ea6b3e2c4250ff1de21c630fe72d0f63eb95c2c32ffbf64a358cf4a8836d714 \
-    --hash=sha256:86cf8755a791f72c85dc287128cc62d4f24d392e3f1e15837245623f4a33cccc \
-    --hash=sha256:88023dfe18799507b73f1dbb0d14326a17465de1bc9c9c7655c22845e9ddc3a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:89095c1968b4ba8285840e131bf2891b09ae137fe2146905acae0354fbce1b5e \
-    --hash=sha256:8d35c139744adb3e727cd51b1a18324bbe44b8bd41bf8322bca4d41289f48eda \
-    --hash=sha256:8e74a6135550c4748af665b1b1118b6aab33b1fc6a16f9aff630af107c3b4512 \
-    --hash=sha256:8f9ec95b8a043d3dfbc74d9abc6f7baf524dd27a8dc160b0a32ff9cdab650c28 \
-    --hash=sha256:90bec57cf82089383bd06a605b3eb8daebf7e5a668520beaf6e327a83a947699 \
-    --hash=sha256:95f2954c2c9473d892eca6e0409f3568b37ab62a8eedb122461f73cc273476e3 \
-    --hash=sha256:961be50688f7fba2fa65f63712d3b9b341a22311f5253460ce933f52f0de1c8c \
-    --hash=sha256:98fff996e983a36d3aa2eca83af40c5821202e7e6f32d13ae94e3d2286f10cfe \
-    --hash=sha256:9b8f0f26ca4e7513c534d351eca551947d053fac438f2a04ac96d882909b0d3a \
-    --hash=sha256:9d72af0cf10a76a600a9690078fe31c63b9588c8e86bf9fd353f713c84b5db0f \
-    --hash=sha256:9d8272c0e483b024e1b9ad029821470ed8ec65631dbd90217469da0e7cd89f1c \
-    --hash=sha256:a016194dbe13d14ee9556e734b772d8d67b947092b268d757fd4290e3ba2dfc2 \
-    --hash=sha256:a5781494d4d400a3f47f8f1da94b324f6e6b440a53387774002890a2a2f4b50f \
-    --hash=sha256:a95b05f9baf29b91171b3a8bd2020b028835243e7b0ff6bb23e2a3c228518b1b \
-    --hash=sha256:aa7a1b53a2a4452ada2d1b5dade9960b2522f1e61293a811a077439e39029565 \
-    --hash=sha256:ac0f1a2d0cfa7eea3f2aaf006ab6e70e8feeb16b75d65b7e5939982ca2f11056 \
-    --hash=sha256:af5e2915d41fe6c961694d7bfdc8562942638200f3ce2765dfb8b745cf997629 \
-    --hash=sha256:b6422532152adf4e59b110cb2808cee7a033800952f5c036b4af047ee43199e7 \
-    --hash=sha256:b65f590ef2a44640f9a05dbb548a429b4ade77913ce683ac8b1480777658a6c0 \
-    --hash=sha256:ba00f661f8ba35d075c937174e27c2c421cec3942fd2e0ea3e66996757c0fdd9 \
-    --hash=sha256:bccbbb5ee76a61f9d99b5bf3846a51d7fca4b6a732fe46f89295610edaf41853 \
-    --hash=sha256:bf01d8c84cbea96b944c73b22182e6c7c432b3475632b8111dbfdc95ddad6e13 \
-    --hash=sha256:bf5c6cf48238b0eb4c086978c492ad1cbc22373fc5b2d7353b3a598ce6db887a \
-    --hash=sha256:c16914df9fb7f500e440e6875fa23ff5e0b31db01fa9c06af98d59a91f0dc2e4 \
-    --hash=sha256:c351efb95e832a853a29361675f33a7ce53de1a109cd73fd47af0712213aa4ce \
-    --hash=sha256:c4165821e131d6d4ca444347c2b694e2311bcfa3fe5a861cc72968f28867beac \
-    --hash=sha256:c5f5df567f6eb216de69be06ce55c8b714090fae02b18a3b40da8163b8c5fa9c \
-    --hash=sha256:c941bb58d5a6e1c3892d86e42927ed6c180302f07e6d395d08c416e594b98b46 \
-    --hash=sha256:c97f080ea627e2863524c5af3836e2270b5f5dfff1f104392b959f8df0c5d384 \
-    --hash=sha256:cb96698e3c7413d906ce83f8ffd245ec1bd94707541f299d0ce4d6b0193e982b \
-    --hash=sha256:cbb7640ce37159548d2147b5b8c241f962143d4c71231431820783f4dc78f210 \
-    --hash=sha256:cdf2448aab5f661c9315308ec8b93f4e8a1a67a3c733f8631067a2b67d5913dc \
-    --hash=sha256:d2117334c3af3bdcb9a88522b844a2bdb5efdc4f71c6c822df55486ae1c3347a \
-    --hash=sha256:d53d10f7da99ae46f7373b9150393e9c5eab9b224909982b43832668de4779f5 \
-    --hash=sha256:d9fafc5aa2e2a39aaf7f8cc0c1f044a9b07fca12e558dca53a3cc5c654ad67a7 \
-    --hash=sha256:db3eb7d46527159a878ec3460e9d40615bc25ba337d477db681aea6e4f05c5d2 \
-    --hash=sha256:dbf7c7a88e2bac086f06d14577332760bdeecc42bdec8ac4077f6260557d9326 \
-    --hash=sha256:df2b82571a1b30f58a87bf4e5a9e78d2b1eff6c6ce8fd3aa3757221f93f0863f \
-    --hash=sha256:df92f2aba50eb4d96718b68ef76f2e57a57b54f2fa62333496d16c6d585a85ca \
-    --hash=sha256:eb4e8997a49aa2c08a3e43c9045d224448b8941d88e7ac163c7d383e560cbf98 \
-    --hash=sha256:efc1cdd798b1aaf39b4610bba7aad28c9bea9b910f25c784ccf9ec1fa719d1f9 \
-    --hash=sha256:f146d154428a2523f9cc7936c02353c2459b8f6cf07d3cd1ee1c0a611109c5d5 \
-    --hash=sha256:f5bce581e6b8c235e566a14768a943b172ada3ed73537bb0c0be1edee312d4e7 \
-    --hash=sha256:f9912624a0c0b834b7520d7769b3644453aabc0a7e1c839da7359f050750e9bc \
-    --hash=sha256:fb62edb5bb52cca65fab91a63afa7561607120d26090a7e8fda6fb9f064726da \
-    --hash=sha256:ff067a8d8d880e7809e4ac88eb009bb848870115317b306666502ccad30b147f
-    # via
-    #   argon2-cffi-bindings
-    #   cryptography
-click==8.4.2 \
-    --hash=sha256:9a6cea6e60b17ebe0a44c5cc636d94f09bd66142c1cd7d8b4cd731c4917a15f6 \
-    --hash=sha256:e6f9f66136c816745b9d65817da91d61d957fb16e02e4dcd0552553c5a197b76
-    # via flask
-cryptography==44.0.3 \
-    --hash=sha256:02f55fb4f8b79c1221b0961488eaae21015b69b210e18c386b69de182ebb1259 \
-    --hash=sha256:157f1f3b8d941c2bd8f3ffee0af9b049c9665c39d3da9db2dc338feca5e98a43 \
-    --hash=sha256:192ed30fac1728f7587c6f4613c29c584abdc565d7417c13904708db10206645 \
-    --hash=sha256:21a83f6f35b9cc656d71b5de8d519f566df01e660ac2578805ab245ffd8523f8 \
-    --hash=sha256:25cd194c39fa5a0aa4169125ee27d1172097857b27109a45fadc59653ec06f44 \
-    --hash=sha256:3883076d5c4cc56dbef0b898a74eb6992fdac29a7b9013870b34efe4ddb39a0d \
-    --hash=sha256:3bb0847e6363c037df8f6ede57d88eaf3410ca2267fb12275370a76f85786a6f \
-    --hash=sha256:3be3f649d91cb182c3a6bd336de8b61a0a71965bd13d1a04a0e15b39c3d5809d \
-    --hash=sha256:3f07943aa4d7dad689e3bb1638ddc4944cc5e0921e3c227486daae0e31a05e54 \
-    --hash=sha256:479d92908277bed6e1a1c69b277734a7771c2b78633c224445b5c60a9f4bc1d9 \
-    --hash=sha256:4ffc61e8f3bf5b60346d89cd3d37231019c17a081208dfbbd6e1605ba03fa137 \
-    --hash=sha256:5639c2b16764c6f76eedf722dbad9a0914960d3489c0cc38694ddf9464f1bb2f \
-    --hash=sha256:58968d331425a6f9eedcee087f77fd3c927c88f55368f43ff7e0a19891f2642c \
-    --hash=sha256:5d186f32e52e66994dce4f766884bcb9c68b8da62d61d9d215bfe5fb56d21334 \
-    --hash=sha256:5d20cc348cca3a8aa7312f42ab953a56e15323800ca3ab0706b8cd452a3a056c \
-    --hash=sha256:6866df152b581f9429020320e5eb9794c8780e90f7ccb021940d7f50ee00ae0b \
-    --hash=sha256:7d5fe7195c27c32a64955740b949070f21cba664604291c298518d2e255931d2 \
-    --hash=sha256:896530bc9107b226f265effa7ef3f21270f18a2026bc09fed1ebd7b66ddf6375 \
-    --hash=sha256:962bc30480a08d133e631e8dfd4783ab71cc9e33d5d7c1e192f0b7c06397bb88 \
-    --hash=sha256:978631ec51a6bbc0b7e58f23b68a8ce9e5f09721940933e9c217068388789fe5 \
-    --hash=sha256:9b4d4a5dbee05a2c390bf212e78b99434efec37b17a4bff42f50285c5c8c9647 \
-    --hash=sha256:ab0b005721cc0039e885ac3503825661bd9810b15d4f374e473f8c89b7d5460c \
-    --hash=sha256:af653022a0c25ef2e3ffb2c673a50e5a0d02fecc41608f4954176f1933b12359 \
-    --hash=sha256:b0cc66c74c797e1db750aaa842ad5b8b78e14805a9b5d1348dc603612d3e3ff5 \
-    --hash=sha256:b424563394c369a804ecbee9b06dfb34997f19d00b3518e39f83a5642618397d \
-    --hash=sha256:c138abae3a12a94c75c10499f1cbae81294a6f983b3af066390adee73f433028 \
-    --hash=sha256:c6cd67722619e4d55fdb42ead64ed8843d64638e9c07f4011163e46bc512cf01 \
-    --hash=sha256:c91fc8e8fd78af553f98bc7f2a1d8db977334e4eea302a4bfd75b9461c2d8904 \
-    --hash=sha256:cad399780053fb383dc067475135e41c9fe7d901a97dd5d9c5dfb5611afc0d7d \
-    --hash=sha256:cb90f60e03d563ca2445099edf605c16ed1d5b15182d21831f58460c48bffb93 \
-    --hash=sha256:dad80b45c22e05b259e33ddd458e9e2ba099c86ccf4e88db7bbab4b747b18d06 \
-    --hash=sha256:dd3db61b8fe5be220eee484a17233287d0be6932d056cf5738225b9c05ef4fff \
-    --hash=sha256:e28d62e59a4dbd1d22e747f57d4f00c459af22181f0b2f787ea83f5a876d7c76 \
-    --hash=sha256:e909df4053064a97f1e6565153ff8bb389af12c5c8d29c343308760890560aff \
-    --hash=sha256:f3ffef566ac88f75967d7abd852ed5f182da252d23fac11b4766da3957766759 \
-    --hash=sha256:fc3c9babc1e1faefd62704bb46a69f359a9819eb0292e40df3fb6e3574715cd4 \
-    --hash=sha256:fe19d8bc5536a91a24a8133328880a41831b6c5df54599a8417b62fe015d3053
-    # via
-    #   aioquic
-    #   mitmproxy
-    #   pyopenssl
-    #   service-identity
-flask==3.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:5f873c5184c897c8d9d1b05df1e3d01b14910ce69607a117bd3277098a5836ac \
-    --hash=sha256:d667207822eb83f1c4b50949b1623c8fc8d51f2341d65f72e1a1815397551136
-    # via mitmproxy
-h11==0.14.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:8f19fbbe99e72420ff35c00b27a34cb9937e902a8b810e2c88300c6f0a3b699d \
-    --hash=sha256:e3fe4ac4b851c468cc8363d500db52c2ead036020723024a109d37346efaa761
-    # via
-    #   mitmproxy
-    #   wsproto
-h2==4.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:03a46bcf682256c95b5fd9e9a99c1323584c3eec6440d379b9903d709476bc6d \
-    --hash=sha256:a83aca08fbe7aacb79fec788c9c0bac936343560ed9ec18b82a13a12c28d2abb
-    # via mitmproxy
-hpack==4.2.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:0895cfa3b5531fc65fe439c05eb65144f123bf7a394fcaa56aa423548d8e45c0 \
-    --hash=sha256:858ac0b02280fa582b5080d68db0899c62a80375e0e5413a74970c5e518b6986
-    # via h2
-hyperframe==6.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:b03380493a519fce58ea5af42e4a42317bf9bd425596f7a0835ffce80f1a42e5 \
-    --hash=sha256:f630908a00854a7adeabd6382b43923a4c4cd4b821fcb527e6ab9e15382a3b08
-    # via
-    #   h2
-    #   mitmproxy
-itsdangerous==2.2.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:c6242fc49e35958c8b15141343aa660db5fc54d4f13a1db01a3f5891b98700ef \
-    --hash=sha256:e0050c0b7da1eea53ffaf149c0cfbb5c6e2e2b69c4bef22c81fa6eb73e5f6173
-    # via flask
-jinja2==3.1.6 \
-    --hash=sha256:0137fb05990d35f1275a587e9aee6d56da821fc83491a0fb838183be43f66d6d \
-    --hash=sha256:85ece4451f492d0c13c5dd7c13a64681a86afae63a5f347908daf103ce6d2f67
-    # via flask
-kaitaistruct==0.10 \
-    --hash=sha256:a044dee29173d6afbacf27bcac39daf89b654dd418cfa009ab82d9178a9ae52a \
-    --hash=sha256:a97350919adbf37fda881f75e9365e2fb88d04832b7a4e57106ec70119efb235
-    # via mitmproxy
-ldap3==2.9.1 \
-    --hash=sha256:5869596fc4948797020d3f03b7939da938778a0f9e2009f7a072ccf92b8e8d70 \
-    --hash=sha256:f3e7fc4718e3f09dda568b57100095e0ce58633bcabbed8667ce3f8fbaa4229f
-    # via mitmproxy
-markupsafe==3.0.3 \
-    --hash=sha256:0303439a41979d9e74d18ff5e2dd8c43ed6c6001fd40e5bf2e43f7bd9bbc523f \
-    --hash=sha256:068f375c472b3e7acbe2d5318dea141359e6900156b5b2ba06a30b169086b91a \
-    --hash=sha256:0bf2a864d67e76e5c9a34dc26ec616a66b9888e25e7b9460e1c76d3293bd9dbf \
-    --hash=sha256:0db14f5dafddbb6d9208827849fad01f1a2609380add406671a26386cdf15a19 \
-    --hash=sha256:0eb9ff8191e8498cca014656ae6b8d61f39da5f95b488805da4bb029cccbfbaf \
-    --hash=sha256:0f4b68347f8c5eab4a13419215bdfd7f8c9b19f2b25520968adfad23eb0ce60c \
-    --hash=sha256:1085e7fbddd3be5f89cc898938f42c0b3c711fdcb37d75221de2666af647c175 \
-    --hash=sha256:116bb52f642a37c115f517494ea5feb03889e04df47eeff5b130b1808ce7c219 \
-    --hash=sha256:12c63dfb4a98206f045aa9563db46507995f7ef6d83b2f68eda65c307c6829eb \
-    --hash=sha256:133a43e73a802c5562be9bbcd03d090aa5a1fe899db609c29e8c8d815c5f6de6 \
-    --hash=sha256:1353ef0c1b138e1907ae78e2f6c63ff67501122006b0f9abad68fda5f4ffc6ab \
-    --hash=sha256:15d939a21d546304880945ca1ecb8a039db6b4dc49b2c5a400387cdae6a62e26 \
-    --hash=sha256:177b5253b2834fe3678cb4a5f0059808258584c559193998be2601324fdeafb1 \
-    --hash=sha256:1872df69a4de6aead3491198eaf13810b565bdbeec3ae2dc8780f14458ec73ce \
-    --hash=sha256:1b4b79e8ebf6b55351f0d91fe80f893b4743f104bff22e90697db1590e47a218 \
-    --hash=sha256:1b52b4fb9df4eb9ae465f8d0c228a00624de2334f216f178a995ccdcf82c4634 \
-    --hash=sha256:1ba88449deb3de88bd40044603fafffb7bc2b055d626a330323a9ed736661695 \
-    --hash=sha256:1cc7ea17a6824959616c525620e387f6dd30fec8cb44f649e31712db02123dad \
-    --hash=sha256:218551f6df4868a8d527e3062d0fb968682fe92054e89978594c28e642c43a73 \
-    --hash=sha256:26a5784ded40c9e318cfc2bdb30fe164bdb8665ded9cd64d500a34fb42067b1c \
-    --hash=sha256:2713baf880df847f2bece4230d4d094280f4e67b1e813eec43b4c0e144a34ffe \
-    --hash=sha256:2a15a08b17dd94c53a1da0438822d70ebcd13f8c3a95abe3a9ef9f11a94830aa \
-    --hash=sha256:2f981d352f04553a7171b8e44369f2af4055f888dfb147d55e42d29e29e74559 \
-    --hash=sha256:32001d6a8fc98c8cb5c947787c5d08b0a50663d139f1305bac5885d98d9b40fa \
-    --hash=sha256:3524b778fe5cfb3452a09d31e7b5adefeea8c5be1d43c4f810ba09f2ceb29d37 \
-    --hash=sha256:3537e01efc9d4dccdf77221fb1cb3b8e1a38d5428920e0657ce299b20324d758 \
-    --hash=sha256:35add3b638a5d900e807944a078b51922212fb3dedb01633a8defc4b01a3c85f \
-    --hash=sha256:38664109c14ffc9e7437e86b4dceb442b0096dfe3541d7864d9cbe1da4cf36c8 \
-    --hash=sha256:3a7e8ae81ae39e62a41ec302f972ba6ae23a5c5396c8e60113e9066ef893da0d \
-    --hash=sha256:3b562dd9e9ea93f13d53989d23a7e775fdfd1066c33494ff43f5418bc8c58a5c \
-    --hash=sha256:457a69a9577064c05a97c41f4e65148652db078a3a509039e64d3467b9e7ef97 \
-    --hash=sha256:4bd4cd07944443f5a265608cc6aab442e4f74dff8088b0dfc8238647b8f6ae9a \
-    --hash=sha256:4e885a3d1efa2eadc93c894a21770e4bc67899e3543680313b09f139e149ab19 \
-    --hash=sha256:4faffd047e07c38848ce017e8725090413cd80cbc23d86e55c587bf979e579c9 \
-    --hash=sha256:509fa21c6deb7a7a273d629cf5ec029bc209d1a51178615ddf718f5918992ab9 \
-    --hash=sha256:5678211cb9333a6468fb8d8be0305520aa073f50d17f089b5b4b477ea6e67fdc \
-    --hash=sha256:591ae9f2a647529ca990bc681daebdd52c8791ff06c2bfa05b65163e28102ef2 \
-    --hash=sha256:5a7d5dc5140555cf21a6fefbdbf8723f06fcd2f63ef108f2854de715e4422cb4 \
-    --hash=sha256:69c0b73548bc525c8cb9a251cddf1931d1db4d2258e9599c28c07ef3580ef354 \
-    --hash=sha256:6b5420a1d9450023228968e7e6a9ce57f65d148ab56d2313fcd589eee96a7a50 \
-    --hash=sha256:722695808f4b6457b320fdc131280796bdceb04ab50fe1795cd540799ebe1698 \
-    --hash=sha256:729586769a26dbceff69f7a7dbbf59ab6572b99d94576a5592625d5b411576b9 \
-    --hash=sha256:77f0643abe7495da77fb436f50f8dab76dbc6e5fd25d39589a0f1fe6548bfa2b \
-    --hash=sha256:795e7751525cae078558e679d646ae45574b47ed6e7771863fcc079a6171a0fc \
-    --hash=sha256:7be7b61bb172e1ed687f1754f8e7484f1c8019780f6f6b0786e76bb01c2ae115 \
-    --hash=sha256:7c3fb7d25180895632e5d3148dbdc29ea38ccb7fd210aa27acbd1201a1902c6e \
-    --hash=sha256:7e68f88e5b8799aa49c85cd116c932a1ac15caaa3f5db09087854d218359e485 \
-    --hash=sha256:83891d0e9fb81a825d9a6d61e3f07550ca70a076484292a70fde82c4b807286f \
-    --hash=sha256:8485f406a96febb5140bfeca44a73e3ce5116b2501ac54fe953e488fb1d03b12 \
-    --hash=sha256:8709b08f4a89aa7586de0aadc8da56180242ee0ada3999749b183aa23df95025 \
-    --hash=sha256:8f71bc33915be5186016f675cd83a1e08523649b0e33efdb898db577ef5bb009 \
-    --hash=sha256:915c04ba3851909ce68ccc2b8e2cd691618c4dc4c4232fb7982bca3f41fd8c3d \
-    --hash=sha256:949b8d66bc381ee8b007cd945914c721d9aba8e27f71959d750a46f7c282b20b \
-    --hash=sha256:94c6f0bb423f739146aec64595853541634bde58b2135f27f61c1ffd1cd4d16a \
-    --hash=sha256:9a1abfdc021a164803f4d485104931fb8f8c1efd55bc6b748d2f5774e78b62c5 \
-    --hash=sha256:9b79b7a16f7fedff2495d684f2b59b0457c3b493778c9eed31111be64d58279f \
-    --hash=sha256:a320721ab5a1aba0a233739394eb907f8c8da5c98c9181d1161e77a0c8e36f2d \
-    --hash=sha256:a4afe79fb3de0b7097d81da19090f4df4f8d3a2b3adaa8764138aac2e44f3af1 \
-    --hash=sha256:ad2cf8aa28b8c020ab2fc8287b0f823d0a7d8630784c31e9ee5edea20f406287 \
-    --hash=sha256:b8512a91625c9b3da6f127803b166b629725e68af71f8184ae7e7d54686a56d6 \
-    --hash=sha256:bc51efed119bc9cfdf792cdeaa4d67e8f6fcccab66ed4bfdd6bde3e59bfcbb2f \
-    --hash=sha256:bdc919ead48f234740ad807933cdf545180bfbe9342c2bb451556db2ed958581 \
-    --hash=sha256:bdd37121970bfd8be76c5fb069c7751683bdf373db1ed6c010162b2a130248ed \
-    --hash=sha256:be8813b57049a7dc738189df53d69395eba14fb99345e0a5994914a3864c8a4b \
-    --hash=sha256:c0c0b3ade1c0b13b936d7970b1d37a57acde9199dc2aecc4c336773e1d86049c \
-    --hash=sha256:c47a551199eb8eb2121d4f0f15ae0f923d31350ab9280078d1e5f12b249e0026 \
-    --hash=sha256:c4ffb7ebf07cfe8931028e3e4c85f0357459a3f9f9490886198848f4fa002ec8 \
-    --hash=sha256:ccfcd093f13f0f0b7fdd0f198b90053bf7b2f02a3927a30e63f3ccc9df56b676 \
-    --hash=sha256:d2ee202e79d8ed691ceebae8e0486bd9a2cd4794cec4824e1c99b6f5009502f6 \
-    --hash=sha256:d53197da72cc091b024dd97249dfc7794d6a56530370992a5e1a08983ad9230e \
-    --hash=sha256:d6dd0be5b5b189d31db7cda48b91d7e0a9795f31430b7f271219ab30f1d3ac9d \
-    --hash=sha256:d88b440e37a16e651bda4c7c2b930eb586fd15ca7406cb39e211fcff3bf3017d \
-    --hash=sha256:de8a88e63464af587c950061a5e6a67d3632e36df62b986892331d4620a35c01 \
-    --hash=sha256:df2449253ef108a379b8b5d6b43f4b1a8e81a061d6537becd5582fba5f9196d7 \
-    --hash=sha256:e1c1493fb6e50ab01d20a22826e57520f1284df32f2d8601fdd90b6304601419 \
-    --hash=sha256:e1cf1972137e83c5d4c136c43ced9ac51d0e124706ee1c8aa8532c1287fa8795 \
-    --hash=sha256:e2103a929dfa2fcaf9bb4e7c091983a49c9ac3b19c9061b6d5427dd7d14d81a1 \
-    --hash=sha256:e56b7d45a839a697b5eb268c82a71bd8c7f6c94d6fd50c3d577fa39a9f1409f5 \
-    --hash=sha256:e8afc3f2ccfa24215f8cb28dcf43f0113ac3c37c2f0f0806d8c70e4228c5cf4d \
-    --hash=sha256:e8fc20152abba6b83724d7ff268c249fa196d8259ff481f3b1476383f8f24e42 \
-    --hash=sha256:eaa9599de571d72e2daf60164784109f19978b327a3910d3e9de8c97b5b70cfe \
-    --hash=sha256:ec15a59cf5af7be74194f7ab02d0f59a62bdcf1a537677ce67a2537c9b87fcda \
-    --hash=sha256:f190daf01f13c72eac4efd5c430a8de82489d9cff23c364c3ea822545032993e \
-    --hash=sha256:f34c41761022dd093b4b6896d4810782ffbabe30f2d443ff5f083e0cbbb8c737 \
-    --hash=sha256:f3e98bb3798ead92273dc0e5fd0f31ade220f59a266ffd8a4f6065e0a3ce0523 \
-    --hash=sha256:f42d0984e947b8adf7dd6dde396e720934d12c506ce84eea8476409563607591 \
-    --hash=sha256:f71a396b3bf33ecaa1626c255855702aca4d3d9fea5e051b41ac59a9c1c41edc \
-    --hash=sha256:f9e130248f4462aaa8e2552d547f36ddadbeaa573879158d721bbd33dfe4743a \
-    --hash=sha256:fed51ac40f757d41b7c48425901843666a6677e3e8eb0abcff09e4ba6e664f50
-    # via
-    #   jinja2
-    #   werkzeug
-mitmproxy==11.1.3 \
-    --hash=sha256:2305880b46465d1a9bdcdac369655826f588d05f382b082249a3e532a0e52952
-    # via -r requirements.gateway.in
-mitmproxy-linux==0.11.5 \
-    --hash=sha256:00a40d08a1522d5718e9ff87458a950f06f62e5374d154d851122c0eb41c5dc0 \
-    --hash=sha256:544be1db84575fc8ecc71fb566032cabe4a65a4891d5bd0dc688e3023b49a18a \
-    --hash=sha256:d7ce0b91d7a510009d532e6abbebe59f027a011fa745b13faa5b4d9ebe92abf5 \
-    --hash=sha256:e6a31faf244a9e3d44db02e3e3301aa2e699da67188820982a93028884f4cba8 \
-    --hash=sha256:ee3782fe4e7ccc6a899fa0ef5ad3e35a3ec358587304bd4d212188d2462c8f82
-    # via mitmproxy-rs
-mitmproxy-rs==0.11.5 \
-    --hash=sha256:05f0da03165c2ee2803f91e6648bc9409692f42d796cbaf3fec5a20754ca8c39 \
-    --hash=sha256:2f668dc92573cc3c3ba8c75b166276d846ce7321daf37f4a68bd837538298c5c \
-    --hash=sha256:5353ad0c828aaa37ac53511f3960e39c0888848565f5faa3ea09e205ed8a7350 \
-    --hash=sha256:5a4ffe6d20b3a0edb47b40cd60e7b62709c29e8adf2573514cc0abd1442acf63 \
-    --hash=sha256:971241cb70bad87b55f12bc6e8d7dd3efd02a1acbe1730703e2cfeeb6edd3908
-    # via mitmproxy
-msgpack==1.1.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:06f5fd2f6bb2a7914922d935d3b8bb4a7fff3a9a91cfce6d06c13bc42bec975b \
-    --hash=sha256:071603e2f0771c45ad9bc65719291c568d4edf120b44eb36324dcb02a13bfddf \
-    --hash=sha256:0907e1a7119b337971a689153665764adc34e89175f9a34793307d9def08e6ca \
-    --hash=sha256:0f92a83b84e7c0749e3f12821949d79485971f087604178026085f60ce109330 \
-    --hash=sha256:115a7af8ee9e8cddc10f87636767857e7e3717b7a2e97379dc2054712693e90f \
-    --hash=sha256:13599f8829cfbe0158f6456374e9eea9f44eee08076291771d8ae93eda56607f \
-    --hash=sha256:17fb65dd0bec285907f68b15734a993ad3fc94332b5bb21b0435846228de1f39 \
-    --hash=sha256:2137773500afa5494a61b1208619e3871f75f27b03bcfca7b3a7023284140247 \
-    --hash=sha256:3180065ec2abbe13a4ad37688b61b99d7f9e012a535b930e0e683ad6bc30155b \
-    --hash=sha256:398b713459fea610861c8a7b62a6fec1882759f308ae0795b5413ff6a160cf3c \
-    --hash=sha256:3d364a55082fb2a7416f6c63ae383fbd903adb5a6cf78c5b96cc6316dc1cedc7 \
-    --hash=sha256:3df7e6b05571b3814361e8464f9304c42d2196808e0119f55d0d3e62cd5ea044 \
-    --hash=sha256:41c991beebf175faf352fb940bf2af9ad1fb77fd25f38d9142053914947cdbf6 \
-    --hash=sha256:42f754515e0f683f9c79210a5d1cad631ec3d06cea5172214d2176a42e67e19b \
-    --hash=sha256:452aff037287acb1d70a804ffd022b21fa2bb7c46bee884dbc864cc9024128a0 \
-    --hash=sha256:4676e5be1b472909b2ee6356ff425ebedf5142427842aa06b4dfd5117d1ca8a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:46c34e99110762a76e3911fc923222472c9d681f1094096ac4102c18319e6468 \
-    --hash=sha256:471e27a5787a2e3f974ba023f9e265a8c7cfd373632247deb225617e3100a3c7 \
-    --hash=sha256:4a1964df7b81285d00a84da4e70cb1383f2e665e0f1f2a7027e683956d04b734 \
