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Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis bd663196dc docs: reposition README around provider-neutral secure substrate
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 36s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 17s
Lead with the agnostic + security story instead of the single-user
security framing. New hero positions bot-bottle as a neutral control
plane that runs any agent (Claude, Codex, or a drop-in contrib plugin)
inside an isolation boundary the agent can't touch.

Restructure Features into three pillars — neutral substrate, isolation
boundary, host-matched isolation — promoting provider-agnosticism (PRD
0053 user plugins) from a buried bullet to a headline. No capability
claims changed; per-provider auth/image detail preserved as a note
linking to Manifest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YcU7nerbg8cVj9R4EkpfLJ
2026-06-24 01:21:05 -04:00
didericis-codex 6b0de88be6 docs: activate install script prd
lint / lint (push) Successful in 1m39s
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 16s
2026-06-23 21:47:12 -04:00
didericis-codex 9a941e59be feat: add install script packaging 2026-06-23 21:47:12 -04:00
didericis d7a3539755 ci(prd): rename PRD to prd-new placeholder per new convention 2026-06-23 21:46:44 -04:00
didericis cfe57a50d0 docs(prd): renumber PRD 0054 → 0057 (0054 slot taken by named-labelled-agents) 2026-06-23 21:46:44 -04:00
didericis e5d551861c docs(prd): PRD 0054 - install script 2026-06-23 21:46:44 -04:00
86 changed files with 1234 additions and 3970 deletions
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
[run]
branch = True
source = .
[report]
omit =
bot_bottle/egress_addon.py
bot_bottle/cli/tui.py
tests/*
+1 -7
View File
@@ -39,14 +39,8 @@ jobs:
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install dev requirements
run: python3 -m pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run unit tests
run: python3 -m coverage run -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v
- name: Report unit coverage
run: python3 -m coverage report -m
run: python3 -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v
integration:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+2 -15
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ on:
- '**.py'
- '.pylintrc'
- 'pyrightconfig.json'
- '.coveragerc'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
@@ -46,19 +45,10 @@ jobs:
echo "errors=$ERRORS" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pyright errors: $ERRORS"
- name: Run coverage and extract percentage
id: coverage
run: |
python -m coverage run -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit > /dev/null 2>&1 || true
PERCENT=$(python -m coverage report 2>/dev/null | grep '^TOTAL' | grep -oP '\d+(?=%)' | tail -1)
echo "percent=$PERCENT" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Coverage: $PERCENT%"
- name: Update badges in README
run: |
PYLINT_SCORE="${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"
PYRIGHT_ERRORS="${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }}"
COVERAGE_PERCENT="${{ steps.coverage.outputs.percent }}"
PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED=$(echo "$PYLINT_SCORE" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')
@@ -68,12 +58,9 @@ jobs:
if [ -n "$PYRIGHT_ERRORS" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/pyright-[^)]*|/badge/pyright-${PYRIGHT_ERRORS}%20errors-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
if [ -n "$COVERAGE_PERCENT" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/coverage-[^)]*|/badge/coverage-${COVERAGE_PERCENT}%25-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
echo "Updated badges:"
grep -E "pylint|pyright|coverage" README.md | head -3
grep -E "pylint|pyright" README.md | head -2
- name: Commit and push badge updates
run: |
@@ -86,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
else
echo "Badge changes detected, committing..."
git add README.md
MSG="chore: update quality badges"$'\n\n'"- Pylint: ${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"$'\n'"- Pyright: ${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }} errors"$'\n'"- Coverage: ${{ steps.coverage.outputs.percent }}%"$'\n\n'"[skip ci]"
MSG="chore: update quality badges"$'\n\n'"- Pylint: ${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"$'\n'"- Pyright: ${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }} errors"$'\n\n'"[skip ci]"
git commit -m "$MSG"
git push
fi
-1
View File
@@ -22,4 +22,3 @@ venv/
.pytest_cache/
.mypy_cache/
.ruff_cache/
.coverage
+41 -10
View File
@@ -7,28 +7,41 @@
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![pylint](https://img.shields.io/badge/pylint-9.93%2F10-brightgreen)](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint)
[![pyright](https://img.shields.io/badge/pyright-0%20errors-brightgreen)](https://github.com/microsoft/pyright)
[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-79%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
**Run any coding agent like it might be compromised — and lose nothing when it is.**
**Solution:** Ephemeral, per agent "bottles" the agent cannot modify that scan all traffic for data exfiltration and limit capabilities and egress to only what the agent needs.
bot-bottle is a provider-neutral, security-first substrate for autonomous agents. Bring Claude Code, Codex, or your own harness; each one runs in an ephemeral, per-agent "bottle" it cannot modify, where every byte of egress is scanned for exfiltration and capabilities are narrowed to exactly what the task declares.
## Features
**Problem:** You want to let a coding agent run unsupervised, but a prompt-injected or misbehaving agent — or a poisoned repo, MCP server, or skill — can wreck your environment or exfiltrate your secrets. Locking yourself to one vendor's cloud doesn't fix that; it just moves the blast radius.
**Solution:** A neutral control plane that runs *whatever agent you choose* inside an isolation boundary the agent can't touch: TLS-bumped egress allowlisting, outbound/inbound DLP, gitleaks-gated pushes, and host secrets the agent never sees. Swap the agent; keep the guarantees.
## Why bot-bottle
### A neutral substrate — bring your own agent
- **Provider-agnostic by design** — Claude and Codex ship built in; any other agent (Gemini, Aider, a local-model wrapper) is a drop-in plugin at `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/` — no fork, no PR against this repo. The manifest accepts any provider template, and the isolation, egress, and git guarantees are identical across all of them.
- **One control plane, every harness** — the same bottle, egress policy, and supervise flow wrap whichever agent you run, so switching or mixing providers doesn't change your security posture.
- **Composable bottles (`extends:`)** — keep provider/runtime policy in one base bottle (e.g. `claude.md`) and overlay task bottles on top.
### An isolation boundary the agent can't touch
- **Per-bottle egress allowlist** — TLS-bumped HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint with a per-manifest host allowlist; per-route path/method/header `matches` filtering; outbound DLP scanning for known tokens and secrets, inbound DLP scanning for prompt-injection attempts; DoH and arbitrary hosts blocked by default.
- **Per-route token-match policy** — each egress route picks what happens when the outbound DLP catches a token via `dlp.outbound_on_match`: `supervise` (default) holds the request and surfaces it in `./cli.py supervise` for approval (an approved value is remembered for the life of the proxy); `redact` scrubs the value and forwards; `block` is a hard `403`. Cuts false-positive friction without weakening default-deny.
- **Tokens the agent never sees** — host secrets live in a sidecar; the agent dials `http://sidecar:9099/<path>` and the proxy strips inbound `Authorization` and injects the real token before forwarding. `printenv` in the agent shows proxy URLs only.
- **Gitleaks-scanned push (git-gate)** — `bottle.git` remotes route through a per-bottle `git daemon` that gitleaks-scans incoming refs pre-receive and forwards clean refs upstream over SSH. The agent never holds the upstream credential.
- **Manifest-scoped skills + secrets** — each bottle declares its skills, env, git identity, remotes, and egress routes; unknown keys die at load.
- **Trust boundary at `$HOME`** — bottles (credentials, egress, remotes) live only under `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/`. Repos may ship agents but not bottles, so a cloned repo can't redirect an env var to an attacker host.
- **Composable bottles (`extends:`)** — keep provider/runtime policy in one base bottle (e.g. `claude.md`) and overlay task bottles on top.
### Isolation that matches your host
- **Parallel, isolated bottles** — each bottle runs in its own backend-owned isolation boundary; bottles don't share state or talk to each other.
- **Provider templates (Claude, Codex)** — `Dockerfile.claude` / `Dockerfile.codex`, or a bottle-supplied Dockerfile. Claude auth via long-lived OAuth token; Codex via opt-in host device-auth forwarding.
- **gVisor auto-detect** — on Linux hosts where `runsc` is registered with Docker, every bottle launches under it for a userspace syscall barrier; no manifest config required.
- **Apple Container backend (macOS default when available)** — runs the agent and sidecar bundle with Apple's `container` CLI, using a host-only agent network plus a separate sidecar egress network.
- **Smolmachines backend** — runs the agent in a libkrun micro-VM while the sidecar bundle stays in Docker. TSI and smolmachines DNS filtering close the raw DNS exfiltration gap that exists in the legacy Docker backend.
- **Legacy Docker backend** — still available for examples, CI, and hosts without Apple Container via `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker` or `--backend=docker`.
Per-provider auth (Claude long-lived OAuth token; Codex opt-in host device-auth forwarding) and per-provider images (`Dockerfile.claude` / `Dockerfile.codex`, or a bottle-supplied Dockerfile) are configured on the bottle — see [Manifest](#manifest).
## Architecture
On the default macOS Apple Container backend, a bottle is an agent container on a host-only internal network plus a sidecar bundle attached to both that internal network and a NAT egress network. The agent gets HTTP(S)_PROXY and CA bundle env vars pointing at the sidecar's internal-network IP, so HTTP/HTTPS traffic flows through the sidecar instead of direct egress. `bottle.git` / git-gate is intentionally deferred on this backend until a safe Apple Container key-delivery path exists.
@@ -70,6 +83,27 @@ The Docker topology looks like this:
When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every sidecar and both networks; nothing about a bottle persists between runs.
## Install
Install the CLI with the bootstrap script:
```sh
curl -fsSL https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh
```
The script checks Python 3.11+, checks Docker daemon reachability, creates the `~/.bot-bottle/` config directories, installs the Python package with `pipx` when available or `pip --user` otherwise, then runs:
```sh
bot-bottle doctor
```
Python-native installers can use the package metadata directly:
```sh
pipx install git+https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle.git
uv tool install git+https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle.git
```
## Quickstart
On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI and does not require Docker. The smolmachines backend requires Docker on the host for the sidecar bundle plus smolvm. The legacy Docker backend requires Docker. Claude bottles also need a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
@@ -150,11 +184,8 @@ You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects.
| `dlp` | no | Per-route DLP overrides. Omit to use defaults (all detectors on). |
| `dlp.outbound_detectors` | no | `false` disables outbound scanning; list restricts to named detectors (`token_patterns`, `known_secrets`). |
| `dlp.inbound_detectors` | no | `false` disables inbound scanning; list restricts to named detectors (`naive_injection_detection`). |
| `dlp.outbound_on_match` | no | What to do when an outbound token is detected: `supervise` (default for manifest routes — hold for operator approval), `redact` (scrub the value and forward), or `block` (hard 403). Agent-provider routes (e.g. `api.anthropic.com`) default to `redact`. |
| `git.fetch` | no | `true` permits smart HTTP clone/fetch (`git-upload-pack`) for this host. Push (`git-receive-pack`) remains blocked. |
When an outbound DLP detector matches a token, the route's `dlp.outbound_on_match` policy decides what happens. Under the default `supervise`, the proxy queues an `egress-token-allow` proposal for the operator's `./cli.py supervise` TUI and holds the request open until it is answered (or `EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, default 300s, elapses — after which it fails closed). The operator never sees the raw token, only the host, method, path, and a redacted snippet; approving adds the value to an in-memory safelist for the life of the egress proxy. Under `redact`, the matched value is scrubbed from the body, headers, and path and the request is forwarded (failing closed if a match lands somewhere unredactable, like the hostname). Under `block` it stays a hard `403`. Structural blocks (CRLF injection) and not-in-allowlist host blocks are always hard `403`s regardless of policy.
More examples in `examples/`. Full design lives under `docs/prds/`; the trust-boundary rationale is in `docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md`.
## Trademarks
+96
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@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
# Per-bottle sidecar bundle image (PRD 0024).
#
# Collapses the prior per-sidecar images (egress, git-gate,
# supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init supervisor at
# /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all daemons, forwards SIGTERM, and
# propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the container log with a
# `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the rationale.
#
# Layout:
#
# /usr/bin/gitleaks gitleaks binary
# /app/egress_addon.py + siblings mitmproxy addon (egress)
# /app/egress-entrypoint.sh mitmdump launcher
# /app/supervise_server.py + .py supervise MCP server
# /app/sidecar_init.py PID 1 supervisor
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/git-gate/pre-receive docker-cp'd at start time
# /git-gate-entrypoint.sh docker-cp'd at start time
# /git-gate/creds/* docker-cp'd at start time
# /git/* bare repos, populated at runtime
# /run/supervise/queue/ bind-mounted at run time
# /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/ mitmproxy CA dir
#
# Exposed ports inside the container:
# 9099 egress (mitmproxy, agent-facing HTTPS proxy)
# 9418 git-gate (git-daemon)
# 9420 git-gate smart HTTP (smolmachines agent-facing transport)
# 9100 supervise (MCP HTTP)
# Stage 1: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# with the binary at /usr/bin/gitleaks. Pinned by digest in lockstep
# with Dockerfile.git-gate's prior base (now deleted at chunk 3).
FROM zricethezav/gitleaks@sha256:c00b6bd0aeb3071cbcb79009cb16a60dd9e0a7c60e2be9ab65d25e6bc8abbb7f AS gitleaks-src
# Stage 2: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Python + mitmdump pre-installed — heavier than the others, so
# this stage starts there and pulls the standalone binaries in.
FROM mitmproxy/mitmproxy:11.1.3
# Run as root inside the bundle. The bundle is the isolation
# boundary; per-daemon user separation inside it is not load-bearing
# and complicates the supervisor's spawn path.
USER root
# Runtime system deps:
# git supplies the `git daemon` subcommand (no separate package)
# plus the core `git` binary the pre-receive hook invokes.
# openssh-client supplies the upstream SSH transport the
# pre-receive hook uses to forward accepted refs.
# ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS (the
# base image already has it; listed for explicitness).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git openssh-client ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Pull the standalone binaries into the final image.
COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# Project Python: addon + server modules + the init supervisor.
# Kept flat under /app/ so mitmdump's loader resolves them as
# top-level siblings (absolute imports), matching the prior
# Dockerfile.egress / Dockerfile.supervise layout.
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py /app/egress_addon_core.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon.py /app/egress_addon.py
COPY bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py /app/dlp_detectors.py
COPY bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py /app/yaml_subset.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise.py /app/supervise.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise_server.py /app/supervise_server.py
COPY bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py /app/sidecar_init.py
COPY bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py /app/git_http_backend.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
# Pre-create runtime directories the compose renderer + start
# step expect to exist. `docker cp` does not create intermediate
# dirs, and bind mounts won't either if the parent is missing.
RUN mkdir -p \
/etc/egress \
/etc/git-gate \
/git-gate/creds \
/git \
/run/supervise/queue \
/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy
# Documentation only — the compose renderer publishes whichever
# subset the bottle uses.
EXPOSE 8888 9099 9418 9420 9100
# WORKDIR matches Dockerfile.supervise's prior layout so the
# in-app same-dir import in supervise_server.py stays deterministic.
WORKDIR /app
# PID 1 is the supervisor. It owns signal handling and exit-code
# propagation; no `exec` chain in the entrypoint itself.
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/sidecar_init.py"]
+2 -10
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
prompt_mode: PromptMode
bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
remote_control_args: tuple[str, ...]
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -370,15 +371,6 @@ def build_agent_provision_plan(
)
def provider_startup_args(
provider_settings: dict[str, object] | None,
) -> tuple[str, ...]:
raw = (provider_settings or {}).get("startup_args", ())
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
return ()
return tuple(arg for arg in raw if isinstance(arg, str))
def prompt_args(
prompt_mode: PromptMode,
prompt_path: str | None,
@@ -390,7 +382,7 @@ def prompt_args(
if prompt_mode == "append_file":
return ["--append-system-prompt-file", prompt_path]
if prompt_mode == "read_prompt_file":
if argv and ("resume" in argv or "remote-control" in argv):
if argv and "resume" in argv:
return []
return [f"Read and follow the instructions in {prompt_path}."]
if prompt_mode == "print_read_prompt_file":
+2 -1
View File
@@ -109,8 +109,9 @@ class BottlePlan(ABC):
def workspace_plan(self) -> WorkspacePlan:
return workspace_plan(self.spec, guest_home=self.guest_home)
def print(self) -> None:
def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
"""Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr."""
del remote_control
spec = self.spec
manifest = self.manifest
agent = manifest.agent
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
"""capability_apply — host-side orchestrator for capability-block
remediation (PRD 0016).
On approval of a capability-block proposal, the dashboard calls
apply_capability_change(slug, new_dockerfile) which:
1. Snapshots the agent's transcript dir to
~/.bot-bottle/state/<slug>/transcript/ (best-effort).
2. Pushes the agent's working tree via `git push` (best-effort —
no upstream / no commits / no git repo all skip with a log).
3. Writes the new Dockerfile to
~/.bot-bottle/state/<slug>/Dockerfile (PRD 0016 Phase 1
state). The next `cli.py start <agent>` picks it up.
4. Force-removes the agent container + all sidecars + the
per-bottle networks. Idempotent — missing resources are not
errors.
Returns (before, after) Dockerfile contents so the dashboard can
record / render the diff. (capability-block has no audit log per
PRD 0013 — the per-bottle Dockerfile state is its own record.)
This is "fire-and-forget" from the agent's perspective: by the time
the dashboard writes the response file the supervise sidecar is
gone, so the agent's tool call connection drops without ever
receiving the response. The replacement agent (next manual
`cli.py start`) sees the new Dockerfile and starts from there.
v1 does not auto-relaunch — see PRD 0016's capability-block return
semantics open question.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import shutil
import subprocess
from ...agent_provider import get_provider
from ...log import info, warn
from ...bottle_state import (
mark_preserved,
per_bottle_dockerfile,
transcript_snapshot_dir,
write_per_bottle_dockerfile,
)
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
# Agent home inside the container (per the repo Dockerfile's
# `USER node` + `WORKDIR /home/node`). Used to locate the transcript
# dir + the workspace dir for git push.
_AGENT_HOME_IN_CONTAINER = "/home/node"
_AGENT_TRANSCRIPT_IN_CONTAINER = f"{_AGENT_HOME_IN_CONTAINER}/.claude"
_AGENT_WORKSPACE_IN_CONTAINER = f"{_AGENT_HOME_IN_CONTAINER}/workspace"
# Per-bottle resource name patterns (mirroring prepare.py).
def _agent_container_name(slug: str) -> str:
return f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
def _per_bottle_container_names(slug: str) -> list[str]:
"""All container names that belong to this bottle. Missing
containers are silently skipped by the teardown helper, so it's
fine to include names that don't exist for a given bottle."""
return [
_agent_container_name(slug),
sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug),
]
def _per_bottle_network_names(slug: str) -> list[str]:
return [
f"bot-bottle-net-{slug}",
f"bot-bottle-egress-{slug}",
]
class CapabilityApplyError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when the apply fails in a way that should keep the
proposal pending (so the operator can retry). Best-effort
failures (transcript snapshot, git push) do not raise — they
just log and proceed."""
# --- Public helpers --------------------------------------------------------
def fetch_current_dockerfile(slug: str) -> str:
"""Return the Dockerfile content the next `cli.py start <agent>`
would use for this bottle. If a per-bottle override exists, that
one; otherwise the repo's Dockerfile.
Used by the operator-edit verb to show the current source of
truth, and by apply_capability_change for the before-diff."""
override = per_bottle_dockerfile(slug)
if override is not None:
return override
repo_dockerfile = get_provider("claude").dockerfile
if repo_dockerfile.is_file():
return repo_dockerfile.read_text()
raise CapabilityApplyError(
f"no per-bottle Dockerfile for {slug} and no provider Dockerfile at "
f"{repo_dockerfile}"
)
def apply_capability_change(slug: str, new_dockerfile: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""End-to-end capability-block remediation. See module docstring
for the sequence. Returns (before, after) Dockerfile content."""
if not new_dockerfile.strip():
raise CapabilityApplyError("proposed Dockerfile is empty")
before = fetch_current_dockerfile(slug)
snapshot_transcript(slug)
_push_working_tree(slug)
write_per_bottle_dockerfile(slug, new_dockerfile)
# Set the preserve marker BEFORE teardown so cli.py's session-end
# cleanup sees it and keeps the state dir intact for the
# operator's `cli.py resume <identity>`. Without the marker the
# state dir would be deleted as part of normal session end.
mark_preserved(slug)
_teardown_bottle(slug)
return before, new_dockerfile
# --- Internals -------------------------------------------------------------
def snapshot_transcript(slug: str) -> None:
"""`docker cp` /home/node/.claude out of the agent container into
~/.bot-bottle/state/<slug>/transcript/. Best-effort: missing
container, missing dir, or cp error all log a warning and return.
The transcript is what `claude --resume` reads to pick up where
the agent left off.
Called from two places:
- capability-apply, before tearing the bottle down.
- cli.py's session-end path, before the launch context closes,
so a crash or normal exit also leaves a transcript on disk
(deleted along with the state dir on clean exit, kept on
crash or capability-block per the preserve marker)."""
container = _agent_container_name(slug)
dest = transcript_snapshot_dir(slug)
if dest.exists():
# Remove any prior snapshot so the new one is a clean copy.
shutil.rmtree(dest, ignore_errors=True)
dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
r = subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", f"{container}:{_AGENT_TRANSCRIPT_IN_CONTAINER}", str(dest)],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"transcript snapshot skipped "
f"({(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'no transcript dir in container?'})"
)
return
info(f"transcript snapshotted to {dest}")
def _push_working_tree(slug: str) -> None:
"""`docker exec <agent> git push` from /home/node/workspace.
Best-effort: not-a-git-repo, no upstream, nothing-to-push, no
network all log a warning and return. The replacement bottle
will pick up whatever's actually upstream."""
container = _agent_container_name(slug)
r = subprocess.run(
[
"docker", "exec", container, "sh", "-c",
f"cd {_AGENT_WORKSPACE_IN_CONTAINER} && "
f"git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree >/dev/null 2>&1 && "
f"git push origin HEAD 2>&1 || true",
],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"capability-apply: git push skipped "
f"({(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'docker exec failed'})"
)
return
output = (r.stdout or "").strip()
if output:
info(f"capability-apply: git push: {output}")
else:
info("capability-apply: git push ran (no output — likely not a git workspace)")
def _teardown_bottle(slug: str) -> None:
"""Force-remove all per-bottle docker resources. Idempotent —
`docker rm -f` / `docker network rm` silently ignore missing
names, so this can be called even mid-rebuild."""
info(f"capability-apply: tearing down bottle {slug}")
for name in _per_bottle_container_names(slug):
subprocess.run(
["docker", "rm", "-f", name],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
for net in _per_bottle_network_names(slug):
subprocess.run(
["docker", "network", "rm", net],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
__all__ = [
"CapabilityApplyError",
"apply_capability_change",
"fetch_current_dockerfile",
"snapshot_transcript",
]
+21 -6
View File
@@ -28,12 +28,11 @@ from typing import Any
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
from ...log import die, warn
from ...supervise import (
CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT,
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME,
SUPERVISE_PORT,
@@ -59,10 +58,17 @@ from .sidecar_bundle import (
)
# Repo root, used as the build context for the bundle Dockerfile.
# Repo root or installed site-packages root, used as the build context for
# Dockerfiles that COPY bot_bottle source files.
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
def _sidecar_bundle_dockerfile() -> str:
if (Path(_REPO_DIR) / SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE).is_file():
return SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE
return f"bot_bottle/{SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE}"
def bottle_plan_to_compose(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Render a Compose v2 spec dict from a fully-resolved
DockerBottlePlan.
@@ -136,7 +142,8 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
volumes.append(_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append(_bind(ep.routes_path.parent, str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent)))
env.extend(egress_sidecar_env_entries(ep))
for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate -----------------------------------------------------
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
@@ -183,7 +190,7 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"image": SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
"build": {
"context": _REPO_DIR,
"dockerfile": SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
"dockerfile": _sidecar_bundle_dockerfile(),
},
"container_name": sidecar_bundle_container_name(plan.slug),
"networks": {
@@ -220,7 +227,6 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
# never lands on argv or in the compose file.
for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
env.append(name)
env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
service: dict[str, Any] = {
"image": plan.image,
@@ -232,6 +238,15 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
if plan.use_runsc:
service["runtime"] = "runsc"
volumes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
volumes.append(_bind(
plan.supervise_plan.current_config_dir,
CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT,
))
if volumes:
service["volumes"] = volumes
# The init supervisor inside the bundle owns intra-bundle
# daemon ordering, so the agent only waits for the bundle
# container itself.
+4 -3
View File
@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import os
# Bundle image. Defaults to a built-locally tag (built from the
# repo's Dockerfile.sidecars via compose `build:`). Operators
# pinning to a published digest can override via env.
# Bundle image. Defaults to a built-locally tag. Source checkouts
# build from the repo-root Dockerfile.sidecars; installed packages
# build from the packaged copy under bot_bottle/.
# Operators pinning to a published digest can override via env.
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE",
"bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
+2 -6
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
from ..bottle_state import egress_state_dir
from ..egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME
from ..egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
from ..egress_addon_core import load_routes
class EgressApplyError(RuntimeError):
@@ -33,15 +33,11 @@ class EgressApplicator(ABC):
@staticmethod
def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
try:
config = load_config(content)
load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}"
) from e
if config.log != LOG_OFF:
raise EgressApplyError(
"proposed routes.yaml must not change egress logging"
)
@staticmethod
def _routes_path(slug: str) -> Path:
+4 -8
View File
@@ -22,12 +22,7 @@ from ...bottle_state import (
git_gate_state_dir,
read_committed_image,
)
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_resolve_token_values,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, egress_resolve_token_values
from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
from ...log import die, info, warn
from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
@@ -355,7 +350,9 @@ def _sidecar_daemons(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
def _sidecar_env_entries(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
env: list[str] = list(egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
env: list[str] = []
if plan.egress_plan.routes:
env.extend(sorted(plan.egress_plan.token_env_map.keys()))
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE={_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
@@ -423,7 +420,6 @@ def _agent_env_entries(
env.append(f"{name}={value}")
for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
env.append(name)
env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
return tuple(env)
@@ -68,11 +68,6 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
_ensure_builder_dns()
args = [_CONTAINER, "build", "-t", ref, "--dns", dns_server()]
if dockerfile:
# `container build` resolves -f relative to the current working
# directory, not the build context. Anchor a relative Dockerfile to
# the context so builds work from any cwd.
if not os.path.isabs(dockerfile):
dockerfile = os.path.join(context, dockerfile)
args.extend(["-f", dockerfile])
args.append(context)
subprocess.run(args, check=True)
+5 -6
View File
@@ -23,9 +23,7 @@ from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_resolve_token_values,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ...util import expand_tilde
@@ -230,9 +228,6 @@ def _discover_urls(
guest_env["GIT_GATE_URL"] = f"http://{agent_git_gate_host}"
if agent_supervise_url:
guest_env["MCP_SUPERVISE_URL"] = agent_supervise_url
for entry in egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan):
name, value = entry.split("=", 1)
guest_env[name] = value
return dataclasses.replace(
plan,
@@ -321,7 +316,11 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
volumes.append((str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append((str(ep.routes_path.parent), str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent), True))
env.extend(egress_sidecar_env_entries(ep))
# Bare-name entries for upstream-token slots. Their values
# come from the docker-run subprocess env (inherited from
# the operator's shell), never landing on argv.
for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate ---------------------------------------------
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
+16 -10
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
"""Per-bottle persistent state.
