feat(orchestrator): list_live broker op + reconcile via broker (#468)

Chunk 3 of the host-control-server stack: grow the broker op vocabulary
(PRD gap 3), starting with `list_live`, and invert `reconcile` onto it.

- broker: split the closed op vocabulary into mutation (`launch`/`teardown`,
  carry a bottle id + static flags) and query (`list_live`, carries nothing
  but its op name) kinds. `verify_request` now enforces a **strict schema**
  (open question 1, resolved yes): unknown claim keys are rejected, a mutation
  must name its bottle, and a query that smuggles any id/flag is refused.
- broker verb: `LaunchBroker.list_live` / `SubmitBroker.list_live` return the
  backend's live source IPs; a backend enumeration failure is converted to the
  single `BrokerUnavailableError` "live set unknown" signal. `DockerBroker`
  enumerates its labelled containers; `StubBroker` derives from launches (or a
  test override).
- host controller: `POST /broker/live` verifies a signed `list_live` token and
  returns `{source_ips}`; `BrokerClient.list_live` is its drop-in client.
- reconcile: `OrchestratorCore.reconcile()` drops the `live_source_ips`
  parameter and pulls the live set from the broker itself — the tell that the
  orchestrator couldn't see the backend goes away. **Fail-safe**: if the broker
  can't return an authoritative set the sweep is skipped, never run against an
  empty/partial set (which would reap healthy rows). The `/reconcile` HTTP
  contract + `OrchestratorClient.reconcile` become a bare trigger.

The macOS launcher's Apple-container enumeration stays for now; it becomes the
host controller's `list_live` when launch itself moves behind the broker (the
pulled-forward chunk 5, next in the stack).

Tests + pyright clean; pylint 10.0 on broker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/consolidated_launch.py

@@ -166,9 +166,17 @@ def register_agent(
     # collide with this bottle's — and `by_source_ip` fail-closes on ambiguity,
     # which would resolve no policy at all and deny every host. Best-effort: a
     # reconciliation failure must not block an otherwise-fine launch.
+    #
+    # The orchestrator now pulls the live set from the broker itself, so this is
+    # a bare trigger. Until macOS moves onto the host controller (the follow-up
+    # that routes launch through the broker), the orchestrator's broker is the
+    # stub, whose live set is the bottles it recorded launches for — so the sweep
+    # only under-reaps (leaves an orphan a cycle longer), never reaps a healthy
+    # bottle. The Apple-container enumeration below (`live_source_ips`) becomes
+    # that host controller's `list_live` there.
     try:
-        client.reconcile(live_source_ips(endpoint.network))
-    except (OrchestratorClientError, EnumerationError) as e:
+        client.reconcile()
+    except OrchestratorClientError as e:
         info(f"registry reconciliation skipped: {e}")
     reg = provision_bottle(
         client, source_ip, egress_plan, git_gate_plan, MacosGatewayTransport(),

bot_bottle/orchestrator/__main__.py

@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 from .. import log
 from .store.store_manager import StoreManager
-from .broker import LaunchBroker, StubBroker
+from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+from .broker import StubBroker, SubmitBroker
+from .broker_client import BrokerClient
+from .host_server import DEFAULT_PORT, broker_secret
 from .server import make_server
 from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
 from .store.registry_store import RegistryStore, default_db_path
@@ -34,8 +37,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
         help=f"registry DB path (default: {default_db_path()})",
     )
     parser.add_argument(
-        "--broker", choices=("stub", "docker"), default="stub",
-        help="launch broker: 'stub' records requests; 'docker' runs containers",
+        "--broker", choices=("stub", "docker", "http"), default="stub",
+        help="launch broker: 'stub' records requests; 'docker' runs containers "
+             "in-process; 'http' relays signed requests to a host control server",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--host-controller-url", default=f"http://127.0.0.1:{DEFAULT_PORT}",
+        help="host control server URL (used only with --broker http)",
     )
     args = parser.parse_args(argv)
 
@@ -47,11 +55,27 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
     # operator reaches it over HTTP (never a second, disconnected DB).
     StoreManager(registry.db_path).migrate()
 
-    # An ephemeral signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its
-    # broker (verifier). 'stub' records launches instead of starting
-    # anything; 'docker' runs real containers (firecracker drops in later).
-    secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
-    broker: LaunchBroker = DockerBroker(secret) if args.broker == "docker" else StubBroker(secret)
+    # A signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its broker (verifier).
+    # 'stub' records launches instead of starting anything; 'docker' runs real
+    # containers in-process; 'http' relays signed requests to a separate host
+    # control server, which verifies and launches. For 'stub'/'docker' the secret
+    # is ephemeral (signer and verifier share this process). For 'http' it must be
+    # the SAME key the host controller holds — and this process is the *guest*
+    # (signer), so it must be given that key by injection, NOT mint its own
+    # process-local one (which would diverge from the host's and 401 every launch).
+    broker: SubmitBroker
+    if args.broker == "http":
+        secret = broker_secret()  # env-injected only; no host-file fallback here
+        if secret is None:
+            parser.error(
+                f"--broker http requires the launch-broker key injected as "
+                f"${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV} (the host controller owns/mints it); the "
+                "orchestrator must not mint its own or it would diverge from the host's"
+            )
+        broker = BrokerClient(args.host_controller_url)
+    else:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        broker = DockerBroker(secret) if args.broker == "docker" else StubBroker(secret)
     orchestrator = OrchestratorCore(registry, broker, secret)
 
     server = make_server(orchestrator, host=args.host, port=args.port)

bot_bottle/orchestrator/broker.py

@@ -29,29 +29,71 @@ import json
 import secrets
 import time
 from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Protocol
 
 _JWT_HEADER = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}
-_ALLOWED_OPS = ("launch", "teardown")
+
+# The closed op vocabulary, split by kind (PRD "ids + static flags" rule):
+#   * mutation ops act on ONE bottle — they carry its id (+ static launch flags);
+#   * query ops enumerate host state — they carry NO ids or flags at all.
+# Each new host-privileged op is added here deliberately; `verify_request`
+# enforces the per-kind shape so the privileged surface can't drift.
+_MUTATION_OPS = ("launch", "teardown")
+_QUERY_OPS = ("list_live",)
+_ALLOWED_OPS = _MUTATION_OPS + _QUERY_OPS
+
+# Every claim key a signed request may carry — the request fields plus the two
+# per-signature envelope claims. A strict allow-list (open question 1, resolved
+# "yes"): an unknown key is rejected outright, so the schema can't silently widen
+# as ops are added.
+_ALLOWED_CLAIMS = frozenset(
+    {"op", "bottle_id", "source_ip", "image_ref", "slot", "jti", "iat"}
+)
 
 
 class BrokerAuthError(Exception):
     """A broker request failed provenance or schema verification —
     bad/absent signature, malformed token, or a payload that doesn't match
-    the fixed launch-request shape. Fail-closed: the broker must not act."""
+    the fixed launch-request shape. Fail-closed: the broker must not act.
+
+    A **definite** negative: nothing was launched, so a caller may safely roll
+    back as if the op never happened."""
+
+
+class BrokerUnavailableError(Exception):
+    """A brokered request could not be carried to a verdict: the broker (or the
+    wire to it) was unreachable, timed out, or dropped the response.
+
+    Crucially **ambiguous** — unlike `BrokerAuthError`, the op MAY already have
+    taken effect on the backend before the response was lost, so a caller must
+    NOT assume it did nothing (e.g. must not roll a registry row back as if no
+    launch happened, which would orphan a running container). Only the in-process
+    brokers never raise this; the out-of-process `BrokerClient` does."""
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
-class LaunchRequest:
-    """The structured, un-coercible launch/teardown request. Ids + flags
-    only — `image_ref` is a content-addressed id, never a path/argv."""
+class BrokerRequest:
+    """A structured, un-coercible broker request. Ids + static flags only —
+    `image_ref` is a content-addressed id, never a path/argv.
+
+    A **mutation** op (`launch`/`teardown`) names the bottle it acts on in
+    `bottle_id` (plus launch's static flags). A **query** op (`list_live`) acts
+    on no single bottle, so it carries nothing but its `op` name — `bottle_id`
+    and every flag stay empty, and `verify_request` rejects a query that smuggles
+    any in. `LaunchRequest` is kept as an alias for the launch/teardown callers."""
 
     op: str  # one of _ALLOWED_OPS
-    bottle_id: str
+    bottle_id: str = ""
     source_ip: str = ""
     image_ref: str = ""
     slot: int | None = None
 
 
+# Historical name — the request type predates the query ops. Kept so the launch
+# path (`OrchestratorCore`, `DockerBroker`) reads unchanged.
+LaunchRequest = BrokerRequest
+
+
 # --- minimal JWS/JWT (HS256), stdlib only ----------------------------------
 
 def _b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
@@ -103,26 +145,55 @@ def verify_request(token: str, secret: bytes) -> LaunchRequest:
         raise BrokerAuthError("unexpected header/alg")
     if not isinstance(claims, dict):
         raise BrokerAuthError("claims are not an object")
+    # Strict schema (open question 1): a signed request may carry ONLY the known
+    # claim keys, so the privileged surface can't widen by smuggling an extra
+    # claim past the fixed field checks below.
+    unknown = set(claims) - _ALLOWED_CLAIMS
+    if unknown:
+        raise BrokerAuthError(f"unknown claim(s): {', '.join(sorted(unknown))}")
 
     op = claims.get("op")
-    bottle_id = claims.get("bottle_id")
+    if not isinstance(op, str) or op not in _ALLOWED_OPS:
+        raise BrokerAuthError("request does not match the broker-request schema")
+    bottle_id = claims.get("bottle_id", "")
     source_ip = claims.get("source_ip", "")
     image_ref = claims.get("image_ref", "")
     slot = claims.get("slot")
     if (
-        not isinstance(op, str) or op not in _ALLOWED_OPS
-        or not isinstance(bottle_id, str) or not bottle_id
+        not isinstance(bottle_id, str)
         or not isinstance(source_ip, str) or not isinstance(image_ref, str)
         or not (slot is None or isinstance(slot, int))
     ):
-        raise BrokerAuthError("request does not match the launch-request schema")
-    return LaunchRequest(
+        raise BrokerAuthError("request does not match the broker-request schema")
+    # Per-kind shape: a mutation names exactly one bottle; a query names none and
+    # carries no flags (the "no arguments" rule for `list_live`). Enforcing both
+    # halves keeps `bottle_id`/flags from being a coercible field on a query op.
+    if op in _MUTATION_OPS:
+        if not bottle_id:
+            raise BrokerAuthError(f"{op} requires a bottle_id")
+    elif bottle_id or source_ip or image_ref or slot is not None:
+        raise BrokerAuthError(f"{op} is a query op and takes no ids or flags")
+    return BrokerRequest(
         op=op, bottle_id=bottle_id, source_ip=source_ip, image_ref=image_ref, slot=slot
     )
 
 
 # --- the broker itself ------------------------------------------------------
 
+class SubmitBroker(Protocol):
+    """The broker surface `OrchestratorCore` depends on. `submit` verifies a
+    signed *mutation* token and performs its op, returning the verified request;
+    `list_live` verifies a signed `list_live` token and returns the source IPs of
+    the bottles the backend currently has running (reconcile's live set). Both the
+    in-process `LaunchBroker` and the out-of-process `BrokerClient` (which relays
+    the token to the host control server) satisfy it structurally, so the core is
+    unchanged whether the backend is local or a real host service."""
+
+    def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest: ...
+
+    def list_live(self, token: str) -> list[str]: ...
+
+
 class LaunchBroker(abc.ABC):
     """Verifies a signed request came from the orchestrator, then performs
     the backend-native launch/teardown. Subclasses implement `_launch` /
@@ -132,15 +203,35 @@ class LaunchBroker(abc.ABC):
         self._secret = secret
 
     def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest:
-        """Verify `token` and perform its op. Returns the verified request;
-        raises `BrokerAuthError` if provenance/shape fails."""
+        """Verify `token` and perform its mutation op. Returns the verified
+        request; raises `BrokerAuthError` if provenance/shape fails, or if the
+        token is a non-mutation op (a `list_live` token routed here by mistake)."""
         req = verify_request(token, self._secret)
         if req.op == "launch":
             self._launch(req)
-        else:
+        elif req.op == "teardown":
             self._teardown(req)
+        else:
+            raise BrokerAuthError(f"{req.op} is not a submit op")
         return req
 
+    def list_live(self, token: str) -> list[str]:
+        """Verify a `list_live` `token` and return the source IPs of the bottles
+        the backend currently has running. Raises `BrokerAuthError` on bad
+        provenance/shape or a non-`list_live` op; a backend enumeration failure
+        is converted to `BrokerUnavailableError` — the single "live set could not
+        be determined" signal reconcile catches to skip the sweep rather than
+        reaping healthy rows against a partial set (the out-of-process
+        `BrokerClient` raises the same on an enumeration 502 / no response)."""
+        req = verify_request(token, self._secret)
+        if req.op != "list_live":
+            raise BrokerAuthError(f"{req.op} is not a list_live op")
+        try:
+            return list(self._list_live())
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — any enumeration failure means the
+            # live set is unknown; reconcile must skip, never reap against it.
+            raise BrokerUnavailableError(f"list_live enumeration failed: {e}") from e
+
     @abc.abstractmethod
     def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         ...
@@ -149,15 +240,31 @@ class LaunchBroker(abc.ABC):
     def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         ...
 