-    --hash=sha256:4b51405e36e075193bc051315dbf29168d6141ae2500ba8cd80a522964e31434 \
-    --hash=sha256:4d1b7ff2d6146e16e8bd665ac726a89c74163ef8cd39fa8c1087d4e52d3a2325 \
-    --hash=sha256:53258eeb7a80fc46f62fd59c876957a2d0e15e6449a9e71842b6d24419d88ca1 \
-    --hash=sha256:534480ee5690ab3cbed89d4c8971a5c631b69a8c0883ecfea96c19118510c846 \
-    --hash=sha256:58638690ebd0a06427c5fe1a227bb6b8b9fdc2bd07701bec13c2335c82131a88 \
-    --hash=sha256:58dfc47f8b102da61e8949708b3eafc3504509a5728f8b4ddef84bd9e16ad420 \
-    --hash=sha256:59caf6a4ed0d164055ccff8fe31eddc0ebc07cf7326a2aaa0dbf7a4001cd823e \
-    --hash=sha256:5dbad74103df937e1325cc4bfeaf57713be0b4f15e1c2da43ccdd836393e2ea2 \
-    --hash=sha256:5e1da8f11a3dd397f0a32c76165cf0c4eb95b31013a94f6ecc0b280c05c91b59 \
-    --hash=sha256:646afc8102935a388ffc3914b336d22d1c2d6209c773f3eb5dd4d6d3b6f8c1cb \
-    --hash=sha256:64fc9068d701233effd61b19efb1485587560b66fe57b3e50d29c5d78e7fef68 \
-    --hash=sha256:65553c9b6da8166e819a6aa90ad15288599b340f91d18f60b2061f402b9a4915 \
-    --hash=sha256:685ec345eefc757a7c8af44a3032734a739f8c45d1b0ac45efc5d8977aa4720f \
-    --hash=sha256:6ad622bf7756d5a497d5b6836e7fc3752e2dd6f4c648e24b1803f6048596f701 \
-    --hash=sha256:73322a6cc57fcee3c0c57c4463d828e9428275fb85a27aa2aa1a92fdc42afd7b \
-    --hash=sha256:74bed8f63f8f14d75eec75cf3d04ad581da6b914001b474a5d3cd3372c8cc27d \
-    --hash=sha256:79ec007767b9b56860e0372085f8504db5d06bd6a327a335449508bbee9648fa \
-    --hash=sha256:7a946a8992941fea80ed4beae6bff74ffd7ee129a90b4dd5cf9c476a30e9708d \
-    --hash=sha256:7ad442d527a7e358a469faf43fda45aaf4ac3249c8310a82f0ccff9164e5dccd \
-    --hash=sha256:7c9a35ce2c2573bada929e0b7b3576de647b0defbd25f5139dcdaba0ae35a4cc \
-    --hash=sha256:7e7b853bbc44fb03fbdba34feb4bd414322180135e2cb5164f20ce1c9795ee48 \
-    --hash=sha256:879a7b7b0ad82481c52d3c7eb99bf6f0645dbdec5134a4bddbd16f3506947feb \
-    --hash=sha256:8a706d1e74dd3dea05cb54580d9bd8b2880e9264856ce5068027eed09680aa74 \
-    --hash=sha256:8a84efb768fb968381e525eeeb3d92857e4985aacc39f3c47ffd00eb4509315b \
-    --hash=sha256:8cf9e8c3a2153934a23ac160cc4cba0ec035f6867c8013cc6077a79823370346 \
-    --hash=sha256:8da4bf6d54ceed70e8861f833f83ce0814a2b72102e890cbdfe4b34764cdd66e \
-    --hash=sha256:8e59bca908d9ca0de3dc8684f21ebf9a690fe47b6be93236eb40b99af28b6ea6 \
-    --hash=sha256:914571a2a5b4e7606997e169f64ce53a8b1e06f2cf2c3a7273aa106236d43dd5 \
-    --hash=sha256:a51abd48c6d8ac89e0cfd4fe177c61481aca2d5e7ba42044fd218cfd8ea9899f \
-    --hash=sha256:a52a1f3a5af7ba1c9ace055b659189f6c669cf3657095b50f9602af3a3ba0fe5 \
-    --hash=sha256:ad33e8400e4ec17ba782f7b9cf868977d867ed784a1f5f2ab46e7ba53b6e1e1b \
-    --hash=sha256:b4c01941fd2ff87c2a934ee6055bda4ed353a7846b8d4f341c428109e9fcde8c \
-    --hash=sha256:bce7d9e614a04d0883af0b3d4d501171fbfca038f12c77fa838d9f198147a23f \
-    --hash=sha256:c40ffa9a15d74e05ba1fe2681ea33b9caffd886675412612d93ab17b58ea2fec \
-    --hash=sha256:c5a91481a3cc573ac8c0d9aace09345d989dc4a0202b7fcb312c88c26d4e71a8 \
-    --hash=sha256:c921af52214dcbb75e6bdf6a661b23c3e6417f00c603dd2070bccb5c3ef499f5 \
-    --hash=sha256:d46cf9e3705ea9485687aa4001a76e44748b609d260af21c4ceea7f2212a501d \
-    --hash=sha256:d8ce0b22b890be5d252de90d0e0d119f363012027cf256185fc3d474c44b1b9e \
-    --hash=sha256:dd432ccc2c72b914e4cb77afce64aab761c1137cc698be3984eee260bcb2896e \
-    --hash=sha256:e0856a2b7e8dcb874be44fea031d22e5b3a19121be92a1e098f46068a11b0870 \
-    --hash=sha256:e1f3c3d21f7cf67bcf2da8e494d30a75e4cf60041d98b3f79875afb5b96f3a3f \
-    --hash=sha256:f1ba6136e650898082d9d5a5217d5906d1e138024f836ff48691784bbe1adf96 \
-    --hash=sha256:f3e9b4936df53b970513eac1758f3882c88658a220b58dcc1e39606dccaaf01c \
-    --hash=sha256:f80bc7d47f76089633763f952e67f8214cb7b3ee6bfa489b3cb6a84cfac114cd \
-    --hash=sha256:fd2906780f25c8ed5d7b323379f6138524ba793428db5d0e9d226d3fa6aa1788
-    # via mitmproxy
-passlib==1.7.4 \
-    --hash=sha256:aa6bca462b8d8bda89c70b382f0c298a20b5560af6cbfa2dce410c0a2fb669f1 \
-    --hash=sha256:defd50f72b65c5402ab2c573830a6978e5f202ad0d984793c8dde2c4152ebe04
-    # via mitmproxy
-publicsuffix2==2.20191221 \
-    --hash=sha256:00f8cc31aa8d0d5592a5ced19cccba7de428ebca985db26ac852d920ddd6fe7b \
-    --hash=sha256:786b5e36205b88758bd3518725ec8cfe7a8173f5269354641f581c6b80a99893
-    # via mitmproxy
-pyasn1==0.6.4 \
-    --hash=sha256:9c447d8431c947fe4c8febc4ed9e760bc29011a5b01e5c74b67025bd9fb8ce81 \
-    --hash=sha256:deda9277cfd454080ec40b207fb6df82206a3a2688735233cdcd8d3d565f088b
-    # via
-    #   ldap3
-    #   pyasn1-modules
-    #   service-identity
-pyasn1-modules==0.4.2 \
-    --hash=sha256:29253a9207ce32b64c3ac6600edc75368f98473906e8fd1043bd6b5b1de2c14a \
-    --hash=sha256:677091de870a80aae844b1ca6134f54652fa2c8c5a52aa396440ac3106e941e6
-    # via service-identity
-pycparser==3.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:600f49d217304a5902ac3c37e1281c9fe94e4d0489de643a9504c5cdfdfc6b29 \
-    --hash=sha256:b727414169a36b7d524c1c3e31839a521725078d7b2ff038656844266160a992
-    # via cffi
-pylsqpack==0.3.24 \
-    --hash=sha256:23b4d8af48836893beac356c10ca268161953de5bf9ed691526a93f5c82433e9 \
-    --hash=sha256:54978a9879471596d84bbad5e67d727014048926bc5bb2dac0eb3701b48c5ac9 \
-    --hash=sha256:6024854eb16d32803d4890fb90a73b9348c74b61c0770680aefaaa75f8456e8c \
-    --hash=sha256:8da12be7b35b7c9a8cf73a4c077f72e5022a311f80a401c79904213376f2d767 \
-    --hash=sha256:8ec455f44614228f89e38d40c1b1e37895620e20ec6b21e3b562fa8b79a23890 \
-    --hash=sha256:8edf48d0a023cd3629b2c4aaccac9b79a46d566c0f61e7416b5678228433763d \
-    --hash=sha256:b6a8bb42127d5ece8d301a673c8205df25b73b69f8c46b9f0c3034588de1789a \
-    --hash=sha256:c3e2327af25ee616ce4483a8748f0957cf017cbca82d58ed15efea68f70f94ff \
-    --hash=sha256:caf63ddc2e581c764d17432893acce02c5c29ff879d77c2abf1e26aa4eeb831b \
-    --hash=sha256:e3dc5f146fd456b50b227858aed59faa0ff8445aa426e69bb4e50d46c487aab0 \
-    --hash=sha256:e3f977d419c60c1d6c2240e6d7a52df820d37eb8c36b4057113bcd7859f53e2c \
-    --hash=sha256:e7d956dbc8f7d597b237b9157d0a16bc7c655a1b031239763c18dc8582aff8cc
-    # via aioquic
-pyopenssl==25.0.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:424c247065e46e76a37411b9ab1782541c23bb658bf003772c3405fbaa128e90 \
-    --hash=sha256:cd2cef799efa3936bb08e8ccb9433a575722b9dd986023f1cabc4ae64e9dac16
-    # via
-    #   aioquic
-    #   mitmproxy
-pyparsing==3.2.1 \
-    --hash=sha256:506ff4f4386c4cec0590ec19e6302d3aedb992fdc02c761e90416f158dacf8e1 \
-    --hash=sha256:61980854fd66de3a90028d679a954d5f2623e83144b5afe5ee86f43d762e5f0a
-    # via mitmproxy
-pyperclip==1.9.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:b7de0142ddc81bfc5c7507eea19da920b92252b548b96186caf94a5e2527d310
-    # via mitmproxy
-ruamel-yaml==0.18.10 \
-    --hash=sha256:20c86ab29ac2153f80a428e1254a8adf686d3383df04490514ca3b79a362db58 \
-    --hash=sha256:30f22513ab2301b3d2b577adc121c6471f28734d3d9728581245f1e76468b4f1
-    # via mitmproxy
-ruamel-yaml-clib==0.2.15 \
-    --hash=sha256:014181cdec565c8745b7cbc4de3bf2cc8ced05183d986e6d1200168e5bb59490 \
-    --hash=sha256:04d21dc9c57d9608225da28285900762befbb0165ae48482c15d8d4989d4af14 \
-    --hash=sha256:05c70f7f86be6f7bee53794d80050a28ae7e13e4a0087c1839dcdefd68eb36b6 \
-    --hash=sha256:0ba6604bbc3dfcef844631932d06a1a4dcac3fee904efccf582261948431628a \
-    --hash=sha256:11e5499db1ccbc7f4b41f0565e4f799d863ea720e01d3e99fa0b7b5fcd7802c9 \
-    --hash=sha256:1b45498cc81a4724a2d42273d6cfc243c0547ad7c6b87b4f774cb7bcc131c98d \
-    --hash=sha256:1bb7b728fd9f405aa00b4a0b17ba3f3b810d0ccc5f77f7373162e9b5f0ff75d5 \
-    --hash=sha256:1f66f600833af58bea694d5892453f2270695b92200280ee8c625ec5a477eed3 \
-    --hash=sha256:27dc656e84396e6d687f97c6e65fb284d100483628f02d95464fd731743a4afe \
-    --hash=sha256:2812ff359ec1f30129b62372e5f22a52936fac13d5d21e70373dbca5d64bb97c \
-    --hash=sha256:2b216904750889133d9222b7b873c199d48ecbb12912aca78970f84a5aa1a4bc \
-    --hash=sha256:331fb180858dd8534f0e61aa243b944f25e73a4dae9962bd44c46d1761126bbf \
-    --hash=sha256:3cb75a3c14f1d6c3c2a94631e362802f70e83e20d1f2b2ef3026c05b415c4900 \
-    --hash=sha256:3eb199178b08956e5be6288ee0b05b2fb0b5c1f309725ad25d9c6ea7e27f962a \
-    --hash=sha256:424ead8cef3939d690c4b5c85ef5b52155a231ff8b252961b6516ed7cf05f6aa \
-    --hash=sha256:45702dfbea1420ba3450bb3dd9a80b33f0badd57539c6aac09f42584303e0db6 \
-    --hash=sha256:468858e5cbde0198337e6a2a78eda8c3fb148bdf4c6498eaf4bc9ba3f8e780bd \
-    --hash=sha256:46895c17ead5e22bea5e576f1db7e41cb273e8d062c04a6a49013d9f60996c25 \
-    --hash=sha256:46e4cc8c43ef6a94885f72512094e482114a8a706d3c555a34ed4b0d20200600 \
-    --hash=sha256:480894aee0b29752560a9de46c0e5f84a82602f2bc5c6cde8db9a345319acfdf \
-    --hash=sha256:4b293a37dc97e2b1e8a1aec62792d1e52027087c8eea4fc7b5abd2bdafdd6642 \
-    --hash=sha256:4be366220090d7c3424ac2b71c90d1044ea34fca8c0b88f250064fd06087e614 \
-    --hash=sha256:4d1032919280ebc04a80e4fb1e93f7a738129857eaec9448310e638c8bccefcf \
-    --hash=sha256:4d3b58ab2454b4747442ac76fab66739c72b1e2bb9bd173d7694b9f9dbc9c000 \
-    --hash=sha256:4dcec721fddbb62e60c2801ba08c87010bd6b700054a09998c4d09c08147b8fb \
-    --hash=sha256:512571ad41bba04eac7268fe33f7f4742210ca26a81fe0c75357fa682636c690 \
-    --hash=sha256:542d77b72786a35563f97069b9379ce762944e67055bea293480f7734b2c7e5e \
-    --hash=sha256:56ea19c157ed8c74b6be51b5fa1c3aff6e289a041575f0556f66e5fb848bb137 \
-    --hash=sha256:5d3c9210219cbc0f22706f19b154c9a798ff65a6beeafbf77fc9c057ec806f7d \
-    --hash=sha256:5fea0932358e18293407feb921d4f4457db837b67ec1837f87074667449f9401 \
-    --hash=sha256:617d35dc765715fa86f8c3ccdae1e4229055832c452d4ec20856136acc75053f \
-    --hash=sha256:64da03cbe93c1e91af133f5bec37fd24d0d4ba2418eaf970d7166b0a26a148a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:65f48245279f9bb301d1276f9679b82e4c080a1ae25e679f682ac62446fac471 \
-    --hash=sha256:6f1d38cbe622039d111b69e9ca945e7e3efebb30ba998867908773183357f3ed \
-    --hash=sha256:713cd68af9dfbe0bb588e144a61aad8dcc00ef92a82d2e87183ca662d242f524 \
-    --hash=sha256:71845d377c7a47afc6592aacfea738cc8a7e876d586dfba814501d8c53c1ba60 \
-    --hash=sha256:753faf20b3a5906faf1fc50e4ddb8c074cb9b251e00b14c18b28492f933ac8ef \
-    --hash=sha256:7e74ea87307303ba91073b63e67f2c667e93f05a8c63079ee5b7a5c8d0d7b043 \
-    --hash=sha256:88eea8baf72f0ccf232c22124d122a7f26e8a24110a0273d9bcddcb0f7e1fa03 \
-    --hash=sha256:923816815974425fbb1f1bf57e85eca6e14d8adc313c66db21c094927ad01815 \
-    --hash=sha256:9b6f7d74d094d1f3a4e157278da97752f16ee230080ae331fcc219056ca54f77 \
-    --hash=sha256:a8220fd4c6f98485e97aea65e1df76d4fed1678ede1fe1d0eed2957230d287c4 \
-    --hash=sha256:ab0df0648d86a7ecbd9c632e8f8d6b21bb21b5fc9d9e095c796cacf32a728d2d \
-    --hash=sha256:ac9b8d5fa4bb7fd2917ab5027f60d4234345fd366fe39aa711d5dca090aa1467 \
-    --hash=sha256:badd1d7283f3e5894779a6ea8944cc765138b96804496c91812b2829f70e18a7 \
-    --hash=sha256:bdc06ad71173b915167702f55d0f3f027fc61abd975bd308a0968c02db4a4c3e \
-    --hash=sha256:bf0846d629e160223805db9fe8cc7aec16aaa11a07310c50c8c7164efa440aec \
-    --hash=sha256:bfd309b316228acecfa30670c3887dcedf9b7a44ea39e2101e75d2654522acd4 \
-    --hash=sha256:c583229f336682b7212a43d2fa32c30e643d3076178fb9f7a6a14dde85a2d8bd \
-    --hash=sha256:cb15a2e2a90c8475df45c0949793af1ff413acfb0a716b8b94e488ea95ce7cff \
-    --hash=sha256:d290eda8f6ada19e1771b54e5706b8f9807e6bb08e873900d5ba114ced13e02c \
-    --hash=sha256:da3d6adadcf55a93c214d23941aef4abfd45652110aed6580e814152f385b862 \
-    --hash=sha256:dcc7f3162d3711fd5d52e2267e44636e3e566d1e5675a5f0b30e98f2c4af7974 \
-    --hash=sha256:def5663361f6771b18646620fca12968aae730132e104688766cf8a3b1d65922 \
-    --hash=sha256:e5e9f630c73a490b758bf14d859a39f375e6999aea5ddd2e2e9da89b9953486a \
-    --hash=sha256:e9fde97ecb7bb9c41261c2ce0da10323e9227555c674989f8d9eb7572fc2098d \
-    --hash=sha256:ef71831bd61fbdb7aa0399d5c4da06bea37107ab5c79ff884cc07f2450910262 \
-    --hash=sha256:f4421ab780c37210a07d138e56dd4b51f8642187cdfb433eb687fe8c11de0144 \
-    --hash=sha256:f6d3655e95a80325b84c4e14c080b2470fe4f33b6846f288379ce36154993fb1 \
-    --hash=sha256:fd4c928ddf6bce586285daa6d90680b9c291cfd045fc40aad34e445d57b1bf51 \
-    --hash=sha256:fe239bdfdae2302e93bd6e8264bd9b71290218fff7084a9db250b55caaccf43f
-    # via ruamel-yaml
-service-identity==24.2.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:6b047fbd8a84fd0bb0d55ebce4031e400562b9196e1e0d3e0fe2b8a59f6d4a85 \
-    --hash=sha256:b8683ba13f0d39c6cd5d625d2c5f65421d6d707b013b375c355751557cbe8e09
-    # via aioquic
-sortedcontainers==2.4.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:25caa5a06cc30b6b83d11423433f65d1f9d76c4c6a0c90e3379eaa43b9bfdb88 \
-    --hash=sha256:a163dcaede0f1c021485e957a39245190e74249897e2ae4b2aa38595db237ee0
-    # via mitmproxy
-tornado==6.4.2 \
-    --hash=sha256:072ce12ada169c5b00b7d92a99ba089447ccc993ea2143c9ede887e0937aa803 \
-    --hash=sha256:1a017d239bd1bb0919f72af256a970624241f070496635784d9bf0db640d3fec \
-    --hash=sha256:2876cef82e6c5978fde1e0d5b1f919d756968d5b4282418f3146b79b58556482 \
-    --hash=sha256:304463bd0772442ff4d0f5149c6f1c2135a1fae045adf070821c6cdc76980634 \
-    --hash=sha256:908b71bf3ff37d81073356a5fadcc660eb10c1476ee6e2725588626ce7e5ca38 \
-    --hash=sha256:92bad5b4746e9879fd7bf1eb21dce4e3fc5128d71601f80005afa39237ad620b \
-    --hash=sha256:932d195ca9015956fa502c6b56af9eb06106140d844a335590c1ec7f5277d10c \
-    --hash=sha256:bca9eb02196e789c9cb5c3c7c0f04fb447dc2adffd95265b2c7223a8a615ccbf \
-    --hash=sha256:c36e62ce8f63409301537222faffcef7dfc5284f27eec227389f2ad11b09d946 \
-    --hash=sha256:c82c46813ba483a385ab2a99caeaedf92585a1f90defb5693351fa7e4ea0bf73 \
-    --hash=sha256:e828cce1123e9e44ae2a50a9de3055497ab1d0aeb440c5ac23064d9e44880da1
-    # via mitmproxy
-typing-extensions==4.16.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:481caa481374e813c1b176ada14e97f1f67a4539ce9cfeb3f350d78d6370c2e8 \
-    --hash=sha256:dc983d19a509c94dba722ee6abd33940f7c05a89e243c47e907eb4db6f1a43e5
-    # via
-    #   pyopenssl
-    #   urwid
-urwid==2.6.16 \
-    --hash=sha256:93ad239939e44c385e64aa00027878b9e5c486d59e855ec8ab5b1e1adcdb32a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:de14896c6df9eb759ed1fd93e0384a5279e51e0dde8f621e4083f7a8368c0797
-    # via mitmproxy
-wcwidth==0.8.2 \
-    --hash=sha256:91fbef97204b96a3d4d421609b80340b760cf33e26da123ff243d76b1fda8dda \
-    --hash=sha256:d63947694a0539a1d51e01eda7caf800c291020e6cdd7e28ad7b14dd33ad4f85
-    # via urwid
-werkzeug==3.1.8 \
-    --hash=sha256:63a77fb8892bf28ebc3178683445222aa500e48ebad5ec77b0ad80f8726b1f50 \
-    --hash=sha256:9bad61a4268dac112f1c5cd4630a56ede601b6ed420300677a869083d70a4c44
-    # via flask
-wsproto==1.2.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:ad565f26ecb92588a3e43bc3d96164de84cd9902482b130d0ddbaa9664a85065 \
-    --hash=sha256:b9acddd652b585d75b20477888c56642fdade28bdfd3579aa24a4d2c037dd736
-    # via mitmproxy
-zstandard==0.23.0 \
-    --hash=sha256:034b88913ecc1b097f528e42b539453fa82c3557e414b3de9d5632c80439a473 \
-    --hash=sha256:0a7f0804bb3799414af278e9ad51be25edf67f78f916e08afdb983e74161b916 \
-    --hash=sha256:11e3bf3c924853a2d5835b24f03eeba7fc9b07d8ca499e247e06ff5676461a15 \
-    --hash=sha256:12a289832e520c6bd4dcaad68e944b86da3bad0d339ef7989fb7e88f92e96072 \
-    --hash=sha256:1516c8c37d3a053b01c1c15b182f3b5f5eef19ced9b930b684a73bad121addf4 \
-    --hash=sha256:157e89ceb4054029a289fb504c98c6a9fe8010f1680de0201b3eb5dc20aa6d9e \
-    --hash=sha256:1bfe8de1da6d104f15a60d4a8a768288f66aa953bbe00d027398b93fb9680b26 \
-    --hash=sha256:1e172f57cd78c20f13a3415cc8dfe24bf388614324d25539146594c16d78fcc8 \
-    --hash=sha256:1fd7e0f1cfb70eb2f95a19b472ee7ad6d9a0a992ec0ae53286870c104ca939e5 \
-    --hash=sha256:203d236f4c94cd8379d1ea61db2fce20730b4c38d7f1c34506a31b34edc87bdd \
-    --hash=sha256:27d3ef2252d2e62476389ca8f9b0cf2bbafb082a3b6bfe9d90cbcbb5529ecf7c \
-    --hash=sha256:29a2bc7c1b09b0af938b7a8343174b987ae021705acabcbae560166567f5a8db \
-    --hash=sha256:2ef230a8fd217a2015bc91b74f6b3b7d6522ba48be29ad4ea0ca3a3775bf7dd5 \
-    --hash=sha256:2ef3775758346d9ac6214123887d25c7061c92afe1f2b354f9388e9e4d48acfc \
-    --hash=sha256:2f146f50723defec2975fb7e388ae3a024eb7151542d1599527ec2aa9cacb152 \
-    --hash=sha256:2fb4535137de7e244c230e24f9d1ec194f61721c86ebea04e1581d9d06ea1269 \
-    --hash=sha256:32ba3b5ccde2d581b1e6aa952c836a6291e8435d788f656fe5976445865ae045 \
-    --hash=sha256:34895a41273ad33347b2fc70e1bff4240556de3c46c6ea430a7ed91f9042aa4e \
-    --hash=sha256:379b378ae694ba78cef921581ebd420c938936a153ded602c4fea612b7eaa90d \
-    --hash=sha256:38302b78a850ff82656beaddeb0bb989a0322a8bbb1bf1ab10c17506681d772a \
-    --hash=sha256:3aa014d55c3af933c1315eb4bb06dd0459661cc0b15cd61077afa6489bec63bb \
-    --hash=sha256:4051e406288b8cdbb993798b9a45c59a4896b6ecee2f875424ec10276a895740 \
-    --hash=sha256:40b33d93c6eddf02d2c19f5773196068d875c41ca25730e8288e9b672897c105 \
-    --hash=sha256:43da0f0092281bf501f9c5f6f3b4c975a8a0ea82de49ba3f7100e64d422a1274 \
-    --hash=sha256:445e4cb5048b04e90ce96a79b4b63140e3f4ab5f662321975679b5f6360b90e2 \
-    --hash=sha256:48ef6a43b1846f6025dde6ed9fee0c24e1149c1c25f7fb0a0585572b2f3adc58 \
-    --hash=sha256:50a80baba0285386f97ea36239855f6020ce452456605f262b2d33ac35c7770b \
-    --hash=sha256:519fbf169dfac1222a76ba8861ef4ac7f0530c35dd79ba5727014613f91613d4 \
-    --hash=sha256:53dd9d5e3d29f95acd5de6802e909ada8d8d8cfa37a3ac64836f3bc4bc5512db \
-    --hash=sha256:53ea7cdc96c6eb56e76bb06894bcfb5dfa93b7adcf59d61c6b92674e24e2dd5e \
-    --hash=sha256:576856e8594e6649aee06ddbfc738fec6a834f7c85bf7cadd1c53d4a58186ef9 \
-    --hash=sha256:59556bf80a7094d0cfb9f5e50bb2db27fefb75d5138bb16fb052b61b0e0eeeb0 \
-    --hash=sha256:5d41d5e025f1e0bccae4928981e71b2334c60f580bdc8345f824e7c0a4c2a813 \
-    --hash=sha256:61062387ad820c654b6a6b5f0b94484fa19515e0c5116faf29f41a6bc91ded6e \
-    --hash=sha256:61f89436cbfede4bc4e91b4397eaa3e2108ebe96d05e93d6ccc95ab5714be512 \
-    --hash=sha256:62136da96a973bd2557f06ddd4e8e807f9e13cbb0bfb9cc06cfe6d98ea90dfe0 \
-    --hash=sha256:64585e1dba664dc67c7cdabd56c1e5685233fbb1fc1966cfba2a340ec0dfff7b \
-    --hash=sha256:65308f4b4890aa12d9b6ad9f2844b7ee42c7f7a4fd3390425b242ffc57498f48 \
-    --hash=sha256:66b689c107857eceabf2cf3d3fc699c3c0fe8ccd18df2219d978c0283e4c508a \
-    --hash=sha256:6a41c120c3dbc0d81a8e8adc73312d668cd34acd7725f036992b1b72d22c1772 \
-    --hash=sha256:6f77fa49079891a4aab203d0b1744acc85577ed16d767b52fc089d83faf8d8ed \
-    --hash=sha256:72c68dda124a1a138340fb62fa21b9bf4848437d9ca60bd35db36f2d3345f373 \
-    --hash=sha256:752bf8a74412b9892f4e5b58f2f890a039f57037f52c89a740757ebd807f33ea \
-    --hash=sha256:76e79bc28a65f467e0409098fa2c4376931fd3207fbeb6b956c7c476d53746dd \
-    --hash=sha256:774d45b1fac1461f48698a9d4b5fa19a69d47ece02fa469825b442263f04021f \
-    --hash=sha256:77da4c6bfa20dd5ea25cbf12c76f181a8e8cd7ea231c673828d0386b1740b8dc \
-    --hash=sha256:77ea385f7dd5b5676d7fd943292ffa18fbf5c72ba98f7d09fc1fb9e819b34c23 \
-    --hash=sha256:80080816b4f52a9d886e67f1f96912891074903238fe54f2de8b786f86baded2 \
-    --hash=sha256:80a539906390591dd39ebb8d773771dc4db82ace6372c4d41e2d293f8e32b8db \
-    --hash=sha256:82d17e94d735c99621bf8ebf9995f870a6b3e6d14543b99e201ae046dfe7de70 \
-    --hash=sha256:837bb6764be6919963ef41235fd56a6486b132ea64afe5fafb4cb279ac44f259 \
-    --hash=sha256:84433dddea68571a6d6bd4fbf8ff398236031149116a7fff6f777ff95cad3df9 \
-    --hash=sha256:8c24f21fa2af4bb9f2c492a86fe0c34e6d2c63812a839590edaf177b7398f700 \
-    --hash=sha256:8ed7d27cb56b3e058d3cf684d7200703bcae623e1dcc06ed1e18ecda39fee003 \
-    --hash=sha256:9206649ec587e6b02bd124fb7799b86cddec350f6f6c14bc82a2b70183e708ba \
-    --hash=sha256:983b6efd649723474f29ed42e1467f90a35a74793437d0bc64a5bf482bedfa0a \
-    --hash=sha256:98da17ce9cbf3bfe4617e836d561e433f871129e3a7ac16d6ef4c680f13a839c \
-    --hash=sha256:9c236e635582742fee16603042553d276cca506e824fa2e6489db04039521e90 \
-    --hash=sha256:9da6bc32faac9a293ddfdcb9108d4b20416219461e4ec64dfea8383cac186690 \
-    --hash=sha256:a05e6d6218461eb1b4771d973728f0133b2a4613a6779995df557f70794fd60f \
-    --hash=sha256:a0817825b900fcd43ac5d05b8b3079937073d2b1ff9cf89427590718b70dd840 \
-    --hash=sha256:a4ae99c57668ca1e78597d8b06d5af837f377f340f4cce993b551b2d7731778d \
-    --hash=sha256:a8c86881813a78a6f4508ef9daf9d4995b8ac2d147dcb1a450448941398091c9 \
-    --hash=sha256:a8fffdbd9d1408006baaf02f1068d7dd1f016c6bcb7538682622c556e7b68e35 \