"""Per-bottle persistent state (PRD 0016).
Holds optional per-bottle Dockerfile overrides, the transcript snapshot
the state-preservation helper saves before teardown, and the launch metadata that lets
Holds the per-bottle Dockerfile override that capability-block
remediation writes, the transcript snapshot the state-preservation
helper saves before teardown, and the launch metadata that lets
`cli.py resume <identity>` reconstruct a bottle's spec. State
lives at:
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ _METADATA_NAME = "metadata.json"
_LIVE_CONFIG_SUBDIR = "live-config"
LIVE_CONFIG_ROUTES_NAME = "routes.yaml"
LIVE_CONFIG_ALLOWLIST_NAME = "allowlist"
# Empty marker file. Session preservation writes it before teardown so
# Empty marker file. capability_apply writes it before teardown so
# cli.py's session-end cleanup knows to preserve the state dir for
# `cli.py resume <identity>`. Absent = clean up.
_PRESERVE_MARKER = ".preserve"
@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ def per_bottle_dockerfile_path(identity: str) -> Path:
def per_bottle_dockerfile(identity: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the per-bottle Dockerfile content if present, else
None. None means: use the provider or manifest Dockerfile."""
None. None means: use the repo's Dockerfile (the original
pre-capability-block behavior)."""
p = per_bottle_dockerfile_path(identity)
if p.is_file():
return p.read_text()
@@ -247,7 +249,9 @@ def write_live_config(
def transcript_snapshot_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""Where agent session snapshots are kept for resume flows."""
"""Where capability_apply stashes the agent's transcript before
teardown, so the next `cli.py start <agent>` can offer to
resume from it."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _TRANSCRIPT_SUBDIR
@@ -274,7 +278,8 @@ def git_gate_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
def supervise_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir reserved for supervise sidecar bind-mount sources.
"""State subdir for the supervise sidecar's current-config dir
(bind-mounted into the agent at /etc/bot-bottle/current-config).
The queue dir is intentionally NOT under here — it lives at
~/.bot-bottle/queue/<slug>/ alongside the audit logs, so it
survives state-dir cleanup."""
@@ -296,8 +301,9 @@ def preserve_marker_path(identity: str) -> Path:
def mark_preserved(identity: str) -> Path:
"""Mark this bottle's state for preservation across session
teardown so cli.py's session-end cleanup leaves the state dir
intact for a subsequent `cli.py resume`."""
teardown. Written by capability_apply.apply_capability_change so
cli.py's session-end cleanup leaves the state dir intact for a
subsequent `cli.py resume`."""
path = preserve_marker_path(identity)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.touch()
@@ -310,7 +316,7 @@ def is_preserved(identity: str) -> bool:
def clear_preserve_marker(identity: str) -> None:
"""Idempotent removal. Called at fresh launch (start or resume)
so a marker left from a prior preserved session doesn't keep
so a marker left from a prior capability-block doesn't keep
state alive past the next normal session-end."""
try:
preserve_marker_path(identity).unlink()
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
"""Main CLI dispatcher.
Commands: cleanup, commit, edit, info, init, list, resume, start, supervise
Commands: cleanup, commit, doctor, edit, info, init, list, resume, start, supervise
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from ._common import PROG
from . import list as _list_mod
from .cleanup import cmd_cleanup
from .commit import cmd_commit
from .doctor import cmd_doctor
from .edit import cmd_edit
from .info import cmd_info
from .init import cmd_init
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ cmd_list = _list_mod.cmd_list
COMMANDS = {
"cleanup": cmd_cleanup,
"commit": cmd_commit,
"doctor": cmd_doctor,
"edit": cmd_edit,
"info": cmd_info,
"init": cmd_init,
@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ def usage() -> None:
sys.stderr.write("Commands:\n")
sys.stderr.write(" cleanup stop and remove all active bot-bottle containers\n")
sys.stderr.write(" commit snapshot a running bottle's container state to a Docker image\n")
sys.stderr.write(" doctor check Python, Docker, and bot-bottle config prerequisites\n")
sys.stderr.write(" edit open an agent in vim for editing\n")
sys.stderr.write(" info print env, skills, and prompt details for a named agent\n")
sys.stderr.write(" init interactively create a new agent and add it to bot-bottle.json\n")
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
PROG = "cli.py"
PROG = Path(sys.argv[0]).name or "bot-bottle"
USER_CWD = os.getcwd()
REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent)
+3 -2
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ dirs are shared layout, so docker is the single owner of that
bucket.
State dirs with `.preserve` are intentionally never touched — they
hold preserved sessions the operator may want to `resume`. Manual
`rm -rf ~/.bot-bottle/state/<identity>` is the path for those.
hold capability-block rebuilds or crash snapshots the operator may
want to `resume`. Manual `rm -rf ~/.bot-bottle/state/<identity>`
is the path for those.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
"""doctor: validate host prerequisites for running bot-bottle."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from ._common import PROG
def _ok(label: str, detail: str) -> None:
print(f"ok: {label}: {detail}")
def _fail(label: str, detail: str) -> None:
print(f"fail: {label}: {detail}")
def _check_python() -> bool:
version = sys.version_info
detail = f"{version.major}.{version.minor}.{version.micro}"
if version >= (3, 11):
_ok("python", detail)
return True
_fail("python", f"{detail}; need 3.11 or newer")
return False
def _check_docker() -> bool:
docker = shutil.which("docker")
if not docker:
_fail("docker", "docker command not found")
return False
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[docker, "info"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=False,
timeout=10,
)
except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
_fail("docker", f"daemon check failed: {exc}")
return False
if result.returncode == 0:
_ok("docker", "daemon reachable")
return True
_fail("docker", "daemon not reachable")
return False
def _check_config_dir() -> bool:
config = Path.home() / ".bot-bottle"
if config.is_dir():
_ok("config", str(config))
return True
_fail("config", f"{config} does not exist")
return False
def cmd_doctor(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} doctor", add_help=True)
parser.parse_args(argv)
checks = (
_check_python(),
_check_docker(),
_check_config_dir(),
)
return 0 if all(checks) else 1
+7 -4
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ Reads ~/.bot-bottle/state/<identity>/metadata.json to recover the
(agent_name, cwd, copy_cwd) the bottle was originally started with,
then runs the same launch core as `start` but pinned to the
recorded identity so the new bottle picks up any per-bottle Dockerfile
override and transcript snapshot under the same state dir.
(from capability-block apply) and transcript snapshot under the same
state dir.
Use case: an interrupted or preserved bottle needs to be relaunched;
the operator runs
Use case: an agent calls capability-block, the dashboard approves
and tears down the bottle, the operator runs
./cli.py resume <identity>
to bring up the replacement from the recorded state.
to bring up the replacement with the new capabilities baked in.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ from .start import _launch_bottle
def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} resume", add_help=True)
parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument("--remote-control", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument(
"identity",
help="bottle identity from a prior `start` (see its session-end output)",
@@ -54,5 +56,6 @@ def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
return _launch_bottle(
spec,
dry_run=args.dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
)
+17 -6
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ from ..bottle_state import (
is_preserved,
mark_preserved,
)
# from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import snapshot_transcript
from ..log import info
from ..manifest import ManifestIndex
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD, read_tty_line
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} start", add_help=True)
parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument("--cwd", action="store_true", help="copy host cwd into the running bottle")
parser.add_argument("--remote-control", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument(
"--backend",
choices=known_backend_names(),
@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
return _launch_bottle(
spec,
dry_run=dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
)
@@ -131,7 +134,7 @@ def prepare_with_preflight(
def attach_agent(
bottle: Bottle, *, resume: bool = False,
bottle: Bottle, *, remote_control: bool = False, resume: bool = False,
agent_provider_template: str = "claude",
startup_args: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> int:
@@ -150,6 +153,8 @@ def attach_agent(
"(Ctrl-D or 'exit' to leave; container will be removed)"
)
agent_args = list(runtime.bypass_args)
if remote_control:
agent_args.extend(runtime.remote_control_args)
agent_args.extend(startup_args)
if resume:
agent_args.extend(runtime.resume_args)
@@ -213,9 +218,9 @@ def _text_prompt_yes() -> bool:
return reply in ("y", "Y", "yes", "YES")
def _text_render_preflight():
def _text_render_preflight(*, remote_control: bool):
def _render(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> None:
plan.print()
plan.print(remote_control=remote_control)
return _render
@@ -223,6 +228,7 @@ def _launch_bottle(
spec: BottleSpec,
*,
dry_run: bool,
remote_control: bool,
backend_name: str | None = None,
) -> int:
"""Shared launch core for `start` and `resume`. Builds the plan,
@@ -234,7 +240,7 @@ def _launch_bottle(
plan, identity = prepare_with_preflight(
spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
render_preflight=_text_render_preflight(),
render_preflight=_text_render_preflight(remote_control=remote_control),
prompt_yes=_text_prompt_yes,
dry_run=dry_run,
backend_name=backend_name,
@@ -247,6 +253,7 @@ def _launch_bottle(
agent_provider_template = getattr(plan, "agent_provider_template", "claude")
exit_code = attach_agent(
bottle,
remote_control=remote_control,
agent_provider_template=agent_provider_template,
startup_args=plan.agent_provision.startup_args,
)
@@ -256,8 +263,12 @@ def _launch_bottle(
)
# While the container is still alive: always snapshot the
# transcript and — if the agent exited non-zero — mark
# the state for preservation. This picks up crashes /
# Ctrl-Cs / OOM kills before cleanup removes the state dir.
# the state for preservation. Capability-block already
# did both before triggering teardown from the dashboard;
# this picks up crashes / Ctrl-Cs / OOM kills the same
# way. snapshot_transcript is best-effort so the
# capability-block path's prior snapshot isn't clobbered
# when the container is already gone.
if agent_provider_template == "claude":
capture_claude_session_state(identity, exit_code)
return 0
+46 -28
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
act on them (approve / modify / reject).
Curses-based TUI; modify-then-approve shells out to $EDITOR. The
Egress proposals are queued for operator review as full routes.yaml
updates.
approval handler wires to PRD 0016 (capability-block), which rebuilds
the bottle Dockerfile. Egress proposals are queued for operator review
as full routes.yaml updates.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -21,6 +22,10 @@ from pathlib import Path
from .. import supervise as _supervise
from ..bottle_state import read_metadata
# from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import (
# CapabilityApplyError,
# apply_capability_change,
# )
from ..backend.docker.egress_apply import (
EgressApplyError,
applicator as _docker_applicator,
@@ -33,6 +38,10 @@ from ..backend.smolmachines.egress_apply import (
)
from ..log import Die, error, info
class CapabilityApplyError(RuntimeError):
"""Placeholder while capability_apply is disabled."""
from ..supervise import (
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
AuditEntry,
@@ -41,10 +50,11 @@ from ..supervise import (
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
archive_proposal,
list_pending_proposals,
render_diff,
write_audit_entry,
@@ -55,11 +65,6 @@ from ._common import PROG
_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS = 1000
# Proposal tools whose payload is a read-only report, not a file the operator
# edits: modify is unavailable and approval requires a recorded reason for the
# audit trail.
_REPORT_ONLY_TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class QueuedProposal:
@@ -72,7 +77,7 @@ class QueuedProposal:
# Errors any remediation engine may raise. Caught by the TUI key
# handlers and surfaced in the status line so a failed apply keeps
# the proposal pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError,)
ApplyError = (CapabilityApplyError, EgressApplyError)
def apply_routes_change(slug: str, content: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
@@ -132,9 +137,11 @@ def _detail_lines(
def _suffix_for_tool(tool: str) -> str:
if tool in (TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
if tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return ".dockerfile"
if tool in (TOOL_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
return ".yaml"
if tool in (TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW):
if tool == TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW:
return ".txt"
return ".txt"
@@ -153,7 +160,18 @@ def approve(
file_to_apply = final_file if final_file is not None else qp.proposal.proposed_file
diff_before, diff_after = "", ""
if qp.proposal.tool in (TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
# if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
# _meta = read_metadata(qp.proposal.bottle_slug)
# if _meta is not None and not _meta.compose_project:
# raise CapabilityApplyError(
# "capability-block remediation is not supported for smolmachines "
# "bottles. Reject this proposal or handle the capability change "
# "manually, then restart the bottle."
# )
# diff_before, diff_after = apply_capability_change(
# qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
# )
if qp.proposal.tool in (TOOL_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
diff_before, diff_after = apply_routes_change(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
file_to_apply,
@@ -170,6 +188,9 @@ def approve(
qp, action=status, notes=notes,
diff_before=diff_before, diff_after=diff_after,
)
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
archive_proposal(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
def reject(qp: QueuedProposal, *, reason: str) -> None:
"""Write a rejection response and an audit entry."""
@@ -191,8 +212,8 @@ def _approve_from_tui(
notes: str = "",
) -> str:
"""Approve from curses, prompting for any tool-specific audit note."""
if qp.proposal.tool in _REPORT_ONLY_TOOLS and final_file is None:
notes = _prompt(stdscr, "allow reason (false positive / legitimately needed): ")
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW and final_file is None:
notes = _prompt(stdscr, "allow reason (test fixture/false positive): ")
if not notes:
return "approve aborted (empty reason)"
approve(qp, final_file=final_file, notes=notes)
@@ -271,10 +292,7 @@ def cmd_supervise(argv: list[str]) -> int:
return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch supervise crash for logging
log_path = _write_crash_log(e)
error(
f"supervise crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}",
context={"error_type": type(e).__name__, "crash_log": str(log_path)},
)
error(f"supervise crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
error(f"full traceback written to {log_path}")
return 1
return 0
@@ -319,7 +337,7 @@ def _list_once() -> int:
return 0
def _try_init_green() -> int: # pragma: no cover
def _try_init_green() -> int:
"""Initialise a green color pair and return its attr, or 0."""
try:
curses.start_color()
@@ -330,7 +348,7 @@ def _try_init_green() -> int: # pragma: no cover
return 0
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore # pragma: no cover
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
curses.curs_set(0)
stdscr.timeout(_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS)
green_attr = _try_init_green()
@@ -390,8 +408,8 @@ def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore # pragm
except ApplyError as e:
status_line = f"apply failed: {e}"
elif key == ord("m"):
if qp.proposal.tool in _REPORT_ONLY_TOOLS:
status_line = f"modify unavailable for {qp.proposal.tool}"
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW:
status_line = "modify unavailable for gitleaks-allow"
continue
edited = _modify(stdscr, qp)
if edited is None:
@@ -420,7 +438,7 @@ def _render(
status_line: str,
*,
green_attr: int = 0, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
) -> None: # pragma: no cover
) -> None:
stdscr.erase()
h, w = stdscr.getmaxyx()
header = f"bot-bottle supervise ({len(pending)} pending)"
@@ -471,7 +489,7 @@ def _detail_view(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
green_attr: int = 0,
) -> None: # pragma: no cover
) -> None:
"""Render the full proposal. Scrollable. Press q to return."""
lines = _detail_lines(qp, green_attr=green_attr)
offset = 0
@@ -504,7 +522,7 @@ def _detail_view(
pass
return
elif key == ord("m"):
if qp.proposal.tool in _REPORT_ONLY_TOOLS:
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW:
return
edited = _modify(stdscr, qp)
if edited is not None:
@@ -523,7 +541,7 @@ def _detail_view(
return
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None: # type: ignore # pragma: no cover
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None: # type: ignore
"""Suspend curses, open $EDITOR on the proposed file, return edited content."""
suffix = _suffix_for_tool(qp.proposal.tool)
curses.endwin()
@@ -534,7 +552,7 @@ def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None:
return edited
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str: # type: ignore # pragma: no cover
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str: # type: ignore
"""One-line input at the bottom of the screen."""
curses.curs_set(1)
h, _ = stdscr.getmaxyx()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ FROM node:22-slim
# to it) works against egress's bumped TLS without the agent needing
# local DNS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl ripgrep \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# App-specific deps. Python isn't required by claude-code itself
+2 -4
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
AgentProvisionDir,
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
provider_startup_args,
)
from ...backend.docker import util as docker_mod
from ...egress import EgressRoute
@@ -91,6 +90,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
remote_control_args=("--remote-control",),
)
@@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
color: str = "",
provider_settings: dict[str, object] | None = None,
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del forward_host_credentials, host_env
del forward_host_credentials, host_env, provider_settings
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
startup_args = provider_startup_args(provider_settings)
guest_home = self.guest_home
trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
@@ -200,7 +199,6 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
has_prompt=has_prompt,
startup_args=startup_args,
dirs=dirs,
files=tuple(files),
egress_routes=egress_routes,
+6 -9
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
# bot-bottle Codex provider image.
#
# Mirrors the default Claude image shape: Node LTS, git/network tooling,
# non-root node user, and the provider CLI installed for that user.
# non-root node user, and the provider CLI installed globally.
FROM node:22-slim
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl procps ripgrep \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# App-specific deps. Python isn't required by codex itself
@@ -17,15 +17,12 @@ RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.136.0 \
&& npm cache clean --force
USER node
WORKDIR /home/node
ENV PATH="/home/node/.local/bin:${PATH}"
# Remote-control support requires the standalone Codex install layout
# under ~/.codex/packages/standalone/current. The npm package can run
# the TUI, but remote-control commands expect this installer-owned path.
RUN mkdir -p /home/node/.codex \
&& curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh
RUN mkdir -p /home/node/.codex
CMD ["codex"]
+2 -4
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
AgentProvisionCommand,
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
provider_startup_args,
)
from .codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from ...egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
@@ -55,6 +54,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
remote_control_args=(),
)
@@ -79,9 +79,8 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
color: str = "",
provider_settings: dict[str, object] | None = None,
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del auth_token, label, color
del auth_token, label, color, provider_settings
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
startup_args = provider_startup_args(provider_settings)
guest_home = self.guest_home
trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
@@ -164,7 +163,6 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
has_prompt=has_prompt,
startup_args=startup_args,
dirs=tuple(dirs),
files=tuple(files),
pre_copy=tuple(pre_copy),
@@ -19,12 +19,7 @@ import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from ...deploy_key_provisioner import DeployKeyCollisionError, DeployKeyProvisioner
# Timeout for ssh-keygen and Gitea API HTTP calls. A hung Gitea instance at
# prepare time would stall bottle launch indefinitely without this bound.
_API_TIMEOUT_SECS = 30
_KEYGEN_TIMEOUT_SECS = 10
from ...deploy_key_provisioner import DeployKeyProvisioner
class GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(DeployKeyProvisioner):
@@ -51,7 +46,6 @@ class GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(DeployKeyProvisioner):
check=True,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
timeout=_KEYGEN_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
private_key = key_path.read_bytes()
public_key = key_path.with_suffix(".pub").read_text().strip()
@@ -73,15 +67,10 @@ class GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(DeployKeyProvisioner):
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=_API_TIMEOUT_SECS) as resp:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
body = json.loads(resp.read())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
_body = _read_error_body(exc)
if exc.code == 422:
raise DeployKeyCollisionError(
f"deploy key collision for {owner_repo!r} "
f"(title={title!r}): key title or content already registered — {_body}"
) from exc
raise RuntimeError(
f"failed to create deploy key for {owner_repo}: "
f"HTTP {exc.code}{_body}"
@@ -104,7 +93,7 @@ class GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner(DeployKeyProvisioner):
method="DELETE",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=_API_TIMEOUT_SECS):
with urllib.request.urlopen(req):
pass
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code == 404:
+1 -3
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
AgentProvisionDir,
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
provider_startup_args,
)
from ...egress import EgressRoute
from ...log import die, info
@@ -166,6 +165,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
prompt_mode="append_system_prompt",
bypass_args=(),
resume_args=(),
remote_control_args=(),
)
@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ class PiAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
models_payload, base_url, api_key_env, models, provider_name = (
_pi_models_json(settings)
)
extra_startup_args = provider_startup_args(provider_settings)
models_file = state_dir / "pi-models.json"
models_file.write_text(json.dumps(models_payload, indent=2) + "\n")
models_file.chmod(0o600)
@@ -220,7 +219,6 @@ class PiAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
startup_args=(
"--models",
",".join(f"{provider_name}/{model}" for model in models),
*extra_startup_args,
),
dirs=(AgentProvisionDir(f"{guest_home}/.pi/agent"),),
files=(AgentProvisionFile(models_file, _models_path(guest_home)),),
-4
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
class DeployKeyCollisionError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when a deploy key title or public key already exists on the repo."""
class DeployKeyProvisioner(ABC):
"""Manages a single deploy-key lifecycle on a remote forge."""
+7 -190
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ import gzip
import re
import typing
import unicodedata
from math import log2
from collections import Counter
from urllib.parse import quote as url_quote
try:
@@ -80,27 +78,16 @@ TOKEN_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
)
def scan_token_patterns(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
safe_tokens: typing.AbstractSet[str] | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
def scan_token_patterns(text: str, *, location: str = "body") -> ScanResult | None:
normalized = _normalize_text(text)
for name, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
for m in pattern.finditer(normalized):
value = m.group(0)
# A value the supervisor has approved (PRD 0062) is no longer a
# block — keep scanning so a second, un-approved token in the
# same request is still caught.
if safe_tokens is not None and value in safe_tokens:
continue
m = pattern.search(normalized)
if m is not None:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=f"{name} found in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(normalized, m.start(), m.end()),
matched=value,
context=_snippet(text, m.start(), m.end()),
)
return None
@@ -109,21 +96,20 @@ def redact_tokens(
text: str,
*,
env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
) -> str:
"""Replace token pattern matches and (if env given) provisioned secrets with REDACT."""
for _, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
text = pattern.sub(REDACT, text)
if env is not None:
for key, value in env.items():
if any(key.startswith(p) for p in sensitive_prefixes) and value:
if key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") and value:
for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
text = text.replace(variant, REDACT)
return text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Known secrets detector
# Known secrets detector (Phase 1b)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
@@ -164,179 +150,26 @@ def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
return variants
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fragmentation-resistant helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Minimum length of alnum projection for projection-based checks to run.
# Short secrets produce too many false positives in projection space.
_ALNUM_MIN_LEN = 8
# Minimum window length for the partial-substring sliding scan.
PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN = 12
def _alnum_projection(text: str) -> str:
"""Return text with every non-alphanumeric character stripped.
Used for fragmentation-resistant matching: separator-injected secrets
(spaces, hyphens, dots inserted between characters) are identical to
their originals in alnum projection space.
"""
return "".join(c for c in text if c.isalnum())
def _find_partial_window(secret_alnum: str, text_alnum: str, min_len: int) -> int | None:
"""Return the position in text_alnum where any min_len-char window of
secret_alnum first appears, or None.
Slides a window of width min_len across secret_alnum and searches for
each window in text_alnum. The first hit position is returned.
"""
if len(secret_alnum) < min_len or len(text_alnum) < min_len:
return None
for i in range(len(secret_alnum) - min_len + 1):
window = secret_alnum[i:i + min_len]
pos = text_alnum.find(window)
if pos >= 0:
return pos
return None
def scan_known_secrets(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
safe_tokens: typing.AbstractSet[str] | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
if env is None:
return None
# Pre-compute alnum projection of the scan text once; reused per secret.
text_alnum: str | None = None
for key, value in env.items():
if not any(key.startswith(p) for p in sensitive_prefixes) or not value:
if not key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") or not value:
continue
# Pass 1: exact match across encoded variants (original behaviour).
approved_exact = False
for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
pos = text.find(variant)
if pos >= 0:
# The supervisor approves the exact encoded variant found
# (PRD 0062); a different encoding of the same secret is a
# fresh block.
if safe_tokens is not None and variant in safe_tokens:
approved_exact = True
continue
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, pos, pos + len(variant)),
matched=variant,
)
if approved_exact:
# Exact match was found and approved; projection passes would
# fire on the same value, so skip them for this secret.
continue
# Pass 2 & 3: fragmentation-resistant projection checks.
secret_alnum = _alnum_projection(value)
if len(secret_alnum) < _ALNUM_MIN_LEN:
continue
if text_alnum is None:
text_alnum = _alnum_projection(text)
# Pass 2: full alnum-projection exact match (catches separator injection).
pos2 = text_alnum.find(secret_alnum)
if pos2 >= 0:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=(
f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location} "
f"(fragmented match — separator injection)"
),
location=location,
context=_snippet(text_alnum, pos2, pos2 + len(secret_alnum)),
)
# Pass 3: sliding-window partial match (catches chunked-substring leaks).
pos3 = _find_partial_window(secret_alnum, text_alnum, PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN)
if pos3 is not None:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=(
f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location} "
f"(partial match — at least {PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN} consecutive "
f"alphanumeric chars)"
),
location=location,
context=_snippet(text_alnum, pos3, pos3 + PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN),
)
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Entropy detector (warn-only)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Sliding window size and step for the entropy scan.
ENTROPY_WINDOW = 64
ENTROPY_STEP = 32
# Bits-per-character threshold. Random ASCII printable ≈ 6.6 bits; random
# lowercase hex ≈ 4 bits; random base64url ≈ 6 bits. 5.5 sits above
# typical structured data (JSON, URLs) while staying below truly random
# content.
ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 5.5
def _shannon_entropy(text: str) -> float:
if not text:
return 0.0
counts = Counter(text)
n = len(text)
return -sum((c / n) * log2(c / n) for c in counts.values())
def scan_entropy(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
window: int = ENTROPY_WINDOW,
threshold: float = ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD,
) -> ScanResult | None:
"""Warn-only detector: flag windows of `window` chars with Shannon entropy
above `threshold` bits per character.
