Compare commits
1 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0e2af7de62 |
@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@ from pathlib import Path
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from .. import log
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from .store.store_manager import StoreManager
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from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
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from .broker import StubBroker, SubmitBroker
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from .broker_client import BrokerClient
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from .host_server import BROKER_SECRET_ENV, DEFAULT_PORT, broker_secret_from_env
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from .host_server import DEFAULT_PORT, broker_secret
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from .server import make_server
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from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
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from .store.registry_store import RegistryStore, default_db_path
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@@ -57,17 +58,19 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
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# A signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its broker (verifier).
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# 'stub' records launches instead of starting anything; 'docker' runs real
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# containers in-process; 'http' relays signed requests to a separate host
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# control server, which verifies and launches. For 'stub'/'docker' the
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# secret is ephemeral (signer and verifier share this process); for 'http'
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# it must be the SAME secret the host controller holds, so it is read from
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# the shared env var (the chunk-1 stand-in for out-of-band provisioning).
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# control server, which verifies and launches. For 'stub'/'docker' the secret
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# is ephemeral (signer and verifier share this process). For 'http' it must be
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# the SAME key the host controller holds — and this process is the *guest*
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# (signer), so it must be given that key by injection, NOT mint its own
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# process-local one (which would diverge from the host's and 401 every launch).
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broker: SubmitBroker
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if args.broker == "http":
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secret = broker_secret_from_env()
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secret = broker_secret() # env-injected only; no host-file fallback here
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if secret is None:
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parser.error(
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f"--broker http requires a shared signing secret in "
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f"${BROKER_SECRET_ENV} (hex), matching the host control server"
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f"--broker http requires the launch-broker key injected as "
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f"${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV} (the host controller owns/mints it); the "
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"orchestrator must not mint its own or it would diverge from the host's"
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)
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broker = BrokerClient(args.host_controller_url)
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else:
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@@ -23,12 +23,15 @@ controller down.
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The signed launch token *is* the endpoint's authentication (its provenance is the
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whole point of the JWS), so `/broker` needs no separate caller credential; the
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host controller's own lifecycle endpoints, which do, arrive with the durable
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`TrustDomain` key in a later chunk.
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host controller's own lifecycle endpoints, which do, arrive with the `host`-role
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tokens of the separate `HOST_CONTROLLER` trust domain in a later chunk.
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The shared signing secret is read from `$BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET` (hex). That is
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a **chunk-1 stopgap**: it must be provisioned to signer and verifier out of band,
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which is exactly what the durable `TrustDomain` key in chunk 2 (#476) replaces.
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The shared signing secret is the durable **launch-broker `TrustDomain` key**
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(#468/#476): a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, provisioned to
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the orchestrator (signer) and this server (verifier). A backend launcher injects
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it via `$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`; a host-side dev-harness process reads the
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key file directly. Durability is the point — a restarted orchestrator re-verifies
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against the same key, so re-adoption works.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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@@ -43,16 +46,14 @@ import typing
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from urllib.parse import urlsplit
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from .. import log
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from ..paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
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from ..trust_domain import LAUNCH_BROKER
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from .broker import BrokerAuthError, LaunchBroker
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from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
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# JSON body payload type (parsed request / rendered response).
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Json = dict[str, object]
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# The hex-encoded HS256 secret shared with the request signer (the orchestrator).
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# Chunk-1 stopgap for the durable, out-of-band `TrustDomain` key of chunk 2.
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BROKER_SECRET_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET"
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# Default host-controller port. Distinct from the orchestrator control plane
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# (8099) — a separate privileged component listening on its own socket.
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DEFAULT_PORT = 8091
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@@ -78,19 +79,34 @@ def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
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return obj
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def broker_secret_from_env(environ: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> bytes | None:
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"""The shared HS256 secret from `$BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET` (hex), or None
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when unset or not valid hex. The signer (orchestrator, `--broker http`) and
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the verifier (this server) read the same env var so both hold the same key —
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the chunk-1 stand-in for out-of-band provisioning."""
