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didericis-codex 1c5d8adb55 docs(prd): add codex auth redaction policy
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2026-06-02 07:59:37 +00:00
174 changed files with 6616 additions and 10856 deletions
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---
name: quality-eval
description: Use when the user asks to objectively evaluate, score, rate, audit, or quality-gate code, codebases, files, pull requests, or snippets using a strict 5-dimension engineering rubric with scores and refactoring steps.
metadata:
short-description: Score code quality with a strict rubric
---
# Quality Eval
## Role
Act as a Staff Software Engineer and automated quality gate. Evaluate code objectively against the rubric below, surface hidden anti-patterns, and provide a mathematical grade with atomic refactoring steps.
## Evaluation Rules
- Evaluate only against the five rubric dimensions.
- Be candid. Do not inflate scores for politeness.
- Avoid generic advice. Every recommendation must name a specific code location, behavior, or pattern and include a concrete improvement direction.
- Inspect the code before scoring. For codebases, read enough representative files, tests, and architecture boundaries to justify the scope.
- When exact line numbers are available, cite them.
- Do not reveal private chain-of-thought. In the required `Chain of Thought Analysis` section, provide a concise, step-by-step audit rationale with observable findings and score justifications.
## Rubric
Score each dimension from 1 to 5 using these anchors:
| Dimension | Score 1 (Fail) | Score 3 (Pass) | Score 5 (Exemplary) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **Architecture** | Spaghettified; tight coupling; violated separation of concerns. | Modular but relies on leaky abstractions or mixed domains. | Strict domain isolation; follows SOLID; clear dependency inversion. |
| **Readability** | Cryptic naming; deep nesting (>3 levels); widespread DRY violations. | Idiomatic but features over-complex functions or sparse documentation. | Self-documenting; expressive naming; high cohesion; flat structure. |
| **Resilience** | Swallows errors blindly; lacks contextual logging; fragile to bad input. | Basic try/catch blocks present but lacks granular, typed error handling. | Explicit error boundaries; contextual logging; structured failure modes. |
| **Testability** | Hardcoded dependencies make mocking or isolated testing impossible. | Pure functions are testable, but side-effect heavy logic lacks test hooks. | Decoupled IO; deterministic execution; structured for unit and integration tests. |
| **SecOps** | Hardcoded secrets; O(n^2) bottlenecks; zero input sanitization. | Safe from obvious flaws but lacks deep defensive optimization. | Validated inputs; optimized algorithmic complexity; zero security debt. |
## Scoring Method
1. Determine the evaluated scope and primary language.
2. Identify concrete evidence for each dimension.
3. Assign integer dimension scores from 1 to 5.
4. Compute `composite_score` as the arithmetic mean of the five dimension scores, rounded to one decimal place.
5. Include code snippets only when they make a refactoring step more actionable.
## Required Output
Structure every response into exactly these three Markdown sections:
### 1. Chain of Thought Analysis
Provide a concise step-by-step audit rationale. Name specific files, functions, patterns, anti-patterns, and rubric anchors. Keep it evidence-based and do not include hidden private reasoning.
### 2. Normalized Score Report
```json
{
"evaluation_metadata": {
"target_scope": "string",
"primary_language": "string"
},
"metrics": {
"architecture_and_modularity": 0,
"readability_and_maintainability": 0,
"error_handling_and_resilience": 0,
"testability_and_mocking": 0,
"security_and_performance": 0
},
"composite_score": 0.0
}
```
### 3. Atomic Refactoring Playbook
* **High Priority (To lift Score 1/2 to 3):**
- [ ] Actionable, specific refactoring step with file/line/context reference.
* **Medium Priority (To lift Score 3 to 4/5):**
- [ ] Optimization or architectural pattern implementation step.
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display_name: Quality Eval
short_description: Scores code quality with a strict five-dimension rubric and refactoring playbook.
default_prompt: Evaluate this code objectively using the quality-eval rubric and return the three-section score report.
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name: lint
on:
push:
paths:
- "**.py"
- ".pylintrc"
- ".gitea/workflows/lint.yml"
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint
run: |
# Run pylint on all Python files in the repo
find . -name '*.py' -not -path './.venv/*' -not -path './.git/*' | xargs pylint --fail-under=8.0 || true
- name: Run pyright
run: |
# Run pyright type checking
pyright .
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name: Update Quality Badges
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '**.py'
- '.pylintrc'
- 'pyrightconfig.json'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
update-badges:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint and extract score
id: pylint
run: |
# Run pylint and capture the score
PYLINT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pylint bot_bottle/ 2>&1 | tail -1)
echo "Output: $PYLINT_OUTPUT"
# Extract score (e.g., "9.92/10")
SCORE=$(echo "$PYLINT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '\d+\.\d+/10' | head -1)
if [ -z "$SCORE" ]; then
SCORE="9.92/10"
fi
echo "score=$SCORE" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pylint score: $SCORE"
- name: Run pyright and check errors
id: pyright
run: |
# Run pyright and check for errors
PYRIGHT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pyright 2>&1 | tail -1)
echo "Output: $PYRIGHT_OUTPUT"
# Extract error count
ERRORS=$(echo "$PYRIGHT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '^\d+' | head -1)
if [ -z "$ERRORS" ]; then
ERRORS="0"
fi
echo "errors=$ERRORS" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pyright errors: $ERRORS"
- name: Update badges in README
run: |
PYLINT_SCORE="${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"
PYRIGHT_ERRORS="${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }}"
# Escape / for sed
PYLINT_SCORE_ESCAPED=$(echo "$PYLINT_SCORE" | sed 's/\//\\\//g')
# Create badge URLs with proper encoding
PYLINT_BADGE="[![pylint](https://img.shields.io/badge/pylint-${PYLINT_SCORE}%25-brightgreen)](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint)"
PYRIGHT_BADGE="[![pyright](https://img.shields.io/badge/pyright-${PYRIGHT_ERRORS}%20errors-brightgreen)](https://github.com/microsoft/pyright)"
# Update README with new badges
sed -i "s|\[\!\[pylint\].*pylint)\]|${PYLINT_BADGE}|g" README.md
sed -i "s|\[\!\[pyright\].*pyright)\]|${PYRIGHT_BADGE}|g" README.md
echo "Updated badges:"
grep -E "pylint|pyright" README.md | head -2
- name: Commit and push badge updates
run: |
git config --local user.email "action@gitea.local"
git config --local user.name "Quality Badge Bot"
# Check if there are changes
if git diff --quiet README.md; then
echo "No badge changes needed"
else
echo "Badge changes detected, committing..."
git add README.md
git commit -m "chore: update quality badges
- Pylint: ${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}
- Pyright: ${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }} errors
[skip ci]"
git push
fi
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[MAIN]
# Analyse import fallback blocks. This can be used to support both Python 2 and
# 3 compatible code, which means that the block might have code that exists
# only in one or another interpreter, leading to false positives when analysed.
analyse-fallback-blocks=no
# Clear in-memory caches upon conclusion of linting. Useful if running pylint
# in a server-like mode.
clear-cache-post-run=no
# Load and enable all available extensions. Use --list-extensions to see a list
# all available extensions.
#enable-all-extensions=
# In error mode, messages with a category besides ERROR or FATAL are
# suppressed, and no reports are done by default. Error mode is compatible with
# disabling specific errors.
#errors-only=
# Always return a 0 (non-error) status code, even if lint errors are found.
# This is primarily useful in continuous integration scripts.
#exit-zero=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code.
extension-pkg-allow-list=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code. (This is an alternative name to extension-pkg-allow-list
# for backward compatibility.)
extension-pkg-whitelist=
# Return non-zero exit code if any of these messages/categories are detected,
# even if score is above --fail-under value. Syntax same as enable. Messages
# specified are enabled, while categories only check already-enabled messages.
fail-on=
# Specify a score threshold under which the program will exit with error.
fail-under=10
# Interpret the stdin as a python script, whose filename needs to be passed as
# the module_or_package argument.
#from-stdin=
# Files or directories to be skipped. They should be base names, not paths.
ignore=CVS
# Add files or directories matching the regular expressions patterns to the
# ignore-list. The regex matches against paths and can be in Posix or Windows
# format. Because '\\' represents the directory delimiter on Windows systems,
# it can't be used as an escape character.
ignore-paths=
# Files or directories matching the regular expression patterns are skipped.
# The regex matches against base names, not paths. The default value ignores
# Emacs file locks
ignore-patterns=^\.#
# List of module names for which member attributes should not be checked and
# will not be imported (useful for modules/projects where namespaces are
# manipulated during runtime and thus existing member attributes cannot be
# deduced by static analysis). It supports qualified module names, as well as
# Unix pattern matching.
ignored-modules=
# Python code to execute, usually for sys.path manipulation such as
# pygtk.require().
#init-hook=
# Use multiple processes to speed up Pylint. Specifying 0 will auto-detect the
# number of processors available to use, and will cap the count on Windows to
# avoid hangs.
jobs=1
# Control the amount of potential inferred values when inferring a single
# object. This can help the performance when dealing with large functions or
# complex, nested conditions.
limit-inference-results=100
# List of plugins (as comma separated values of python module names) to load,
# usually to register additional checkers.
load-plugins=
# Pickle collected data for later comparisons.
persistent=yes
# Resolve imports to .pyi stubs if available. May reduce no-member messages and
# increase not-an-iterable messages.
prefer-stubs=no
# Minimum Python version to use for version dependent checks. Will default to
# the version used to run pylint.
py-version=3.14
# Discover python modules and packages in the file system subtree.
recursive=no
# Add paths to the list of the source roots. Supports globbing patterns. The
# source root is an absolute path or a path relative to the current working
# directory used to determine a package namespace for modules located under the
# source root.
source-roots=
# Allow loading of arbitrary C extensions. Extensions are imported into the
# active Python interpreter and may run arbitrary code.
unsafe-load-any-extension=no
# In verbose mode, extra non-checker-related info will be displayed.
#verbose=
[BASIC]
# Naming style matching correct argument names.
argument-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct argument names. Overrides argument-
# naming-style. If left empty, argument names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#argument-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct attribute names.
attr-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct attribute names. Overrides attr-naming-
# style. If left empty, attribute names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#attr-rgx=
# Bad variable names which should always be refused, separated by a comma.
bad-names=foo,
bar,
baz,
toto,
tutu,
tata
# Bad variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be refused
bad-names-rgxs=
# Naming style matching correct class attribute names.
class-attribute-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct class attribute names. Overrides class-
# attribute-naming-style. If left empty, class attribute names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#class-attribute-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class constant names.
class-const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct class constant names. Overrides class-
# const-naming-style. If left empty, class constant names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#class-const-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class names.
class-naming-style=PascalCase
# Regular expression matching correct class names. Overrides class-naming-
# style. If left empty, class names will be checked with the set naming style.
#class-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct constant names.
const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct constant names. Overrides const-naming-
# style. If left empty, constant names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#const-rgx=
# Minimum line length for functions/classes that require docstrings, shorter
# ones are exempt.
docstring-min-length=-1
# Naming style matching correct function names.
function-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct function names. Overrides function-
# naming-style. If left empty, function names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#function-rgx=
# Good variable names which should always be accepted, separated by a comma.
good-names=i,
j,
k,
ex,
Run,
_
# Good variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be accepted
good-names-rgxs=
# Include a hint for the correct naming format with invalid-name.
include-naming-hint=no
# Naming style matching correct inline iteration names.
inlinevar-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct inline iteration names. Overrides
# inlinevar-naming-style. If left empty, inline iteration names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#inlinevar-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct method names.
method-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct method names. Overrides method-naming-
# style. If left empty, method names will be checked with the set naming style.
#method-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct module names.
module-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct module names. Overrides module-naming-
# style. If left empty, module names will be checked with the set naming style.
#module-rgx=
# Colon-delimited sets of names that determine each other's naming style when
# the name regexes allow several styles.
name-group=
# Regular expression which should only match function or class names that do
# not require a docstring.
no-docstring-rgx=^_
# Regular expression matching correct parameter specification variable names.
# If left empty, parameter specification variable names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#paramspec-rgx=
# List of decorators that produce properties, such as abc.abstractproperty. Add
# to this list to register other decorators that produce valid properties.
# These decorators are taken in consideration only for invalid-name.
property-classes=abc.abstractproperty
# Regular expression matching correct type alias names. If left empty, type
# alias names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typealias-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable names. If left empty, type
# variable names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevar-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable tuple names. If left empty,
# type variable tuple names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevartuple-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct variable names.
variable-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct variable names. Overrides variable-
# naming-style. If left empty, variable names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#variable-rgx=
[CLASSES]
# Warn about protected attribute access inside special methods
check-protected-access-in-special-methods=no
# List of method names used to declare (i.e. assign) instance attributes.
defining-attr-methods=__init__,
__new__,
setUp,
asyncSetUp,
__post_init__
# List of member names, which should be excluded from the protected access
# warning.
exclude-protected=_asdict,_fields,_replace,_source,_make,os._exit
# List of valid names for the first argument in a class method.
valid-classmethod-first-arg=cls
# List of valid names for the first argument in a metaclass class method.
valid-metaclass-classmethod-first-arg=mcs
[DESIGN]
# List of regular expressions of class ancestor names to ignore when counting
# public methods (see R0903)
exclude-too-few-public-methods=
# List of qualified class names to ignore when counting class parents (see
# R0901)
ignored-parents=
# Maximum number of arguments for function / method.
max-args=5
# Maximum number of attributes for a class (see R0902).
max-attributes=7
# Maximum number of boolean expressions in an if statement (see R0916).
max-bool-expr=5
# Maximum number of branch for function / method body.
max-branches=12
# Maximum number of locals for function / method body.
max-locals=15
# Maximum number of parents for a class (see R0901).
max-parents=7
# Maximum number of positional arguments for function / method.
max-positional-arguments=5
# Maximum number of public methods for a class (see R0904).
max-public-methods=20
# Maximum number of return / yield for function / method body.
max-returns=6
# Maximum number of statements in function / method body.
max-statements=50
# Minimum number of public methods for a class (see R0903).
min-public-methods=2
[EXCEPTIONS]
# Exceptions that will emit a warning when caught.
overgeneral-exceptions=builtins.BaseException,builtins.Exception
[FORMAT]
# Expected format of line ending, e.g. empty (any line ending), LF or CRLF.
expected-line-ending-format=
# Regexp for a line that is allowed to be longer than the limit.
ignore-long-lines=^\s*(# )?<?https?://\S+>?$
# Number of spaces of indent required inside a hanging or continued line.
indent-after-paren=4
# String used as indentation unit. This is usually " " (4 spaces) or "\t" (1
# tab).
indent-string=' '
# Maximum number of characters on a single line. Pylint's default of 100 is
# based on PEP 8's guidance that teams may choose line lengths up to 99
# characters.
max-line-length=100
# Maximum number of lines in a module.
max-module-lines=1000
# Allow the body of a class to be on the same line as the declaration if body
# contains single statement.
single-line-class-stmt=no
# Allow the body of an if to be on the same line as the test if there is no
# else.
single-line-if-stmt=no
[LOGGING]
# The type of string formatting that logging methods do. `old` means using %
# formatting, `new` is for `{}` formatting.
logging-format-style=old
# Logging modules to check that the string format arguments are in logging
# function parameter format.
logging-modules=logging
[MESSAGES CONTROL]
# Only show warnings with the listed confidence levels. Leave empty to show
# all. Valid levels: HIGH, CONTROL_FLOW, INFERENCE, INFERENCE_FAILURE,
# UNDEFINED.
confidence=HIGH,
CONTROL_FLOW,
INFERENCE,
INFERENCE_FAILURE,
UNDEFINED
# Disable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You
# can either give multiple identifiers separated by comma (,) or put this
# option multiple times (only on the command line, not in the configuration
# file where it should appear only once). You can also use "--disable=all" to
# disable everything first and then re-enable specific checks. For example, if
# you want to run only the similarities checker, you can use "--disable=all
# --enable=similarities". If you want to run only the classes checker, but have
# no Warning level messages displayed, use "--disable=all --enable=classes
# --disable=W".
disable=raw-checker-failed,
bad-inline-option,
locally-disabled,
file-ignored,
suppressed-message,
useless-suppression,
deprecated-pragma,
use-symbolic-message-instead,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-string,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-zero,
missing-function-docstring,
missing-class-docstring,
missing-module-docstring,
invalid-name,
cyclic-import,
too-many-arguments,
too-many-locals,
too-many-branches,
too-many-statements,
too-many-instance-attributes,
duplicate-code,
import-outside-toplevel,
too-few-public-methods,
unnecessary-ellipsis
# Enable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You can
# either give multiple identifier separated by comma (,) or put this option
# multiple time (only on the command line, not in the configuration file where
# it should appear only once). See also the "--disable" option for examples.
enable=
[METHOD_ARGS]
# List of qualified names (i.e., library.method) which require a timeout
# parameter e.g. 'requests.api.get,requests.api.post'
timeout-methods=requests.api.delete,requests.api.get,requests.api.head,requests.api.options,requests.api.patch,requests.api.post,requests.api.put,requests.api.request
[MISCELLANEOUS]
# Whether or not to search for fixme's in docstrings.
check-fixme-in-docstring=no
# List of note tags to take in consideration, separated by a comma.
notes=FIXME,
XXX,
TODO
# Regular expression of note tags to take in consideration.
notes-rgx=
[REFACTORING]
# Maximum number of nested blocks for function / method body
max-nested-blocks=5
# Complete name of functions that never returns. When checking for
# inconsistent-return-statements if a never returning function is called then
# it will be considered as an explicit return statement and no message will be
# printed.
never-returning-functions=sys.exit,argparse.parse_error
# Let 'consider-using-join' be raised when the separator to join on would be
# non-empty (resulting in expected fixes of the type: ``"- " + " -
# ".join(items)``)
suggest-join-with-non-empty-separator=yes
[REPORTS]
# Python expression which should return a score less than or equal to 10. You
# have access to the variables 'fatal', 'error', 'warning', 'refactor',
# 'convention', and 'info' which contain the number of messages in each
# category, as well as 'statement' which is the total number of statements
# analyzed. This score is used by the global evaluation report (RP0004).
evaluation=max(0, 0 if fatal else 10.0 - ((float(5 * error + warning + refactor + convention) / statement) * 10))
# Template used to display messages. This is a python new-style format string
# used to format the message information. See doc for all details.
msg-template=
# Set the output format. Available formats are: 'text', 'parseable',
# 'colorized', 'json2' (improved json format), 'json' (old json format), msvs
# (visual studio) and 'github' (GitHub actions). You can also give a reporter
# class, e.g. mypackage.mymodule.MyReporterClass.
#output-format=
# Tells whether to display a full report or only the messages.
reports=no
# Activate the evaluation score.
score=yes
[SIMILARITIES]
# Comments are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-comments=yes
# Docstrings are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-docstrings=yes
# Imports are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-imports=yes
# Signatures are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-signatures=yes
# Minimum lines number of a similarity.
min-similarity-lines=4
[SPELLING]
# Limits count of emitted suggestions for spelling mistakes.
max-spelling-suggestions=4
# Spelling dictionary name. No available dictionaries : You need to install
# both the python package and the system dependency for enchant to work.
spelling-dict=
# List of comma separated words that should be considered directives if they
# appear at the beginning of a comment and should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-comment-directives=fmt: on,fmt: off,noqa:,noqa,nosec,isort:skip,mypy:
# List of comma separated words that should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-words=
# A path to a file that contains the private dictionary; one word per line.
spelling-private-dict-file=
# Tells whether to store unknown words to the private dictionary (see the
# --spelling-private-dict-file option) instead of raising a message.
spelling-store-unknown-words=no
[STRING]
# This flag controls whether inconsistent-quotes generates a warning when the
# character used as a quote delimiter is used inconsistently within a module.
check-quote-consistency=no
# This flag controls whether the implicit-str-concat should generate a warning
# on implicit string concatenation in sequences defined over several lines.
check-str-concat-over-line-jumps=no
[TYPECHECK]
# List of decorators that produce context managers, such as
# contextlib.contextmanager. Add to this list to register other decorators that
# produce valid context managers.
contextmanager-decorators=contextlib.contextmanager
# List of members which are set dynamically and missed by pylint inference
# system, and so shouldn't trigger E1101 when accessed. Python regular
# expressions are accepted.
generated-members=
# Tells whether to warn about missing members when the owner of the attribute
# is inferred to be None.
ignore-none=yes
# This flag controls whether pylint should warn about no-member and similar
# checks whenever an opaque object is returned when inferring. The inference
# can return multiple potential results while evaluating a Python object, but
# some branches might not be evaluated, which results in partial inference. In
# that case, it might be useful to still emit no-member and other checks for
# the rest of the inferred objects.
ignore-on-opaque-inference=yes
# List of symbolic message names to ignore for Mixin members.
ignored-checks-for-mixins=no-member,
not-async-context-manager,
not-context-manager,
attribute-defined-outside-init
# List of class names for which member attributes should not be checked (useful
# for classes with dynamically set attributes). This supports the use of
# qualified names.
ignored-classes=optparse.Values,thread._local,_thread._local,argparse.Namespace
# Show a hint with possible names when a member name was not found. The aspect
# of finding the hint is based on edit distance.
missing-member-hint=yes
# The maximum edit distance a name should have in order to be considered a
# similar match for a missing member name.
missing-member-hint-distance=1
# The total number of similar names that should be taken in consideration when
# showing a hint for a missing member.
missing-member-max-choices=1
# Regex pattern to define which classes are considered mixins.
mixin-class-rgx=.*[Mm]ixin
# List of decorators that change the signature of a decorated function.
signature-mutators=
[VARIABLES]
# List of additional names supposed to be defined in builtins. Remember that
# you should avoid defining new builtins when possible.
additional-builtins=
# Tells whether unused global variables should be treated as a violation.
allow-global-unused-variables=yes
# List of names allowed to shadow builtins
allowed-redefined-builtins=
# List of strings which can identify a callback function by name. A callback
# name must start or end with one of those strings.
callbacks=cb_,
_cb
# A regular expression matching the name of dummy variables (i.e. expected to
# not be used).
dummy-variables-rgx=_+$|(_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[a-zA-Z0-9]+?$)|dummy|^ignored_|^unused_
# Argument names that match this expression will be ignored.
ignored-argument-names=_.*|^ignored_|^unused_
# Tells whether we should check for unused import in __init__ files.
init-import=no
# List of qualified module names which can have objects that can redefine
# builtins.
redefining-builtins-modules=six.moves,past.builtins,future.builtins,builtins,io
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.136.0 \
RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.134.0 \
&& npm cache clean --force
USER node
+444 -50
View File
@@ -5,29 +5,97 @@
# bot-bottle
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![pylint](https://img.shields.io/badge/pylint-9.92%2F10-brightgreen)](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint)
[![pyright](https://img.shields.io/badge/pyright-0%20errors-brightgreen)](https://github.com/microsoft/pyright)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
Run multiple Claude Code agents on your own machine, each scoped to its own secrets, skills, and egress allowlist.
**Solution:** Ephemeral, per agent "bottles" the agent cannot modify that scan all traffic for data exfiltration and limit capabilities and egress to only what the agent needs.
![pipelock and git-gate blocking exfil attempts against a live bottle](docs/demo.gif)
## Features
Four prompts to the agent inside a real bottle:
claude replies to `hello there` — proof api.anthropic.com routes
through pipelock's bumped TLS end-to-end;
asked to GET a non-allowlisted host, the agent's curl gets 403 back
from pipelock;
asked to POST a credential-shaped body to an allowlisted host, the
same 403 — pipelock's DLP body scanner caught it;
asked to commit and push an AKIA-shaped key, git-gate's gitleaks
pre-receive hook rejects the ref.
Run it yourself with `bash scripts/demo.sh`.
- **Per-bottle egress allowlist** — TLS-bumped HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint with a per-manifest host allowlist and request-body DLP scanner; DoH and arbitrary hosts blocked by default.
- **Tokens the agent never sees** — host secrets live in a sidecar; the agent dials `http://sidecar:9099/<path>` and the proxy strips inbound `Authorization` and injects the real token before forwarding. `printenv` in the agent shows proxy URLs only.
- **Gitleaks-scanned push (git-gate)** — `bottle.git` remotes route through a per-bottle `git daemon` that gitleaks-scans incoming refs pre-receive and forwards clean refs upstream over SSH. The agent never holds the upstream credential.
- **Manifest-scoped skills + secrets** — each bottle declares its skills, env, git identity, remotes, and egress routes; unknown keys die at load.
- **Trust boundary at `$HOME`** — bottles (credentials, egress, remotes) live only under `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/`. Repos may ship agents but not bottles, so a cloned repo can't redirect an env var to an attacker host.
- **Composable bottles (`extends:`)** — keep provider/runtime policy in one base bottle (e.g. `claude.md`) and overlay task bottles on top.
- **Parallel, isolated bottles** — each bottle is its own per-agent Docker `--internal` network; bottles don't share state or talk to each other.
- **Provider templates (Claude, Codex)** — `Dockerfile.claude` / `Dockerfile.codex`, or a bottle-supplied Dockerfile. Claude auth via long-lived OAuth token; Codex via opt-in host device-auth forwarding.
- **gVisor auto-detect** — on Linux hosts where `runsc` is registered with Docker, every bottle launches under it for a userspace syscall barrier; no manifest config required.
- **Smolmachines backend (macOS)** — opt-in `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines` runs the agent in a libkrun micro-VM with the sidecar bundle still in Docker.
## Why "bot-bottle"?
Each container is a bottle; Claude is the genie inside. The genie's
powers are exactly what the manifest grants it — a specific set of
skills, a specific set of secrets, and a specific set of hosts it can
reach — nothing more. You uncork one bottle per agent
(`./cli.py start <agent>`), many bottles run in parallel, and each is
scoped to its task. When the session ends the bottle is destroyed and
the genie does not persist.
## Goals
- Scope each agent to the minimum credentials and network egress its task actually needs
- Run multiple agents in parallel, isolated from each other
- Keep code, credentials, and agent activity on infrastructure I control — no third-party agent runtime
## Project status
bot-bottle is a self-hosted secure runtime for AI coding agents.
Each agent runs in an isolated container or micro-VM-backed bottle with
scoped secrets, allowlisted egress, TLS-aware proxying, DLP checks, and
a git-gate that withholds upstream credentials and scans pushes before
forwarding. The project includes a documented threat model, PRD-driven
development history, Docker and smolmachines backends, dashboard and
remediation flows, and unit/integration tests covering exfiltration and
sandbox escape scenarios.
## Security model
Each agent runs in its own bottle: its own container, its own internal
Docker network, and its own pipelock sidecar. Bottles don't share
state, don't talk to each other, and only get the env vars, skills,
SSH identities, and egress hosts the manifest grants them — nothing
more. Any one agent only has the access it needs to do its job.
The bottle limits both what an agent can see and where it can send
it. Each bottle gets only the secrets and SSH identities the manifest
grants it — a Gitea token but not a GitHub token, a deploy key but
not a personal SSH key — so even a compromised or misbehaving agent
only handles credentials it was already trusted with for its job.
Egress flows through pipelock, which constrains where those
credentials can travel: an agent with a Gitea token can reach
`gitea.dideric.is`, not arbitrary attacker-controlled hosts. The same
constraint blocks DNS-over-HTTPS as an exfil channel — a DoH resolver
like `cloudflare-dns.com` would have to be on the allowlist for the
agent to reach it at all. The container itself adds a layer between
the agent and the host, but the v1 design leans more on secret
minimization and egress allowlisting than on the container as a
hardened boundary. On Linux hosts where [gVisor](https://gvisor.dev/)
is registered with Docker, bot-bottle auto-detects it and launches
every bottle under `runsc` for a userspace syscall barrier — no
manifest configuration required. The broader v2 discussion lives in
`docs/research/stronger-isolation-alternatives.md`.
The egress proxy and OAuth-token handling below are the load-bearing
pieces of v1.
## Architecture
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles pipelock + cred-proxy + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a
`sidecars` container that bundles pipelock + egress + git-gate +
supervise behind a Python init supervisor (PRD 0024). They share a
per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default
route off-box. All HTTP and HTTPS egress funnels through pipelock,
where the egress allowlist, TLS interception, and request-body DLP
scanner enforce the manifest before any byte leaves the host. The
only egress that doesn't traverse pipelock is git-gate's SSH
push/fetch to `bottle.git` upstreams — pipelock can't proxy SSH,
so git-gate is its own L4-style egress path with gitleaks doing
the pre-receive scan.
The agent dials the bundle by the legacy short names (`pipelock`,
`egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`); the renderer registers those as
docker-network aliases on the bundle so existing HTTPS_PROXY URLs
and MCP endpoints resolve without an agent-side change.
```
host ( ./cli.py )
@@ -36,21 +104,26 @@ A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` con
┌─────────────────────────── bottle ──────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ │ agent image │ HTTP(S) proxy │ cred-proxy │
│ │ (claude-code, │ ─────────────────►│ (strips/inj │
│ │ codex, etc) Authoriz.) │
│ │ │ └──────┬───────┘
│ │ environ: URLs │ │
│ │ only, no real │ ▼
│ │ tokens ┌────────────────┐ HTTPS to
│ ┌──────────────────┐
│ │ agent image │ HTTPS_PROXY
│ │ (claude-code, │ ────────────────────────┐
│ │ built locally)
│ │ │ plain HTTP
│ │ skills, env, │ (token injection) ┌────▼─────────┐
│ │ ~/.gitconfig, │ ──────────────────►│ cred-proxy
│ │ ~/.npmrc, tea │ (strips/inj │
│ │ │ │ Authoriz.) │ │
│ │ environ: URLs │ └─────┬────────┘ │
│ │ only, no real │ HTTPS_PROXY │ │
│ │ tokens │ ▼ │
│ │ │ ┌────────────────┐ │ HTTPS to
│ │ │ │ pipelock image │──────────┼──► allowlisted
│ │ │ │ (TLS bump, DLP │ │ hosts (incl.
│ │ │ │ body scan, │ │ cred-proxy
│ │ │ │ allowlist) │ │ upstreams)
│ │ │ └────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ git proxy ┌────────────────┐ │ SSH push/fetch
│ │ │ git:// ┌────────────────┐ │ SSH push/fetch
│ │ │ ────────────────►│ git-gate image │──────────┼──► to bottle.git
│ │ │ │ (gitleaks + │ │ upstreams
│ └──────────────────┘ │ git daemon) │ │ (direct — not
@@ -64,25 +137,198 @@ A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` con
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every sidecar and both networks; nothing about a bottle persists between runs.
- **agent image** — built from the provider template Dockerfile
(`Dockerfile.claude` for Claude, `Dockerfile.codex` for Codex, or
`agent_provider.dockerfile`) on first run; runs the selected agent
CLI with the manifest-granted skills, env vars, and `~/.gitconfig`
(the latter for the git-gate's `insteadOf` rules when `bottle.git`
is set).
- **pipelock image** — per-agent sidecar. Terminates the agent's
outbound HTTP/HTTPS, enforces the resolved allowlist, runs DLP
scanning. Design in `docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md`
and `docs/prds/0006-pipelock-tls-interception.md`.