Never blocks; always returns severity='warn'. Disabled by default
routes must opt in via dlp.outbound_detectors=['entropy'].
"""
if not text:
return None
step = max(1, window // 2)
end = len(text)
# Scan overlapping windows; also check the final tail if shorter than window.
positions = list(range(0, end - window + 1, step))
if end < window:
positions = [0]
elif (end - window) % step != 0:
positions.append(end - window)
for i in positions:
chunk = text[i:i + window]
if _shannon_entropy(chunk) >= threshold:
return ScanResult(
severity="warn",
reason=f"high-entropy content in {location} (possible encrypted exfil)",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, i, i + len(chunk)),
)
return None
@@ -432,14 +265,6 @@ _CRLF_ENCODED_RE = re.compile(r"%0[dD]%0[aA]", re.ASCII)
_CRLF_HEADER_INJECT_RE = re.compile(r"\r\n[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]+\s*:", re.ASCII)
def strip_crlf(text: str) -> str:
"""Remove URL-encoded and literal CRLF injection sequences from a request
surface (PRD 0062 redact policy). Used to scrub the request line / headers
so the request can be forwarded instead of hard-blocked."""
text = _CRLF_ENCODED_RE.sub("", text)
return _CRLF_HEADER_INJECT_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(0)[2:], text)
def scan_crlf_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
if _CRLF_ENCODED_RE.search(text):
return ScanResult(
@@ -455,20 +280,12 @@ def scan_crlf_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
__all__ = [
"ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD",
"ENTROPY_WINDOW",
"ENTROPY_STEP",
"PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN",
"REDACT",
"SNIPPET_CONTEXT",
"TOKEN_PATTERNS",
"_alnum_projection",
"_shannon_entropy",
"redact_tokens",
"scan_crlf_injection",
"scan_entropy",
"scan_known_secrets",
"scan_naive_injection",
"scan_token_patterns",
"strip_crlf",
]
+11 -102
View File
@@ -10,14 +10,12 @@ specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import secrets
from abc import ABC
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from .egress_addon_core import (
ON_MATCH_REDACT,
HeaderMatch as CoreHeaderMatch,
MatchEntry as CoreMatchEntry,
PathMatch as CorePathMatch,
@@ -35,50 +33,6 @@ EGRESS_HOSTNAME = "egress"
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME = Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).name
_CANARY_ENV_WORDS = (
"ACCORD",
"ANCHOR",
"ATLAS",
"CANON",
"CIPHER",
"EMBER",
"FALCON",
"HARBOR",
"LANTERN",
"MARBLE",
"NOVA",
"ORBIT",
"PIVOT",
"RADIUS",
"SUMMIT",
"VECTOR",
)
def _random_canary_env() -> str:
first = secrets.choice(_CANARY_ENV_WORDS)
remaining = tuple(word for word in _CANARY_ENV_WORDS if word != first)
second = secrets.choice(remaining)
return f"{first}_{second}_SECRET"
def egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Return sidecar env entries needed by egress across all backends."""
env: list[str] = []
if plan.routes:
env.extend(sorted(plan.token_env_map.keys()))
if plan.canary and plan.canary_env:
env.append(f"{plan.canary_env}={plan.canary}")
env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES={plan.canary_env}")
return tuple(env)
def egress_agent_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Return agent-visible egress env entries shared by all backends."""
if plan.canary and plan.canary_env:
return (f"{plan.canary_env}={plan.canary}",)
return ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute(Route):
@@ -110,8 +64,6 @@ class EgressPlan:
mitmproxy_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path: Path = Path()
log: int = 0
canary: str = ""
canary_env: str = ""
def egress_manifest_routes(
@@ -143,7 +95,6 @@ def egress_manifest_routes(
git_fetch=r.GitFetch,
outbound_detectors=r.OutboundDetectors,
inbound_detectors=r.InboundDetectors,
outbound_on_match=r.OutboundOnMatch,
))
return tuple(out)
@@ -154,27 +105,12 @@ def egress_routes_for_bottle(
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
manifest = egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
merged = list(_default_provider_on_match(provider_routes)) + [
merged = list(provider_routes) + [
r for r in manifest if r.host.lower() not in provisioned_hosts
]
return _assign_token_slots(merged)
def _default_provider_on_match(
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Provider routes (the agent talking to its own LLM API) default to the
`redact` on-match policy (PRD 0062): high-volume conversation payloads are
the worst source of token-shaped false positives, so a match is scrubbed
and forwarded rather than hard-blocked or queued for the operator. A
provider that sets `outbound_on_match` explicitly keeps its choice."""
return tuple(
r if r.outbound_on_match
else dataclasses.replace(r, outbound_on_match=ON_MATCH_REDACT)
for r in provider_routes
)
def _assign_token_slots(
routes: list[EgressRoute],
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
@@ -210,17 +146,6 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
return out
def _yaml_str_escape(s: str) -> str:
"""Escape a string for use inside a YAML double-quoted scalar."""
return (
s.replace("\\", "\\\\")
.replace('"', '\\"')
.replace("\n", "\\n")
.replace("\r", "\\r")
.replace("\t", "\\t")
)
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
fields: dict[str, object] = {"host": r.host}
if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
@@ -252,11 +177,7 @@ def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
fields["matches"] = matches_data
if r.git_fetch:
fields["git"] = {"fetch": True}
if (
r.outbound_detectors is not None
or r.inbound_detectors is not None
or r.outbound_on_match
):
if r.outbound_detectors is not None or r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp: dict[str, object] = {}
if r.outbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["outbound_detectors"] = (
@@ -268,8 +189,6 @@ def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
False if not r.inbound_detectors
else list(r.inbound_detectors)
)
if r.outbound_on_match:
dlp["outbound_on_match"] = r.outbound_on_match
fields["dlp"] = dlp
return fields
@@ -283,12 +202,12 @@ def _render_match_entry(entry: dict[str, object]) -> list[str]:
for pd in entry["paths"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
pd_dict: dict[str, str] = pd # type: ignore[assignment]
if "type" in pd_dict:
lines.append(f' - type: "{_yaml_str_escape(pd_dict["type"])}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{_yaml_str_escape(pd_dict["value"])}"')
lines.append(f' - type: "{pd_dict["type"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
else:
lines.append(f' - value: "{_yaml_str_escape(pd_dict["value"])}"')
lines.append(f' - value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
if "methods" in entry:
methods_str = ", ".join(f'"{_yaml_str_escape(m)}"' for m in entry["methods"]) # type: ignore[union-attr]
methods_str = ", ".join(f'"{m}"' for m in entry["methods"]) # type: ignore[union-attr]
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f'{prefix}methods: [{methods_str}]')
first_key = False
@@ -298,8 +217,8 @@ def _render_match_entry(entry: dict[str, object]) -> list[str]:
first_key = False
for hd in entry["headers"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
hd_dict: dict[str, str] = hd # type: ignore[assignment]
lines.append(f' - name: "{_yaml_str_escape(hd_dict["name"])}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{_yaml_str_escape(hd_dict["value"])}"')
lines.append(f' - name: "{hd_dict["name"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{hd_dict["value"]}"')
if first_key:
lines.append(" - {}")
return lines
@@ -319,10 +238,10 @@ def egress_render_routes(
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
for r in routes:
f = _route_to_yaml_fields(r)
lines.append(f' - host: "{_yaml_str_escape(str(f["host"]))}"')
lines.append(f' - host: "{f["host"]}"')
if "auth_scheme" in f:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{_yaml_str_escape(str(f["auth_scheme"]))}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{_yaml_str_escape(str(f["token_env"]))}"')
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{f["auth_scheme"]}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
if "matches" in f:
lines.append(" matches:")
for entry in f["matches"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
@@ -341,8 +260,6 @@ def egress_render_routes(
elif isinstance(dv, list):
items_str = ", ".join(f'"{x}"' for x in dv)
lines.append(f" {dk}: [{items_str}]")
elif isinstance(dv, str):
lines.append(f' {dk}: "{_yaml_str_escape(dv)}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
@@ -382,18 +299,12 @@ class Egress(ABC):
routes_path = stage_dir / EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes, log=log))
routes_path.chmod(0o600)
# Generate a per-session fake secret under a plausible random env name.
# The sidecar marks that exact env name as sensitive for known-secret
# scanning; the agent receives the same name/value as exfil bait.
canary = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
return EgressPlan(
slug=slug,
routes_path=routes_path,
routes=routes,
token_env_map=egress_token_env_map(routes),
log=log,
canary=canary,
canary_env=_random_canary_env(),
)
__all__ = [
@@ -408,7 +319,5 @@ __all__ = [
"egress_render_routes",
"egress_resolve_token_values",
"egress_routes_for_bottle",
"egress_agent_env_entries",
"egress_sidecar_env_entries",
"egress_token_env_map",
]
+22 -282
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ egress container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import signal
@@ -17,15 +16,9 @@ from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
LOG_BLOCKS,
LOG_FULL,
DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH,
ON_MATCH_BLOCK,
ON_MATCH_REDACT,
Config,
Route,
ScanResult,
build_inbound_scan_text,
build_outbound_scan_text,
build_token_allow_payload,
decide,
decide_git_fetch,
is_git_fetch_request,
@@ -39,55 +32,23 @@ from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: dis
)
try:
from dlp_detectors import redact_tokens, strip_crlf # type: ignore[import-not-found]
from dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
redact_tokens,
strip_crlf,
)
try:
import supervise as _sv # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv # type: ignore[import-not-found]
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
# Seconds the egress proxy holds a token-blocked request open waiting for the
# operator's supervisor decision (PRD 0062), overridable via env.
DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300.0
# Filesystem poll cadence while awaiting the operator's response.
TOKEN_ALLOW_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 0.5
# Fixed operator guidance attached to every token-allow proposal.
_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION = (
"egress DLP blocked an outbound request carrying a detected token. "
"Approve only if this value is a false positive or a credential this "
"request legitimately needs; the value is then allowed for the life of "
"this bottle's egress proxy."
)
class EgressAddon:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.config: Config = Config(routes=())
# Tokens the operator has approved this session (PRD 0062). In-memory
# only — a restart re-prompts. Mutated only from the asyncio loop that
# runs the addon hooks, so no lock is needed.
self.safe_tokens: set[str] = set()
self._supervise_queue_dir = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR", "").strip()
self._supervise_slug = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", "").strip()
self._token_allow_timeout = _token_allow_timeout_from_env(os.environ)
self._reload(initial=True)
self._install_sighup()
def _supervise_available(self) -> bool:
return bool(self._supervise_queue_dir and self._supervise_slug)
def _reload(self, *, initial: bool = False) -> None:
try:
text = Path(self.routes_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
@@ -160,42 +121,31 @@ class EgressAddon:
)
def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
headers = {
k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()
if k.lower() != "authorization"
}
body = redact_tokens(flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_request",
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
"headers": headers,
"body": body,
"headers": dict(flow.request.headers),
"body": flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
headers = {
k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()
}
body = redact_tokens(flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_response",
"host": flow.request.pretty_host,
"status": flow.response.status_code,
"headers": headers,
"body": body,
"headers": dict(flow.response.headers),
"body": flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
@@ -207,11 +157,21 @@ class EgressAddon:
# Hostname is included to catch DNS-tunnelling exfiltration attempts.
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
if not await self._handle_outbound_dlp(flow, route):
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
query,
outbound_scan_headers(route, dict(flow.request.headers)),
body,
)
dlp_result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ)
if dlp_result is not None and dlp_result.severity == "block":
ctx = self._req_ctx(flow)
if dlp_result.context:
ctx = {**ctx, "context": dlp_result.context}
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {dlp_result.reason}", ctx=ctx)
return
# The redact policy may have rewritten the request line; recompute
# the path/query the git checks below rely on.
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
self._block(
@@ -261,202 +221,6 @@ class EgressAddon:
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_request(flow)
def _block_dlp(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, result: ScanResult) -> None:
ctx = self._req_ctx(flow)
if result.context:
ctx = {**ctx, "context": result.context}
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=ctx)
async def _handle_outbound_dlp(
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
route: Route,
) -> bool:
"""Scan the outbound request and apply the route's on-match policy
(PRD 0062). Returns True if the request may be forwarded, False if a
403 response has been written to `flow`.
Loops so the supervise policy can re-scan after each approval a
second, un-approved token in the same request is still caught."""
while True:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
headers = outbound_scan_headers(route, dict(flow.request.headers))
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, body,
)
# CRLF is scanned only over the request line + headers, never the
# body (see scan_outbound) — a body is not an injection vector.
crlf_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, "",
)
result = scan_outbound(
route, scan_text, os.environ,
safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens, crlf_text=crlf_text,
)
if result is None or result.severity != "block":
return True
policy = route.outbound_on_match or DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH
# redact scrubs every detection (tokens and structural CRLF) and
# forwards; it fails closed only if a match survives the scrub.
if policy == ON_MATCH_REDACT:
if self._redact_outbound(flow, route):
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_redacted",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
return True
self._block(
flow,
f"egress DLP: {result.reason}; redaction could not remove "
"all matches (e.g. a match in the hostname)",
ctx=self._req_ctx(flow),
)
return False
# Structural blocks (CRLF, no safelist-able value) cannot be
# supervised — there is nothing to approve and remember — so under
# block/supervise they are a hard 403.
if policy == ON_MATCH_BLOCK or not result.matched:
self._block_dlp(flow, result)
return False
# supervise (default): hold the request for operator approval.
# Fall back to a hard 403 when supervise isn't wired for the bottle.
if not self._supervise_available():
self._block_dlp(flow, result)
return False
approved = await self._supervise_token_block(flow, request_path, result)
if not approved:
return False # _supervise_token_block wrote the 403 response
# loop: the approved value is now in safe_tokens; re-scan.
def _redact_outbound(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, route: Route) -> bool:
"""Scrub detected tokens (and CRLF injection sequences) from the mutable
request surfaces (body, headers, path/query) and re-scan. Returns True
if the request is now clean; False if a block-severity match remains on
a surface redaction cannot rewrite (the hostname) so the caller fails
closed."""
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False)
if body:
redacted_body = redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)
if redacted_body != body:
flow.request.text = redacted_body
for name, value in list(flow.request.headers.items()):
if name.lower() == "host":
continue # routing-critical; never a legitimate token
redacted = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ))
if redacted != value:
flow.request.headers[name] = redacted
redacted_path = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ))
if redacted_path != flow.request.path:
flow.request.path = redacted_path
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
new_body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
headers = outbound_scan_headers(route, dict(flow.request.headers))
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, new_body,
)
crlf_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, "",
)
result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ, crlf_text=crlf_text)
return result is None or result.severity != "block"
async def _supervise_token_block(
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
request_path: str,
result: ScanResult,
) -> bool:
"""Route a token DLP block to the operator's supervisor queue and wait.
Returns True if the operator approved (the matched value is added to
`self.safe_tokens` and the caller re-scans); False if the request must
be blocked (a 403 response has been written to `flow`)."""
host = flow.request.pretty_host
payload = build_token_allow_payload(
redact_tokens(host, env=os.environ),
flow.request.method,
redact_tokens(request_path, env=os.environ),
result,
)
proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
bottle_slug=self._supervise_slug,
tool=_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
proposed_file=payload,
justification=_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION,
current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(payload),
)
queue_dir = Path(self._supervise_queue_dir)
try:
_sv.write_proposal(queue_dir, proposal)
except OSError as e:
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: could not queue token-allow proposal: {e}; "
"blocking request\n"
)
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
return False
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_token_supervise",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
"proposal": proposal.id,
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
response = await self._await_token_response(queue_dir, proposal.id)
_sv.archive_proposal(queue_dir, proposal.id)
if response is not None and response.status in (
_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, _sv.STATUS_MODIFIED,
):
self.safe_tokens.add(result.matched)
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_token_allowed",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
"proposal": proposal.id,
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
return True
if response is None:
reason = (
f"egress DLP: {result.reason}; supervisor approval timed out "
f"after {self._token_allow_timeout:g}s"
)
else:
reason = f"egress DLP: {result.reason}; supervisor rejected the request"
self._block(flow, reason, ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
return False
async def _await_token_response(
self,
queue_dir: Path,
proposal_id: str,
) -> "_sv.Response | None":
"""Poll the queue dir for the operator's response without blocking the
proxy event loop. Returns the Response, or None on timeout."""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
deadline = loop.time() + self._token_allow_timeout
while True:
try:
return _sv.read_response(queue_dir, proposal_id)
except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError):
# Not written yet, or a partial/malformed write — retry until
# the deadline, then fail closed.
pass
if loop.time() >= deadline:
return None
await asyncio.sleep(TOKEN_ALLOW_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP inbound scan on response headers and body."""
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
@@ -508,12 +272,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
message = flow.websocket.messages[-1] # type: ignore[union-attr]
content = message.content.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if message.from_client:
# A WebSocket data frame is not an HTTP request line, so CRLF is
# not an injection vector here — scan only for credential leakage.
result = scan_outbound(
route, content, os.environ,
safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens, crlf_text="",
)
result = scan_outbound(route, content, os.environ)
if result is not None and result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
flow.kill() # type: ignore[union-attr]
@@ -527,23 +286,4 @@ class EgressAddon:
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
def _token_allow_timeout_from_env(env: "os._Environ[str]") -> float:
"""Read EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS; fall back to the default on an
unset or invalid value (a bad value should not wedge egress at boot)."""
raw = env.get("EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
value = 0.0
if value <= 0:
sys.stderr.write(
"egress: invalid EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS="
f"{raw!r}; using default {DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS:g}s\n"
)
return DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
return value
addons = [EgressAddon()]
+24 -110
View File
@@ -34,18 +34,9 @@ VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
"CONNECT",
})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets", "entropy"})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
# Per-route policy for what the proxy does when an outbound DLP detector
# matches a token (PRD 0062).
ON_MATCH_BLOCK = "block" # hard 403, never overridable
ON_MATCH_REDACT = "redact" # scrub the matched value, forward the request
ON_MATCH_SUPERVISE = "supervise" # queue for operator approval, hold the request
OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES = (ON_MATCH_BLOCK, ON_MATCH_REDACT, ON_MATCH_SUPERVISE)
# Unset resolves to supervise (fall back to block when supervise is not wired).
DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH = ON_MATCH_SUPERVISE
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
@@ -78,8 +69,6 @@ class Route:
git_fetch: bool = False
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
# "" means unset → DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH. See OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES.
outbound_on_match: str = ""
LOG_OFF = 0 # no logging
@@ -106,11 +95,6 @@ class ScanResult:
reason: str
location: str = "" # where the match was found, e.g. "body", "authorization header"
context: str = "" # surrounding text with the match replaced by REDACT
# Raw substring the detector matched. Used inside the sidecar to key the
# supervisor-approved "safe tokens" set (PRD 0062); never logged or written
# to a proposal file. Empty for structural detectors (CRLF) that carry no
# safelist-able value.
matched: str = ""
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -234,12 +218,12 @@ def _parse_detectors(
idx: int,
host: str,
raw_dict: dict[str, object],
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None, str]:
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
"""Parse the optional `dlp` block on a route, returning
(outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors, outbound_on_match)."""
(outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors)."""
dlp_raw = raw_dict.get("dlp")
if dlp_raw is None:
return None, None, ""
return None, None
label = f"route[{idx}] ({host})"
if not isinstance(dlp_raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'dlp' must be an object")
@@ -276,24 +260,13 @@ def _parse_detectors(
outbound = _parse_detector_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_detector_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
on_match = ""
on_match_raw = dlp.get("outbound_on_match")
if on_match_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(on_match_raw, str) or on_match_raw not in OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.outbound_on_match must be one of "
f"{', '.join(OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES)} (got {on_match_raw!r})"
)
on_match = on_match_raw
for k in dlp:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors", "outbound_on_match"):
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys "
f"are 'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors', "
f"'outbound_on_match'"
f"are 'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound, on_match
return outbound, inbound
def parse_routes(payload: object) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
@@ -364,7 +337,7 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
)
# dlp detectors
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors, outbound_on_match = _parse_detectors(
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_detectors(
idx, host, raw_dict,
)
@@ -383,7 +356,6 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
git_fetch=git_fetch,
outbound_detectors=outbound_detectors,
inbound_detectors=inbound_detectors,
outbound_on_match=outbound_on_match,
)
@@ -432,13 +404,20 @@ def route_to_yaml_dict(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
dlp["outbound_detectors"] = list(r.outbound_detectors)
if r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["inbound_detectors"] = list(r.inbound_detectors)
if r.outbound_on_match:
dlp["outbound_on_match"] = r.outbound_on_match
if dlp:
d["dlp"] = dlp
return d
def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""Parse YAML text → routes."""
try:
payload = parse_yaml_subset(text)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ValueError(f"routes payload: invalid YAML: {e}") from e
return parse_routes(payload)
def parse_config(payload: object) -> "Config":
"""Parse a full egress config payload (top-level log level + routes)."""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
@@ -711,103 +690,43 @@ def scan_outbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
environ: typing.Mapping[str, str],
*,
safe_tokens: typing.AbstractSet[str] | None = None,
crlf_text: str | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
# Lazy import to avoid circular deps and keep dlp_detectors optional
# at import time (the sidecar copies it flat alongside this file).
try:
from dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
scan_crlf_injection,
scan_entropy,
scan_known_secrets,
scan_token_patterns,
)
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
scan_crlf_injection,
scan_entropy,
scan_known_secrets,
scan_token_patterns,
)
# Binary bodies: latin-1 is a bijective byte↔codepoint mapping that
# preserves every byte value, so ASCII-range secret strings remain
# findable by str.find / regex. Prefer strict UTF-8 for valid text bodies.
if isinstance(body, bytes):
try:
text = body.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
text = body.decode("latin-1")
else:
text = body
text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
# CRLF injection is only an attack in the request line + headers, never the
# body: an HTTP body is delimited by Content-Length, so CRLF bytes there
# cannot split the request. Scanning the body produces false positives on
# legitimate form-encoded / multi-line content. Callers pass the
# body-excluded surfaces as `crlf_text`; `None` falls back to the full text
# for backward-compatible callers (host-side tests, websocket frames).
crlf_target = text if crlf_text is None else crlf_text
result = scan_crlf_injection(crlf_target)
# CRLF injection is never legitimate — runs unconditionally, not gated
# by outbound_detectors config.
result = scan_crlf_injection(text)
if result is not None:
return result
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "token_patterns"):
result = scan_token_patterns(text, location="body", safe_tokens=safe_tokens)
result = scan_token_patterns(text, location="body")
if result is not None:
return result
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "known_secrets"):
# BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES lets operators add extra env prefixes
# beyond EGRESS_TOKEN_* without changing the manifest schema.
extra_raw = environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES", "")
extra = tuple(p for p in extra_raw.split(",") if p)
sensitive_prefixes = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",) + extra
result = scan_known_secrets(
text, location="body", env=environ,
sensitive_prefixes=sensitive_prefixes, safe_tokens=safe_tokens,
)
if result is not None:
return result
# Entropy scanning requires explicit opt-in: it is NOT part of the
# default "all detectors" set because it produces false positives on
# legitimate base64 / binary payloads. Routes must list "entropy" in
# dlp.outbound_detectors to enable it.
if (
route.outbound_detectors is not None
and "entropy" in route.outbound_detectors
):
result = scan_entropy(text, location="body")
result = scan_known_secrets(text, location="body", env=environ)
if result is not None:
return result
return None
def build_token_allow_payload(
host: str,
method: str,
path: str,
result: ScanResult,
) -> str:
"""Render the human-readable supervisor proposal body for an outbound
token block (PRD 0062). Carries the host/method/path, the detector
reason, and the redacted context snippet never the raw token value."""
lines = [
"egress blocked an outbound request carrying a detected token",
f"host: {host}",
f"method: {method}",
f"path: {path}",
f"detector: {result.reason}",
]
if result.context:
lines.append(f"context: {result.context}")
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
def scan_inbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
@@ -832,11 +751,6 @@ __all__ = [
"route_to_yaml_dict",
"LOG_FULL",
"LOG_OFF",
"ON_MATCH_BLOCK",
"ON_MATCH_REDACT",
"ON_MATCH_SUPERVISE",
"OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES",
"DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH",
"Config",
"Decision",
"HeaderMatch",
@@ -846,13 +760,13 @@ __all__ = [
"ScanResult",
"build_inbound_scan_text",
"build_outbound_scan_text",
"build_token_allow_payload",
"decide",
"decide_git_fetch",
"evaluate_matches",
"is_git_push_request",
"is_git_fetch_request",
"load_config",
"load_routes",
"match_route",
"outbound_scan_headers",
"parse_config",
+6 -17
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@ from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitEntry
# Short network alias for git-gate inside the sidecar bundle. The
# agent's `.gitconfig` insteadOf rewrites resolve through this name.
GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"
# Shared timeout (seconds) for all git-gate subprocess and CGI calls:
# git daemon (--timeout/--init-timeout), the access-hook subprocess in
# git_http_backend, and the git http-backend CGI subprocess.
GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15
# Bound half-open git client sessions. If an agent/tool runner is
# interrupted during push, git daemon should reap the receive-pack
# child instead of keeping the gate wedged indefinitely.
GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -112,15 +112,6 @@ def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: ManifestBottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstre
)
def _gitconfig_validate_value(field: str, value: str) -> None:
"""Raise ValueError if value contains characters that break gitconfig line syntax."""
if "\n" in value or "\r" in value:
raise ValueError(
f"git-gate: {field} contains a newline, which would inject "
f"arbitrary gitconfig keys; rejecting manifest entry"
)
def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
entries: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
) -> str:
@@ -145,7 +136,6 @@ def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
"# fetch-from-upstream-before-every-upload-pack via access-hook).\n",
]
for entry in entries:
_gitconfig_validate_value(f"repos[{entry.Name!r}].url", entry.Upstream)
out.append(f'[url "{scheme}://{gate_host}/{entry.Name}.git"]\n')
out.append(f"\tinsteadOf = {entry.Upstream}\n")
if entry.RemoteKey and entry.RemoteKey != entry.UpstreamHost:
@@ -158,7 +148,6 @@ def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
f"ssh://{entry.UpstreamUser}@{entry.RemoteKey}{port}/"
f"{entry.UpstreamPath}"
)
_gitconfig_validate_value(f"repos[{entry.Name!r}].url (resolved alias)", alias)
out.append(f"\tinsteadOf = {alias}\n")
return "".join(out)
@@ -228,8 +217,8 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
"",
"exec git daemon \\",
" --reuseaddr \\",
f" --timeout={GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
f" --init-timeout={GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
f" --timeout={GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
f" --init-timeout={GIT_GATE_DAEMON_TIMEOUT_SECS} \\",
" --base-path=/git \\",
" --export-all \\",
" --enable=receive-pack \\",
+1 -11
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
from .git_gate import GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS
DEFAULT_PORT = 9420
@@ -49,7 +47,6 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
if hook.returncode != 0:
detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
@@ -113,7 +110,6 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
env=env,
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
self._write_cgi_response(proc.stdout)
@@ -152,13 +148,7 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
key, _, value = line.decode("latin1").partition(":")
value = value.strip()
if key.lower() == "status":
try:
status = int(value.split()[0])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
self.log_message(
"malformed CGI Status header %r; using 500", value,
)
status = 500
status = int(value.split()[0])
else:
headers.append((key, value))
self.send_response(status)
+10 -96
View File
@@ -1,107 +1,21 @@
"""Tiny logging wrappers. All output goes to stderr.