+    @abc.abstractmethod
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        """Every running bottle's source IP, backend-native. Must raise (not
+        return a partial list) if the live set can't be determined
+        authoritatively, so reconcile skips rather than reaping healthy rows."""
+        ...
+
 
 class StubBroker(LaunchBroker):
     """Dev-harness broker: records verified requests without launching
-    anything. Exercises the full sign -> verify -> act contract in-process."""
+    anything. Exercises the full sign -> verify -> act contract in-process.
+
+    Its live set (`_list_live`) is, by default, every bottle it recorded a
+    launch for and no teardown since — the in-process analogue of enumerating
+    the backend. Tests that need to simulate a bottle dying out from under the
+    registry (the case reconcile exists for) set `live_source_ips` explicitly to
+    override that derived set."""
 
     def __init__(self, secret: bytes) -> None:
         super().__init__(secret)
         self.launched: list[LaunchRequest] = []
         self.torn_down: list[LaunchRequest] = []
+        # When not None, the exact live set `_list_live` reports — lets a test
+        # say "only these IPs are still up" regardless of what was launched.
+        self.live_source_ips: list[str] | None = None
 
     def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         self.launched.append(req)
@@ -165,10 +272,20 @@ class StubBroker(LaunchBroker):
     def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         self.torn_down.append(req)
 
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        if self.live_source_ips is not None:
+            return list(self.live_source_ips)
+        torn = {r.bottle_id for r in self.torn_down}
+        return [r.source_ip for r in self.launched
+                if r.bottle_id not in torn and r.source_ip]
+
 
 __all__ = [
     "BrokerAuthError",
+    "BrokerUnavailableError",
+    "BrokerRequest",
     "LaunchRequest",
+    "SubmitBroker",
     "LaunchBroker",
     "StubBroker",
     "sign_request",

bot_bottle/orchestrator/broker_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""Orchestrator-side broker transport (issue #468, chunk 1).
+
+The signer's half of the launch-broker transport gap. `BrokerClient` satisfies
+the exact `submit(token)` contract `OrchestratorCore` already depends on (see
+`broker.SubmitBroker`), but instead of verifying and launching in-process it POSTs
+the signed token to the host control server over HTTP (stdlib `urllib`, like
+`orchestrator/client.py`). Because it is drop-in for that interface, wiring a real
+out-of-process backend does not change the core: it still signs a request and
+calls `submit()`; only the wire is new.
+
+A provenance/schema rejection from the host controller (HTTP 401) is re-raised as
+the same `BrokerAuthError` the in-process broker raises, so the launch path's
+rollback-on-failure (`OrchestratorCore.launch_bottle`) behaves identically whether
+the broker is local or remote.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+from .broker import BrokerAuthError, BrokerUnavailableError, LaunchRequest
+
+DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
+
+
+class BrokerClientError(RuntimeError):
+    """The host control server *responded*, but with an unexpected status other
+    than the fail-closed 401 (which surfaces as `BrokerAuthError`) — e.g. a 502
+    backend failure or a malformed body. A definite negative: the host processed
+    the request and it did not launch. (A *no-response* failure — unreachable /
+    timeout / dropped — is the ambiguous `BrokerUnavailableError` instead.)"""
+
+
+class BrokerClient:
+    """Drop-in `submit(token)` that relays a signed request to the host control
+    server. Holds no secret — provenance rides entirely in the signed token, so a
+    caller that can reach this client still cannot forge a launch."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
+        self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self._timeout = timeout
+
+    def submit(self, token: str) -> LaunchRequest:
+        """POST the signed token to the host controller and return the request it
+        verified and acted on.
+
+        Raises `BrokerAuthError` on a fail-closed 401 (bad provenance/schema —
+        the same exception the in-process broker raises); `BrokerClientError` if
+        the host *responds* with any other non-success status or a malformed
+        body (a definite negative); or `BrokerUnavailableError` if no response is
+        obtained (unreachable / timeout / dropped) — the **ambiguous** case, where
+        the host may already have acted, so the caller must not roll back."""
+        data = json.dumps({"token": token}).encode()
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self._base}/broker", data=data, method="POST",
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
+                return _request_from(_json_object(resp.read()))
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+            detail = _error_detail(e)
+            if e.code == 401:
+                raise BrokerAuthError(
+                    detail or "host controller rejected the request"
+                ) from e
+            raise BrokerClientError(
+                f"POST /broker: HTTP {e.code} {detail}".rstrip()
+            ) from e
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as e:
+            # No usable response — unreachable, timed out, or the connection
+            # dropped mid-exchange. Ambiguous: the request may already have
+            # launched the bottle, so this is NOT a definite failure.
+            raise BrokerUnavailableError(f"POST /broker: {e}") from e
+
+    def list_live(self, token: str) -> list[str]:
+        """POST the signed `list_live` token to the host controller and return
+        the source IPs of the bottles it enumerated as running.
+
+        Raises `BrokerAuthError` on a fail-closed 401 (bad provenance/schema);
+        `BrokerClientError` on any other non-success status or a malformed body
+        (a backend-enumeration 502 included); or `BrokerUnavailableError` if no
+        response is obtained. A query has no backend side effect, so — unlike
+        `submit` — every one of these is a *definite* "no live set"; reconcile
+        catches all three and skips the sweep rather than reaping against an
+        unknown or partial set."""
+        data = json.dumps({"token": token}).encode()
+        req = urllib.request.Request(
+            f"{self._base}/broker/live", data=data, method="POST",
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
+                return _source_ips_from(_json_object(resp.read()))
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+            detail = _error_detail(e)
+            if e.code == 401:
+                raise BrokerAuthError(
+                    detail or "host controller rejected the request"
+                ) from e
+            raise BrokerClientError(
+                f"POST /broker/live: HTTP {e.code} {detail}".rstrip()
+            ) from e
+        except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as e:
+            raise BrokerUnavailableError(f"POST /broker/live: {e}") from e
+
+
+def _json_object(raw: bytes) -> dict[str, object]:
+    """Parse a JSON object, tolerating an empty or malformed body (→ {}), like
+    the orchestrator client — a bad body becomes a clean 'missing field' error
+    downstream rather than an opaque JSON crash."""
+    if not raw:
+        return {}
+    try:
+        obj = json.loads(raw)
+    except ValueError:
+        return {}
+    return obj if isinstance(obj, dict) else {}
+
+
+def _error_detail(e: urllib.error.HTTPError) -> str:
+    """The `error` string from a structured error response, best-effort — an
+    error body may be absent or unreadable, in which case there is no detail."""
+    try:
+        detail = _json_object(e.read()).get("error", "")
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — the error body is advisory only
+        return ""
+    return detail if isinstance(detail, str) else ""
+
+
+def _source_ips_from(payload: dict[str, object]) -> list[str]:
+    """The `source_ips` list from a `/broker/live` response — every string
+    entry, ignoring any non-string the host controller should never send. A
+    missing/!list field is a malformed response (the query is meaningless
+    without it), so it fails rather than silently reconciling against []."""
+    raw = payload.get("source_ips")
+    if not isinstance(raw, list):
+        raise BrokerClientError("host controller response missing source_ips")
+    return [ip for ip in raw if isinstance(ip, str) and ip]
+
+
+def _request_from(payload: dict[str, object]) -> LaunchRequest:
+    """Reconstruct the verified `LaunchRequest` the controller echoed, so the
+    returned value matches the in-process broker's (which returns the request it
+    acted on). A missing op/bottle_id means a malformed response."""
+    op = payload.get("op")
+    bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
+    if not isinstance(op, str) or not isinstance(bottle_id, str) or not bottle_id:
+        raise BrokerClientError("host controller response missing op/bottle_id")
+    source_ip = payload.get("source_ip")
+    image_ref = payload.get("image_ref")
+    slot = payload.get("slot")
+    return LaunchRequest(
+        op=op,
+        bottle_id=bottle_id,
+        source_ip=source_ip if isinstance(source_ip, str) else "",
+        image_ref=image_ref if isinstance(image_ref, str) else "",
+        slot=slot if isinstance(slot, int) and not isinstance(slot, bool) else None,
+    )
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "BrokerClient",
+    "BrokerClientError",
+    "DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
+]

bot_bottle/orchestrator/client.py

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import json
 import urllib.error
 import urllib.request
-from collections.abc import Iterable
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from ..log import debug
@@ -194,14 +193,13 @@ class OrchestratorClient:
             raise OrchestratorClientError(f"teardown {bottle_id}: HTTP {status}")
         return True
 
-    def reconcile(
-        self, live_source_ips: Iterable[str], *, grace_seconds: float | None = None,
-    ) -> list[str]:
-        """Drop registry rows for bottles that are no longer running
-        (`POST /reconcile`), returning the reaped bottle ids. `live_source_ips`
-        is the caller's enumeration of its live bottles — the orchestrator
-        can't see the backend from inside the orchestrator container/VM."""
-        body: dict[str, object] = {"live_source_ips": list(live_source_ips)}
+    def reconcile(self, *, grace_seconds: float | None = None) -> list[str]:
+        """Trigger the orchestrator's self-heal sweep (`POST /reconcile`),
+        returning the reaped bottle ids. The caller no longer enumerates the
+        live set: the orchestrator pulls it from the host controller
+        (`list_live`) itself, so this is a bare trigger with an optional
+        `grace_seconds`."""
+        body: dict[str, object] = {}
         if grace_seconds is not None:
             body["grace_seconds"] = grace_seconds
         payload = self._ok("POST", "/reconcile", body)

bot_bottle/orchestrator/docker_broker.py

@@ -71,6 +71,31 @@ class DockerBroker(LaunchBroker):
                 f"docker rm failed for {req.bottle_id}: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
             )
 
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        """Every running bottle container's network IP, from `docker ps` filtered
+        to this broker's label. Raises `DockerBrokerError` if the listing or any
+        inspect fails, so reconcile treats the live set as unknown and skips the
+        sweep rather than reaping healthy rows against a partial enumeration."""
+        listing = self._docker([
+            "docker", "ps", "--filter", f"label={BOTTLE_ID_LABEL}",
+            "--format", "{{.ID}}",
+        ])
+        if listing.returncode != 0:
+            raise DockerBrokerError(f"docker ps failed: {listing.stderr.strip()}")
+        ips: list[str] = []
+        for cid in (line for line in listing.stdout.splitlines() if line):
+            inspected = self._docker([
+                "docker", "inspect", "--format",
+                "{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}} {{end}}", cid,
+            ])
+            if inspected.returncode != 0:
+                raise DockerBrokerError(
+                    f"docker inspect {cid} failed; live set is not authoritative: "
+                    f"{inspected.stderr.strip()}"
+                )
+            ips.extend(ip for ip in inspected.stdout.split() if ip)
+        return ips
+
 