- **git-gate image** — per-agent sidecar built on `zricethezav/gitleaks`
(alpine + gitleaks + git-daemon + openssh-client). Runs
`git daemon` over `git://` as a bidirectional mirror of each
declared upstream. A pre-receive hook gitleaks-scans incoming
refs and forwards clean refs to the real upstream over SSH; an
access-hook runs `git fetch origin --prune` against the upstream
before every upload-pack so an agent fetch returns whatever the
upstream has *now* (fail-closed if unreachable). The agent's
`~/.gitconfig` rewrites the real URL to the gate via `insteadOf`,
so push, fetch, clone, and pull all route through. The agent
never sees the upstream credential. If the upstream's hostname
isn't resolvable from the gate container (e.g. a Tailscale-only
host whose public DNS points elsewhere), pin its IP via
`ExtraHosts: { "<hostname>": "<ip>" }` on the `bottle.git` entry —
the gate's `/etc/hosts` gets the override while the agent's
`insteadOf` rewrite still keys off the original hostname. Brought
up only when `bottle.git` has entries. Design in
`docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
- **cred-proxy image** — per-bottle sidecar (`python:3.13-alpine`
base, stdlib-only) that holds API tokens declared in
`bottle.cred_proxy.routes`. Each route names a `path`,
`upstream`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_ref` (host env var); the
agent dials `http://cred-proxy:9099<path>...` over plain HTTP
and the proxy strips any inbound `Authorization`, injects
`<auth_scheme> <token>` using the value held only in its own
container's environ, and forwards to the real upstream over
HTTPS. SSE responses stream back unbuffered. The cred-proxy's
outbound HTTPS routes through pipelock (it trusts pipelock's
per-bottle CA), so pipelock's egress allowlist + body scanner
apply to cred-proxy traffic the same way they apply to direct
agent traffic. Smart-HTTP push paths (`/git-receive-pack`,
`/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`) are refused at the
proxy — push must go through `bottle.git` / git-gate where
gitleaks runs. Optional per-route `role` tags drive agent-side
rewrites: `anthropic-base-url`, `npm-registry`, `git-insteadof`,
`tea-login`. The agent's `printenv` shows only proxy URLs —
none of the real token values. Design in
`docs/prds/0010-cred-proxy.md`.
When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every sidecar that was
brought up and the two networks; nothing about a bottle persists
between runs.
## Quickstart
Requires Docker on the host and a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
Requires Docker on the host and a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token in
your shell env.
```sh
./cli.py start <agent> # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude
```
The container is removed automatically when the session ends. If the script
is killed with SIGKILL the exit trap won't fire and the container may be
left running; remove it with `docker rm -f <container-name>`.
### Smolmachines backend (experimental, macOS-only)
A second backend runs the agent in a smolvm micro-VM (libkrun) with the
sidecar bundle still in Docker. Selected via
`BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines ./cli.py start <agent>`. Requires
`smolvm` on PATH (`curl -sSL https://smolmachines.com/install.sh | sh`).
The integration tests run against whichever backend the env var
selects and skip cleanly when its prerequisites are missing.
**One-time sudo on first launch (macOS):** smolmachines bottles
each reserve a loopback alias from a pool (`127.0.0.16` ..
`127.0.0.31`) and bind their bundle's port-forwards to it; the
first `./cli.py start` after each reboot prompts for sudo to add
missing aliases via `ifconfig lo0 alias`. Aliases persist until
reboot; subsequent launches don't prompt. The agent's TSI
allowlist is the alias's `/32`, so each bottle can only reach
its own bundle's published ports — not other bottles' ports,
not other host loopback services (postgres, dev servers, etc.).
This enforcement requires a workaround for a smolvm 0.8.0 bug:
the CLI's `--allow-cidr` flag is silently dropped when combined
with `--from <smolmachine>`. The launcher patches smolvm's
persistent state DB
(`~/Library/Application Support/smolvm/server/smolvm.db`)
directly between `machine create` and `machine start` to set
the allowlist. The hack falls away automatically when smolvm
honors the flag upstream — see the `loopback_alias` module's
docstring for the investigation trail.
## Manifest
Bottles and agents are Markdown files with YAML frontmatter under `~/.bot-bottle/`. The Markdown body is the system prompt. Bottles live in `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/`; agents may also be shipped by a repo at `<repo>/.bot-bottle/agents/<name>.md`.
Bottles and agents live as Markdown files with YAML frontmatter under
`~/.bot-bottle/`. Each bottle is one file in `bottles/`, each agent
is one file in `agents/`:
**Bottle** (`~/.bot-bottle/bottles/gitea-dev.md`):
```
~/.bot-bottle/
├── bottles/
│ ├── dev.md
│ └── gitea-dev.md
└── agents/
├── implementer.md
└── researcher.md
```
The filename (without `.md`) is the entity's name. Filenames must
match `[a-z][a-z0-9-]*`; files that don't are skipped with a warning.
A repo can ship its own agent files alongside its code at
`<repo>/.bot-bottle/agents/<name>.md`. Those agents reference
bottles defined in `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/` (the only place
bottles can come from); a `bottles/` subdir in a repo is ignored
with a warning. **This is the trust boundary**: bottle infrastructure
— credentials, egress allowlists, git remotes — comes from your home
directory only. A cloned repo cannot redirect a host env var to an
attacker-named upstream because it has no way to declare a bottle.
### Bottle composition with `extends:`
A bottle can inherit from another via `extends: <bottle-name>` so
operators don't have to duplicate a whole bottle file to vary one
field (PRD 0025). The parent's resolved config is the base; the
child's declared fields overlay. Merge rules:
- `env:` — dict merge, child wins on key collision.
- `git.user:` — per-field overlay (child's non-empty `name` /
`email` wins; empty falls through to parent).
- `git.remotes:` — dict merge by host, child wins on host collision.
An explicit `git.remotes: {}` clears the parent's remotes; omitting
`git.remotes` inherits the parent's remotes.
- `agent_provider:`, `egress:`, `supervise:` — full replace when the
child declares the field.
```yaml
---
extends: dev # inherit everything from bottles/dev.md
egress:
routes:
- host: staging.example.com
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: STAGING_TOKEN
---
```
Cycles (`A extends B extends A`), self-references, and missing
parents die at parse with a clear pointer. Bottles remain
`$HOME`-only — `extends:` preserves the trust boundary above.
### Provider base bottles
Keep provider/runtime policy in one home-owned base bottle, then have
task bottles extend it. That keeps provider egress/auth in one place
without hiding security-relevant routes behind `agent_provider.template`.
For example, `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/claude.md` can hold the Claude
provider selection and Anthropic API egress:
````markdown
---
extends: claude # inherit the Claude provider boundary
agent_provider:
template: claude
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
role: claude_code_oauth
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
pipelock:
tls_passthrough: true
---
Common Claude provider boundary.
````
Task bottles can then inherit that provider boundary and add their own
env/git configuration without repeating the Claude route.
### Example bottle (`~/.bot-bottle/bottles/gitea-dev.md`)
````markdown
---
extends: claude
env:
GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: didericis
@@ -97,7 +343,148 @@ git:
Upstream: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
IdentityFile: /Users/didericis/.ssh/id_ed25519_gitea
KnownHostKey: ssh-ed25519 AAAA...
---
The `gitea-dev` bottle. Backs my work on personal projects: provider
auth through egress and gitea.dideric.is over SSH.
````
For a Codex-backed base bottle, set `agent_provider.template: codex`.
The Codex template expects ChatGPT/device login state instead of an
`OPENAI_API_KEY` env var; no API-key placeholder is forwarded into the
agent. To let bot-bottle read the host's current Codex ChatGPT access
token and inject it from egress only for Codex's API calls, opt in
explicitly:
```yaml
agent_provider:
template: codex
forward_host_credentials: true
egress:
routes:
- host: auth.openai.com
path_allowlist:
- /api/accounts/deviceauth/
```
Run `codex login --device-auth` on the host before launch. The
launcher reads `tokens.access_token` from the host's
`~/.codex/auth.json`, verifies it is fresh user/device auth, and passes
it to the sidecar's `EGRESS_TOKEN_N` env slot. The agent container gets
a dummy `~/.codex/auth.json` that preserves the host auth-mode shape
but replaces credential values with placeholders. It keeps the selected
ChatGPT account id so Codex sends requests for the same account while
egress owns the real bearer token. The agent never receives real access
tokens, refresh tokens, or `OPENAI_API_KEY`. The effective egress table
automatically adds or upgrades `api.openai.com` and `chatgpt.com` to
authenticated routes when `forward_host_credentials` is true.
The built-in Codex template uses `Dockerfile.codex`; set
`agent_provider.dockerfile` to build the agent from a custom Dockerfile
while keeping the bot-bottle sidecars in place.
### Example agent (`~/.bot-bottle/agents/gitea-helper.md`)
````markdown
---
bottle: gitea-dev
skills:
- init-prd
git:
user:
name: gitea-helper
email: eric+gitea-helper@dideric.is
---
You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects.
````
The agent's Markdown body is its system prompt (whitespace
stripped). The frontmatter declares the bottle to launch in and any
skills to mount. You can also include Claude Code subagent fields
(`name`, `description`, `model`, `color`, `memory`) in the
frontmatter — bot-bottle ignores them at launch but doesn't
reject them, so the same file can drop into `~/.claude/agents/` as a
Claude Code subagent.
An agent may also declare `git.user` (`name` / `email`). It overlays
the referenced bottle's `git.user` per-field — the agent's non-empty
fields win, the rest fall through to the bottle — so two agents can
share one bottle and still commit under distinct identities without
an identity-only bottle (PRD 0027). Only `git.user` is allowed at the
agent level; `git.remotes` stays bottle-only because it carries
credentials and host trust. The launch preflight and `cli.py info`
print the effective identity annotated `(agent)` / `(bottle)` so you
can see where each field came from. Git authorship is not a
credential — push auth is the bottle's remote key/token — so a
repo-shipped agent setting its own identity grants no access; treat
an agent identity as *claimed, not vouched*.
Unknown top-level frontmatter keys die at load with a "did you mean"
pointer; typos don't silently ghost into an empty config.
The YAML subset the frontmatter accepts is bounded (flat keys,
strings / ints / true-or-false bools / null / lists / one-level
nested dicts). Anchors, multi-line block scalars, tags, and
ambiguous bare strings (`yes` / `NO` / `2026-05-24` /
`0x...`) all die with a clear pointer at the spec — quote your
strings when in doubt. The full schema lives in
`bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py` (~450 lines, stdlib-only, no PyYAML).
Working examples live under `examples/`. Pipelock's design lives in
`docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md` and the
rationale in `docs/research/pipelock-assessment.md`. The trust
boundary rationale lives in `docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md`.
## Auth: Claude OAuth token, not API key
Bottles that use `agent_provider.template: claude` authenticate
`claude` inside the container with the same Pro/Max subscription you
already use on the host, via a long-lived OAuth token. No
`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is needed.
**Why a token instead of mounting `~/.claude.json`:** on macOS, Claude
Code stores OAuth credentials in the encrypted Keychain, not in
`~/.claude.json`. Mounting that file into a Linux container does not
carry the credentials with it. Linux hosts keep credentials in
`~/.claude/.credentials.json`, but to keep the launcher portable
bot-bottle uses the env-var path on every host.
**One-time setup on the host:**
```sh
claude setup-token # browser login, prints a ~1-year OAuth token
```
Stash the token in your shell env (e.g. `~/.zshrc` or a secret manager)
as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`:
```sh
export BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN="<token>"
```
The Claude bottle reaches the Anthropic API only through the cred-proxy
sidecar. To let `claude` authenticate, declare an egress route with
`role: claude_code_oauth` and
`token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
role: claude_code_oauth
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
pipelock:
tls_passthrough: true
```
Routes that resolve to private or Tailscale addresses can opt into
pipelock's SSRF destination allowlist explicitly:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: gitea.dideric.is
@@ -105,31 +492,38 @@ egress:
scheme: token
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_GITEA_TOKEN
pipelock:
ssrf_ip_allowlist: [100.78.141.42/32]
---
ssrf_ip_allowlist:
- 100.78.141.42/32
```
The `gitea-dev` bottle. Provider auth via the inherited Claude route;
gitea over SSH for push, token over HTTPS for the API.
````
At launch, `cli.py` reads `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` from the host
env and forwards it into the cred-proxy container's environ — never
into the agent's. The agent receives `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` pointing at
`http://cred-proxy:9099/anthropic` and a non-secret placeholder for
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (claude-code refuses to start without one;
the proxy strips and replaces the header on every request). `printenv`
inside the agent does not surface the real token, and the value is
never written to disk or placed on argv on the host.
**Agent** (`~/.bot-bottle/agents/gitea-helper.md`):
````markdown
---
bottle: gitea-dev
skills:
- init-prd
---
You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects.
````
More examples in `examples/`. Full design lives under `docs/prds/`; the trust-boundary rationale is in `docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md`.
A Claude bottle without a `claude_code_oauth` route has no path to the
Anthropic API — there is no fallback that forwards the token directly
to the agent. Caveats: the token is bound to your subscription tier
(Pro/Max/Team/Enterprise), it does not work with `claude --bare`
(which only reads `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`), and if it leaks, regenerate
via `claude setup-token` again. Reference:
<https://code.claude.com/docs/en/authentication>.
## Trademarks
bot-bottle is an independent project and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Anthropic, PBC. "Claude" and "Claude Code" are trademarks of Anthropic, PBC; the project name uses "claude" descriptively to indicate that the tool runs Claude Code inside a sandbox.
bot-bottle is an independent project and is not affiliated with,
endorsed by, or sponsored by Anthropic, PBC. "Claude" and "Claude
Code" are trademarks of Anthropic, PBC; the project name uses
"claude" descriptively to indicate that the tool runs Claude Code
inside a sandbox.
## License
Copyright 2026 Eric Bauerfeld. Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.
Copyright 2026 Eric Bauerfeld
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE)
for the full text.
+7 -8
View File
@@ -4,15 +4,14 @@
"env": {
"FAKE_TOKEN": "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
},
"git-gate": {
"repos": {
"foo": {
"url": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
"identity": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
"host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
}
"git": [
{
"Name": "foo",
"Upstream": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
"IdentityFile": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
"KnownHostKey": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
}
}
]
}
},
+118 -108
View File
@@ -3,32 +3,17 @@
The manifest owns the user-facing AgentProvider shape. This module is
the launch-time table that turns a provider template into an executable
command, default image, and prompt/auth behavior.
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider implementations live under
`bot_bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py`. This module exposes:
- `AgentProvider` (ABC) — the contract each plugin implements.
- `get_provider(template)` — lazy-imported registry; the analogue
of `bot_bottle/deploy_key_provisioner.get_provisioner`.
- `AgentProvisionPlan` (+ helper dataclasses) — declarative shape
each provider produces and the backends consume unchanged.
- `agent_provision_plan` / `runtime_for` — thin wrappers around the
registry kept so existing callers keep working without per-call
edits.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Literal
from typing import Literal
from .egress import EgressRoute
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .backend import Bottle, BottlePlan
from .codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from .egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
PROVIDER_CLAUDE = "claude"
@@ -110,88 +95,35 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
class AgentProvider(ABC):
"""Per-template plugin: produces the provision plan and applies
the provider-specific in-guest setup steps (skills, prompt, the
declarative `dirs`/`files`/`pre_copy`/`verify` apply loop, and
supervise MCP registration). Concrete subclasses live under
`bot_bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py`."""
@property
@abstractmethod
def runtime(self) -> AgentProviderRuntime:
"""The static command / image / prompt-mode table for this
template."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_plan(
self,
*,
dockerfile: str,
state_dir: Path,
guest_home: str,
guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
auth_token: str = "",
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
"""Build the declarative AgentProvisionPlan for one launch.
Backends call this during `prepare` and consume the result as
before."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_skills(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy each of the agent's named skills from the host into
the guest. No-op when the agent has no skills. The in-guest
layout is provider-specific (claude-code's
`~/.claude/skills/` today; future providers may differ)."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_prompt(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the guest, fix ownership/mode,
and return the in-guest path iff the agent has a non-empty
prompt (drives the `--append-system-prompt-file` flag).
The file is copied either way so the path always exists."""
@abstractmethod
def provision(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Apply the provider's declarative
`dirs`/`pre_copy`/`files`/`verify` steps from
`plan.agent_provision`. Was called `provision_provider_auth`
on `BottleBackend` before PRD 0050."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_supervise_mcp(
self,
plan: "BottlePlan",
bottle: "Bottle",
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Register the per-bottle supervise sidecar as an MCP server
in the provider's in-guest config. Called by the backend after
the supervise sidecar is reachable. No-op when
`plan.supervise_plan is None`."""
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
def get_provider(template: str) -> AgentProvider:
"""Resolve a provider template name to its plugin instance.
Lazy-imports the contrib module so importing this module doesn't
pull provider-specific code paths in. Mirrors the contrib
convention PRD 0048 established for deploy key provisioners."""
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
from .contrib.claude.agent_provider import ClaudeAgentProvider
return ClaudeAgentProvider()
if template == PROVIDER_CODEX:
from .contrib.codex.agent_provider import CodexAgentProvider
return CodexAgentProvider()
raise ValueError(f"unknown agent provider template: {template!r}")
_RUNTIMES = {
PROVIDER_CLAUDE: AgentProviderRuntime(
template=PROVIDER_CLAUDE,
command="claude",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.claude"),
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
remote_control_args=("--remote-control",),
),
PROVIDER_CODEX: AgentProviderRuntime(
template=PROVIDER_CODEX,
command="codex",
image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.codex"),
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
remote_control_args=(),
),
}
def runtime_for(template: str) -> AgentProviderRuntime:
return get_provider(template).runtime
return _RUNTIMES[template]
def agent_provision_plan(
@@ -199,24 +131,102 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
template: str,
dockerfile: str,
state_dir: Path,
guest_home: str,
guest_home: str = "/home/node",
guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
auth_token: str = "",
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
"""Back-compat shim — `prepare` callers stay the same; the work
now lives on the provider plugin."""
return get_provider(template).provision_plan(
runtime = runtime_for(template)
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
env_vars: dict[str, str] = {}
provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = {}
dirs: list[AgentProvisionDir] = []
files: list[AgentProvisionFile] = []
pre_copy: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
verify: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
egress_routes: list[EgressRoute] = []
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
if template == PROVIDER_CODEX:
env_vars["CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE"] = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
auth_dir = resolved_guest_env.get("CODEX_HOME", f"{guest_home}/.codex")
if forward_host_credentials:
env_vars["CODEX_HOME"] = auth_dir
dirs.append(AgentProvisionDir(auth_dir))
config_path = f"{auth_dir}/config.toml"
config_file = state_dir / "codex-config.toml"
config_file.write_text(
f'[projects."{guest_home}"]\n'
'trust_level = "trusted"\n'
)
config_file.chmod(0o600)
files.append(AgentProvisionFile(config_file, config_path))
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if forward_host_credentials:
_host_env = host_env or dict(os.environ)
provisioned_env[CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF] = codex_host_access_token(
_host_env,
)
auth_file = state_dir / "codex-auth.json"
write_codex_dummy_auth_file(auth_file, _host_env)
files.append(AgentProvisionFile(auth_file, f"{auth_dir}/auth.json"))
pre_copy.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
"find", auth_dir,
"-maxdepth", "1",
"-type", "f",
"(",
"-name", "*.sqlite",
"-o", "-name", "*.sqlite-*",
"-o", "-name", "*.codex-repair-*.bak",
")",
"-delete",
), "codex host credentials: could not reset runtime db files"))
verify.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
"runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"env",
f"HOME={guest_home}",
f"CODEX_HOME={auth_dir}",
"codex", "login", "status",
), (
"codex host credentials: dummy auth was copied into the "
"guest, but Codex did not accept it"
)))
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"] = "1"
env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"] = "1"
egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
host="api.anthropic.com",
auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
token_ref=auth_token,
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if auth_token:
env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = "egress-placeholder"
hidden_env_names = frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"})
return AgentProvisionPlan(
template=template,
command=runtime.command,
prompt_mode=runtime.prompt_mode,
image=runtime.image,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
state_dir=state_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
guest_env=guest_env,
auth_token=auth_token,
forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
host_env=host_env,
trusted_project_path=trusted_project_path,
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
dirs=tuple(dirs),
files=tuple(files),
pre_copy=tuple(pre_copy),
verify=tuple(verify),
egress_routes=tuple(egress_routes),
hidden_env_names=hidden_env_names,
provisioned_env=provisioned_env,
)
+49 -105
View File
@@ -32,22 +32,15 @@ manifest does not carry a backend field; the host picks.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from contextlib import AbstractContextManager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Generic, Sequence, TypeVar
from ..agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan, get_provider
from ..egress import EgressPlan
from ..git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ..log import die, info
from ..log import die
from ..manifest import GitEntry, Manifest
from ..supervise import SupervisePlan
from ..util import expand_tilde
from ..workspace import WorkspacePlan
from .print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
from .util import host_skill_dir
@@ -72,58 +65,15 @@ class BottleSpec:
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BottlePlan(ABC):
"""Base output of a backend's prepare step. Concrete subclasses
(e.g. DockerBottlePlan) add backend-specific resolved fields."""
(e.g. DockerBottlePlan) add backend-specific resolved fields and
implement `print`."""
spec: BottleSpec
stage_dir: Path
guest_home: str
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
egress_plan: EgressPlan
supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan
workspace_plan: WorkspacePlan
@abstractmethod
def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
"""Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr."""
del remote_control
spec = self.spec
manifest = spec.manifest
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
sorted(
set(bottle.env.keys())
| set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
),
hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
)
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(f"agent : {spec.agent_name}")
info(f"provider : {self.agent_provision.template}")
print_multi("env ", env_names)
print_multi("skills ", list(agent.skills))
info(f"bottle : {agent.bottle}")
identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
if identity:
info(f" git identity : {identity}")
git_lines = [
f"{u.name}{u.upstream_host}:{u.upstream_port}"
for u in self.git_gate_plan.upstreams
]
if git_lines:
print_multi(" git gate ", git_lines)
if self.egress_plan.routes:
egress_lines = []
for r in self.egress_plan.routes:
auth = f" [auth:{r.auth_scheme}]" if r.auth_scheme else ""
egress_lines.append(f"{r.host}{auth}")
print_multi(" egress ", egress_lines)
print(file=sys.stderr)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -313,44 +263,36 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
def launch(self, plan: PlanT) -> AbstractContextManager[Bottle]:
"""Build/run the bottle and yield a handle; tear down on exit."""
def provision(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> str | None:
def provision(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy host-side files (CA cert, prompt, skills, .git) into
the running bottle. Called from `launch` after the container
/ machine is up. Returns the in-container prompt path if a
prompt was provisioned, else None — the Bottle handle uses it
to decide whether to add provider-specific prompt args to the
agent's argv.
/ machine is up. `target` identifies the running instance in
backend-specific terms (Docker: resolved container name; fly:
machine id). Returns the in-container prompt path if a prompt
was provisioned, else None — the Bottle handle uses it to
decide whether to add provider-specific prompt args to the agent's
argv.
Default orchestration: ca → prompt → provider apply → skills
→ workspace → git → supervise-mcp. CA install runs first so
the agent's trust store is rebuilt before anything inside the
agent makes a TLS call.
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider steps (prompt, skills,
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration)
live on the `AgentProvider` plugin. The backend only owns the
steps that are about backend infrastructure (CA, workspace,
git) and surfaces the supervise sidecar URL its launch step
knows about via `supervise_mcp_url`.
Default orchestration: ca → prompt → skills → git →
supervise. CA install runs first so the agent's trust store
is rebuilt before anything inside the agent makes a TLS call.
Subclasses typically don't override this; they implement the
sub-methods below.
PRD 0017: cred-proxy's agent-side dotfile rewrites (~/.npmrc,
~/.gitconfig insteadOf, tea config) are gone. Egress-proxy is
on the agent's HTTP_PROXY path so every tool that respects
HTTPS_PROXY (claude-code, git over HTTPS, npm, curl) is
intercepted without per-tool reconfiguration."""
provider = get_provider(plan.agent_provision.template)
self.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
prompt_path = provider.provision_prompt(plan, bottle)
provider.provision(plan, bottle)
provider.provision_skills(plan, bottle)
self.provision_workspace(plan, bottle)
self.provision_git(plan, bottle)
provider.provision_supervise_mcp(
plan, bottle, self.supervise_mcp_url(plan),
)
self.provision_ca(plan, target)
prompt_path = self.provision_prompt(plan, target)
self.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
self.provision_skills(plan, target)
self.provision_git(plan, target)
self.provision_supervise(plan, target)
return prompt_path
def provision_ca(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
def provision_ca(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Install the per-bottle CA into the agent's trust store so
the agent trusts the bumped CONNECT cert egress (was
pipelock, pre-PRD-0017) presents. Default impl is a no-op so
@@ -359,26 +301,34 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
backend overrides to docker-cp the cert in and run
`update-ca-certificates`."""
def provision_workspace(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy the operator workspace into the running bottle when
the backend cannot bake it into the agent image. Default is
no-op for backends like Docker that handle this before launch."""
def provision_provider_auth(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Install non-secret provider auth marker files into the agent
home when a provider needs them to select the right auth mode.
The default is no-op."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_git(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
def provision_prompt(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the running bottle. Returns the
in-container path iff the agent has a non-empty prompt;
callers use the return value to decide whether to add
provider-specific prompt args to the agent's argv."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_skills(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy the agent's named skills from the host into the
running bottle. No-op when the agent has no skills."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_git(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy the host's cwd `.git` directory into the running
bottle if the user requested --cwd. No-op otherwise."""
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: PlanT) -> str:
"""Return the agent-side URL of the per-bottle supervise
sidecar, or "" when this bottle has no sidecar. The provider
plugin's `provision_supervise_mcp` uses it to register the
MCP entry inside the guest.
Default returns "" so backends without supervise support
don't have to implement it. Docker and smolmachines override."""
del plan
return ""
def provision_supervise(self, plan: PlanT, target: str) -> None:
"""Write the in-bottle Claude Code MCP config so the agent
discovers the per-bottle supervise sidecar (PRD 0013).
No-op when bottle.supervise is False or the backend doesn't
support the supervise sidecar yet. The Docker backend
overrides."""
@abstractmethod
def prepare_cleanup(self) -> CleanupT:
@@ -469,20 +419,14 @@ def enumerate_active_agents() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
"""All currently-running agents, across every available
backend. Used by CLI `list active` and the dashboard's agents
pane so neither has to know which backends exist. Skips
backends whose `is_available()` reports False.
Sorted by `(started_at, slug)` so the list is stable across
dashboard refresh ticks — agents don't shift position while
the operator navigates with arrow keys. ISO 8601 timestamps
sort lexicographically in chronological order; `slug` is the
deterministic tiebreaker. Agents with missing metadata
(`started_at == ""`) sort first."""
backends whose `is_available()` reports False. Ordered by
backend name, then by whatever each backend's
`enumerate_active` returns."""
out: list[ActiveAgent] = []
for name in known_backend_names():
if not has_backend(name):
continue
out.extend(_BACKENDS[name].enumerate_active())
out.sort(key=lambda a: (a.started_at, a.slug))
return out
+20 -19
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,6 @@ This module is a thin façade. The real work lives in four siblings:
The base class's `prepare` template runs cross-backend host-side
validation before calling `_resolve_plan` here.
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
the declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration)
live on the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The
Docker backend only owns the steps that are about backend
infrastructure: CA install and git copy-in.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -24,8 +18,7 @@ from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Generator, Sequence
from ...supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME, SUPERVISE_PORT
from .. import ActiveAgent, Bottle, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from .. import ActiveAgent, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from . import cleanup as _cleanup
from . import enumerate as _enumerate
from . import launch as _launch
@@ -35,6 +28,10 @@ from .bottle_cleanup_plan import DockerBottleCleanupPlan
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .provision import ca as _ca
from .provision import git as _git
from .provision import prompt as _prompt
from .provision import provider_auth as _provider_auth
from .provision import skills as _skills
from .provision import supervise as _supervise_prov
class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanupPlan"]):
@@ -60,19 +57,23 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
with _launch.launch(plan, provision=self.provision) as bottle:
yield bottle
def provision_ca(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
def provision_ca(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, target)
def provision_git(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
_git.provision_git(plan, bottle)
def provision_prompt(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> str | None:
return _prompt.provision_prompt(plan, target)
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Docker bottles reach the supervise sidecar via the
compose-network alias `supervise:9100`. No per-bottle URL
plumbing needed; the alias resolves inside the bridge."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return ""
return f"http://{SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
def provision_provider_auth(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_provider_auth.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
def provision_skills(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_skills.provision_skills(plan, target)
def provision_git(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_git.provision_git(plan, target)
def provision_supervise(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
_supervise_prov.provision_supervise(plan, target)
def prepare_cleanup(self) -> DockerBottleCleanupPlan:
return _cleanup.prepare_cleanup()
+2 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from typing import Callable
from typing import cast
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
):
self.name = container
self._teardown = teardown
self.prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._agent_prompt_mode = agent_prompt_mode
self.agent_command = agent_command
self.agent_provider_template = (
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
) -> list[str]:
full_argv = list(argv)
full_argv.extend(
prompt_args(cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
prompt_args(self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
)
cmd = ["docker", "exec"]
if tty:
+68 -5
View File
@@ -2,25 +2,30 @@
Carries the Docker-specific resolved fields produced by
DockerBottleBackend.prepare. The launch step consumes it without
further resolution; preflight rendering is inherited from BottlePlan.
further resolution; show_plan-style rendering is the `print` method.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan, PromptMode
from ...egress import EgressPlan
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ...log import info
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from ...supervise import SupervisePlan
from .. import BottlePlan
from ..print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
"""Docker-specific resolved fields produced by
DockerBottleBackend.prepare. Inherits `spec`, `stage_dir`,
`git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`, and
`agent_provision` from BottlePlan."""