Two capabilities layer onto the bare wrappers (issue #252):
- **Levels.** `debug` / `info` / `warn` / `error` carry an ordered
severity. Output is gated by `BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL` (debug | info |
warn | error; default `info`). A message emits when its severity is
at or above the threshold, so `debug` is silent by default and
`error` always surfaces (nothing sits above it) which keeps the
fatal `die` path visible regardless of the configured level.
- **Context.** Every wrapper takes an optional `context` mapping that
renders as a parseable ` [k=v ...]` suffix (keys sorted; values with
whitespace/quotes are quoted), so failures can be filtered and
correlated instead of being flat strings.
With no `context` and the default level, output is byte-identical to the
original `bot-bottle: <msg>` / `bot-bottle: warning: <msg>` /
`bot-bottle: error: <msg>` lines the 100+ existing call sites are
unaffected.
"""
"""Tiny logging wrappers. All output goes to stderr."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from typing import Mapping, NoReturn
# Ordered severities. Gaps left between values so intermediate levels
# can be added later without renumbering.
DEBUG = 10
INFO = 20
WARN = 30
ERROR = 40
_LEVEL_NAMES: dict[str, int] = {
"debug": DEBUG,
"info": INFO,
"warn": WARN,
"warning": WARN,
"error": ERROR,
}
# Default threshold when BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL is unset or unrecognised.
_DEFAULT_THRESHOLD = INFO
_LOG_LEVEL_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL"
from typing import NoReturn
def _threshold() -> int:
"""Resolve the active level threshold from the environment.
Read per-call (not cached) so the level can be changed at runtime
and so tests can patch `os.environ` without a reload. Unknown values
fall back to the default rather than raising logging must never be
the thing that crashes the process."""
raw = os.environ.get(_LOG_LEVEL_ENV, "")
return _LEVEL_NAMES.get(raw.strip().lower(), _DEFAULT_THRESHOLD)
def info(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"bot-bottle: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
def _format_context(context: Mapping[str, object] | None) -> str:
"""Render a context mapping as a ` [k=v k2=v2]` suffix.
Keys are sorted for stable, diffable output. Values that are empty or
contain whitespace or a quote are wrapped in double quotes (with inner
quotes escaped) so each `k=v` pair stays parseable. Empty/None context
renders as the empty string."""
if not context:
return ""
parts: list[str] = []
for key in sorted(context):
value = str(context[key])
if value == "" or any(ch.isspace() for ch in value) or '"' in value:
value = '"' + value.replace('"', '\\"') + '"'
parts.append(f"{key}={value}")
return " [" + " ".join(parts) + "]"
def warn(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"bot-bottle: warning: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
def _emit(
level: int,
label: str,
msg: str,
context: Mapping[str, object] | None,
) -> None:
if level < _threshold():
return
prefix = f"{label}: " if label else ""
sys.stderr.write(f"bot-bottle: {prefix}{msg}{_format_context(context)}\n")
def debug(msg: str, *, context: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> None:
_emit(DEBUG, "debug", msg, context)
def info(msg: str, *, context: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> None:
_emit(INFO, "", msg, context)
def warn(msg: str, *, context: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> None:
_emit(WARN, "warning", msg, context)
def error(msg: str, *, context: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> None:
_emit(ERROR, "error", msg, context)
def error(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"bot-bottle: error: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
class Die(SystemExit):
@@ -117,6 +31,6 @@ class Die(SystemExit):
self.message = message
def die(msg: str, *, context: Mapping[str, object] | None = None) -> NoReturn:
error(msg, context=context)
def die(msg: str) -> NoReturn:
error(msg)
raise Die(1, msg)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ class ManifestBottle:
egress: ManifestEgressConfig = field(default_factory=ManifestEgressConfig)
# Per-bottle stuck-recovery sidecar (PRD 0013). When true (the
# default, issue #249), the launch step brings up a supervise
# sidecar that exposes egress MCP tools to the agent. Set
# `supervise: false` to skip the sidecar.
# sidecar that exposes MCP tools to the agent (egress-block,
# capability-block) plus mounts the current-config dir read-only
# into the agent at /etc/bot-bottle/current-config. Set
# `supervise: false` to skip the sidecar and mount.
supervise: bool = True
@classmethod
+6 -28
View File
@@ -199,10 +199,13 @@ def _parse_provider_settings(
) -> dict[str, object]:
if raw is None:
return {}
if template != "pi":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.settings is only "
"supported for template 'pi'"
)
settings = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.settings")
common_allowed = {"startup_args"}
pi_allowed = {
allowed = {
"provider",
"base_url",
"api",
@@ -215,37 +218,12 @@ def _parse_provider_settings(
"supports_developer_role",
"supports_reasoning_effort",
}
if template == "pi":
allowed = common_allowed | pi_allowed
elif template in ("claude", "codex"):
allowed = common_allowed
elif template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
return dict(settings)
else:
allowed = common_allowed
for key in settings:
if key not in allowed:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.settings has unknown "
f"key {key!r}; allowed: {', '.join(sorted(allowed))}"
)
startup_args = settings.get("startup_args")
if startup_args is not None:
if not isinstance(startup_args, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.settings.startup_args "
f"must be an array of strings"
)
for i, arg in enumerate(startup_args):
if not isinstance(arg, str) or not arg:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.settings."
f"startup_args[{i}] must be a non-empty string"
)
if template != "pi":
return dict(settings)
for key in ("provider", "base_url", "api", "api_key", "api_key_env"):
value = settings.get(key)
if value is not None and (not isinstance(value, str) or not value):
+5 -22
View File
@@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
# What the proxy does on an outbound token match (PRD 0062).
OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES = ("block", "redact", "supervise")
def validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
@@ -70,7 +67,6 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
GitFetch: bool = False
OutboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
InboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
OutboundOnMatch: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "ManifestEgressRoute":
@@ -165,9 +161,8 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
# --- dlp ---
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
outbound_on_match = ""
if "dlp" in d:
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors, outbound_on_match = _parse_dlp_block(
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_dlp_block(
label, d.get("dlp"),
)
@@ -206,7 +201,6 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
GitFetch=git_fetch,
OutboundDetectors=outbound_detectors,
InboundDetectors=inbound_detectors,
OutboundOnMatch=outbound_on_match,
)
@@ -329,7 +323,7 @@ def _parse_header_match(
def _parse_dlp_block(
route_label: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None, str]:
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
label = f"{route_label} dlp"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
@@ -364,24 +358,13 @@ def _parse_dlp_block(
outbound = _parse_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
on_match = ""
on_match_raw = d.get("outbound_on_match")
if on_match_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(on_match_raw, str) or on_match_raw not in OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} outbound_on_match must be one of "
f"{', '.join(OUTBOUND_ON_MATCH_VALUES)} (got {on_match_raw!r})"
)
on_match = on_match_raw
for k in d:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors", "outbound_on_match"):
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors', "
f"'outbound_on_match'"
f"'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound, on_match
return outbound, inbound
LOG_LEVELS = frozenset({0, 1, 2})
+18 -110
View File
@@ -49,125 +49,33 @@ def _resolve_one_bottle(
repos_cache[name] = _resolve_repos_raw({}, child_raw)
return bottle
# Normalize to list, accepting both str and list[str].
raw_list: list[object]
if isinstance(parent_name_raw, str):
raw_list = [parent_name_raw]
elif isinstance(parent_name_raw, list):
raw_list = parent_name_raw
else:
if not isinstance(parent_name_raw, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends must be a string or list of strings "
f"bottle '{name}' extends must be a string "
f"(was {type(parent_name_raw).__name__})"
)
# Validate each entry before resolving any of them.
parent_names: list[str] = []
for i, pname in enumerate(raw_list):
if not isinstance(pname, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends[{i}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(pname).__name__})"
)
parent_names.append(pname)
if pname == name:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends itself; remove the self-reference"
)
if pname not in raws:
avail = ", ".join(sorted(raws.keys())) or "(none)"
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends '{pname}' which is not "
f"defined. Available bottles: {avail}"
)
combined_parent, combined_repos_raw = _fold_parents(
parent_names, raws, cache, repos_cache, seen + (name,)
parent_name: str = parent_name_raw
if parent_name == name:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends itself; remove the "
f"self-reference"
)
if parent_name not in raws:
avail = ", ".join(sorted(raws.keys())) or "(none)"
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' extends '{parent_name}' which is not "
f"defined. Available bottles: {avail}"
)
parent = _resolve_one_bottle(
parent_name, raws, cache, repos_cache, seen + (name,)
)
merged_repos_raw = _resolve_repos_raw(combined_repos_raw, child_raw)
bottle = _merge_bottles(combined_parent, child_raw, merged_repos_raw, name)
merged_repos_raw = _resolve_repos_raw(repos_cache[parent_name], child_raw)
bottle = _merge_bottles(parent, child_raw, merged_repos_raw, name)
cache[name] = bottle
repos_cache[name] = merged_repos_raw
return bottle
def _fold_parents(
parent_names: list[str],
raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]],
cache: dict[str, ManifestBottle],
repos_cache: dict[str, dict[str, object]],
seen: tuple[str, ...],
) -> tuple[ManifestBottle, dict[str, object]]:
"""Resolve each parent and fold them left-to-right.
Later parents win over earlier ones on conflict. The `seen` tuple
carries the current bottle's name so cycle detection works across
every parent edge in the multi-parent graph."""
first = parent_names[0]
effective = _resolve_one_bottle(first, raws, cache, repos_cache, seen)
effective_repos_raw = repos_cache[first]
for pname in parent_names[1:]:
later = _resolve_one_bottle(pname, raws, cache, repos_cache, seen)
later_repos_raw = repos_cache[pname]
effective, effective_repos_raw = _fold_two_bottles(
effective, effective_repos_raw, later, later_repos_raw
)
return effective, effective_repos_raw
def _fold_two_bottles(
earlier: ManifestBottle,
earlier_repos_raw: dict[str, object],
later: ManifestBottle,
later_repos_raw: dict[str, object],
) -> tuple[ManifestBottle, dict[str, object]]:
"""Combine two resolved parent bottles; later wins over earlier."""
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitUser
from .manifest_egress import ManifestEgressConfig
from .manifest_git import parse_git_gate_config
from .manifest_util import as_json_object
merged_env = {**earlier.env, **later.env}
merged_git_user = ManifestGitUser(
name=later.git_user.name or earlier.git_user.name,
email=later.git_user.email or earlier.git_user.email,
)
# Repos: union by name; for same-name entries, later wins per-field.
# Unlike _resolve_repos_raw, an empty later_repos_raw means "no repos
# declared" — it does NOT clear the earlier parent's repos.
names = list(earlier_repos_raw) + [
n for n in later_repos_raw if n not in earlier_repos_raw
]
merged_repos_raw: dict[str, object] = {
n: {
**as_json_object(earlier_repos_raw.get(n, {}), "earlier parent repo"),
**as_json_object(later_repos_raw.get(n, {}), "later parent repo"),
}
for n in names
}
if merged_repos_raw:
merged_git, _ = parse_git_gate_config("_fold", {"repos": merged_repos_raw})
else:
merged_git = ()
# Egress: routes concatenate; scalar fields use last-wins.
merged_egress = ManifestEgressConfig(
routes=earlier.egress.routes + later.egress.routes,
Log=later.egress.Log,
)
return ManifestBottle(
env=merged_env,
agent_provider=later.agent_provider,
git=merged_git,
git_user=merged_git_user,
egress=merged_egress,
supervise=later.supervise,
), merged_repos_raw
def _merge_bottles(
parent: ManifestBottle,
child_raw: dict[str, object],
-2
View File
@@ -87,7 +87,5 @@ def load_bottle_chain_from_dir(
parent = fm.get("extends")
if isinstance(parent, str):
to_load.append(parent)
elif isinstance(parent, list):
to_load.extend(p for p in parent if isinstance(p, str))
return resolve_bottles(raws)[bottle_name]
+45 -20
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
The supervise plane is the per-bottle MCP sidecar plus its host-side
queue/audit support. The sidecar (bot_bottle.supervise_server)
sits on the bottle's internal network and exposes MCP tools the agent
calls when it needs an operator-reviewed egress change:
sits on the bottle's internal network and exposes three MCP tools the
agent calls when it hits a stuck-recovery category:
* egress-block / allow agent proposes a new routes.yaml
* capability-block agent proposes a new agent Dockerfile
Each tool call: the agent passes the full proposed file plus a
justification text. The sidecar validates the proposal syntactically,
@@ -47,18 +48,16 @@ from pathlib import Path
SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME = "supervise"
SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK = "capability-block"
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK = "egress-block"
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW = "egress-allow"
TOOL_ALLOW = "allow"
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW = "gitleaks-allow"
# Written directly by the egress addon (not an agent-facing MCP tool) when an
# outbound DLP token block is routed to the operator for override (PRD 0062).
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW = "egress-token-allow"
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES = "list-egress-routes"
TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_ALLOW,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
)
@@ -72,8 +71,12 @@ TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
EGRESS_FORWARD_PROXY = "http://127.0.0.1:9099"
EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL = "http://_egress.local/allowlist"
# capability-block has no on-disk config the operator edits in place
# (the Dockerfile is rebuilt, not patched), so it has no audit log
# here — those changes are captured by git history + the rebuild record
# laid down in PRD 0016.
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL: dict[str, str] = {
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW: "egress",
TOOL_ALLOW: "egress",
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "egress",
}
@@ -87,6 +90,8 @@ STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = (STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED, STATUS_REJECTED)
ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT = "operator-edit"
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = "/run/supervise/queue"
CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT = "/etc/bot-bottle/current-config"
DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC = 0.5
@@ -429,39 +434,59 @@ def sha256_hex(content: str) -> str:
# --- Sidecar plan + abstract lifecycle -------------------------------------
# Filename of the staged Dockerfile inside the agent's read-only
# current-config mount. The capability-block tool's description
# points the agent at this exact path so it can read the current
# Dockerfile and propose modifications.
#
# routes.yaml + allowlist used to live here too; PRD 0017 chunk 3
# moved them behind the `list-egress-routes` MCP tool (live state
# from egress's introspection endpoint) so the agent always sees
# current data rather than a launch-time snapshot.
CURRENT_CONFIG_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SupervisePlan:
"""Output of Supervise.prepare; consumed by .start.
`queue_dir` is the host directory bind-mounted into the sidecar
at /run/supervise/queue. `internal_network` is empty at prepare
time; the backend's launch step fills it via dataclasses.replace
before calling .start."""
at /run/supervise/queue. `current_config_dir` is the host
directory bind-mounted (read-only) into the *agent* container
at /etc/bot-bottle/current-config currently holds only the
Dockerfile snapshot (routes.yaml + allowlist moved to the
`list-egress-routes` MCP tool). `internal_network` is
empty at prepare time; the backend's launch step fills it via
dataclasses.replace before calling .start."""
slug: str
queue_dir: Path
current_config_dir: Path
internal_network: str = ""
class Supervise(ABC):
"""Per-bottle supervise sidecar. Encapsulates the host-side
prepare (queue dir staging); the sidecar's start/stop lifecycle
is backend-specific."""
prepare (queue dir + current-config staging); the sidecar's
start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific."""
def prepare(
self,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
) -> SupervisePlan:
"""Stage the per-bottle queue dir on the host. Returns the
plan; `internal_network` must be set by the launch step before
"""Stage the per-bottle queue dir on the host and the
current-config dir under `stage_dir`. Returns the plan;
`internal_network` must be set by the launch step before
.start runs."""
del stage_dir
queue_dir = queue_dir_for_slug(slug)
queue_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
current_config_dir = stage_dir / "current-config"
current_config_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return SupervisePlan(
slug=slug,
queue_dir=queue_dir,
current_config_dir=current_config_dir,
)
# --- Helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -512,6 +537,8 @@ __all__ = [
"ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT",
"AuditEntry",
"COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL",
"CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT",
"CURRENT_CONFIG_DOCKERFILE",
"DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_SEC",
"Proposal",
"QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER",
@@ -527,10 +554,8 @@ __all__ = [
"TOOLS",
"EGRESS_FORWARD_PROXY",
"EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL",
"TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW",
"TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",
"TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK",
"TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW",
"TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW",
"TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES",
"archive_proposal",
"audit_dir",
+66 -64
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
"""Supervise sidecar HTTP server (PRD 0013).
Per-bottle MCP server exposing tools the agent calls to propose egress
config changes when stuck. The tools are `egress-allow`,
`egress-block`, and `list-egress-routes`.
Per-bottle MCP server exposing tools the agent calls to propose config
changes when stuck. The tools are `allow`, `egress-block`,
`capability-block`, and `list-egress-routes`.
Each queued tool call:
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ from pathlib import Path
try:
# Same-directory imports inside the bundle container; these files are
# COPYed flat under /app by Dockerfile.sidecars.
from egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
from egress_addon_core import load_routes
import supervise as _sv
except ModuleNotFoundError:
# Package imports for host-side tests and tooling.
from .egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
from .egress_addon_core import load_routes
from . import supervise as _sv
@@ -90,19 +90,19 @@ def parse_jsonrpc(body: bytes) -> JsonRpcRequest:
try:
raw = json.loads(body)
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_PARSE, f"parse error: {e}") from e
raise _RpcError(ERR_PARSE, f"parse error: {e}") from e
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "request must be a JSON object")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "request must be a JSON object")
if raw.get("jsonrpc") != JSONRPC_VERSION:
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "jsonrpc field must be '2.0'")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "jsonrpc field must be '2.0'")
method = raw.get("method")
if not isinstance(method, str):
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "method must be a string")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_REQUEST, "method must be a string")
params = raw.get("params", {})
if params is None:
params = {}
if not isinstance(params, dict):
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "params must be an object")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "params must be an object")
rpc_id = raw.get("id", _NO_ID)
is_notification = rpc_id is _NO_ID
return JsonRpcRequest(
@@ -117,23 +117,12 @@ _NO_ID = object()
class _RpcError(Exception):
"""Base class for all typed RPC errors that surface as JSON-RPC error responses."""
def __init__(self, code: int, message: str):
super().__init__(message)
self.code = code
self.message = message
class _RpcClientError(_RpcError):
"""Caller sent a bad request; returned verbatim, no server-side logging."""
class _RpcInternalError(_RpcError):
"""Server-side fault; logged at ERROR with cause, always returns ERR_INTERNAL."""
def __init__(self, message: str) -> None:
super().__init__(ERR_INTERNAL, message)
def jsonrpc_result(request_id: object, result: object) -> bytes:
payload = {"jsonrpc": JSONRPC_VERSION, "id": request_id, "result": result}
return (json.dumps(payload) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
@@ -159,7 +148,7 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"allowlist. Returns JSON with one entry per allowed host, "
"each carrying its matches rules (if any) and whether "
"the proxy injects Authorization for the route. Use this "
"before composing an `egress-allow` or `egress-block` proposal so "
"before composing an `allow` or `egress-block` proposal so "
"the new routes file extends the live one rather than "
"replacing it."
),
@@ -170,7 +159,7 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"name": _sv.TOOL_ALLOW,
"description": (
"Request operator approval to change the bottle's egress "
"allowlist. Pass the full proposed routes.yaml content, not "
@@ -198,7 +187,6 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
" dlp: (optional DLP scanner overrides)\n"
" outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]\n"
" inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection]\n"
" outbound_on_match: block|redact|supervise (default supervise)\n"
"Omit any key that should use its default. "
"`list-egress-routes` returns routes in this same format."
),
@@ -240,7 +228,6 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
" dlp: (optional DLP scanner overrides)\n"
" outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]\n"
" inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection]\n"
" outbound_on_match: block|redact|supervise (default supervise)\n"
"Omit any key that should use its default. "
"`list-egress-routes` returns routes in this same format."
),
@@ -253,13 +240,42 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"required": ["routes_yaml", "justification"],
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when the bottle is missing a tool, skill, permission, "
"or env var you need — something that lives in the agent "
"Dockerfile rather than in the egress routes. "
"Read the current Dockerfile from "
"/etc/bot-bottle/current-config/Dockerfile, compose a "
"modified version, and pass the full new file plus a "
"justification. On approval the supervisor rebuilds the "
"bottle from the new Dockerfile and starts a replacement on "
"the same branch (wired in PRD 0016; v1 acknowledges only)."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"dockerfile": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Full proposed Dockerfile content.",
},
"justification": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Why this capability is needed.",
},
},
"required": ["dockerfile", "justification"],
},
},
]
# Map each proposal tool to the input field that carries the agent's
# payload (stored in Proposal.proposed_file).
PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD: dict[str, str] = {
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW: "routes_yaml",
_sv.TOOL_ALLOW: "routes_yaml",
_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK: "dockerfile",
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "routes_yaml",
}
@@ -272,22 +288,21 @@ def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
catches obvious paste-errors / wrong-tool selections before they
enter the queue."""
if not content.strip():
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"{tool}: proposed file is empty")
if tool in (_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"{tool}: proposed file is empty")
if tool == _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
# Dockerfiles are too varied to validate syntactically beyond
# non-empty. The operator reads the diff in the TUI.
pass
elif tool in (_sv.TOOL_ALLOW, _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
try:
config = load_config(content)
load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
raise _RpcClientError(
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}",
) from e
if config.log != LOG_OFF:
raise _RpcClientError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: proposed routes.yaml must not change egress logging",
)
else:
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {tool!r}")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {tool!r}")
# --- MCP handlers ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -360,17 +375,17 @@ def handle_tools_call(
doesn't need operator approval."""
name = params.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
if name == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
return handle_list_egress_routes(typing.cast(dict[str, object], params.get("arguments", {})), config)
args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call 'arguments' must be an object")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call 'arguments' must be an object")
justification = args_raw.get("justification")
if not isinstance(justification, str) or not justification.strip():
raise _RpcClientError(
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{name}: 'justification' is required and must be a non-empty string",
)
@@ -379,13 +394,13 @@ def handle_tools_call(
file_field = PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD[name]
proposed_file = args_raw.get(file_field)
if not isinstance(proposed_file, str):
raise _RpcClientError(
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{name}: '{file_field}' is required and must be a string",
)
validate_proposed_file(name, proposed_file)
else:
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {name!r}")
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {name!r}")
proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
bottle_slug=config.bottle_slug,
@@ -394,10 +409,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
justification=justification,
current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(proposed_file),
)
try:
_sv.write_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal)
except OSError as e:
raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to write proposal to queue: {e}") from e
_sv.write_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal)
sys.stderr.write(
f"supervise: queued proposal {proposal.id} ({name}) "
f"for bottle {config.bottle_slug}; waiting for operator...\n"
@@ -417,10 +429,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
"isError": False,
}
try:
_sv.archive_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
except OSError as e:
raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to archive proposal: {e}") from e
_sv.archive_proposal(config.queue_dir, proposal.id)
text = format_response_text(response)
return {
@@ -454,8 +463,9 @@ def format_pending_response_text(timeout_seconds: float) -> str:
# --- HTTP transport --------------------------------------------------------
# Max request body the server accepts. 1 MB is well above any realistic
# routes.yaml proposal.
# Max request body the server accepts. Generous because Dockerfile
# proposals can be a few KB; routes.json is small. 1 MB is well above
# any realistic config file.
MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024
@@ -495,7 +505,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
try:
req = parse_jsonrpc(body)
except _RpcClientError as e:
except _RpcError as e:
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(None, e.code, e.message))
return
@@ -503,19 +513,11 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
try:
result = self._dispatch(req, config)
except _RpcClientError as e:
except _RpcError as e:
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, e.code, e.message))
return
except _RpcInternalError as e:
cause = e.__cause__
detail = f": {cause}" if cause else ""
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: internal error: {e.message}{detail}\n")
sys.stderr.flush()
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, ERR_INTERNAL, "internal error"))
return
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — unexpected errors
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: unexpected error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\n")
sys.stderr.flush()
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch-all for RPC dispatch errors
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: internal error: {e}\n")
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, ERR_INTERNAL, "internal error"))
return
@@ -534,7 +536,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
return handle_tools_list(req.params)
if method == "tools/call":
return handle_tools_call(req.params, config)
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, f"method not found: {method}")
raise _RpcError(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, f"method not found: {method}")
def _write_jsonrpc(self, body: bytes) -> None:
self.send_response(200)
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0062: Supervisor override for egress token blocks
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-24
- **Issue:** #261
## Summary
Give each egress route a policy for what happens when an outbound DLP detector
matches a token, via `dlp.outbound_on_match: block | redact | supervise`
(default `supervise`):
- **`supervise`** (default) — route the block through the existing supervisor
approval queue instead of returning `403` immediately. The proxy holds the
request open until the operator approves or rejects it. On approval the
matched token is added to an in-memory "safe tokens" set so the request — and
any later request carrying the same token — flows through without
re-prompting.
- **`redact`** — scrub the matched value(s) from the request and forward it,
no operator in the loop. For routes where a token-shaped value is noise the
upstream doesn't need (telemetry/log sinks). Fails closed if a match lands on
a surface redaction can't rewrite (the hostname).
- **`block`** — the original hard `403`; never overridable. For routes where a
detected token must always stop.
The motivating goal is reducing friction from false positives without weakening
the default-deny posture: supervise keeps a human in the loop, redact is an
explicit per-route opt-in, and block stays available for sensitive routes.