 __all__ = [
     "DockerBroker",

bot_bottle/orchestrator/host_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+"""Host control server (issue #468) — the launch broker as a real host service.
+
+Chunk 1 of the host-control-server stack closes the **transport** gap the PRD
+opens with: today `LaunchBroker.submit(token)` is an in-process method call from
+`OrchestratorCore`, and a real host service needs it reachable over the wire.
+This module is that service — the single privileged host component — reached over
+**HTTP** (the universal transport 0070 chose), mirroring the orchestrator control
+plane's shape (`orchestrator/server.py`): a pure `dispatch()` for socket-free
+testing, wrapped by a thin stdlib `http.server` adapter.
+
+    GET  /health       -> 200 {"status": "ok"}
+    POST /broker       -> 200 {"op", "bottle_id", "source_ip", "image_ref", "slot"}
+                          400 (bad body) | 401 (bad provenance/schema) | 502 (backend)
+                          body: {"token": "<signed launch/teardown JWT>"}
+    POST /broker/live  -> 200 {"source_ips": [...]}
+                          400 (bad body) | 401 (bad provenance/schema) | 502 (backend)
+                          body: {"token": "<signed list_live JWT>"}
+
+The op vocabulary grows one signed op at a time (PRD gap 3); each verb reaches
+the backend only through `verify_request`, so nothing free-form ever crosses the
+wire. `/broker/live` is the first query op — reconcile's live-bottle enumeration,
+which the orchestrator (blind to the backend from inside its container) now pulls
+from the host controller instead of being handed by the CLI.
+
+Only the **signed token** crosses the wire; the server holds the shared HS256
+secret and a real `LaunchBroker` (e.g. `DockerBroker`) and runs the existing
+`verify_request` + `_launch`/`_teardown` path behind the endpoint, so nothing
+free-form ever reaches it. Provenance/schema failures are fail-closed 401s that
+never touch the backend (`LaunchBroker.submit` verifies before acting), and a
+backend launch failure is a 502 the caller must surface — neither takes the
+controller down.
+
+The signed launch token *is* the endpoint's authentication (its provenance is the
+whole point of the JWS), so `/broker` needs no separate caller credential; the
+host controller's own lifecycle endpoints, which do, arrive with the `host`-role
+tokens of the separate `HOST_CONTROLLER` trust domain in a later chunk.
+
+The shared signing secret is the durable **launch-broker `TrustDomain` key**
+(#468/#476): a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, provisioned to
+the orchestrator (signer) and this server (verifier). A backend launcher injects
+it via `$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`; a host-side dev-harness process reads the
+key file directly. Durability is the point — a restarted orchestrator re-verifies
+against the same key, so re-adoption works.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import http.server
+import json
+import os
+import socketserver
+import sys
+import typing
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from .. import log
+from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+from ..trust_domain import LAUNCH_BROKER
+from .broker import BrokerAuthError, LaunchBroker
+from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
+
+# JSON body payload type (parsed request / rendered response).
+Json = dict[str, object]
+
+# Default host-controller port. Distinct from the orchestrator control plane
+# (8099) — a separate privileged component listening on its own socket.
+DEFAULT_PORT = 8091
+
+# Cap on the request body. A signed broker request is tiny, so rejecting anything
+# larger *before reading it* keeps a caller that can merely reach the socket (no
+# signed token needed) from exhausting memory or a handler thread with a huge
+# Content-Length — the signed token, not mere reachability, is the authority.
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+
+# Per-request socket timeout, bounding how long a stalled / slow-loris caller can
+# hold a handler thread on this privileged listener.
+REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15
+
+
+def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
+    """Parse a JSON object body. Raises ValueError for non-objects / bad JSON."""
+    if not body:
+        return {}
+    obj = json.loads(body)  # raises json.JSONDecodeError (a ValueError)
+    if not isinstance(obj, dict):
+        raise ValueError("request body must be a JSON object")
+    return obj
+
+
+def broker_secret(
+    environ: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None, *, allow_host_file: bool = False,
+) -> bytes | None:
+    """The shared launch-broker HS256 secret, as this process should use it.
+
+    Always prefers the key injected into this process's env
+    (`$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`). `allow_host_file` decides the fallback when
+    it is absent, and the distinction is a security boundary:
+
+    - **Host-side** processes — the host controller and the host dev-harness — pass
+      ``allow_host_file=True`` to read (minting on first use) the durable host key
+      file (``bot_bottle_root()/launch-broker-key``) they legitimately own.
+    - The **guest orchestrator** (``--broker http``) keeps the default ``False``.
+      It runs inside a container/VM whose ``bot_bottle_root()`` is process-local,
+      so minting a file there would silently create a key UNRELATED to the host
+      controller's — startup would succeed but every launch would be rejected 401.
+      It must instead be *given* the key by its launcher, and fail closed (None)
+      if it wasn't, rather than diverge.
+
+    None when no key is available (a guest with no injection, or an unwritable
+    host root)."""
+    key = LAUNCH_BROKER.key_from_env(environ)
+    if not key and allow_host_file:
+        try:
+            key = LAUNCH_BROKER.signing_key()  # host-canonical, minted on first use
+        except OSError:
+            return None
+    return key.encode("utf-8") if key else None
+
+
+def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
+    broker: LaunchBroker, method: str, path: str, body: bytes,
+) -> tuple[int, Json]:
+    """Route one host-control request to a (status, payload) pair. Pure — the
+    only side effect is the broker's own backend launch — so routing is testable
+    without a socket.
+
+    Total by design: a provenance/schema failure becomes 401 and a backend launch
+    failure becomes 502 rather than raising, so one bad request can neither act
+    on the backend nor take the controller down for the next caller."""
+    route = urlsplit(path).path.rstrip("/") or "/"
+
+    if method == "GET" and route == "/health":
+        return 200, {"status": "ok"}
+
+    if method == "POST" and route == "/broker":
+        try:
+            data = _parse_json_object(body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
+        token = data.get("token")
+        if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+            return 400, {"error": "token (string) is required"}
+        try:
+            req = broker.submit(token)
+        except BrokerAuthError as e:
+            # Fail-closed: bad signature, malformed token, or off-schema payload.
+            # `submit` verifies before acting, so nothing was launched.
+            return 401, {"error": f"broker auth failed: {e}"}
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — a backend launch failure (docker
+            # down, image gone) is operational, not a control-plane bug; the
+            # caller must see it as a distinct 502, and the server must stay up.
+            return 502, {"error": f"backend launch failed: {e}"}
+        return 200, {
+            "op": req.op,
+            "bottle_id": req.bottle_id,
+            "source_ip": req.source_ip,
+            "image_ref": req.image_ref,
+            "slot": req.slot,
+        }
+
+    if method == "POST" and route == "/broker/live":
+        try:
+            data = _parse_json_object(body)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
+        token = data.get("token")
+        if not isinstance(token, str) or not token:
+            return 400, {"error": "token (string) is required"}
+        try:
+            source_ips = broker.list_live(token)
+        except BrokerAuthError as e:
+            # Fail-closed: bad signature, malformed token, or a non-list_live op.
+            return 401, {"error": f"broker auth failed: {e}"}
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — a backend enumeration failure
+            # (docker down, inspect failed) is operational, not a control-plane
+            # bug; surface it as a 502 so the caller skips reconcile rather than
+            # reaping against a partial set, and keep the controller up.
+            return 502, {"error": f"backend enumeration failed: {e}"}
+        return 200, {"source_ips": source_ips}
+
+    return 404, {"error": "not found"}
+
+
+class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Thin stdlib adapter: read the body, call `dispatch`, write JSON."""
+
+    # Socket timeout per request (applied by StreamRequestHandler.setup) so a
+    # stalled caller can't pin a handler thread on this privileged listener.
+    timeout = REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+
+    # Quiet by default; opt back into stdlib access logging with
+    # BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_DEBUG (the controller has its own logging).
+    def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None:  # noqa: A002
+        if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_DEBUG"):
+            super().log_message(format, *args)
+
+    def _serve(self, method: str) -> None:
+        """Read the request body (bounded), dispatch it, and write the JSON
+        reply. A dispatch that raises (it shouldn't — dispatch is total) still
+        returns a 500 rather than dropping the connection."""
+        server = self.server
+        assert isinstance(server, HostControlServer)
+        try:
+            length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        except ValueError:
+            self._reply(400, {"error": "invalid Content-Length"})
+            return
+        if length < 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+            # Reject before reading: nothing legitimate is this big, so an
+            # oversized declared length is a bug or a resource-exhaustion attempt.
+            self._reply(413, {"error": "request body too large"})
+            return
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
+        try:
+            status, payload = dispatch(server.broker, method, self.path, body)
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — the controller must stay up
+            sys.stderr.write(f"host controller: {method} {self.path} failed: {e!r}\n")
+            sys.stderr.flush()
+            status, payload = 500, {"error": f"internal error: {e}"}
+        self._reply(status, payload)
+
+    def _reply(self, status: int, payload: typing.Mapping[str, object]) -> None:
+        """Write one JSON response with an explicit Content-Length."""
+        data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:
+        self._serve("GET")
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:
+        self._serve("POST")
+
+
+class HostControlServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
+    """Threading HTTP server that carries the launch broker for its handlers.
+
+    The broker holds the shared signing secret and performs the backend-native
+    launch/teardown; the server itself keeps no secret of its own — provenance
+    rides entirely in each request's signed token."""
+
+    daemon_threads = True
+    allow_reuse_address = True
+
+    def __init__(self, address: tuple[str, int], broker: LaunchBroker) -> None:
+        self.broker = broker
+        super().__init__(address, Handler)
+
+
+def make_host_server(
+    broker: LaunchBroker, host: str = "127.0.0.1", port: int = DEFAULT_PORT
+) -> HostControlServer:
+    """Build (but do not start) a host control server. `port=0` binds an
+    ephemeral port — read `server.server_address` for the actual one."""
+    return HostControlServer((host, port), broker)
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    """Run the host control server as a plain process (dev-harness).
+
+        python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server [--host H] [--port P]
+
+    Fail-closed: without the launch-broker key the server can verify no request's
+    provenance, so it refuses to start rather than run a launcher that accepts
+    unsigned input. As the host-side owner of the key, it may mint/read the host
+    key file (`allow_host_file=True`)."""
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server")
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="bind address")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="bind port (0 = ephemeral)")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    secret = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+    if secret is None:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            f"host controller: refusing to start without the launch-broker key "
+            f"(${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV}, or a writable host root to mint it) — it "
+            "could verify no request's provenance and would relay unsigned "
+            "launches to the backend\n"
+        )
+        sys.stderr.flush()
+        return 2
+
+    broker = DockerBroker(secret)
+    server = make_host_server(broker, host=args.host, port=args.port)
+    bound_host, bound_port = server.server_address[0], server.server_address[1]
+    log.info(
+        "host control server listening",
+        context={"host": bound_host, "port": bound_port},
+    )
+    try:
+        server.serve_forever()
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        log.info("host controller shutting down")
+    finally:
+        server.server_close()
+    return 0
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "dispatch",
+    "Handler",
+    "HostControlServer",
+    "make_host_server",
+    "broker_secret",
+    "main",
+    "Json",
+    "DEFAULT_PORT",
+]
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

bot_bottle/orchestrator/server.py

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ vsock / unix-socket portability caveats):
                                          body: {"env_var_secret"}
     DELETE /bottles/<bottle_id>        -> 200 {"torn_down": true} | 404  (teardown)
     POST   /reconcile                 -> 200 {"reaped": [bottle_id, ...]}
-                                         body: {"live_source_ips": [...],
-                                                ["grace_seconds"]}
+                                         body: {["grace_seconds"]}  (live set is
+                                         pulled from the host controller, not sent)
     POST   /attribute                 -> 200 {"bottle_id"} | 403
     POST   /resolve                   -> 200 {"bottle_id","policy"} | 403
                                          body: {"source_ip","identity_token"}
@@ -207,20 +207,15 @@ def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
         return 404, {"error": "no such bottle"}
 
     if method == "POST" and route == "/reconcile":
-        # Host-driven self-heal: the caller enumerates its live bottles (only
-        # the host can see the backend) and the orchestrator drops rows for
-        # every other active bottle. Trusted-caller only — an agent that could
-        # reach this would be able to unregister its neighbours.
+        # Host-driven self-heal trigger: the orchestrator pulls its own live set
+        # from the host controller (`list_live`) and drops rows for every other
+        # active bottle — the caller no longer supplies the live IPs. Trusted-
+        # caller only: an agent that could reach this would trigger a sweep that
+        # unregisters its neighbours. Body is optional (just `grace_seconds`).
         try:
             data = _parse_json_object(body)
         except ValueError as e:
             return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
-        raw_ips = data.get("live_source_ips")
-        if not isinstance(raw_ips, list):
-            return 400, {"error": "live_source_ips (list of strings) is required"}
-        if any(not isinstance(ip, str) or not ip for ip in raw_ips):
-            return 400, {"error": "live_source_ips must contain non-empty strings"}
-        live = raw_ips
         grace = data.get("grace_seconds")
         kwargs: dict[str, float] = {}
         if grace is not None:
@@ -230,7 +225,7 @@ def dispatch(  # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
             if not math.isfinite(parsed_grace) or parsed_grace < 0:
                 return 400, {"error": "grace_seconds must be a non-negative finite number"}
             kwargs["grace_seconds"] = parsed_grace
-        return 200, {"reaped": orch.reconcile(live, **kwargs)}
+        return 200, {"reaped": orch.reconcile(**kwargs)}
 
     if method == "POST" and route == "/attribute":
         try:

bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py

@@ -22,10 +22,17 @@ Launch lifecycle:
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
-from collections.abc import Iterable
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
-from .broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, sign_request
+from .. import log
+from .broker import (
+    BrokerAuthError,
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
+    LaunchRequest,
+    SubmitBroker,
+    sign_request,
+)
+from .broker_client import BrokerClientError
 from .store.registry_store import DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS, BottleRecord, RegistryStore
 from .supervisor import (
     AuditEntry,
@@ -62,7 +69,7 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
     def __init__(
         self,
         registry: RegistryStore,
-        broker: LaunchBroker,
+        broker: SubmitBroker,
         sign_secret: bytes,
         supervisor: Supervisor | None = None,
     ) -> None:
@@ -111,14 +118,23 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
             image_ref=image_ref,
             slot=slot,
         )
-        launched = False
         try:
             self._broker.submit(sign_request(req, self._secret))
-            launched = True
-        finally:
-            if not launched:
-                self.registry.deregister(rec.bottle_id)
-                self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
+        except BrokerUnavailableError:
+            # Ambiguous delivery failure (timeout / dropped response): the broker
+            # may already have launched the bottle before the response was lost.
+            # Do NOT deregister — that would orphan a running container with no
+            # registry row (reconcile reaps rows, never containers). Keep the row
+            # so reconcile reaps it iff the bottle is not actually live; surface
+            # the error so the caller knows the launch is unconfirmed.
+            raise
+        except Exception:
+            # A definite failure — a fail-closed rejection, a backend launch
+            # error, or the host reporting it did not launch: nothing is running,
+            # so roll the registry entry back to leave no orphan.
+            self.registry.deregister(rec.bottle_id)
+            self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
+            raise
         return rec
 
     def teardown_bottle(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
@@ -136,22 +152,36 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
 
     def reconcile(
         self,
-        live_source_ips: Iterable[str],
         *,
         grace_seconds: float = DEFAULT_REAP_GRACE_SECONDS,
     ) -> list[str]:
         """Drop registry rows for bottles that are no longer running, and
         forget their in-memory egress tokens. Returns the reaped bottle ids.
 
-        The caller supplies the live set because only the host can enumerate
-        its own containers — the orchestrator runs *inside* the infra
-        container and has no view of the backend. Deliberately does not
-        broker a teardown: the container is already gone, so there is nothing
-        to stop, and a broker error must not stop the sweep from clearing
-        the row that would otherwise brick the next bottle at that address.
+        The live set is pulled from the **broker** (`list_live`), not passed in:
+        only the host can enumerate its own containers, and the host controller
+        is now that host component, so the orchestrator — blind to the backend
+        from inside its container — asks it over the same signed seam it launches
+        through. (Before the host control server this was a `live_source_ips`
+        argument the CLI handed in; the tell that the orchestrator couldn't see
+        the backend goes away with it — PRD gap 3.)
+
+        Fail-safe: if the broker can't return an authoritative live set
+        (unreachable, timed out, enumeration failed), the sweep is **skipped**,
+        never run against an empty/partial set — reaping a healthy bottle is far
+        worse than leaving an orphan one more cycle. Deliberately does not broker
+        a teardown: a reaped container is already gone, so there is nothing to
+        stop.
 