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env = os.environ if environ is None else environ
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raw = env.get(BROKER_SECRET_ENV, "").strip()
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if not raw:
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return None
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try:
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return bytes.fromhex(raw)
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def broker_secret(
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environ: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None, *, allow_host_file: bool = False,
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) -> bytes | None:
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"""The shared launch-broker HS256 secret, as this process should use it.
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Always prefers the key injected into this process's env
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(`$BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY`). `allow_host_file` decides the fallback when
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it is absent, and the distinction is a security boundary:
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- **Host-side** processes — the host controller and the host dev-harness — pass
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``allow_host_file=True`` to read (minting on first use) the durable host key
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file (``bot_bottle_root()/launch-broker-key``) they legitimately own.
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- The **guest orchestrator** (``--broker http``) keeps the default ``False``.
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It runs inside a container/VM whose ``bot_bottle_root()`` is process-local,
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so minting a file there would silently create a key UNRELATED to the host
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controller's — startup would succeed but every launch would be rejected 401.
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It must instead be *given* the key by its launcher, and fail closed (None)
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if it wasn't, rather than diverge.
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None when no key is available (a guest with no injection, or an unwritable
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host root)."""
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key = LAUNCH_BROKER.key_from_env(environ)
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if not key and allow_host_file:
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try:
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key = LAUNCH_BROKER.signing_key() # host-canonical, minted on first use
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except OSError:
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return None
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return key.encode("utf-8") if key else None
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def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
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@@ -219,20 +235,22 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
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python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server [--host H] [--port P]
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Fail-closed: without a shared `$BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET` the server can
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verify no request's provenance, so it refuses to start rather than run a
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launcher that accepts unsigned input."""
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Fail-closed: without the launch-broker key the server can verify no request's
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provenance, so it refuses to start rather than run a launcher that accepts
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unsigned input. As the host-side owner of the key, it may mint/read the host
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key file (`allow_host_file=True`)."""
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server")
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parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="bind address")
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parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="bind port (0 = ephemeral)")
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args = parser.parse_args(argv)
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secret = broker_secret_from_env()
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secret = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
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if secret is None:
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sys.stderr.write(
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f"host controller: refusing to start without a shared signing secret "
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f"(${BROKER_SECRET_ENV}, hex) — it could verify no request's "
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"provenance and would relay unsigned launches to the backend\n"
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f"host controller: refusing to start without the launch-broker key "
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f"(${LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV}, or a writable host root to mint it) — it "
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"could verify no request's provenance and would relay unsigned "
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"launches to the backend\n"
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)
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sys.stderr.flush()
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return 2
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@@ -258,10 +276,9 @@ __all__ = [
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"Handler",
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"HostControlServer",
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"make_host_server",
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"broker_secret_from_env",
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"broker_secret",
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"main",
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"Json",
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"BROKER_SECRET_ENV",
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"DEFAULT_PORT",
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]
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@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ ROLE_GATEWAY = "gateway"
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ROLE_CLI = "cli"
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ROLES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_CLI})
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# The host controller's own lifecycle role (#468). Deliberately OUTSIDE `ROLES`:
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# it belongs to a separate trust domain (`HOST_CONTROLLER`) signed by a key the
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# orchestrator never holds, so the orchestrator's control-plane key can neither
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# mint nor accept it — the orchestrator must not be able to forge the credential
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# used to start and stop it.
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ROLE_HOST = "host"
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_ALG = "HS256"
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@@ -103,4 +110,4 @@ def verify(token: str, secret: str, *, roles: frozenset[str] = ROLES) -> str | N
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return role if isinstance(role, str) and role in roles else None
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__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]
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__all__ = ["ROLE_GATEWAY", "ROLE_CLI", "ROLE_HOST", "ROLES", "mint", "verify"]
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@@ -47,6 +47,22 @@ ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN"
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# cannot forge a higher-privilege `cli` token (issue #469 review).
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ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT"
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# The durable launch-broker signing key: the HS256 secret the orchestrator
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# (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share to sign/verify launch
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# requests (#468). A host-canonical key file (minted 0600 on first use) so it
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# survives orchestrator restarts — re-adoption re-verifies against the same key —
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# instead of the ephemeral per-process secret of the in-process broker.