## Problem
The outbound DLP detectors (`token_patterns`, `known_secrets`) are
deliberately aggressive: any string that looks like a credential is blocked
before it leaves the bottle. That is the right default, but it produces false
positives — a token-shaped value that is not actually a secret, or a credential
the agent legitimately needs to send to a declared host. Today the only
recovery is for the operator to notice the `egress DLP` 403 in the logs and
hand-edit the route's `dlp.outbound_detectors`, which disables the detector for
the whole route rather than allowing the one value.
The operator has no in-the-loop signal that a token block happened and no
fine-grained way to say "this specific value is fine."
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. An outbound DLP **token** block (a `ScanResult` carrying a matched secret
value) creates a supervisor proposal instead of an immediate `403`.
2. The egress proxy holds the blocked request open, polling for the operator's
response up to a bounded timeout.
3. The proposal shows the operator the host, method, path, the detector reason,
and a **redacted** context snippet — never the raw token value.
4. On `approved`/`modified`, the matched token value is added to an in-memory
safe-tokens set and the request proceeds normally; later requests carrying
the same value skip the block.
5. On `rejected`, timeout, malformed response, or missing supervisor wiring,
the request fails closed with the same `403` as today.
6. Structural blocks that carry no token value (CRLF injection) and the
route-not-allowlisted / git blocks are unchanged — they stay hard `403`s and
keep their existing agent-driven `allow` / `egress-block` MCP path.
7. The proxy event loop is not stalled while waiting: the wait is asynchronous,
so other flows keep being served.
## Non-goals
- Persisting the safe-tokens set across egress restarts. It lives in process
memory only; a restart re-prompts. (The issue explicitly defers persistence.)
- Supervising inbound (prompt-injection) blocks or WebSocket frame blocks.
WebSocket frames still honour the safe-tokens set for already-approved values
but cannot wait for approval (there is no response surface after upgrade).
- Generalising an approved secret across encodings. The safe-tokens set matches
the exact value the detector found.
- Replacing the per-route `dlp.outbound_detectors` override. That remains the
way to turn a detector off wholesale.
- Making `redact` the default. Silent redaction of a true false positive
corrupts legitimate data, so it is opt-in per route; `supervise` (human in
the loop) stays the default.
## Scope
### In scope
The minimum cut that ships, in build order:
1. **Core**`ScanResult.matched`; thread `safe_tokens` through
`scan_outbound` / the token detectors; `build_token_allow_payload`.
2. **Supervise + TUI**`TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW`; TUI suffix, modify guard,
required approval reason.
3. **Addon glue** — async `request`, safe-tokens set, proposal write + async
poll, allow/block decision; pass `safe_tokens` into the WebSocket path.
4. **On-match policy**`dlp.outbound_on_match` through manifest → render →
addon; `redact` surface scrub with fail-closed re-scan; policy dispatch in
the addon's outbound handler.
5. **Tests + docs** — core/supervise/TUI/manifest/render unit tests; README
egress + supervisor notes.
### Out of scope
The deferrals enumerated under **Non-goals** — restart persistence, inbound /
WebSocket-frame supervision, cross-encoding generalisation, replacing
`dlp.outbound_detectors`, and making `redact` the default.
## Proposed Design
### New services / components
A new proposal tool constant `egress-token-allow` (`TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW`)
is added to `supervise.TOOLS`, and the egress addon gains an in-memory
safe-tokens set plus the policy-dispatch path that drives it.
On an outbound block the addon dispatches on the resolved policy:
- **Structural blocks always 403.** A `ScanResult` with no `matched` value
(CRLF injection) is a hard `403` regardless of policy — there is nothing to
redact or safelist.
- **`redact`** runs `redact_tokens` over the body, non-`host` header values,
and path/query, then re-scans. If the re-scan is clean the (rewritten)
request is forwarded; if a block-severity match remains (e.g. in the
hostname, or a unicode-evasion token redaction can't reach) it fails closed
with a `403`.
- **`block`** writes the `403` immediately.
- **`supervise`** runs the queue-and-wait loop, falling back to `block` when
supervise isn't wired for the bottle.
For `supervise`, the addon writes the proposal directly to
`SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR` (the queue is bind-mounted into the sidecar bundle and
shared by every daemon, exactly as git-gate's `gitleaks-allow` proposal in PRD
0061 does). The proposal's `proposed_file` is a human-readable text payload
built by `build_token_allow_payload`:
```
egress blocked an outbound request carrying a detected token
host: api.example.com
method: POST
path: /v1/ingest
detector: OpenAI API key found in body
context: ...before ******** after...
```
The justification tells the operator to approve only if the value is a false
positive or a credential the request legitimately needs. The addon then polls
`<proposal-id>.response.json` for `EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` (default
300). `approved`/`modified` allow the request and add the value to the
safe-tokens set; `rejected`, malformed responses, and timeout fail the request
closed. The proposal + response are archived to `processed/` after a decision.
Because the wait happens inside mitmproxy's asyncio loop, the addon's `request`
hook is async and polls with `asyncio.sleep`, so concurrent flows are
unaffected.
### Existing code touched
- **Policy threading.** `dlp.outbound_on_match` is a per-route enum threaded
from the bottle manifest (`manifest_egress`) through the resolved route
(`egress.EgressRoute`), the rendered `routes.yaml` (`egress_render_routes`),
and the addon's `Route` (`egress_addon_core`). Unset renders nothing and
resolves to `supervise` at request time. The `list-egress-routes`
introspection endpoint round-trips it so the agent's proposals preserve it.
- **Provider-route default.** Agent-provider routes (the agent talking to its
own LLM API — `api.anthropic.com`, the Codex backend, etc.) are the worst
source of token-shaped false positives because the whole conversation payload
flows through them. `egress_routes_for_bottle` fills `outbound_on_match=redact`
on any provider route that doesn't set it explicitly; a provider that sets the
policy keeps its choice, and manifest routes are unaffected (they default to
`supervise`).
- **Scanners.** `scan_outbound` (and the token detectors `scan_token_patterns`
/ `scan_known_secrets` it calls) accept a `safe_tokens` set. A match whose
value is in `safe_tokens` is skipped, so an approved token no longer blocks;
the scanners keep searching past a safelisted match so a second, un-approved
secret in the same request is still caught. The WebSocket path is passed the
same `safe_tokens` set.
- **Supervisor UI.** `cli/supervise.py` renders `egress-token-allow` like
`gitleaks-allow`: the text payload is shown, modify is unavailable (there is
no file patch to edit), and approval prompts for a non-empty reason recorded
in the response notes. There is no on-disk config diff, so — like
`gitleaks-allow` and `capability-block` — it writes no egress audit-log entry.
- **Failure handling.** If `SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR` / `SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG` are
unset (supervise disabled for the bottle), the addon skips the queue and
returns the existing `403`. Any error writing the proposal or reading the
response also fails closed.
### Data model changes
- New per-route manifest field `dlp.outbound_on_match: block | redact |
supervise`, rendered into `routes.yaml` (omitted when unset).
- `ScanResult` gains a `matched: str = ""` field carrying the raw substring the
detector matched. The token detectors populate it; the structural CRLF
detector leaves it empty. The value stays inside the egress sidecar process —
never written to a log line (logs use the redacted `context`) nor to the
proposal file.
- Proposal text payload (above) plus `<proposal-id>.response.json` in
`SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR`, archived to `processed/` after a decision.
- New env var `EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` (default 300).
### External dependencies
None. Reuses the existing supervisor queue (`SUPERVISE_QUEUE_DIR`) and the
mitmproxy addon framework already in the egress sidecar.
## Open questions
- Should `known_secrets` (provisioned `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` exfiltration) be
override-able at all, or only `token_patterns`? This PRD allows both —
approval is an explicit operator decision and the safe-tokens set matches the
exact found value — but a future revision could restrict `known_secrets` to
reject-only.
## References
- Issue #261
- PRD 0061 — `gitleaks-allow` supervisor proposal pattern this reuses.
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0063: Strengthen outbound exfiltration detection
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-25
- **Issue:** #259
## Summary
The current DLP system has two detection tiers: weak (vendor token regexes)
and strong (exact matching of provisioned `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values in multiple
encodings). This PRD adds four complementary hardening layers in ranked order
of impact:
1. **Canary tokens** — inject a per-session fake secret into the agent's
environment; any outbound appearance is a zero-false-positive exfil signal.
2. **Broadened known-value scanning** — extend the strong tier beyond
`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` via a `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` sidecar env var.
3. **Fragmentation-resistant matching** — catch separator injection and
long-substring leaks via alnum projection and sliding-window substring
search.
4. **Entropy scoring** — warn-only flag on high-entropy blobs as a
complementary signal for encrypted exfil.
## Problem
After PRD 0056 the outbound scan covers all HTTP request surfaces (host, path,
query, headers, body). But the content-based strong tier only matches
`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values and their encodings. Three gaps remain:
| Gap | How an agent exploits it |
|-----|--------------------------|
| No canary | There is no "can't be false-positive" signal |
| Narrow prefix filter | Sensitive values provisioned under other env prefixes (MCP keys, API keys injected via the agent provider) are invisible to `scan_known_secrets` |
| Fragmentation blindness | Inserting `-`, space, or `\n` between secret characters turns an exact-match into a miss |
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. Each launched bottle has a unique canary token in the agent's environment
under a randomized `WORD_WORD_SECRET` env var name. The egress sidecar gets
the same env var and registers that exact name through
`BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES`. Any outbound appearance of the canary
blocks the request as a known-secret match.
2. `scan_known_secrets` accepts a `sensitive_prefixes` parameter (default:
`("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)`). `scan_outbound` reads
`BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` from `environ` and merges those prefixes
in, so operators can mark additional env vars as scanned values without
changing the manifest schema.
3. For every secret that passes exact-match, a secondary alnum-projection pass
checks for the secret with all non-alphanumeric characters stripped. This
catches separator-injection evasion (`MY-SECRET` → body contains
`MY SECRET`).
4. A sliding-window partial-match pass checks for long-enough contiguous
substrings of the secret's alnum projection in the text's alnum projection.
Any match ≥ `PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN` (12 chars) blocks with reason
`"partial match"`.
5. A new `scan_entropy` detector flags outbound text windows with Shannon
entropy ≥ `ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD` (5.5 bits/char) at **warn** severity
only. It is registered under the new detector name `"entropy"` in
`OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES` and disabled by default (routes must opt in).
6. Binary request bodies are decoded via `latin-1` instead of
`utf-8 errors="replace"`, preserving every byte value and allowing
ASCII-range secrets to be found within binary payloads.
7. All new behaviour is unit-tested; existing tests pass unchanged.
## Non-goals
- Rolling per-host buffer for split-across-requests detection (state in the
stateless addon is complex; deferred).
- Additional vendor regexes.
- ML / embedding-based detection.
- Entropy-based hard blocks (warn only per the issue).
## Design
### Canary token flow
```
Egress.prepare()
canary = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
canary_env = <random WORD_WORD_SECRET>
EgressPlan(canary=canary, canary_env=canary_env, ...)
Docker compose render:
sidecar env: <canary_env>=<canary>
sidecar env: BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=<canary_env>
agent env: <canary_env>=<canary> ← visible to agent as a "secret"
macos-container launch: same literals added to sidecar + agent env entries
```
The sidecar uses `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` to make the random canary env
name part of the existing `scan_known_secrets` detector without adding a
manifest schema field.
### Broadened known-value scanning
`scan_known_secrets` gains a `sensitive_prefixes` parameter:
```python
def scan_known_secrets(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
) -> ScanResult | None:
```
`scan_outbound` reads `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` (comma-separated list
of additional prefixes) from `environ` and appends them:
```python
extra = tuple(
p for p in environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES", "").split(",") if p
)
sensitive_prefixes = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",) + extra
```
`redact_tokens` receives the same treatment for consistent redaction.
### Fragmentation-resistant matching
A new helper `_alnum_projection(text)` strips all non-alphanumeric characters.
`scan_known_secrets` runs two passes per secret:
1. **Exact pass** — existing encoded-variant loop (unchanged).
2. **Alnum-projection pass** — if the secret's alnum projection has ≥ 8 chars,
check if it appears in the text's alnum projection. Match → block with
`"fragmented match (separator injection)"` reason.
3. **Partial-substring pass** — if the secret's alnum projection has ≥
`PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN` chars (12), slide a window of that length across the
secret's projection and look for each window in the text's alnum projection.
First match → block with `"partial match"` reason.
All three passes run only for the `"known_secrets"` detector; the token-pattern
and entropy detectors are unchanged.
### Entropy scoring
New public function:
```python
def scan_entropy(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
window: int = ENTROPY_WINDOW, # 64
threshold: float = ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD, # 5.5
) -> ScanResult | None:
```
Slides a window of `window` characters across `text` in steps of `window // 2`.
If any window's Shannon entropy exceeds `threshold`, returns a **warn**-severity
`ScanResult`. Never blocks.
`OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES` gains `"entropy"`. Routes opt in via their `dlp`
block; entropy scanning is **off by default** to avoid false-positive noise on
legitimate binary payloads.
### Binary body handling
In `scan_outbound`, the bytes → str decoding changes from:
```python
body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
```
to:
```python
body.decode("utf-8") if body is str else body.decode("latin-1")
```
`latin-1` is a bijective byte↔codepoint mapping; every byte value is preserved
as its corresponding Latin-1 code point, so ASCII-range secret strings remain
intact and `str.find` / regex still locate them correctly. The fallback from
strict UTF-8 is tried first so valid UTF-8 bodies are decoded faithfully.
## Implementation
Delivered in three commits on the same branch:
1. **DLP detector changes**`_alnum_projection`, fragmentation passes,
`scan_entropy`, broadened `scan_known_secrets`, updated `scan_outbound` and
`redact_tokens`; all accompanying unit tests.
2. **Canary injection**`EgressPlan.canary`, `Egress.prepare()`,
Docker compose + macos-container backend injection.
3. **PRD flip**`Status: Draft → Active`.
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0064: LOG_FULL egress logging credential redaction
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-25
- **Issue:** #257
## Summary
The `LOG_FULL` egress logging path (`_log_request` and `_log_response` in `egress_addon.py`) writes request/response headers and bodies to stderr without redaction and includes the sidecar-injected upstream `Authorization` header verbatim. This PR applies `redact_tokens` to header values and bodies in both log functions and strips the injected `Authorization` header from request logs entirely.
## Problem
`LOG_FULL` (log level 2) is intended for debugging egress traffic. When active it calls `_log_request` and `_log_response`. Both functions have two related bugs:
1. **Injected `Authorization` header exposure.** `_log_request` is called *after* the sidecar injects upstream credentials (`flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization`). The full header dict — including the live credential — is serialized to stderr. Any log collector that ingests the egress container's stderr will receive the upstream bearer token in plaintext.
2. **Unredacted bodies and header values.** Neither `_log_request` nor `_log_response` passes body or header values through `redact_tokens`. By contrast, `_req_ctx` (used for block/warn events) already calls `redact_tokens` on path and host. Any provisioned secret or recognized token pattern that appears in a request body, response body, or non-Authorization header value will be logged verbatim under `LOG_FULL`.
These two bugs compose: an agent that enables `LOG_FULL` and simultaneously triggers a request that carries a known token gains a write path from credentials → egress logs.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- `_log_request` never logs the `authorization` header in any form.
- `_log_request` applies `redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ)` to every other header value before serializing.
- `_log_request` applies `redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)` to the request body before logging.
- `_log_response` applies `redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ)` to every response header value before logging.
- `_log_response` applies `redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)` to the response body before logging.
- Unit tests cover each of the five cases above.
## Non-goals
- Redacting host or path in the full-log path (already covered by `_req_ctx` for block/warn events; `_log_request` already calls `redact_tokens` on host and path).
- Suppressing `LOG_FULL` or adding a new log level.
- Changing the outbound DLP scan logic.
## Design
### `_log_request`
```python
def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
headers = {
k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()
if k.lower() != "authorization"
}
body = redact_tokens(flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_request",
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
"headers": headers,
"body": body,
})
+ "\n"
)
```
The `authorization` key is excluded because by the time `_log_request` is called the sidecar has already injected the upstream credential (`decision.inject_authorization`). Logging it would write a live bearer token to stderr on every allowed request. There is no safe subset to log — the value is always a live credential or empty.
### `_log_response`
```python
def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
headers = {
k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()
}
body = redact_tokens(flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_response",
"host": flow.request.pretty_host,
"status": flow.response.status_code,
"headers": headers,
"body": body,
})
+ "\n"
)
```
Response headers don't carry injected credentials, so no header name is suppressed — only the values are scrubbed by `redact_tokens`.
-166
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@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0065: Multi-parent `extends:` for bottles
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-06-25
- **Issue:** #268
- **Extends:** PRD 0025 (`0025-bottle-extends.md`)
## Summary
Allow a bottle's `extends:` field to accept either a single bottle name (existing
behavior) or a list of bottle names (new). Multiple parents are resolved
independently and folded left-to-right into a single effective parent before the
child is merged on top. This lets orthogonal concerns (base env, networking/egress,
agent provider) live in separate bottles and be composed without forcing them into a
linear chain.
## Problem
PRD 0025 shipped single-parent `extends:` and listed "No multi-parent inheritance"
as a non-goal. In practice, users want to compose multiple orthogonal bottles — a
base environment, a networking profile, and an agent-provider override — without
creating a three-level linear chain that couples unrelated parents to each other.
The linear chain workaround has two problems:
1. **Ordering constraint.** `networking extends base` works, but then
`agent extends networking` can't also pick up `base` without going through
`networking`, coupling two unrelated concerns.
2. **Quadratic duplication.** N orthogonal bottles require O(N²) chain variants
(one chain per permutation of applied concerns).
Multi-parent `extends:` removes both constraints: each orthogonal concern stays in
its own bottle, and the child bottle is the only place that names the combination.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- `extends:` accepts a list of strings in addition to a plain string.
- Backward compat: existing single-string `extends:` is unchanged.
- Parents are resolved left-to-right; later entries win on conflict.
- Child wins over all parents (unchanged from PRD 0025).
- Cycle detection covers multi-parent graphs, not just linear chains.
- Diamond inheritance: a shared ancestor is resolved once (via the existing cache).
- Invalid list entries (non-string, undefined bottle, self-reference) die at parse
with clear messages.
- `manifest_loader.py`'s `load_bottle_chain_from_dir` enqueues all parents from a
list `extends:` so the resolver sees every bottle in the graph.
## Non-goals
- No change to the agent-vs-bottle trust boundary (PRD 0025 "Alternatives
considered" option 2 stays rejected).
- No MRO / C3 linearization. Left-to-right fold is sufficient for the expected use
cases.
- No preflight display of per-field provenance across multiple parents (same open
question as PRD 0025; remains a follow-up).
## Design
### Schema
`extends:` now accepts either form:
```yaml
# single parent (unchanged)
extends: base
# multiple parents (new)
extends: [base, networking]
```
Both forms are normalized to a list internally. A list with one element behaves
identically to the string form.
### Merge rules for multi-parent fold
Parents are folded pairwise left-to-right before the child merge. For each step in
the fold, the "earlier" bottle is the running accumulator and the "later" bottle is
the next parent. Rules per field:
| Field | Fold rule |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| `env` | dict merge; later wins on key collision |
| `git-gate.user` | per-field overlay; later's non-empty fields win |
| `git-gate.repos` | union by name; for same-name entries, later wins per-field |
| `egress.routes` | concatenate (earlier first, later appended) |
| `egress.log` | later wins (last-wins) |
| `agent_provider` | later wins (last-wins) |
| `supervise` | later wins (last-wins) |
After the fold, the combined parent is merged against the child using the existing
PRD 0025 rules (child always wins). The child's `egress.routes` appends to the
combined parent's concatenated routes; `validate_egress_routes` runs once on the
final merged set and catches duplicate hosts.
### Algorithm
```
extends: [p1, p2, p3]
fold:
combined = resolve(p1)
combined = fold_two(combined, resolve(p2))
combined = fold_two(combined, resolve(p3))
merge:
result = _merge_bottles(combined, child_raw, name)
```
`fold_two(earlier, later)` applies the rules in the table above. Cycle detection
(the `seen` tuple) is passed to each parent resolution call unchanged — if any
parent's chain circles back to the current bottle, it is caught. The `cache` dict
ensures a shared ancestor is only resolved once across all parents.
### Error cases
| Condition | Error message shape |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `extends` is not a string or list | `extends must be a string or list of strings (was <type>)` |
| A list entry is not a string | `extends[<i>] must be a string (was <type>)` |
| A list entry names an undefined bottle | `extends '<name>' which is not defined. Available bottles: ...` |
| A list entry is the bottle itself | `extends itself; remove the self-reference` |
| Cycle through any parent edge | `is in an extends cycle: <chain>` |
## Implementation
### `bot_bottle/manifest_extends.py`
- `_resolve_one_bottle`: accept `str | list[str]` for `extends`; normalize to list;
validate each entry; for a single-entry list fall through to the existing
single-parent path; for multiple entries call `_fold_parents` then
`_merge_bottles`.
- `_fold_parents(parent_names, raws, cache, repos_cache, seen)`: resolve each
parent and fold pairwise left-to-right; return `(effective_bottle,
effective_repos_raw)`.
- `_fold_two_bottles(earlier, earlier_repos_raw, later, later_repos_raw)`: apply
the fold rules above; return `(folded_bottle, folded_repos_raw)`.
### `bot_bottle/manifest_loader.py`
- `load_bottle_chain_from_dir`: when `extends` is a list, enqueue all parent names
for loading (previously only `isinstance(parent, str)` was handled).
### `tests/unit/test_manifest_extends.py`
- `TestExtendsErrors.test_non_string_extends_dies`: update to use an integer
`extends` value (a list is now valid).
- New class `TestExtendsMultiParent` covering all cases listed in the issue.
## Testing strategy
Unit tests via `ManifestIndex.from_json_obj` (same resolver surface used by all
paths). No integration test changes needed — downstream code consumes the already-
merged bottle and is unchanged.
Test cases:
- Two-parent list: env union, egress routes concat, git repos union
- Last-parent-wins on scalar (supervise, agent_provider)
- Child wins over all parents on conflict
- Diamond: two parents share an ancestor; ancestor resolved once
- Single-element list: identical to string form
- Non-string extends value → ManifestError
- Non-string list entry → ManifestError
- Undefined bottle in list → ManifestError
- Self-reference in list → ManifestError
- Cycle through multi-parent edge → ManifestError
+75
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
# PRD prd-new: Install script
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-06-06
- **Issue:** #197
## Summary
Add a proper Python package distribution and a thin `install.sh` bootstrapper so users can install bot-bottle with a single command without cloning the repo.
## Problem
There is currently no install path for new users. The only way to run bot-bottle is to clone the repo and invoke `cli.py` directly. This blocks any HN-style public demo: readers want `curl | sh` or `pipx install`, not a manual clone-and-configure flow.
## Goals / Success Criteria
- `curl -fsSL <url>/install.sh | sh` (or equivalent) leaves a working `bot-bottle` command on PATH.
- Python-native users can install with `pipx install bot-bottle` or `uv tool install bot-bottle`.
- `install.sh` validates prerequisites (Python ≥ 3.11, Docker) and exits with a clear message if they are missing. It does not silently install Docker.
- `install.sh` runs `bot-bottle doctor` (or equivalent diagnostic) after install to confirm the environment is ready.
- The package has no runtime pip dependencies (stdlib-only, matching the existing constraint).
## Non-goals
- Bundling a Python runtime or producing a standalone binary.
- Automatic Docker installation.
- Plugin architecture changes (out of scope; see issue #197 for future direction).
- Publishing to PyPI in this PR — the package structure is the deliverable; publishing is a separate step.
## Design
### Package structure
Add a minimal `pyproject.toml` at the repo root:
```toml
[project]
name = "bot-bottle"
version = "0.1.0"
requires-python = ">=3.11"
dependencies = []
[project.scripts]
bot-bottle = "bot_bottle.cli:main"
```
The existing `bot_bottle/` package and `cli.py` entry point already contain the logic; this just wires up the standard entry point. `cli.py` may need a small refactor to expose a `main()` callable if it uses `if __name__ == "__main__"` only.
### `install.sh`
A thin bootstrapper that:
1. Checks `python3 --version` ≥ 3.11; exits with instructions if not met.
2. Checks `docker info` exits 0; exits with instructions if Docker is not running.
3. Installs via `pipx` if available, otherwise falls back to `pip install --user`.
4. Runs `bot-bottle doctor` to verify the install.
The script must be idempotent (safe to re-run) and must not require `sudo`.
### `bot-bottle doctor`
A new subcommand that checks and reports:
- Python version.
- Docker daemon reachability.
- Whether `~/.bot-bottle/` config directory exists.
Exits 0 if all checks pass, non-zero otherwise.
## Decisions
- `install.sh` is hosted from the repo's raw Gitea URL for now:
`https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/raw/branch/main/install.sh`.
- Should `version` in `pyproject.toml` be driven by a git tag at build time (e.g. via `hatch-vcs`) or kept as a static string? Static is simpler for now.
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ escapes**, and **whether credentials are short-lived and scoped**.
- Outbound: Docker containers have full internet access by default; no egress monitoring on most home networks
- Lateral movement: compromised container can reach the LAN — NAS, other machines, internal services
- Notable: CVE-2025-59536 (CVSS 8.7, Feb 2026) — a poisoned `.claude/settings.json` in a repo gives RCE when Claude Code opens it. `--dangerously-skip-permissions` removes the last gate.
- Supply chain: MCP servers, skills, and npm packages pulled during agent execution. A Jan 2026 large-scale empirical study of a 98,380-skill snapshot confirmed 157 malicious skills, ~71% of them credential harvesters. Exfiltration was overwhelmingly naive — plaintext HTTP to hardcoded endpoints; under 10% used any code obfuscation, and concealment was mostly at the documentation level, not the code level. ([Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild](https://arxiv.org/html/2602.06547v1), arXiv:2602.06547)
- Supply chain: MCP servers, skills, and npm packages pulled during agent execution. ~20% of ClawHub skills were found malicious in early 2026.