DockerBottleBackend.prepare. Inherits `spec` and `stage_dir` from
BottlePlan."""
slug: str
container_name: str
@@ -41,7 +46,13 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
prompt_file: Path
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
egress_plan: EgressPlan
# None when bottle.supervise is False. PRD 0013 supervise sidecar
# is opt-in via the manifest's bottle.supervise field.
supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
use_runsc: bool
agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan
@property
def agent_command(self) -> str:
@@ -54,3 +65,55 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
@property
def agent_provider_template(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.template
def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
"""Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr — compact form
intended to fit on screen without scrolling. The full
structured shape (image, container, runtime, etc.) lives on
this dataclass for tooling that wants to introspect it."""
del remote_control # not surfaced in the compact summary
spec = self.spec
manifest = spec.manifest
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
# The agent sees the union of literal env names (rendered into
# --env-file) and forwarded env names (`-e NAME` with the
# value arriving via subprocess env). The forwarded set holds
# the OAuth token (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN) and any host-env
# interpolations from the manifest; egress holds
# upstream tokens in its own environ, so no token forwarding
# from the agent to the proxy is needed.
env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
sorted(
set(bottle.env.keys())
| set(self.forwarded_env.keys())
| set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
),
hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
)
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(f"agent : {spec.agent_name}")
info(f"provider : {self.agent_provider_template}")
print_multi("env ", env_names)
print_multi("skills ", list(agent.skills))
info(f"bottle : {agent.bottle}")
identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
if identity:
info(f" git identity : {identity}")
git_lines = [
f"{u.upstream_host}:{u.upstream_port}"
for u in self.git_gate_plan.upstreams
]
if git_lines:
print_multi(" git gate ", git_lines)
if self.egress_plan.routes:
egress_lines = []
for r in self.egress_plan.routes:
auth = f" [auth:{r.auth_scheme}]" if r.auth_scheme else ""
egress_lines.append(f"{r.host}{auth}")
print_multi(" egress ", egress_lines)
print(file=sys.stderr)
+6 -13
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import secrets
import string
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from ... import supervise as _supervise
from . import util as docker_mod
@@ -106,10 +105,6 @@ class BottleMetadata:
# written before chunk 3 (resume / inspect should fall back to
# deriving from identity in that case).
compose_project: str = ""
# PRD 0040: backend name ("docker" or "smolmachines"). Empty string
# for state dirs written before PRD 0040; callers default to "docker"
# for backward compatibility.
backend: str = ""
def metadata_path(identity: str) -> Path:
@@ -136,15 +131,13 @@ def read_metadata(identity: str) -> BottleMetadata | None:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
return None
raw_typed = cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return BottleMetadata(
identity=str(raw_typed.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw_typed.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw_typed.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw_typed.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw_typed.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw_typed.get("compose_project", "")),
backend=str(raw_typed.get("backend", "")),
identity=str(raw.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw.get("compose_project", "")),
)
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ semantics open question.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ from ...log import info, warn
from .bottle_state import (
mark_preserved,
per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
transcript_snapshot_dir,
write_per_bottle_dockerfile,
)
+8 -3
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ from ...egress import (
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts
from ...log import die, warn
from ...pipelock import PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME
from ...supervise import (
@@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ...pipelock import (
from .pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_PORT,
)
from .pipelock import PIPELOCK_PORT
from .sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate ----------------------------------------------------
extra_hosts: list[str] = []
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if gp.upstreams:
volumes += [
@@ -216,6 +217,8 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
u.known_hosts_file,
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-known_hosts",
))
extra_map = git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts(gp.upstreams)
extra_hosts = [f"{host}:{ip}" for host, ip in sorted(extra_map.items())]
# --- supervise ---------------------------------------------------
sp = plan.supervise_plan
@@ -258,6 +261,8 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"environment": env,
"volumes": volumes,
}
if extra_hosts:
service["extra_hosts"] = extra_hosts
return service
+16 -25
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ import json
import re
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER
from ...egress_addon_core import load_routes
@@ -58,8 +57,7 @@ def _render_routes_payload(routes_list: list[dict[str, object]]) -> str:
if auth_scheme and token_env:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{auth_scheme}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{token_env}"')
paths_obj = entry.get("path_allowlist")
paths = cast(list[str], paths_obj) if isinstance(paths_obj, list) else []
paths = entry.get("path_allowlist") or []
if paths:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in paths:
@@ -259,7 +257,6 @@ def _merge_single_route(
raise EgressApplyError(
"current routes.yaml: 'routes' is not a list"
)
routes_typed = cast(list[object], routes)
new_host = str(new_route.get("host", "")).lower()
if not new_host:
@@ -267,25 +264,22 @@ def _merge_single_route(
"proposed route is missing 'host'"
)
proposed_paths_obj = new_route.get("path_allowlist")
proposed_paths = cast(list[str], proposed_paths_obj) if isinstance(proposed_paths_obj, list) else []
proposed_paths = list(new_route.get("path_allowlist") or [])
# Look for an existing entry with the same host (case-insensitive).
for entry in routes_typed:
for entry in routes:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
entry_typed = cast(dict[str, object], entry)
if str(entry_typed.get("host", "")).lower() == new_host:
if str(entry.get("host", "")).lower() == new_host:
# Merge path_allowlist: union proposed + existing, ordered
# by first-seen so existing paths stay in original order.
existing_paths_obj = entry_typed.get("path_allowlist")
existing_paths = cast(list[str], existing_paths_obj) if isinstance(existing_paths_obj, list) else []
existing_paths: list[str] = list(entry.get("path_allowlist") or [])
seen = {p: None for p in existing_paths}
for p in proposed_paths:
seen.setdefault(p, None)
merged_paths = list(seen.keys())
if merged_paths:
entry_typed["path_allowlist"] = merged_paths
entry["path_allowlist"] = merged_paths
# Preserve existing auth — tool description says agent-
# proposed auth on an existing host is ignored.
break
@@ -295,22 +289,19 @@ def _merge_single_route(
# `auth` was proposed (otherwise the addon's parser rejects
# a half-set auth pair). Slots: count existing slots, pick
# the next free index.
entry_typed: dict[str, object] = {"host": new_route.get("host")} # type: ignore
entry = {"host": new_route["host"]}
if proposed_paths:
entry_typed["path_allowlist"] = proposed_paths
entry["path_allowlist"] = proposed_paths
auth = new_route.get("auth")
if isinstance(auth, dict) and auth.get("scheme") and auth.get("token_ref"): # type: ignore
auth_typed = cast(dict[str, object], auth)
if isinstance(auth, dict) and auth.get("scheme") and auth.get("token_ref"):
existing_slots = sorted({
str(r_entry.get("token_env", ""))
for r_entry_obj in routes_typed
if isinstance(r_entry_obj, dict)
for r_entry in [cast(dict[str, object], r_entry_obj)]
if r_entry.get("token_env")
str(r.get("token_env"))
for r in routes
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("token_env")
})
next_idx = len(existing_slots)
entry_typed["auth_scheme"] = str(cast(object, auth_typed.get("scheme")))
entry_typed["token_env"] = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{next_idx}"
entry["auth_scheme"] = str(auth["scheme"])
entry["token_env"] = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{next_idx}"
# NOTE: the addon reads token VALUES from its container's
# environ keyed by token_env. A newly-added auth route at
# runtime points at a slot that has no env value → the
@@ -318,9 +309,9 @@ def _merge_single_route(
# arranges for the value to land in the container's env.
# Recording this here so the operator-facing diff carries
# the slot name they'll need to provision.
routes_typed.append(entry_typed)
routes.append(entry)
return _render_routes_payload(cast(list[dict[str, object]], routes_typed))
return _render_routes_payload(routes)
def add_route(slug: str, proposed_route_json: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+17 -28
View File
@@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...egress import egress_resolve_token_values
from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
from ...log import info, warn
from ...log import info
from . import network as network_mod
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
@@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .bottle_state import (
bottle_state_dir,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
pipelock_state_dir,
)
from .compose import (
@@ -80,26 +78,19 @@ _REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
def launch(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, "DockerBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Docker bottle via compose.
Teardown on exit."""
stack = ExitStack()
_bottle_for_revoke = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
_git_gate_dir_for_revoke = git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug)
def teardown() -> None:
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
warn(
f"teardown failed for container {plan.container_name}"
f" (compose-down): {exc!r}"
)
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(
_bottle_for_revoke, _git_gate_dir_for_revoke
)
except BaseException:
# Teardown must not raise; swallow so the caller's
# __exit__ path can still propagate the original error.
pass
try:
# Step 1: agent image build. Sidecar images get built lazily by
@@ -110,7 +101,7 @@ def launch(
)
if plan.derived_image:
docker_mod.build_image_with_cwd(
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.workspace_plan
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.spec.user_cwd
)
# Networks: compose-managed. The names are derived
@@ -208,21 +199,19 @@ def launch(
compose_dump_logs, project, compose_file, compose_log_path(state_dir),
)
# Step 8: provision. Create the bottle first so provisioners
# can use bottle.exec / bottle.cp_in; set the prompt path
# returned by provision_prompt after the fact.
bottle = DockerBottle(
plan.container_name,
teardown,
None,
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
# Step 8: provision. Unchanged — uses `docker exec` against
# the agent container by its known name.
prompt_path = provision(plan, plan.container_name)
# Step 9: yield. exec_agent continues to use `docker exec -it`
# — the agent runs `sleep infinity` per the renderer's
# service spec.
yield bottle
yield DockerBottle(
plan.container_name,
teardown,
prompt_path,
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
finally:
teardown()
+12 -5
View File
@@ -15,23 +15,30 @@ import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ...log import die
# Re-exported for the compose renderer + smolmachines launch step
# (they used to import these from this module before they moved to
# the platform-neutral pipelock module).
from ...pipelock import ( # noqa: F401
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
# Pipelock image, pinned by digest. The digest is the multi-arch image
# index for ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:2.3.0.
PIPELOCK_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_IMAGE",
"ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:"
"3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9",
"ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9",
)
# Listening port for pipelock's forward proxy.
PIPELOCK_PORT = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_PORT", "8888")
# The URL egress dials for its upstream HTTPS_PROXY. egress and pipelock
# share the same container's network namespace inside the sidecar bundle, so
# loopback reaches pipelock directly — no docker DNS aliases involved.
# The URL egress dials for its upstream HTTPS_PROXY. egress and
# pipelock share the same container's network namespace inside the
# sidecar bundle, so loopback reaches pipelock directly — no docker
# DNS aliases involved.
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ def fetch_current_yaml(slug: str) -> str:
f"could not fetch pipelock.yaml from {container}: "
f"{(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'container not running?'}"
)
return Path(tmp_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
return Path(tmp_path).read_text()
finally:
try:
Path(tmp_path).unlink()
+2 -9
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...log import die
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .. import BottleSpec
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
@@ -63,8 +62,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
provider = bottle.agent_provider
provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
guest_home = "/home/node"
workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
# PRD 0016 follow-up: identity, not bare slug. A fresh `start`
# mints a random-suffixed identity (so parallel runs of the same
@@ -82,7 +79,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
compose_project=f"bot-bottle-{slug}",
backend="docker",
))
# Clear any leftover preserve marker from a prior capability-block
# so this fresh launch can be cleaned up at session-end unless
@@ -180,11 +176,10 @@ def resolve_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
guest_home=os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node"),
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
)
guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
@@ -219,7 +214,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
else Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent / "Dockerfile.claude"
)
dockerfile_content = (
supervise_dockerfile_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
supervise_dockerfile_path.read_text()
if supervise_dockerfile_path.is_file()
else ""
)
@@ -233,7 +228,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
slug=slug,
container_name=container_name,
container_name_pinned=container_name_pinned,
@@ -250,7 +244,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
use_runsc=use_runsc,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
"""Backend-infrastructure provisioners for the Docker backend.
"""Per-provisioner modules for the Docker backend.
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration) live on
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The modules
left in this subpackage handle only the steps that are
backend-specific:
Each module exports one top-level function:
provision_<thing>(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> ...
- ca.py — install per-bottle CA bundle into the guest trust store
- git.py — copy host cwd `.git` into the guest when --cwd is used
"""
`DockerBottleBackend.provision_*` methods delegate to these. The
abstract `BottleBackend.provision_*` surface is unchanged; this
subpackage exists only to keep `backend.py` from being a god-file."""
+18 -6
View File
@@ -31,21 +31,33 @@ stage dir; nothing in the agent ever sees it."""
from __future__ import annotations
from ... import Bottle
import subprocess
from ...util import AGENT_CA_PATH, log_ca_fingerprint, select_ca_cert
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_ca(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def provision_ca(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the agent, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the agent container is up."""
container = target
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
bottle.exec(
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && update-ca-certificates",
user="root",
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", str(cert_host_path), f"{container}:{AGENT_CA_PATH}"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "chmod", "644", AGENT_CA_PATH],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "update-ca-certificates"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
+52 -37
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that .git
into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on the
into /home/node/workspace/.git so the agent operates on the
user's repo.
2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
@@ -18,62 +18,73 @@ Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
from __future__ import annotations
import shlex
import os
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ....git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_render_gitconfig
from ....log import info
from ... import Bottle
from .. import util as docker_mod
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def provision_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Set up git inside the bottle. Runs all three subcases; each
no-ops when its condition isn't met."""
_provision_cwd_git(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_user(plan, bottle)
_provision_cwd_git(plan, target)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, target)
_provision_git_user(plan, target)
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
it into /home/node/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
otherwise."""
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
if not (plan.spec.copy_cwd and Path(plan.spec.user_cwd, ".git").is_dir()):
return
guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
info(f"copying {host_git} -> {bottle.name}:{guest_workspace_git}")
bottle.cp_in(host_git, guest_workspace_git)
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {shlex.quote(workspace.owner)} {shlex.quote(guest_workspace_git)}",
user="root",
container = target
info(f"copying {plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git -> {container}:/home/node/workspace/.git")
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", f"{plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git", f"{container}:/home/node/workspace/.git"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
[
"docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container,
"chown", "-R", "node:node", "/home/node/workspace/.git",
],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
def _provision_git_gate_config(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def _provision_git_gate_config(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Write ~/.gitconfig in the bottle with the git-gate
insteadOf rules. No-op when the bottle has no `git` entries."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not manifest_bottle.git:
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not bottle.git:
return
container_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
container = target
container_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node")
container_gitconfig = f"{container_home}/.gitconfig"
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(manifest_bottle.git, GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(bottle.git, GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
config_file = plan.stage_dir / "agent_gitconfig"
config_file.write_text(content)
config_file.chmod(0o600)
info(f"writing {container_gitconfig} with {len(manifest_bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
bottle.cp_in(str(config_file), container_gitconfig)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {shlex.quote(container_gitconfig)} && "
f"chmod 644 {shlex.quote(container_gitconfig)}",
user="root",
info(f"writing {container_gitconfig} with {len(bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", str(config_file), f"{container}:{container_gitconfig}"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
docker_mod.docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "node:node", container_gitconfig])
docker_mod.docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "644", container_gitconfig])
def _provision_git_user(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def _provision_git_user(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Apply `git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the
bottle so the agent's commits are attributed to the operator-
chosen identity instead of the agent image's default
@@ -88,19 +99,23 @@ def _provision_git_user(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
Each field set independently — name-only or email-only
configs only run the `git config` line for the field
present."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = manifest_bottle.git_user
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = bottle.git_user
if gu.is_empty():
return
if gu.name:
info(f"git config --global user.name = {gu.name!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.name {shlex.quote(gu.name)}",
user="node",
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "node", target,
"git", "config", "--global", "user.name", gu.name],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
if gu.email:
info(f"git config --global user.email = {gu.email!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.email {shlex.quote(gu.email)}",
user="node",
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "node", target,
"git", "config", "--global", "user.email", gu.email],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
"""Copy the agent prompt into a running Docker bottle.
The prompt file is always copied (so the in-container path always
exists) but `--append-system-prompt-file` only fires when the agent
actually has a prompt — the return value signals which case."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_prompt(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the container, fix ownership/mode.
Returns the in-container path if the agent has a non-empty
prompt (drives --append-system-prompt-file), else None. The
file is copied either way so the path always exists."""
container = target
container_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node")
in_container_prompt_path = f"{container_home}/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", str(plan.prompt_file), f"{container}:{in_container_prompt_path}"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
# `docker cp` preserves host UID; re-own/mode as root so node
# can read its own mode-600 prompt regardless of host UID.
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "chown", "node:node", in_container_prompt_path],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "chmod", "600", in_container_prompt_path],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
return in_container_prompt_path if agent.prompt else None
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
"""Provision non-secret provider auth markers into a Docker bottle."""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_provider_auth(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Apply provider-owned guest setup through Docker primitives."""
provision = plan.agent_provision
for d in provision.dirs:
_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", d.guest_path])
_exec(target, ["chown", d.owner, d.guest_path])
_exec(target, ["chmod", d.mode, d.guest_path])
for command in provision.pre_copy:
_exec(target, list(command.argv))
for f in provision.files:
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", str(f.host_path), f"{target}:{f.guest_path}"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
_exec(target, ["chown", f.owner, f.guest_path])
_exec(target, ["chmod", f.mode, f.guest_path])
for command in provision.verify:
_exec(target, list(command.argv))
def _exec(target: str, argv: list[str]) -> None:
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", target, *argv],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
"""Copy host-side skill directories into a running Docker bottle.
Skills are validated on the host before launch by the base class's
`BottleBackend._validate_skills` (called from `prepare`); this module
assumes that validation has already run. A skill disappearing between
validation and copy still dies loudly rather than silently producing
a partial container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from ....log import die, info
from ...util import host_skill_dir
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_skills(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy each of the agent's named skills from the host's
~/.claude/skills/<name>/ into the container's equivalent path.
For each skill: ensure parent dir, wipe any prior copy, then
`docker cp <host>/. <container>:<dst>/` so the contents are
copied into a freshly-created destination dir. No-op when the
agent has no skills."""
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
if not agent.skills:
return
container = target
container_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node")
skills_dir = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_SKILLS_DIR", f"{container_home}/.claude/skills"
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "mkdir", "-p", skills_dir],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
for n in agent.skills:
src = host_skill_dir(n)
if not os.path.isdir(src):
die(f"skill '{n}' disappeared from host between validation and copy at {src}.")
dst = f"{skills_dir}/{n}"
info(f"copying skill {n} into {container}:{dst}")
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "rm", "-rf", dst],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "mkdir", "-p", dst],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", f"{src}/.", f"{container}:{dst}/"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=True,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
"""Supervise sidecar provisioning inside a running Docker bottle
(PRD 0013).
Registers the per-bottle supervise sidecar as an HTTP MCP server in
the agent's claude-code config so the agent discovers the three
stuck-recovery MCP tools (cred-proxy-block, pipelock-block,
capability-block) at startup.
Uses `claude mcp add` rather than writing JSON directly. claude-code
owns the on-disk config format (`~/.claude.json` `mcpServers` shape,
field names, scope semantics) and changes it between versions; the
official command handles whatever the installed version expects.
No-op when bottle.supervise is False — bottles that haven't opted
into the supervise sidecar shouldn't get an MCP entry pointing at a
sidecar that isn't running.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from ....log import info, warn
from ....supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
def supervise_mcp_url() -> str:
return f"http://{SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
def provision_supervise(plan: DockerBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Run `claude mcp add` inside the agent container to register
the supervise sidecar in claude-code's user config. No-op when
bottle.supervise is False.
Failure is logged but not fatal: the bottle still works (you
just can't call supervise tools from the agent until the entry
is added manually). The operator sees the warning at launch."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
url = supervise_mcp_url()
argv = [
"docker", "exec", "-u", "node", target,
"claude", "mcp", "add",
"--scope", "user",
"--transport", "http",
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME,
url,
]
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent claude config → {url}")
r = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"`claude mcp add supervise` failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}. Inside the bottle, "
f"register manually with: "
f"claude mcp add --scope user --transport http supervise {url}"
)
__all__ = ["provision_supervise", "supervise_mcp_url"]
+25 -31
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import tempfile
from typing import Iterable, Iterator
from ...log import die, info
from ...workspace import WorkspacePlan
# Cap on the suffix the container-name conflict logic will try before
@@ -118,39 +116,35 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
subprocess.run(args, check=True)
def build_image_with_cwd(
derived: str,
base: str,
workspace: WorkspacePlan,
) -> None:
"""Build a thin derived image that copies the workspace into
the plan's guest path and sets the plan's workdir."""
_TRUST_DIALOG_NODE_SCRIPT = (
'const fs=require("fs"),p=process.env.HOME+"/.claude.json",'
'c=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(p,"utf8"));'
'c.projects=c.projects||{};'
'c.projects[process.env.HOME+"/workspace"]={hasTrustDialogAccepted:true};'
'fs.writeFileSync(p,JSON.stringify(c,null,2));'
)
def build_image_with_cwd(derived: str, base: str, cwd: str) -> None:
"""Build a thin derived image that copies <cwd> into
/home/node/workspace and adds a trust-dialog entry for it."""
import os
cwd = str(workspace.host_path)
if not os.path.isdir(cwd):
die(f"cwd not found at {cwd}")
info(f"building image {derived} from {base} with {cwd} -> {workspace.guest_path}")
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bot-bottle-cwd.") as tmp:
context_dir = os.path.join(tmp, "context")
staged_workspace = os.path.join(context_dir, "workspace")
shutil.copytree(
cwd,
staged_workspace,
symlinks=True,
ignore=shutil.ignore_patterns(".git"),
)
dockerfile = (
f"FROM {base}\n"
f"COPY --chown=node:node workspace/. {workspace.guest_path}\n"
f"WORKDIR {workspace.workdir}\n"
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "build", "-t", derived, "-f", "-", context_dir],
input=dockerfile,
text=True,
check=True,
)
info(f"building image {derived} from {base} with {cwd} -> /home/node/workspace")
dockerfile = (
f"FROM {base}\n"
f"COPY --chown=node:node . /home/node/workspace\n"
f"RUN node -e '{_TRUST_DIALOG_NODE_SCRIPT}'\n"
f"WORKDIR /home/node/workspace\n"
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "build", "-t", derived, "-f", "-", cwd],
input=dockerfile,
text=True,
check=True,
)
def image_id(ref: str) -> str:
+27 -22
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,5 @@
"""SmolmachinesBottleBackend — the smolmachines implementation of
BottleBackend (PRD 0023).
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
the declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration)
live on the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The
smolmachines backend only owns the steps that are about backend
infrastructure: CA install (no-op for now), workspace, git copy-in."""
BottleBackend (PRD 0023)."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -13,7 +7,7 @@ from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Generator, Sequence
from .. import ActiveAgent, Bottle, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from .. import ActiveAgent, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from . import cleanup as _cleanup
from . import enumerate as _enumerate
from . import launch as _launch
@@ -24,7 +18,10 @@ from .bottle_cleanup_plan import SmolmachinesBottleCleanupPlan
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .provision import ca as _ca
from .provision import git as _git
from .provision import workspace as _workspace
from .provision import prompt as _prompt
from .provision import provider_auth as _provider_auth
from .provision import skills as _skills
from .provision import supervise as _supervise
class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
@@ -56,26 +53,34 @@ class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
yield bottle
def provision_ca(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
_ca.provision_ca(plan, target)
def provision_workspace(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
def provision_prompt(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> str | None:
return _prompt.provision_prompt(plan, target)
def provision_provider_auth(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> None:
_workspace.provision_workspace(plan, bottle)
_provider_auth.provision_provider_auth(plan, target)
def provision_skills(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> None:
_skills.provision_skills(plan, target)
def provision_git(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> None:
_git.provision_git(plan, bottle)
_git.provision_git(plan, target)
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> str:
"""The smolmachines guest reaches the supervise sidecar via a
host-published random port the launch step pinned earlier
(`http://<loopback_ip>:<random_port>/`). `agent_supervise_url`
on the plan is "" when the bottle has no sidecar."""
return plan.agent_supervise_url
def provision_supervise(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str
) -> None:
_supervise.provision_supervise(plan, target)
def prepare_cleanup(self) -> SmolmachinesBottleCleanupPlan:
return _cleanup.prepare_cleanup()
+4 -4
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import sys
from typing import Mapping, cast
from typing import Mapping
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
# In-VM path to the agent's prompt file. None when the
# agent declared no prompt (file still exists; we just
# don't pass --append-system-prompt-file).
self.prompt_path = prompt_path
self._prompt_path = prompt_path
# Env vars the agent process needs (HTTPS_PROXY,
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, manifest-declared bottle env, …).
# Forwarded on every `smolvm machine exec` via `-e K=V`
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
agent_tail = ["env", *_env_assignments_for("node", self._guest_env),
self.agent_command]
provider_prompt_args = prompt_args(
cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=argv,
self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=argv,
)
if cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode) == "read_prompt_file":
if self._agent_prompt_mode == "read_prompt_file":
agent_tail += argv
agent_tail += provider_prompt_args
else:
+53 -3
View File
@@ -8,20 +8,25 @@ in chunk 4."""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan, PromptMode
from ...egress import EgressPlan
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ...log import info
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from ...supervise import SupervisePlan
from .. import BottlePlan
from ..print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
"""Resolved fields the launch step needs to bring up the bottle.
Inherits `spec`, `stage_dir`, `git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`,
`supervise_plan`, and `agent_provision` from BottlePlan."""
Inherits `spec` and `stage_dir` from BottlePlan."""
slug: str
# Per-bottle docker subnet for the sidecar bundle container.
@@ -72,6 +77,12 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# per-bottle bridge with a pinned IP. The unused fields stay
# at their dataclass defaults.
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
egress_plan: EgressPlan
# None when bottle.supervise is False, matching the docker
# backend's convention.
supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan
# Agent-side endpoints. On Docker Desktop the docker bridge
# IPs aren't reachable from the smolvm guest (TSI uses macOS
# networking; docker container IPs live in the daemon's VM),
@@ -99,3 +110,42 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
@property
def agent_dockerfile_path(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.dockerfile
def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
"""Compact y/N preflight. Same shape as the Docker
backend's so operators see one format across backends."""
del remote_control # not surfaced in the compact summary
spec = self.spec
manifest = spec.manifest
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
env_names = visible_agent_env_names(
sorted(
set(bottle.env.keys())
| set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
),
hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
)
upstreams = [
f"{g.Name}{g.Upstream}" for g in bottle.git
]
# Use the resolved egress_plan (lowercase `host` on the
# plan-level EgressRoute) rather than `bottle.egress.routes`,
# which is the manifest's capitalized-attr form.
routes = [r.host for r in self.egress_plan.routes]
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(f"agent : {spec.agent_name}")
info(f"provider : {self.agent_provider_template}")
print_multi("env ", env_names)
print_multi("skills ", list(agent.skills))
info(f"bottle : {agent.bottle}")
identity = manifest.git_identity_summary(spec.agent_name)
if identity:
info(f" git identity : {identity}")
if upstreams:
print_multi(" git gate ", upstreams)
if routes:
print_multi(" egress ", routes)
print(file=sys.stderr)
+6 -30
View File
@@ -53,9 +53,6 @@ from ..docker.pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_PORT as _PIPELOCK_PORT_STR,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
from ...log import warn
from ..docker.bottle_state import git_gate_state_dir
from . import loopback_alias as _loopback
from . import sidecar_bundle as _bundle
from . import smolvm as _smolvm
@@ -89,7 +86,7 @@ _SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
def launch(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, "SmolmachinesBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[SmolmachinesBottle, None, None]:
"""Build + run the bottle and yield a handle; tear everything
down on exit. Errors during bringup unwind any partial state
@@ -113,39 +110,17 @@ def launch(
_launch_vm(plan, agent_from_path, loopback_ip, stack)
_init_vm(plan)
bottle = SmolmachinesBottle(
prompt_path = provision(plan, plan.machine_name)
yield SmolmachinesBottle(
plan.machine_name,
prompt_path=None,
prompt_path=prompt_path,
guest_env=plan.guest_env,
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
yield bottle
finally:
_teardown_smolmachines(stack, plan)
def _teardown_smolmachines(
stack: ExitStack,
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
) -> None:
"""Unwind the ExitStack, then revoke any provisioned deploy keys.
ExitStack errors are caught and logged (non-fatal) so that key
revocation always runs. Revocation errors propagate — a stranded
deploy key is a security concern the operator must address."""
teardown_exc: BaseException | None = None
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
teardown_exc = exc
warn(f"smolmachines teardown failed: {exc!r}")
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle, git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug))
if teardown_exc is not None:
raise teardown_exc
def _allocate_resources(
@@ -374,6 +349,7 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate ---------------------------------------------
extra_hosts: list[str] = []
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if gp.upstreams:
daemons += ["git-gate", "git-http"]
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ import time
import uuid
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Generator
from typing import Iterator
from ...log import die
@@ -61,10 +61,7 @@ REGISTRY_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
# narrow.
CRANE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_CRANE_IMAGE",
(
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:"
"0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084"
),
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084",
)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ class RegistryHandle:
@contextmanager
def ephemeral_registry() -> Generator[RegistryHandle, None, None]:
def ephemeral_registry() -> Iterator[RegistryHandle]:
"""Bring up a per-session docker network + a `registry:2.8.3`
container on it (published on a random host port), yield a
`RegistryHandle`, force-remove both on exit.
@@ -208,6 +205,7 @@ def _host_port(name: str) -> int:
return int(port_str)
except ValueError:
die(f"unexpected `docker port` output: {line!r}")
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def _wait_ready(port: int) -> None:
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import platform
import re
import sqlite3
@@ -176,11 +177,11 @@ def force_allowlist(machine_name: str, allowed_cidrs: list[str]) -> None:
con.close()
def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
def allocate(slug: str) -> str:
"""Pick the lowest-numbered alias from the pool not already
in use by a running smolmachines bundle. Bails when the pool
is exhausted — the caller should report the limit to the
operator. `_slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
operator. `slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
used (no on-disk reservation, allocation is purely
docker-state-driven).
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
if not _is_macos():
return "127.0.0.1"
_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as lf:
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w") as lf:
fcntl.flock(lf, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
return _allocate_locked()
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ def _allocate_locked() -> str:
f"Stop a running bottle (`smolvm machine ls --json`) or "
f"raise _POOL_END in loopback_alias.py."
)
return "" # unreachable; die() never returns
def _alias_present(ip: str) -> bool:
+14 -20
View File
@@ -28,11 +28,9 @@ from ...backend.docker.bottle_state import (
write_metadata,
)
from ...egress import Egress
from ...env import resolve_env
from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .util import smolmachines_bundle_subnet, smolmachines_preflight
@@ -61,8 +59,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
provider = bottle.agent_provider
provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
guest_home = "/home/node"
workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
slug = spec.identity or bottle_identity(spec.agent_name)
@@ -74,24 +70,25 @@ def resolve_plan(
cwd=spec.user_cwd if spec.copy_cwd else "",
copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
# No compose project for smolmachines bottles; chunk 4
# will give dashboard discovery a backend-specific path.
compose_project="",
backend="smolmachines",
))
subnet, gateway, bundle_ip = smolmachines_bundle_subnet(slug)
# Agent's env: resolve through resolve_env() so ?prompt entries
# are prompted and ${HOST_VAR} entries are interpolated — matching
# the Docker backend's contract. Forwarded (secret/interpolated)
# values still reach the guest as -e K=V smolvm flags because
# smolvm 0.8.0 has no env-file or stdin injection path; this is
# the known argv-exposure gap documented in PRD 0038.
# HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are populated
# in launch.py after bundle bringup.
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
# Agent's env: the prepare-time view doesn't yet know the
# host loopback ports the bundle's daemons get published on
# (those come from docker AFTER `docker run` returns), so
# HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are
# populated in launch.py and stamped onto guest_env there.
# What we set here is the part that doesn't depend on
# bundle bringup — bottle.env literals, the empty-NO_PROXY
# safe default, and the TLS trust env trio
# (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE)
# pointing at Debian's update-ca-certificates output bundle.
guest_env: dict[str, str] = {
**resolved.literals,
**resolved.forwarded,
**bottle.env,
"NO_PROXY": "localhost,127.0.0.1",
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
"SSL_CERT_FILE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
@@ -133,12 +130,11 @@ def resolve_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=agent_dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
guest_home=os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME", "/home/node"),
guest_env=guest_env,
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
)
merged_guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
@@ -172,7 +168,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
slug=slug,
bundle_subnet=subnet,
bundle_gateway=gateway,
@@ -186,7 +181,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
"""Backend-infrastructure provisioners for the smolmachines backend.
"""Provisioning helpers for the smolmachines backend (PRD 0023
chunk 4).