         See `RegistryStore.reap_absent` for why orphans accumulate and why
         they are harmful rather than merely untidy."""
+        token = sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), self._secret)
+        try:
+            live_source_ips = self._broker.list_live(token)
+        except (BrokerUnavailableError, BrokerAuthError, BrokerClientError) as e:
+            log.info("reconcile skipped: live set unavailable",
+                     context={"error": str(e)})
+            return []
         reaped = self.registry.reap_absent(
             live_source_ips, grace_seconds=grace_seconds)
         for rec in reaped:

bot_bottle/orchestrator/store/secret_store.py

@@ -12,12 +12,22 @@ reattachment path reads ENV_VAR_SECRET from the running agent container via
 ``POST /bottles/<id>/reprovision_gateway``; the orchestrator decrypts the
 stored rows and re-populates ``_tokens``.
 
-Encryption scheme: HMAC-SHA256 used as a PRF in CTR mode (stdlib-only,
-no external deps). Each value is encrypted independently. The output blob is
-``nonce (16 bytes) || ciphertext`` encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding).
+Encryption scheme: HMAC-SHA256 used as a PRF in CTR mode, **authenticated**
+encrypt-then-MAC (stdlib-only, no external deps). Each value is encrypted
+independently. The output blob is ``nonce (16 bytes) || ciphertext || tag
+(32 bytes)`` encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding).
 
     keystream_block_i = HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce || i.to_bytes(4, "big"))
     ciphertext_i      = plaintext_i XOR keystream_block_i[:len(plaintext_i)]
+    mac_key           = HMAC-SHA256(key, "bottled-secret-mac-v1")
+    tag               = HMAC-SHA256(mac_key, nonce || ciphertext)
+
+The tag is what makes a **wrong key deterministically detectable**: without it,
+CTR decryption with the wrong key yields garbage that only fails when it isn't
+valid UTF-8 (so ``reprovision`` would sometimes "succeed" with a wrong
+ENV_VAR_SECRET and inject garbage egress tokens). The MAC key is derived from
+the ENV_VAR_SECRET by a domain-separated HMAC so the same key never both
+generates the keystream and signs the tag with the same message shape.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -29,6 +39,7 @@ import secrets
 
 _KEY_BYTES = 32    # 256-bit key from ENV_VAR_SECRET
 _NONCE_BYTES = 16  # 128-bit random nonce per encrypt call
+_TAG_BYTES = 32    # HMAC-SHA256 authentication tag
 _BLOCK = 32        # HMAC-SHA256 output width == one keystream block
 
 # Env-var name the agent container receives at startup.
@@ -50,45 +61,58 @@ def _keystream(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, block_index: int) -> bytes:
     ).digest()
 
 
+def _tag(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, ciphertext: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """The authentication tag over ``nonce || ciphertext``, keyed by a MAC
+    subkey domain-separated from the keystream key."""
+    mac_key = hmac.new(key, b"bottled-secret-mac-v1", hashlib.sha256).digest()
+    return hmac.new(mac_key, nonce + ciphertext, hashlib.sha256).digest()
+
+
+def _ctr(key: bytes, nonce: bytes, data: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """CTR keystream XOR — its own inverse, so it both encrypts and decrypts."""
+    out = bytearray()
+    for i in range(0, len(data), _BLOCK):
+        chunk = data[i : i + _BLOCK]
+        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
+        out.extend(b ^ k for b, k in zip(chunk, ks))
+    return bytes(out)
+
+
 def encrypt_value(secret_b64: str, plaintext: str) -> str:
     """Encrypt a single string value with *secret_b64* (the ENV_VAR_SECRET).
 
-    Returns a URL-safe base64 blob ``nonce || ciphertext`` suitable for
+    Returns a URL-safe base64 blob ``nonce || ciphertext || tag`` suitable for
     the ``bottled_agent_secrets.value`` column."""
     key = _b64dec(secret_b64)
-    pt = plaintext.encode()
     nonce = secrets.token_bytes(_NONCE_BYTES)
-    ct = bytearray()
-    for i in range(0, len(pt), _BLOCK):
-        chunk = pt[i : i + _BLOCK]
-        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
-        ct.extend(p ^ k for p, k in zip(chunk, ks))
-    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce + bytes(ct)).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+    ct = _ctr(key, nonce, plaintext.encode())
+    tag = _tag(key, nonce, ct)
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(nonce + ct + tag).rstrip(b"=").decode()
 
 
 def decrypt_value(secret_b64: str, blob_b64: str) -> str:
     """Decrypt a blob produced by :func:`encrypt_value`.
 
     Returns the original plaintext string. Raises ``ValueError`` for malformed
-    input or a key mismatch (wrong key produces garbage, not an error, unless
-    the plaintext is non-UTF-8 — treat all such failures as wrong key)."""
+    input, a **wrong key**, or a tampered ciphertext — all caught by the
+    authentication tag before any plaintext is returned, so a wrong
+    ENV_VAR_SECRET is rejected deterministically (never a garbage token)."""
     key = _b64dec(secret_b64)
     try:
         blob = _b64dec(blob_b64)
     except Exception as exc:
         raise ValueError(f"invalid ciphertext blob: {exc}") from exc
-    if len(blob) < _NONCE_BYTES:
+    if len(blob) < _NONCE_BYTES + _TAG_BYTES:
         raise ValueError("ciphertext blob too short")
-    nonce, ciphertext = blob[:_NONCE_BYTES], blob[_NONCE_BYTES:]
-    pt = bytearray()
-    for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), _BLOCK):
-        chunk = ciphertext[i : i + _BLOCK]
-        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
-        pt.extend(c ^ k for c, k in zip(chunk, ks))
+    nonce = blob[:_NONCE_BYTES]
+    tag = blob[-_TAG_BYTES:]
+    ciphertext = blob[_NONCE_BYTES:-_TAG_BYTES]
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(tag, _tag(key, nonce, ciphertext)):
+        raise ValueError("ciphertext failed authentication (wrong key or tampered)")
     try:
-        return bytes(pt).decode()
-    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f"decryption produced non-UTF-8 output (wrong key?): {exc}") from exc
+        return _ctr(key, nonce, ciphertext).decode()
+    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:  # pragma: no cover - authenticated, so unreachable
+        raise ValueError(f"decryption produced non-UTF-8 output: {exc}") from exc
 
 
 __all__ = ["ENV_VAR_SECRET_NAME", "new_env_var_secret", "encrypt_value", "decrypt_value"]

bot_bottle/orchestrator_auth.py

@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ ROLE_GATEWAY = "gateway"
 ROLE_CLI = "cli"
 ROLES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_CLI})
 
+# The host controller's own lifecycle role (#468). Deliberately OUTSIDE `ROLES`:
+# it belongs to a separate trust domain (`HOST_CONTROLLER`) signed by a key the
+# orchestrator never holds, so the orchestrator's control-plane key can neither
+# mint nor accept it — the orchestrator must not be able to forge the credential
+# used to start and stop it.
+ROLE_HOST = "host"
+
 _ALG = "HS256"
 
 
@@ -103,4 +110,4 @@ def verify(token: str, secret: str, *, roles: frozenset[str] = ROLES) -> str | N
     return role if isinstance(role, str) and role in roles else None
 
 
-__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]
+__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLE_HOST", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]

bot_bottle/paths.py

@@ -47,6 +47,22 @@ ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN"
 # cannot forge a higher-privilege `cli` token (issue #469 review).
 ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT"
 
+# The durable launch-broker signing key: the HS256 secret the orchestrator
+# (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share to sign/verify launch
+# requests (#468). A host-canonical key file (minted 0600 on first use) so it
+# survives orchestrator restarts — re-adoption re-verifies against the same key —
+# instead of the ephemeral per-process secret of the in-process broker.
+LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME = "launch-broker-key"
+LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY"
+# The host controller's OWN key, for its lifecycle endpoints (the direct
+# cli -> host controller path that starts/stops the orchestrator). Separate from
+# the launch-broker key and never held by the orchestrator: the controller starts
+# and stops the orchestrator, so the orchestrator must not be able to mint the
+# credentials used to drive it (#468/#476).
+HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME = "host-controller-key"
+HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY"
+HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT"
+
 # The host directory holding the gateway's persistent mitmproxy CA. Bind-mounted
 # into the infra/gateway container at mitmproxy's confdir so the self-generated
 # CA survives container recreation — every agent installs this one CA to trust
@@ -142,6 +158,11 @@ __all__ = [
     "ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME",
     "ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV",
     "ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
     "GATEWAY_CA_DIRNAME",
     "bot_bottle_root",
     "host_db_path",

bot_bottle/trust_domain.py

@@ -29,8 +29,13 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 
 from . import orchestrator_auth
-from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY
+from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
 from .paths import (
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
     ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
     ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV,
     ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME,
@@ -99,6 +104,40 @@ CONTROL_PLANE = TrustDomain(
 )
 
 
+# The launch-broker domain (#468): durable key material for the broker's own
+# signed launch requests (`broker.py`'s HS256 launch JWT), shared by the
+# orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier). Unlike
+# `CONTROL_PLANE` it mints no role tokens — the broker's provenance is the launch
+# JWT, not a role token — so its `roles` set is empty and it is used only as a
+# provider of durable, host-canonical key material (`signing_key` / `key_from_env`).
+# The durability is the point: the key survives orchestrator restarts, so a
+# restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key instead of the
+# ephemeral per-process secret the in-process broker used.
+LAUNCH_BROKER = TrustDomain(
+    name="launch-broker",
+    key_filename=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    roles=frozenset(),
+    key_env=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
+    token_env="",
+)
+
+# The host controller's own domain (#468) — the SECOND domain #476 reserves. Its
+# key, which the orchestrator never holds, signs the `host`-role tokens the CLI
+# presents on the host controller's lifecycle endpoints (start / restart / status
+# of the orchestrator itself). Keeping it separate from `CONTROL_PLANE` is the
+# whole point: the host controller starts and stops the orchestrator, so the
+# orchestrator must not be able to mint the credentials used to drive it. (The
+# lifecycle endpoints themselves arrive in a later chunk; the domain is
+# established here alongside the durable launch-broker key.)
+HOST_CONTROLLER = TrustDomain(
+    name="host-controller",
+    key_filename=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
+    roles=frozenset({ROLE_HOST}),
+    key_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
+    token_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
+)
+
+
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
     """The one seam every backend launcher uses to provision control-plane auth,
@@ -132,9 +171,56 @@ class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
         return self.domain.mint(ROLE_GATEWAY)
 
 
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LaunchBrokerProvisioning:
+    """The seam that provisions the host-side launch broker's durable keys (#468),
+    the counterpart to `ControlPlaneProvisioning`. Both the orchestrator (signer)
+    and the host control server (verifier) receive the SAME launch-broker key
+    (carry it in `broker_domain.key_env`); the host controller ALSO receives its
+    own lifecycle key (`controller_domain.key_env`) the orchestrator never holds.
+
+    Fail-closed like the control-plane seam: minting returns "" only if the host
+    root is unwritable, and an empty launch-broker key would leave the verifier
+    unable to authenticate any launch — so we raise rather than hand back a key
+    that would make the host controller reject (or, if a caller defaulted it,
+    accept) unsigned input."""
+
+    broker_domain: TrustDomain = LAUNCH_BROKER
+    controller_domain: TrustDomain = HOST_CONTROLLER
+
+    def broker_key(self) -> str:
+        """The durable launch-broker key both the orchestrator and the host
+        control server must receive (in `broker_domain.key_env`). Raises rather
+        than return ""."""
+        key = self.broker_domain.signing_key()
+        if not key:
+            raise ProvisioningError(
+                f"refusing to provision the {self.broker_domain.name} broker "
+                "without a signing key: the host controller could then verify no "
+                "launch request's provenance"
+            )
+        return key
+
+    def controller_key(self) -> str:
+        """The host controller's own lifecycle key — provisioned ONLY to the host
+        controller (in `controller_domain.key_env`), never to the orchestrator, so
+        the orchestrator cannot mint the `host`-role tokens that start and stop
+        it. Raises rather than return ""."""
+        key = self.controller_domain.signing_key()
+        if not key:
+            raise ProvisioningError(
+                f"refusing to provision the {self.controller_domain.name} without "
+                "a signing key: its lifecycle endpoints would authenticate no one"
+            )
+        return key
+
+
 __all__ = [
     "ProvisioningError",
     "TrustDomain",
     "CONTROL_PLANE",
+    "LAUNCH_BROKER",
+    "HOST_CONTROLLER",
     "ControlPlaneProvisioning",
+    "LaunchBrokerProvisioning",
 ]