**What local topology protects:**
- No inbound attack surface — nothing listening on a public port
Executable
+50
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
PACKAGE_SPEC="${BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC:-git+https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle.git}"
MIN_PYTHON="3.11"
say() {
printf 'bot-bottle install: %s\n' "$*" >&2
}
die() {
say "error: $*"
exit 1
}
command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "python3 is required (version ${MIN_PYTHON} or newer)"
python3 - <<'PY' || die "python3 3.11 or newer is required"
import sys
raise SystemExit(0 if sys.version_info >= (3, 11) else 1)
PY
command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Docker is required; install Docker and start the daemon, then re-run this script"
docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Docker is installed but the daemon is not reachable; start Docker and re-run this script"
mkdir -p \
"${HOME}/.bot-bottle/agents" \
"${HOME}/.bot-bottle/bottles" \
"${HOME}/.bot-bottle/contrib"
if command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
say "installing with pipx"
pipx install --force "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
else
say "pipx not found; installing with python3 -m pip --user"
python3 -m pip install --user --upgrade "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
fi
if command -v bot-bottle >/dev/null 2>&1; then
BOT_BOTTLE_BIN="bot-bottle"
elif [ -x "${HOME}/.local/bin/bot-bottle" ]; then
BOT_BOTTLE_BIN="${HOME}/.local/bin/bot-bottle"
say "using ${BOT_BOTTLE_BIN}; add ${HOME}/.local/bin to PATH for future shells"
else
die "bot-bottle was installed but is not on PATH"
fi
say "running bot-bottle doctor"
"${BOT_BOTTLE_BIN}" doctor
+27
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
[build-system]
requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
[project]
name = "bot-bottle"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "Self-hosted sandbox for AI coding agents with egress controls"
readme = "README.md"
requires-python = ">=3.11"
license = { text = "Apache-2.0" }
dependencies = []
[project.scripts]
bot-bottle = "bot_bottle.cli:main"
[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
include = ["bot_bottle*"]
[tool.setuptools.package-data]
bot_bottle = [
"Dockerfile.sidecars",
"egress_entrypoint.sh",
"contrib/claude/Dockerfile",
"contrib/codex/Dockerfile",
"contrib/pi/Dockerfile",
]
-1
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@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@
pylint>=3.0.0
pyright>=1.1.300
coverage>=7.0.0
+4 -7
View File
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
"on PATH: curl -sSL https://smolmachines.com/install.sh | sh"
)
# Throwaway static key for the git-gate fixture. It need not
# be a real SSH key: test 5 reaches gitleaks before any SSH
# attempt anyway.
# Throwaway "identity file" for the git-gate's `identity` field.
# It need not be a real SSH key: test 5 reaches gitleaks before
# any SSH attempt anyway.
fd, kp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="sandbox-test-key.")
os.close(fd)
cls._key_path = Path(kp)
@@ -123,10 +123,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
"git-gate": {"repos": {
"throwaway": {
"url": "ssh://git@unreachable.invalid:22/throwaway.git",
"key": {
"provider": "static",
"path": str(cls._key_path),
},
"identity": str(cls._key_path),
},
}},
},
@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@ class TestSmolmachinesLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
# connect fails, which is the property chunk 3 will
# preserve once egress is actually running.
r = self.bottle.exec(
"env -u HTTPS_PROXY -u HTTP_PROXY -u https_proxy -u http_proxy "
f"curl -s --show-error --max-time 3 http://{self.plan.bundle_ip}:9099 "
"2>&1 || true"
)
-46
View File
@@ -168,34 +168,6 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("~/.claude/statusline.sh", settings["statusLine"]["command"])
self.assertEqual("custom:bot-bottle-research-ui", settings["theme"])
def test_claude_plan_uses_startup_args_from_provider_settings(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
template="claude",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
provider_settings={
"startup_args": ["--model", "opus"],
},
)
self.assertEqual(("--model", "opus"), plan.startup_args)
def test_codex_plan_uses_startup_args_from_provider_settings(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
template="codex",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
provider_settings={
"startup_args": ["--model", "gpt-5-codex"],
},
)
self.assertEqual(("--model", "gpt-5-codex"), plan.startup_args)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_populates_egress_routes(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
home = Path(tmp) / "host-codex"
@@ -422,24 +394,6 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("OPENROUTER_API_KEY", plan.guest_env)
self.assertTrue(provider["compat"]["supportsReasoningEffort"])
def test_pi_plan_appends_startup_args_from_provider_settings(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
template="pi",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
provider_settings={
"models": ["qwen3:14b"],
"startup_args": ["--no-stream"],
},
)
self.assertEqual(
("--models", "ollama/qwen3:14b", "--no-stream"),
plan.startup_args,
)
def test_pi_prompt_mode_appends_system_prompt_interactively(self):
self.assertEqual(
["--append-system-prompt", "/home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt"],
+2 -2
View File
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ class TestBottleIdentity(unittest.TestCase):
class TestPreserveMarker(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
"""The .preserve marker tells cli.py's session-end cleanup to keep
the state dir instead of removing it."""
"""The .preserve marker is how capability_apply tells cli.py's
session-end cleanup to keep the state dir instead of removing it."""
def setUp(self):
self._setup_fake_home()
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
"""Unit: `bot-bottle doctor` host prerequisite checks."""
from __future__ import annotations
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from bot_bottle.cli import doctor
class TestDoctor(unittest.TestCase):
def test_success_when_prerequisites_present(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp, patch.object(
doctor.Path, "home", return_value=Path(tmp),
), patch.object(
doctor.shutil, "which", return_value="/usr/bin/docker",
), patch.object(
doctor.subprocess, "run",
return_value=MagicMock(returncode=0),
):
Path(tmp, ".bot-bottle").mkdir()
self.assertEqual(0, doctor.cmd_doctor([]))
def test_missing_config_fails(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp, patch.object(
doctor.Path, "home", return_value=Path(tmp),
), patch.object(
doctor.shutil, "which", return_value="/usr/bin/docker",
), patch.object(
doctor.subprocess, "run",
return_value=MagicMock(returncode=0),
):
self.assertEqual(1, doctor.cmd_doctor([]))
def test_missing_docker_fails_before_daemon_check(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp, patch.object(
doctor.Path, "home", return_value=Path(tmp),
), patch.object(
doctor.shutil, "which", return_value=None,
), patch.object(
doctor.subprocess, "run",
) as run:
Path(tmp, ".bot-bottle").mkdir()
self.assertEqual(1, doctor.cmd_doctor([]))
run.assert_not_called()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+2 -23
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ class _FakeHomeMixin:
class TestCaptureSessionState(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
# capture_claude_session_state handles the preserve marker for
# non-zero agent exits.
# snapshot_transcript is commented out (capability_apply is disabled);
# capture_claude_session_state now only handles the preserve marker.
def setUp(self):
self._setup_fake_home()
@@ -102,27 +102,6 @@ class TestAttachAgent(unittest.TestCase):
bottle.argv,
)
def test_remote_control_is_provider_startup_arg(self):
class Bottle:
argv: list[str] = []
def exec_agent(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> int:
self.argv = list(argv)
return 0
bottle = Bottle()
exit_code = start_mod.attach_agent(
bottle, # type: ignore[arg-type]
agent_provider_template="codex",
startup_args=("remote-control",),
)
self.assertEqual(0, exit_code)
self.assertEqual(
["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
bottle.argv,
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+26 -26
View File
@@ -80,11 +80,7 @@ def _git_gate_plan(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()) -> GitGatePlan:
)
def _egress_plan(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
*,
canary: bool = False,
) -> EgressPlan:
def _egress_plan(routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()) -> EgressPlan:
token_env_map = {
r.token_env: r.token_ref
for r in routes
@@ -99,8 +95,6 @@ def _egress_plan(
egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "mitmproxy-ca.pem",
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "ca.pem",
canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
)
@@ -108,6 +102,7 @@ def _supervise_plan() -> SupervisePlan:
return SupervisePlan(
slug=SLUG,
queue_dir=STATE / "supervise" / "queue",
current_config_dir=STATE / "supervise" / "current-config",
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
)
@@ -117,7 +112,6 @@ def _plan(
with_git: bool = False,
with_egress: bool = False,
supervise: bool = False,
canary: bool = False,
) -> DockerBottlePlan:
"""Build a fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan. Toggles cover the
matrix the renderer's conditional-service logic branches on."""
@@ -156,7 +150,7 @@ def _plan(
slug=SLUG,
forwarded_env={"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN": "x"},
git_gate_plan=_git_gate_plan(upstreams),
egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes, canary=canary),
egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes),
supervise_plan=_supervise_plan() if supervise else None,
use_runsc=False,
agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
@@ -270,11 +264,18 @@ class TestAgentAlwaysPresent(unittest.TestCase):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(**kwargs))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual(["sidecars"], s["depends_on"])
def test_agent_has_no_current_config_mount_with_supervise(self):
def test_agent_current_config_mount_only_with_supervise(self):
with_sv = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(supervise=True))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertNotIn("volumes", with_sv)
self.assertTrue(any(
v["target"] == "/etc/bot-bottle/current-config"
for v in with_sv.get("volumes", [])
))
without_sv = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(supervise=False))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertNotIn("volumes", without_sv)
# Either no volumes key at all, or no current-config target.
self.assertFalse(any(
v["target"] == "/etc/bot-bottle/current-config"
for v in without_sv.get("volumes", [])
))
class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -300,6 +301,19 @@ class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-sidecars:latest", sc["image"])
self.assertEqual("Dockerfile.sidecars", sc["build"]["dockerfile"])
def test_bundle_uses_packaged_dockerfile_when_root_missing(self):
from bot_bottle.backend.docker import compose as compose_mod
original = compose_mod._REPO_DIR
try:
compose_mod._REPO_DIR = "/tmp/does-not-exist"
self.assertEqual(
"bot_bottle/Dockerfile.sidecars",
compose_mod._sidecar_bundle_dockerfile(),
)
finally:
compose_mod._REPO_DIR = original
def test_bundle_container_name_uses_sidecars_prefix(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
self.assertEqual(f"bot-bottle-sidecars-{SLUG}", sc["container_name"])
@@ -374,20 +388,6 @@ class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertNotIn("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", env_strings)
def test_canary_env_registered_as_sensitive_in_sidecar(self):
sc = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
self.assertIn(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
env_strings,
)
def test_canary_env_visible_to_agent(self):
agent = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["agent"]
env_strings = agent["environment"]
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
def test_supervise_env_present_when_active(self):
sc = self._render(supervise=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ def _plan(
supervise_plan = SupervisePlan(
slug="demo-abc12",
queue_dir=Path("/tmp/queue"),
current_config_dir=Path("/tmp/current-config"),
)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
+1 -9
View File
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise import SupervisePlan
_URL = "http://supervise:9100/"
_CODEX_DOCKERFILE = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile"
)
def _make_bottle(exec_result: ExecResult | None = None) -> MagicMock:
@@ -78,6 +75,7 @@ def _plan(
supervise_plan = SupervisePlan(
slug="demo-abc12",
queue_dir=Path("/tmp/queue"),
current_config_dir=Path("/tmp/current-config"),
)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
@@ -278,12 +276,6 @@ class TestCodexProvision(unittest.TestCase):
)
class TestCodexDockerfile(unittest.TestCase):
def test_installs_procps_for_remote_control_pid_management(self):
dockerfile = _CODEX_DOCKERFILE.read_text()
self.assertIn("procps", dockerfile)
class TestCodexSuperviseMcp(unittest.TestCase):
def test_noop_when_supervise_disabled(self):
bottle = _make_bottle()
@@ -10,11 +10,8 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner import (
GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner,
_API_TIMEOUT_SECS,
_KEYGEN_TIMEOUT_SECS,
_split_owner_repo,
)
from bot_bottle.deploy_key_provisioner import DeployKeyCollisionError
def _provisioner() -> GiteaDeployKeyProvisioner:
@@ -85,25 +82,6 @@ class TestCreate(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(str(fake_key_id), key_id)
self.assertEqual(fake_private, private_bytes)
def test_create_passes_timeout_to_ssh_keygen_and_urlopen(self):
provisioner = _provisioner()
with patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.subprocess.run"
) as mock_run, patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.urllib.request.urlopen"
) as mock_urlopen, patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.Path.read_bytes",
return_value=b"PRIVATE",
), patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.Path.read_text",
return_value="ssh-ed25519 AAAA\n",
):
mock_urlopen.return_value = _urlopen_response({"id": 1})
provisioner.create("owner/repo", "title")
self.assertEqual(_KEYGEN_TIMEOUT_SECS, mock_run.call_args.kwargs.get("timeout"))
self.assertEqual(_API_TIMEOUT_SECS, mock_urlopen.call_args.kwargs.get("timeout"))
def test_create_raises_on_http_error(self):
provisioner = _provisioner()
with patch(
@@ -122,30 +100,6 @@ class TestCreate(unittest.TestCase):
provisioner.create("owner/repo", "title")
self.assertIn("403", str(ctx.exception))
def test_create_raises_collision_error_on_422(self):
provisioner = _provisioner()
collision_body = json.dumps({
"errors": ["Key content already exists on this repository"],
"message": "422 Unprocessable Entity",
})
with patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.subprocess.run"
), patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.urllib.request.urlopen",
side_effect=_http_error(422, collision_body),
), patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.Path.read_bytes",
return_value=b"pk",
), patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.Path.read_text",
return_value="ssh-ed25519 AAAA\n",
):
with self.assertRaises(DeployKeyCollisionError) as ctx:
provisioner.create("owner/repo", "my-title")
msg = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertIn("owner/repo", msg)
self.assertIn("my-title", msg)
class TestDelete(unittest.TestCase):
def test_delete_calls_correct_endpoint(self):
@@ -160,16 +114,6 @@ class TestDelete(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("/api/v1/repos/didericis/bot-bottle/keys/99", req.full_url)
self.assertEqual("DELETE", req.get_method())
def test_delete_passes_timeout_to_urlopen(self):
provisioner = _provisioner()
with patch(
"bot_bottle.contrib.gitea.deploy_key_provisioner.urllib.request.urlopen"
) as mock_urlopen:
mock_urlopen.return_value = _urlopen_response({})
provisioner.delete("owner/repo", "7")
self.assertEqual(_API_TIMEOUT_SECS, mock_urlopen.call_args.kwargs.get("timeout"))
def test_delete_tolerates_404(self):
provisioner = _provisioner()
with patch(
+2 -250
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,18 @@
"""Unit: DLP detectors (PRD 0053).
Tests for token pattern scanning, known secret detection, fragmentation-
resistant matching, entropy scoring, and naive prompt injection detection."""
Tests for token pattern scanning, known secret detection, and
naive prompt injection detection."""
import base64
import gzip
import unittest
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import (
ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD,
PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN,
REDACT,
_alnum_projection,
_encoded_variants,
_normalize_text,
_shannon_entropy,
redact_tokens,
scan_crlf_injection,
scan_entropy,
scan_known_secrets,
scan_naive_injection,
scan_token_patterns,
@@ -450,248 +445,5 @@ class TestKnownSecretsNewVariants(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
class TestMatchedAndSafeTokens(unittest.TestCase):
"""PRD 0062: detectors carry the raw matched value, and a safelisted
value is skipped so the supervisor can approve a specific token."""
def test_token_pattern_sets_matched(self):
token = "ghp_" + "A" * 36
result = scan_token_patterns(f"token: {token}")
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual(token, result.matched)
def test_safe_token_is_skipped(self):
token = "ghp_" + "A" * 36
self.assertIsNone(
scan_token_patterns(f"token: {token}", safe_tokens={token})
)
def test_safe_token_does_not_mask_other_token(self):
safe = "ghp_" + "A" * 36
other = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
result = scan_token_patterns(
f"a={safe} b={other}", safe_tokens={safe},
)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual(other, result.matched)
self.assertIn("AWS", result.reason)
def test_known_secret_sets_matched_and_safelist_skips(self):
secret = "supersecretvalue123"
env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_FOO": secret}
result = scan_known_secrets(f"x={secret}", env=env)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual(secret, result.matched)
self.assertIsNone(
scan_known_secrets(f"x={secret}", env=env, safe_tokens={secret})
)
def test_crlf_block_has_no_matched_value(self):
result = scan_crlf_injection("path%0d%0aHost: evil")
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("", result.matched)
class TestStripCrlf(unittest.TestCase):
def test_removes_url_encoded_crlf(self):
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import strip_crlf
out = strip_crlf("next=%0d%0aX-Injected: evil")
self.assertNotRegex(out, r"%0[dD]%0[aA]")
def test_removes_literal_header_injection(self):
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import strip_crlf
out = strip_crlf("value\r\nX-Injected: evil")
self.assertIsNone(scan_crlf_injection(out))
def test_leaves_clean_text_unchanged(self):
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import strip_crlf
self.assertEqual("/api/v1/data?q=hello", strip_crlf("/api/v1/data?q=hello"))
class TestAlnumProjection(unittest.TestCase):
def test_alphanumeric_unchanged(self):
self.assertEqual("abc123XYZ", _alnum_projection("abc123XYZ"))
def test_strips_hyphens(self):
self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my-secret-value"))
def test_strips_spaces(self):
self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my secret value"))
def test_strips_dots_and_underscores(self):
self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my.secret_value"))
def test_empty_string(self):
self.assertEqual("", _alnum_projection(""))
def test_all_special_chars(self):
self.assertEqual("", _alnum_projection("!@#$%^&*()"))
class TestFragmentationResistantMatching(unittest.TestCase):
"""scan_known_secrets catches separator-injection and partial-substring evasion."""
# Secrets long enough that their alnum projections are ≥ 8 chars.
SECRET = "supersecrettoken99"
ENV = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": SECRET}
def test_exact_match_still_works(self):
result = scan_known_secrets(f"key={self.SECRET}", env=self.ENV)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
def test_separator_injection_blocked(self):
# Hyphens inserted between chars of the secret.
fragmented = "-".join(self.SECRET)
result = scan_known_secrets(f"data={fragmented}", env=self.ENV)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
self.assertIn("separator injection", result.reason)
def test_space_separator_blocked(self):
fragmented = " ".join(self.SECRET)
result = scan_known_secrets(f"body: {fragmented}", env=self.ENV)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertIn("separator injection", result.reason)
def test_partial_substring_blocked(self):
# First PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN alnum chars of the secret, no separators.
partial = _alnum_projection(self.SECRET)[:PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN]
result = scan_known_secrets(f"x={partial}&y=other", env=self.ENV)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
self.assertIn("partial match", result.reason)
def test_short_secret_skips_projection(self):
# Secrets shorter than _ALNUM_MIN_LEN in alnum projection are not
# fragmentation-checked (too many false positives).
short_env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "abc"}
# "a b c" has alnum projection "abc" (3 chars, < 8); should not block.
self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets("a b c", env=short_env))
def test_clean_text_not_blocked(self):
self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets("nothing to see here", env=self.ENV))
def test_sensitive_prefixes_param_extra_prefix(self):
env = {"MY_CRED_0": self.SECRET, "IGNORED": "other"}
result = scan_known_secrets(
f"key={self.SECRET}",
env=env,
sensitive_prefixes=("MY_CRED_",),
)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertIn("MY_CRED_0", result.reason)
def test_sensitive_prefixes_default_only_egress_token(self):
# A value under a non-EGRESS_TOKEN_ key is ignored with default prefixes.
env = {"MY_CRED_0": self.SECRET}
self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets(f"key={self.SECRET}", env=env))
def test_canary_prefix_detected(self):
canary_value = "canary-fake-secret-value-xyz"
env = {"CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary_value}
result = scan_known_secrets(
f"x={canary_value}",
env=env,
sensitive_prefixes=("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",),
)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", result.reason)
class TestRedactTokensBroadenedPrefixes(unittest.TestCase):
SECRET = "my-provisioned-secret"
def test_default_redacts_egress_token(self):
env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": self.SECRET}
out = redact_tokens(f"val={self.SECRET}", env=env)
self.assertNotIn(self.SECRET, out)
self.assertIn(REDACT, out)
def test_extra_prefix_redacted(self):
env = {"MY_SECRET_KEY": self.SECRET}
out = redact_tokens(
f"val={self.SECRET}",
env=env,
sensitive_prefixes=("MY_SECRET_",),
)
self.assertNotIn(self.SECRET, out)
self.assertIn(REDACT, out)
def test_non_matching_prefix_not_redacted(self):
env = {"MY_SECRET_KEY": self.SECRET}
out = redact_tokens(f"val={self.SECRET}", env=env)
# Default prefixes only include EGRESS_TOKEN_ → secret not redacted
self.assertIn(self.SECRET, out)
class TestShannonEntropy(unittest.TestCase):
def test_empty_string_zero(self):
self.assertEqual(0.0, _shannon_entropy(""))
def test_single_char_zero(self):
self.assertEqual(0.0, _shannon_entropy("aaaaaa"))
def test_two_equal_chars_one_bit(self):
self.assertAlmostEqual(1.0, _shannon_entropy("abababab"), places=10)
def test_high_entropy_random_like(self):
# Uniform 64-char string over 64 distinct symbols has entropy 6 bits.
import string
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
text = alphabet # each char appears exactly once
self.assertAlmostEqual(6.0, _shannon_entropy(text), places=10)
class TestScanEntropy(unittest.TestCase):
def test_empty_returns_none(self):
self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy(""))
def test_low_entropy_returns_none(self):
# Highly repetitive text has low entropy.
self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy("a" * 200))
def test_high_entropy_warns(self):
# Build a 64-char string with entropy > ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD.
# Use all 64 distinct printable chars to maximise entropy (~6 bits).
import string
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
result = scan_entropy(alphabet, threshold=ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("warn", result.severity)
self.assertIn("high-entropy", result.reason)
def test_never_blocks(self):
import string
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
result = scan_entropy(alphabet)
# scan_entropy is warn-only; it must never return severity="block".
if result is not None:
self.assertNotEqual("block", result.severity)
def test_location_in_result(self):
import string
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
result = scan_entropy(alphabet, location="authorization header")
if result is not None:
self.assertIn("authorization header", result.location)
def test_structured_json_no_warn(self):
# Typical JSON has low entropy and should not be flagged.
json_body = '{"status": "ok", "message": "hello world", "count": 42}'
self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy(json_body))
def test_short_text_below_window(self):
# Text shorter than the window: checked as one chunk.
# Use a uniform string to ensure it won't be flagged.
self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy("abcde", threshold=ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-10
View File
@@ -136,16 +136,6 @@ class TestClaudeArgv(unittest.TestCase):
argv,
)
def test_codex_remote_control_startup_arg_does_not_receive_initial_prompt(self):
argv = _codex_bottle("/home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt").agent_argv(
["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
)
self.assertEqual(
["docker", "exec", "-it", "bot-bottle-dev-abc", "codex",
"--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
argv,
)
def test_codex_resume_does_not_append_initial_prompt(self):
argv = _codex_bottle("/home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt").agent_argv(
["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "resume", "--last"],
+2 -2
View File
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ class TestOrphanStateDirs(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
)
def test_preserve_marker_skips_dir(self):
# Preserve marker means the user explicitly wanted this dir
# kept for `resume`.
# Preserve marker = capability-block or crash auto-preserve;
# the user explicitly wanted this dir kept for `resume`.
bottle_state.write_per_bottle_dockerfile("kept-ccc", "FROM x\n")
bottle_state.mark_preserved("kept-ccc")
self.assertEqual(
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ class _Provider(AgentProvider):
return AgentProviderRuntime(
template="test", command="test", image="",
prompt_mode="append_file", bypass_args=(), resume_args=(),
remote_control_args=(),
)
def provision_plan(self, **kwargs): # type: ignore[override]
raise NotImplementedError
+6 -231
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,15 @@
"""Unit: Egress route lift + routes.yaml render + token
resolution (PRD 0017, PRD 0053)."""
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.egress import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
Egress,
EgressPlan,
EgressRoute,
_yaml_str_escape,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_manifest_routes,
egress_render_routes,
egress_resolve_token_values,
egress_routes_for_bottle,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
egress_token_env_map,
)
from bot_bottle.log import Die
@@ -209,23 +202,6 @@ class TestProviderRouteMerge(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual((), routes[0].matches)
self.assertEqual({}, egress_token_env_map(routes))
def test_provider_route_defaults_to_redact_on_match(self):
b = _bottle([])
pr = EgressRoute(host="api.anthropic.com")
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual("redact", routes[0].outbound_on_match)
def test_provider_route_explicit_on_match_preserved(self):
b = _bottle([])
pr = EgressRoute(host="api.anthropic.com", outbound_on_match="supervise")
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual("supervise", routes[0].outbound_on_match)
def test_manifest_route_does_not_get_redact_default(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "api.example.com"}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
self.assertEqual("", routes[0].outbound_on_match)
def test_two_provider_routes_with_same_token_ref_share_slot(self):
b = _bottle([])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (
@@ -323,7 +299,7 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual([], parse_yaml_subset(rendered)["routes"])
def test_round_trip_through_addon_core(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
b = _bottle([
{"host": "api.github.com",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "GH_PAT"},
@@ -334,7 +310,7 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
{"host": "api.anthropic.com"},
])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
addon_routes = load_config(egress_render_routes(routes)).routes
addon_routes = load_routes(egress_render_routes(routes))
self.assertEqual(3, len(addon_routes))
self.assertEqual("Bearer", addon_routes[0].auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", addon_routes[0].token_env)
@@ -342,41 +318,24 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("", addon_routes[2].auth_scheme)
def test_dlp_round_trips(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example", "dlp": {
"outbound_detectors": ["token_patterns"],
"inbound_detectors": False,
}}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
addon_routes = load_routes(rendered)
self.assertEqual(("token_patterns",), addon_routes[0].outbound_detectors)
self.assertEqual((), addon_routes[0].inbound_detectors)
def test_outbound_on_match_round_trips(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
b = _bottle([{"host": "logs.example", "dlp": {
"outbound_on_match": "redact",
}}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
self.assertIn('outbound_on_match: "redact"', rendered)
addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
self.assertEqual("redact", addon_routes[0].outbound_on_match)
def test_outbound_on_match_default_omitted_from_render(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example"}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
self.assertNotIn("outbound_on_match", rendered)
def test_git_fetch_policy_round_trips(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
b = _bottle([{"host": "github.com", "git": {"fetch": True}}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
self.assertEqual({"fetch": True}, self._parsed(routes)[0]["git"])
addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
addon_routes = load_routes(rendered)
self.assertTrue(addon_routes[0].git_fetch)
def test_log_zero_omitted_from_render(self):
@@ -420,76 +379,6 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(LOG_BLOCKS, cfg.log)
class TestYamlStrEscape(unittest.TestCase):
"""_yaml_str_escape produces safe YAML double-quoted scalar content."""
def test_plain_string_unchanged(self):
self.assertEqual("api.example.com", _yaml_str_escape("api.example.com"))
def test_double_quote_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual('\\"', _yaml_str_escape('"'))
def test_backslash_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual("\\\\", _yaml_str_escape("\\"))
def test_newline_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual("\\n", _yaml_str_escape("\n"))
def test_carriage_return_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual("\\r", _yaml_str_escape("\r"))
def test_tab_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual("\\t", _yaml_str_escape("\t"))
def test_combined(self):
self.assertEqual('\\"\\n\\\\', _yaml_str_escape('"\n\\'))
class TestRenderRoutesEscaping(unittest.TestCase):
"""Stray quotes/newlines in manifest strings do not corrupt routes.yaml."""