-    --hash=sha256:a9b07268d0c3ca5c170a385a0ab9fb7fdd9f5fd866be004c4ea39e44edce47dd \
-    --hash=sha256:ab19a2d91963ed9e42b4e8d77cd847ae8381576585bad79dbd0a8837a9f6620a \
-    --hash=sha256:ac184f87ff521f4840e6ea0b10c0ec90c6b1dcd0bad2f1e4a9a1b4fa177982ea \
-    --hash=sha256:b0e166f698c5a3e914947388c162be2583e0c638a4703fc6a543e23a88dea3c1 \
-    --hash=sha256:b2170c7e0367dde86a2647ed5b6f57394ea7f53545746104c6b09fc1f4223573 \
-    --hash=sha256:b2d8c62d08e7255f68f7a740bae85b3c9b8e5466baa9cbf7f57f1cde0ac6bc09 \
-    --hash=sha256:b4567955a6bc1b20e9c31612e615af6b53733491aeaa19a6b3b37f3b65477094 \
-    --hash=sha256:b69bb4f51daf461b15e7b3db033160937d3ff88303a7bc808c67bbc1eaf98c78 \
-    --hash=sha256:b8c0bd73aeac689beacd4e7667d48c299f61b959475cdbb91e7d3d88d27c56b9 \
-    --hash=sha256:be9b5b8659dff1f913039c2feee1aca499cfbc19e98fa12bc85e037c17ec6ca5 \
-    --hash=sha256:bf0a05b6059c0528477fba9054d09179beb63744355cab9f38059548fedd46a9 \
-    --hash=sha256:c16842b846a8d2a145223f520b7e18b57c8f476924bda92aeee3a88d11cfc391 \
-    --hash=sha256:c363b53e257246a954ebc7c488304b5592b9c53fbe74d03bc1c64dda153fb847 \
-    --hash=sha256:c7c517d74bea1a6afd39aa612fa025e6b8011982a0897768a2f7c8ab4ebb78a2 \
-    --hash=sha256:d20fd853fbb5807c8e84c136c278827b6167ded66c72ec6f9a14b863d809211c \
-    --hash=sha256:d2240ddc86b74966c34554c49d00eaafa8200a18d3a5b6ffbf7da63b11d74ee2 \
-    --hash=sha256:d477ed829077cd945b01fc3115edd132c47e6540ddcd96ca169facff28173057 \
-    --hash=sha256:d50d31bfedd53a928fed6707b15a8dbeef011bb6366297cc435accc888b27c20 \
-    --hash=sha256:dc1d33abb8a0d754ea4763bad944fd965d3d95b5baef6b121c0c9013eaf1907d \
-    --hash=sha256:dc5d1a49d3f8262be192589a4b72f0d03b72dcf46c51ad5852a4fdc67be7b9e4 \
-    --hash=sha256:e2d1a054f8f0a191004675755448d12be47fa9bebbcffa3cdf01db19f2d30a54 \
-    --hash=sha256:e7792606d606c8df5277c32ccb58f29b9b8603bf83b48639b7aedf6df4fe8171 \
-    --hash=sha256:ed1708dbf4d2e3a1c5c69110ba2b4eb6678262028afd6c6fbcc5a8dac9cda68e \
-    --hash=sha256:f2d4380bf5f62daabd7b751ea2339c1a21d1c9463f1feb7fc2bdcea2c29c3160 \
-    --hash=sha256:f3513916e8c645d0610815c257cbfd3242adfd5c4cfa78be514e5a3ebb42a41b \
-    --hash=sha256:f8346bfa098532bc1fb6c7ef06783e969d87a99dd1d2a5a18a892c1d7a643c58 \
-    --hash=sha256:f83fa6cae3fff8e98691248c9320356971b59678a17f20656a9e59cd32cee6d8 \
-    --hash=sha256:fa6ce8b52c5987b3e34d5674b0ab529a4602b632ebab0a93b07bfb4dfc8f8a33 \
-    --hash=sha256:fb2b1ecfef1e67897d336de3a0e3f52478182d6a47eda86cbd42504c5cbd009a \
-    --hash=sha256:fc9ca1c9718cb3b06634c7c8dec57d24e9438b2aa9a0f02b8bb36bf478538880 \
-    --hash=sha256:fd30d9c67d13d891f2360b2a120186729c111238ac63b43dbd37a5a40670b8ca \
-    --hash=sha256:fd7699e8fd9969f455ef2926221e0233f81a2542921471382e77a9e2f2b57f4b \
-    --hash=sha256:fe3b385d996ee0822fd46528d9f0443b880d4d05528fd26a9119a54ec3f91c69
-    # via mitmproxy
@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Fail when a supported image reintroduces mutable build inputs."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import re
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-
-REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
-DOCKERFILES = (
-    Path("Dockerfile.gateway"),
-    Path("Dockerfile.orchestrator"),
-    Path("Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc"),
-    Path("bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile"),
-    Path("bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile"),
-    Path("bot_bottle/contrib/pi/Dockerfile"),
-)
-NPM_MANIFESTS = (
-    Path("bot_bottle/contrib/claude/package.json"),
-    Path("bot_bottle/contrib/pi/package.json"),
-)
-IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS = Path("image-build-args.json")
-CODEX_CHECKSUMS = Path("bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex-package_SHA256SUMS")
-REQUIRED_CODEX_ASSETS = frozenset({
-    "codex-package-aarch64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz",
-    "codex-package-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl.tar.gz",
-})
-REQUIRED_BASE_ARGS = frozenset({
-    "DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE",
-    "NODE_BASE_IMAGE",
-    "PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE",
-})
-
-_DIGEST = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$")
-_EXACT_NPM_VERSION = re.compile(
-    r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z.-]*)?$",
-)
-_SNAPSHOT = re.compile(r"ARG\s+DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT=\d{8}T\d{6}Z")
-_NETWORK_TO_SHELL = re.compile(
-    r"(?:curl|wget)\b[^|\n]*\|\s*(?:ba)?sh\b",
-    re.IGNORECASE,
-)
-
-
-def _logical_lines(text: str) -> str:
-    """Join Dockerfile continuations so policy regexes see one instruction."""
-    return re.sub(r"\\\r?\n", " ", text)
-
-
-def check_dockerfile(
-    path: Path,
-    text: str,
-    image_build_args: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> list[str]:
-    """Return policy violations for one Dockerfile."""
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    logical = _logical_lines(text)
-    instructions = "\n".join(
-        line for line in logical.splitlines()
-        if not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
-    )
-    from_matches = list(re.finditer(r"(?im)^\s*FROM\s+(\S+)", logical))
-    from_values = [match.group(1) for match in from_matches]
-    preamble = logical[:from_matches[0].start()] if from_matches else logical
-    base_args = {
-        match.group(1): match.group(2)
-        for match in re.finditer(
-            r"(?im)^\s*ARG\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)(?:=(\S+))?\s*$",
-            preamble,
-        )
-    }
-    if not from_values:
-        problems.append(f"{path}: missing FROM")
-    for value in from_values:
-        variable = re.fullmatch(r"\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\}", value)
-        if variable and variable.group(1) == "ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE":
-            if (
-                "ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE" not in base_args
-                or base_args["ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE"] is not None
-            ):
-                problems.append(
-                    f"{path}: local base argument must have no mutable default",
-                )
-            continue
-        if variable:
-            name = variable.group(1)
-            if name not in base_args:
-                problems.append(
-                    f"{path}: dynamic base argument {name} is not declared before FROM",
-                )
-                continue
-            if base_args[name] is not None:
-                problems.append(
-                    f"{path}: base argument {name} must not define a default",
-                )
-                continue
-            if image_build_args is None or name not in image_build_args:
-                problems.append(
-                    f"{path}: base argument {name} lacks a centralized value",
-                )
-                continue
-            value = image_build_args[name]
-        if "$" in value:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: dynamic base image is not content-pinned: {value}")
-            continue
-        try:
-            image, digest = value.rsplit("@sha256:", 1)
-        except ValueError:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: base image lacks a sha256 digest: {value}")
-            continue
-        leaf = image.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
-        if ":" not in leaf:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: base image lacks a version-qualified tag: {value}")
-        elif leaf.rsplit(":", 1)[1] == "latest":
-            problems.append(f"{path}: base image uses latest: {value}")
-        if not _DIGEST.fullmatch(digest):
-            problems.append(f"{path}: base image digest is not 64 lowercase hex: {value}")
-
-    if _NETWORK_TO_SHELL.search(instructions):
-        problems.append(f"{path}: downloads network content directly into a shell")
-    if re.search(r"\b(?:npm\s+(?:i|install)|pi\s+install)\b", instructions):
-        problems.append(f"{path}: use npm ci with a committed integrity lock")
-    if "apt-get install" in instructions:
-        if not _SNAPSHOT.search(text):
-            problems.append(f"{path}: apt install lacks a fixed Debian snapshot")
-        if "snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/${DEBIAN_SNAPSHOT}" not in text:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: apt sources are not routed to the snapshot")
-        if "Acquire::Check-Valid-Until=false" not in text:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: snapshot apt update lacks validity override")
-    if path == Path("Dockerfile.gateway"):
-        if "--require-hashes" not in instructions:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: gateway Python install does not require hashes")
-        if "requirements.gateway.lock" not in text:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: gateway Python lock is not consumed")
-    if path == Path("bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile"):
-        required = (
-            "codex-package_SHA256SUMS",
-            "sha256sum -c",
-            "codex-package-${codex_target}.tar.gz",
-        )
-        for marker in required:
-            if marker not in instructions:
-                problems.append(f"{path}: verified pinned Codex install lacks {marker!r}")
-    return problems
-
-
-def load_image_build_args(root: Path) -> tuple[dict[str, str], list[str]]:
-    """Load and validate the one repository location for base-image args."""
-    path = root / IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS
-    try:
-        data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        return {}, [f"{IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS}: cannot read image build arguments: {exc}"]
-    if not isinstance(data, dict):
-        return {}, [f"{IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS}: must contain a JSON object"]
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    names = set(data)
-    missing = REQUIRED_BASE_ARGS - names
-    unexpected = names - REQUIRED_BASE_ARGS
-    if missing:
-        problems.append(
-            f"{IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS}: missing arguments: {', '.join(sorted(missing))}",
-        )
-    if unexpected:
-        problems.append(
-            f"{IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS}: unexpected arguments: "
-            f"{', '.join(sorted(unexpected))}",
-        )
-    for name, value in data.items():
-        if not isinstance(value, str):
-            problems.append(f"{IMAGE_BUILD_ARGS}: {name} must be a string")
-    return {
-        name: value for name, value in data.items()
-        if isinstance(name, str) and isinstance(value, str)
-    }, problems
-
-
-def check_npm_manifest(root: Path, manifest_path: Path) -> list[str]:
-    """Validate exact direct versions and integrity-complete npm locks."""
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    manifest_file = root / manifest_path
-    lock_file = manifest_file.with_name("package-lock.json")
-    try:
-        manifest = json.loads(manifest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-        lock = json.loads(lock_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
-        return [f"{manifest_path}: cannot read manifest and lock: {exc}"]
-
-    direct = manifest.get("dependencies", {})
-    for package, version in direct.items():
-        if not isinstance(version, str) or not _EXACT_NPM_VERSION.fullmatch(version):
-            problems.append(
-                f"{manifest_path}: {package} is not an exact version: {version!r}",
-            )
-    root_lock = lock.get("packages", {}).get("", {}).get("dependencies", {})
-    if root_lock != direct:
-        problems.append(f"{lock_file.relative_to(root)}: root dependencies are stale")
-    if lock.get("lockfileVersion") != 3:
-        problems.append(f"{lock_file.relative_to(root)}: require lockfileVersion 3")
-    for package_path, package in lock.get("packages", {}).items():
-        if not package_path or package.get("link"):
-            continue
-        resolved = package.get("resolved", "")
-        if isinstance(resolved, str) and resolved.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
-            integrity = package.get("integrity", "")
-            if not isinstance(integrity, str) or not integrity.startswith("sha512-"):
-                problems.append(
-                    f"{lock_file.relative_to(root)}: "
-                    f"{package_path} lacks sha512 integrity",
-                )
-    return problems
-
-
-def check_python_lock(root: Path) -> list[str]:
-    """Validate that every gateway Python requirement is exact and hashed."""
-    path = root / "requirements.gateway.lock"
-    try:
-        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    except OSError as exc:
-        return [f"requirements.gateway.lock: cannot read lock: {exc}"]
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    blocks = re.split(r"(?m)(?=^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+==)", text)
-    requirements = [block for block in blocks if re.match(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+==", block)]
-    if not requirements:
-        problems.append("requirements.gateway.lock: contains no exact requirements")
-    for block in requirements:
-        name = block.split("==", 1)[0]
-        first_line = block.splitlines()[0]
-        if not re.match(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+==[^\s\\]+", first_line):
-            problems.append(f"requirements.gateway.lock: {name} is not exact")
-        if not re.search(r"--hash=sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}", block):
-            problems.append(f"requirements.gateway.lock: {name} lacks a sha256 hash")
-    try:
-        direct = [
-            line.strip()
-            for line in (root / "requirements.gateway.in").read_text().splitlines()
-            if line.strip() and not line.lstrip().startswith("#")
-        ]
-    except OSError as exc:
-        problems.append(f"requirements.gateway.in: cannot read input: {exc}")
-        direct = []
-    for requirement in direct:
-        if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+==[^\s]+", requirement):
-            problems.append(
-                f"requirements.gateway.in: direct dependency is not exact: {requirement}",
-            )
-        if not re.search(rf"(?m)^{re.escape(requirement)}(?:\s|\\)", text):
-            problems.append(
-                f"requirements.gateway.lock: missing direct dependency {requirement}",
-            )
-    return problems
-
-
-def check_codex_checksums(root: Path) -> list[str]:
-    """Require one valid digest for every supported standalone archive."""
-    try:
-        lines = (root / CODEX_CHECKSUMS).read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
-    except OSError as exc:
-        return [f"{CODEX_CHECKSUMS}: cannot read checksum manifest: {exc}"]
-    assets: dict[str, str] = {}
-    problems: list[str] = []
-    for line in lines:
-        match = re.fullmatch(r"([0-9a-f]{64})  (\S+)", line)
-        if match is None:
-            problems.append(f"{CODEX_CHECKSUMS}: malformed checksum line: {line!r}")
-            continue
-        digest, asset = match.groups()
-        if asset in assets:
-            problems.append(f"{CODEX_CHECKSUMS}: duplicate checksum for {asset}")
-        assets[asset] = digest
-    missing = REQUIRED_CODEX_ASSETS - assets.keys()
-    if missing:
-        problems.append(
-            f"{CODEX_CHECKSUMS}: missing supported archives: "
-            f"{', '.join(sorted(missing))}",
-        )
-    return problems
-
-
-def check_repo(root: Path = REPO_ROOT) -> list[str]:
-    """Return every repository image-input policy violation."""
-    image_build_args, problems = load_image_build_args(root)
-    for path in DOCKERFILES:
-        try:
-            text = (root / path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        except OSError as exc:
-            problems.append(f"{path}: cannot read Dockerfile: {exc}")
-            continue
-        problems.extend(check_dockerfile(path, text, image_build_args))
-    for manifest in NPM_MANIFESTS:
-        problems.extend(check_npm_manifest(root, manifest))
-    problems.extend(check_codex_checksums(root))
-    nested_path = Path(
-        "bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/nested_containers.py",
-    )
-    try:
-        nested_source = (root / nested_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-    except OSError as exc:
-        problems.append(f"{nested_path}: cannot read generated image source: {exc}")
-    else:
-        if "FROM docker:" in nested_source:
-            problems.append(
-                "nested-containers image uses a mutable Docker CLI base",
-            )
-        if '"ARG DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE\\n"' not in nested_source:
-            problems.append(
-                "nested-containers image does not consume DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE",
-            )
-        if 'image = f"{pinned_base}{IMAGE_SUFFIX}"' not in nested_source:
-            problems.append(
-                "nested-containers output is not keyed by its pinned agent base",
-            )
-    problems.extend(check_python_lock(root))
-    return problems
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    problems = check_repo()
-    if problems:
-        for problem in problems:
-            print(f"image-input policy: {problem}", file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-    print("image-input policy: all supported image inputs are pinned and verified")
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    sys.exit(main())
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Complete duplicate npm lock entries from an identical verified artifact."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import argparse
-import json
-from pathlib import Path
-
-
-def complete_lock(path: Path) -> int:
-    """Fill missing SRI only from the same resolved URL; return change count."""
-    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    packages = data.get("packages", {})
-    integrity_by_url: dict[str, str] = {}
-    for package in packages.values():
-        resolved = package.get("resolved")
-        integrity = package.get("integrity")
-        if not isinstance(resolved, str) or not resolved.startswith(
-            ("http://", "https://"),
-        ):
-            continue
-        if not isinstance(integrity, str) or not integrity.startswith("sha512-"):
-            continue
-        prior = integrity_by_url.setdefault(resolved, integrity)
-        if prior != integrity:
-            raise ValueError(f"conflicting integrity values for {resolved}")
-
-    changed = 0
-    missing: list[str] = []
-    for package_path, package in packages.items():
-        resolved = package.get("resolved")
-        if not isinstance(resolved, str) or not resolved.startswith(
-            ("http://", "https://"),
-        ):
-            continue
-        integrity = package.get("integrity")
-        if isinstance(integrity, str) and integrity.startswith("sha512-"):
-            continue
-        known = integrity_by_url.get(resolved)
-        if known is None:
-            missing.append(package_path)
-            continue
-        package["integrity"] = known
-        changed += 1
-    if missing:
-        joined = ", ".join(missing)
-        raise ValueError(f"no verified duplicate artifact for: {joined}")
-    if changed:
-        path.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
-    return changed
-
-
-def main() -> int:
-    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
-    parser.add_argument("locks", nargs="+", type=Path)
-    args = parser.parse_args()
-    for path in args.locks:
-        changed = complete_lock(path)
-        print(f"{path}: completed {changed} duplicate integrity entries")
-    return 0
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -35,12 +35,5 @@ chmod 600 "$fake_key_dir/fake-key"