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LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME = "launch-broker-key"
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LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY"
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# The host controller's OWN key, for its lifecycle endpoints (the direct
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# cli -> host controller path that starts/stops the orchestrator). Separate from
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# the launch-broker key and never held by the orchestrator: the controller starts
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# and stops the orchestrator, so the orchestrator must not be able to mint the
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# credentials used to drive it (#468/#476).
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HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME = "host-controller-key"
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HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY"
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HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT"
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# The host directory holding the gateway's persistent mitmproxy CA. Bind-mounted
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# into the infra/gateway container at mitmproxy's confdir so the self-generated
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# CA survives container recreation — every agent installs this one CA to trust
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@@ -142,6 +158,11 @@ __all__ = [
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"ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME",
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"ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV",
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"ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
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"LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME",
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"LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV",
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"HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME",
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"HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV",
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"HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV",
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"GATEWAY_CA_DIRNAME",
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"bot_bottle_root",
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"host_db_path",
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@@ -29,8 +29,13 @@ from collections.abc import Mapping
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from . import orchestrator_auth
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from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY
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from .orchestrator_auth import ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
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from .paths import (
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HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
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HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
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HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
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LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
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LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
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ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
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ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV,
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ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_FILENAME,
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@@ -99,6 +104,40 @@ CONTROL_PLANE = TrustDomain(
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)
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# The launch-broker domain (#468): durable key material for the broker's own
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# signed launch requests (`broker.py`'s HS256 launch JWT), shared by the
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# orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier). Unlike
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# `CONTROL_PLANE` it mints no role tokens — the broker's provenance is the launch
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# JWT, not a role token — so its `roles` set is empty and it is used only as a
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# provider of durable, host-canonical key material (`signing_key` / `key_from_env`).
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# The durability is the point: the key survives orchestrator restarts, so a
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# restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key instead of the
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# ephemeral per-process secret the in-process broker used.
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LAUNCH_BROKER = TrustDomain(
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name="launch-broker",
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key_filename=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_FILENAME,
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roles=frozenset(),
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key_env=LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV,
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token_env="",
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)
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# The host controller's own domain (#468) — the SECOND domain #476 reserves. Its
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# key, which the orchestrator never holds, signs the `host`-role tokens the CLI
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# presents on the host controller's lifecycle endpoints (start / restart / status
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# of the orchestrator itself). Keeping it separate from `CONTROL_PLANE` is the
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# whole point: the host controller starts and stops the orchestrator, so the
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# orchestrator must not be able to mint the credentials used to drive it. (The
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# lifecycle endpoints themselves arrive in a later chunk; the domain is
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# established here alongside the durable launch-broker key.)
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HOST_CONTROLLER = TrustDomain(
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name="host-controller",
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key_filename=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_FILENAME,
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roles=frozenset({ROLE_HOST}),
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key_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_KEY_ENV,
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token_env=HOST_CONTROLLER_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
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)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
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"""The one seam every backend launcher uses to provision control-plane auth,
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@@ -132,9 +171,56 @@ class ControlPlaneProvisioning:
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return self.domain.mint(ROLE_GATEWAY)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class LaunchBrokerProvisioning:
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"""The seam that provisions the host-side launch broker's durable keys (#468),
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the counterpart to `ControlPlaneProvisioning`. Both the orchestrator (signer)
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and the host control server (verifier) receive the SAME launch-broker key
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(carry it in `broker_domain.key_env`); the host controller ALSO receives its
|
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own lifecycle key (`controller_domain.key_env`) the orchestrator never holds.
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Fail-closed like the control-plane seam: minting returns "" only if the host
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root is unwritable, and an empty launch-broker key would leave the verifier
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unable to authenticate any launch — so we raise rather than hand back a key
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that would make the host controller reject (or, if a caller defaulted it,
|
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accept) unsigned input."""
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broker_domain: TrustDomain = LAUNCH_BROKER
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controller_domain: TrustDomain = HOST_CONTROLLER
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def broker_key(self) -> str:
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"""The durable launch-broker key both the orchestrator and the host
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control server must receive (in `broker_domain.key_env`). Raises rather
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than return ""."""