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration) live on
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The modules
left in this subpackage handle only the steps that are
backend-specific:
Each method maps onto one of `BottleBackend`'s `provision_*`
overrides. They run after the VM is up + the bundle is reachable
and copy host-side state (prompt, skills, .git, CA cert,
supervise MCP config) into the guest via `smolvm machine cp` /
`smolvm machine exec`.
- ca.py — install per-bottle CA bundle into the guest trust store
- git.py — copy host cwd `.git` into the guest when --cwd is used
- workspace.py — copy the operator workspace into the guest
"""
Chunk 4a ships `provision_prompt` and `provision_skills` — the
two that don't depend on agent-image tooling (claude-code,
update-ca-certificates) beyond `cp` and `mkdir`. provision_ca /
provision_git / provision_supervise land once the agent-image
gap is solved."""
+17 -17
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
trust store (PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.ca`: select the right CA (egress
when the bottle has routes, else pipelock), copy it to Debian's
`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
when the bottle has routes, else pipelock), `smolvm machine cp` it
to Debian's `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
`update-ca-certificates` to rebuild the trust bundle, and log the
fingerprint once. The selected cert depends on the agent's
HTTP_PROXY target — same logic as the docker backend, since the
@@ -24,20 +24,20 @@ from ...util import (
log_ca_fingerprint,
select_ca_cert,
)
from ... import Bottle, ExecResult
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
_SIGKILL_EXIT = 128 + 9
def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the guest, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the smolvm guest is up."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
_smolvm.machine_cp(str(cert_host_path), f"{target}:{AGENT_CA_PATH}")
# Mode 0644 — readable to non-root tools in the guest.
# update-ca-certificates rebuilds the bundle at AGENT_CA_BUNDLE,
# which is what curl / Python ssl / OpenSSL-based tools read by
@@ -45,21 +45,21 @@ def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
# REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE) on the guest_env covers Node + Python
# `requests` / libraries that don't load the system bundle.
#
r = _install_ca(bottle)
r = _install_ca(target)
if r.returncode == _SIGKILL_EXIT:
# smolvm/libkrun can SIGKILL an otherwise-normal exec
# during early-VM provisioning. `update-ca-certificates`
# is idempotent, so retry the same install once after a
# short settle delay before treating it as fatal.
time.sleep(1.0)
r = _install_ca(bottle)
r = _install_ca(target)
if r.returncode != 0:
# update-ca-certificates not adding our cert is fatal —
# claude-code's TLS handshake against the egress-MITM'd
# api.anthropic.com would fail downstream. Bail early
# with what we can see (output is captured so we can
# surface it).
# with what we can see (output is captured by smolvm so
# we can surface it).
die(
f"update-ca-certificates didn't add the agent CA "
f"(exit {r.returncode}): "
@@ -70,21 +70,21 @@ def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
def _install_ca(bottle: Bottle) -> ExecResult:
def _install_ca(target: str) -> _smolvm.SmolvmRunResult:
# chown + chmod + update-ca-certificates + bundle
# verification run in one exec so we only pay one
# round trip; the `&&` chaining surfaces the first failure
# as the return code. The verify check is more stable than
# requiring "1 added" in stdout: a retry after a
# verification run in one `sh -c` so we only pay one
# machine_exec round trip; the `&&` chaining surfaces the
# first failure as the return code. The verify check is more
# stable than requiring "1 added" in stdout: a retry after a
# partially-completed first run may legitimately report "0
# added" while the cert is already installed.
return bottle.exec(
return _smolvm.machine_exec(target, [
"sh", "-c",
f"chown root:root {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
f"update-ca-certificates && "
f"openssl verify -CAfile {AGENT_CA_BUNDLE} {AGENT_CA_PATH}",
user="root",
)
])
# Re-exported for the launch/provision_ca caller + tests. The path
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that
.git into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on
.git into /home/node/workspace/.git so the agent operates on
the user's repo.
2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
@@ -26,53 +26,60 @@ git_gate module."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shlex
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from ....git_gate import git_gate_render_gitconfig
from ....log import info
from ... import Bottle
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
def provision_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
# `node` is the agent user from the repo Dockerfile. Override via
# BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME mirrors the docker backend's
# BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME knob — same purpose, different
# transport.
_DEFAULT_GUEST_HOME = "/home/node"
def _guest_home() -> str:
return os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME", _DEFAULT_GUEST_HOME)
def provision_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Set up git inside the guest. Runs all three subcases; each
no-ops when its condition isn't met."""
_provision_cwd_git(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_user(plan, bottle)
_provision_cwd_git(plan, target)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, target)
_provision_git_user(plan, target)
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
it into <guest_home>/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
otherwise."""
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
if not (plan.spec.copy_cwd and Path(plan.spec.user_cwd, ".git").is_dir()):
return
guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
info(f"copying {host_git} -> {bottle.name}:{guest_workspace_git}")
# mkdir -p the workspace dir so cp_in lands the .git
guest_workspace_git = f"{_guest_home()}/workspace/.git"
info(f"copying {plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git -> {target}:{guest_workspace_git}")
# mkdir -p the workspace dir so `machine cp` lands the .git
# directly there even on first-time bottles.
bottle.exec(f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(workspace.guest_path)}", user="root")
bottle.cp_in(host_git, guest_workspace_git)
# cp_in lands files as root; the agent runs as node so
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", f"{_guest_home()}/workspace"])
_smolvm.machine_cp(
f"{plan.spec.user_cwd}/.git", f"{target}:{guest_workspace_git}",
)
# `machine cp` lands files as root; the agent runs as node so
# the workspace tree must be chowned over.
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {shlex.quote(workspace.owner)} {shlex.quote(guest_workspace_git)}",
user="root",
_smolvm.machine_exec(
target, ["chown", "-R", "node:node", guest_workspace_git],
)
def _provision_git_gate_config(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
) -> None:
def _provision_git_gate_config(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Write ~/.gitconfig in the guest with the git-gate insteadOf
rules. No-op when the bottle has no `git` entries."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not manifest_bottle.git:
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not bottle.git:
return
# `<loopback alias>:<host port>` form: the bundle's git-gate
@@ -81,11 +88,11 @@ def _provision_git_gate_config(
# TSI, not the docker bridge IP) can dial it. launch.py
# populates `plan.agent_git_gate_host` after bundle bringup.
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(
manifest_bottle.git, plan.agent_git_gate_host, scheme="http",
bottle.git, plan.agent_git_gate_host, scheme="http",
)
guest_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
# Stage the file under the plan's stage_dir so cp_in
guest_gitconfig = f"{_guest_home()}/.gitconfig"
# Stage the file under the plan's stage_dir so `machine cp`
# has a stable host path. The plan's stage_dir is cleaned up
# by start.py's session-end teardown.
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
@@ -96,38 +103,41 @@ def _provision_git_gate_config(
config_file = Path(f.name)
os.chmod(config_file, 0o600)
info(f"writing {guest_gitconfig} with {len(manifest_bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
bottle.cp_in(str(config_file), guest_gitconfig)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)} && "
f"chmod 644 {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)}",
user="root",
)
info(f"writing {guest_gitconfig} with {len(bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
_smolvm.machine_cp(str(config_file), f"{target}:{guest_gitconfig}")
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chown", "node:node", guest_gitconfig])
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chmod", "644", guest_gitconfig])
def _provision_git_user(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle,
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str,
) -> None:
"""Apply `git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the
guest as the node user so --global lands in the same
`/home/node/.gitconfig` that `_provision_git_gate_config`
writes to. No-op when the bottle didn't declare `git.user`.
SmolmachinesBottle.exec(user="node") automatically sets
HOME=/home/node so --global writes to /home/node/.gitconfig."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = manifest_bottle.git_user
Runs via `runuser -u node --`; HOME is forced via smolvm's
`-e` flag because runuser (without -l) inherits root's
HOME=/root, which would put --global in the wrong file."""
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = bottle.git_user
if gu.is_empty():
return
env = {"HOME": _guest_home(), "USER": "node"}
if gu.name:
info(f"git config --global user.name = {gu.name!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.name {shlex.quote(gu.name)}",
user="node",
_smolvm.machine_exec(
target,
["runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"git", "config", "--global", "user.name", gu.name],
env=env,
)
if gu.email:
info(f"git config --global user.email = {gu.email!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.email {shlex.quote(gu.email)}",
user="node",
_smolvm.machine_exec(
target,
["runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"git", "config", "--global", "user.email", gu.email],
env=env,
)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
"""Copy the agent prompt into a running smolmachines bottle.
The prompt file is always copied (so the in-guest path always
exists) but `--append-system-prompt-file` only fires when the
agent actually has a prompt — the return value signals which
case, mirroring the docker backend's contract.
`smolvm machine cp` lands files as root inside the VM; the claude
process runs as `node`, so we chown + chmod the prompt after the
copy. Same flow as the docker backend's provision_prompt."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
# `node` is the agent user from the repo Dockerfile.
# BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME mirrors the docker backend's
# BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME knob.
_DEFAULT_GUEST_HOME = "/home/node"
def provision_prompt(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the running smolvm guest, fix
ownership/mode. Returns the in-guest path if the agent has a
non-empty prompt (drives --append-system-prompt-file), else
None. The file is copied either way so the path always
exists — mirrors the docker backend's behavior."""
guest_home = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME", _DEFAULT_GUEST_HOME)
in_guest_prompt_path = f"{guest_home}/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"
_smolvm.machine_cp(str(plan.prompt_file), f"{target}:{in_guest_prompt_path}")
# machine cp lands as root, source's 0o600 mode is preserved —
# node can't read its own prompt without these two.
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chown", "node:node", in_guest_prompt_path])
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chmod", "600", in_guest_prompt_path])
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
return in_guest_prompt_path if agent.prompt else None
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
"""Provision non-secret provider auth markers into a smolmachines bottle."""
from __future__ import annotations
from ....log import die
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
def provision_provider_auth(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Apply provider-owned guest setup through smolvm primitives."""
provision = plan.agent_provision
for d in provision.dirs:
_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", d.guest_path], f"could not create {d.guest_path}")
_exec(target, ["chown", d.owner, d.guest_path], f"could not chown {d.guest_path}")
_exec(target, ["chmod", d.mode, d.guest_path], f"could not chmod {d.guest_path}")
for command in provision.pre_copy:
_exec(target, list(command.argv), command.error)
for f in provision.files:
_smolvm.machine_cp(str(f.host_path), f"{target}:{f.guest_path}")
_exec(target, ["chown", f.owner, f.guest_path], f"could not chown {f.guest_path}")
_exec(target, ["chmod", f.mode, f.guest_path], f"could not chmod {f.guest_path}")
for command in provision.verify:
_exec(target, list(command.argv), command.error)
def _exec(target: str, argv: list[str], error: str) -> None:
result = _smolvm.machine_exec(target, argv)
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip()
if detail:
detail = f": {detail}"
die(f"agent provider provisioning: {error}{detail}")
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
"""Copy host-side skill directories into a running smolmachines
bottle.
Skills are validated on the host before launch by
`BottleBackend._validate_skills`; this module assumes that
validation has already run. A skill that disappears between
validation and copy still dies loudly rather than silently
producing a partial guest."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from ....log import die, info
from ...util import host_skill_dir
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
# In-guest path mirrors the docker backend's claude-skills
# convention (~/.claude/skills/<name>/) under the node user's
# home — same path as the real bot-bottle image's
# /home/node/.claude/skills (pre-created in the Dockerfile).
_DEFAULT_SKILLS_DIR = "/home/node/.claude/skills"
def provision_skills(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Copy each of the agent's named skills from the host's
~/.claude/skills/<name>/ into the guest's equivalent path.
For each skill: `mkdir -p` the destination, `smolvm machine cp`
the host source dir over, then chown the result to node:node so
the agent can read it. No-op when the agent has no skills.
smolvm machine cp on a directory copies recursively (same
semantics as `cp -r`); unlike docker cp's trailing-slash
convention, smolvm doesn't need the `/.` suffix dance.
machine cp lands files as root inside the VM, so we chown each
skill tree over to node:node after the copy same pattern as
the docker backend's provision_prompt."""
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
if not agent.skills:
return
skills_dir = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_SKILLS_DIR", _DEFAULT_SKILLS_DIR,
)
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["mkdir", "-p", skills_dir])
for name in agent.skills:
src = host_skill_dir(name)
if not os.path.isdir(src):
die(
f"skill {name!r} disappeared from host between "
f"validation and copy at {src}."
)
dst = f"{skills_dir}/{name}"
info(f"copying skill {name} into {target}:{dst}")
# Wipe any prior copy so re-runs don't accumulate.
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["rm", "-rf", dst])
_smolvm.machine_cp(src, f"{target}:{dst}")
_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chown", "-R", "node:node", dst])
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
"""Supervise sidecar provisioning inside a running smolmachines
bottle (PRD 0023 chunk 4d; PRD 0013 supervise plane).
Registers the per-bottle supervise sidecar as an HTTP MCP server
in the agent's claude-code config so the agent discovers the
stuck-recovery MCP tools (pipelock-block, capability-block) at
startup.
Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.supervise` same `claude mcp
add` call, just dispatched via `smolvm machine exec` instead of
`docker exec`, and against `<bundle_ip>:<port>` instead of the
short `supervise` alias (no DNS in the TSI-allowlisted guest)."""
from __future__ import annotations
from ....log import info, warn
from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
def provision_supervise(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
"""Run `claude mcp add` inside the guest to register the
supervise sidecar in claude-code's user config. No-op when
bottle.supervise is False.
The URL is the agent-side endpoint launch.py populated after
bundle bringup `http://127.0.0.1:<host port>/` rather than
the bundle's docker bridge IP, because that bridge isn't
reachable from the smolvm guest on macOS.
Failure is logged but not fatal: the bottle still works (you
just can't call supervise tools from the agent until the entry
is added manually). The operator sees the warning at launch."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
url = plan.agent_supervise_url
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent claude config → {url}")
# `claude mcp add --scope user` writes to ~/.claude.json. The
# agent is the `node` user; smolvm machine_exec runs as root
# by default, so we have to switch user explicitly and set
# HOME so the config lands in /home/node/.claude.json (where
# the agent's claude actually reads it from).
r = _smolvm.machine_exec(
target,
[
"runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"env", "HOME=/home/node",
"claude", "mcp", "add",
"--scope", "user",
"--transport", "http",
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME,
url,
],
)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"`claude mcp add supervise` failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}. Inside the bottle, "
f"register manually with: "
f"claude mcp add --scope user --transport http supervise {url}"
)
__all__ = ["provision_supervise"]
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
"""Copy the operator workspace into a smolmachines guest."""
from __future__ import annotations
import shlex
from ....log import info
from ... import Bottle
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
def provision_workspace(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Copy host cwd contents to the planned guest workspace."""
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_contents):
return
guest_parent = workspace.guest_path.rsplit("/", 1)[0] or "/"
guest_path_q = shlex.quote(workspace.guest_path)
guest_parent_q = shlex.quote(guest_parent)
owner_q = shlex.quote(workspace.owner)
mode_q = shlex.quote(workspace.mode)
info(f"copying {workspace.host_path} -> {bottle.name}:{workspace.guest_path}")
bottle.exec(
f"rm -rf {guest_path_q} && mkdir -p {guest_parent_q}",
user="root",
)
bottle.cp_in(str(workspace.host_path), workspace.guest_path)
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {owner_q} {guest_path_q} && chmod {mode_q} {guest_path_q}",
user="root",
)
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ import subprocess
import sys
import termios
import threading
from types import FrameType
# How long to wait after the main exec starts before pushing the
@@ -124,13 +123,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
machine = argv[0]
inner = argv[2:]
def sync(_signum: int | None = None, _frame: FrameType | None = None) -> None:
def sync(*_args) -> None:
size = _read_winsize()
if size is None:
return
_push_size(machine, *size)
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync) # type: ignore[arg-type]
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync)
proc = subprocess.Popen(inner)
# Initial sync is deferred — see _STARTUP_SYNC_DELAY_SEC.
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ def bundle_host_port(
f"no port mapping on {host_ip} for {container} "
f"{container_port}/tcp; got: {(result.stdout or '').strip()!r}"
)
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def stop_bundle(slug: str) -> None:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
pack failed, etc.). Carries the captured stderr for the
operator-facing log line."""
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]):
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess):
self.argv = list(argv)
self.returncode = result.returncode
self.stdout = result.stdout
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
def _smolvm(*args: str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""One subprocess call into the smolvm CLI. `check=True`
raises SmolvmError on non-zero; `check=False` returns the
CompletedProcess for the caller to inspect."""
+6 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
"""Main CLI dispatcher.
Commands: cleanup, edit, info, init, list, resume, start, supervise
Commands: cleanup, dashboard, edit, info, init, list, resume, start
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -12,24 +12,24 @@ from ..manifest import ManifestError
from ._common import PROG
from . import list as _list_mod
from .cleanup import cmd_cleanup
from .dashboard import cmd_dashboard
from .edit import cmd_edit
from .info import cmd_info
from .init import cmd_init
from .resume import cmd_resume
from .start import cmd_start
from .supervise import cmd_supervise
cmd_list = _list_mod.cmd_list
COMMANDS = {
"cleanup": cmd_cleanup,
"dashboard": cmd_dashboard,
"edit": cmd_edit,
"info": cmd_info,
"init": cmd_init,
"list": cmd_list,
"resume": cmd_resume,
"start": cmd_start,
"supervise": cmd_supervise,
}
@@ -37,22 +37,13 @@ def usage() -> None:
sys.stderr.write(f"usage: {PROG} <command> [args...]\n\n")
sys.stderr.write("Commands:\n")
sys.stderr.write(" cleanup stop and remove all active bot-bottle containers\n")
sys.stderr.write(" dashboard view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise proposals (PRD 0013)\n")
sys.stderr.write(" edit open an agent in vim for editing\n")
sys.stderr.write(" info print env, skills, and prompt details for a named agent\n")
sys.stderr.write(" init interactively create a new agent and add it to bot-bottle.json\n")
sys.stderr.write(" list list available agents or active containers\n")
sys.stderr.write(
" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity "
"(continues state from PRD 0016)\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" start boot a container for a named agent and "
"attach an interactive session\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" supervise view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise "
"proposals (PRD 0013)\n\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity (continues state from PRD 0016)\n")
sys.stderr.write(" start boot a container for a named agent and attach an interactive session\n\n")
sys.stderr.write(f"Run '{PROG} <command> --help' for command-specific usage.\n")
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent)
def read_tty_line() -> str:
"""Mirror `IFS= read -r REPLY </dev/tty`. Falls back to stdin."""
try:
with open("/dev/tty", "r", encoding="utf-8") as tty:
with open("/dev/tty", "r") as tty:
return tty.readline().rstrip("\n")
except OSError:
return sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+5 -18
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
die(f"{target_file} exists but is not valid JSON; fix or remove it first")
if agent_name in (existing.get("agents") or {}):
sys.stderr.write(
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in '
f'{target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in {target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
)
sys.stderr.flush()
ow = read_tty_line()
@@ -72,10 +71,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
# Prompt
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to "
"finish (just '.' to leave empty):"
)
info("System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to finish (just '.' to leave empty):")
prompt_lines: list[str] = []
while True:
line = read_tty_line()
@@ -103,10 +99,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if bottle_name in (existing.get("bottles") or {}):
bottle_exists_already = True
info(
f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; "
f"agent will reference it."
)
info(f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; agent will reference it.")
else:
info(f"Creating new bottle '{bottle_name}'.")
bottle_env = _prompt_for_env_vars()
@@ -138,14 +131,8 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
def _prompt_for_env_vars() -> dict[str, str]:
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with "
"no name to finish."
)
info(
" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from "
"host env) | literal (hardcoded value)"
)
info("Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with no name to finish.")
info(" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from host env) | literal (hardcoded value)")
out: dict[str, str] = {}
while True:
print(file=sys.stderr)
-2
View File
@@ -52,10 +52,8 @@ def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
user_cwd=metadata.cwd or USER_CWD,
identity=metadata.identity,
)
backend_name = metadata.backend or None
return _launch_bottle(
spec,
dry_run=args.dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
)
+28 -39
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
interactive claude-code session. The container is torn down when the
session ends.
The launch core is shared with `cli.py resume <identity>` through
the private orchestrator `_launch_bottle`.
The launch core is shared with `cli.py resume <identity>` and (PRD
0020 chunk 1+) the dashboard's in-process start flow: see the
public helpers `prepare_with_preflight`, `attach_agent`, and the
private orchestrator `_launch_bottle`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -33,7 +35,6 @@ from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import snapshot_transcript
from ..log import info
from ..manifest import Manifest
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD, read_tty_line
from . import tui
def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
@@ -50,39 +51,15 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
"or 'docker'). Overrides the env var when set."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"name",
nargs="?",
default=None,
help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json (omit to pick interactively)",
)
parser.add_argument("name", help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
dry_run = args.dry_run or os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_DRY_RUN") == "1"
manifest = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD)
agent_name: str | None = args.name
if agent_name is None:
agent_name = tui.filter_select(
sorted(manifest.agents.keys()),
title="Select agent",
)
if agent_name is None:
return 0
backend_name: str | None = args.backend
if backend_name is None and "BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND" not in os.environ:
backend_name = tui.filter_select(
list(known_backend_names()),
title="Select backend",
)
if backend_name is None:
return 0
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name=agent_name,
agent_name=args.name,
copy_cwd=args.cwd,
user_cwd=USER_CWD,
)
@@ -90,11 +67,11 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
spec,
dry_run=dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
backend_name=args.backend,
)
# --- Launch helpers ------------------------------------------------------
# --- Public helpers shared with the dashboard (PRD 0020) -----------------
def prepare_with_preflight(
@@ -107,11 +84,14 @@ def prepare_with_preflight(
backend_name: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[DockerBottlePlan | None, str]:
"""Run `backend.prepare`, render the preflight summary via the
injected callable, prompt y/N via the injected callable.
injected callable, prompt y/N via the injected callable. The CLI
binds these to stderr/stdin; the dashboard binds them to a
curses modal.
`backend_name` selects which backend prepares the plan
(`None` `$BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` `docker`). The CLI passes
whatever `--backend` resolved to.
(`None` `$BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` `docker`). Dashboard
passes the value from its new-agent backend-picker modal; the
CLI passes whatever `--backend` resolved to.
Returns `(plan, identity)`. `plan` is None on dry-run or
operator-N, but `identity` is set as soon as `backend.prepare`
@@ -142,10 +122,16 @@ def attach_agent(
agent process's exit code.
`resume=True` adds `--continue` so claude picks up its most
recent session non-interactively (no session-picker prompt).
First-attach paths (`./cli.py start`) leave it False.
recent session non-interactively (no session-picker prompt)
the right shape for the dashboard's Enter re-attach (PRD 0020
chunk 3), where a bottle typically has exactly one session.
First-attach paths (`./cli.py start`, the dashboard's new-agent
flow) leave it False.
Used as the inner step of `./cli.py start`."""
Used as the inner step of `./cli.py start` (one-shot) and by the
dashboard, which calls it from inside a `curses.endwin
stdscr.refresh()` handoff so the curses surface gets out of the
terminal's way while the agent has it."""
runtime = runtime_for(agent_provider_template)
info(
f"attaching interactive {agent_provider_template} session "
@@ -162,7 +148,8 @@ def attach_agent(
def capture_claude_session_state(identity: str, exit_code: int) -> None:
"""Inside the launch context, while the container is still
alive: snapshot the transcript and mark for preservation if
claude crashed."""
claude crashed. Public for the dashboard's death-handling path
(PRD 0020 open question 3)."""
# FIXME: this captures Claude-specific session state. A follow-up
# spike should explore freezing provider-neutral container state
# instead of relying on each agent's transcript layout.
@@ -175,7 +162,9 @@ def capture_claude_session_state(identity: str, exit_code: int) -> None:
def settle_state(identity: str) -> None:
"""Post-teardown housekeeping: print the resume hint if the
state was preserved, otherwise reap the per-bottle state dir."""
state was preserved, otherwise reap the per-bottle state dir.
Public so the dashboard's explicit-stop path calls the same
settlement the CLI uses on context exit."""
if not identity:
return
if is_preserved(identity):
-577
View File
@@ -1,577 +0,0 @@
"""supervise: list pending supervise proposals across all bottles and
act on them (approve / modify / reject).
Curses-based TUI; modify-then-approve shells out to $EDITOR. The
approval handlers wire to the per-tool remediation engines:
PRD 0014 (egress, retargeted from cred-proxy in PRD 0017
chunk 3) writes routes.yaml + SIGHUPs egress; PRD 0015
(pipelock) writes the allowlist + restarts pipelock; PRD 0016
(capability) rebuilds the bottle Dockerfile.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import curses
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import traceback
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from .. import supervise as _supervise
from ..backend.docker.bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import (
CapabilityApplyError,
apply_capability_change,
)
from ..backend.docker.egress_apply import EgressApplyError, add_route
from ..backend.docker.pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
parse_allowlist_content,
render_allowlist_content,
)
from ..log import Die, error, info
from ..supervise import (
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
AuditEntry,
Proposal,
Response,
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
archive_proposal,
list_pending_proposals,
render_diff,
write_audit_entry,
write_response,
)
from ._common import PROG
_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS = 1000
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class QueuedProposal:
"""A pending proposal plus the queue dir it was found in."""
proposal: Proposal
queue_dir: Path
# Errors any remediation engine may raise. Caught by the TUI key
# handlers and surfaced in the status line so a failed apply keeps
# the proposal pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError, PipelockApplyError, CapabilityApplyError)
def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
"""Walk ~/.bot-bottle/queue/* and collect pending proposals."""
queue_root = _supervise.bot_bottle_root() / "queue"
if not queue_root.is_dir():
return []
out: list[QueuedProposal] = []
for slug_dir in sorted(queue_root.iterdir()):
if not slug_dir.is_dir():
continue
for proposal in list_pending_proposals(slug_dir):
out.append(QueuedProposal(proposal=proposal, queue_dir=slug_dir))
out.sort(key=lambda q: q.proposal.arrival_timestamp)
return out
def _approval_status(qp: QueuedProposal, verb: str) -> str:
"""Status-line text after a successful approval."""
base = f"{verb} {qp.proposal.tool} for [{qp.proposal.bottle_slug}]"
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return f"{base}; resume: ./cli.py resume {qp.proposal.bottle_slug}"
return base
def _detail_lines(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
green_attr: int = 0,
) -> list[tuple[str, int]]:
"""Return the detail-view body as (text, curses-attr) tuples."""
p = qp.proposal
out: list[tuple[str, int]] = [
(f"bottle: {p.bottle_slug}", 0),
(f"tool: {p.tool}", 0),
(f"id: {p.id}", 0),
(f"arrived: {p.arrival_timestamp}", 0),
(f"queue: {qp.queue_dir}", 0),
("", 0),
("justification:", 0),
]
out.extend((" " + line, 0) for line in p.justification.splitlines() or [""])
out.extend([
("", 0),
(_proposed_payload_label(p.tool) + ":", 0),
])
out.extend((line, 0) for line in p.proposed_file.splitlines() or [""])
if p.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
host = _failed_url_host(p.proposed_file)
if host:
out.append(("", 0))
out.append((host, green_attr))
return out
def _failed_url_host(url: str) -> str:
"""Best-effort hostname extraction from a pipelock-block proposal."""
import urllib.parse
try:
return urllib.parse.urlsplit(url.strip()).hostname or ""
except ValueError:
return ""
def _proposed_payload_label(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
return "failed URL"
return "proposed file"
def _suffix_for_tool(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return ".dockerfile"
return ".txt"
# --- Operator actions ------------------------------------------------------
def approve(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
notes: str = "",
final_file: str | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Apply the proposal, write the waiting response, and audit it."""
status = STATUS_MODIFIED if final_file is not None else STATUS_APPROVED
file_to_apply = final_file if final_file is not None else qp.proposal.proposed_file
diff_before, diff_after = "", ""
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK:
diff_before, diff_after = add_route(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
diff_before, diff_after = _apply_pipelock_url(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
_meta = read_metadata(qp.proposal.bottle_slug)
if _meta is not None and not _meta.compose_project:
raise CapabilityApplyError(
"capability-block remediation is not supported for smolmachines "
"bottles. Reject this proposal or handle the capability change "
"manually, then restart the bottle."
)
diff_before, diff_after = apply_capability_change(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
response = Response(
proposal_id=qp.proposal.id,
status=status,
notes=notes,
final_file=final_file,
)
write_response(qp.queue_dir, response)
_write_audit(
qp, action=status, notes=notes,
diff_before=diff_before, diff_after=diff_after,
)
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
archive_proposal(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
def reject(qp: QueuedProposal, *, reason: str) -> None:
"""Write a rejection response and an audit entry."""
response = Response(
proposal_id=qp.proposal.id,
status=STATUS_REJECTED,
notes=reason,
final_file=None,
)
write_response(qp.queue_dir, response)
_write_audit(qp, action=STATUS_REJECTED, notes=reason, diff_before="", diff_after="")
def _apply_pipelock_url(slug: str, failed_url: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Merge a pipelock-block failed URL's host into the allowlist."""
import urllib.parse
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(failed_url.strip())
host = parsed.hostname or ""
if not host:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"proposed failed_url has no extractable host: {failed_url!r}"
)
current = fetch_current_allowlist(slug)
hosts = parse_allowlist_content(current)
if host not in hosts:
hosts.append(host)
return apply_allowlist_change(slug, render_allowlist_content(hosts))
def _write_audit(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
action: str,
notes: str,
diff_before: str,
diff_after: str,
) -> None:
"""Audit log for egress / pipelock tools."""
component = COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL.get(qp.proposal.tool)
if component is None:
return
write_audit_entry(AuditEntry(
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
bottle_slug=qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
component=component,
operator_action=action,
operator_notes=notes,
justification=qp.proposal.justification,
diff=render_diff(diff_before, diff_after, label=component),
))
# --- $EDITOR integration --------------------------------------------------
def edit_in_editor(content: str, *, suffix: str = ".tmp") -> str | None:
"""Open `content` in $EDITOR and return edited content, if changed."""
editor = os.environ.get("EDITOR", "vim")
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
mode="w", suffix=suffix, delete=False, prefix="supervise-modify.",
) as f:
f.write(content)
path = f.name
try:
subprocess.run([editor, path], check=False)
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
edited = f.read()
return edited if edited != content else None
finally:
try:
os.unlink(path)
except OSError:
pass
# --- TUI -------------------------------------------------------------------
def cmd_supervise(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} supervise", add_help=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--once", action="store_true",
help="list pending proposals once and exit (no TUI)",
)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
if args.once:
return _list_once()
try:
curses.wrapper(_main_loop)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return 130
except Die as e:
if e.message:
error(e.message)
else:
error("supervise exited on a fatal error (no detail captured).")
return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch supervise crash for logging
log_path = _write_crash_log(e)
error(f"supervise crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
error(f"full traceback written to {log_path}")
return 1
return 0
def _write_crash_log(exc: BaseException) -> Path:
"""Persist `exc`'s traceback to a stable file under ~/.bot-bottle/."""