 # Build the image graph quietly so the recorded run shows only the
 # bottle launch and the four `!` probes, not BuildKit progress.
-node_base_image=$(
-  python3 -c \
-    'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["NODE_BASE_IMAGE"])'
-)
-docker build -q \
-  --build-arg "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=$node_base_image" \
-  -f bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile \
-  -t bot-bottle-claude:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+docker build -q -f bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile -t bot-bottle-claude:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
 docker build -q -f Dockerfile.git-gate -t bot-bottle-git-gate:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
@@ -21,11 +21,9 @@ _ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
 # Must match bot_bottle.resources.BUNDLED_RESOURCES (paths relative to root).
 _BUNDLED_RESOURCES = (
    "pyproject.toml",
-    "image-build-args.json",
    "Dockerfile.gateway",
    "Dockerfile.orchestrator",
    "Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc",
-    "requirements.gateway.lock",
    "nix/firecracker-netpool.nix",
    "scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh",
 )
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import os
 import subprocess
 import unittest

-from bot_bottle import resources
 from tests._backend import skip_unless_backend


@@ -39,18 +38,9 @@ class TestGatewayImage(unittest.TestCase):
    @classmethod
    def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
        repo_root = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__)))
-        build_args = resources.image_build_args(
-            _DOCKERFILE,
-            context=repo_root,
-        )
-        arg_flags = [
-            item
-            for name, value in build_args.items()
-            for item in ("--build-arg", f"{name}={value}")
-        ]
        proc = subprocess.run(
            ["docker", "build", "-t", _IMAGE,
-             "-f", _DOCKERFILE, *arg_flags, "."],
+             "-f", _DOCKERFILE, "."],
            cwd=repo_root,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
            check=False,
@@ -2,43 +2,24 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