@staticmethod
def _parsed(routes) -> list[dict]: # type: ignore
return parse_yaml_subset(egress_render_routes(routes))["routes"] # type: ignore
def test_host_with_double_quote_round_trips(self):
routes = (EgressRoute(host='bad"host.example'),)
parsed = self._parsed(routes)
self.assertEqual('bad"host.example', parsed[0]["host"])
def test_host_with_newline_round_trips(self):
routes = (EgressRoute(host="host\nextra.example"),)
parsed = self._parsed(routes)
self.assertEqual("host\nextra.example", parsed[0]["host"])
def test_auth_scheme_with_double_quote_round_trips(self):
routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.example",
auth_scheme='Bear"er',
token_env="EGRESS_TOKEN_0",
),)
parsed = self._parsed(routes)
self.assertEqual('Bear"er', parsed[0]["auth_scheme"])
def test_path_value_with_double_quote_round_trips(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import PathMatch, MatchEntry
routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.example",
matches=(MatchEntry(paths=(PathMatch(type="prefix", value='/v1/"quoted"/'),)),),
),)
parsed = self._parsed(routes)
self.assertEqual('/v1/"quoted"/', parsed[0]["matches"][0]["paths"][0]["value"])
def test_header_value_with_double_quote_round_trips(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import HeaderMatch, MatchEntry
routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.example",
matches=(MatchEntry(headers=(HeaderMatch(name="x-h", value='val"ue'),)),),
),)
parsed = self._parsed(routes)
self.assertEqual('val"ue', parsed[0]["matches"][0]["headers"][0]["value"])
class TestResolveTokenValues(unittest.TestCase):
def test_reads_host_env(self):
out = egress_resolve_token_values(
@@ -520,119 +409,5 @@ class TestResolveTokenValues(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual({"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "codex-access-token"}, out)
class TestCanaryGeneration(unittest.TestCase):
"""Egress.prepare() generates a unique canary token per session."""
def _bottle_obj(self):
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {"dev": {"egress": {"routes": []}}},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
}).bottles["dev"]
def _make_plan(self) -> EgressPlan:
# Use a concrete no-op subclass so we can call prepare() without
# a real backend.
class _TestEgress(Egress):
pass
e = _TestEgress()
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
return e.prepare(self._bottle_obj(), "test-slug", Path(td))
def test_canary_is_non_empty(self):
plan = self._make_plan()
self.assertIsInstance(plan.canary, str)
self.assertGreater(len(plan.canary), 0)
self.assertRegex(plan.canary_env, r"^[A-Z]+_[A-Z]+_SECRET$")
def test_canary_is_unique_per_session(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
bottle = self._bottle_obj()
class _TestEgress(Egress):
pass
e = _TestEgress()
plan_a = e.prepare(bottle, "slug-a", Path(td))
plan_b = e.prepare(bottle, "slug-b", Path(td))
self.assertNotEqual(plan_a.canary, plan_b.canary)
def test_canary_detected_by_scan_known_secrets(self):
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import scan_known_secrets
plan = self._make_plan()
env = {plan.canary_env: plan.canary}
result = scan_known_secrets(
f"exfil={plan.canary}",
env=env,
sensitive_prefixes=(plan.canary_env,),
)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
self.assertIn(plan.canary_env, result.reason)
def test_egress_plan_canary_field_default_empty(self):
# Verify EgressPlan can be constructed with an empty canary (backward compat).
from pathlib import Path
plan = EgressPlan(
slug="s",
routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
routes=(),
token_env_map={},
)
self.assertEqual("", plan.canary)
self.assertEqual("", plan.canary_env)
class TestEgressEnvEntries(unittest.TestCase):
def test_sidecar_entries_include_route_tokens_and_canary_scan_prefix(self):
plan = EgressPlan(
slug="s",
routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
routes=(EgressRoute(host="api.example"),),
token_env_map={"EGRESS_TOKEN_1": "T1", "EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "T0"},
canary="fake-canary-value",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
)
self.assertEqual(
(
"EGRESS_TOKEN_0",
"EGRESS_TOKEN_1",
"CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value",
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
),
egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan),
)
def test_agent_entries_include_only_canary_bait(self):
plan = EgressPlan(
slug="s",
routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
routes=(),
token_env_map={},
canary="fake-canary-value",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
)
self.assertEqual(
("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value",),
egress_agent_env_entries(plan),
)
def test_canary_entries_omitted_when_name_missing(self):
plan = EgressPlan(
slug="s",
routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
routes=(),
token_env_map={},
canary="fake-canary-value",
)
self.assertEqual((), egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan))
self.assertEqual((), egress_agent_env_entries(plan))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+38 -234
View File
@@ -22,16 +22,15 @@ from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (
MatchEntry,
PathMatch,
Route,
ScanResult,
build_inbound_scan_text,
build_outbound_scan_text,
build_token_allow_payload,
decide,
decide_git_fetch,
evaluate_matches,
is_git_fetch_request,
is_git_push_request,
load_config,
load_routes,
match_route,
outbound_scan_headers,
parse_config,
@@ -268,24 +267,46 @@ class TestParseDlp(unittest.TestCase):
"dlp": {"wat": True},
}]})
def test_outbound_on_match_default_empty(self):
routes = parse_routes({"routes": [{"host": "x.example"}]})
self.assertEqual("", routes[0].outbound_on_match)
def test_outbound_on_match_parsed(self):
for policy in ("block", "redact", "supervise"):
routes = parse_routes({"routes": [{
"host": "x.example",
"dlp": {"outbound_on_match": policy},
}]})
self.assertEqual(policy, routes[0].outbound_on_match)
# --- load_routes ---------------------------------------------------------
def test_outbound_on_match_invalid_rejected(self):
class TestLoadRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
def test_yaml_text_round_trip(self):
routes = load_routes(
'routes:\n'
' - host: "api.example"\n'
)
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
self.assertEqual("api.example", routes[0].host)
def test_full_route_shape_parses(self):
routes = load_routes(
'routes:\n'
' - host: "api.example"\n'
' auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
' token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_0"\n'
' matches:\n'
' - paths:\n'
' - value: "/v1/"\n'
' - type: "exact"\n'
' value: "/messages"\n'
)
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
r = routes[0]
self.assertEqual("api.example", r.host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", r.token_env)
self.assertEqual(1, len(r.matches))
self.assertEqual(2, len(r.matches[0].paths))
def test_empty_routes_list(self):
routes = load_routes("routes: []\n")
self.assertEqual((), routes)
def test_invalid_yaml_raises_value_error(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
parse_routes({"routes": [{
"host": "x.example",
"dlp": {"outbound_on_match": "nope"},
}]})
load_routes("routes:\n\t- host: x\n")
# --- load_config / parse_config ------------------------------------------
@@ -336,33 +357,6 @@ class TestLoadConfig(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
parse_config("not a dict")
def test_empty_routes_list(self):
cfg = load_config("routes: []\n")
self.assertEqual((), cfg.routes)
def test_full_route_shape_parses(self):
cfg = load_config(
'routes:\n'
' - host: "api.example"\n'
' auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
' token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_0"\n'
' matches:\n'
' - paths:\n'
' - value: "/v1/"\n'
' - type: "exact"\n'
' value: "/messages"\n'
)
r = cfg.routes[0]
self.assertEqual("api.example", r.host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", r.token_env)
self.assertEqual(1, len(r.matches))
self.assertEqual(2, len(r.matches[0].paths))
def test_invalid_yaml_raises_value_error(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
load_config("routes:\n\t- host: x\n")
# --- evaluate_matches ---------------------------------------------------
@@ -1173,195 +1167,5 @@ class TestScanInbound(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
class TestScanOutboundSafeTokens(unittest.TestCase):
"""PRD 0062: scan_outbound threads the supervisor-approved safe-tokens
set into the token detectors."""
def test_safe_token_allows_request(self):
text = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/v1/data", query="",
headers={}, body=f"key={_AWS_KEY}",
)
self.assertIsNone(
scan_outbound(_ROUTE, text, {}, safe_tokens={_AWS_KEY})
)
def test_unrelated_safe_token_still_blocks(self):
text = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/v1/data", query="",
headers={}, body=f"key={_AWS_KEY}",
)
result = scan_outbound(_ROUTE, text, {}, safe_tokens={"ghp_" + "A" * 36})
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual(_AWS_KEY, result.matched)
class TestScanOutboundCrlfText(unittest.TestCase):
"""PRD 0062: CRLF is scanned only over the request line + headers
(crlf_text), never the body a body is not an injection vector."""
def test_body_crlf_not_flagged_when_crlf_text_excludes_body(self):
# A form-encoded multi-line body legitimately contains %0d%0a.
body = "comment=line1%0d%0aline2"
full = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/submit", query="",
headers={}, body=body,
)
crlf_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/submit", query="",
headers={}, body="",
)
self.assertIsNone(scan_outbound(_ROUTE, full, {}, crlf_text=crlf_text))
def test_request_line_crlf_still_flagged(self):
full = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/p", query="next=%0d%0aX:evil",
headers={}, body="",
)
crlf_text = full
result = scan_outbound(_ROUTE, full, {}, crlf_text=crlf_text)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
def test_default_crlf_text_scans_full_blob(self):
# Backward compatibility: crlf_text=None scans everything (body too).
full = build_outbound_scan_text(
host="api.example.com", path="/submit", query="",
headers={}, body="x=%0d%0aX:evil",
)
self.assertIsNotNone(scan_outbound(_ROUTE, full, {}))
class TestBuildTokenAllowPayload(unittest.TestCase):
def test_payload_includes_context_and_no_raw_token(self):
result = ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason="AWS access key found in body",
location="body",
context="key=******** tail",
matched=_AWS_KEY,
)
payload = build_token_allow_payload(
"api.example.com", "POST", "/v1/ingest", result,
)
self.assertIn("host: api.example.com", payload)
self.assertIn("method: POST", payload)
self.assertIn("path: /v1/ingest", payload)
self.assertIn("AWS access key found in body", payload)
self.assertIn("key=******** tail", payload)
# The raw matched value must never appear in the proposal file.
self.assertNotIn(_AWS_KEY, payload)
def test_payload_omits_context_line_when_empty(self):
result = ScanResult(severity="block", reason="r", matched="x")
payload = build_token_allow_payload("h", "GET", "/", result)
self.assertNotIn("context:", payload)
class TestScanOutboundEnhanced(unittest.TestCase):
"""scan_outbound changes: binary decode, entropy detector,
broadened known-value prefixes, fragmentation resistance."""
_ROUTE = Route(host="api.example.com")
_ROUTE_ENTROPY = Route(
host="api.example.com",
outbound_detectors=("entropy",),
)
def test_binary_body_latin1_decode_finds_ascii_secret(self):
# Body contains valid ASCII secret surrounded by non-UTF-8 bytes.
secret = "supersecrettoken99"
env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}
# Wrap the secret in bytes that are invalid UTF-8.
body = b"\x80\x81" + secret.encode("ascii") + b"\xff"
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, body, env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
def test_binary_body_valid_utf8_decoded_correctly(self):
env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "mysecret"}
# Valid UTF-8 body — should be decoded as UTF-8, not latin-1.
body = "clean body with mysecret".encode("utf-8")
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, body, env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
def test_entropy_detector_off_by_default(self):
import string
# High-entropy content should NOT warn if the route has no entropy detector.
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, alphabet, {})
self.assertIsNone(result)
def test_entropy_detector_warns_when_enabled(self):
import string
alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE_ENTROPY, alphabet, {})
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("warn", result.severity)
def test_bot_bottle_sensitive_prefixes_env_var(self):
# When the sidecar env contains BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES,
# scan_outbound should scan those additional prefixes.
secret = "extra-sensitive-value-abc"
env = {
"MY_CRED_KEY": secret,
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "MY_CRED_",
}
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"x={secret}", env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
def test_bot_bottle_sensitive_prefixes_multiple(self):
secret = "my-api-key-value-xyz"
env = {
"ANTHROPIC_API_0": secret,
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "ANTHROPIC_API_,OTHER_",
}
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"auth={secret}", env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
def test_canary_detected_via_random_secret_env_name(self):
# The fake secret uses a randomized env name that the sidecar marks
# as sensitive through BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES.
canary = "canaryvalue12345abcdef"
env = {
"CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary,
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
}
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"data={canary}", env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
assert result is not None
self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", result.reason)
def test_fragmented_canary_blocked(self):
# Canary with separators injected is still caught.
canary = "supersecretcanary99"
env = {
"CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary,
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
}
fragmented = "-".join(canary)
result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"x={fragmented}", env)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
class TestOutboundDetectorNames(unittest.TestCase):
def test_entropy_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
self.assertIn("entropy", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
def test_known_secrets_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
self.assertIn("known_secrets", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
def test_token_patterns_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
self.assertIn("token_patterns", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
"""Unit: LOG_FULL credential redaction in _log_request / _log_response (issue #257).
egress_addon.py is sidecar-only code that depends on mitmproxy, which is
not installed on the host. This file pre-populates sys.modules with the
minimum mocks needed so EgressAddon can be imported and tested without the
real mitmproxy package."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import sys
import types
import unittest
from io import StringIO
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import patch
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Sidecar-import shims — must run before importing egress_addon
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _ensure_shims() -> None:
if "mitmproxy" not in sys.modules:
_mm = types.ModuleType("mitmproxy")
_mh = types.ModuleType("mitmproxy.http")
setattr(_mm, "http", _mh)
sys.modules["mitmproxy"] = _mm
sys.modules["mitmproxy.http"] = _mh
if "egress_addon_core" not in sys.modules:
import bot_bottle.egress_addon_core as _core
sys.modules["egress_addon_core"] = _core
_ensure_shims()
from bot_bottle.egress_addon import EgressAddon # noqa: E402 (import after shims)
from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import Config, LOG_FULL # noqa: E402
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _addon() -> EgressAddon:
"""Return a bare EgressAddon with LOG_FULL config and no routes file."""
a: EgressAddon = EgressAddon.__new__(EgressAddon)
a.config = Config(routes=(), log=LOG_FULL)
a.safe_tokens = set()
a._supervise_queue_dir = ""
a._supervise_slug = ""
a._token_allow_timeout = 300.0
return a
class _Headers:
def __init__(self, d: dict[str, str]) -> None:
self._d = d
def items(self) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
return list(self._d.items())
class _Request:
def __init__(
self,
host: str = "api.example.com",
method: str = "POST",
path: str = "/v1/messages",
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
body: str = "",
) -> None:
self.pretty_host = host
self.method = method
self.path = path
self.headers = _Headers(headers or {})
self._body = body
def get_text(self, *, strict: bool = True) -> str:
return self._body
class _Response:
def __init__(
self,
status_code: int = 200,
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
body: str = "",
) -> None:
self.status_code = status_code
self.headers = _Headers(headers or {})
self._body = body
def get_text(self, *, strict: bool = True) -> str:
return self._body
class _Flow:
def __init__(
self,
request: _Request | None = None,
response: _Response | None = None,
) -> None:
self.request = request or _Request()
self.response = response or _Response()
def _log_request(addon: EgressAddon, flow: _Flow) -> dict[str, Any]:
buf = StringIO()
with patch("sys.stderr", buf):
addon._log_request(flow) # type: ignore[arg-type]
return json.loads(buf.getvalue())
def _log_response(addon: EgressAddon, flow: _Flow) -> dict[str, Any]:
buf = StringIO()
with patch("sys.stderr", buf):
addon._log_response(flow) # type: ignore[arg-type]
return json.loads(buf.getvalue())
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _log_request — authorization header stripped
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLogRequestAuthorizationStripped(unittest.TestCase):
def test_lowercase_authorization_excluded(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret"}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn("authorization", entry["headers"])
def test_titlecase_authorization_excluded(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"Authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret"}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn("Authorization", entry["headers"])
self.assertNotIn("authorization", entry["headers"])
def test_non_auth_headers_retained(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={
"authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret",
"content-type": "application/json",
}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertIn("content-type", entry["headers"])
self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["content-type"])
def test_no_authorization_header_logs_all_others(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"x-request-id": "abc"}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertEqual({"x-request-id": "abc"}, entry["headers"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _log_request — body redaction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_OPENAI_KEY = "sk-" + "A" * 48
class TestLogRequestBodyRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
def test_token_pattern_in_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=f"key={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["body"])
self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
def test_provisioned_secret_in_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
secret = "provisioned-egress-secret-xyz"
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=f"token={secret}"))
with patch.dict("os.environ", {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}):
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn(secret, entry["body"])
self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
def test_clean_body_preserved(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
payload = '{"model": "claude-3", "max_tokens": 1024}'
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=payload))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertEqual(payload, entry["body"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _log_request — non-authorization header value redaction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLogRequestHeaderValuesRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
def test_token_in_custom_header_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"x-api-key": _OPENAI_KEY}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["headers"].get("x-api-key", ""))
self.assertIn("********", entry["headers"].get("x-api-key", ""))
def test_clean_header_value_preserved(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"accept": "application/json"}))
entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["accept"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _log_response — body redaction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLogResponseBodyRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
def test_token_pattern_in_response_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(
request=_Request(),
response=_Response(body=f'{{"key": "{_OPENAI_KEY}"}}'),
)
entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["body"])
self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
def test_provisioned_secret_in_response_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
secret = "provisioned-egress-secret-xyz"
flow = _Flow(
request=_Request(),
response=_Response(body=f'{{"token": "{secret}"}}'),
)
with patch.dict("os.environ", {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}):
entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
self.assertNotIn(secret, entry["body"])
self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
def test_clean_response_body_preserved(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(request=_Request(), response=_Response(body='{"result": "ok"}'))
entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
self.assertEqual('{"result": "ok"}', entry["body"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _log_response — response header value redaction
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLogResponseHeaderValuesRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
def test_token_in_response_header_scrubbed(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(
request=_Request(),
response=_Response(headers={"set-cookie": f"token={_OPENAI_KEY}"}),
)
entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
cookie_val = entry["headers"].get("set-cookie", "")
self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, cookie_val)
self.assertIn("********", cookie_val)
def test_clean_response_header_preserved(self) -> None:
addon = _addon()
flow = _Flow(
request=_Request(),
response=_Response(headers={"content-type": "application/json"}),
)
entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["content-type"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-9
View File
@@ -54,15 +54,6 @@ class TestValidateRoutesContent(unittest.TestCase):
' auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
)
def test_rejects_log_full(self):
with self.assertRaises(EgressApplyError) as cm:
applicator.validate_routes_content(
'log: 2\n'
'routes:\n'
' - host: "x.example"\n'
)
self.assertIn("must not change egress logging", str(cm.exception))
class TestApplyRoutesChange(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
-65
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from bot_bottle.git_gate import (
GitGate,
@@ -14,8 +13,6 @@ from bot_bottle.git_gate import (
git_gate_render_access_hook,
git_gate_render_entrypoint,
git_gate_render_hook,
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys,
_resolve_identity_file,
git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle,
)
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
@@ -331,68 +328,6 @@ class TestPrepare(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("exec git daemon", content)
class TestDynamicKeyProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.stage = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
def tearDown(self):
import shutil
shutil.rmtree(self.stage, ignore_errors=True)
def _gitea_manifest(self):
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"git-gate": {
"repos": {
"repo": {
"url": "ssh://git@gitea.example.com/org/repo.git",
"key": {
"provider": "gitea",
"forge_token_env": "GITEA_TOKEN",
},
"host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
},
},
}
}
},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
})
def test_resolve_identity_file_static_uses_entry_path(self):
entry = fixture_with_git().bottles["dev"].git[0]
self.assertEqual(entry.IdentityFile, _resolve_identity_file(entry, "demo", self.stage))
def test_resolve_identity_file_gitea_provisions_key(self):
entry = self._gitea_manifest().bottles["dev"].git[0]
with patch("bot_bottle.git_gate._provision_dynamic_key", return_value="/tmp/provisioned-key") as mock_provision:
self.assertEqual("/tmp/provisioned-key", _resolve_identity_file(entry, "demo", self.stage))
mock_provision.assert_called_once()
def test_revoke_skips_non_gitea_and_missing_id_file(self):
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(fixture_with_git().bottles["dev"], self.stage)
def test_revoke_calls_delete_for_gitea_entry(self):
bottle = self._gitea_manifest().bottles["dev"]
(self.stage / "repo-deploy-key-id").write_text("123\n")
with patch.dict("os.environ", {"GITEA_TOKEN": "token"}), patch(
"bot_bottle.deploy_key_provisioner.get_provisioner"
) as mock_get_provisioner:
provisioner = mock_get_provisioner.return_value
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle, self.stage)
mock_get_provisioner.assert_called_once()
provisioner.delete.assert_called_once_with("org/repo", "123")
def test_revoke_missing_token_raises(self):
bottle = self._gitea_manifest().bottles["dev"]
(self.stage / "repo-deploy-key-id").write_text("123\n")
with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=True), self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as cm:
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle, self.stage)
self.assertIn("env var is not set", str(cm.exception))
class TestShellEscaping(unittest.TestCase):
"""Regression tests: all three render functions must produce syntactically
valid sh code even when names and upstream URLs contain shell-special
-107
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from unittest import mock
from bot_bottle.git_gate import GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS
from bot_bottle.git_http_backend import GitHttpHandler, MAX_BODY_BYTES
@@ -151,61 +150,6 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertEqual("git/test", env["HTTP_USER_AGENT"])
def test_subprocess_calls_include_timeout(self):
"""Both subprocess.run calls (access-hook and git http-backend) must
pass timeout= so a hung upstream cannot wedge the sidecar."""
from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
root = Path(tmp)
(root / "repo.git").mkdir()
old_root = os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT")
os.environ["GIT_PROJECT_ROOT"] = str(root)
self.addCleanup(self._restore_env, old_root)
old_hook = os.environ.get("GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK")
hook = root / "access-hook"
hook.write_text("#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n")
hook.chmod(0o700)
os.environ["GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK"] = str(hook)
self.addCleanup(self._restore_hook, old_hook)
server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), GitHttpHandler)
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
backend_response = (
b"Status: 200 OK\r\n"
b"Content-Type: application/x-git-upload-pack-result\r\n"
b"\r\n"
b"0000"
)
calls = [
subprocess.CompletedProcess(["hook"], 0, b"", b""),
subprocess.CompletedProcess(["git"], 0, backend_response, b""),
]
with mock.patch(
"bot_bottle.git_http_backend.subprocess.run",
side_effect=calls,
) as run:
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
"/repo.git/git-upload-pack",
data=b"",
method="POST",
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5):
pass
for call in run.call_args_list:
self.assertEqual(
GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
call.kwargs.get("timeout"),
f"subprocess.run call missing timeout: {call}",
)
def test_access_hook_denial_is_logged_to_stdout(self):
"""When the access-hook exits non-zero we still return 403 to the
client, but the hook's stderr must also appear on the handler's
@@ -312,57 +256,6 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
os.environ["GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK"] = value
class TestMalformedStatusHeader(unittest.TestCase):
"""Malformed CGI Status: headers must not propagate as unhandled exceptions;
the handler should fall back to HTTP 500."""
def setUp(self):
from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
import tempfile
self._tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
os.environ["GIT_PROJECT_ROOT"] = self._tmp
self._server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), GitHttpHandler)
self._thread = threading.Thread(
target=self._server.serve_forever, daemon=True,
)
self._thread.start()
self._port = self._server.server_port
def tearDown(self):
self._server.shutdown()
self._server.server_close()
os.environ.pop("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", None)
import shutil
shutil.rmtree(self._tmp, ignore_errors=True)
def _get_with_backend_response(self, cgi_response: bytes) -> int:
with mock.patch(
"bot_bottle.git_http_backend.subprocess.run",
return_value=mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout=cgi_response),
):
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{self._port}/repo.git/info/refs",
method="GET",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=3) as resp:
return resp.status
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: # type: ignore
return e.code
def test_empty_status_value_returns_500(self):
status = self._get_with_backend_response(
b"Status: \r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"
)
self.assertEqual(500, status)
def test_non_numeric_status_returns_500(self):
status = self._get_with_backend_response(
b"Status: bad\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"
)
self.assertEqual(500, status)
class TestContentLengthBounds(unittest.TestCase):
"""PRD 0041: malformed or oversized Content-Length is rejected before
git http-backend is invoked."""
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
"""Unit: install.sh static contract checks."""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
class TestInstallScript(unittest.TestCase):
def test_shell_syntax(self):
result = subprocess.run(
["sh", "-n", str(ROOT / "install.sh")],
check=False,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
)
self.assertEqual("", result.stderr)
self.assertEqual(0, result.returncode)
def test_contract_phrases(self):
script = (ROOT / "install.sh").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
self.assertIn("python3", script)
self.assertIn("docker info", script)
self.assertIn("pipx install --force", script)
self.assertIn("pip install --user --upgrade", script)
self.assertIn('"${BOT_BOTTLE_BIN}" doctor', script)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-127
View File
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
"""Unit: leveled + structured logging wrappers (issue #252).