docs/prds/prd-new-host-control-server.md

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+# PRD prd-new: Host control server
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** Claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-26
+- **Issue:** #468
+
+## Summary
+
+Promote the in-process launch broker into a standalone **host control
+server**: the single privileged component on the host. Both the CLI and the
+orchestrator drive it over HTTP; it brokers agent launches, owns the
+orchestrator's own lifecycle, and is the sole writer of host-durable state (the
+tamper-evident audit record). This closes the three gaps between today's
+well-formed broker *contract* ([`orchestrator/broker.py`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/broker.py))
+and a real out-of-process service — transport, durable provisioned secret,
+and a disciplined op vocabulary — and splits host state by
+owner and lifetime. The prize: **the CLI no longer needs the Docker socket**,
+which is what finally lets a dedicated Gitea runner user drop the
+root-equivalent `docker` group (PRD 0070, "Relationship to other work").
+
+## Problem
+
+Container launches run directly from a short-lived CLI process against the
+Docker socket. That socket is root-equivalent, so every host that launches
+bottles hands root to whoever invokes the CLI — including a CI runner user we
+want to keep unprivileged. PRD 0070 already argues for replacing the fat socket
+with a **thin, structured, auditable** launch broker, and the contract for that
+broker exists and is tested in-process. But it is *only* in-process:
+`LaunchBroker.submit(token)` is a method call from
+`OrchestratorCore.launch_bottle` ([`service.py:116`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py)),
+and `DockerBroker` is on no production path — every backend starts the
+orchestrator with `--broker stub` ([`__main__.py:54`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/__main__.py)).
+
+Three gaps stand between that scaffold and a host service:
+
+1. **No transport.** `submit` is an in-process call. A real service needs a
+   `BrokerClient` that POSTs the signed token and a host-side HTTP server that
+   verifies and acts.
+2. **The signing secret is ephemeral and self-generated.**
+   [`__main__.py:53`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/__main__.py) does
+   `secrets.token_bytes(32)` and hands the *same value* to signer and verifier —
+   viable only because they share a process. A separate daemon needs the secret
+   provisioned out of band and durable across orchestrator restarts.
+3. **The op vocabulary is `launch` / `teardown` only.** Everything else
+   host-privileged still lives in the CLI, so the schema has to grow — carefully,
+   since PRD 0070's security argument rests on "structured requests only, static
+   flags + ids."
+
+Separately, host state has no clear owner. `OrchestratorCore.reconcile` takes
+`live_source_ips` as a parameter *only because the orchestrator cannot see the
+backend* ([`service.py:137`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/service.py)); the
+egress traffic log is written to the container's stderr; and there is no durable,
+tamper-evident home for the audit record that survives orchestrator destruction.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A standalone host control server that the CLI and orchestrator reach over
+  **HTTP**, with three entry paths working end to end:
+  - `web console -(iroh)-> orchestrator -(http)-> host controller -> launch`
+  - `cli -(http)-> orchestrator -(http)-> host controller -> launch`
+  - `cli -(http)-> host controller` — start / restart / status of the
+    orchestrator **itself** (the bootstrap/recovery path #391 targets).
+- The launch op is expressed as a **signed JWT of static flags + ids only**,
+  verified against a closed schema.
+- The signing secret is **provisioned out of band and durable** across
+  orchestrator restarts (a `TrustDomain` per #476, with a key the orchestrator
+  never holds for the host controller's *own* endpoints).
+- Host-privileged operations move off the CLI to the control server; **the CLI
+  no longer opens the Docker socket** for bottle operations.
+- `Orchestrator.reconcile` no longer takes `live_source_ips` — live-bottle
+  enumeration becomes an internal control-server call.
+- Host-durable state lands as an **append-only, hash-chained JSONL** audit log
+  owned solely by the host controller; operational state stays SQLite owned
+  solely by the orchestrator.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Removing standing privilege.** This converts on-demand privilege (a CLI the
+  user invokes) into standing privilege (a daemon under launchd/systemd). The
+  win is that the privilege is *narrower* (structured requests vs. a raw socket),
+  not that it disappears. "Always running" is an accepted new property.
+- **Asymmetric signing.** We stay HS256 — see Design / "Signing stays
+  symmetric."
+- **Integrity against a live compromised orchestrator.** Host-location of the
+  audit log does not buy this: the orchestrator makes the decisions being audited
+  and can forge or omit entries wherever the file lives. An off-box copy is the
+  answer, tracked separately.
+- **A single unified DB for all state.** Impossible over a guest-kernel share
+  (SQLite locking is not coherent); state is split by owner and lifetime instead.
+- **The generic `SecretProvider` (#355)** and **remote terminal design (#478)** —
+  both ride the same door but are their own work.
+
+## Design
+
+### Topology
+
+The host controller is the sole privileged component. The orchestrator becomes a
+client of it for launches, and the CLI becomes a client of it for *both* bottle
+operations (indirectly, through the orchestrator) and orchestrator lifecycle
+(directly, for bootstrap/recovery — startup can't route through the thing being
+started).
+
+```
+web console ─(iroh)─▶ orchestrator ─┐
+                                    ├─(http, signed JWT)─▶ host controller ─▶ launch
+cli ────────(http)──▶ orchestrator ─┘
+cli ────────(http, bearer)──────────────────────────────▶ host controller   (orchestrator lifecycle)
+```
+
+### Transport: `BrokerClient` + host server
+
+`LaunchBroker.submit(token)` keeps its exact signature and semantics; only the
+*wire* changes. A new `BrokerClient` implements the same submit contract by
+POSTing the signed token to the host controller (stdlib `urllib`, like the
+existing [`orchestrator/client.py`](../../bot_bottle/orchestrator/client.py)),
+and the host controller's launch handler is the existing `verify_request` +
+`_launch`/`_teardown` path, now reached over HTTP instead of a method call. The
+in-process `StubBroker` stays for the dev-harness and tests; `DockerBroker`'s
+`_launch`/`_teardown` bodies move behind the server unchanged. Because the client
+satisfies the same interface `OrchestratorCore` already depends on, the core does
+not change to gain a real backend.
+
+### Signing stays symmetric (HS256)
+
+PRD 0070 nominally specifies asymmetric; the code is HS256 and we keep it.
+Asymmetric matters when the verifier is *less* privileged than the signer — here
+it is the reverse: the host controller (verifier) is strictly more privileged
+than the orchestrator (signer), and a controller that could forge orchestrator
+requests gains nothing, since it is already the component that launches. Staying
+symmetric also honors the no-runtime-deps policy (stdlib has no Ed25519). This
+matches the reasoning already inlined in `broker.py`'s module docstring.
+
+### Replay protection is out of scope (tracked in #494)
+
+Once the launch token travels over a wire, a captured token could be replayed —
+`sign_request` already emits `jti`/`iat` but `verify_request` reads neither, so
+there is no expiry window or `jti` cache today. Enforcing that (an `iat` window +
+a self-trimming `jti` cache) is a pure in-process change that lands independently
+of this work, and it is deferred to **#494** rather than gating the MVP of the
+host control server. Nothing here depends on it; it can merge before or after.
+
+### Op vocabulary and the "ids + static flags" rule (gap 3)
+
+Each op moved off the CLI widens the privileged surface, so growth is governed by
+one explicit rule, enforced in `verify_request`'s schema check:
+
+> A broker op carries **only ids and enumerated static flags** — a bottle id, a
+> pool slot, a **content-addressed** image ref chosen from a fixed set, an op
+> name from a closed vocabulary. Never a free-form path, argv, command, or
+> caller-supplied filesystem location. If an operation cannot be expressed that
+> way, it does not become a broker op.
+
+Operations that fit and move off the CLI (all today in
+`backend/*/consolidated_launch.py`, driven by a short-lived CLI process):
+
+| Op | What it does | Fits the rule because |
+|---|---|---|
+| `launch` / `teardown` | existing | ids + slot + image ref |
+| `orchestrator.ensure_running` | start the infra container | no arguments |
+| `orchestrator.{start,restart,status}` | lifecycle (the #391 path) | no arguments |
+| `list_live` | enumerate running bottles for reconcile | no arguments; returns ids/IPs |
+| `allocate_ip` | `next_free_ip` over `_network_container_ips` | no arguments; returns an IP |
+| `provision_git_gate` | `cp`/`exec` a per-bottle deploy key into the gateway | bottle id + key handle, no path |
+| `reprovision` | `docker exec printenv <ENV_VAR_SECRET>` on a live agent | bottle id + secret *name* |
+
+Image **builds** stay with the orchestrator for v1 (PRD 0070 §Memory: builds run
+control-plane-side; a dedicated slim build unit is later, #468-adjacent), so no
+`build` broker op is added here.
+
+With `list_live` as an internal control-server call, `Orchestrator.reconcile`'s
+`live_source_ips` parameter goes away — the tell PRD 0070 called out that the
+orchestrator couldn't see the backend disappears with it.
+
+### Secret provisioning (gap 2)
+
+The shared HS256 secret becomes a durable, out-of-band artifact via the
+**`TrustDomain`** seam (#476,
+[`trust_domain.py`](../../bot_bottle/trust_domain.py)):
+
+- The **launch-broker secret** is a `TrustDomain` whose key
+  (`host_signing_key(<file>)`, minted 0600 on first use, durable under
+  `bot_bottle_root()`) is provisioned to the orchestrator (signer) and the host
+  controller (verifier). Durability across orchestrator restarts is what makes
+  re-adoption work — a restart re-verifies against the same key.
+- The **host controller's own lifecycle endpoints** (the direct `cli -> host
+  controller` path) get a **separate** `TrustDomain` key the orchestrator never
+  holds — exactly the second domain #476's PRD reserves. The orchestrator must
+  not be able to mint the credentials used to start and stop it.
+
+This reuses the seam #476 landed rather than re-deriving provisioning per
+backend (the PR #471 bug class).
+
+### One daemon, structurally separate handlers (open decision 1)
+
+The audit writer and the broker live in **one daemon** for install simplicity,
+but with **no shared parsing** and **different credentials per handler**:
+
+- the **launch** handler requires the signed launch **JWT** (provenance +
+  un-coercible schema);
+- the **audit-append** handler takes a plain **bearer token** and writes to the
+  JSONL log.
+
+This does not defend against orchestrator compromise (it holds both creds) — it
+stops a bug in the boring audit path from reaching the privileged launch path.
+The launcher stays small enough to audit line-by-line, per PRD 0070.
+
+### State ownership: split by owner and lifetime
+
+A single mounted DB is impossible — SQLite locking is not coherent across guest
+kernels over a share, which is why the macOS backend already uses a container-only
+volume (`INFRA_DB_VOLUME`). So state splits three ways (depends on #469, which
+gets `bot-bottle.db` off the data plane first):
+
+| Owner | State | Home | Shape |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **Orchestrator** | `orchestrator_bottles` registry; `bottled_agent_secrets` (encrypted egress tokens); `supervise_proposals` / `supervise_responses` | volume nothing else mounts (generalizing the macOS design) | **SQLite** — mutable, transactional, queried |
+| **Host controller** | supervise audit entries; egress traffic log (today → container stderr); host-side config | host filesystem, survives orchestrator/volume destruction | **JSONL** — append-only |
+| **Gateway** | none | — | after #469 the data plane holds no DB state |
+
+The historical record is **JSONL, not SQLite**, because it is append-only, never
+updated, never transactionally queried: `O_APPEND` writes are atomic, there is no
+locking protocol to get wrong, hash-chaining for tamper-evidence is cheap, and it
+survives container-runtime volume pruning (the #450 lesson) and stays readable
+without the orchestrator running. Both halves of "the audit record" — supervise
+decisions and the egress traffic log — land in the one place.
+
+The orchestrator is **sole mounter and sole writer** of its SQLite volume; the
+host controller is **sole writer** of the JSONL log, over the authenticated
+audit-append channel.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+Ordered, each independently mergeable:
+
+1. **`BrokerClient` + host launch server** over HTTP, reusing `verify_request`
+   and the existing `DockerBroker` bodies. Wire `OrchestratorCore` to a
+   `BrokerClient` behind a flag; keep `StubBroker` for the dev-harness. Closes
+   gap 1.
+2. **Durable secret via `TrustDomain`** — provision the launch-broker key to
+   signer + verifier; add the host controller's own lifecycle `TrustDomain`.
+   Closes gap 2.
+3. **Grow the op vocabulary** one op at a time (`list_live` first — it also
+   removes `reconcile`'s `live_source_ips`), each behind the ids + static-flags
+   rule. Closes gap 3.
+4. **JSONL audit log** — the host-controller-owned, hash-chained historical
+   record with the plain-bearer audit-append handler; redirect the egress traffic
+   log into it.
+5. **Drop the Docker socket from the CLI** once every host-privileged op it used
+   is a broker op — the payoff that unblocks the unprivileged Gitea runner user.
+
+## Open questions
+
+1. **Schema-width rule enforcement.** The "ids + static flags" rule is stated;
+   should `verify_request` reject unknown claim keys outright (strict schema) to
+   keep the surface from drifting? Leaning yes.
+2. **Audit-append back-pressure.** What the audit handler does if the JSONL sink
+   is unavailable (fail-closed vs. buffer) — resolve before shipping chunk 5.
+
+## References
+
+- **PRD 0070** — the contract, the launch broker, and the state tiers this
+  implements.
+- **#469** — get `bot-bottle.db` off the data plane (lands underneath this).
+- **#476** ([`prd-new-control-plane-auth-provisioning`](prd-new-control-plane-auth-provisioning.md))
+  — the `TrustDomain` seam this plugs the host controller's key into.
+- **#391** — backend-agnostic orchestrator restart (the bootstrap path).
+- **#494** — enforce broker replay protection (`iat` window + `jti` cache); split
+  out of this PRD as an independent in-process change.
+- **#386** — prebuilt images from the Gitea OCI registry (the fixed image set the
+  broker validates against).
+- **#355** — generic `SecretProvider`.
+- **#478** — remote terminal design.