-import json
 import re
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path


-_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
-_CONTRIB_DIR = _REPO_ROOT / "bot_bottle/contrib"
+_CONTRIB_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "bot_bottle/contrib"
 _AGENT_DOCKERFILES = tuple(sorted(_CONTRIB_DIR.glob("*/Dockerfile")))


 class TestBuiltinAgentImages(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_all_share_one_digest_pinned_node_trixie_base(self):
+    def test_all_use_debian_trixie_stable(self):
        self.assertTrue(_AGENT_DOCKERFILES)
-        inputs = json.loads((_REPO_ROOT / "image-build-args.json").read_text())
-        self.assertRegex(
-            inputs["NODE_BASE_IMAGE"],
-            r"^node:22\.\d+\.\d+-trixie-slim@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$",
-        )
        for dockerfile in _AGENT_DOCKERFILES:
            with self.subTest(provider=dockerfile.parent.name):
-                text = dockerfile.read_text()
-                self.assertRegex(text, r"(?m)^ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE$")
-                self.assertIn("FROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}", text)
-
-    def test_orchestrator_and_gateway_share_configurable_python_base(self):
-        inputs = json.loads((_REPO_ROOT / "image-build-args.json").read_text())
-        self.assertRegex(
-            inputs["PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"],
-            r"^python:3\.12\.\d+-slim-trixie@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$",
-        )
-        for name in ("Dockerfile.orchestrator", "Dockerfile.gateway"):
-            dockerfile = _REPO_ROOT / name
-            text = dockerfile.read_text()
-            with self.subTest(dockerfile=name):
-                self.assertRegex(text, r"(?m)^ARG PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE$")
-                self.assertIn("FROM ${PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE}", text)
+                self.assertRegex(
+                    dockerfile.read_text(),
+                    r"(?m)^FROM node:22-trixie-slim\s*$",
+                )

    def test_none_install_podman(self):
        # podman lives in the nested-containers derived layer (nested_containers.py),
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-"""Unit tests for npm's duplicate lock-entry integrity completion."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import io
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from contextlib import redirect_stdout
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from scripts import complete_npm_lock_integrity as integrity_tool
-
-complete_lock = integrity_tool.complete_lock
-
-
-class TestCompleteLock(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _lock(self, directory: str, packages: dict[str, dict[str, str]]) -> Path:
-        path = Path(directory) / "package-lock.json"
-        path.write_text(json.dumps({
-            "lockfileVersion": 3,
-            "packages": packages,
-        }))
-        return path
-
-    def test_copies_integrity_only_for_identical_resolved_url(self):
-        url = "https://registry.npmjs.org/example/-/example-1.2.3.tgz"
-        integrity = "sha512-trusted"
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = self._lock(directory, {
-                "node_modules/example": {
-                    "resolved": url,
-                    "integrity": integrity,
-                },
-                "node_modules/parent/node_modules/example": {
-                    "resolved": url,
-                },
-            })
-            self.assertEqual(1, complete_lock(path))
-            packages = json.loads(path.read_text())["packages"]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            integrity,
-            packages["node_modules/parent/node_modules/example"]["integrity"],
-        )
-
-    def test_rejects_missing_integrity_without_verified_duplicate(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = self._lock(directory, {
-                "node_modules/example": {
-                    "resolved": (
-                        "https://registry.npmjs.org/example/-/example-1.2.3.tgz"
-                    ),
-                },
-            })
-            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "no verified duplicate"):
-                complete_lock(path)
-
-    def test_rejects_conflicting_integrities_for_same_url(self):
-        url = "https://registry.npmjs.org/example/-/example-1.2.3.tgz"
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = self._lock(directory, {
-                "node_modules/a": {"resolved": url, "integrity": "sha512-a"},
-                "node_modules/b": {"resolved": url, "integrity": "sha512-b"},
-            })
-            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, "conflicting integrity"):
-                complete_lock(path)
-
-    def test_ignores_local_entries_and_leaves_complete_lock_unchanged(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = self._lock(directory, {
-                "": {"name": "root"},
-                "node_modules/local": {"resolved": "file:../local"},
-                "node_modules/complete": {
-                    "resolved": "https://registry.example/complete.tgz",
-                    "integrity": "sha512-complete",
-                },
-            })
-            before = path.read_text()
-            self.assertEqual(0, complete_lock(path))
-            self.assertEqual(before, path.read_text())
-
-    def test_main_processes_every_requested_lock(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            first = self._lock(directory, {})
-            second = Path(directory) / "second-lock.json"
-            second.write_text(first.read_text())
-            stdout = io.StringIO()
-            with patch(
-                "sys.argv",
-                ["complete_npm_lock_integrity.py", str(first), str(second)],
-            ), redirect_stdout(stdout):
-                self.assertEqual(0, integrity_tool.main())
-        self.assertEqual(2, stdout.getvalue().count("completed 0"))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

-import json
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
@@ -22,7 +21,6 @@ from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex

 _URL = "http://supervise:9100/"
 _PI_DOCKERFILE = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "bot_bottle/contrib/pi/Dockerfile"
-_PI_PACKAGE_JSON = _PI_DOCKERFILE.with_name("package.json")


 def _make_bottle(exec_result: ExecResult | None = None) -> MagicMock:
@@ -211,13 +209,9 @@ class TestPiSuperviseMcp(unittest.TestCase):


 class TestPiDockerfile(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_installs_exact_pi_cwd_from_the_committed_lock(self):
+    def test_installs_pi_cwd_at_build_time(self):
        dockerfile = _PI_DOCKERFILE.read_text()
-        package = json.loads(_PI_PACKAGE_JSON.read_text())
-        version = package["dependencies"]["@harms-haus/pi-cwd"]
-        self.assertRegex(version, r"^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$")
-        self.assertIn("npm ci --omit=dev", dockerfile)
-        self.assertNotIn("pi install", dockerfile)
+        self.assertIn("pi install npm:@harms-haus/pi-cwd", dockerfile)

    def test_prepares_pi_extension_state_dirs_and_tmp_for_node(self):
        dockerfile = _PI_DOCKERFILE.read_text()
@@ -221,10 +221,6 @@ class TestDockerOrchestrator(unittest.TestCase):
        builds = [c.args[0] for c in run.call_args_list if c.args[0][:2] == ["docker", "build"]]
        self.assertEqual(1, len(builds))
        self.assertTrue(any(a.endswith("Dockerfile.orchestrator") for a in builds[0]))
-        arg_index = builds[0].index("--build-arg")
-        self.assertTrue(
-            builds[0][arg_index + 1].startswith("PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE=python:"),
-        )

    def test_ensure_built_raises_on_build_failure(self) -> None:
        with patch(_RUN, return_value=_proc(returncode=1, stderr="no space left")):
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import subprocess
 import unittest
 from datetime import timezone
-from unittest.mock import call, patch
+from unittest.mock import patch

 from bot_bottle.backend.docker import util as docker_mod

@@ -121,147 +121,5 @@ class TestCommitContainer(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIn("my-tag:v1", die.call_args.args[0])