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key = self.broker_domain.signing_key()
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if not key:
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raise ProvisioningError(
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f"refusing to provision the {self.broker_domain.name} broker "
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"without a signing key: the host controller could then verify no "
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"launch request's provenance"
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)
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return key
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def controller_key(self) -> str:
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"""The host controller's own lifecycle key — provisioned ONLY to the host
|
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controller (in `controller_domain.key_env`), never to the orchestrator, so
|
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the orchestrator cannot mint the `host`-role tokens that start and stop
|
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it. Raises rather than return ""."""
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key = self.controller_domain.signing_key()
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if not key:
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raise ProvisioningError(
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f"refusing to provision the {self.controller_domain.name} without "
|
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"a signing key: its lifecycle endpoints would authenticate no one"
|
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)
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return key
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__all__ = [
|
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"ProvisioningError",
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"TrustDomain",
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"CONTROL_PLANE",
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"LAUNCH_BROKER",
|
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"HOST_CONTROLLER",
|
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"ControlPlaneProvisioning",
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"LaunchBrokerProvisioning",
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]
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@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
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import http.client
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import io
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import json
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import os
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import secrets
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import tempfile
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import threading
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import typing
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import unittest
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||||
@@ -28,11 +30,12 @@ from bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server import (
|
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MAX_BODY_BYTES,
|
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Handler,
|
||||
HostControlServer,
|
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broker_secret_from_env,
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broker_secret,
|
||||
dispatch,
|
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main,
|
||||
make_host_server,
|
||||
)
|
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from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
|
||||
|
||||
|
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def _body(obj: object) -> bytes:
|
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@@ -124,16 +127,34 @@ class TestDispatch(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertEqual(200, status)
|
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|
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|
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class TestBrokerSecretFromEnv(unittest.TestCase):
|
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def test_reads_hex_secret(self) -> None:
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s = secrets.token_bytes(16)
|
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self.assertEqual(s, broker_secret_from_env({"BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET": s.hex()}))
|
||||
class TestBrokerSecret(unittest.TestCase):
|
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"""The durable launch-broker key (#468/#476): prefer the env-injected key,
|
||||
else the durable host key file, so signer and verifier resolve the same one."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unset_is_none(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(broker_secret_from_env({}))
|
||||
def test_reads_injected_key_from_env(self) -> None:
|
||||
# The injected key is honoured regardless of allow_host_file — both the
|
||||
# host controller and the guest orchestrator take an injected key.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
b"injected-key", broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
b"injected-key",
|
||||
broker_secret({LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: "injected-key"}, allow_host_file=True))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_invalid_hex_is_none(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(broker_secret_from_env({"BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET": "not-hex"}))
|
||||
def test_guest_without_injection_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
# The default (guest orchestrator): no env key and NO host-file fallback,
|
||||
# so it returns None rather than mint a divergent process-local key.
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(broker_secret({}))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_host_side_falls_back_to_the_durable_key_file(self) -> None:
|
||||
# allow_host_file=True (host controller / dev-harness): mint/read the
|
||||
# durable host key file, the same key on every call (restart re-adoption).
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
|
||||
with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT": root}, clear=False):
|
||||
os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
|
||||
first = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
|
||||
second = broker_secret(allow_host_file=True)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(first)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first, second)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSeamRoundTrip(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@@ -264,7 +285,7 @@ class TestServeUnit(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_fail_closed_without_secret(self) -> None:
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret_from_env",
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
|
||||
return_value=None):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(2, main(["--port", "0"]))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -272,7 +293,7 @@ class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
fake = MagicMock()
|
||||
fake.server_address = ("127.0.0.1", 0)
|
||||
fake.serve_forever.side_effect = KeyboardInterrupt
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret_from_env",
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.broker_secret",
|
||||
return_value=b"k"), \
|
||||
patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.host_server.make_host_server",
|
||||
return_value=fake):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__ import main
|
||||
from bot_bottle.paths import LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _fake_server() -> MagicMock:
|
||||
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.__main__.make_server", return_value=fake), \
|
||||
patch.dict("os.environ", env or {}, clear=False):
|
||||
if env is None:
|
||||
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET", None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
|
||||
rc = main(argv)
|
||||
return rc, fake
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,16 +47,18 @@ class TestMain(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
rc, _ = self._run("docker")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_http_broker_with_secret_serves(self) -> None:
|
||||
def test_http_broker_with_injected_key_serves(self) -> None:
|
||||
# The guest orchestrator takes the launch-broker key by injection.
|
||||
rc, _ = self._run(
|
||||
"http", env={"BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET": secrets.token_bytes(16).hex()})
|
||||
"http", env={LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV: secrets.token_urlsafe(16)})
|
||||
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_http_broker_without_secret_exits(self) -> None:
|
||||
# Fail-closed: --broker http with no shared secret is a usage error.
|
||||
def test_http_broker_without_injected_key_exits(self) -> None:
|
||||
# Fail-closed: no host-file fallback for the guest, so a missing injected
|
||||
# key is a usage error rather than a silently-minted divergent key.
|
||||
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
|
||||
with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
|
||||
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET", None)
|
||||
os.environ.pop(LAUNCH_BROKER_KEY_ENV, None)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
|
||||
main(["--db", str(Path(d) / "r.db"), "--broker", "http"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
from bot_bottle import orchestrator_auth
|
||||
from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY
|
||||
from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
|
||||
from bot_bottle.trust_domain import (
|
||||
CONTROL_PLANE,
|
||||
HOST_CONTROLLER,
|
||||
LAUNCH_BROKER,
|
||||
ControlPlaneProvisioning,
|
||||
LaunchBrokerProvisioning,
|
||||
ProvisioningError,
|
||||
TrustDomain,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -101,5 +104,73 @@ class TestControlPlaneProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(ROLE_CLI, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLaunchBrokerAndHostControllerDomains(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""The real #468 domains: the launch-broker key (shared by orchestrator +
|
||||
host controller) and the host controller's own lifecycle key."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_launch_broker_mints_no_role_tokens(self) -> None:
|
||||
# Empty role set — it provides durable key material for the broker's own
|
||||
# launch JWT, not orchestrator_auth role tokens.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(frozenset(), LAUNCH_BROKER.roles)
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
LAUNCH_BROKER.mint(ROLE_CLI)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_host_controller_signs_host_role_only(self) -> None:
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
|
||||
tok = HOST_CONTROLLER.mint(ROLE_HOST)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ROLE_HOST, HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(tok, "k"))
|
||||
# A control-plane `cli` token (the orchestrator's key) never verifies as a
|
||||
# host-controller role — the orchestrator can't forge lifecycle creds.
|
||||
cli_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(ROLE_CLI, "k")
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(cli_tok, "k"))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_control_plane_cannot_mint_the_host_role(self) -> None:
|
||||
# `host` is outside the control-plane role set on purpose.
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
CONTROL_PLANE.mint(ROLE_HOST)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_the_three_domains_use_distinct_keys_and_env_vars(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.assertEqual(3, len({
|
||||
CONTROL_PLANE.key_filename,
|
||||
LAUNCH_BROKER.key_filename,
|
||||
HOST_CONTROLLER.key_filename,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(3, len({
|
||||
CONTROL_PLANE.key_env, LAUNCH_BROKER.key_env, HOST_CONTROLLER.key_env,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestLaunchBrokerProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_broker_key_returns_the_durable_key(self) -> None:
|
||||
prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="bk"):
|
||||
self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_broker_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
|
||||
# An empty key would leave the host controller unable to verify any
|
||||
# launch — fail-closed rather than hand back a useless/dangerous key.
|
||||
prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
|
||||
prov.broker_key()
|
||||
|
||||
def test_controller_key_is_distinct_from_the_broker_key(self) -> None:
|
||||
# The orchestrator holds the broker key but NEVER the controller key.
|
||||
prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
|
||||
keys = {"launch-broker-key": "bk", "host-controller-key": "ck"}
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key",
|
||||
side_effect=keys.__getitem__):
|
||||
self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
|
||||
self.assertEqual("ck", prov.controller_key())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_controller_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
|
||||
prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
|
||||
with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
|
||||
prov.controller_key()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user