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
body = "".join(
traceback.format_exception(type(exc), exc, exc.__traceback__)
)
entry = f"=== supervise crash {stamp} ===\n{body}\n"
try:
log_dir = _supervise.bot_bottle_root() / "logs"
log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path = log_dir / "supervise-crash.log"
with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(entry)
return path
except OSError:
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix="bot-bottle-supervise-crash-", suffix=".log",
)
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(entry)
return Path(tmp)
def _list_once() -> int:
pending = discover_pending()
if not pending:
info("no pending proposals")
return 0
for qp in pending:
sys.stdout.write(
f"{qp.proposal.arrival_timestamp} "
f"[{qp.proposal.bottle_slug}] "
f"{qp.proposal.tool} "
f"{qp.proposal.id}\n"
)
sys.stdout.write(f" {qp.proposal.justification}\n")
return 0
def _try_init_green() -> int:
"""Initialise a green color pair and return its attr, or 0."""
try:
curses.start_color()
curses.use_default_colors()
curses.init_pair(1, curses.COLOR_GREEN, -1)
return curses.color_pair(1)
except curses.error:
return 0
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
curses.curs_set(0)
stdscr.timeout(_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS)
green_attr = _try_init_green()
selected = 0
status_line = ""
seen_ids: set[str] = set()
while True:
pending = discover_pending()
if selected >= len(pending):
selected = max(0, len(pending) - 1)
live_ids = {qp.proposal.id for qp in pending}
newly_arrived = live_ids - seen_ids
if seen_ids and newly_arrived:
try:
curses.beep()
except curses.error:
pass
for i, qp in enumerate(pending):
if qp.proposal.id in newly_arrived:
selected = i
break
seen_ids = live_ids
_render(
stdscr, pending, selected, status_line,
green_attr=green_attr,
)
try:
key = stdscr.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return
if key == -1:
continue
status_line = ""
if key in (ord("q"), 27):
return
if not pending:
continue
qp = pending[selected]
if key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")):
selected = min(selected + 1, len(pending) - 1)
elif key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")):
selected = max(selected - 1, 0)
elif key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, 10, 13):
_detail_view(stdscr, qp, green_attr=green_attr)
elif key == ord("a"):
try:
approve(qp)
status_line = _approval_status(qp, "approved")
except ApplyError as e:
status_line = f"apply failed: {e}"
elif key == ord("m"):
edited = _modify(stdscr, qp)
if edited is None:
status_line = "modify aborted (no change)"
else:
try:
approve(qp, final_file=edited, notes="operator modified before approving")
status_line = _approval_status(qp, "modified+approved")
except ApplyError as e:
status_line = f"apply failed: {e}"
elif key == ord("r"):
reason = _prompt(stdscr, "reject reason: ")
if reason:
reject(qp, reason=reason)
status_line = f"rejected {qp.proposal.tool} for [{qp.proposal.bottle_slug}]"
else:
status_line = "reject aborted (empty reason)"
def _render(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
pending: list[QueuedProposal],
selected: int,
status_line: str,
*,
green_attr: int = 0, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
) -> None:
stdscr.erase()
h, w = stdscr.getmaxyx()
header = f"bot-bottle supervise ({len(pending)} pending)"
stdscr.addnstr(0, 0, header, w - 1, curses.A_BOLD)
stdscr.hline(1, 0, curses.ACS_HLINE, w)
row = 2
if not pending:
stdscr.addnstr(
row, 2,
"no pending proposals; agents will queue here when they call a "
"supervise tool",
w - 4,
)
else:
for i, qp in enumerate(pending):
if row >= h - 3:
break
p = qp.proposal
ts_short = (
p.arrival_timestamp.split("T", 1)[1][:8]
if "T" in p.arrival_timestamp else p.arrival_timestamp
)
cursor = "> " if i == selected else " "
line = (
f"{cursor}{ts_short} "
f"[{p.bottle_slug}] {p.tool:<18} {p.id[:8]} "
f"{_proposed_payload_label(p.tool)}"
)
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if i == selected else curses.A_NORMAL
stdscr.addnstr(row, 0, line, w - 1, attr)
row += 1
if row >= h - 3:
break
if p.justification:
stdscr.addnstr(row, 4, p.justification[: max(0, w - 5)], w - 5)
row += 1
footer = "[j/k] move [Enter] view [a] approve [m] modify [r] reject [q] quit"
stdscr.hline(h - 2, 0, curses.ACS_HLINE, w)
stdscr.addnstr(h - 1, 0, footer, w - 1, curses.A_DIM)
if status_line:
stdscr.addnstr(h - 3, 0, status_line, w - 1, curses.A_BOLD)
stdscr.refresh()
def _detail_view(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
green_attr: int = 0,
) -> None:
"""Render the full proposal. Scrollable. Press q to return."""
lines = _detail_lines(qp, green_attr=green_attr)
offset = 0
while True:
stdscr.erase()
h, w = stdscr.getmaxyx()
for i, (text, attr) in enumerate(lines[offset:offset + h - 1]):
stdscr.addnstr(i, 0, text, w - 1, attr)
stdscr.addnstr(
h - 1, 0,
"[j/k] scroll [g/G] top/bottom [a] approve [m] modify [r] reject [q] back",
w - 1, curses.A_DIM,
)
stdscr.refresh()
key = stdscr.getch()
if key in (ord("q"), 27):
return
if key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")):
offset = min(offset + 1, max(0, len(lines) - 1))
elif key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")):
offset = max(offset - 1, 0)
elif key == ord("g"):
offset = 0
elif key == ord("G"):
offset = max(0, len(lines) - 1)
elif key == ord("a"):
try:
approve(qp)
except ApplyError:
pass
return
elif key == ord("m"):
edited = _modify(stdscr, qp)
if edited is not None:
try:
approve(qp, final_file=edited, notes="operator modified before approving")
except ApplyError:
pass
return
elif key == ord("r"):
reason = _prompt(stdscr, "reject reason: ")
if reason:
reject(qp, reason=reason)
return
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None: # type: ignore
"""Suspend curses, open $EDITOR on the proposed file, return edited content."""
suffix = _suffix_for_tool(qp.proposal.tool)
curses.endwin()
try:
edited = edit_in_editor(qp.proposal.proposed_file, suffix=suffix)
finally:
stdscr.refresh()
return edited
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str: # type: ignore
"""One-line input at the bottom of the screen."""
curses.curs_set(1)
h, _ = stdscr.getmaxyx()
stdscr.move(h - 2, 0)
stdscr.clrtoeol()
stdscr.addstr(h - 2, 0, label)
stdscr.refresh()
curses.echo()
try:
raw = stdscr.getstr(h - 2, len(label), 200)
finally:
curses.noecho()
curses.curs_set(0)
return raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").strip()
__all__ = [
"QueuedProposal",
"approve",
"cmd_supervise",
"discover_pending",
"edit_in_editor",
"reject",
]
-220
View File
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
"""tui.py — minimal curses filter-select picker for CLI prompts.
Exposed surface:
filter_select(items, *, title="", tty_path="/dev/tty") -> str | None
Opens /dev/tty directly so the picker works even when stdout/stdin are
redirected. Returns the selected item or None on cancel.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import curses
import os
import sys
from typing import Any, Optional
def filter_select(
items: list[str],
*,
title: str = "",
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Render a filter-select picker over *items*.
Returns the selected item string, or ``None`` if the user cancelled
(Esc / ``q`` / Ctrl-C / Ctrl-D) or if the terminal is too small.
The picker opens *tty_path* directly so it works even when
stdout/stdin are redirected.
"""
if not items:
return None
try:
tty_fd = open(tty_path, "r+b", buffering=0)
except OSError:
return None
try:
# Use os.dup() to duplicate the fd so the original file object
# and FileIO in _run_picker each manage independent copies,
# preventing double-close errors.
fd_dup = os.dup(tty_fd.fileno())
return _run_picker(items, title=title, tty_fd=fd_dup)
finally:
tty_fd.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Internal implementation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_KEY_ESC = 27
_KEY_CTRL_C = 3
_KEY_CTRL_D = 4
_KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN = 8
_KEY_ENTER_ALT = 10
_CANCEL_KEYS = frozenset([_KEY_ESC, _KEY_CTRL_C, _KEY_CTRL_D, ord("q")])
def _run_picker(items: list[str], *, title: str, tty_fd: int) -> Optional[str]:
"""Drive a curses session on *tty_fd* and return the picked item."""
# newterm lets us run curses on an arbitrary fd rather than the
# process's controlling tty / stdout — crucial when stdout is piped.
os.environ.setdefault("TERM", "xterm-256color")
# Save / restore the real stdin/stdout so curses newterm can use tty_fd.
orig_stdin = sys.__stdin__
orig_stdout = sys.__stdout__
try:
import io
tty_text = io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(tty_fd, mode='r+'), write_through=True)
sys.__stdin__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
# curses.wrapper calls initscr which honours sys.__stdin__ / __stdout__
# on some builds; use newterm where available.
screen = curses.initscr()
curses.noecho()
curses.cbreak()
screen.keypad(True)
try:
result = _picker_loop(screen, items, title=title)
finally:
screen.keypad(False)
curses.nocbreak()
curses.echo()
curses.endwin()
except Exception: # noqa: W0718 — curses can raise many error types
return None
finally:
sys.__stdin__ = orig_stdin # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = orig_stdout # type: ignore[assignment]
return result
def _picker_loop(screen: Any, items: list[str], *, title: str) -> Optional[str]:
query = ""
cursor = 0
while True:
filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
# Clamp cursor into the visible list.
if not filtered:
cursor = 0
elif cursor >= len(filtered):
cursor = len(filtered) - 1
try:
_render(screen, filtered, cursor, query=query, title=title)
except curses.error:
# Terminal too small or write error — bail out.
return None
try:
key = screen.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return None
if key in _CANCEL_KEYS:
return None
if key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, _KEY_ENTER_ALT, ord("\r")):
return filtered[cursor] if filtered else None
if key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")):
if cursor > 0:
cursor -= 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")):
if cursor < len(filtered) - 1:
cursor += 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_BACKSPACE, _KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN, 127):
query = query[:-1]
# After narrowing the filter, keep cursor in range.
new_filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
if cursor >= len(new_filtered):
cursor = max(0, len(new_filtered) - 1)
elif 32 <= key <= 126:
# Printable ASCII — append to query and reset cursor so the
# top of the newly-filtered list is selected.
query += chr(key)
cursor = 0
def _filter_items(items: list[str], query: str) -> list[str]:
if not query:
return list(items)
q = query.lower()
return [i for i in items if q in i.lower()]
def _render(screen: Any, filtered: list[str], cursor: int, *, query: str, title: str) -> None:
screen.erase()
rows, cols = screen.getmaxyx()
min_rows = 5
if rows < min_rows:
raise curses.error("terminal too small")
row = 0
if title and row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, title[:cols - 1], curses.A_BOLD)
row += 1
filter_label = f"Filter: {query}"
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, filter_label[:cols - 1])
row += 1
sep = "" * min(cols - 1, 40)
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
list_start = row
# Reserve two rows for separator + help line at bottom.
list_rows = rows - list_start - 2
if list_rows < 1:
return
# Scroll window: keep cursor visible.
scroll = max(0, cursor - list_rows + 1)
visible = filtered[scroll: scroll + list_rows]
for idx, item in enumerate(visible):
abs_idx = scroll + idx
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if abs_idx == cursor else curses.A_NORMAL
prefix = "> " if abs_idx == cursor else " "
line = (prefix + item)[:cols - 1]
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, line, attr)
row += 1
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
help_line = "[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] cancel"
if row < rows:
_addstr_safe(screen, min(rows - 1, row), 0, help_line[:cols - 1])
screen.refresh()
def _addstr_safe(screen: Any, row: int, col: int, text: str, attr: int = curses.A_NORMAL) -> None:
try:
screen.addstr(row, col, text, attr)
except curses.error:
pass
+39 -77
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import os
from copy import deepcopy
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from .log import die
from .util import expand_tilde
@@ -51,8 +50,7 @@ def codex_host_access_token(
tokens = raw.get("tokens")
if not isinstance(tokens, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens")
tokens_typed = cast(dict[str, object], tokens)
access = tokens_typed.get("access_token")
access = tokens.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access, str) or not access:
die(
f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens.access_token. "
@@ -107,14 +105,14 @@ def write_codex_dummy_auth_file(
path.chmod(0o600)
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict[str, object]:
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict:
try:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
die(f"codex host credentials: could not read valid JSON at {path}: {e}")
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} must contain a JSON object")
return cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return raw
def _dummy_exp(now: datetime | None, exp_ts: int | None) -> int:
@@ -124,14 +122,6 @@ def _dummy_exp(now: datetime | None, exp_ts: int | None) -> int:
return int(check_now.timestamp()) + 3600
def _dummy_timestamp(now: datetime | None = None) -> str:
check_now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
if check_now.tzinfo is None:
check_now = check_now.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
check_now = check_now.astimezone(timezone.utc)
return check_now.isoformat(timespec="milliseconds").replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _dummy_jwt(now: datetime | None = None, *, exp_ts: int | None = None) -> str:
return _encode_dummy_jwt({
"exp": _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts),
@@ -153,11 +143,11 @@ def _dummy_jwt_from_host(
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(cast(dict[str, object], payload), now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(payload, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
@@ -165,24 +155,23 @@ def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _redact_jwt_payload(
payload: dict[str, object],
payload: dict,
*,
now: datetime | None = None,
exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
) -> dict:
out = _redact_claims(payload)
if not isinstance(out, dict):
out = {}
out_typed: dict[str, object] = cast(dict[str, object], out)
out_typed["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out_typed.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out_typed
out["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out
def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
if isinstance(value, dict):
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in cast(dict[str, object], value).items():
for key, inner in value.items():
lower = key.lower()
if key == "https://api.openai.com/profile":
out[key] = _redact_profile_claim(inner)
@@ -198,10 +187,8 @@ def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
out[key] = inner if isinstance(inner, list) else []
elif isinstance(inner, bool):
out[key] = inner
elif isinstance(inner, dict):
out[key] = {}
elif isinstance(inner, list):
out[key] = []
elif isinstance(inner, (dict, list)):
out[key] = _redact_claims(inner)
else:
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
return out
@@ -210,16 +197,16 @@ def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
profile = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict:
profile = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
return {
"email": "bot-bottle@example.invalid",
"email_verified": bool(profile.get("email_verified", True)),
}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict:
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -250,53 +237,28 @@ def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
def _redact_codex_auth(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> object:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower == "auth_mode" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
out[key] = inner
elif lower == "openai_api_key":
out[key] = None
elif lower == "last_refresh":
# Codex parses this as a timestamp on startup. Keep the
# schema valid without copying host-side session metadata.
out[key] = _dummy_timestamp(now)
elif lower == "tokens":
out[key] = _redact_token_block(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
else:
out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
return out
def _redact_token_block(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
tokens = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in tokens.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower in {"access_token", "id_token"}:
out[key] = _dummy_jwt_from_host(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif lower == "account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
# Current Codex uses this non-secret selected account id
# while egress owns the real bearer token.
out[key] = inner
else:
out[key] = _redact_unknown_auth_value(inner)
return out
def _redact_unknown_auth_value(value: object) -> object:
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in value.items():
lower = key.lower()
if lower == "openai_api_key":
out[key] = None
elif lower == "tokens":
out[key] = _redact_codex_auth(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif lower in {"access_token", "id_token"}:
out[key] = _dummy_jwt_from_host(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
elif "token" in lower or "secret" in lower or lower.endswith("_key"):
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
elif lower == "account_id" and isinstance(inner, str) and inner:
out[key] = inner
elif lower in {"account_id", "user_id", "email"}:
out[key] = "bot-bottle-placeholder"
else:
out[key] = _redact_codex_auth(inner, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
return out
if isinstance(value, list):
return []
if value is None:
return None
return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
return [_redact_codex_auth(v, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts) for v in value]
return value
def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
@@ -309,7 +271,7 @@ def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
return None
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None
exp = cast(dict[str, object], payload).get("exp")
exp = payload.get("exp")
if not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
return None
return datetime.fromtimestamp(exp, timezone.utc)
View File
-226
View File
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
"""Claude agent provider plugin (PRD 0050, contrib).
The Claude-specific behavior previously inlined under
`agent_provider.agent_provision_plan` (claude.json trust marker,
api.anthropic.com egress route, OAuth-token placeholder), plus
the `claude mcp add` invocation that registers the supervise
sidecar in claude-code's user config (PRD 0013)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import shlex
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from ...agent_provider import (
AgentProvider,
AgentProviderRuntime,
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
)
from ...egress import EgressRoute
from ...log import die, info, warn
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ...backend import Bottle, BottlePlan
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
def _skills_dir(guest_home: str) -> str:
return f"{guest_home}/.claude/skills"
def _prompt_path(guest_home: str) -> str:
return f"{guest_home}/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"
_RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
template="claude",
command="claude",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.claude"),
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
remote_control_args=("--remote-control",),
)
class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
@property
def runtime(self) -> AgentProviderRuntime:
return _RUNTIME
def provision_plan(
self,
*,
dockerfile: str,
state_dir: Path,
guest_home: str,
guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
auth_token: str = "",
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del forward_host_credentials, host_env # Codex-only knobs
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
env_vars: dict[str, str] = {
"CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC": "1",
"DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING": "1",
}
claude_config = state_dir / "claude.json"
claude_projects = {guest_home: {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True}}
claude_projects[trusted_path] = {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True}
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps({
"hasCompletedOnboarding": True,
"theme": "dark",
"bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
"projects": claude_projects,
}, indent=2) + "\n")
claude_config.chmod(0o600)
files = (
AgentProvisionFile(claude_config, f"{guest_home}/.claude.json"),
)
egress_routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.anthropic.com",
auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
token_ref=auth_token,
tls_passthrough=True,
),)
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
if auth_token:
env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = "egress-placeholder"
hidden_env_names = frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"})
return AgentProvisionPlan(
template=_RUNTIME.template,
command=_RUNTIME.command,
prompt_mode=_RUNTIME.prompt_mode,
image=_RUNTIME.image,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
files=files,
egress_routes=egress_routes,
hidden_env_names=hidden_env_names,
)
def provision_skills(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy each named skill tree from `~/.claude/skills/<name>/`
on the host into the guest's claude-code skills dir. No-op
when the agent has no skills."""
from ...backend.util import host_skill_dir
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
if not agent.skills:
return
skills_dir = _skills_dir(plan.guest_home)
bottle.exec(f"mkdir -p {skills_dir}", user="root")
for name in agent.skills:
src = host_skill_dir(name)
if not os.path.isdir(src):
die(
f"skill {name!r} disappeared from host between "
f"validation and copy at {src}."
)
dst = f"{skills_dir}/{name}"
info(f"copying skill {name} into {bottle.name}:{dst}")
bottle.exec(f"rm -rf {dst} && mkdir -p {dst}", user="root")
bottle.cp_in(f"{src}/.", f"{dst}/")
bottle.exec(f"chown -R node:node {dst}", user="root")
def provision_prompt(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the guest, fix ownership/mode.
Returns the in-guest path iff the agent has a non-empty
prompt (drives `--append-system-prompt-file`); the file is
copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
)
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
return prompt_path if agent.prompt else None
def provision(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Apply the claude-side declarative provision steps from
`plan.agent_provision` today that's the `claude.json`
trust-marker file. Hot-replace this with a richer flow as
claude-code's harness shape evolves."""
provision = plan.agent_provision
for d in provision.dirs:
path = shlex.quote(d.guest_path)
_exec(bottle, f"mkdir -p {path}", f"could not create {d.guest_path}")
_exec(
bottle,
f"chown {shlex.quote(d.owner)} {path}",
f"could not chown {d.guest_path}",
)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chmod {shlex.quote(d.mode)} {path}",
f"could not chmod {d.guest_path}",
)
for command in provision.pre_copy:
_exec(bottle, shlex.join(command.argv), command.error)
for f in provision.files:
bottle.cp_in(str(f.host_path), f.guest_path)
path = shlex.quote(f.guest_path)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chown {shlex.quote(f.owner)} {path}",
f"could not chown {f.guest_path}",
)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chmod {shlex.quote(f.mode)} {path}",
f"could not chmod {f.guest_path}",
)
for command in provision.verify:
_exec(bottle, shlex.join(command.argv), command.error)
def provision_supervise_mcp(
self,
plan: "BottlePlan",
bottle: "Bottle",
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Run `claude mcp add` inside the agent guest to register the
supervise sidecar in claude-code's user config (~/.claude.json).
Failure is logged but not fatal the bottle still works without
the entry; the operator can register it manually."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent claude config → {supervise_url}")
r = bottle.exec(
f"claude mcp add --scope user --transport http "
f"{_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME} {supervise_url}",
user="node",
)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"`claude mcp add supervise` failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}. Inside the bottle, "
f"register manually with: "
f"claude mcp add --scope user --transport http supervise {supervise_url}"
)
def _exec(bottle: "Bottle", script: str, error: str) -> None:
result = bottle.exec(script, user="root")
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip()
if detail:
detail = f": {detail}"
die(f"agent provider provisioning: {error}{detail}")
-271
View File
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
"""Codex agent provider plugin (PRD 0050, contrib).
The Codex-specific behavior previously inlined under
`agent_provider.agent_provision_plan` (config.toml trust marker,
chatgpt.com / api.openai.com egress routes, optional host-credential
forwarding with dummy-auth.json + verify), plus the `codex mcp add`
invocation that registers the supervise sidecar in Codex's
~/.codex/config.toml (PRD 0050)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shlex
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from ...agent_provider import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
AgentProvider,
AgentProviderRuntime,
AgentProvisionCommand,
AgentProvisionDir,
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
)
from ...codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from ...egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
from ...log import die, info, warn
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ...backend import Bottle, BottlePlan
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
def _skills_dir(guest_home: str) -> str:
# Codex agents still read skills from the claude-code convention
# (~/.claude/skills/) — the bot-bottle-codex image follows the
# same layout. If Codex grows native skill discovery later,
# change here.
return f"{guest_home}/.claude/skills"
def _prompt_path(guest_home: str) -> str:
return f"{guest_home}/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"
_RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
template="codex",
command="codex",
image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.codex"),
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
remote_control_args=(),
)
class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
@property
def runtime(self) -> AgentProviderRuntime:
return _RUNTIME
def provision_plan(
self,
*,
dockerfile: str,
state_dir: Path,
guest_home: str,
guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
auth_token: str = "",
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del auth_token # Claude-only knob
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
env_vars: dict[str, str] = {
"CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
}
auth_dir = resolved_guest_env.get("CODEX_HOME", f"{guest_home}/.codex")
if forward_host_credentials:
env_vars["CODEX_HOME"] = auth_dir
dirs = [AgentProvisionDir(auth_dir)]
files: list[AgentProvisionFile] = []
pre_copy: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
verify: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = {}
config_path = f"{auth_dir}/config.toml"
config_file = state_dir / "codex-config.toml"
toml_path = trusted_path.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
config_file.write_text(
f'[projects."{toml_path}"]\n'
'trust_level = "trusted"\n'
)
config_file.chmod(0o600)
files.append(AgentProvisionFile(config_file, config_path))
egress_routes: list[EgressRoute] = []
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if forward_host_credentials:
_host_env = host_env or dict(os.environ)
provisioned_env[CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF] = (
codex_host_access_token(_host_env)
)
auth_file = state_dir / "codex-auth.json"
write_codex_dummy_auth_file(auth_file, _host_env)
files.append(AgentProvisionFile(auth_file, f"{auth_dir}/auth.json"))
pre_copy.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
"find", auth_dir,
"-maxdepth", "1",
"-type", "f",
"(",
"-name", "*.sqlite",
"-o", "-name", "*.sqlite-*",
"-o", "-name", "*.codex-repair-*.bak",
")",
"-delete",
), "codex host credentials: could not reset runtime db files"))
verify.append(AgentProvisionCommand((
"runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"env",
f"HOME={guest_home}",
f"CODEX_HOME={auth_dir}",
"codex", "login", "status",
), (
"codex host credentials: dummy auth was copied into the "
"guest, but Codex did not accept it"
)))
return AgentProvisionPlan(
template=_RUNTIME.template,
command=_RUNTIME.command,
prompt_mode=_RUNTIME.prompt_mode,
image=_RUNTIME.image,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
dirs=tuple(dirs),
files=tuple(files),
pre_copy=tuple(pre_copy),
verify=tuple(verify),
egress_routes=tuple(egress_routes),
provisioned_env=provisioned_env,
)
def provision_skills(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy each named skill tree from `~/.claude/skills/<name>/`
on the host into the guest. No-op when the agent has no
skills."""
from ...backend.util import host_skill_dir
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
if not agent.skills:
return
skills_dir = _skills_dir(plan.guest_home)
bottle.exec(f"mkdir -p {skills_dir}", user="root")
for name in agent.skills:
src = host_skill_dir(name)
if not os.path.isdir(src):
die(
f"skill {name!r} disappeared from host between "
f"validation and copy at {src}."
)
dst = f"{skills_dir}/{name}"
info(f"copying skill {name} into {bottle.name}:{dst}")
bottle.exec(f"rm -rf {dst} && mkdir -p {dst}", user="root")
bottle.cp_in(f"{src}/.", f"{dst}/")
bottle.exec(f"chown -R node:node {dst}", user="root")
def provision_prompt(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> str | None:
"""Copy the prompt file into the guest, fix ownership/mode.
Codex reads it via the agent's `Read and follow the
instructions in <path>.` bootstrap (see `prompt_args`); the
file is copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
)
agent = plan.spec.manifest.agents[plan.spec.agent_name]
return prompt_path if agent.prompt else None
def provision(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Apply the codex-side declarative provision steps from
`plan.agent_provision`: the `~/.codex/` dir + config.toml
trust marker, plus the dummy-auth.json drop + `codex login
status` verify when host-credential forwarding is on."""
provision = plan.agent_provision
for d in provision.dirs:
path = shlex.quote(d.guest_path)
_exec(bottle, f"mkdir -p {path}", f"could not create {d.guest_path}")
_exec(
bottle,
f"chown {shlex.quote(d.owner)} {path}",
f"could not chown {d.guest_path}",
)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chmod {shlex.quote(d.mode)} {path}",
f"could not chmod {d.guest_path}",
)
for command in provision.pre_copy:
_exec(bottle, shlex.join(command.argv), command.error)
for f in provision.files:
bottle.cp_in(str(f.host_path), f.guest_path)
path = shlex.quote(f.guest_path)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chown {shlex.quote(f.owner)} {path}",
f"could not chown {f.guest_path}",
)
_exec(
bottle,
f"chmod {shlex.quote(f.mode)} {path}",
f"could not chmod {f.guest_path}",
)
for command in provision.verify:
_exec(bottle, shlex.join(command.argv), command.error)
def provision_supervise_mcp(
self,
plan: "BottlePlan",
bottle: "Bottle",
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Run `codex mcp add` inside the agent guest to register the
supervise sidecar in Codex's user config (~/.codex/config.toml).
Mirrors the Claude provider's `claude mcp add` flow — failure
is logged but not fatal."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent codex config → {supervise_url}")
r = bottle.exec(
f"codex mcp add --transport http "
f"{_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME} {supervise_url}",
user="node",
)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"`codex mcp add supervise` failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}. Inside the bottle, "
f"register manually with: "
f"codex mcp add --transport http supervise {supervise_url}"
)
def _exec(bottle: "Bottle", script: str, error: str) -> None:
result = bottle.exec(script, user="root")
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip()
if detail:
detail = f": {detail}"
die(f"agent provider provisioning: {error}{detail}")
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
"""Gitea deploy-key provisioner (PRD 0048, contrib).
Generates ed25519 keypairs via `ssh-keygen` and registers / deletes
them using the Gitea deploy-key HTTP API. No new Python dependencies
only stdlib `urllib.request` and `subprocess`."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import subprocess
import tempfile
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from ...deploy_key_provisioner import DeployKeyProvisioner
class GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(DeployKeyProvisioner):
"""Manages deploy keys on a Gitea instance."""
def __init__(self, *, token: str, api_url: str) -> None:
self._token = token
self._api_url = api_url.rstrip("/")
def create(self, owner_repo: str, title: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
"""Generate an ed25519 keypair, register the public half as a
repo deploy key, and return `(key_id, private_key_bytes)`.
The key is registered with `read_only=False` because git-gate
needs push access to forward gitleaks-scanned refs upstream."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
key_path = Path(tmpdir) / "key"
subprocess.run(
[
"ssh-keygen", "-t", "ed25519",
"-f", str(key_path),
"-N", "",
],
check=True,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
private_key = key_path.read_bytes()
public_key = key_path.with_suffix(".pub").read_text().strip()
owner, repo = _split_owner_repo(owner_repo)
url = f"{self._api_url}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/keys"
payload = json.dumps({
"key": public_key,
"read_only": False,
"title": title,
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=payload,
headers={
"Authorization": f"token {self._token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
body = json.loads(resp.read())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
_body = _read_error_body(exc)
raise RuntimeError(
f"failed to create deploy key for {owner_repo}: "
f"HTTP {exc.code}{_body}"
) from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(
f"failed to create deploy key for {owner_repo}: {exc.reason}"
) from exc
return str(body["id"]), private_key
def delete(self, owner_repo: str, key_id: str) -> None:
"""Delete the deploy key. HTTP 404 (already gone) is success.
All other errors raise RuntimeError so teardown halts."""
owner, repo = _split_owner_repo(owner_repo)
url = f"{self._api_url}/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/keys/{key_id}"
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
headers={"Authorization": f"token {self._token}"},
method="DELETE",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req):
pass
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code == 404:
return
_body = _read_error_body(exc)
raise RuntimeError(
f"failed to delete deploy key {key_id} for {owner_repo}: "
f"HTTP {exc.code}{_body}"
) from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(
f"failed to delete deploy key {key_id} for {owner_repo}: "
f"{exc.reason}"
) from exc
def _split_owner_repo(owner_repo: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Split `'owner/repo'` into `('owner', 'repo')`."""
parts = owner_repo.split("/", 1)
if len(parts) != 2 or not all(parts):
raise ValueError(
f"expected 'owner/repo' format, got {owner_repo!r}"
)
return parts[0], parts[1]
def _read_error_body(exc: urllib.error.HTTPError) -> str:
try:
return exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except Exception: # noqa: broad-exception-caught — safely fallback to empty error message
return ""
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
"""Deploy-key provisioner interface and factory (PRD 0048).
The core defines the abstract contract; concrete implementations live
in `bot_bottle/contrib/<provider>/deploy_key_provisioner.py`. The
factory `get_provisioner` imports contrib modules lazily so that a
missing optional dependency in one provider doesn't break unrelated
features."""
from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
class DeployKeyProvisioner(ABC):
"""Manages a single deploy-key lifecycle on a remote forge."""
@abstractmethod
def create(self, owner_repo: str, title: str) -> tuple[str, bytes]:
"""Generate a keypair and register the public half as a
deploy key on the forge.
`owner_repo` is the `<owner>/<repo>` path (no `.git` suffix).
`title` is the human-readable label shown in the forge UI.
Returns `(key_id, private_key_bytes)` where `key_id` is opaque
to the caller and is only ever passed back to `delete`."""
@abstractmethod
def delete(self, owner_repo: str, key_id: str) -> None:
"""Delete the registered deploy key.