-class TestBuildImage(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_passes_centralized_image_build_args(self):
-        with patch.object(
-            docker_mod.resources,
-            "image_build_args",
-            return_value={"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:pinned"},
-        ), patch.object(
-            docker_mod.subprocess, "run", return_value=_ok(),
-        ) as run, patch.object(docker_mod, "info"):
-            docker_mod.build_image(
-                "agent:test",
-                "/context",
-                dockerfile="Dockerfile.agent",
-            )
-        self.assertIn(
-            ["--build-arg", "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=node:pinned"],
-            [
-                run.call_args.args[0][index:index + 2]
-                for index in range(len(run.call_args.args[0]) - 1)
-            ],
-        )
-
-    def test_passes_build_args_without_mutating_the_value(self):
-        with patch.object(
-            docker_mod.subprocess, "run", return_value=_ok(),
-        ) as run, patch.object(docker_mod, "info"):
-            docker_mod.build_image(
-                "derived:test",
-                "/context",
-                dockerfile="Dockerfile.derived",
-                build_args={"BASE_IMAGE": "sha256:" + "a" * 64},
-            )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            [
-                "docker", "build", "-t", "derived:test",
-                "-f", "Dockerfile.derived",
-                "--build-arg", "BASE_IMAGE=sha256:" + "a" * 64,
-                "/context",
-            ],
-            run.call_args.args[0],
-        )
-
-
-class TestImageId(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_returns_content_addressed_local_id(self):
-        expected = "sha256:" + "b" * 64
-        with patch.object(
-            docker_mod, "run_docker", return_value=_ok(stdout=expected + "\n"),
-        ) as run:
-            self.assertEqual(expected, docker_mod.image_id("base:mutable"))
-        self.assertEqual(
-            [
-                "docker", "image", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Id}}",
-                "base:mutable",
-            ],
-            run.call_args.args[0],
-        )
-
-    def test_rejects_failed_or_non_content_addressed_inspect(self):
-        for result in (_fail("missing"), _ok(stdout="base:latest\n")):
-            with self.subTest(result=result), patch.object(
-                docker_mod, "run_docker", return_value=result,
-            ), patch.object(
-                docker_mod, "die", side_effect=SystemExit("die"),
-            ) as die:
-                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
-                    docker_mod.image_id("base:latest")
-                die.assert_called_once()
-
-
-class TestPinnedLocalImageRef(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_tags_and_verifies_content_derived_reference(self):
-        image = "sha256:" + "c" * 64
-        expected = "registry.example:5000/team/base:sha256-" + "c" * 64
-        with patch.object(
-            docker_mod,
-            "image_id",
-            side_effect=[image, image],
-        ) as image_id, patch.object(
-            docker_mod,
-            "run_docker",
-            return_value=_ok(),
-        ) as run:
-            self.assertEqual(
-                expected,
-                docker_mod.pinned_local_image_ref(
-                    "registry.example:5000/team/base:mutable"
-                ),
-            )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            ["docker", "image", "tag", image, expected],
-            run.call_args.args[0],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            [
-                call("registry.example:5000/team/base:mutable"),
-                call(expected),
-            ],
-            image_id.call_args_list,
-        )
-
-    def test_rejects_invalid_id_or_failed_tag(self):
-        cases = [
-            ("sha256:short", _ok()),
-            ("sha256:" + "d" * 64, _fail("tag failed")),
-        ]
-        for image, result in cases:
-            with self.subTest(image=image), patch.object(
-                docker_mod,
-                "image_id",
-                return_value=image,
-            ), patch.object(
-                docker_mod,
-                "run_docker",
-                return_value=result,
-            ), patch.object(
-                docker_mod,
-                "die",
-                side_effect=SystemExit("die"),
-            ):
-                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
-                    docker_mod.pinned_local_image_ref("base:latest")
-
-    def test_rejects_content_tag_that_resolves_to_another_image(self):
-        image = "sha256:" + "e" * 64
-        with patch.object(
-            docker_mod,
-            "image_id",
-            side_effect=[image, "sha256:" + "f" * 64],
-        ), patch.object(
-            docker_mod,
-            "run_docker",
-            return_value=_ok(),
-        ), patch.object(
-            docker_mod,
-            "die",
-            side_effect=SystemExit("die"),
-        ):
-            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
-                docker_mod.pinned_local_image_ref("base:latest")
-
-
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -75,39 +75,8 @@ class TestBuildAgentRootfsDir(unittest.TestCase):
        other.write_text("FROM python:3.12-slim\n")
        self.assertNotEqual(base, image_builder._rootfs_digest(other))

-    def test_rootfs_digest_tracks_centralized_build_args(self):
-        with patch.object(
-            image_builder.resources,
-            "image_build_args",
-            return_value={"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:first"},
-        ):
-            first = image_builder._rootfs_digest(self.dockerfile)
-        with patch.object(
-            image_builder.resources,
-            "image_build_args",
-            return_value={"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:second"},
-        ):
-            second = image_builder._rootfs_digest(self.dockerfile)
-        self.assertNotEqual(first, second)
-

 class TestSmokeTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_buildah_receives_centralized_image_build_args(self):
-        with patch.object(
-            image_builder,
-            "_ssh_streamed",
-            return_value=0,
-        ) as ssh, patch.object(image_builder, "info"):
-            image_builder._buildah_build(
-                Path("/k"),
-                "10.0.0.1",
-                "/tmp/context",
-                "agent:test",
-                {"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:pinned"},
-            )
-        script = ssh.call_args.args[2]
-        self.assertIn("--build-arg NODE_BASE_IMAGE=node:pinned", script)
-
    def test_empty_argv_is_noop(self):
        with patch.object(image_builder, "_ssh") as ssh:
            image_builder._smoke_test(Path("/k"), "10.0.0.1", "tag", "ctr", ())
@@ -107,12 +107,7 @@ class TestEnsureBuilt(unittest.TestCase):

    def test_local_mode_builds_orchestrator_before_its_fc_image(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_INFRA_BUILD": "local"}), \
-                patch.object(infra_vm.docker_mod, "build_image") as build, \
-                patch.object(
-                    infra_vm.docker_mod,
-                    "pinned_local_image_ref",
-                    return_value="bot-bottle-orchestrator:sha256-" + "a" * 64,
-                ) as pinned_ref:
+                patch.object(infra_vm.docker_mod, "build_image") as build:
            infra_vm.ensure_built()
        tags = [c.args[0] for c in build.call_args_list]
        # orchestrator-fc is FROM orchestrator, so the base is built first.
@@ -121,14 +116,6 @@ class TestEnsureBuilt(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(infra_vm._ORCHESTRATOR_FC_IMAGE, tags[-1])
        self.assertLess(tags.index(infra_vm._ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE),
                        tags.index(infra_vm._ORCHESTRATOR_FC_IMAGE))
-        pinned_ref.assert_called_once_with(infra_vm._ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            {
-                "ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE":
-                    "bot-bottle-orchestrator:sha256-" + "a" * 64,
-            },
-            build.call_args_list[-1].kwargs["build_args"],
-        )


 class TestStop(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -206,75 +206,6 @@ class TestHookRender(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIn('set -- "$@" --push-option="$opt"', hook)
        self.assertIn('git push "$@" origin "$refspec"', hook)

-    def test_agit_review_refs_rejected_before_scan(self):
-        # Creating/updating refs/for/*, refs/draft/*, or refs/for-review/*
-        # opens a Gitea AGit pull request backed by a server-managed review
-        # ref instead of a normal branch, which the git-gate branch workflow
-        # can't push follow-ups to. The guard rejects those refs, and it runs
-        # in Phase 0 — before the gitleaks scan and the upstream forward.
-        hook = git_gate_render_hook()
-        self.assertIn(
-            "refs/for/*|refs/draft/*|refs/for-review/*", hook,
-        )
-        self.assertIn("refusing AGit review ref", hook)
-        self.assertIn("branch-backed pull request", hook)
-        guard = hook.index("refusing AGit review ref")
-        self.assertLess(
-            guard, hook.index("gitleaks scanning"),
-            "AGit guard must run before the gitleaks scan",
-        )
-        self.assertLess(
-            guard, hook.index("forwarding $ref to origin"),
-            "AGit guard must run before the upstream forward",
-        )
-
-    def test_agit_review_ref_deletion_still_allowed(self):
-        # Cleanup of a legacy AGit ref (new == zero) must not be blocked, so
-        # the reject is guarded by the same delete short-circuit the scan and
-        # forward phases use.
-        hook = git_gate_render_hook()
-        guard_block = hook[
-            hook.index("Phase 0"):hook.index("supervise_gitleaks_allow()")
-        ]
-        self.assertIn('[ "$new" = "$zero" ] && continue', guard_block)
-        self.assertIn("refs/for/*", guard_block)
-
-    def _run_hook_stdin(self, stdin: str):
-        # Execute the rendered hook far enough to exercise Phase 0. The guard
-        # touches only mktemp + read, so it rejects (or falls through) without
-        # a bare repo, gitleaks, or ssh — anything past Phase 0 fails for
-        # unrelated reasons, which is fine for the reject cases asserted here.
-        import subprocess
-        fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".sh")
-        try:
-            with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
-                f.write(git_gate_render_hook())
-            return subprocess.run(
-                ["sh", path], input=stdin, capture_output=True, text=True,
-            )
-        finally:
-            os.unlink(path)
-
-    def test_agit_review_ref_create_is_rejected(self):
-        one = "1" * 40
-        for ref in ("refs/for/main", "refs/draft/main", "refs/for-review/main"):
-            with self.subTest(ref=ref):
-                result = self._run_hook_stdin(f"{'0' * 40} {one} {ref}\n")
-                self.assertEqual(1, result.returncode)
-                self.assertIn("refusing AGit review ref", result.stderr)
-                self.assertIn("branch-backed pull request", result.stderr)
-                # Rejected in Phase 0, before the gitleaks scan runs.
-                self.assertNotIn("gitleaks scanning", result.stderr)
-
-    def test_ordinary_branch_passes_agit_guard(self):
-        # A normal refs/heads push must fall through Phase 0 and reach the
-        # gitleaks scan (which then fails for lack of a real repo — proving
-        # only that the guard did not short-circuit it).
-        one = "1" * 40
-        result = self._run_hook_stdin(f"{'0' * 40} {one} refs/heads/main\n")
-        self.assertNotIn("refusing AGit review ref", result.stderr)
-        self.assertIn("gitleaks scanning", result.stderr)
-
    def test_inline_gitleaks_allow_routes_to_supervisor(self):
        hook = git_gate_render_hook()
        # First gitleaks runs normally; only if that passes does the
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
-"""Unit tests for the immutable container-build input policy."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import io
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from scripts import check_image_inputs as policy
-
-
-class TestDockerfilePolicy(unittest.TestCase):
-    _NODE_BASE = {
-        "NODE_BASE_IMAGE":
-            "node:22.23.1-trixie-slim@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
-    }
-
-    def test_accepts_versioned_digest_base(self):
-        text = "FROM node:22.23.1-trixie-slim@sha256:" + "a" * 64 + "\n"
-        self.assertEqual([], policy.check_dockerfile(Path("Dockerfile"), text))
-
-    def test_accepts_defaultless_base_argument_with_centralized_value(self):
-        text = "ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE\nFROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}\n"
-        self.assertEqual(
-            [],
-            policy.check_dockerfile(
-                Path("Dockerfile"),
-                text,
-                self._NODE_BASE,
-            ),
-        )
-
-    def test_rejects_mutable_and_latest_bases(self):
-        for value in (
-            "node:22-trixie-slim",
-            "node:latest@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
-            "node@sha256:" + "a" * 64,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(value=value):
-                problems = policy.check_dockerfile(
-                    Path("Dockerfile"), f"FROM {value}\n",
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(problems)
-
-    def test_rejects_network_pipe_to_shell(self):
-        text = (
-            "FROM node:22.23.1@sha256:" + "a" * 64
-            + "\nRUN curl -fsSL https://example.invalid/install.sh | sh\n"
-        )
-        problems = policy.check_dockerfile(Path("Dockerfile"), text)
-        self.assertTrue(any("directly into a shell" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_rejects_unlocked_npm_and_pi_installs(self):
-        base = "FROM node:22.23.1@sha256:" + "a" * 64 + "\nRUN "
-        for install in (
-            "npm install -g package@1.2.3",
-            "pi install npm:extension@1.2.3",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(install=install):
-                problems = policy.check_dockerfile(
-                    Path("Dockerfile"), base + install + "\n",
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(any("npm ci" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_requires_snapshot_for_apt(self):
-        text = (
-            "FROM node:22.23.1@sha256:" + "a" * 64
-            + "\nRUN apt-get update && apt-get install git\n"
-        )
-        problems = policy.check_dockerfile(Path("Dockerfile"), text)
-        self.assertTrue(any("fixed Debian snapshot" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_rejects_missing_dynamic_and_malformed_bases(self):
-        cases = (
-            ("RUN true\n", "missing FROM"),
-            ("FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}\n", "not declared before FROM"),
-            (
-                "ARG BASE_IMAGE=node:latest\nFROM ${BASE_IMAGE}\n",
-                "must not define a default",
-            ),
-            (
-                "ARG BASE_IMAGE\nFROM ${BASE_IMAGE}\n",
-                "lacks a centralized value",
-            ),
-            (
-                "ARG ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE=base:latest\n"
-                "FROM ${ORCHESTRATOR_BASE_IMAGE}\n",
-                "mutable default",
-            ),
-            ("FROM node:22@sha256:abc\n", "64 lowercase hex"),
-        )
-        for text, expected in cases:
-            with self.subTest(expected=expected):
-                problems = policy.check_dockerfile(Path("Dockerfile"), text)
-                self.assertTrue(any(expected in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_rejects_mutable_centralized_base_value(self):
-        text = "ARG NODE_BASE_IMAGE\nFROM ${NODE_BASE_IMAGE}\n"
-        problems = policy.check_dockerfile(
-            Path("Dockerfile"),
-            text,
-            {"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:latest"},
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(any("lacks a sha256 digest" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_requires_gateway_lock_and_verified_codex_markers(self):
-        base = "FROM node:22.23.1@sha256:" + "a" * 64 + "\n"
-        gateway = policy.check_dockerfile(Path("Dockerfile.gateway"), base)
-        self.assertTrue(any("require hashes" in item for item in gateway))
-        self.assertTrue(any("lock is not consumed" in item for item in gateway))
-
-        codex = policy.check_dockerfile(
-            Path("bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile"),
-            base,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(3, len(codex))
-        self.assertTrue(all("verified pinned Codex install" in item for item in codex))
-
-
-class TestNpmLockPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _write(self, root: Path, *, version: str, integrity: str = "") -> Path:
-        package_dir = root / "provider"
-        package_dir.mkdir()
-        manifest = {
-            "name": "test",
-            "private": True,
-            "dependencies": {"example": version},
-        }
-        package = {
-            "version": "1.2.3",
-            "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/example/-/example-1.2.3.tgz",
-        }
-        if integrity:
-            package["integrity"] = integrity
-        lock = {
-            "name": "test",
-            "lockfileVersion": 3,
-            "packages": {
-                "": {"dependencies": {"example": version}},
-                "node_modules/example": package,
-            },
-        }
-        (package_dir / "package.json").write_text(json.dumps(manifest))
-        (package_dir / "package-lock.json").write_text(json.dumps(lock))
-        return Path("provider/package.json")
-
-    def test_accepts_exact_integrity_locked_package(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            root = Path(directory)
-            path = self._write(root, version="1.2.3", integrity="sha512-abc")
-            self.assertEqual([], policy.check_npm_manifest(root, path))
-
-    def test_rejects_range_and_missing_integrity(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            root = Path(directory)
-            path = self._write(root, version="^1.2.3")
-            problems = policy.check_npm_manifest(root, path)
-            self.assertTrue(any("not an exact version" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("lacks sha512 integrity" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_rejects_unreadable_stale_or_old_lock(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            root = Path(directory)
-            missing = policy.check_npm_manifest(root, Path("missing/package.json"))
-            self.assertTrue(any("cannot read" in item for item in missing))
-
-            path = self._write(root, version="1.2.3", integrity="sha512-abc")
-            lock_path = root / path.with_name("package-lock.json")
-            lock = json.loads(lock_path.read_text())
-            lock["lockfileVersion"] = 2
-            lock["packages"][""]["dependencies"] = {}
-            lock_path.write_text(json.dumps(lock))
-            problems = policy.check_npm_manifest(root, path)
-            self.assertTrue(any("root dependencies are stale" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("lockfileVersion 3" in item for item in problems))
-
-
-class TestPythonLockPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_rejects_missing_or_empty_lock(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            root = Path(directory)
-            missing = policy.check_python_lock(root)
-            self.assertTrue(any("cannot read lock" in item for item in missing))
-
-            (root / "requirements.gateway.lock").write_text("# empty\n")
-            problems = policy.check_python_lock(root)
-            self.assertTrue(any("contains no exact requirements" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("cannot read input" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_rejects_unhashed_and_stale_direct_requirements(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            root = Path(directory)
-            (root / "requirements.gateway.lock").write_text(
-                "example== \\\n"
-                "    # deliberately malformed and unhashed\n"
-            )
-            (root / "requirements.gateway.in").write_text(
-                "example>=1\n"
-                "missing==2.0.0\n"
-            )
-            problems = policy.check_python_lock(root)
-            self.assertTrue(any("example is not exact" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("example lacks a sha256 hash" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("direct dependency is not exact" in item for item in problems))
-            self.assertTrue(any("missing direct dependency" in item for item in problems))
-
-
-class TestRepositoryPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_repository_image_inputs_pass(self):
-        self.assertEqual([], policy.check_repo())
-
-    def test_missing_repository_inputs_are_reported(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory, patch.object(
-            policy,
-            "DOCKERFILES",
-            (Path("missing.Dockerfile"),),
-        ), patch.object(policy, "NPM_MANIFESTS", ()):
-            problems = policy.check_repo(Path(directory))
-        self.assertTrue(any("cannot read Dockerfile" in item for item in problems))
-
-    def test_main_reports_success_and_failure(self):
-        with patch.object(policy, "check_repo", return_value=[]), redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):
-            self.assertEqual(0, policy.main())
-        stderr = io.StringIO()
-        with patch.object(
-            policy,
-            "check_repo",
-            return_value=["bad base"],
-        ), redirect_stderr(stderr):
-            self.assertEqual(1, policy.main())
-        self.assertIn("bad base", stderr.getvalue())
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
@@ -110,10 +110,6 @@ class TestVersionInputs(unittest.TestCase):
        for name in ("Dockerfile.orchestrator", "Dockerfile.orchestrator.fc",
                     "Dockerfile.gateway"):
            (root / name).write_text(f"FROM scratch  # {name}\n")
-        (root / "image-build-args.json").write_text(
-            '{"PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE": "python:pinned"}\n',
-        )
-        (root / "requirements.gateway.lock").write_text("mitmproxy==11.1.3\n")
        (root / "pyproject.toml").write_text("[project]\nname = 'bot-bottle'\n")

    def test_pyproject_toml_change_bumps_version(self) -> None:
@@ -150,38 +146,6 @@ class TestVersionInputs(unittest.TestCase):
            after = ia.infra_artifact_version("init", _ROLE, repo_root=root)
        self.assertNotEqual(before, after)

-    def test_gateway_lock_change_bumps_gateway_version(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            root = Path(d)
-            self._fake_repo(root)
-            before = ia.infra_artifact_version(
-                "init", "gateway", repo_root=root,
-            )
-            (root / "requirements.gateway.lock").write_text(
-                "mitmproxy==11.1.3 --hash=sha256:changed\n",
-            )
-            after = ia.infra_artifact_version(
-                "init", "gateway", repo_root=root,
-            )
-        self.assertNotEqual(before, after)
-
-    def test_base_image_argument_change_bumps_both_role_versions(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            root = Path(d)
-            self._fake_repo(root)
-            before = {
-                role: ia.infra_artifact_version("init", role, repo_root=root)
-                for role in ia.ROLES
-            }
-            (root / "image-build-args.json").write_text(
-                '{"PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE": "python:different"}\n',
-            )
-            after = {
-                role: ia.infra_artifact_version("init", role, repo_root=root)
-                for role in ia.ROLES
-            }
-        self.assertTrue(all(before[role] != after[role] for role in ia.ROLES))
-
    def test_pyc_and_pycache_ignored(self) -> None:
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
            root = Path(d)
@@ -115,60 +115,6 @@ resolver #2
            run.call_args_list[-1].args[0],
        )