tests/unit/test_macos_consolidated_launch.py

@@ -190,8 +190,7 @@ class TestRegisterAgentReconciles(unittest.TestCase):
 
     def _register(self, client: Mock) -> None:
         with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
-                patch(f"{_UTIL}.provision_git_gate"), \
-                patch(f"{_MOD}.live_source_ips", return_value=["10.0.0.7"]):
+                patch(f"{_UTIL}.provision_git_gate"):
             register_agent(
                 _egress_plan(), _git_plan(),
                 source_ip="10.0.0.7", endpoint=_endpoint(),
@@ -213,7 +212,9 @@ class TestRegisterAgentReconciles(unittest.TestCase):
         client.register_bottle.side_effect = _register_bottle
         self._register(client)
         self.assertEqual(["reconcile", "register"], calls)
-        client.reconcile.assert_called_once_with(["10.0.0.7"])
+        # A bare trigger now — the orchestrator enumerates the live set itself
+        # (from the host controller), so the CLI passes no IPs.
+        client.reconcile.assert_called_once_with()
 
     def test_a_reconcile_failure_does_not_block_the_launch(self) -> None:
         from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClientError
@@ -221,18 +222,3 @@ class TestRegisterAgentReconciles(unittest.TestCase):
         client.reconcile.side_effect = OrchestratorClientError("unreachable")
         self._register(client)
         client.register_bottle.assert_called_once()
-
-    def test_enumeration_error_does_not_block_the_launch(self) -> None:
-        """A partial container listing must not abort the launch — skip
-        reconciliation and proceed, just as with an unreachable orchestrator."""
-        from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.enumerate import EnumerationError
-        client = _client()
-        with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
-                patch(f"{_UTIL}.provision_git_gate"), \
-                patch(f"{_MOD}.live_source_ips",
-                      side_effect=EnumerationError("container list failed")):
-            register_agent(
-                _egress_plan(), _git_plan(),
-                source_ip="10.0.0.7", endpoint=_endpoint(),
-            )
-        client.register_bottle.assert_called_once()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_broker.py

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
 import secrets
 import unittest
 
@@ -14,6 +18,21 @@ from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
 )
 
 
+def _sign_claims(claims: dict[str, object], secret: bytes) -> str:
+    """Sign an arbitrary claims dict (bypassing `sign_request`'s fixed fields)
+    so a test can craft off-schema payloads — e.g. an extra claim key, or a
+    query op carrying ids — with a *valid* signature, isolating the schema check
+    from the provenance check."""
+    def b64(data: bytes) -> str:
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+    header = b64(json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}, sort_keys=True,
+                            separators=(",", ":")).encode())
+    payload = b64(json.dumps(claims, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode())
+    signing_input = f"{header}.{payload}"
+    sig = b64(hmac.new(secret, signing_input.encode("ascii"), hashlib.sha256).digest())
+    return f"{signing_input}.{sig}"
+
+
 class TestSignVerify(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
@@ -54,6 +73,41 @@ class TestSignVerify(unittest.TestCase):
         with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
             verify_request(token, self.secret)
 
+    def test_list_live_round_trip(self) -> None:
+        req = LaunchRequest(op="list_live")
+        got = verify_request(sign_request(req, self.secret), self.secret)
+        self.assertEqual("list_live", got.op)
+        self.assertEqual("", got.bottle_id)
+
+    def test_mutation_without_bottle_id_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # A launch/teardown must name its bottle even with a valid signature.
+        for op in ("launch", "teardown"):
+            token = _sign_claims(
+                {"op": op, "bottle_id": "", "jti": "x", "iat": 1}, self.secret)
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                verify_request(token, self.secret)
+
+    def test_query_op_carrying_ids_or_flags_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # list_live is "no arguments" — a signed one that smuggles a bottle_id /
+        # source_ip / image_ref / slot is off-schema and refused.
+        for extra in (
+            {"bottle_id": "b1"}, {"source_ip": "10.0.0.1"},
+            {"image_ref": "img"}, {"slot": 2},
+        ):
+            claims: dict[str, object] = {"op": "list_live", "jti": "x", "iat": 1, **extra}
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                verify_request(_sign_claims(claims, self.secret), self.secret)
+
+    def test_unknown_claim_key_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # Strict schema (open question 1): a well-signed token with an extra claim
+        # key is refused, so the surface can't widen past the fixed fields.
+        token = _sign_claims(
+            {"op": "launch", "bottle_id": "b1", "cmd": "rm -rf /", "jti": "x", "iat": 1},
+            self.secret,
+        )
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+            verify_request(token, self.secret)
+
 
 class TestStubBroker(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
@@ -81,6 +135,37 @@ class TestStubBroker(unittest.TestCase):
             self.broker.submit(forged)
         self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)  # nothing acted on
 
+    def test_list_live_derives_from_launches(self) -> None:
+        # Default live set: launched, minus torn-down, by source IP.
+        self.broker.submit(
+            sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1"),
+                         self.secret))
+        self.broker.submit(
+            sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b2", source_ip="10.0.0.2"),
+                         self.secret))
+        self.broker.submit(
+            sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="teardown", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1"),
+                         self.secret))
+        live = self.broker.list_live(
+            sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), self.secret))
+        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.2"], live)
+
+    def test_list_live_override(self) -> None:
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = ["10.0.0.9"]
+        live = self.broker.list_live(
+            sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), self.secret))
+        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.9"], live)
+
+    def test_submit_rejects_a_list_live_token(self) -> None:
+        # The verbs don't cross: a query token routed to submit is fail-closed.
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+            self.broker.submit(sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), self.secret))
+
+    def test_list_live_rejects_a_mutation_token(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+            self.broker.list_live(
+                sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1"), self.secret))
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_broker_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""Unit: orchestrator-side broker client (issue #468, chunk 1). HTTP mocked."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import json
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerAuthError,
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
+    LaunchRequest,
+)
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client import BrokerClient, BrokerClientError
+
+_URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client.urllib.request.urlopen"
+
+
+def _resp(payload: object) -> MagicMock:
+    m = MagicMock()
+    m.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = json.dumps(payload).encode()
+    return m
+
+
+def _http_error(code: int, payload: object = None) -> urllib.error.HTTPError:
+    body = json.dumps(payload).encode() if payload is not None else b""
+    return urllib.error.HTTPError(
+        "http://host/broker", code, "err", {}, io.BytesIO(body))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+
+class TestSubmit(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.c = BrokerClient("http://host:8091")
+
+    def test_returns_the_verified_request(self) -> None:
+        echo = {
+            "op": "launch", "bottle_id": "b1", "source_ip": "10.0.0.1",
+            "image_ref": "img", "slot": 3,
+        }
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(echo)):
+            got = self.c.submit("tok")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1",
+                          image_ref="img", slot=3),
+            got,
+        )
+
+    def test_posts_token_to_broker_endpoint(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"op": "teardown", "bottle_id": "b1"})) as m:
+            self.c.submit("signed-token")
+        request = m.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual("POST", request.get_method())
+        self.assertTrue(request.full_url.endswith("/broker"))
+        self.assertEqual({"token": "signed-token"}, json.loads(request.data))
+
+    def test_401_raises_broker_auth_error(self) -> None:
+        # A fail-closed provenance/schema rejection surfaces as the SAME exception
+        # the in-process broker raises, so the launch path's rollback is identical.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(401, {"error": "bad signature"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                self.c.submit("forged")
+
+    def test_502_is_a_definite_client_error(self) -> None:
+        # The host responded — it processed the request and did not launch, so a
+        # definite BrokerClientError (the caller may safely roll back).
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(502, {"error": "docker down"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_unreachable_is_ambiguous_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        # No response at all — the request may already have launched, so the
+        # AMBIGUOUS BrokerUnavailableError (the caller must NOT roll back).
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_timeout_is_ambiguous_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        # A dropped/late response after the request was sent is the exact orphan
+        # risk: the host may have launched. Must be ambiguous, not a definite fail.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=TimeoutError("read timed out")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_malformed_success_body_raises(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"op": "launch"})):  # missing bottle_id
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_empty_error_body_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
+        # An error with no readable JSON body still classifies by status code.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(401)):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                self.c.submit("forged")
+
+    def test_non_json_success_body_raises(self) -> None:
+        # A 200 whose body isn't JSON is tolerated into {} then fails the
+        # missing-field check — a definite client error, not a crash.
+        m = MagicMock()
+        m.__enter__.return_value.read.return_value = b"not json at all"
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=m):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+    def test_unreadable_error_body_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
+        # An HTTPError whose body can't be read (fp=None) still classifies by
+        # status — the error detail is best-effort.
+        err = urllib.error.HTTPError(
+            "http://host/broker", 502, "err", {}, None)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=err):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.submit("tok")
+
+
+class TestListLive(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.c = BrokerClient("http://host:8091")
+
+    def test_returns_source_ips(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"source_ips": ["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"]})):
+            self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"], self.c.list_live("tok"))
+
+    def test_posts_token_to_live_endpoint(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"source_ips": []})) as m:
+            self.c.list_live("signed-token")
+        request = m.call_args.args[0]
+        self.assertEqual("POST", request.get_method())
+        self.assertTrue(request.full_url.endswith("/broker/live"))
+        self.assertEqual({"token": "signed-token"}, json.loads(request.data))
+
+    def test_non_string_entries_are_filtered(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({"source_ips": ["10.0.0.1", 5, None, ""]})):
+            self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.1"], self.c.list_live("tok"))
+
+    def test_missing_source_ips_raises(self) -> None:
+        # A response without the field is malformed — better to fail (reconcile
+        # skips) than to reconcile against a silent empty set.
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp({})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.list_live("tok")
+
+    def test_401_raises_broker_auth_error(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(401, {"error": "bad signature"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+                self.c.list_live("forged")
+
+    def test_502_enumeration_failure_is_client_error(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(502, {"error": "docker down"})):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerClientError):
+                self.c.list_live("tok")
+
+    def test_unreachable_is_unavailable(self) -> None:
+        with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=urllib.error.URLError("refused")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.c.list_live("tok")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_client.py

@@ -159,26 +159,27 @@ class TestReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.c = OrchestratorClient("http://orch:8080")
 
-    def test_posts_live_ips_and_returns_reaped(self) -> None:
+    def test_triggers_sweep_and_returns_reaped(self) -> None:
         with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": ["b1", "b2"]})) as m:
-            got = self.c.reconcile(["10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.3"])
+            got = self.c.reconcile()
         self.assertEqual(["b1", "b2"], got)
         sent = json.loads(m.call_args.args[0].data)
-        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.2", "10.0.0.3"], sent["live_source_ips"])
+        # The live set is no longer sent — the orchestrator enumerates it.
+        self.assertNotIn("live_source_ips", sent)
         self.assertNotIn("grace_seconds", sent)  # omitted -> server default
 
     def test_grace_seconds_is_forwarded_when_given(self) -> None:
         with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": []})) as m:
-            self.c.reconcile([], grace_seconds=30)
+            self.c.reconcile(grace_seconds=30)
         self.assertEqual(30, json.loads(m.call_args.args[0].data)["grace_seconds"])
 
     def test_malformed_reaped_is_tolerated(self) -> None:
         with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {"reaped": ["ok", 5, None]})):
-            self.assertEqual(["ok"], self.c.reconcile([]))
+            self.assertEqual(["ok"], self.c.reconcile())
         with patch(_URLOPEN, return_value=_resp(200, {})):
-            self.assertEqual([], self.c.reconcile([]))
+            self.assertEqual([], self.c.reconcile())
 
     def test_error_status_raises(self) -> None:
         with patch(_URLOPEN, side_effect=_http_error(500)):
             with self.assertRaises(OrchestratorClientError):
-                self.c.reconcile([])
+                self.c.reconcile()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_docker_broker.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from unittest.mock import Mock, patch
 
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
     BrokerAuthError,
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
     LaunchRequest,
     sign_request,
 )
@@ -96,5 +97,50 @@ class TestDockerBroker(unittest.TestCase):
             m.assert_not_called()
 