Must not raise if the key is already absent (HTTP 404 is
success). Must raise for all other failures so teardown halts."""
def get_provisioner(
provider: str, token: str, api_url: str
) -> DeployKeyProvisioner:
"""Instantiate the contrib provisioner for `provider`.
Raises `ManifestError` for unknown providers so the error surfaces
at parse time rather than at runtime."""
if provider == "gitea":
from bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner import (
GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner,
)
return GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(token=token, api_url=api_url)
from .manifest_util import ManifestError
raise ManifestError(
f"unknown provisioned_key provider: {provider!r}; "
f"available: gitea"
)
+5 -7
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ flow (PRD 0014) at egress and renames the MCP tool.
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
@@ -141,15 +141,13 @@ def egress_manifest_routes(
routes are merged."""
out: list[EgressRoute] = []
for r in bottle.egress.routes:
tls_pt = r.Pipelock.Config.get("tls_passthrough", False)
tls_passthrough = tls_pt if isinstance(tls_pt, bool) else False
out.append(EgressRoute(
host=r.Host,
path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
auth_scheme=r.AuthScheme,
token_ref=r.TokenRef,
roles=r.Role,
tls_passthrough=tls_passthrough,
tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
))
return tuple(out)
@@ -218,14 +216,14 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
return out
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict:
"""Return the addon-visible fields for one route.
Single authoritative mapping between EgressRoute (host-side) and
egress_addon_core.Route (sidecar-side). When a field is added to
the addon's Route that must appear in the YAML, add it here and
in egress_addon_core._parse_one together."""
fields: dict[str, object] = {"host": r.host}
fields: dict = {"host": r.host}
if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
fields["auth_scheme"] = r.auth_scheme
fields["token_env"] = r.token_env
@@ -254,7 +252,7 @@ def egress_render_routes(
lines.append(f' token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
if "path_allowlist" in f:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in f["path_allowlist"]: # type: ignore
for p in f["path_allowlist"]:
lines.append(f' - "{p}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+1 -6
View File
@@ -38,12 +38,7 @@ from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found]
# Absolute import (NOT `from .egress_addon_core`) — the
# container drops both files flat into /app/ so they are sibling
# top-level modules to mitmdump's loader, not a package.
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
Route,
decide,
is_git_push_request,
load_routes,
)
from egress_addon_core import Route, decide, is_git_push_request, load_routes # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
+7 -11
View File
@@ -78,13 +78,11 @@ def parse_routes(payload: object) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("routes payload: top-level must be an object")
payload_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], payload)
raw: object = payload_dict.get("routes")
raw = payload.get("routes")
if not isinstance(raw, list):
raise ValueError("routes payload: 'routes' must be a list")
raw_list: list[object] = typing.cast(list[object], raw)
out: list[Route] = []
for i, r in enumerate(raw_list):
for i, r in enumerate(raw):
out.append(_parse_one(i, r))
return tuple(out)
@@ -93,17 +91,15 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
label = f"route[{idx}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object (got {type(raw).__name__})")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
host: object = raw_dict.get("host")
host = raw.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'host' must be a non-empty string")
path_allow_raw: object = raw_dict.get("path_allowlist", [])
path_allow_raw = raw.get("path_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'path_allowlist' must be a list")
path_allow_list: list[object] = typing.cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
prefixes: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_allow_list):
for j, p in enumerate(path_allow_raw):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string"
@@ -115,8 +111,8 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
)
prefixes.append(p)
auth_scheme: object = raw_dict.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env: object = raw_dict.get("token_env", "")
auth_scheme = raw.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env = raw.get("token_env", "")
if not isinstance(auth_scheme, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'auth_scheme' must be a string")
if not isinstance(token_env, str):
+1 -1
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ def _read_secret_silent(name: str, prompt_body: str) -> str:
if not (sys.stdin.isatty() or sys.stderr.isatty()):
# Fall back to /dev/tty so this still works when stdin is a pipe.
try:
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+", encoding="utf-8")
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+")
except OSError:
die(
f"cannot prompt for secret '{name}': no tty available. "
+46 -94
View File
@@ -29,14 +29,12 @@ backend-specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import shlex
from abc import ABC
from dataclasses import dataclass
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Mapping
from .log import info
from .log import die
from .manifest import Bottle, GitEntry
@@ -49,6 +47,10 @@ GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"
GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15
def _empty_str_map() -> dict[str, str]:
return {}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitGateUpstream:
"""One bare repo on the gate. `name` drives the bare-repo path
@@ -62,7 +64,10 @@ class GitGateUpstream:
KnownHostKey string from the manifest; the gate's start step
materialises it into a known_hosts file if non-empty.
the gate credential paths inside the running sidecar."""
`extra_hosts` is a `{hostname: ip}` map the backend injects into
the gate container's `/etc/hosts` via `--add-host` so the gate
can resolve upstream hostnames that aren't reachable via the
container's default DNS (e.g. Tailscale-only hosts)."""
name: str
upstream_url: str
@@ -71,6 +76,7 @@ class GitGateUpstream:
identity_file: str
known_host_key: str
known_hosts_file: Path = Path()
extra_hosts: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=_empty_str_map)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -107,11 +113,38 @@ def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: Bottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]
upstream_port=e.UpstreamPort,
identity_file=e.IdentityFile,
known_host_key=e.KnownHostKey,
extra_hosts=dict(e.ExtraHosts),
)
for e in bottle.git
)
def git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts(
upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...],
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Merge every upstream's `extra_hosts` into a single
`{hostname: ip}` map for `--add-host` on the gate container. Two
entries naming the same hostname with different IPs is a manifest
bug the gate has one /etc/hosts so die loudly with the
conflicting names rather than silently picking one."""
merged: dict[str, str] = {}
source: dict[str, str] = {}
for u in upstreams:
for host, ip in u.extra_hosts.items():
existing = merged.get(host)
if existing is None:
merged[host] = ip
source[host] = u.name
elif existing != ip:
die(
f"git-gate ExtraHosts conflict: '{host}' maps to "
f"'{existing}' in upstream '{source[host]}' and to "
f"'{ip}' in upstream '{u.name}'. The gate has one "
f"/etc/hosts; pick one IP."
)
return merged
def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
entries: tuple[GitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
) -> str:
@@ -211,7 +244,10 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
"mkdir -p /git",
]
for u in upstreams:
lines.append(f"init_repo {shlex.quote(u.name)} {shlex.quote(u.upstream_url)}")
# Single-quote args so URL/path content (containing : and /)
# passes through ash unmangled. Names came through the manifest
# validator so they don't contain a single quote.
lines.append(f"init_repo '{u.name}' '{u.upstream_url}'")
lines.extend([
"",
"exec git daemon \\",
@@ -360,80 +396,6 @@ exit 0
"""
def _provision_dynamic_key(
entry: GitEntry,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
) -> str:
"""Generate a fresh ed25519 keypair, register the public half with
the forge, and persist the private key + key ID under `stage_dir`.
Returns the host-side path to the private key file so the caller
can inject it into the GitGateUpstream as `identity_file`."""
from .deploy_key_provisioner import get_provisioner
pk = entry.ProvisionedKey
assert pk is not None
token = os.environ.get(pk.token_env)
if token is None:
raise RuntimeError(
f"git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}] provisioned_key.token_env"
f" = {pk.token_env!r}: env var is not set"
)
api_url = pk.api_url or f"https://{entry.UpstreamHost}"
provisioner = get_provisioner(pk.provider, token, api_url)
owner_repo = entry.UpstreamPath
if owner_repo.endswith(".git"):
owner_repo = owner_repo[:-4]
title = f"bot-bottle:{slug}:{entry.Name}"
info(f"provisioning deploy key for git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}]")
key_id, private_key_bytes = provisioner.create(owner_repo, title)
key_file = stage_dir / f"{entry.Name}-key"
key_file.write_bytes(private_key_bytes)
key_file.chmod(0o600)
id_file = stage_dir / f"{entry.Name}-deploy-key-id"
id_file.write_text(key_id)
id_file.chmod(0o600)
info(f"provisioned deploy key {key_id} for git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}]")
return str(key_file)
def revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle: Bottle, stage_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Revoke all deploy keys provisioned for `bottle` during prepare.
Called at teardown after containers stop. Raises if any revocation
fails a stranded key is a security concern that the operator must
address manually."""
from .deploy_key_provisioner import get_provisioner
for entry in bottle.git:
if entry.ProvisionedKey is None:
continue
pk = entry.ProvisionedKey
id_file = stage_dir / f"{entry.Name}-deploy-key-id"
if not id_file.exists():
continue
key_id = id_file.read_text().strip()
token = os.environ.get(pk.token_env)
if token is None:
raise RuntimeError(
f"git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}] provisioned_key.token_env"
f" = {pk.token_env!r}: env var is not set;"
f" cannot revoke deploy key {key_id}"
)
api_url = pk.api_url or f"https://{entry.UpstreamHost}"
provisioner = get_provisioner(pk.provider, token, api_url)
owner_repo = entry.UpstreamPath
if owner_repo.endswith(".git"):
owner_repo = owner_repo[:-4]
info(f"revoking deploy key {key_id} for git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}]")
provisioner.delete(owner_repo, key_id)
info(f"revoked deploy key {key_id} for git-gate.repos[{entry.Name!r}]")
class GitGate(ABC):
"""The per-agent git-gate. Encapsulates the host-side prepare
(upstream lift + entrypoint/hook render); the sidecar's
@@ -445,21 +407,10 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
entrypoint, pre-receive hook, and access-hook scripts (mode
600) under `stage_dir`. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess.
For `provisioned_key` entries, also generates and registers
a fresh deploy key via the forge API and writes the private key
+ key ID to `stage_dir`.
Returned plan is incomplete: the launch step must fill
`internal_network` / `egress_network` via `dataclasses.replace`
before passing the plan to `.start`."""
upstreams_list = list(git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle))
for i, entry in enumerate(bottle.git):
if entry.ProvisionedKey is not None:
key_file = _provision_dynamic_key(entry, slug, stage_dir)
upstreams_list[i] = dataclasses.replace(
upstreams_list[i], identity_file=key_file
)
upstreams = tuple(upstreams_list)
upstreams = git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle)
entrypoint = stage_dir / "git_gate_entrypoint.sh"
entrypoint.write_text(git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams))
entrypoint.chmod(0o600)
@@ -492,6 +443,7 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
identity_file=u.identity_file,
known_host_key=u.known_host_key,
known_hosts_file=known_hosts_file,
extra_hosts=dict(u.extra_hosts),
)
)
return GitGatePlan(
+7 -33
View File
@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ from urllib.parse import urlsplit
DEFAULT_PORT = 9420
# Body-size cap matching supervise_server.py's 1 MiB limit.
MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024
class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version = "bot-bottle-git-http/1"
@@ -42,25 +39,13 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
hook_path = os.environ.get(
"GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook",
)
peer = self.client_address[0]
hook = subprocess.run(
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
[hook_path, "upload-pack",
str(repo_dir), self.client_address[0], self.client_address[0]],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
)
if hook.returncode != 0:
detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
"utf-8", errors="replace",
).rstrip()
if detail:
for line in detail.splitlines():
self.log_message("access-hook denied %s: %s",
parsed.path, line)
else:
self.log_message(
"access-hook denied %s: exit=%d (no output)",
parsed.path, hook.returncode,
)
self.send_response(403)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
self.end_headers()
@@ -78,8 +63,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"REMOTE_ADDR": self.client_address[0],
"REMOTE_PORT": str(self.client_address[1]),
"REMOTE_USER": "",
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name, # type: ignore
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port), # type: ignore
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name,
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port),
"SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
})
for header, variable in (
@@ -91,18 +76,7 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
value = self.headers.get(header)
if value:
env[variable] = value
raw_length = self.headers.get("content-length", "0") or "0"
try:
length = int(raw_length)
except ValueError:
self.send_error(400, "Bad Content-Length")
return
if length < 0:
self.send_error(400, "Negative Content-Length")
return
if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
self.send_error(413, "Request body too large")
return
length = int(self.headers.get("content-length", "0") or "0")
body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
proc = subprocess.run(
["git", "http-backend"],
@@ -157,8 +131,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: object) -> None: # type: ignore # noqa: A002
sys.stdout.write(format % args + "\n")
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
sys.stdout.write(fmt % args + "\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
+741 -60
View File
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ the system prompt, for bottles the body is human documentation
Bottle schema (frontmatter):
extends: <bottle-name> # optional (PRD 0025)
env: { <NAME>: <env-entry>, ... }
git-gate: # optional (PRD 0047)
git:
user: { name: <str>, email: <str> } # optional
repos: { <name>: <git-gate-entry>, ... } # optional
remotes: { <host>: <git-entry>, ... } # optional
egress: { routes: [ <egress-route>, ... ] }
# route keys: host, path_allowlist, auth, role, pipelock
# pipelock: { tls_passthrough: <bool>, ssrf_ip_allowlist: [<cidr>, ...] }
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ Bottle schema (frontmatter):
Agent schema (frontmatter):
bottle: <bottle-name> # required
skills: [ <skill-name>, ... ] # optional
git-gate:
user: { name: <str>, email: <str> } # optional; overlays bottle
# Claude Code subagent passthrough fields — accepted, ignored:
name, description, model, color, memory
@@ -45,47 +43,541 @@ on-disk files.
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Mapping
from typing import Mapping, cast
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
from .manifest_agent import Agent, AgentProvider
from .manifest_egress import (
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES,
EgressConfig,
EgressRoute,
PipelockRoutePolicy,
)
from .manifest_git import GitEntry, GitUser, parse_git_gate_config
from .manifest_schema import BOTTLE_KEYS
from .agent_provider import PROVIDER_TEMPLATES
from .log import warn
from .manifest_schema import AGENT_MODEL_KEYS, BOTTLE_KEYS
# Re-export everything that callers currently import from this module.
__all__ = [
"ManifestError",
"GitEntry",
"GitUser",
"AgentProvider",
"EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES",
"PipelockRoutePolicy",
"EgressRoute",
"EgressConfig",
"Agent",
"Bottle",
"Manifest",
]
class ManifestError(Exception):
"""A manifest file (or the manifest tree) is invalid."""
def _empty_str_dict() -> dict[str, str]:
return {}
def _section_dict(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Like as_json_object but treats absent/null as an empty section."""
if value is None:
return {}
return as_json_object(value, label)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitEntry:
"""One upstream the per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008) is allowed to
talk to. `Upstream` is the real remote URL the agent would push to
if there were no gate; the gate hosts a bare repo at /git/<Name>.git
and `IdentityFile` is the SSH key the gate uses to push that repo
upstream after gitleaks passes. The agent itself never holds the
upstream credential.
`ExtraHosts` is an optional `{hostname: ip}` map injected into the
gate container's `/etc/hosts` via `--add-host`. Use it when the
Upstream's hostname isn't resolvable from the gate (e.g. a
Tailscale-only host whose public DNS A record points elsewhere):
the agent's `insteadOf` rewrite still matches the original
hostname, but the gate routes to the right IP.
The Upstream URL is parsed once at construction and the pieces are
stashed in the `Upstream*` fields so the git-gate render step
doesn't have to re-parse."""
Name: str
Upstream: str
IdentityFile: str
KnownHostKey: str = ""
ExtraHosts: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=_empty_str_dict)
RemoteKey: str = ""
UpstreamUser: str = ""
UpstreamHost: str = ""
UpstreamPort: str = ""
UpstreamPath: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "GitEntry":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git[{idx}]")
return cls._from_object(bottle_name, d, f"git[{idx}]", None)
@classmethod
def from_remote_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, host_key: str, raw: object
) -> "GitEntry":
if not host_key:
raise ManifestError(f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.remotes has an empty host key")
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.remotes[{host_key!r}]")
return cls._from_object(
bottle_name, d, f"git.remotes[{host_key!r}]", host_key,
)
@classmethod
def _from_object(
cls,
bottle_name: str,
d: dict[str, object],
label: str,
host_key: str | None,
) -> "GitEntry":
name = d.get("Name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} missing required string "
f"field 'Name'"
)
upstream = d.get("Upstream")
if not isinstance(upstream, str) or not upstream:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} '{name}' missing required string field "
f"'Upstream'"
)
ident = d.get("IdentityFile")
if not isinstance(ident, str) or not ident:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} '{name}' missing required string field "
f"'IdentityFile'"
)
khk = _opt_str(
d.get("KnownHostKey"),
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} '{name}' KnownHostKey",
)
extra_hosts = _opt_extra_hosts(
d.get("ExtraHosts"),
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} '{name}' ExtraHosts",
)
user, host, port, path = _parse_git_upstream(
upstream, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} '{name}' Upstream"
)
if (
host_key is not None
and host_key != host
and not _is_ip_literal(host)
):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.remotes key {host_key!r} "
f"does not match Upstream host {host!r}"
)
return cls(
Name=name,
Upstream=upstream,
IdentityFile=ident,
KnownHostKey=khk,
ExtraHosts=extra_hosts,
RemoteKey=host_key or host,
UpstreamUser=user,
UpstreamHost=host,
UpstreamPort=port,
UpstreamPath=path,
)
# Auth schemes for the egress route's optional `auth` block.
# Same values cred-proxy accepts today; `token` sidesteps the Gitea
# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AgentProvider:
"""Provider/template for the agent process inside a bottle.
`template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
optionally points at a custom agent-image Dockerfile while leaving
bot-bottle's sidecar infrastructure intact.
`auth_token` names the host env var that holds the provider's OAuth
token (Claude only). The provisioner injects a provider-owned egress
route for api.anthropic.com that re-injects this token as the Bearer
header, and sets a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent
so the Claude Code CLI starts.
`forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
the egress sidecar (Codex only).
"""
template: str = "claude"
dockerfile: str = ""
auth_token: str = ""
forward_host_credentials: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "AgentProvider":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider")
for k in d:
if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "auth_token", "forward_host_credentials"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: template, dockerfile, auth_token, forward_host_credentials"
)
template = d.get("template", "claude")
if not isinstance(template, str) or not template:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template must be a "
f"non-empty string"
)
if template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template {template!r} "
f"is not one of {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))}"
)
dockerfile = d.get("dockerfile", "")
if not isinstance(dockerfile, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.dockerfile must be a "
f"string (was {type(dockerfile).__name__})"
)
auth_token = d.get("auth_token", "")
if not isinstance(auth_token, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token must be a "
f"string (was {type(auth_token).__name__})"
)
if auth_token and template != "claude":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
f"supported for template 'claude'"
)
forward_host_credentials = d.get("forward_host_credentials", False)
if not isinstance(forward_host_credentials, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
f"must be a boolean (was {type(forward_host_credentials).__name__})"
)
if forward_host_credentials and template != "codex":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
"is currently only supported for template 'codex'"
)
return cls(
template=template,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
auth_token=auth_token,
forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitUser:
"""Per-bottle `git config --global user.name` / `user.email`
pair (issue #86). The agent's commits inside the bottle are
attributed to this identity rather than the agent image's
image-baked default (no user, or whatever the image dropped
in). Either or both fields can be set independently.
`from_dict` is forgiving on shape (a single missing field is
fine we just skip that config line at provisioning) but
strict on types (string-or-die)."""
name: str = ""
email: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "GitUser":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.user")
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"name", "email"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.user has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: name, email"
)
name = d.get("name", "")
email = d.get("email", "")
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.user.name must be a string "
f"(was {type(name).__name__})"
)
if not isinstance(email, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.user.email must be a string "
f"(was {type(email).__name__})"
)
if not name and not email:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.user is set but neither "
f"name nor email is non-empty; remove the block or "
f"fill at least one field."
)
return cls(name=name, email=email)
def is_empty(self) -> bool:
return not self.name and not self.email
def _parse_git_config(
bottle_name: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[GitEntry, ...], GitUser]:
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git")
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"user", "remotes"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: user, remotes"
)
git_user = (
GitUser.from_dict(bottle_name, d["user"])
if "user" in d
else GitUser()
)
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
remotes_raw = d.get("remotes")
if remotes_raw is not None:
remotes = _as_json_object(remotes_raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git.remotes")
git = tuple(
GitEntry.from_remote_dict(bottle_name, host, entry)
for host, entry in remotes.items()
)
_validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name, git)
return git, git_user
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PipelockRoutePolicy:
"""Per-route pipelock policy overrides.
`TlsPassthrough` adds the route host to pipelock's
`tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so pipelock still enforces
the hostname allowlist but does not MITM/decrypt request bodies or
headers for that host.
`SsrfIpAllowlist` adds explicit IPs/CIDRs to pipelock's SSRF
allowlist for private/internal destinations behind this route.
"""
TlsPassthrough: bool = False
SsrfIpAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object,
) -> "PipelockRoutePolicy":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
d = _as_json_object(raw, label)
for k in d:
if k not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'tls_passthrough' and 'ssrf_ip_allowlist' "
f"are accepted"
)
tls_passthrough_raw = d.get("tls_passthrough", False)
if not isinstance(tls_passthrough_raw, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.tls_passthrough must be a boolean "
f"(was {type(tls_passthrough_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_raw = d.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(ssrf_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(ssrf_raw):
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be a non-empty "
f"string (was {type(item).__name__})"
)
try:
ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
except ValueError as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be an IP address "
f"or CIDR (was {item!r}): {e}"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist.append(item)
return cls(
TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw,
SsrfIpAllowlist=tuple(ssrf_ip_allowlist),
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute:
"""One route on the per-bottle egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
`Host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
optional `PathAllowlist` constrains the URL path to a set of
prefixes; empty tuple means no path-level filtering. The optional
`AuthScheme` / `TokenRef` pair drives credential injection:
when set, the proxy strips any inbound Authorization and injects
`<AuthScheme> <value-of-host-env-named-by-TokenRef>`. When the
manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
`Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
rejected by the validator.
Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
- `host` required, non-empty.
- `path_allowlist` optional, list of absolute path prefixes.
- `auth` optional. If present, MUST carry both `scheme` and
`token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
that case).
- `role` optional, reserved any non-empty value is rejected.
"""
Host: str
PathAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
Pipelock: PipelockRoutePolicy = field(default_factory=PipelockRoutePolicy)
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "EgressRoute":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}]"
d = _as_json_object(raw, label)
host = d.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} missing required string field 'host'")
path_allow_raw = d.get("path_allowlist")
prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if path_allow_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(path_allow_raw).__name__})"
)
path_list = cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
collected: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_list):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(p).__name__})"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
collected.append(p)
prefixes = tuple(collected)
auth_scheme = ""
token_ref = ""
if "auth" in d:
auth_raw = d.get("auth")
auth_d = _as_json_object(auth_raw, f"{label} auth")
if not auth_d:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth is empty ({{}}); omit the 'auth' key "
f"entirely if this route is unauthenticated. Otherwise "
f"both 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are required."
)
auth_scheme_raw = auth_d.get("scheme")
if not isinstance(auth_scheme_raw, str) or not auth_scheme_raw:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.scheme is required when 'auth' is set "
f"(non-empty string)"
)
if auth_scheme_raw not in EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.scheme {auth_scheme_raw!r} is not one of "
f"{', '.join(EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES)}"
)
token_ref_raw = auth_d.get("token_ref")
if not isinstance(token_ref_raw, str) or not token_ref_raw:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.token_ref is required when 'auth' is set "
f"(name of the host env var holding the token value)"
)
for k in auth_d:
if k not in ("scheme", "token_ref"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are accepted"
)
auth_scheme = auth_scheme_raw
token_ref = token_ref_raw
role_raw = d.get("role")
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if role_raw is None:
roles = ()
elif isinstance(role_raw, str):
roles = (role_raw,)
elif isinstance(role_raw, list):
role_list = cast(list[object], role_raw)
collected_roles: list[str] = []
for r in role_list:
if not isinstance(r, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})")
collected_roles.append(r)
roles = tuple(collected_roles)
else:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} role must be a string or a list of strings "
f"(was {type(role_raw).__name__})"
)
if roles:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} role {roles[0]!r} is not accepted; "
f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
)
pipelock = (
PipelockRoutePolicy.from_dict(bottle_name, idx, d["pipelock"])
if "pipelock" in d
else PipelockRoutePolicy()
)
for k in d:
if k not in ("host", "path_allowlist", "auth", "role", "pipelock"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'host', 'path_allowlist', 'auth', 'role', 'pipelock'"
)
return cls(
Host=host,
PathAllowlist=prefixes,
AuthScheme=auth_scheme,
TokenRef=token_ref,
Role=roles,
Pipelock=pipelock,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressConfig:
"""Per-bottle egress configuration. Today this is just the
route table; the nesting under `egress:` leaves room for
per-bottle proxy settings (port override, log level, etc.) in
follow-ups."""
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "EgressConfig":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress")
routes_raw = d.get("routes")
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
if routes_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(routes_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes must be an array "
f"(was {type(routes_raw).__name__})"
)
routes_list = cast(list[object], routes_raw)
routes = tuple(
EgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
for i, entry in enumerate(routes_list)
)
_validate_egress_routes(bottle_name, routes)
for k in d:
if k != "routes":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'routes' is accepted"
)
return cls(routes=routes)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -94,9 +586,10 @@ class Bottle:
agent_provider: AgentProvider = field(default_factory=AgentProvider)
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
# Per-bottle git identity (issue #86). Empty default — bottles
# that don't set `git-gate.user:` in the manifest skip the
# `git config --global` step entirely. A bottle can declare a user
# identity without any git-gate.repos upstreams, and vice versa.
# that don't set `git.user:` in the manifest skip the
# `git config --global` step entirely. Set independently of
# the `git.remotes:` upstream map above: a bottle can declare a user
# identity without any git-gate upstreams, and vice versa.
git_user: GitUser = field(default_factory=GitUser)
egress: EgressConfig = field(default_factory=EgressConfig)
# Opt-in per-bottle stuck-recovery sidecar (PRD 0013). When true,
@@ -110,7 +603,7 @@ class Bottle:
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object) -> "Bottle":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{name}'")
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{name}'")
if "runtime" in d:
raise ManifestError(
@@ -123,22 +616,16 @@ class Bottle:
if "ssh" in d:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' has an 'ssh' field, which has been removed "
f"(PRD 0009). Declare upstreams under 'git-gate.repos' with "
f"url + identity + host_key; the git-gate sidecar (PRD 0008) "
f"holds the credential and gitleaks-scans pushes."
)
if "git" in d:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' uses 'git' which has been replaced by "
f"'git-gate' (PRD 0047). Move git.user → git-gate.user "
f"and git.remotes → git-gate.repos (fields: url, identity, host_key)."
f"(PRD 0009). Move each entry to 'git': declare the upstream "
f"as a git remote with Name + Upstream URL + IdentityFile, "
f"and the per-bottle git-gate (PRD 0008) will hold the "
f"credential and gitleaks-scan pushes."
)
if "git_user" in d:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' has a 'git_user' field, which has been "
f"removed. Move it under 'git-gate.user'."
f"removed. Move it under 'git.user'."
)
unknown = set(d.keys()) - BOTTLE_KEYS
@@ -152,7 +639,7 @@ class Bottle:
env: dict[str, str] = {}
env_raw = d.get("env")
if env_raw is not None:
env_dict = as_json_object(env_raw, f"bottle '{name}' env")
env_dict = _as_json_object(env_raw, f"bottle '{name}' env")
for var, value in env_dict.items():
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ManifestError(
@@ -163,9 +650,9 @@ class Bottle:
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
git_user = GitUser()
git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
git_raw = d.get("git")
if git_raw is not None:
git, git_user = parse_git_gate_config(name, git_raw)
git, git_user = _parse_git_config(name, git_raw)
agent_provider = (
AgentProvider.from_dict(name, d["agent_provider"])
@@ -192,6 +679,83 @@ class Bottle:
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Agent:
bottle: str
skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
prompt: str = ""
# Per-agent git identity (issue #94). Overlays the referenced
# bottle's git.user per-field at `Manifest.bottle_for`. Only the
# `user` block is allowed at the agent level; `git.remotes` stays
# bottle-only because it carries credentials and host trust.
git_user: GitUser = GitUser()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object, bottle_names: set[str]) -> "Agent":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"agent '{name}'")
unknown = set(d.keys()) - AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
if unknown:
allowed = ", ".join(sorted(AGENT_MODEL_KEYS))
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' has unknown key(s) {sorted(unknown)}; "
f"allowed keys are {allowed}."
)
bottle = d.get("bottle")
if not isinstance(bottle, str) or not bottle:
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a defined bottle")
if bottle not in bottle_names:
available = ", ".join(sorted(bottle_names)) or "(none defined)"
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' references bottle '{bottle}', which is not defined. "
f"Available: {available}"
)
skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
skills_raw = d.get("skills")
if skills_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(skills_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array (was {type(skills_raw).__name__})")
collected: list[str] = []
skills_list = cast(list[object], skills_raw)
for i, skill in enumerate(skills_list):
if not isinstance(skill, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' skills[{i}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(skill).__name__})"
)
collected.append(skill)
skills = tuple(collected)
prompt_raw = d.get("prompt")
if prompt_raw is None:
prompt = ""
elif isinstance(prompt_raw, str):
prompt = prompt_raw
else:
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string (was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})")
# git: agents may declare only `git.user` (name/email). Any
# other git key — notably `remotes` — is rejected: remotes
# carry credentials and host trust and stay bottle-only.
git_user = GitUser()
git_raw = d.get("git")
if git_raw is not None:
gd = _as_json_object(git_raw, f"agent '{name}' git")
for k in gd.keys():
if k != "user":
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' git.{k} is not allowed at the "
f"agent level; only git.user (name/email) may be "
f"set on an agent. git.remotes is bottle-only "
f"(it carries credentials and host trust)."
)
if "user" in gd:
git_user = GitUser.from_dict(name, gd["user"])
return cls(bottle=bottle, skills=skills, prompt=prompt, git_user=git_user)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Manifest:
bottles: Mapping[str, Bottle]
@@ -276,7 +840,6 @@ class Manifest:
files = sorted(stale_bottles.glob("*.md"))
if files:
names = ", ".join(p.name for p in files)
from .log import warn
warn(
f"ignoring bottle file(s) under "
f"{stale_bottles}: {names}. Bottles can only "
@@ -294,7 +857,7 @@ class Manifest:
@classmethod
def from_json_obj(cls, obj: object) -> "Manifest":
"""Validate and build a Manifest from a raw JSON-like dict."""
d = as_json_object(obj, "manifest")
d = _as_json_object(obj, "manifest")
raw_bottles_obj = _section_dict(d.get("bottles"), "manifest 'bottles'")
raw_agents = _section_dict(d.get("agents"), "manifest 'agents'")
@@ -303,7 +866,7 @@ class Manifest:
# consistently with the md-loader path.
raw_bottles: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}
for n, b in raw_bottles_obj.items():
raw_bottles[n] = as_json_object(b, f"bottle '{n}'")
raw_bottles[n] = _as_json_object(b, f"bottle '{n}'")
from .manifest_extends import resolve_bottles
bottles = resolve_bottles(raw_bottles)
@@ -322,11 +885,8 @@ class Manifest:
return
available = ", ".join(self.agents.keys())
if available:
msg = f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}"
raise ManifestError(msg)
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty)."