-    def test_build_image_passes_centralized_image_build_args(self):
-        status = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
-            args=[],
-            returncode=0,
-            stdout=(
-                '[{"status":{"state":"running"},'
-                '"configuration":{"dns":{"nameservers":["9.9.9.9"]}}}]'
-            ),
-            stderr="",
-        )
-        with patch.object(util.subprocess, "run", return_value=status) as run, \
-             patch.object(
-                 util.resources,
-                 "image_build_args",
-                 return_value={"NODE_BASE_IMAGE": "node:pinned"},
-             ), patch.object(util.os, "environ", {
-                 "BOT_BOTTLE_MACOS_CONTAINER_DNS": "9.9.9.9",
-             }):
-            util.build_image(
-                "bot-bottle-agent:latest",
-                "/repo",
-                dockerfile="Dockerfile.agent",
-            )
-        self.assertIn(
-            ["--build-arg", "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=node:pinned"],
-            [
-                run.call_args_list[-1].args[0][index:index + 2]
-                for index in range(len(run.call_args_list[-1].args[0]) - 1)
-            ],
-        )
-
-    def test_pinned_local_image_ref_tags_and_verifies_exact_id(self):
-        image = "sha256:" + "a" * 64
-        completed = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
-            args=[], returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="",
-        )
-        with patch.object(util, "image_id", return_value=image) as inspect, \
-             patch.object(util.subprocess, "run", return_value=completed) as run:
-            pinned = util.pinned_local_image_ref("registry:5000/agent:latest")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            f"registry:5000/agent:sha256-{'a' * 64}",
-            pinned,
-        )
-        run.assert_called_once_with(
-            ["container", "image", "tag", image, pinned],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            [("registry:5000/agent:latest",), (pinned,)],
-            [call.args for call in inspect.call_args_list],
-        )
-
    def test_commit_container_execs_tar_and_builds_image(self):
        # stderr is bytes because subprocess.run uses stderr=PIPE without text=True
        completed = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
@@ -107,18 +107,14 @@ class TestNestedContainersImage(unittest.TestCase):
        def build(image: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str) -> None:
            calls.append((image, context, dockerfile))
            text = Path(dockerfile).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-            self.assertIn("ARG DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE", text)
-            self.assertIn("FROM ${DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE} AS docker_cli", text)
-            self.assertIn("FROM agent:sha256-deadbeef", text)
+            self.assertIn("FROM agent:base", text)
            self.assertIn("aardvark-dns fuse-overlayfs netavark nftables passt podman", text)
            self.assertIn("USER node", text)
            self.assertTrue((Path(context) / "nested-containers-init.sh").is_file())

-        image = nested_containers.build_image(
-            "agent:sha256-deadbeef", build,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual("agent:sha256-deadbeef-nested-containers", image)
-        self.assertEqual("agent:sha256-deadbeef-nested-containers", calls[0][0])
+        image = nested_containers.build_image("agent:base", build)
+        self.assertEqual("agent:base-nested-containers", image)
+        self.assertEqual("agent:base-nested-containers", calls[0][0])

    def test_installs_the_whole_podman_5_networking_stack(self) -> None:
        """Each missing piece fails at a different, misleading layer: no pasta
@@ -131,9 +127,7 @@ class TestNestedContainersImage(unittest.TestCase):
        def build(_image: str, _context: str, *, dockerfile: str) -> None:
            seen.append(Path(dockerfile).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))

-        nested_containers.build_image(
-            "agent:sha256-deadbeef", build,
-        )
+        nested_containers.build_image("agent:base", build)
        for package in ("podman", "passt", "nftables", "aardvark-dns"):
            self.assertIn(package, seen[0])

@@ -149,9 +143,7 @@ class TestNestedContainersImage(unittest.TestCase):
        def build(_image: str, _context: str, *, dockerfile: str) -> None:
            seen.append(Path(dockerfile).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))

-        nested_containers.build_image(
-            "agent:sha256-deadbeef", build,
-        )
+        nested_containers.build_image("agent:base", build)
        text = seen[0]
        self.assertIn("sed -i '/^node:/d' /etc/subuid /etc/subgid", text)
        self.assertNotIn("subuid", text.replace(
@@ -283,15 +275,10 @@ class TestBuildOrLoadImages(unittest.TestCase):
        )
        with patch.object(launch_mod, "read_committed_image", return_value=None), \
             patch.object(launch_mod.container_mod, "build_image") as build, \
-             patch.object(
-                 launch_mod.container_mod,
-                 "pinned_local_image_ref",
-                 return_value="agent:sha256-deadbeef",
-             ) as pin, \
             patch.object(
                 launch_mod.nested_containers_mod,
                 "build_image",
-                 return_value="agent:sha256-deadbeef-nested-containers",
+                 return_value="agent:base-nested-containers",
             ) as derived:
            images = launch_mod.build_or_load_images(plan)

@@ -299,9 +286,8 @@ class TestBuildOrLoadImages(unittest.TestCase):
            "agent:base", str(launch_mod.resources.build_root()),
            dockerfile="/repo/Dockerfile",
        )
-        pin.assert_called_once_with("agent:base")
-        derived.assert_called_once_with("agent:sha256-deadbeef", build)
-        self.assertEqual("agent:sha256-deadbeef-nested-containers", images.agent)
+        derived.assert_called_once_with("agent:base", build)
+        self.assertEqual("agent:base-nested-containers", images.agent)

    def test_derived_image_layers_onto_a_committed_image(self) -> None:
        plan = _plan(
@@ -313,22 +299,16 @@ class TestBuildOrLoadImages(unittest.TestCase):
             ), \
             patch.object(launch_mod.container_mod, "image_exists", return_value=True), \
             patch.object(launch_mod.container_mod, "build_image") as build, \
-             patch.object(
-                 launch_mod.container_mod,
-                 "pinned_local_image_ref",
-                 return_value="agent:sha256-cafebabe",
-             ) as pin, \
             patch.object(
                 launch_mod.nested_containers_mod,
                 "build_image",
-                 return_value="agent:sha256-cafebabe-nested-containers",
+                 return_value="agent:committed-nested-containers",
             ) as derived:
            images = launch_mod.build_or_load_images(plan)

        build.assert_not_called()
-        pin.assert_called_once_with("agent:committed")
-        derived.assert_called_once_with("agent:sha256-cafebabe", build)
-        self.assertEqual("agent:sha256-cafebabe-nested-containers", images.agent)
+        derived.assert_called_once_with("agent:committed", build)
+        self.assertEqual("agent:committed-nested-containers", images.agent)

    def test_cached_policy_refuses_to_build_the_derived_image(self) -> None:
        plan = _plan(
@@ -337,11 +317,6 @@ class TestBuildOrLoadImages(unittest.TestCase):
            spec=_Spec(image_policy="cached"),
        )
        with patch.object(launch_mod, "read_committed_image", return_value=None), \
-             patch.object(
-                 launch_mod.container_mod,
-                 "pinned_local_image_ref",
-                 return_value="agent:sha256-deadbeef",
-             ), \
             patch.object(
                 launch_mod.container_mod, "image_exists",
                 side_effect=_base_image_only,
@@ -351,10 +326,7 @@ class TestBuildOrLoadImages(unittest.TestCase):
            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
                launch_mod.build_or_load_images(plan)
        derived.assert_not_called()
-        self.assertIn(
-            "agent:sha256-deadbeef-nested-containers",
-            die.call_args.args[0],
-        )
+        self.assertIn("agent:base-nested-containers", die.call_args.args[0])


 if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""Unit: orchestrator-side broker client (issue #468, chunk 1). HTTP mocked."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerAuthError,
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
+    LaunchRequest,
+)
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client import BrokerClient, BrokerClientError
+
+_URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client.urllib.request.urlopen"
+
+
+def _resp(payload: object) -> MagicMock:
+    m = MagicMock()
+    m.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+    return m
+
+
+def _http_error(code: int, payload: object = None) -> urllib.error.HTTPError:
+    body = json.dumps(payload).encode() if payload is not None else b""
+    return urllib.error.HTTPError(
+        "http://host/broker", code, "err", {}, io.BytesIO(body))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+
+class TestSubmit(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.c = BrokerClient("http://host:8091")
+
+    def test_returns_the_verified_request(self) -> None:
+        echo = {
+            "op": "launch", "bottle_id": "b1", "source_ip": "10.0.0.1",
+            "image_ref": "img", "slot": 3,
+        }
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(echo)):
+            got = self.c.submit("tok")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1",
+                          image_ref="img", slot=3),
+            got,
+        )
+
+    def test_posts_token_to_broker_endpoint(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"op": "teardown", "bottle_id": "b1"})) as m:
+            self.c.submit("signed-token")
+        request = m.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual("POST", request.get_method())
+        self.assertTrue(request.full_url.endswith("/broker"))
+        self.assertEqual({"token": "signed-token"}, json.loads(request.data))
+
+    def test_401_raises_broker_auth_error(self) -> None:
+        # A fail-closed provenance/schema rejection surfaces as the SAME exception
+        # the in-process broker raises, so the launch path's rollback is identical.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(401, {"error": "bad signature"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                self.c.submit("forged")
+
+    def test_502_is_a_definite_client_error(self) -> None:
+        # The host responded — it processed the request and did not launch, so a
+        # definite BrokerClientError (the caller may safely roll back).
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(502, {"error": "docker down"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_unreachable_is_ambiguous_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        # No response at all — the request may already have launched, so the
+        # AMBIGUOUS BrokerUnavailableError (the caller must NOT roll back).
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_timeout_is_ambiguous_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        # A dropped/late response after the request was sent is the exact orphan
+        # risk: the host may have launched. Must be ambiguous, not a definite fail.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=TimeoutError("read timed out")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_malformed_success_body_raises(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"op": "launch"})):  # missing bottle_id
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_empty_error_body_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
+        # An error with no readable JSON body still classifies by status code.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(401)):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                self.c.submit("forged")
+
+    def test_non_json_success_body_raises(self) -> None:
+        # A 200 whose body isn't JSON is tolerated into {} then fails the
+        # missing-field check — a definite client error, not a crash.
+        m = MagicMock()
+        m.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = b"not json at all"
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=m):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_unreadable_error_body_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
+        # An HTTPError whose body can't be read (fp=None) still classifies by
+        # status — the error detail is best-effort.
+        err = urllib.error.HTTPError(
+            "http://host/broker", 502, "err", {}, None)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=err):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -323,10 +323,6 @@ class TestDockerGatewayBuild(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(1, len(builds))
        self.assertIn(self.sc.image_ref, builds[0])
        self.assertTrue(any(a.endswith("Dockerfile.gateway") for a in builds[0]))
-        arg_index = builds[0].index("--build-arg")
-        self.assertTrue(
-            builds[0][arg_index + 1].startswith("PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE=python:"),
-        )
        self.assertNotIn("--no-cache", builds[0])

    def test_ensure_built_no_cache_env_forces_full_rebuild(self) -> None:
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Unit tests for the host control server (issue #468, chunk 1).
+
+Mostly exercises the pure `dispatch()` (socket-free, like the orchestrator
+server tests), plus a real-socket round-trip through `BrokerClient` that proves
+the full sign -> POST -> verify -> act seam over HTTP.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import http.client
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import typing
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerAuthError,
+    LaunchBroker,
+    LaunchRequest,
+    StubBroker,
+    sign_request,
+)
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client import BrokerClient
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server import (
+    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+    Handler,
+    HostControlServer,
+    broker_secret,
+    dispatch,
+    main,
+    make_host_server,
+)
+from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+
+
+def _body(obj: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(obj).encode()
+
+
+class _RaisingBroker(LaunchBroker):
+    """A broker whose backend launch always fails — exercises the 502 path (an
+    operational backend failure, distinct from a fail-closed provenance 401)."""
+
+    def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("docker down")
+
+    def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("docker down")
+
+
+class TestDispatch(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        self.broker = StubBroker(self.secret)
+
+    def _token(self, **kwargs: object) -> str:
+        return sign_request(LaunchRequest(**kwargs), self.secret)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+    def test_health(self) -> None:
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/health", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("ok", payload["status"])
+
+    def test_broker_launch_verifies_and_acts(self) -> None:
+        token = self._token(
+            op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.243.0.1",
+            image_ref="img", slot=2,
+        )
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("launch", payload["op"])
+        self.assertEqual("b1", payload["bottle_id"])
+        self.assertEqual("img", payload["image_ref"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, payload["slot"])
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in self.broker.launched])
+
+    def test_broker_teardown_acts(self) -> None:
+        token = self._token(op="teardown", bottle_id="b1")
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in self.broker.torn_down])
+
+    def test_forged_token_is_401_and_nothing_acted(self) -> None:
+        forged = sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1"), secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": forged}))
+        self.assertEqual(401, status)
+        self.assertIn("broker auth failed", str(payload["error"]))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)  # fail-closed: never launched
+
+    def test_backend_failure_is_502(self) -> None:
+        broker = _RaisingBroker(self.secret)
+        token = self._token(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", image_ref="img")
+        status, payload = dispatch(broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(502, status)
+        self.assertIn("backend launch failed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+    def test_missing_token_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({}))
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_bad_json_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"{not json")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_empty_body_is_missing_token_400(self) -> None:
+        # Empty body parses to {} (no token) → 400, never reaching the broker.
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)
+
+    def test_non_object_body_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"[1, 2]")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_unknown_route_404(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/nope", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(404, status)
+
+    def test_trailing_slash_normalized(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/health/", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+
+
+class TestBrokerSecret(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The durable launch-broker key (#468/#476): prefer the env-injected key,
+    else the durable host key file, so signer and verifier resolve the same one."""
+
+    def test_reads_injected_key_from_env(self) -> None:
+        # The injected key is honoured regardless of allow_host_file — both the
+        # host controller and the guest orchestrator take an injected key.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            b"injected-key", broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            b"injected-key",
+            broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}, allow_host_file=True))
+
+    def test_guest_without_injection_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        # The default (guest orchestrator): no env key and NO host-file fallback,
+        # so it returns None rather than mint a divergent process-local key.
+        self.assertIsNone(broker_secret({}))
+
+    def test_host_side_falls_back_to_the_durable_key_file(self) -> None:
+        # allow_host_file=True (host controller / dev-harness): mint/read the
+        # durable host key file, the same key on every call (restart re-adoption).
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
+            with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT": root}, clear=False):
+                os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                first = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+                second = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+        self.assertTrue(first)
+        self.assertEqual(first, second)
+
+
+class TestSeamRoundTrip(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The whole point of chunk 1: a request signed by the orchestrator side is
+    POSTed to a real host control server, verified there, and acted on — over
+    HTTP, not an in-process call."""
+
+    def _serve(self, broker: LaunchBroker) -> BrokerClient:
+        server = make_host_server(broker, "127.0.0.1", 0)
+        self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
+        threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
+        host, port = server.server_address[0], server.server_address[1]
+        return BrokerClient(f"http://{host}:{port}")
+
+    def test_sign_post_verify_act_over_http(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        client = self._serve(broker)
+        req = LaunchRequest(
+            op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1", image_ref="img", slot=1)
+        got = client.submit(sign_request(req, secret))
+        self.assertEqual(req, got)  # the controller echoes the verified request
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in broker.launched])
+
+    def test_forged_token_raises_broker_auth_error_over_http(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        client = self._serve(broker)
+        forged = sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1"), secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+            client.submit(forged)
+        self.assertEqual([], broker.launched)  # fail-closed across the wire
+
+
+class TestRequestLimits(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The privileged listener must not let a caller that can merely reach the
+    socket (no signed token) exhaust it via an oversized declared body — and it
+    rejects on the Content-Length *header*, before reading the body."""
+
+    def _addr(self) -> tuple[str, int]:
+        self.broker = StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        server = make_host_server(self.broker, "127.0.0.1", 0)
+        self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
+        threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
+        host, port = server.server_address[:2]
+        return typing.cast(str, host), port
+
+    def test_oversized_content_length_is_rejected_before_reading(self) -> None:
+        host, port = self._addr()
+        conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=5)
+        self.addCleanup(conn.close)
+        # Declare an oversized body but send only a sliver: the server must reject
+        # on the header before reading, so the caller gets a clean, deterministic
+        # 413 (no large unread body to race a connection reset).
+        conn.putrequest("POST", "/broker", skip_accept_encoding=True)
+        conn.putheader("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        conn.putheader("Content-Length", str(MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1))
+        conn.endheaders()
+        conn.send(b"{}")  # far short of the declared length; never read
+        resp = conn.getresponse()
+        self.assertEqual(413, resp.status)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)  # never reached the broker
+
+
+class TestServeUnit(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Drive `Handler._serve` directly (no socket). The real per-request handler
+    runs in a daemon thread whose coverage/trace data is lost, so the
+    bounded-body and error paths are exercised here in the main thread instead."""
+
+    def _handler(self, broker: LaunchBroker, headers: dict[str, str],
+                 body: bytes = b"") -> tuple[Handler, MagicMock]:
+        server = HostControlServer.__new__(HostControlServer)
+        server.broker = broker
+        h = Handler.__new__(Handler)
+        h.server = server
+        h.headers = headers  # type: ignore[assignment] — dict is a valid .get() stand-in
+        h.path = "/broker"
+        h.rfile = io.BytesIO(body)
+        h.wfile = io.BytesIO()
+        send_response = MagicMock()
+        h.send_response = send_response  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        h.send_header = MagicMock()  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        h.end_headers = MagicMock()  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        return h, send_response
+
+    def test_oversized_content_length_is_413(self) -> None:
+        broker = StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        h, send_response = self._handler(broker, {"Content-Length": str(MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1)})
+        h.do_POST()  # exercises do_POST -> _serve
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(413)
+        self.assertEqual([], broker.launched)  # rejected before the broker
+
+    def test_invalid_content_length_is_400(self) -> None:
+        h, send_response = self._handler(StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)),
+                                         {"Content-Length": "not-a-number"})
+        h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(400)
+
+    def test_valid_request_dispatches_200(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        body = _body({"token": sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="teardown", bottle_id="b1"), secret)})
+        h, send_response = self._handler(broker, {"Content-Length": str(len(body))}, body)
+        h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(200)
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in broker.torn_down])
+
+    def test_dispatch_exception_becomes_500(self) -> None:
+        # dispatch is total, but the handler still guards it: a raised dispatch
+        # returns 500 rather than dropping the connection.
+        h, send_response = self._handler(
+            StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)), {"Content-Length": "0"})
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.dispatch",
+                   side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
+            h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(500)
+
+    def test_health_over_do_get(self) -> None:
+        h, send_response = self._handler(StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)), {})
+        h.path = "/health"
+        h.do_GET()
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(200)
+
+
+class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fail_closed_without_secret(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
+                   return_value=None):
+            self.assertEqual(2, main(["--port", "0"]))
+
+    def test_serves_then_shuts_down_cleanly(self) -> None:
+        fake = MagicMock()
+        fake.server_address = ("127.0.0.1", 0)
+        fake.serve_forever.side_effect = KeyboardInterrupt
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
+                   return_value=b"k"), \
+             patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.make_host_server",
+                   return_value=fake):
+            self.assertEqual(0, main(["--port", "0"]))
+        fake.serve_forever.assert_called_once()
+        fake.server_close.assert_called_once()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Unit: the orchestrator dev-harness entrypoint (`python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator`).
+
+Exercises broker selection (stub / docker / http) and the fail-closed http path,
+patching `make_server` so the serve loop returns instead of blocking.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import secrets
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__ import main
+from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+
+
+def _fake_server() -> MagicMock:
+    fake = MagicMock()
+    fake.server_address = ("127.0.0.1", 0)
+    # Break out of serve_forever immediately, exercising the try/finally.
+    fake.serve_forever.side_effect = KeyboardInterrupt
+    return fake
+
+
+class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _run(self, broker: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> tuple[int, MagicMock]:
+        fake = _fake_server()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            argv = ["--db", str(Path(d) / "r.db"), "--port", "0", "--broker", broker]
+            with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__.make_server", return_value=fake), \
+                    patch.dict("os.environ", env or {}, clear=False):
+                if env is None:
+                    os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                rc = main(argv)
+        return rc, fake
+
+    def test_stub_broker_serves_and_closes(self) -> None:
+        rc, fake = self._run("stub")
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+        fake.serve_forever.assert_called_once()
+        fake.server_close.assert_called_once()
+
+    def test_docker_broker_serves(self) -> None:
+        rc, _ = self._run("docker")
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+
+    def test_http_broker_with_injected_key_serves(self) -> None:
+        # The guest orchestrator takes the launch-broker key by injection.
+        rc, _ = self._run(
+            "http", env={LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: secrets.token_urlsafe(16)})
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+
+    def test_http_broker_without_injected_key_exits(self) -> None:
+        # Fail-closed: no host-file fallback for the guest, so a missing injected
+        # key is a usage error rather than a silently-minted divergent key.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
+                os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                    main(["--db", str(Path(d) / "r.db"), "--broker", "http"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