 
+class TestDockerBrokerListLive(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        self.broker = DockerBroker(self.secret)
+
+    def test_enumerates_labeled_container_ips(self) -> None:
+        # `docker ps` lists two labeled containers; each inspect yields an IP.
+        ps = Mock(returncode=0, stdout="c1\nc2\n", stderr="")
+        i1 = Mock(returncode=0, stdout="10.0.0.1 \n", stderr="")
+        i2 = Mock(returncode=0, stdout="10.0.0.2 \n", stderr="")
+        with patch.object(self.broker, "_docker", side_effect=[ps, i1, i2]) as m:
+            got = self.broker._list_live()
+        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"], got)
+        # First call is the label-filtered `docker ps`.
+        ps_argv = m.call_args_list[0].args[0]
+        self.assertEqual(["docker", "ps", "--filter", f"label={BOTTLE_ID_LABEL}"], ps_argv[:4])
+
+    def test_no_containers_is_empty(self) -> None:
+        with patch.object(self.broker, "_docker",
+                          return_value=Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")):
+            self.assertEqual([], self.broker._list_live())
+
+    def test_ps_failure_raises(self) -> None:
+        with patch.object(self.broker, "_docker",
+                          return_value=Mock(returncode=1, stdout="", stderr="daemon down")):
+            with self.assertRaises(DockerBrokerError):
+                self.broker._list_live()
+
+    def test_inspect_failure_raises(self) -> None:
+        ps = Mock(returncode=0, stdout="c1\n", stderr="")
+        bad = Mock(returncode=1, stdout="", stderr="no such container")
+        with patch.object(self.broker, "_docker", side_effect=[ps, bad]):
+            with self.assertRaises(DockerBrokerError):
+                self.broker._list_live()
+
+    def test_enumeration_failure_surfaces_as_unavailable_via_list_live(self) -> None:
+        # Through the verb, a backend failure is the single "live set unknown"
+        # signal (BrokerUnavailableError) reconcile catches to skip the sweep.
+        token = sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), self.secret)
+        with patch.object(self.broker, "_docker",
+                          return_value=Mock(returncode=1, stdout="", stderr="down")):
+            with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+                self.broker.list_live(token)
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_host_server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+"""Unit tests for the host control server (issue #468, chunk 1).
+
+Mostly exercises the pure `dispatch()` (socket-free, like the orchestrator
+server tests), plus a real-socket round-trip through `BrokerClient` that proves
+the full sign -> POST -> verify -> act seam over HTTP.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import http.client
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import secrets
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import typing
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerAuthError,
+    LaunchBroker,
+    LaunchRequest,
+    StubBroker,
+    sign_request,
+)
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker_client import BrokerClient
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server import (
+    MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+    Handler,
+    HostControlServer,
+    broker_secret,
+    dispatch,
+    main,
+    make_host_server,
+)
+from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+
+
+def _body(obj: object) -> bytes:
+    return json.dumps(obj).encode()
+
+
+class _RaisingBroker(LaunchBroker):
+    """A broker whose backend launch/enumeration always fails — exercises the
+    502 path (an operational backend failure, distinct from a fail-closed
+    provenance 401)."""
+
+    def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("docker down")
+
+    def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("docker down")
+
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        raise RuntimeError("docker down")
+
+
+class TestDispatch(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        self.broker = StubBroker(self.secret)
+
+    def _token(self, **kwargs: object) -> str:
+        return sign_request(LaunchRequest(**kwargs), self.secret)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+    def test_health(self) -> None:
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/health", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("ok", payload["status"])
+
+    def test_broker_launch_verifies_and_acts(self) -> None:
+        token = self._token(
+            op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.243.0.1",
+            image_ref="img", slot=2,
+        )
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual("launch", payload["op"])
+        self.assertEqual("b1", payload["bottle_id"])
+        self.assertEqual("img", payload["image_ref"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, payload["slot"])
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in self.broker.launched])
+
+    def test_broker_teardown_acts(self) -> None:
+        token = self._token(op="teardown", bottle_id="b1")
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in self.broker.torn_down])
+
+    def test_forged_token_is_401_and_nothing_acted(self) -> None:
+        forged = sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1"), secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": forged}))
+        self.assertEqual(401, status)
+        self.assertIn("broker auth failed", str(payload["error"]))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)  # fail-closed: never launched
+
+    def test_backend_failure_is_502(self) -> None:
+        broker = _RaisingBroker(self.secret)
+        token = self._token(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", image_ref="img")
+        status, payload = dispatch(broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(502, status)
+        self.assertIn("backend launch failed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+    def test_broker_live_returns_source_ips(self) -> None:
+        # Two launched bottles -> the stub reports both as live.
+        self.broker.submit(self._token(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1"))
+        self.broker.submit(self._token(op="launch", bottle_id="b2", source_ip="10.0.0.2"))
+        token = self._token(op="list_live")
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker/live", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.2"],
+            sorted(typing.cast("list[str]", payload["source_ips"])),
+        )
+
+    def test_broker_live_forged_token_is_401(self) -> None:
+        forged = sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker/live", _body({"token": forged}))
+        self.assertEqual(401, status)
+        self.assertIn("broker auth failed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+    def test_broker_live_rejects_a_mutation_token(self) -> None:
+        # A launch token routed to the query endpoint is a fail-closed 401 — the
+        # endpoints don't share a schema even though they share a secret.
+        token = self._token(op="launch", bottle_id="b1", image_ref="img")
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker/live", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(401, status)
+
+    def test_broker_live_backend_failure_is_502(self) -> None:
+        broker = _RaisingBroker(self.secret)
+        token = self._token(op="list_live")
+        status, payload = dispatch(broker, "POST", "/broker/live", _body({"token": token}))
+        self.assertEqual(502, status)
+        self.assertIn("backend enumeration failed", str(payload["error"]))
+
+    def test_broker_live_missing_token_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker/live", _body({}))
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_missing_token_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", _body({}))
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_bad_json_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"{not json")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_empty_body_is_missing_token_400(self) -> None:
+        # Empty body parses to {} (no token) → 400, never reaching the broker.
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)
+
+    def test_non_object_body_is_400(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "POST", "/broker", b"[1, 2]")
+        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+
+    def test_unknown_route_404(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/nope", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(404, status)
+
+    def test_trailing_slash_normalized(self) -> None:
+        status, _ = dispatch(self.broker, "GET", "/health/", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+
+
+class TestBrokerSecret(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The durable launch-broker key (#468/#476): prefer the env-injected key,
+    else the durable host key file, so signer and verifier resolve the same one."""
+
+    def test_reads_injected_key_from_env(self) -> None:
+        # The injected key is honoured regardless of allow_host_file — both the
+        # host controller and the guest orchestrator take an injected key.
+        self.assertEqual(
+            b"injected-key", broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            b"injected-key",
+            broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}, allow_host_file=True))
+
+    def test_guest_without_injection_fails_closed(self) -> None:
+        # The default (guest orchestrator): no env key and NO host-file fallback,
+        # so it returns None rather than mint a divergent process-local key.
+        self.assertIsNone(broker_secret({}))
+
+    def test_host_side_falls_back_to_the_durable_key_file(self) -> None:
+        # allow_host_file=True (host controller / dev-harness): mint/read the
+        # durable host key file, the same key on every call (restart re-adoption).
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
+            with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT": root}, clear=False):
+                os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                first = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+                second = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
+        self.assertTrue(first)
+        self.assertEqual(first, second)
+
+
+class TestSeamRoundTrip(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The whole point of chunk 1: a request signed by the orchestrator side is
+    POSTed to a real host control server, verified there, and acted on — over
+    HTTP, not an in-process call."""
+
+    def _serve(self, broker: LaunchBroker) -> BrokerClient:
+        server = make_host_server(broker, "127.0.0.1", 0)
+        self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
+        threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
+        host, port = server.server_address[0], server.server_address[1]
+        return BrokerClient(f"http://{host}:{port}")
+
+    def test_sign_post_verify_act_over_http(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        client = self._serve(broker)
+        req = LaunchRequest(
+            op="launch", bottle_id="b1", source_ip="10.0.0.1", image_ref="img", slot=1)
+        got = client.submit(sign_request(req, secret))
+        self.assertEqual(req, got)  # the controller echoes the verified request
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in broker.launched])
+
+    def test_forged_token_raises_broker_auth_error_over_http(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        client = self._serve(broker)
+        forged = sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="launch", bottle_id="b1"), secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerAuthError):
+            client.submit(forged)
+        self.assertEqual([], broker.launched)  # fail-closed across the wire
+
+    def test_list_live_enumerates_over_http(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        broker.live_source_ips = ["10.0.0.7", "10.0.0.8"]
+        client = self._serve(broker)
+        got = client.list_live(sign_request(LaunchRequest(op="list_live"), secret))
+        self.assertEqual(["10.0.0.7", "10.0.0.8"], got)
+
+
+class TestRequestLimits(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The privileged listener must not let a caller that can merely reach the
+    socket (no signed token) exhaust it via an oversized declared body — and it
+    rejects on the Content-Length *header*, before reading the body."""
+
+    def _addr(self) -> tuple[str, int]:
+        self.broker = StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        server = make_host_server(self.broker, "127.0.0.1", 0)
+        self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
+        threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
+        host, port = server.server_address[:2]
+        return typing.cast(str, host), port
+
+    def test_oversized_content_length_is_rejected_before_reading(self) -> None:
+        host, port = self._addr()
+        conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(host, port, timeout=5)
+        self.addCleanup(conn.close)
+        # Declare an oversized body but send only a sliver: the server must reject
+        # on the header before reading, so the caller gets a clean, deterministic
+        # 413 (no large unread body to race a connection reset).
+        conn.putrequest("POST", "/broker", skip_accept_encoding=True)
+        conn.putheader("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        conn.putheader("Content-Length", str(MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1))
+        conn.endheaders()
+        conn.send(b"{}")  # far short of the declared length; never read
+        resp = conn.getresponse()
+        self.assertEqual(413, resp.status)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.launched)  # never reached the broker
+
+
+class TestServeUnit(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Drive `Handler._serve` directly (no socket). The real per-request handler
+    runs in a daemon thread whose coverage/trace data is lost, so the
+    bounded-body and error paths are exercised here in the main thread instead."""
+
+    def _handler(self, broker: LaunchBroker, headers: dict[str, str],
+                 body: bytes = b"") -> tuple[Handler, MagicMock]:
+        server = HostControlServer.__new__(HostControlServer)
+        server.broker = broker
+        h = Handler.__new__(Handler)
+        h.server = server
+        h.headers = headers  # type: ignore[assignment] — dict is a valid .get() stand-in
+        h.path = "/broker"
+        h.rfile = io.BytesIO(body)
+        h.wfile = io.BytesIO()
+        send_response = MagicMock()
+        h.send_response = send_response  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        h.send_header = MagicMock()  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        h.end_headers = MagicMock()  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        return h, send_response
+
+    def test_oversized_content_length_is_413(self) -> None:
+        broker = StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16))
+        h, send_response = self._handler(broker, {"Content-Length": str(MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1)})
+        h.do_POST()  # exercises do_POST -> _serve
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(413)
+        self.assertEqual([], broker.launched)  # rejected before the broker
+
+    def test_invalid_content_length_is_400(self) -> None:
+        h, send_response = self._handler(StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)),
+                                         {"Content-Length": "not-a-number"})
+        h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(400)
+
+    def test_valid_request_dispatches_200(self) -> None:
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        body = _body({"token": sign_request(
+            LaunchRequest(op="teardown", bottle_id="b1"), secret)})
+        h, send_response = self._handler(broker, {"Content-Length": str(len(body))}, body)
+        h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(200)
+        self.assertEqual(["b1"], [r.bottle_id for r in broker.torn_down])
+
+    def test_dispatch_exception_becomes_500(self) -> None:
+        # dispatch is total, but the handler still guards it: a raised dispatch
+        # returns 500 rather than dropping the connection.
+        h, send_response = self._handler(
+            StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)), {"Content-Length": "0"})
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.dispatch",
+                   side_effect=RuntimeError("boom")):
+            h._serve("POST")
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(500)
+
+    def test_health_over_do_get(self) -> None:
+        h, send_response = self._handler(StubBroker(secrets.token_bytes(16)), {})
+        h.path = "/health"
+        h.do_GET()
+        send_response.assert_called_once_with(200)
+
+
+class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_fail_closed_without_secret(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
+                   return_value=None):
+            self.assertEqual(2, main(["--port", "0"]))
+
+    def test_serves_then_shuts_down_cleanly(self) -> None:
+        fake = MagicMock()
+        fake.server_address = ("127.0.0.1", 0)
+        fake.serve_forever.side_effect = KeyboardInterrupt
+        with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
+                   return_value=b"k"), \
+             patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.make_host_server",
+                   return_value=fake):
+            self.assertEqual(0, main(["--port", "0"]))
+        fake.serve_forever.assert_called_once()
+        fake.server_close.assert_called_once()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_main.py

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"""Unit: the orchestrator dev-harness entrypoint (`python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator`).
+
+Exercises broker selection (stub / docker / http) and the fail-closed http path,
+patching `make_server` so the serve loop returns instead of blocking.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import secrets
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__ import main
+from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
+
+
+def _fake_server() -> MagicMock:
+    fake = MagicMock()
+    fake.server_address = ("127.0.0.1", 0)
+    # Break out of serve_forever immediately, exercising the try/finally.
+    fake.serve_forever.side_effect = KeyboardInterrupt
+    return fake
+
+
+class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _run(self, broker: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> tuple[int, MagicMock]:
+        fake = _fake_server()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            argv = ["--db", str(Path(d) / "r.db"), "--port", "0", "--broker", broker]
+            with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__.make_server", return_value=fake), \
+                    patch.dict("os.environ", env or {}, clear=False):
+                if env is None:
+                    os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                rc = main(argv)
+        return rc, fake
+
+    def test_stub_broker_serves_and_closes(self) -> None:
+        rc, fake = self._run("stub")
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+        fake.serve_forever.assert_called_once()
+        fake.server_close.assert_called_once()
+
+    def test_docker_broker_serves(self) -> None:
+        rc, _ = self._run("docker")
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+
+    def test_http_broker_with_injected_key_serves(self) -> None:
+        # The guest orchestrator takes the launch-broker key by injection.
+        rc, _ = self._run(
+            "http", env={LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: secrets.token_urlsafe(16)})
+        self.assertEqual(0, rc)
+
+    def test_http_broker_without_injected_key_exits(self) -> None:
+        # Fail-closed: no host-file fallback for the guest, so a missing injected
+        # key is a usage error rather than a silently-minted divergent key.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
+                os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
+                with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
+                    main(["--db", str(Path(d) / "r.db"), "--broker", "http"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_secret_store.py

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import base64
 import unittest
 