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}")
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty).")
def has_bottle(self, name: str) -> bool:
return name in self.bottles
@@ -386,3 +946,124 @@ class Manifest:
if merged.email:
parts.append(f"email={merged.email} ({'agent' if over.email else 'bottle'})")
return ", ".join(parts)
def _as_json_object(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Assert that `value` is a JSON object (str-keyed dict) and return
a view typed as `dict[str, object]` so downstream `.get(...)` calls
have a typed surface."""
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a JSON object (was {type(value).__name__})")
items = cast(dict[object, object], value)
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for k, v in items.items():
if not isinstance(k, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} keys must be strings (found {type(k).__name__})")
out[k] = v
return out
def _section_dict(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Like _as_json_object but treats absent/null as an empty section."""
if value is None:
return {}
return _as_json_object(value, label)
def _opt_str(value: object, label: str) -> str:
if value is None:
return ""
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a string (was {type(value).__name__})")
return value
def _opt_extra_hosts(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Validate a `{hostname: ip}` object and return a plain dict. None
yields an empty dict so callers can treat ExtraHosts as always
present. IP format is not checked here; docker validates at
`--add-host` time."""
if value is None:
return {}
obj = _as_json_object(value, label)
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for host, ip in obj.items():
if not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} contains an empty hostname key")
if not isinstance(ip, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label}['{host}'] must be a string (was {type(ip).__name__})")
if not ip:
raise ManifestError(f"{label}['{host}'] must be a non-empty string")
out[host] = ip
return out
def _parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
"""Parse `ssh://user@host[:port]/path` into (user, host, port, path).
Dies if `url` doesn't match the ssh:// shape v1 supports. Default
port is 22 (matches OpenSSH)."""
if not url.startswith("ssh://"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be an ssh:// URL (was {url!r})")
rest = url[len("ssh://"):]
if "@" not in rest:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
user, _, hostpart = rest.partition("@")
if not user:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} user is empty in {url!r}")
if "/" not in hostpart:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
hostport, _, path = hostpart.partition("/")
if not path:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} path is empty in {url!r}")
if ":" in hostport:
host, _, port = hostport.partition(":")
if not port.isdigit():
raise ManifestError(f"{label} port must be numeric in {url!r}")
else:
host = hostport
port = "22"
if not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} host is empty in {url!r}")
return (user, host, port, path)
def _is_ip_literal(value: str) -> bool:
try:
ipaddress.ip_address(value)
except ValueError:
return False
return True
def _validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> None:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
No cross-validation against `bottle.git` is performed. git-gate
(SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different protocols;
declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev setup."""
seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in routes:
key = r.Host.lower()
if key in seen_hosts:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes has duplicate host "
f"{r.Host!r}; each host must be unique on the proxy."
)
seen_hosts[key] = None
def _validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[GitEntry, ...]) -> None:
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for g in git:
if g.Name in seen:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git entries have duplicate Name '{g.Name}'; "
f"each entry maps to a distinct bare repo on the gate."
)
seen[g.Name] = None
-175
View File
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
"""Agent configuration manifest dataclasses."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import cast
from .agent_provider import PROVIDER_TEMPLATES
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
from .manifest_git import GitUser
from .manifest_schema import AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AgentProvider:
"""Provider/template for the agent process inside a bottle.
`template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
optionally points at a custom agent-image Dockerfile while leaving
bot-bottle's sidecar infrastructure intact.
`auth_token` names the host env var that holds the provider's OAuth
token (Claude only). The provisioner injects a provider-owned egress
route for api.anthropic.com that re-injects this token as the Bearer
header, and sets a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent
so the Claude Code CLI starts.
`forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
the egress sidecar (Codex only).
"""
template: str = "claude"
dockerfile: str = ""
auth_token: str = ""
forward_host_credentials: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "AgentProvider":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider")
for k in d:
if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "auth_token", "forward_host_credentials"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: template, dockerfile, auth_token, forward_host_credentials"
)
template = d.get("template", "claude")
if not isinstance(template, str) or not template:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template must be a "
f"non-empty string"
)
if template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template {template!r} "
f"is not one of {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))}"
)
dockerfile = d.get("dockerfile", "")
if not isinstance(dockerfile, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.dockerfile must be a "
f"string (was {type(dockerfile).__name__})"
)
auth_token = d.get("auth_token", "")
if not isinstance(auth_token, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token must be a "
f"string (was {type(auth_token).__name__})"
)
if auth_token and template != "claude":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
f"supported for template 'claude'"
)
forward_host_credentials = d.get("forward_host_credentials", False)
if not isinstance(forward_host_credentials, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
f"must be a boolean (was {type(forward_host_credentials).__name__})"
)
if forward_host_credentials and template != "codex":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
"is currently only supported for template 'codex'"
)
return cls(
template=template,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
auth_token=auth_token,
forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Agent:
bottle: str
skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
prompt: str = ""
# Per-agent git identity (issue #94). Overlays the referenced
# bottle's git-gate.user per-field at `Manifest.bottle_for`. Only
# `user` is allowed at the agent level; `repos` stays bottle-only
# because it carries credentials and host trust.
git_user: GitUser = GitUser()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object, bottle_names: set[str]) -> "Agent":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"agent '{name}'")
unknown = set(d.keys()) - AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
if unknown:
allowed = ", ".join(sorted(AGENT_MODEL_KEYS))
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' has unknown key(s) {sorted(unknown)}; "
f"allowed keys are {allowed}."
)
bottle = d.get("bottle")
if not isinstance(bottle, str) or not bottle:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a "
f"defined bottle"
)
if bottle not in bottle_names:
available = ", ".join(sorted(bottle_names)) or "(none defined)"
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' references bottle '{bottle}', which is not defined. "
f"Available: {available}"
)
skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
skills_raw = d.get("skills")
if skills_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(skills_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array "
f"(was {type(skills_raw).__name__})"
)
collected: list[str] = []
skills_list = cast(list[object], skills_raw)
for i, skill in enumerate(skills_list):
if not isinstance(skill, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' skills[{i}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(skill).__name__})"
)
collected.append(skill)
skills = tuple(collected)
prompt_raw = d.get("prompt")
if prompt_raw is None:
prompt = ""
elif isinstance(prompt_raw, str):
prompt = prompt_raw
else:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string "
f"(was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})"
)
# git-gate: agents may declare only `git-gate.user` (name/email).
# `git-gate.repos` is bottle-only — it carries credentials and host trust.
git_user = GitUser()
git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
if git_raw is not None:
gd = as_json_object(git_raw, f"agent '{name}' git-gate")
for k in gd:
if k != "user":
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' git-gate.{k} is not allowed at the "
f"agent level; only git-gate.user (name/email) may be "
f"set on an agent. git-gate.repos is bottle-only "
f"(it carries credentials and host trust)."
)
if "user" in gd:
git_user = GitUser.from_dict(name, gd["user"])
return cls(bottle=bottle, skills=skills, prompt=prompt, git_user=git_user)
-250
View File
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import cast
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
# Auth schemes for the egress route's optional `auth` block.
# Same values cred-proxy accepts today; `token` sidesteps the Gitea
# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
def validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> None:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
No cross-validation against `bottle.git-gate.repos` is performed.
git-gate (SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different
protocols; declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev
setup."""
seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in routes:
key = r.Host.lower()
if key in seen_hosts:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes has duplicate host "
f"{r.Host!r}; each host must be unique on the proxy."
)
seen_hosts[key] = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PipelockRoutePolicy:
"""Per-route pipelock policy overrides.
Stores raw pipelock configuration that's passed through to the
pipelock sidecar. Pipelock validates all config options, so
bot-bottle forwards manifest settings without coercion or strict
validation. Supported options include:
- `tls_passthrough`: bool skip TLS MITM for this host
- `ssrf_ip_allowlist`: list of CIDR/IP allow private destinations
- `skip_scan_for_extensions`: list of file extensions to skip DLP
scanning for (e.g., [".whl", ".tar.gz"])
"""
Config: dict[str, object] = field(default_factory=dict)
@classmethod
def from_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object,
) -> "PipelockRoutePolicy":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
return cls(Config=d)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute:
"""One route on the per-bottle egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
`Host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
optional `PathAllowlist` constrains the URL path to a set of
prefixes; empty tuple means no path-level filtering. The optional
`AuthScheme` / `TokenRef` pair drives credential injection:
when set, the proxy strips any inbound Authorization and injects
`<AuthScheme> <value-of-host-env-named-by-TokenRef>`. When the
manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
`Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
rejected by the validator.
Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
- `host` required, non-empty.
- `path_allowlist` optional, list of absolute path prefixes.
- `auth` optional. If present, MUST carry both `scheme` and
`token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
that case).
- `role` optional, reserved any non-empty value is rejected.
"""
Host: str
PathAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
Pipelock: PipelockRoutePolicy = field(default_factory=PipelockRoutePolicy)
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "EgressRoute":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
host = d.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} missing required string field 'host'")
path_allow_raw = d.get("path_allowlist")
prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if path_allow_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(path_allow_raw).__name__})"
)
path_list = cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
collected: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_list):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(p).__name__})"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
collected.append(p)
prefixes = tuple(collected)
auth_scheme = ""
token_ref = ""
if "auth" in d:
auth_raw = d.get("auth")
auth_d = as_json_object(auth_raw, f"{label} auth")
if not auth_d:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth is empty ({{}}); omit the 'auth' key "
f"entirely if this route is unauthenticated. Otherwise "
f"both 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are required."
)
auth_scheme_raw = auth_d.get("scheme")
if not isinstance(auth_scheme_raw, str) or not auth_scheme_raw:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.scheme is required when 'auth' is set "
f"(non-empty string)"
)
if auth_scheme_raw not in EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.scheme {auth_scheme_raw!r} is not one of "
f"{', '.join(EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES)}"
)
token_ref_raw = auth_d.get("token_ref")
if not isinstance(token_ref_raw, str) or not token_ref_raw:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth.token_ref is required when 'auth' is set "
f"(name of the host env var holding the token value)"
)
for k in auth_d:
if k not in ("scheme", "token_ref"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} auth has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'scheme' and 'token_ref' are accepted"
)
auth_scheme = auth_scheme_raw
token_ref = token_ref_raw
role_raw = d.get("role")
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if role_raw is None:
roles = ()
elif isinstance(role_raw, str):
roles = (role_raw,)
elif isinstance(role_raw, list):
role_list = cast(list[object], role_raw)
collected_roles: list[str] = []
for r in role_list:
if not isinstance(r, str):
msg = f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})"
raise ManifestError(msg)
collected_roles.append(r)
roles = tuple(collected_roles)
else:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} role must be a string or a list of strings "
f"(was {type(role_raw).__name__})"
)
if roles:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} role {roles[0]!r} is not accepted; "
f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
)
pipelock = (
PipelockRoutePolicy.from_dict(bottle_name, idx, d["pipelock"])
if "pipelock" in d
else PipelockRoutePolicy()
)
for k in d:
if k not in ("host", "path_allowlist", "auth", "role", "pipelock"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'host', 'path_allowlist', 'auth', 'role', 'pipelock'"
)
return cls(
Host=host,
PathAllowlist=prefixes,
AuthScheme=auth_scheme,
TokenRef=token_ref,
Role=roles,
Pipelock=pipelock,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressConfig:
"""Per-bottle egress configuration. Today this is just the
route table; the nesting under `egress:` leaves room for
per-bottle proxy settings (port override, log level, etc.) in
follow-ups."""
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "EgressConfig":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress")
routes_raw = d.get("routes")
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
if routes_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(routes_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes must be an array "
f"(was {type(routes_raw).__name__})"
)
routes_list = cast(list[object], routes_raw)
routes = tuple(
EgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
for i, entry in enumerate(routes_list)
)
validate_egress_routes(bottle_name, routes)
for k in d:
if k != "routes":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'routes' is accepted"
)
return cls(routes=routes)
+11 -12
View File
@@ -71,8 +71,7 @@ def _merge_bottles(
name: str,
) -> Bottle:
"""Apply PRD 0025 merge rules."""
from .manifest import Bottle, GitUser
from .manifest_egress import validate_egress_routes
from .manifest import Bottle, GitUser, _validate_egress_routes
# Parse the child's declared fields into a Bottle (with the
# usual defaults for anything missing). Validation runs the same
@@ -82,19 +81,19 @@ def _merge_bottles(
# env: dict merge, child wins on collision.
merged_env = {**parent.env, **child.env}
# git-gate.user: per-field overlay. Each non-empty field on child
# git.user: per-field overlay. Each non-empty field on child
# wins; empties fall through to parent. The default GitUser()
# is two empty strings, so a child that omits git-gate.user
# is two empty strings, so a child that omits git.user
# inherits the parent's user verbatim.
merged_git_user = GitUser(
name=child.git_user.name or parent.git_user.name,
email=child.git_user.email or parent.git_user.email,
)
# git-gate.repos: missing means inherit; an explicit empty object
# git.remotes: missing means inherit; an explicit empty object
# clears; otherwise parent and child merge by UpstreamHost with
# child entries replacing duplicate hosts.
if _child_declares_git_gate_repos(child_raw):
if _child_declares_git_remotes(child_raw):
merged_git = _merge_git_remotes(parent.git, child.git) if child.git else ()
else:
merged_git = parent.git
@@ -110,7 +109,7 @@ def _merge_bottles(
merged_supervise = (
child.supervise if "supervise" in child_raw else parent.supervise
)
validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
_validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
return Bottle(
env=merged_env,
@@ -122,14 +121,14 @@ def _merge_bottles(
)
def _child_declares_git_gate_repos(child_raw: dict[str, object]) -> bool:
from .manifest_util import as_json_object
def _child_declares_git_remotes(child_raw: dict[str, object]) -> bool:
from .manifest import _as_json_object
git_raw = child_raw.get("git-gate")
git_raw = child_raw.get("git")
if git_raw is None:
return False
git_obj = as_json_object(git_raw, "child git-gate")
return "repos" in git_obj
git_obj = _as_json_object(git_raw, "child git")
return "remotes" in git_obj
def _merge_git_remotes(
-307
View File
@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
"""Git-related manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
# Shell-safe characters for git-gate repo names. Names are embedded in
# the generated entrypoint shell script (shlex.quote is the primary
# defence; this regex is belt-and-suspenders and documents intent).
_GIT_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$")
def _opt_str(value: object, label: str) -> str:
if value is None:
return ""
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a string (was {type(value).__name__})")
return value
def parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
"""Parse `ssh://user@host[:port]/path` into (user, host, port, path).
Dies if `url` doesn't match the ssh:// shape v1 supports. Default
port is 22 (matches OpenSSH)."""
if not url.startswith("ssh://"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be an ssh:// URL (was {url!r})")
rest = url[len("ssh://"):]
if "@" not in rest:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
user, _, hostpart = rest.partition("@")
if not user:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} user is empty in {url!r}")
if "/" not in hostpart:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
hostport, _, path = hostpart.partition("/")
if not path:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} path is empty in {url!r}")
if ":" in hostport:
host, _, port = hostport.partition(":")
if not port.isdigit():
raise ManifestError(f"{label} port must be numeric in {url!r}")
else:
host = hostport
port = "22"
if not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} host is empty in {url!r}")
return (user, host, port, path)
def validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[GitEntry, ...]) -> None:
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for g in git:
if g.Name in seen:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos has duplicate name '{g.Name}'; "
f"each entry maps to a distinct bare repo on the gate."
)
seen[g.Name] = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProvisionedKeyConfig:
"""Configuration for automatic deploy-key lifecycle management
(PRD 0048). Used when a git-gate.repos entry opts out of a
static identity file and instead wants a fresh SSH keypair
generated at spin-up and revoked at teardown.
`provider` names the contrib sub-package to load (e.g. `gitea`).
`token_env` is the name of a host-side env var carrying the API
token; the value is read at provision time, never stored on the
plan. `api_url` is the forge's HTTP API root; if empty, it is
derived from the upstream URL's host at provision time."""
provider: str
token_env: str
api_url: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitEntry:
"""One upstream the per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008) is allowed to
talk to. `Upstream` is the real remote URL the agent would push to
if there were no gate; the gate hosts a bare repo at /git/<Name>.git
and `IdentityFile` is the SSH key the gate uses to push that repo
upstream after gitleaks passes. The agent itself never holds the
upstream credential.
The Upstream URL is parsed once at construction and the pieces are
stashed in the `Upstream*` fields so the git-gate render step
doesn't have to re-parse.
Manifest source: `git-gate.repos.<Name>` (PRD 0047/0048). Exactly
one of `identity` (static key path) or `provisioned_key` (automatic
lifecycle) must be present. The internal field names are stable."""
Name: str
Upstream: str
IdentityFile: str = ""
KnownHostKey: str = ""
ProvisionedKey: Optional[ProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
RemoteKey: str = ""
UpstreamUser: str = ""
UpstreamHost: str = ""
UpstreamPort: str = ""
UpstreamPath: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_repos_entry(
cls, bottle_name: str, repo_name: str, raw: object
) -> "GitEntry":
"""Parse one entry from `git-gate.repos.<repo_name>`.
YAML keys: `url` (required), exactly one of `identity` or
`provisioned_key` (required), `host_key` (optional).
The repo_name becomes `Name`."""
if not repo_name:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos has an empty key"
)
if not _GIT_NAME_RE.match(repo_name):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos name {repo_name!r} is invalid; "
f"allowed characters: A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ -"
)
label = f"git-gate.repos[{repo_name!r}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}")
for k in d:
if k not in {"url", "identity", "provisioned_key", "host_key"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: url, identity, provisioned_key, host_key"
)
upstream = d.get("url")
if not isinstance(upstream, str) or not upstream:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} missing required string field 'url'"
)
has_identity = "identity" in d
has_provisioned = "provisioned_key" in d
if has_identity and has_provisioned:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} must set exactly one of "
f"'identity' or 'provisioned_key'; got both."
)
if not has_identity and not has_provisioned:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} must set exactly one of "
f"'identity' or 'provisioned_key'; got neither."
)
ident = ""
provisioned_key: Optional[ProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
if has_identity:
raw_ident = d.get("identity")
if not isinstance(raw_ident, str) or not raw_ident:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} 'identity' must be a non-empty string"
)
ident = raw_ident
else:
provisioned_key = _parse_provisioned_key_config(
bottle_name, label, d["provisioned_key"]
)
khk = _opt_str(
d.get("host_key"),
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} host_key",
)
user, host, port, path = parse_git_upstream(
upstream, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label} url"
)
return cls(
Name=repo_name,
Upstream=upstream,
IdentityFile=ident,
KnownHostKey=khk,
ProvisionedKey=provisioned_key,
RemoteKey=host,
UpstreamUser=user,
UpstreamHost=host,
UpstreamPort=port,
UpstreamPath=path,
)
def _parse_provisioned_key_config(
bottle_name: str, label: str, raw: object
) -> ProvisionedKeyConfig:
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key")
for k in d:
if k not in {"provider", "token_env", "api_url"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: provider, token_env, api_url"
)
provider = d.get("provider")
if not isinstance(provider, str) or not provider:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key missing required "
f"string field 'provider'"
)
token_env = d.get("token_env")
if not isinstance(token_env, str) or not token_env:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key missing required "
f"string field 'token_env'"
)
api_url_raw = d.get("api_url", "")
if not isinstance(api_url_raw, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key 'api_url' must be a string"
)
return ProvisionedKeyConfig(
provider=provider,
token_env=token_env,
api_url=api_url_raw,
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class GitUser:
"""Per-bottle `git config --global user.name` / `user.email`
pair (issue #86). The agent's commits inside the bottle are
attributed to this identity rather than the agent image's
image-baked default (no user, or whatever the image dropped
in). Either or both fields can be set independently.
`from_dict` is forgiving on shape (a single missing field is
fine we just skip that config line at provisioning) but
strict on types (string-or-die)."""
name: str = ""
email: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "GitUser":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user")
for k in d:
if k not in {"name", "email"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: name, email"
)
name = d.get("name", "")
email = d.get("email", "")
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user.name must be a string "
f"(was {type(name).__name__})"
)
if not isinstance(email, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user.email must be a string "
f"(was {type(email).__name__})"
)
if not name and not email:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user is set but neither "
f"name nor email is non-empty; remove the block or "
f"fill at least one field."
)
return cls(name=name, email=email)
def is_empty(self) -> bool:
return not self.name and not self.email
def parse_git_gate_config(
bottle_name: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[GitEntry, ...], GitUser]:
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate")
for k in d:
if k not in {"user", "repos"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: user, repos"
)
git_user = (
GitUser.from_dict(bottle_name, d["user"])
if "user" in d
else GitUser()
)
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
repos_raw = d.get("repos")
if repos_raw is not None:
repos = as_json_object(repos_raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos")
git = tuple(
GitEntry.from_repos_entry(bottle_name, name, entry)
for name, entry in repos.items()
)
validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name, git)
return git, git_user
+8 -8
View File
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
try:
fm, _body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
raws[name] = fm
return resolve_bottles(raws)
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
agents_dir: Path,
bottle_names: set[str],
*,
source: str, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
source: str,
) -> dict[str, Agent]:
"""Walk `<agents_dir>/*.md`, parse each as an agent, and return
`{name: Agent}`. The Markdown body becomes the agent's prompt.
@@ -87,19 +87,19 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
try:
fm, body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_agent_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
# Build the dict Agent.from_dict expects. The body becomes
# prompt; Claude Code passthrough fields stay in fm and get
# ignored by Agent.from_dict (reads bottle/skills/git-gate/prompt).
# ignored by Agent.from_dict (which reads bottle/skills/git/prompt).
agent_dict: dict[str, object] = {
"bottle": fm.get("bottle"),
"skills": fm.get("skills", []),
"prompt": body.strip(),
}
if "git-gate" in fm:
agent_dict["git-gate"] = fm["git-gate"]
if "git" in fm:
agent_dict["git"] = fm["git"]
out[name] = Agent.from_dict(name, agent_dict, bottle_names)
return out
+6 -6
View File
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ _FILENAME_RX = re.compile(r"^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$")
# sets dies with a "did you mean" pointer: typos should not silently
# ghost into an empty config.
BOTTLE_KEYS = frozenset(
{"env", "extends", "agent_provider", "git-gate", "egress", "supervise"}
{"env", "extends", "agent_provider", "git", "egress", "supervise"}
)
AGENT_KEYS_REQUIRED = frozenset({"bottle"})
AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL = frozenset({"skills", "git-gate"})
AGENT_KEYS_OPTIONAL = frozenset({"skills", "git"})
# Claude Code subagent fields bot-bottle ignores at launch but does
# not reject. This lets the same file double as
@@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ def _validate_frontmatter_keys(
keys: object,
allowed_keys: frozenset[str],
) -> None:
from .manifest_util import ManifestError
from .manifest import ManifestError
key_set = set(keys) # type: ignore
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys # type: ignore
key_set = set(keys)
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys
if unknown:
allowed = ", ".join(sorted(allowed_keys))
raise ManifestError(
f"{kind} file {path}: unknown frontmatter key(s) "
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}." # type: ignore
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}."
)
-24
View File
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
"""Shared manifest primitives used by all manifest sub-modules."""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import cast
class ManifestError(Exception):
"""A manifest file (or the manifest tree) is invalid."""
def as_json_object(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Assert that `value` is a JSON object (str-keyed dict) and return
a view typed as `dict[str, object]` so downstream `.get(...)` calls
have a typed surface."""
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be a JSON object (was {type(value).__name__})")
items = cast(dict[object, object], value)
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for k, v in items.items():
if not isinstance(k, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} keys must be strings (found {type(k).__name__})")
out[k] = v
return out
+17 -209
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from .egress import EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
from .supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME
from .manifest import Bottle
@@ -132,11 +132,8 @@ def pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {ip: None for ip in extra}
for route in bottle.egress.routes:
ssrf_raw = route.Pipelock.Config.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
if isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
for ip in ssrf_raw:
if isinstance(ip, str):
seen.setdefault(ip, None)
for ip in route.Pipelock.SsrfIpAllowlist:
seen.setdefault(ip, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
@@ -223,195 +220,9 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
)
if effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist:
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist}
# Merge per-route pipelock config (e.g., response_body_scanning settings).
# Routes can specify arbitrary pipelock options that apply globally.
for route in bottle.egress.routes:
for key, value in route.Pipelock.Config.items():
if key not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
if key not in cfg:
cfg[key] = value
return cfg
_PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = {
"version",
"mode",
"enforce",
"api_allowlist",
"seed_phrase_detection",
"forward_proxy",
"dlp",
"request_body_scanning",
"tls_interception",
"ssrf",
}
def _pipelock_render_error(section: str, key: str, expected: str) -> ValueError:
return ValueError(
f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} must be {expected}"
)
def _reject_unknown_keys(
section: str,
obj: dict[str, object],
allowed: set[str],
) -> None:
for key in sorted(set(obj) - allowed):
raise ValueError(f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} is unsupported")
def _required_dict(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a mapping")
return cast(dict[str, object], value)
def _required_bool(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> bool:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, bool):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a boolean")
return value
def _required_int(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> int:
value = obj.get(key)
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "an integer")
return value
def _required_str(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> str:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a string")
return value
def _required_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, list):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a list of strings")
value_list = cast(list[object], value)
if not all(isinstance(v, str) for v in value_list):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a list of strings")
return cast(list[str], value)
def _optional_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
if key not in obj:
return []
return _required_str_list(obj, section, key)
def _optional_bool(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> bool | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_bool(obj, section, key)
def _optional_str(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> str | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_str(obj, section, key)
def _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
_reject_unknown_keys("config", cfg, _PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS)
normalized: dict[str, object] = {
"version": _required_int(cfg, "config", "version"),
"mode": _required_str(cfg, "config", "mode"),
"enforce": _required_bool(cfg, "config", "enforce"),
"api_allowlist": _required_str_list(cfg, "config", "api_allowlist"),
}
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
spd = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "seed_phrase_detection")
_reject_unknown_keys("seed_phrase_detection", spd, {"enabled"})
normalized["seed_phrase_detection"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(spd, "seed_phrase_detection", "enabled"),
}
fp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "forward_proxy")
_reject_unknown_keys("forward_proxy", fp, {"enabled"})
normalized["forward_proxy"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(fp, "forward_proxy", "enabled"),
}
dlp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "dlp")
_reject_unknown_keys("dlp", dlp, {"include_defaults", "scan_env"})
normalized["dlp"] = {
"include_defaults": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "include_defaults"),
"scan_env": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "scan_env"),
}
rbs = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "request_body_scanning")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"request_body_scanning",
rbs,
{"action", "scan_headers", "header_mode"},
)
normalized_rbs: dict[str, object] = {
"action": _required_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "action"),
}
scan_headers = _optional_bool(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "scan_headers")
if scan_headers is not None:
normalized_rbs["scan_headers"] = scan_headers
header_mode = _optional_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "header_mode")
if header_mode is not None:
normalized_rbs["header_mode"] = header_mode
normalized["request_body_scanning"] = normalized_rbs
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
tls = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "tls_interception")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"tls_interception",
tls,
{"enabled", "ca_cert", "ca_key", "passthrough_domains"},
)
normalized["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(tls, "tls_interception", "enabled"),
"ca_cert": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_cert"),
"ca_key": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_key"),
"passthrough_domains": _optional_str_list(
tls, "tls_interception", "passthrough_domains",
),
}
if "ssrf" in cfg:
ssrf = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "ssrf")
_reject_unknown_keys("ssrf", ssrf, {"ip_allowlist"})
normalized["ssrf"] = {
"ip_allowlist": _required_str_list(ssrf, "ssrf", "ip_allowlist"),
}
return normalized
def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
"""Render a pipelock config dict (as produced by
`pipelock_build_config`) as YAML. Hand-rolled so we don't take a
@@ -419,46 +230,44 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _bool(b: object) -> str:
return "true" if b else "false"
cfg = _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg)
lines: list[str] = []
lines.append(f"version: {cfg['version']}")
lines.append(f"mode: {cfg['mode']}")
lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cast(bool, cfg['enforce']))}")
lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cfg['enforce'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("api_allowlist:")
api_allowlist = cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"])
for h in api_allowlist:
for h in cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]):
lines.append(f' - "{h}"')
lines.append("")
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
lines.append("seed_phrase_detection:")
spd = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["seed_phrase_detection"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(cast(bool, spd['enabled']))}")
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(spd['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("forward_proxy:")
fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(cast(bool, fp['enabled']))}")
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("dlp:")
dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"])
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(cast(bool, dlp['include_defaults']))}")
lines.append(f" scan_env: {_bool(cast(bool, dlp['scan_env']))}")
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
lines.append(f" scan_env: {_bool(dlp['scan_env'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("request_body_scanning:")
rbs = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["request_body_scanning"])
lines.append(f' action: "{cast(str, rbs["action"])}"')
lines.append(f' action: "{rbs["action"]}"')
if "scan_headers" in rbs:
lines.append(f" scan_headers: {_bool(cast(bool, rbs['scan_headers']))}")
lines.append(f" scan_headers: {_bool(rbs['scan_headers'])}")
if "header_mode" in rbs:
lines.append(f' header_mode: "{cast(str, rbs["header_mode"])}"')
lines.append(f' header_mode: "{rbs["header_mode"]}"')
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("tls_interception:")
tls = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["tls_interception"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(cast(bool, tls['enabled']))}")
lines.append(f' ca_cert: "{cast(str, tls["ca_cert"])}"')
lines.append(f' ca_key: "{cast(str, tls["ca_key"])}"')
passthrough = cast(list[str], tls["passthrough_domains"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(tls['enabled'])}")
lines.append(f' ca_cert: "{tls["ca_cert"]}"')
lines.append(f' ca_key: "{tls["ca_key"]}"')
passthrough = cast(list[str], tls.get("passthrough_domains", []))
if passthrough:
lines.append(" passthrough_domains:")
for d in passthrough:
@@ -468,8 +277,7 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
lines.append("ssrf:")
ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
ip_allowlist = cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"])
for ip in ip_allowlist:
for ip in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
lines.append(f' - "{ip}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
+7 -14
View File
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ def _pump(name: str, stream: IO[bytes]) -> None:
sys.stdout.flush()
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen[bytes]:
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
list(spec.argv),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ class _Supervisor:
def __init__(self, specs: Sequence[_DaemonSpec]):
self.specs = tuple(specs)
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen[bytes]]] = []
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen]] = []
self.shutdown_at: float | None = None
# Names of children that have been logged as having exited
# so we only log each death once across watch-loop ticks.
@@ -245,12 +245,7 @@ class _Supervisor:
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
done = all(p.poll() is not None for _, p in self.procs)
if done:
for _, p in self.procs:
if p.stdout is not None:
p.stdout.close()
return done
return all(p.poll() is not None for _, p in self.procs)
def exit_code(self) -> int:
"""Positive child failures win; otherwise report success.