+import base64
 import unittest

 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.secret_store import (
    ENV_VAR_SECRET_NAME,
+    _NONCE_BYTES,
    decrypt_value,
    encrypt_value,
    new_env_var_secret,
@@ -65,22 +67,27 @@ class TestDecryptErrors(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self) -> None:
        self.secret = new_env_var_secret()

-    def test_wrong_key_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
+    def test_wrong_key_always_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
+        # Deterministic: the authentication tag rejects a wrong key every time,
+        # so reprovision can never inject a garbage token. Repeat across many
+        # random keys (the old unauthenticated scheme let ~5% through when the
+        # garbage happened to decode as valid UTF-8).
+        for _ in range(200):
+            ct = encrypt_value(self.secret, "secret-token")
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                decrypt_value(new_env_var_secret(), ct)
+
+    def test_tampered_ciphertext_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
        ct = encrypt_value(self.secret, "secret-token")
-        other_key = new_env_var_secret()
-        # Wrong key produces garbage bytes; decrypt_value raises ValueError
-        # when the result is non-UTF-8 (which is very likely for 12-char data).
-        # We allow it to succeed only if garbage happens to be valid UTF-8, but
-        # the plaintext must not match.
-        try:
-            result = decrypt_value(other_key, ct)
-            self.assertNotEqual("secret-token", result)
-        except ValueError:
-            pass
+        raw = bytearray(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(ct + "=" * (-len(ct) % 4)))
+        raw[_NONCE_BYTES] ^= 0x01  # flip a bit in the ciphertext body → tag mismatch
+        tampered = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(bytes(raw)).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            decrypt_value(self.secret, tampered)

    def test_truncated_blob_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-            decrypt_value(self.secret, "dG9vc2hvcnQ")  # "tooshort" — under 16 nonce bytes
+            decrypt_value(self.secret, "dG9vc2hvcnQ")  # "tooshort" — under nonce+tag

    def test_invalid_base64_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ from contextlib import closing
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest.mock import patch

-from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, StubBroker
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
+    LaunchBroker,
+    LaunchRequest,
+    StubBroker,
+)
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.registry_store import RegistryStore
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.service import OrchestratorCore
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.secret_store import new_env_var_secret
@@ -25,8 +30,8 @@ from bot_bottle.orchestrator.supervisor import (


 class _FailingBroker(LaunchBroker):
-    """Verifies the token like any broker, then fails the launch — to
-    exercise the orchestrator's registry rollback."""
+    """Verifies the token like any broker, then fails the launch *definitely* —
+    to exercise the orchestrator's registry rollback."""

    def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
        raise RuntimeError("launch failed")
@@ -35,6 +40,18 @@ class _FailingBroker(LaunchBroker):
        pass


+class _UnavailableBroker(LaunchBroker):
+    """Verifies the token, then raises the *ambiguous* BrokerUnavailableError —
+    the host may already have launched — so the orchestrator must KEEP the
+    registry row rather than orphan a running container."""
+
+    def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise BrokerUnavailableError("delivery dropped after send")
+
+    def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        pass
+
+
 class TestOrchestrator(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self) -> None:
        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
@@ -144,11 +161,20 @@ class TestOrchestrator(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIsNotNone(self.orch.resolve("10.243.0.3", rec.identity_token))
        self.assertIsNone(self.orch.resolve("10.243.0.3", "wrong-token"))

-    def test_launch_rolls_back_registry_on_broker_failure(self) -> None:
+    def test_launch_rolls_back_registry_on_definite_broker_failure(self) -> None:
        orch = OrchestratorCore(self.store, _FailingBroker(self.secret), self.secret)
        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
            orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.9")
-        self.assertEqual([], self.store.all())  # no orphan
+        self.assertEqual([], self.store.all())  # no orphan row
+
+    def test_launch_keeps_registry_on_ambiguous_broker_failure(self) -> None:
+        # The host may already have launched the bottle before the response was
+        # lost, so deregistering would orphan a running container with no row.
+        # The row is kept for reconcile to reap iff the bottle is not live.
+        orch = OrchestratorCore(self.store, _UnavailableBroker(self.secret), self.secret)
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+            orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.9")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(self.store.all()))  # row survives — no orphan container

    def test_gateway_status_reports_unconfigured(self) -> None:
        # The orchestrator no longer owns a standalone gateway lifecycle; the
@@ -38,33 +38,6 @@ class TestCheckoutMode(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertTrue(resources.nix_netpool_module().is_file())
        self.assertTrue(resources.netpool_script().is_file())

-    def test_image_build_args_come_from_the_central_input_file(self):
-        root = resources.build_root()
-        args = resources.image_build_args(
-            "Dockerfile.gateway",
-            context=root,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual({"PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"}, set(args))
-        self.assertRegex(
-            args["PYTHON_BASE_IMAGE"],
-            r"^python:\d+\.\d+\.\d+-.+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$",
-        )
-
-    def test_generated_dockerfile_uses_central_input_from_build_root(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            dockerfile = Path(tmp) / "Dockerfile"
-            dockerfile.write_text(
-                "ARG DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE\n"
-                "FROM ${DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE}\n",
-                encoding="utf-8",
-            )
-            args = resources.image_build_args(dockerfile, context=tmp)
-        self.assertEqual({"DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE"}, set(args))
-        self.assertRegex(
-            args["DOCKER_CLI_BASE_IMAGE"],
-            r"^docker:\d+-cli@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$",
-        )
-
    def test_bundled_resources_all_exist_at_root(self):
        # Drift guard: every path setup.py bundles must exist in the checkout.
        root = resources.build_root()
@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch

 from bot_bottle import orchestrator_auth
-from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
 from bot_bottle.trust_domain import (
    CONTROL_PLANE,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER,
    ControlPlaneProvisioning,
+    LaunchBrokerProvisioning,
    ProvisioningError,
    TrustDomain,
 )
@@ -101,5 +104,73 @@ class TestControlPlaneProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertNotEqual(ROLE_CLI, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))


+class TestLaunchBrokerAndHostControllerDomains(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The real #468 domains: the launch-broker key (shared by orchestrator +
+    host controller) and the host controller's own lifecycle key."""
+
+    def test_launch_broker_mints_no_role_tokens(self) -> None:
+        # Empty role set — it provides durable key material for the broker's own
+        # launch JWT, not orchestrator_auth role tokens.
+        self.assertEqual(frozenset(), LAUNCH_BROKER.roles)
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                LAUNCH_BROKER.mint(ROLE_CLI)
+
+    def test_host_controller_signs_host_role_only(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            tok = HOST_CONTROLLER.mint(ROLE_HOST)
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_HOST, HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(tok, "k"))
+        # A control-plane `cli` token (the orchestrator's key) never verifies as a
+        # host-controller role — the orchestrator can't forge lifecycle creds.
+        cli_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(ROLE_CLI, "k")
+        self.assertIsNone(HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(cli_tok, "k"))
+
+    def test_control_plane_cannot_mint_the_host_role(self) -> None:
+        # `host` is outside the control-plane role set on purpose.
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                CONTROL_PLANE.mint(ROLE_HOST)
+
+    def test_the_three_domains_use_distinct_keys_and_env_vars(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(3, len({
+            CONTROL_PLANE.key_filename,
+            LAUNCH_BROKER.key_filename,
+            HOST_CONTROLLER.key_filename,
+        }))
+        self.assertEqual(3, len({
+            CONTROL_PLANE.key_env, LAUNCH_BROKER.key_env, HOST_CONTROLLER.key_env,
+        }))
+
+
+class TestLaunchBrokerProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_broker_key_returns_the_durable_key(self) -> None:
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="bk"):
+            self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
+
+    def test_broker_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        # An empty key would leave the host controller unable to verify any
+        # launch — fail-closed rather than hand back a useless/dangerous key.
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
+            with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
+                prov.broker_key()
+
+    def test_controller_key_is_distinct_from_the_broker_key(self) -> None:
+        # The orchestrator holds the broker key but NEVER the controller key.
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        keys = {"launch-broker-key": "bk", "host-controller-key": "ck"}
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key",
+                   side_effect=keys.__getitem__):
+            self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
+            self.assertEqual("ck", prov.controller_key())
+
+    def test_controller_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
+            with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
+                prov.controller_key()
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
didericis-claude	0e2af7de62	feat(orchestrator): durable launch-broker secret via TrustDomain (#468 ) tracker-policy-pr / check-pr (pull_request) Successful in 10s Details lint / lint (push) Successful in 1m0s Details test / integration-docker (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s Details test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m10s Details test / coverage (pull_request) Successful in 14s Details Chunk 2 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's durable secret gap and replace chunk 1's BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET stopgap. - trust_domain.py: two new domains. LAUNCH_BROKER holds the durable HS256 key both the orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share for the broker's launch JWT — a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, so a restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key. HOST_CONTROLLER is the separate domain for the controller's own lifecycle endpoints, keyed by a key the orchestrator never holds (its role is `host`, deliberately outside control-plane ROLES). LaunchBrokerProvisioning is the fail-closed seam. - orchestrator_auth.py: ROLE_HOST, outside ROLES. - paths.py: key-file + env-var constants for both domains. Key resolution is split by owner (addresses codex review on #497): broker_secret(allow_host_file=...) — the host controller / dev-harness (True) may mint/read the durable host key file it owns; the GUEST orchestrator (--broker http, default False) must be injected the key and fails closed if it isn't. A guest that fell back to the host file would mint a process-local key unrelated to the host controller's, so startup would succeed but every launch would 401 — this prevents that silent divergence. Tested: domain boundary + separation, provisioning fail-closed, and broker_secret env-only (guest) vs host-file (host) resolution. pyright clean; pylint 9.86. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 20:36:46 +00:00
didericis-claude	b5753b5921	fix(secret): authenticate bottled-secret encryption (#468 ) tracker-policy-pr / check-pr (pull_request) Successful in 10s Details test / integration-docker (pull_request) Successful in 1m6s Details test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m12s Details test / coverage (pull_request) Successful in 39s Details The per-bottle egress-secret encryption (secret_store.py) was unauthenticated CTR/XOR: decrypting with the WRONG ENV_VAR_SECRET produced garbage that decrypt_value only rejected when it wasn't valid UTF-8. For short token values that garbage is coincidentally valid UTF-8 ~5% of the time, so `reprovision_from_secret` would occasionally "succeed" with a wrong key and inject a garbage egress credential — and test_reprovision_rejects_missing_rows_and_wrong_key failed ~5% of runs (flaky CI, surfaced by this stack's unit job). Switch to authenticated encrypt-then-MAC: append an HMAC-SHA256 tag over `nonce \|\| ciphertext`, keyed by a domain-separated MAC subkey derived from the ENV_VAR_SECRET. decrypt_value verifies the tag (constant-time) before returning any plaintext, so a wrong key or tampered ciphertext is rejected deterministically. Blob format is now `nonce \|\| ciphertext \|\| tag` (the stored rows are transient — re-written every launch — so no migration is needed). Pre-existing bug on main, unrelated to the transport work, but it blocks this stack's CI. Tests: wrong key rejected 200/200; tampered ciphertext rejected; round-trips unchanged. Deterministic now (was ~5% flaky). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00
didericis-claude	61383e741d	fix(orchestrator): address review on host control server transport (#468 ) Codex review on #496: - High — ambiguous delivery no longer orphans a launched bottle. A timeout / dropped response from the host controller is now the ambiguous BrokerUnavailableError (distinct from the definite BrokerAuthError / BrokerClientError). OrchestratorCore.launch_bottle keeps the registry row on the ambiguous case instead of deregistering — deregistering would orphan a running container with no record (reconcile reaps rows, never containers). The row is left for reconcile to reap iff the bottle is not actually live. Definite failures still roll back, so a real failure leaves no orphan row. - Medium — the privileged endpoint bounds request bodies. The host server rejects an oversized Content-Length with 413 before reading it, and sets a per-request socket timeout, so a caller that can merely reach the socket (no signed token) can't exhaust memory or a handler thread. Tests: ambiguous-keep vs definite-rollback in the launch path; the BrokerUnavailableError/BrokerClientError split in BrokerClient; the 413 body cap + handler error paths (driven in-thread, since daemon request threads lose coverage) plus a deterministic real-socket check that declares an oversized Content-Length but sends a sliver (rejection on the header, no unread-body reset race); and the __main__ entrypoint broker selection. Diff-coverage 98%; pyright clean; pylint 9.8. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00
didericis-claude	904ed2ef2f	feat(orchestrator): host control server transport (#468 ) Chunk 1 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's transport gap. Today LaunchBroker.submit(token) is an in-process method call from OrchestratorCore; this makes it a real out-of-process service reached over HTTP. - host_server.py: the host control server. A pure dispatch() (POST /broker verifies a signed token via the existing verify_request + _launch/_teardown path, GET /health) wrapped by a thin http.server adapter, mirroring orchestrator/server.py. Only the signed token crosses the wire; provenance/schema failures are fail-closed 401s that never touch the backend, a backend launch failure is a 502. - broker_client.py: BrokerClient — a drop-in submit(token) that POSTs the signed token to the host controller. A 401 re-raises as BrokerAuthError so the launch path's rollback is identical local or remote. - broker.py: SubmitBroker Protocol — the one method OrchestratorCore depends on, satisfied by both LaunchBroker and BrokerClient, so the core is unchanged (service.py annotation only). - __main__.py: wire `--broker http` behind the shared-secret env var (BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET, hex) — a chunk-1 stopgap the durable TrustDomain key (chunk 2, #476) replaces. Tested: pure-dispatch cases, BrokerClient with HTTP mocked, and a real-socket sign -> POST -> verify -> act round-trip (incl. fail-closed forged token). pyright clean; pylint 9.86. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 13:32:54 -04:00
didericis-claude	892299aac5	docs: defer broker replay protection to its own issue (#494 ) prd-number-check / require-numbered-prds (pull_request) Failing after 6s Details tracker-policy-pr / check-pr (pull_request) Successful in 13s Details Per PR review, replay protection is too heavy for the host control server MVP. Drop it from the four-gap framing (now three gaps), remove the enforcement design section and implementation chunk, and track the iat-window + jti-cache work in #494 as an independent in-process change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 13:32:41 -04:00
didericis-claude	4860eead0c	docs: PRD for host-side control server (#468 ) Promote the in-process launch broker into a standalone host control server: the single privileged host component that brokers launches, owns orchestrator lifecycle, and is the sole writer of host-durable state. Closes the four broker gaps (transport, durable provisioned secret, replay protection, disciplined op vocabulary) and splits host state by owner and lifetime (orchestrator SQLite / host JSONL audit / gateway none). The payoff is dropping the Docker socket from the CLI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-26 13:32:41 -04:00