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.secret_store import (
     ENV_VAR_SECRET_NAME,
+    _NONCE_BYTES,
     decrypt_value,
     encrypt_value,
     new_env_var_secret,
@@ -65,22 +67,27 @@ class TestDecryptErrors(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self.secret = new_env_var_secret()
 
-    def test_wrong_key_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
+    def test_wrong_key_always_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
+        # Deterministic: the authentication tag rejects a wrong key every time,
+        # so reprovision can never inject a garbage token. Repeat across many
+        # random keys (the old unauthenticated scheme let ~5% through when the
+        # garbage happened to decode as valid UTF-8).
+        for _ in range(200):
+            ct = encrypt_value(self.secret, "secret-token")
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                decrypt_value(new_env_var_secret(), ct)
+
+    def test_tampered_ciphertext_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
         ct = encrypt_value(self.secret, "secret-token")
-        other_key = new_env_var_secret()
-        # Wrong key produces garbage bytes; decrypt_value raises ValueError
-        # when the result is non-UTF-8 (which is very likely for 12-char data).
-        # We allow it to succeed only if garbage happens to be valid UTF-8, but
-        # the plaintext must not match.
-        try:
-            result = decrypt_value(other_key, ct)
-            self.assertNotEqual("secret-token", result)
-        except ValueError:
-            pass
+        raw = bytearray(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(ct + "=" * (-len(ct) % 4)))
+        raw[_NONCE_BYTES] ^= 0x01  # flip a bit in the ciphertext body → tag mismatch
+        tampered = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(bytes(raw)).rstrip(b"=").decode()
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            decrypt_value(self.secret, tampered)
 
     def test_truncated_blob_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
         with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-            decrypt_value(self.secret, "dG9vc2hvcnQ")  # "tooshort" — under 16 nonce bytes
+            decrypt_value(self.secret, "dG9vc2hvcnQ")  # "tooshort" — under nonce+tag
 
     def test_invalid_base64_raises_value_error(self) -> None:
         with self.assertRaises(ValueError):

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_server.py

@@ -624,13 +624,18 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
 
 
 class TestReconcileRoute(unittest.TestCase):
-    """`POST /reconcile` — the host tells the orchestrator which bottles are
-    actually up, since the orchestrator can't see the backend from inside the
-    infra container."""
+    """`POST /reconcile` — a bare self-heal trigger. The orchestrator pulls its
+    own live set from the broker (`list_live`); the caller no longer supplies it,
+    so the request body carries at most `grace_seconds`."""
 
     def setUp(self) -> None:
         self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.orch = _orchestrator(Path(self._tmp.name) / "r.db")
+        store = RegistryStore(Path(self._tmp.name) / "r.db")
+        store.migrate()
+        secret = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        # Hold a typed StubBroker so tests can set its live set directly.
+        self.broker = StubBroker(secret)
+        self.orch = OrchestratorCore(store, self.broker, secret)
 
     def tearDown(self) -> None:
         self._tmp.cleanup()
@@ -647,44 +652,35 @@ class TestReconcileRoute(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_reaps_absent_and_reports_ids(self) -> None:
         dead = self._old("10.0.0.1")
         alive = self._old("10.0.0.2")
-        status, payload = dispatch(
-            self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": ["10.0.0.2"]}))
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = ["10.0.0.2"]  # broker: only .2 is up
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({}))
         self.assertEqual(200, status)
         self.assertEqual([dead], payload["reaped"])
         self.assertIsNone(self.orch.registry.get(dead))
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.orch.registry.get(alive))
 
-    def test_missing_live_source_ips_is_400(self) -> None:
-        status, _ = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({}))
-        self.assertEqual(400, status)
+    def test_empty_body_triggers_the_sweep(self) -> None:
+        """No body is fine — the live set comes from the broker, not the body."""
+        dead = self._old("10.0.0.1")
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = []  # broker: nothing running
+        status, payload = dispatch(self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", b"")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual([dead], payload["reaped"])
 
     def test_grace_seconds_is_honoured(self) -> None:
         """A grace window wide enough to cover the row protects it."""
         self.orch.registry.register("10.0.0.3")
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = []
         status, payload = dispatch(
-            self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile",
-            _body({"live_source_ips": [], "grace_seconds": 3600}))
+            self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({"grace_seconds": 3600}))
         self.assertEqual(200, status)
         self.assertEqual([], payload["reaped"])
 
-    def test_non_string_entries_are_rejected(self) -> None:
-        status, payload = dispatch(
-            self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile",
-            _body({"live_source_ips": [None, 7, "10.0.0.9"]}))
-        self.assertEqual(400, status)
-        self.assertIn("live_source_ips", str(payload["error"]))
-
-    def test_empty_live_source_ip_is_rejected(self) -> None:
-        status, payload = dispatch(
-            self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile", _body({"live_source_ips": [""]}))
-        self.assertEqual(400, status)
-        self.assertIn("live_source_ips", str(payload["error"]))
-
     def test_invalid_grace_seconds_is_rejected(self) -> None:
         for value in (True, "30", -1, float("inf"), float("nan")):
             with self.subTest(value=value):
                 status, payload = dispatch(
                     self.orch, "POST", "/reconcile",
-                    _body({"live_source_ips": [], "grace_seconds": value}))
+                    _body({"grace_seconds": value}))
                 self.assertEqual(400, status)
                 self.assertIn("grace_seconds", str(payload["error"]))

tests/unit/test_orchestrator_service.py

@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ from contextlib import closing
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest.mock import patch
 
-from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, StubBroker
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator.broker import (
+    BrokerUnavailableError,
+    LaunchBroker,
+    LaunchRequest,
+    StubBroker,
+)
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.registry_store import RegistryStore
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.service import OrchestratorCore
 from bot_bottle.orchestrator.store.secret_store import new_env_var_secret
@@ -25,8 +30,8 @@ from bot_bottle.orchestrator.supervisor import (
 
 
 class _FailingBroker(LaunchBroker):
-    """Verifies the token like any broker, then fails the launch — to
-    exercise the orchestrator's registry rollback."""
+    """Verifies the token like any broker, then fails the launch *definitely* —
+    to exercise the orchestrator's registry rollback."""
 
     def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         raise RuntimeError("launch failed")
@@ -34,6 +39,24 @@ class _FailingBroker(LaunchBroker):
     def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
         pass
 
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        return []
+
+
+class _UnavailableBroker(LaunchBroker):
+    """Verifies the token, then raises the *ambiguous* BrokerUnavailableError —
+    the host may already have launched — so the orchestrator must KEEP the
+    registry row rather than orphan a running container."""
+
+    def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        raise BrokerUnavailableError("delivery dropped after send")
+
+    def _teardown(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def _list_live(self) -> list[str]:
+        return []
+
 
 class TestOrchestrator(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self) -> None:
@@ -144,11 +167,20 @@ class TestOrchestrator(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.orch.resolve("10.243.0.3", rec.identity_token))
         self.assertIsNone(self.orch.resolve("10.243.0.3", "wrong-token"))
 
-    def test_launch_rolls_back_registry_on_broker_failure(self) -> None:
+    def test_launch_rolls_back_registry_on_definite_broker_failure(self) -> None:
         orch = OrchestratorCore(self.store, _FailingBroker(self.secret), self.secret)
         with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
             orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.9")
-        self.assertEqual([], self.store.all())  # no orphan
+        self.assertEqual([], self.store.all())  # no orphan row
+
+    def test_launch_keeps_registry_on_ambiguous_broker_failure(self) -> None:
+        # The host may already have launched the bottle before the response was
+        # lost, so deregistering would orphan a running container with no row.
+        # The row is kept for reconcile to reap iff the bottle is not live.
+        orch = OrchestratorCore(self.store, _UnavailableBroker(self.secret), self.secret)
+        with self.assertRaises(BrokerUnavailableError):
+            orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.9")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(self.store.all()))  # row survives — no orphan container
 
     def test_gateway_status_reports_unconfigured(self) -> None:
         # The orchestrator no longer owns a standalone gateway lifecycle; the
@@ -339,8 +371,9 @@ class TestOrchestratorSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
         pid = self.orch.supervise_queue_proposal(
             rec.bottle_id, tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
             proposed_file="routes:\n  - host: google.com\n", justification="j")
-        # No live source IPs -> the bottle is reaped (grace 0 so it's immediate).
-        self.assertEqual([rec.bottle_id], self.orch.reconcile([], grace_seconds=0))
+        # No live source IPs (nothing launched through the stub) -> the bottle
+        # is reaped (grace 0 so it's immediate).
+        self.assertEqual([rec.bottle_id], self.orch.reconcile(grace_seconds=0))
         self.assertEqual(
             {"status": "unknown"}, self.orch.supervise_poll_response(rec.bottle_id, pid))
 
@@ -385,7 +418,9 @@ class TestOrchestratorReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
         live = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.2", tokens={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "keep"})
         self._age_all(600)
 
-        self.assertEqual([dead.bottle_id], self.orch.reconcile(["10.243.0.2"]))
+        # The broker reports only .2 as still running -> .1 is reaped.
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = ["10.243.0.2"]
+        self.assertEqual([dead.bottle_id], self.orch.reconcile())
         self.assertIsNone(self.store.get(dead.bottle_id))
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(live.bottle_id))
         # The in-memory egress credential goes with the row.
@@ -397,14 +432,31 @@ class TestOrchestratorReconcile(unittest.TestCase):
         broker error must not stop the sweep clearing the row."""
         self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1")
         self._age_all(600)
-        self.broker.launched.clear()
-        self.orch.reconcile([])
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = []  # broker reports nothing running
+        self.orch.reconcile()
         self.assertEqual([], self.broker.torn_down)
 
     def test_reconcile_keeps_everything_when_all_are_live(self) -> None:
         a = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1")
         b = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.2")
         self._age_all(600)
-        self.assertEqual([], self.orch.reconcile(["10.243.0.1", "10.243.0.2"]))
+        self.broker.live_source_ips = ["10.243.0.1", "10.243.0.2"]
+        self.assertEqual([], self.orch.reconcile())
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(a.bottle_id))
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(b.bottle_id))
+
+    def test_reconcile_skipped_when_broker_cannot_enumerate(self) -> None:
+        """A broker that can't return an authoritative live set must NOT be
+        treated as "nothing is live" — that would reap every healthy bottle.
+        The sweep is skipped instead."""
+        a = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.1")
+        b = self.orch.launch_bottle("10.243.0.2")
+        self._age_all(600)
+
+        def _boom() -> list[str]:
+            raise RuntimeError("docker ps failed")
+
+        self.broker._list_live = _boom  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        self.assertEqual([], self.orch.reconcile())
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(a.bottle_id))
         self.assertIsNotNone(self.store.get(b.bottle_id))

tests/unit/test_trust_domain.py

@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
 
 from bot_bottle import orchestrator_auth
-from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY
+from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
 from bot_bottle.trust_domain import (
     CONTROL_PLANE,
+    HOST_CONTROLLER,
+    LAUNCH_BROKER,
     ControlPlaneProvisioning,
+    LaunchBrokerProvisioning,
     ProvisioningError,
     TrustDomain,
 )
@@ -101,5 +104,73 @@ class TestControlPlaneProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotEqual(ROLE_CLI, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))
 
 
+class TestLaunchBrokerAndHostControllerDomains(unittest.TestCase):
+    """The real #468 domains: the launch-broker key (shared by orchestrator +
+    host controller) and the host controller's own lifecycle key."""
+
+    def test_launch_broker_mints_no_role_tokens(self) -> None:
+        # Empty role set — it provides durable key material for the broker's own
+        # launch JWT, not orchestrator_auth role tokens.
+        self.assertEqual(frozenset(), LAUNCH_BROKER.roles)
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                LAUNCH_BROKER.mint(ROLE_CLI)
+
+    def test_host_controller_signs_host_role_only(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            tok = HOST_CONTROLLER.mint(ROLE_HOST)
+        self.assertEqual(ROLE_HOST, HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(tok, "k"))
+        # A control-plane `cli` token (the orchestrator's key) never verifies as a
+        # host-controller role — the orchestrator can't forge lifecycle creds.
+        cli_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(ROLE_CLI, "k")
+        self.assertIsNone(HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(cli_tok, "k"))
+
+    def test_control_plane_cannot_mint_the_host_role(self) -> None:
+        # `host` is outside the control-plane role set on purpose.
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
+            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                CONTROL_PLANE.mint(ROLE_HOST)
+
+    def test_the_three_domains_use_distinct_keys_and_env_vars(self) -> None:
+        self.assertEqual(3, len({
+            CONTROL_PLANE.key_filename,
+            LAUNCH_BROKER.key_filename,
+            HOST_CONTROLLER.key_filename,
+        }))
+        self.assertEqual(3, len({
+            CONTROL_PLANE.key_env, LAUNCH_BROKER.key_env, HOST_CONTROLLER.key_env,
+        }))
+
+
+class TestLaunchBrokerProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_broker_key_returns_the_durable_key(self) -> None:
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="bk"):
+            self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
+
+    def test_broker_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        # An empty key would leave the host controller unable to verify any
+        # launch — fail-closed rather than hand back a useless/dangerous key.
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
+            with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
+                prov.broker_key()
+
+    def test_controller_key_is_distinct_from_the_broker_key(self) -> None:
+        # The orchestrator holds the broker key but NEVER the controller key.
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        keys = {"launch-broker-key": "bk", "host-controller-key": "ck"}
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key",
+                   side_effect=keys.__getitem__):
+            self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
+            self.assertEqual("ck", prov.controller_key())
+
+    def test_controller_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
+            with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
+                prov.controller_key()
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()