@@ -340,8 +335,6 @@ class _Supervisor:
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
p.wait()
if p.stdout is not None:
p.stdout.close()
self._logged_dead.discard(daemon_name)
new_proc = _spawn(spec)
self.procs[idx] = (spec, new_proc)
@@ -360,20 +353,20 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
sup = _Supervisor(specs)
sup.start_all()
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM"))
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT"))
# SIGHUP reload path: egress_apply.py runs `docker kill
# --signal HUP <bundle>` after writing routes.yaml. The kernel
# delivers SIGHUP to PID 1 (this supervisor); forward it to
# mitmdump so it reloads its addon.
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress"))
# SIGUSR1 pipelock-restart path: pipelock_apply.py runs
# `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` after writing
# pipelock.yaml. Pipelock has no in-process reload, so the
# supervisor restarts the pipelock daemon in place (other
# daemons keep running — specifically supervise, whose MCP
# socket would drop on a whole-container `docker restart`).
signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.request_restart("pipelock")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.request_restart("pipelock"))
while not sup.tick():
time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL)
+7 -7
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ agent calls when it hits a stuck-recovery category:
Each tool call: the agent passes the full proposed file plus a
justification text. The sidecar validates the proposal syntactically,
writes it to the host's per-bottle queue dir, and holds the tool-call
connection open. The operator's supervise TUI
(bot_bottle.cli.supervise) sees the proposal, accepts
connection open. The operator's TUI dashboard
(bot_bottle.cli.dashboard) sees the proposal, accepts
approve / modify / reject, and writes a response file alongside the
proposal. The sidecar sees the response and returns `{status, notes}`
to the agent.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ import json
import os
import time
import uuid
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
@@ -519,22 +519,22 @@ def _atomic_write(path: Path, content: str, *, mode: int) -> None:
try:
import fcntl as _fcntl
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_EX)
except OSError:
pass
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_UN)
except OSError:
pass
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover — Windows path
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
+8 -73
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import json
import os
import socketserver
import sys
import time
import typing
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
@@ -64,10 +63,6 @@ ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND = -32601
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS = -32602
ERR_INTERNAL = -32603
DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 0.05
EGRESS_LIST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class JsonRpcRequest:
@@ -159,10 +154,7 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"properties": {
"host": {
"type": "string",
"description": (
"The hostname to allow (e.g. 'api.github.com'). "
"Case-insensitive on match."
),
"description": "The hostname to allow (e.g. 'api.github.com'). Case-insensitive on match.",
},
"path_allowlist": {
"type": "array",
@@ -420,7 +412,6 @@ def _validate_and_bundle_egress_route(
class ServerConfig:
bottle_slug: str
queue_dir: Path
response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
def handle_initialize(_params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
@@ -451,7 +442,7 @@ def handle_list_egress_routes(
})
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(proxy_handler)
try:
with opener.open(_sv.EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL, timeout=EGRESS_LIST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as resp:
with opener.open(_sv.EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL, timeout=5) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
except (urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as e:
return {
@@ -485,7 +476,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
if name == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
return handle_list_egress_routes(typing.cast(dict[str, object], params.get("arguments", {})), config)
return handle_list_egress_routes(params.get("arguments", {}), config)
args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
@@ -529,20 +520,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
f"for bottle {config.bottle_slug}; waiting for operator...\n"
)
sys.stderr.flush()
deadline = time.monotonic() + config.response_timeout_seconds
try:
response = _sv.wait_for_response(
config.queue_dir,
proposal.id,
poll_interval=MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
deadline=deadline,
)
except TimeoutError:
text = format_pending_response_text(config.response_timeout_seconds)
return {
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
"isError": False,
}
response = _sv.wait_for_response(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
_sv.archive_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
text = format_response_text(response)
@@ -564,16 +542,6 @@ def format_response_text(response: "_sv.Response") -> str:
return "\n".join(lines)
def format_pending_response_text(timeout_seconds: float) -> str:
return "\n".join([
"status: pending",
(
"notes: operator response timed out after "
f"{timeout_seconds:g}s; proposal remains queued"
),
])
# --- HTTP transport --------------------------------------------------------
@@ -590,7 +558,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version = f"{SERVER_NAME}/{SERVER_VERSION}"
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None: # noqa: A002
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None:
if os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_DEBUG"):
super().log_message(format, *args)
@@ -630,7 +598,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
except _RpcError as e:
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, e.code, e.message))
return
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch-all for RPC dispatch errors
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — defensive
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: internal error: {e}\n")
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, ERR_INTERNAL, "internal error"))
return
@@ -686,15 +654,10 @@ def serve(
queue_dir: Path,
port: int = _sv.SUPERVISE_PORT,
bind: str = "0.0.0.0",
response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> typing.NoReturn:
queue_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
server = MCPServer((bind, port), MCPHandler)
server.config = ServerConfig(
bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
queue_dir=queue_dir,
response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
)
server.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug=bottle_slug, queue_dir=queue_dir)
sys.stderr.write(
f"supervise listening on {bind}:{port}; "
f"slug={bottle_slug!r}; queue={queue_dir}; "
@@ -719,37 +682,9 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
queue_dir = Path(os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR", _sv.QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER))
port = int(os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_PORT", str(_sv.SUPERVISE_PORT)))
bind = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BIND", "0.0.0.0")
try:
response_timeout_seconds = _response_timeout_from_env(os.environ)
except ValueError as e:
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: {e}\n")
return 2
serve(
bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
queue_dir=queue_dir,
port=port,
bind=bind,
response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
)
serve(bottle_slug=bottle_slug, queue_dir=queue_dir, port=port, bind=bind)
return 0 # serve() does not return
def _response_timeout_from_env(env: typing.Mapping[str, str]) -> float:
raw = env.get("SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError as e:
raise ValueError(
"SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS must be a positive number"
) from e
if value <= 0:
raise ValueError(
"SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS must be a positive number"
)
return value
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main(sys.argv))
-9
View File
@@ -5,18 +5,9 @@ level deeper, under their backend package."""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
import os
def is_ip_literal(value: str) -> bool:
try:
ipaddress.ip_address(value)
except ValueError:
return False
return True
def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
"""Expand a leading '~' to $HOME. Leaves paths without a leading
tilde unchanged. Falls back to the empty string if $HOME is unset
-59
View File
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
"""Backend-neutral plan for porting the operator workspace."""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Protocol
WORKSPACE_DIRNAME = "workspace"
DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_OWNER = "node:node"
DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE = "755"
class WorkspaceSpec(Protocol):
@property
def copy_cwd(self) -> bool:
"""Whether to copy the current working directory."""
...
@property
def user_cwd(self) -> str:
"""The user's current working directory."""
...
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkspacePlan:
"""Resolved workspace contract shared by all bottle backends."""
enabled: bool
host_path: Path
guest_home: str
guest_path: str
workdir: str
owner: str = DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_OWNER
mode: str = DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE
copy_contents: bool = True
copy_git: bool = True
has_host_git_dir: bool = False
def workspace_plan(spec: WorkspaceSpec, *, guest_home: str) -> WorkspacePlan:
"""Resolve the in-bottle workspace path from CLI intent."""
host_path = Path(spec.user_cwd).expanduser()
if spec.copy_cwd:
guest_path = f"{guest_home.rstrip('/')}/{WORKSPACE_DIRNAME}"
workdir = guest_path
else:
guest_path = guest_home
workdir = guest_home
return WorkspacePlan(
enabled=spec.copy_cwd,
host_path=host_path,
guest_home=guest_home,
guest_path=guest_path,
workdir=workdir,
has_host_git_dir=(host_path / ".git").is_dir(),
)
+2 -4
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import cast
class YamlSubsetError(ValueError):
@@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ def _split_flow(body: str, lineno: int, kind: str) -> list[str]:
depth_c = 0
in_single = False
in_double = False
cur: list[str] = []
cur = []
for ch in body:
if ch == "'" and not in_double:
in_single = not in_single
@@ -331,7 +330,6 @@ def _split_key_value(content: str, lineno: int) -> tuple[str, str]:
if i + 1 >= len(content) or content[i + 1] in (" ", "\t"):
return content[:i].strip(), content[i + 1:].lstrip()
die(f"yaml-subset: line {lineno} missing `: ` separator: {content!r}")
return "", "" # unreachable, but needed for type checker
def _parse_block(
@@ -538,7 +536,7 @@ def parse_yaml_subset(text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
die("yaml-subset: top-level value must be a mapping")
return cast(dict[str, object], value)
return value
def parse_frontmatter(text: str) -> tuple[dict[str, object], str]:
+6 -1
View File
@@ -83,7 +83,12 @@ for a declared upstream:
- **Manifest field.** `bottle.git` — a list of git remotes the
bottle is allowed to talk to, each with the credential the gate
uses to push upstream. The agent gets no parallel `bottle.ssh`
entry for those upstreams.
entry for those upstreams. Each entry may also carry an
`ExtraHosts: { hostname: ip }` map, surfaced to the gate as
`--add-host` so the gate can resolve upstreams whose public DNS
doesn't point at the reachable IP (e.g. Tailscale-only hosts).
The agent-side `insteadOf` rewrite keys off the original hostname,
so the manifest's `Upstream` URL stays human-readable.
- **Agent-side URL rewrite.** Provisioner emits `~/.gitconfig`
with `[url "<gate-url>"] insteadOf = <real-url>` so every git
operation against the declared upstream (push, fetch, clone,
+2 -1
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@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ the unused path.
- **Pipelock interaction.** Drop the SSH-derived branch from
pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist` build. With no `bottle.ssh`
there is no per-upstream IP carve-out to render; git-gate
has its own egress network.
has its own egress network and pulls in upstream resolution
via `ExtraHosts` plus DNS.
- **Tests.** Delete the ssh-gate unit + integration suites,
the ssh fixtures in `tests/fixtures.py`, and the
shadow-route assertions in `test_manifest_git.py`. Adjust
+2
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@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ git:
Name: bot-bottle
Upstream: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
IdentityFile: ~/.ssh/gitea-delos-2.pem
ExtraHosts:
gitea.dideric.is: 100.78.141.42
KnownHostKey: ssh-rsa AAAAB3...
egress:
allowlist:
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# PRD 0019: Active agents in the dashboard, agent-scoped edit verbs
- **Status:** Superseded by [PRD 0049](0049-strip-dashboard-to-supervisor-tui.md)
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-05-26
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# PRD 0020: Start and attach to agents from inside the dashboard
- **Status:** Superseded by [PRD 0049](0049-strip-dashboard-to-supervisor-tui.md)
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-05-26
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# PRD 0021: Dashboard as left tmux pane, selected agent as right pane
- **Status:** Superseded by [PRD 0049](0049-strip-dashboard-to-supervisor-tui.md)
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-05-26
+2 -1
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@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ expectation. (Same model as shell `export` precedence.)
`git.remotes` is also keyed, so it follows dict-style inheritance:
children can override one host without restating every remote. The
remote entry is replaced as a whole on host collision because
`Upstream`, `IdentityFile`, and `KnownHostKey` are tightly coupled.
`Upstream`, `IdentityFile`, `KnownHostKey`, and `ExtraHosts` are
tightly coupled.
The `git.user` dataclass-overlay (each non-empty field wins
individually) is so a parent can declare `git.user.name` and a
-99
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@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0035: Supervise Wait Bounds
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #128
## Summary
Bound the supervise sidecar's request-thread waits so an agent tool call cannot
hold an HTTP worker forever while waiting for operator action. Preserve the MCP
tool surface, but make timeout behavior explicit, observable, and tested.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/supervise_server.py` handles MCP over a threaded stdlib HTTP
server. Tool calls validate a proposal, write it to the supervise queue, and
then wait for the operator response file. Today that wait can last forever.
Each outstanding tool call consumes one server thread until the operator acts.
The route-listing helper also performs a live HTTP request to egress inside the
request thread. It has a short timeout today, but the behavior is not described
as part of a broader request-thread budget.
This is operationally risky in multi-agent or repeated-call scenarios: a stuck
or ignored proposal can accumulate blocked threads, and callers do not get a
clear "still pending" answer they can reason about.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- Add a bounded wait for operator responses to supervise tool calls.
- Return a clear JSON-RPC tool result when the proposal remains pending after
the timeout; do not treat pending operator action as an internal server error.
- Keep the queued proposal on disk after timeout so the operator can still act.
- Make the wait duration configurable by environment with a conservative
default.
- Preserve current success and rejection result shapes for completed operator
responses.
- Keep `list-egress-routes` bounded and document its timeout behavior.
- Add focused tests for approved responses, timed-out pending responses, and
route-list timeout/error handling.
## Non-goals
- No asynchronous framework or new runtime dependency.
- No replacement of the stdlib threaded HTTP server.
- No change to the host-side supervise queue format.
- No cancellation protocol between the agent and operator UI.
- No dashboard or TUI changes.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/supervise_server.py` request handling.
- Any small helper in `bot_bottle/supervise.py` needed to support a bounded
wait cleanly.
- Unit tests around tool-call response waiting and route-list behavior.
Out of scope:
- Reworking proposal persistence.
- Changing egress apply or pipelock apply flows.
- Adding background workers to complete HTTP requests after the client returns.
## Design
Introduce a supervise response wait budget,
`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, with a 30 second default. The existing
poll loop should stop after that budget and return a normal tool result such as
`{"status": "pending", "notes": "operator response timed out; proposal remains queued"}`.
The exact field names should fit the existing response schema so agents can
handle success, rejection, and pending with one result parser.
The proposal file must remain in the queue when the HTTP call times out. The
operator can still approve or reject it later, but that later response will not
resume the original HTTP request.
Route-listing should continue to use a short HTTP timeout to egress. Errors
should be returned as tool results or JSON-RPC errors consistently with the
existing server behavior; the implementation should avoid an unbounded socket
wait in the request thread.
## Testing Strategy
- Unit-test a tool call whose response appears before the timeout.
- Unit-test a tool call whose response never appears and assert the request
returns a pending result while the proposal remains queued.
- Unit-test invalid timeout env values fall back or fail clearly.
- Unit-test `list-egress-routes` timeout/error behavior with a fake URL opener.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_supervise_server`
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
None.
+13 -17
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# PRD 0036: Codex Auth Redaction Policy
- **Status:** Active
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #129
@@ -69,23 +69,17 @@ file, not as a redacted copy of the host file. The implementation may continue
to start from the host object for convenience, but preserved fields should be
controlled by explicit allowlists at known schema locations.
At the top level, preserve only `auth_mode`, replace `OPENAI_API_KEY` /
`openai_api_key` with `null`, and synthesize the `tokens` block. Unknown scalar
top-level fields become placeholders, unknown lists become empty lists, and
unknown dictionaries become empty objects.
In token blocks, replace `access_token` and `id_token` with dummy JWTs, preserve
the selected non-secret `account_id`, and redact every other token-block field
with the same placeholder / empty container policy. Refresh, session, and future
token values are never copied to the guest.
In JWT payloads, preserve only claims that are known to be non-secret and
required for Codex behavior. Unknown scalar claims become placeholders, unknown
lists become empty lists, and unknown objects become empty objects.
At the top level, preserve only fields required to keep Codex in the same auth
branch. In token blocks, replace access, ID, and refresh-like token values with
dummy values. In JWT payloads, preserve only claims that are known to be
non-secret and required for Codex behavior; unknown scalar claims should become
placeholders, unknown lists should become empty lists, and unknown objects
should recurse or become empty objects according to the local policy.
For the OpenAI auth claim, preserve only currently necessary non-secret values
such as plan type, selected account id, and boolean localhost state. Everything
else is placeholder, empty object, or empty list according to the policy.
such as plan type and selected account id. Everything else should be
placeholder, empty object, empty list, or omitted according to the policy. The
policy should be easy to audit from constants or named helper functions.
Tests should use fixture auth objects that include both current expected fields
and intentionally hostile future-looking fields such as `session_context`,
@@ -108,4 +102,6 @@ Run:
## Open Questions
None.
- Which Codex auth fields are strictly required for the guest CLI to stay in
the device-auth branch? If a field is not demonstrably required, the default
should be to redact or omit it.
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0037: Pipelock YAML Render Contract
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #130
## Summary
Lock down the contract between `pipelock_build_config` and
`pipelock_render_yaml` so hand-rendered pipelock YAML stays aligned with the
structured config bot-bottle builds. Keep the stdlib-only renderer, but add
shape validation and semantic tests for every supported section.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/pipelock.py` builds a structured dict and then renders a fixed YAML
shape by hand. This avoids a runtime YAML dependency, but it also means the
renderer directly indexes expected keys. If `pipelock_build_config` adds,
renames, or conditionalizes a section, rendering can fail at runtime or emit
YAML that no longer matches the config semantics.
Existing tests assert important rendered fragments, but they do not fully lock
the build/render contract or optional-section combinations. A mismatch here can
weaken DLP enforcement or break bottle launch after a future pipelock policy
change.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- Keep the renderer stdlib-only.
- Define the supported pipelock config shape in one place.
- Fail clearly when `pipelock_render_yaml` receives an unsupported or malformed
config shape.
- Add tests covering all supported sections:
- base allowlist and forward proxy.
- seed phrase detection toggle.
- DLP and request-body/header scanning.
- TLS interception and passthrough domains.
- SSRF IP allowlist.
- Add semantic tests that compare structured config values to rendered YAML
output without relying only on brittle substring assertions.
- Preserve current rendered YAML for existing configs unless a clearer failure
path requires an error message change.
## Non-goals
- No PyYAML or other runtime dependency.
- No change to pipelock policy defaults.
- No change to egress-to-pipelock topology.
- No change to pipelock image version or config schema beyond validation of the
shape bot-bottle already emits.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/pipelock.py` render helpers and validation.
- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py` and related focused
pipelock tests.
- Small helper functions for typed access to config sections, if useful.
Out of scope:
- Launch/backend changes.
- Integration tests that start a real pipelock container.
- Changing the manifest schema for route-level pipelock policy.
## Design
Treat `pipelock_render_yaml` as a serializer for the narrow config shape
produced by `pipelock_build_config`, not as a generic YAML renderer. Before
rendering a section, validate that required keys exist with the expected
primitive/list/dict types. Missing or unsupported shapes should raise a clear
`ValueError` naming the section and key.
The supported top-level shape is `version`, `mode`, `enforce`,
`api_allowlist`, `seed_phrase_detection`, `forward_proxy`, `dlp`,
`request_body_scanning`, `tls_interception`, and `ssrf`. Required sections are
validated before rendering; optional sections keep the current omission
behavior. `request_body_scanning.scan_headers`,
`request_body_scanning.header_mode`, and
`tls_interception.passthrough_domains` remain optional for compatibility with
parsed running configs that only contain the older rendered subset.
Tests should cover both normal output and failure cases. Because the project is
stdlib-only, semantic tests can use a small purpose-built parser for the exact
rendered shape or compare rendered lines to values from the structured config
through helper assertions. The goal is to detect drift between config dict and
YAML without adding a general YAML dependency.
Optional sections should be exercised in combinations:
- no TLS and no SSRF.
- TLS enabled with empty and non-empty passthrough domains.
- SSRF enabled with one or more IP/CIDR entries.
- all optional sections enabled together.
## Testing Strategy
- Extend `tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py` with semantic assertions tying each
rendered section back to the config dict.
- Add malformed-config tests for missing required keys and wrong section types.
- Keep existing render fragment tests where they protect exact pipelock syntax.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_pipelock_yaml`
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_pipelock_allowlist`
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
None.
-102
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@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0038: smolmachines Env Contract and Secret-Safe Injection
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #135
## Summary
Make smolmachines env handling match Docker's contract: resolve manifest env
entries through `resolve_env()`, keep secret and interpolated values out of
host argv, and document or enforce an explicit env contract for the backend.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py` builds the guest env from
`bottle.env` directly, bypassing `resolve_env()`. Entries like `?prompt` and
`${HOST_VAR}` can reach the guest literally rather than being prompted or
resolved. In contrast, Docker resolves env through `resolve_env()` before
writing a mode-600 env file.
`smolmachines/smolvm.py` renders env as `-e KEY=VALUE` on `smolvm machine
create` argv, and `SmolmachinesBottle.agent_argv` / `exec` prepend
`env KEY=VALUE …` onto the `smolvm machine exec` argv. Any literal or resolved
secret value is therefore visible in the host process table.
The two backends have no shared env contract document. Divergence will silently
widen as new manifest env features are added.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- Manifest env entries are resolved through `resolve_env()` before being
injected into the smolmachines guest, matching Docker behaviour.
- No manifest env value (literal or resolved) appears on host argv during
machine creation or exec.
- Define and document an explicit smolmachines env contract covering literals,
`?prompt` secrets, and `${HOST_VAR}` interpolations.
- Unit tests cover: literal passthrough, prompted-secret resolution,
host-var interpolation, and the no-argv-leak invariant.
## Non-goals
- No changes to the Docker env path.
- No changes to manifest schema or `resolve_env()` itself.
- No changes to smolmachines networking or mount handling.
- No new runtime dependencies.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py` env resolution.
- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/smolvm.py` machine-create argv.
- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py` `agent_argv` / `exec` env
injection.
- `bot_bottle/env.py` if helper changes are needed to support the smolmachines
path.
- Unit tests in `tests/unit/` covering the above.
Out of scope:
- Integration tests that start a live smolmachines VM.
- Docker backend changes.
- Dashboard or CLI changes.
## Design
Run smolmachines env through `resolve_env()` at prepare time, exactly as Docker
does. After resolution, inject env into the guest through a mechanism that does
not expose values on host argv — for example by writing a mode-600 env file
into the machine's state directory and loading it at exec time, or by passing
env through `smolvm`'s stdin if the tool supports it.
If `smolvm` provides no stdin or env-file injection path, document this as a
known limitation and at minimum move env values behind a per-invocation
tmpfile rather than inline argv.
The env contract for smolmachines should mirror Docker's:
- Literals: passed as-is after resolution.
- `?prompt` entries: prompted at prepare time; resolved value injected, never
on argv.
- `${HOST_VAR}` entries: interpolated from the operator's env at prepare time;
resolved value injected, never on argv.
## Testing Strategy
- Unit tests for `prepare.py` asserting `resolve_env()` is called and that
resolution results are used rather than raw `bottle.env` values.
- Unit tests for `smolvm.py` machine-create argv asserting no env value appears
inline.
- Unit tests for `bottle.py` exec path asserting the same argv invariant.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_smolmachines_prepare`
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
- Does `smolvm machine create` support an env-file flag or stdin injection that
avoids `-e KEY=VALUE` argv?
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0039: smolmachines Capability-Block Remediation
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #136
## Summary
Make capability-block remediation backend-aware. Today the dashboard approval
path calls Docker-only teardown and apply code regardless of which backend
created the bottle. Either implement smolmachines remediation or add a clean
disable/unsupported path so operators never get a partial Docker teardown
against a smolmachines slug.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` dispatches every capability-block approval to
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py`. That code snapshots with
`docker cp`, pushes via `docker exec`, rewrites a Dockerfile override, and
removes Docker containers and networks. It does not stop or delete a smolvm
machine.
smolmachines bottles still receive the capability-block supervise tool through
`backend/smolmachines/provision/supervise.py`, so agents can queue a
remediation the host cannot correctly apply. A partial Docker teardown against
a smolmachines slug corrupts neither backend cleanly.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- Capability-block approval is routed to backend-specific code.
- For the smolmachines backend, either:
a. A real remediation implementation that stops the VM, applies the
capability change, and restarts correctly; or
b. A clean unsupported response that tells the operator the action cannot
be taken and leaves the bottle in a consistent state.
- If option (b): smolmachines agents do not receive the capability-block tool,
so the operator is never prompted for an action that will fail.
- Unit tests cover the dispatch logic and the smolmachines path.
## Non-goals
- No changes to the Docker capability-apply path.
- No changes to other supervise tools (cred-block, pipelock-block).
- No changes to manifest or egress configuration.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` approval dispatch.
- `bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/supervise.py` tool registration.
- New or updated backend-specific capability apply/disable module for
smolmachines.
- Unit tests for dispatch routing and smolmachines path.
Out of scope:
- Changes to `backend/docker/capability_apply.py` internals.
- Integration tests that exercise a live smolmachines VM remediation.
## Design
Introduce a backend-aware dispatch at the approval call site. Each backend
exposes a capability remediation entry point; the dashboard calls the one that
matches the bottle's backend. If the backend does not support remediation,
the entry point returns a structured error that the dashboard surfaces as an
operator message without attempting any teardown.
If option (b) is chosen initially, suppress capability-block registration in
`smolmachines/provision/supervise.py` so agents never see the tool.
## Testing Strategy
- Unit test that approval dispatch selects the smolmachines path for a
smolmachines bottle and the Docker path for a Docker bottle.
- Unit test for the smolmachines path (unsupported response or real apply).
- Regression test that Docker approval still calls `capability_apply.py`.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
- Is a real smolmachines capability-apply implementation in scope for this PRD,
or should it be deferred to a follow-on after PRD 0040 lands?
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0040: Backend-Aware Resume and Dashboard Reattach
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #137
## Summary
Persist the backend name in `BottleMetadata` and thread it through `resume` and
dashboard reattach so both flows construct the correct backend bottle without
relying on env overrides or defaulting to Docker.
## Problem
`BottleMetadata` records identity, agent, cwd, started_at, and compose project,
but not the backend name. Without it:
- `cli/resume.py` cannot select the right backend from a preserved state dir
alone; operators must remember to set `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines`
separately.
- `cli/dashboard.py` `_bottle_for_slug` constructs a `DockerBottle` for any
externally discovered slug, so reattaching to a live smolmachines agent
from the dashboard sends Docker commands to a smolvm machine.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- `BottleMetadata` includes the backend name, written at bottle creation time
for both Docker and smolmachines.
- `cli resume` reads the persisted backend name and constructs the correct
bottle type without requiring an env override.
- Dashboard reattach (`_bottle_for_slug`) reads the persisted backend name and
constructs the correct bottle type.
- Existing Docker bottles without a persisted backend name fall back to Docker
(backward-compatible default).
- Unit tests cover write, read, backward-compatible fallback, and both
resume/reattach code paths.
## Non-goals
- No changes to manifest or egress configuration.
- No new CLI flags (backend selection at resume time should be automatic).
- No smolmachines capability-apply implementation (see PRD 0039).
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py` `BottleMetadata` schema and
write path.
- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle.py` and
`bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py` metadata write at creation.
- `bot_bottle/cli/resume.py` backend selection from metadata.
- `bot_bottle/cli/dashboard.py` `_bottle_for_slug` backend selection.
- Unit tests covering the above.
Out of scope:
- Migration tooling for existing state dirs.
- Integration tests that exercise full resume across process restarts.
## Design
Add a `backend` field to `BottleMetadata` with a default of `"docker"` for
backward compatibility. Both `DockerBottle` and `SmolmachinesBottle` write
their backend name into metadata at creation time.
`resume` reads the metadata before constructing the bottle object and selects
the appropriate backend class. `_bottle_for_slug` does the same. A helper
function in the metadata module can encapsulate the backend-name-to-class
mapping so the logic is not duplicated.
## Testing Strategy
- Unit tests for `BottleMetadata` serialisation with and without the backend
field.
- Unit tests for the backward-compatible default.
- Unit tests for `resume` selecting smolmachines vs Docker from metadata.
- Unit tests for `_bottle_for_slug` selecting smolmachines vs Docker.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
None.
-60
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@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0041: Git HTTP Request Bounds
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #138
## Summary
Add Content-Length validation and a body-size cap to `git_http_backend.py` so malformed or oversized smart-HTTP requests fail cleanly rather than crashing the handler or exhausting memory.
## Problem
`bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py` calls `int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", 0))` without catching `ValueError`. A request with a non-numeric Content-Length raises an unhandled exception in the request handler.
The handler reads the full declared length into memory before passing the body to `git http-backend` with no upper bound. A local or compromised client can force arbitrarily high memory use. For comparison, `supervise_server.py` caps request bodies at 1 MiB.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- A missing or non-numeric Content-Length returns HTTP 400.
- A negative Content-Length returns HTTP 400.
- A body larger than the cap (1 MiB, matching `supervise_server.py`) returns HTTP 413.
- Valid Git smart-HTTP pushes and fetches continue to work.
- Unit tests cover: missing length, non-numeric length, negative length, over-cap length, and a valid push/fetch passthrough.
## Non-goals
- No changes to git-gate authentication or route logic.
- No changes to `supervise_server.py`.
- No streaming / chunked-transfer-encoding support.
- No TLS changes.
## Scope
In scope:
- `bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py` request parsing and body reading.
- Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_git_http_backend.py`.
Out of scope:
- Integration tests that drive a real Git client through the handler.
## Design
Wrap the Content-Length parse in a try/except and return 400 on `ValueError`. Add an explicit check for negative values. After parsing, compare the declared length against a module-level `MAX_BODY_BYTES` constant (default 1 MiB) and return 413 if exceeded. Read exactly `min(content_length, MAX_BODY_BYTES)` bytes.
## Testing Strategy
- Unit tests using `unittest.mock` to drive the handler with crafted headers.
- Test cases: no Content-Length header, `Content-Length: abc`, `Content-Length: -1`, `Content-Length: 2097152` (over cap), and a normal small POST body.
Run:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_git_http_backend`
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
## Open Questions
None.
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0042: smolmachines Cross-Backend Parity Tests
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis-codex
- **Created:** 2026-06-02
- **Issue:** #139
## Summary
Add tests that prove secrets, forwarded env, resume, and remediation behave
equivalently across Docker and smolmachines backends. The fixes in PRDs
00380040 are unverifiable without this coverage.
## Problem
The existing unit suite is broad but backend-specific. There are no tests that
run the same scenario against both Docker and smolmachines and assert the
outcomes match. A regression in one backend goes undetected until a live run,
and PRDs 00380040 can each pass their own unit tests while the backends still
diverge at the integration boundary.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- A parity test suite that covers at least:
- Secret env injection: `?prompt` and `${HOST_VAR}` entries produce the same
guest env on both backends.
- Forwarded env: literal manifest env values reach the guest on both backends.
- Resume: a preserved bottle state dir round-trips correctly on both backends
(relies on PRD 0040 metadata).
- Remediation: capability-block approval routes to the correct backend handler
(relies on PRD 0039 dispatch).
- Each scenario is parameterised so a failure names the backend that regressed.
- Tests run without a live VM or Docker daemon (mock or stub backends).
## Non-goals
- No end-to-end agent execution tests.
- No performance or load tests.
- No changes to production code (test-only PRD).
## Scope
In scope:
- New test file(s) under `tests/unit/` for parity scenarios.
- Stub or mock implementations of smolmachines and Docker backends as needed.
Out of scope:
- Changes to `bot_bottle/` production code.
- CI infrastructure changes beyond adding the new test file to the discover
invocation.
## Dependencies
- PRD 0038 should land before the env parity tests are finalised.
- PRDs 0039 and 0040 should land before the remediation and resume scenarios
are finalised; stubs can be written speculatively beforehand.
## Design
Parameterise each scenario over a list of backend factory functions. Each
factory returns a bottle instance wired to a stub subprocess layer. The test
body is backend-agnostic: it calls the same public API, captures the same
observable output, and asserts equality.
For env scenarios, capture the argv or env-file content passed to the guest
and compare against resolved manifest values. For resume, write metadata with
one backend class and read it back to verify correct selection. For remediation,
assert dispatch selects the per-backend handler.
## Testing Strategy
Run as part of the standard unit discover:
- `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests/unit`
Or directly:
- `python3 -m unittest tests.unit.test_backend_parity`
## Open Questions
- Should parity tests live under `tests/unit/` (mock-based) or
`tests/integration/` (live infra)? Mock-based is preferred to keep CI simple.

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