Locks three properties of bot_bottle.log:
- backward compatibility default output is byte-identical to the
original bare wrappers, so the 100+ existing single-string call
sites are unaffected;
- context rendering an optional mapping becomes a parseable
` [k=v ...]` suffix;
- level gating BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL filters by severity, debug is
silent by default, and error always surfaces.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import io
import unittest
from typing import Callable
from unittest import mock
from bot_bottle import log
def _capture(
fn: Callable[..., None],
*args: object,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
**kwargs: object,
) -> str:
buf = io.StringIO()
patched = mock.patch.dict("os.environ", env or {}, clear=False)
with patched, contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
fn(*args, **kwargs)
return buf.getvalue()
class TestBackwardCompat(unittest.TestCase):
"""No context + default level → exactly the legacy lines."""
def test_info(self):
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle: hello\n", _capture(log.info, "hello"))
def test_warn(self):
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: warning: careful\n", _capture(log.warn, "careful")
)
def test_error(self):
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: error: boom\n", _capture(log.error, "boom")
)
class TestContext(unittest.TestCase):
def test_appends_sorted_parseable_suffix(self):
out = _capture(
log.error, "rpc failed", context={"slug": "abc123", "code": "-32603"}
)
# keys sorted: code before slug
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: error: rpc failed [code=-32603 slug=abc123]\n", out
)
def test_quotes_values_with_whitespace(self):
out = _capture(
log.info, "did thing", context={"path": "/a b/c", "ok": "yes"}
)
self.assertEqual(
'bot-bottle: did thing [ok=yes path="/a b/c"]\n', out
)
def test_empty_context_is_noop_suffix(self):
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: x\n", _capture(log.info, "x", context={})
)
class TestLevels(unittest.TestCase):
def test_debug_silent_by_default(self):
self.assertEqual("", _capture(log.debug, "trace"))
def test_debug_emits_when_level_lowered(self):
out = _capture(log.debug, "trace", env={"BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL": "debug"})
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle: debug: trace\n", out)
def test_error_level_suppresses_info_and_warn(self):
env = {"BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL": "error"}
self.assertEqual("", _capture(log.info, "i", env=env))
self.assertEqual("", _capture(log.warn, "w", env=env))
# error still surfaces — nothing sits above it
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: error: e\n", _capture(log.error, "e", env=env)
)
def test_unknown_level_falls_back_to_default(self):
# garbage value → default INFO threshold, so info still prints
out = _capture(log.info, "i", env={"BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL": "loud"})
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle: i\n", out)
def test_warning_alias_accepted(self):
env = {"BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL": "warning"}
self.assertEqual("", _capture(log.info, "i", env=env))
self.assertEqual(
"bot-bottle: warning: w\n", _capture(log.warn, "w", env=env)
)
class TestDie(unittest.TestCase):
def test_die_still_raises_and_prints_error(self):
buf = io.StringIO()
with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
with self.assertRaises(log.Die) as cm:
log.die("fatal thing")
self.assertEqual("fatal thing", cm.exception.message)
self.assertIn("bot-bottle: error: fatal thing", buf.getvalue())
def test_die_surfaces_even_at_error_level(self):
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_LOG_LEVEL": "error"}):
with contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
with self.assertRaises(log.Die):
log.die("still fatal")
self.assertIn("bot-bottle: error: still fatal", buf.getvalue())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+1 -24
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ def _plan(
supervise: bool = False,
agent_git_gate_url: str = "",
agent_supervise_url: str = "",
canary: bool = False,
) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
routes_path = stage_dir / "routes.yaml"
routes_path.write_text("routes: []\n", encoding="utf-8")
@@ -43,8 +42,6 @@ def _plan(
routes_path=routes_path,
routes=("route",),
token_env_map={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "HOST_TOKEN"},
canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
)
if git:
key_path = stage_dir / "origin-key"
@@ -141,26 +138,6 @@ class TestMacosContainerLaunchArgv(unittest.TestCase):
argv,
)
def test_sidecar_argv_registers_canary_env_as_sensitive(self):
plan = _plan(stage_dir=self.stage_dir, canary=True)
argv = launch._sidecar_run_argv(
plan,
"bot-bottle-sidecars-dev-abc",
"bot-bottle-net-dev-abc",
"bot-bottle-egress-dev-abc",
)
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", argv)
self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", argv)
def test_agent_argv_receives_canary_env(self):
plan = _plan(stage_dir=self.stage_dir, canary=True)
argv = launch._agent_run_argv(
plan,
"bot-bottle-net-dev-abc",
"192.0.2.10",
)
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", argv)
def test_agent_env_points_proxy_at_sidecar_ip(self):
plan = _plan(
stage_dir=self.stage_dir,
@@ -294,7 +271,7 @@ def _build_plan(stage_dir: Path) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
manifest=_MANIFEST,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
git_gate_plan=cast(GitGatePlan, SimpleNamespace(upstreams=())),
egress_plan=cast(EgressPlan, SimpleNamespace(canary="")),
egress_plan=cast(EgressPlan, SimpleNamespace()),
supervise_plan=None,
agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
template="claude",
-27
View File
@@ -73,33 +73,6 @@ resolver #2
)
self.assertTrue(run.call_args_list[-1].kwargs["check"])
def test_build_image_anchors_relative_dockerfile_to_context(self):
status = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=[],
returncode=0,
stdout=(
'[{"status":{"state":"running"},'
'"configuration":{"dns":{"nameservers":["9.9.9.9"]}}}]'
),
stderr="",
)
with patch.object(util.subprocess, "run", return_value=status) as run, \
patch.object(util.os, "environ", {
"BOT_BOTTLE_MACOS_CONTAINER_DNS": "9.9.9.9",
}):
util.build_image(
"bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
"/repo",
dockerfile="Dockerfile.sidecars",
)
self.assertEqual(
[
"container", "build", "-t", "bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
"--dns", "9.9.9.9", "-f", "/repo/Dockerfile.sidecars", "/repo",
],
run.call_args_list[-1].args[0],
)
def test_commit_container_execs_tar_and_builds_image(self):
# stderr is bytes because subprocess.run uses stderr=PIPE without text=True
completed = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+1 -46
View File
@@ -167,40 +167,13 @@ class TestAgentProviderHostCredentials(unittest.TestCase):
},
})
def test_startup_args_allowed_for_claude(self):
b = _provider_config_bottle({
"template": "claude",
"settings": {"startup_args": ["--model", "opus"]},
})
self.assertEqual(
{"startup_args": ["--model", "opus"]},
b.agent_provider.settings,
)
def test_startup_args_allowed_for_codex(self):
b = _provider_config_bottle({
"template": "codex",
"settings": {"startup_args": ["--model", "gpt-5-codex"]},
})
self.assertEqual(
{"startup_args": ["--model", "gpt-5-codex"]},
b.agent_provider.settings,
)
def test_provider_specific_settings_still_rejected_for_claude(self):
def test_settings_rejected_for_claude(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_config_bottle({
"template": "claude",
"settings": {"models": ["qwen2.5-coder:7b"]},
})
def test_startup_args_must_be_string_array(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_config_bottle({
"template": "codex",
"settings": {"startup_args": ["--model", 42]},
})
def test_settings_models_must_be_non_empty_string_array(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_config_bottle({
@@ -329,24 +302,6 @@ class TestDlp(unittest.TestCase):
"bogus": True,
}}])
def test_outbound_on_match_omitted_is_empty(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example"}])
self.assertEqual("", b.egress.routes[0].OutboundOnMatch)
def test_outbound_on_match_accepts_policies(self):
for policy in ("block", "redact", "supervise"):
with self.subTest(policy=policy):
b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example", "dlp": {
"outbound_on_match": policy,
}}])
self.assertEqual(policy, b.egress.routes[0].OutboundOnMatch)
def test_outbound_on_match_rejects_unknown_value(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_bottle([{"host": "x.example", "dlp": {
"outbound_on_match": "allow",
}}])
class TestGitPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
def test_omitted_means_https_git_fetch_disabled(self):
+3 -176
View File
@@ -423,182 +423,9 @@ class TestExtendsErrors(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertIn("extends cycle", msg)
def test_non_string_non_list_extends_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(_build, child={"extends": 123})
self.assertIn("extends must be a string or list of strings", msg)
def test_list_entry_non_string_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(_build, child={"extends": [123]})
self.assertIn("extends[0] must be a string", msg)
class TestExtendsMultiParent(unittest.TestCase):
"""extends: [p1, p2, ...] — multi-parent composition (issue #268)."""
_GIT_A = {"url": "ssh://git@host-a/a.git", "key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/k"}}
_GIT_B = {"url": "ssh://git@host-b/b.git", "key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/k"}}
def test_single_element_list_same_as_string(self):
m = _build(
base={"env": {"X": "1"}},
child={"extends": ["base"]},
)
self.assertEqual({"X": "1"}, dict(m.bottles["child"].env))
def test_two_parents_env_union(self):
m = _build(
p1={"env": {"A": "1"}},
p2={"env": {"B": "2"}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
self.assertEqual({"A": "1", "B": "2"}, dict(m.bottles["child"].env))
def test_two_parents_env_last_wins_on_collision(self):
m = _build(
p1={"env": {"X": "from-p1"}},
p2={"env": {"X": "from-p2"}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
self.assertEqual("from-p2", m.bottles["child"].env["X"])
def test_child_wins_over_all_parents(self):
m = _build(
p1={"env": {"X": "from-p1"}},
p2={"env": {"X": "from-p2"}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"], "env": {"X": "from-child"}},
)
self.assertEqual("from-child", m.bottles["child"].env["X"])
def test_two_parents_supervise_last_wins(self):
m = _build(
p1={"supervise": False},
p2={"supervise": True},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
self.assertTrue(m.bottles["child"].supervise)
def test_child_supervise_overrides_all_parents(self):
m = _build(
p1={"supervise": True},
p2={"supervise": True},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"], "supervise": False},
)
self.assertFalse(m.bottles["child"].supervise)
def test_two_parents_egress_routes_concatenated(self):
m = _build(
p1={"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "a.example.com"}]}},
p2={"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "b.example.com"}]}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
hosts = [r.Host for r in m.bottles["child"].egress.routes]
self.assertEqual(["a.example.com", "b.example.com"], hosts)
def test_child_egress_appends_after_combined_parents(self):
m = _build(
p1={"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "a.example.com"}]}},
p2={"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "b.example.com"}]}},
child={
"extends": ["p1", "p2"],
"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "c.example.com"}]},
},
)
hosts = [r.Host for r in m.bottles["child"].egress.routes]
self.assertEqual(["a.example.com", "b.example.com", "c.example.com"], hosts)
def test_two_parents_git_repos_union(self):
m = _build(
p1={"git-gate": {"repos": {"a": self._GIT_A}}},
p2={"git-gate": {"repos": {"b": self._GIT_B}}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
names = {e.Name for e in m.bottles["child"].git}
self.assertEqual({"a", "b"}, names)
def test_two_parents_git_same_name_later_wins_per_field(self):
# Both parents declare the same repo name. p2's `key` wins; p1's
# `host_key` is preserved because p2 doesn't override it.
p1_entry = {
"url": "ssh://git@host-a/repo.git",
"host_key": "ecdsa AAAA",
"key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/k1"},
}
p2_entry = {
"url": "ssh://git@host-a/repo.git", # required, same url
"key": {"provider": "gitea", "forge_token_env": "TOK"},
}
m = _build(
p1={"git-gate": {"repos": {"repo": p1_entry}}},
p2={"git-gate": {"repos": {"repo": p2_entry}}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
entries = m.bottles["child"].git
self.assertEqual(1, len(entries))
e = entries[0]
self.assertEqual("ssh://git@host-a/repo.git", e.Upstream)
self.assertEqual("ecdsa AAAA", e.KnownHostKey)
self.assertEqual("gitea", e.Key.provider)
def test_p1_repos_preserved_when_p2_has_none(self):
m = _build(
p1={"git-gate": {"repos": {"a": self._GIT_A}}},
p2={"env": {"X": "1"}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2"]},
)
names = [e.Name for e in m.bottles["child"].git]
self.assertEqual(["a"], names)
def test_diamond_shared_ancestor_resolved_once(self):
# a <- b, a <- c; child extends [b, c]
# `a` must be resolved once and cached.
m = _build(
a={"env": {"FROM_A": "1"}, "supervise": False},
b={"extends": "a", "env": {"FROM_B": "1"}},
c={"extends": "a", "env": {"FROM_C": "1"}},
child={"extends": ["b", "c"]},
)
child = m.bottles["child"]
self.assertEqual("1", child.env["FROM_A"])
self.assertEqual("1", child.env["FROM_B"])
self.assertEqual("1", child.env["FROM_C"])
# supervise=False from `a` threads through both b and c; c is the
# later parent so its effective supervise (False) wins.
self.assertFalse(child.supervise)
def test_three_parents_env_fold_order(self):
m = _build(
p1={"env": {"X": "1", "A": "a"}},
p2={"env": {"X": "2", "B": "b"}},
p3={"env": {"X": "3", "C": "c"}},
child={"extends": ["p1", "p2", "p3"]},
)
env = dict(m.bottles["child"].env)
self.assertEqual("3", env["X"])
self.assertEqual("a", env["A"])
self.assertEqual("b", env["B"])
self.assertEqual("c", env["C"])
def test_undefined_bottle_in_list_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(
_build,
base={"env": {}},
child={"extends": ["base", "ghost"]},
)
self.assertIn("extends 'ghost'", msg)
self.assertIn("not defined", msg)
def test_self_reference_in_list_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(_build, child={"extends": ["child"]})
self.assertIn("extends itself", msg)
def test_cycle_through_multi_parent_edge_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(
_build,
a={"extends": ["b", "c"]},
b={},
c={"extends": "a"},
)
self.assertIn("extends cycle", msg)
def test_non_string_extends_dies(self):
msg = _error_message(_build, child={"extends": ["base"]})
self.assertIn("extends must be a string", msg)
class TestExtendsAvailableInBottleKeys(unittest.TestCase):
+1 -1
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ def _capture_print(plan: DockerBottlePlan | SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> list[str]
orig = sys.stderr
sys.stderr = buf
try:
plan.print()
plan.print(remote_control=False)
finally:
sys.stderr = orig
return buf.getvalue().splitlines()
-38
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import unittest
from bot_bottle.git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME,
_gitconfig_validate_value,
git_gate_render_gitconfig,
)
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
@@ -91,42 +90,5 @@ class TestGitGateGitconfigRender(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("gitea.dideric.is", out)
class TestGitconfigValidateValue(unittest.TestCase):
"""_gitconfig_validate_value rejects values that would inject gitconfig keys."""
def test_normal_url_passes(self):
_gitconfig_validate_value("url", "ssh://git@github.com/owner/repo.git")
def test_newline_in_url_raises(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_gitconfig_validate_value("url", "ssh://git@github.com/owner/\nrepo.git")
def test_carriage_return_in_url_raises(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_gitconfig_validate_value("url", "ssh://git@github.com/\rrepo.git")
def test_error_message_names_field(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError, msg="error should name the field") as ctx:
_gitconfig_validate_value("repos['bad'].url", "ssh://host/\npath")
self.assertIn("repos['bad'].url", str(ctx.exception))
class TestGitconfigRenderRejectsNewlineInUpstream(unittest.TestCase):
"""git_gate_render_gitconfig raises on Upstream values with newlines."""
def test_newline_in_upstream_raises(self):
m = ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {"dev": {"git-gate": {"repos": {
"evil": {
"url": "ssh://git@github.com/owner/\nfake-key = injected\nrepo.git",
"key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/dev/null"},
},
}}}},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
})
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
git_gate_render_gitconfig(m.bottles["dev"].git, GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
"""Unit: Python package metadata for install script PRD."""
from __future__ import annotations
import tomllib
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
class TestPyproject(unittest.TestCase):
def test_console_script_and_no_runtime_dependencies(self):
data = tomllib.loads((ROOT / "pyproject.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
project = data["project"]
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle", project["name"])
self.assertEqual(">=3.11", project["requires-python"])
self.assertEqual([], project["dependencies"])
self.assertEqual(
"bot_bottle.cli:main",
project["scripts"]["bot-bottle"],
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+5 -29
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle_plan import (
SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
)
from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines import launch as _launch
# from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.provision import (
# workspace as _workspace,
# )
from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.launch import _bundle_launch_spec
from bot_bottle.backend.util import AGENT_CA_PATH
from bot_bottle.egress import EgressPlan, EgressRoute
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ class _Provider(AgentProvider):
return AgentProviderRuntime(
template="test", command="test", image="",
prompt_mode="append_file", bypass_args=(), resume_args=(),
remote_control_args=(),
)
def provision_plan(self, **kwargs): # type: ignore[override]
raise NotImplementedError
@@ -83,7 +86,6 @@ def _plan(
stage_dir: Path | None = None,
egress_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
egress_ca_path: Path = Path(),
canary: bool = False,
supervise: bool = False,
bundle_ip: str = "192.168.50.2",
agent_git_gate_host: str = "127.0.0.1:55555",
@@ -130,6 +132,7 @@ def _plan(
supervise_plan = SupervisePlan(
slug="demo-abc12",
queue_dir=Path("/tmp/queue"),
current_config_dir=Path("/tmp/current-config"),
)
return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
@@ -153,8 +156,6 @@ def _plan(
routes=egress_routes,
token_env_map={},
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_path,
canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
),
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_git_gate_host=agent_git_gate_host,
@@ -410,31 +411,6 @@ class TestBundleLaunchSpec(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn(9420, spec.ports_to_publish)
self.assertNotIn(9418, spec.ports_to_publish)
def test_canary_env_registered_as_sensitive_in_bundle(self):
plan = _plan(canary=True)
spec = _bundle_launch_spec(plan, "net", "127.0.0.16")
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", spec.environment)
self.assertIn(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
spec.environment,
)
def test_canary_env_visible_to_smolvm_guest(self):
plan = _plan(canary=True)
with patch.object(
_launch._bundle,
"bundle_host_port",
return_value="65000",
):
stamped = _launch._discover_urls(plan, "127.0.0.16")
self.assertEqual(
"fake-canary-value",
stamped.guest_env["CANON_ALPHA_SECRET"],
)
class TestProvisionGitUser(unittest.TestCase):
"""`provision_git` runs `git config --global` inside the
+20 -26
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise import (
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
archive_proposal,
audit_log_path,
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ FIXED_TS = datetime(2026, 5, 25, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def _proposal(
tool: str = TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
proposed: str = "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
justification: str = "need egress",
tool: str = TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
proposed: str = "FROM python:3.13\n",
justification: str = "need a capability",
) -> Proposal:
return Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="dev",
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ class TestProposalRoundtrip(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertTrue(p.id)
self.assertEqual("2026-05-25T12:00:00+00:00", p.arrival_timestamp)
self.assertEqual("dev", p.bottle_slug)
self.assertEqual(TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, p.tool)
self.assertEqual(TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK, p.tool)
def test_to_from_dict_roundtrip(self):
p = _proposal()
@@ -142,14 +142,14 @@ class TestQueueIO(unittest.TestCase):
def test_list_pending_sorted_by_arrival(self):
# Fabricate two with explicit timestamps.
a = Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
proposed_file="routes:\n - host: early.example.com\n", justification="early",
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
proposed_file="FROM python:3.13\n", justification="early",
current_file_hash="x",
now=datetime(2026, 5, 25, 10, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
)
b = Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
proposed_file="routes:\n - host: late.example.com\n", justification="late",
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
proposed_file="FROM python:3.13\n", justification="late",
current_file_hash="x",
now=datetime(2026, 5, 25, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
)
@@ -318,29 +318,19 @@ class TestToolConstants(unittest.TestCase):
def test_tools_tuple_matches_individual_constants(self):
self.assertEqual(
(
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
supervise.TOOL_ALLOW,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
supervise.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
),
supervise.TOOLS,
)
def test_token_allow_proposal_roundtrips(self):
p = Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="dev",
tool=supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
proposed_file="host: api.example.com\n",
justification="false positive",
current_file_hash="h",
)
self.assertEqual(p, Proposal.from_dict(p.to_dict()))
def test_component_map_has_egress_entries(self):
self.assertEqual(
{
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW: "egress",
supervise.TOOL_ALLOW: "egress",
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "egress",
},
supervise.COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
@@ -377,16 +367,20 @@ class TestSupervisePrepare(unittest.TestCase):
supervise.bot_bottle_root = fake_root # type: ignore[assignment]
return lambda: setattr(supervise, "bot_bottle_root", original)
def test_prepare_creates_queue(self):
def test_prepare_creates_queue_and_current_config(self):
plan = _StubSupervise().prepare("dev", self.stage_dir)
self.assertTrue(plan.queue_dir.is_dir())
self.assertTrue(plan.current_config_dir.is_dir())
self.assertEqual("dev", plan.slug)
self.assertEqual("", plan.internal_network)
def test_prepare_does_not_create_current_config_dir(self):
def test_prepare_writes_no_files_to_current_config(self):
# dockerfile_content is no longer accepted by prepare.
# routes.yaml + allowlist live behind the
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool (PRD 0017 chunk 3).
plan = _StubSupervise().prepare("dev", self.stage_dir)
self.assertFalse((self.stage_dir / "current-config").exists())
self.assertFalse(hasattr(plan, "current_config_dir"))
files = sorted(p.name for p in plan.current_config_dir.iterdir())
self.assertEqual([], files)
if __name__ == "__main__":
+29 -58
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,8 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise import (
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
read_audit_entries,
read_response,
sha256_hex,
@@ -30,12 +29,12 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise import (
FIXED = datetime(2026, 5, 25, 12, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def _proposal(slug: str = "dev", tool: str = TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW) -> Proposal:
def _proposal(slug: str = "dev", tool: str = TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK) -> Proposal:
payloads = {
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW: "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK: "FROM python:3.13\n",
supervise.TOOL_ALLOW: "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW: "file: tests/test_fixture.py\nline: 3\n",
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW: "host: api.example.com\ndetector: token\n",
}
payload = payloads.get(tool, "")
return Proposal.new(
@@ -85,14 +84,14 @@ class TestDiscoverPending(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
def test_sorted_by_arrival_across_bottles(self):
early = Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="api", tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
proposed_file="routes:\n - host: early.example.com\n", justification="early",
bottle_slug="api", tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
proposed_file="FROM python:3.13\n", justification="early",
current_file_hash="h",
now=datetime(2026, 5, 25, 10, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
)
late = Proposal.new(
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
proposed_file="routes:\n - host: late.example.com\n", justification="late",
bottle_slug="dev", tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
proposed_file="FROM python:3.13\n", justification="late",
current_file_hash="h",
now=datetime(2026, 5, 25, 14, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
)
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ class TestApproveReject(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
def tearDown(self):
self._teardown_fake_home()
def _enqueue(self, tool: str = TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW):
def _enqueue(self, tool: str = TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK):
p = _proposal(tool=tool)
qdir = supervise.queue_dir_for_slug("dev")
qdir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
@@ -130,29 +129,19 @@ class TestApproveReject(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
def test_approve_writes_response(self):
qp = self._enqueue()
with patch(
"bot_bottle.cli.supervise.apply_routes_change",
return_value=("routes: []\n", "routes:\n - host: example.com\n"),
):
supervise_cli.approve(qp)
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
supervise_cli.approve(qp)
# capability-block is archived on approve, so the response file
# moves to processed/ before the caller can read it.
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir / "processed", qp.proposal.id)
self.assertEqual(STATUS_APPROVED, resp.status)
self.assertIsNone(resp.final_file)
def test_approve_with_final_file_marks_modified(self):
qp = self._enqueue()
with patch(
"bot_bottle.cli.supervise.apply_routes_change",
return_value=("routes: []\n", "routes:\n - host: edited.example.com\n"),
):
supervise_cli.approve(
qp,
final_file="routes:\n - host: edited.example.com\n",
notes="tweaked",
)
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
supervise_cli.approve(qp, final_file="FROM bookworm\n", notes="tweaked")
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir / "processed", qp.proposal.id)
self.assertEqual(STATUS_MODIFIED, resp.status)
self.assertEqual("routes:\n - host: edited.example.com\n", resp.final_file)
self.assertEqual("FROM bookworm\n", resp.final_file)
self.assertEqual("tweaked", resp.notes)
def test_reject_writes_rejection(self):
@@ -162,6 +151,11 @@ class TestApproveReject(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(STATUS_REJECTED, resp.status)
self.assertEqual("nope", resp.notes)
def test_no_audit_log_for_capability_block(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK)
supervise_cli.approve(qp)
self.assertEqual([], read_audit_entries("egress", "dev"))
def test_approve_egress_block_writes_audit_log(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=supervise.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK)
with patch(
@@ -202,38 +196,10 @@ class TestApproveReject(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
self.assertEqual("test fixture", resp.notes)
def test_approve_token_allow_leaves_response_for_egress(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW)
supervise_cli.approve(qp, notes="false positive")
# The egress addon polls the queue dir for the response; the TUI must
# not archive it (the addon archives after reading).
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
self.assertEqual(STATUS_APPROVED, resp.status)
self.assertEqual("false positive", resp.notes)
self.assertFalse((qp.queue_dir / "processed").exists())
def test_token_allow_writes_no_audit_log(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW)
supervise_cli.approve(qp, notes="false positive")
self.assertEqual([], read_audit_entries("egress", "dev"))
def test_tui_token_allow_requires_reason(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW)
with patch.object(supervise_cli, "_prompt", return_value=""):
status = supervise_cli._approve_from_tui(None, qp) # type: ignore[arg-type]
self.assertEqual("approve aborted (empty reason)", status)
self.assertFalse((qp.queue_dir / "processed").exists())
def test_tui_token_allow_writes_reason(self):
qp = self._enqueue(tool=TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW)
with patch.object(supervise_cli, "_prompt", return_value="legit"):
status = supervise_cli._approve_from_tui(None, qp) # type: ignore[arg-type]
self.assertIn("approved egress-token-allow", status)
resp = read_response(qp.queue_dir, qp.proposal.id)
self.assertEqual("legit", resp.notes)
def test_suffix_for_token_allow_is_txt(self):
self.assertEqual(".txt", supervise_cli._suffix_for_tool(TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW))
# class TestCapabilityApplyWiring(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
# # DISABLED — capability_apply functionality is currently commented out.
# pass
class TestEditInEditor(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -280,5 +246,10 @@ class TestEditInEditor(unittest.TestCase):
os.environ["EDITOR"] = original_editor
# class TestCapabilityBlockSmolmachinesGuard(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
# # DISABLED — capability_apply functionality is currently commented out.
# pass
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+26 -180
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import supervise as _sv # noqa: E402 # type: ignore
from bot_bottle import supervise_server # noqa: E402
from bot_bottle.supervise_server import (
ERR_INTERNAL,
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
ERR_INVALID_REQUEST,
ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND,
@@ -30,9 +29,7 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise_server import (
PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD,
ServerConfig,
TOOL_DEFINITIONS,
_RpcClientError,
_RpcError,
_RpcInternalError,
_response_timeout_from_env,
format_response_text,
handle_initialize,
@@ -50,19 +47,19 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise_server import (
class TestValidation(unittest.TestCase):
def test_capability_block_accepts_anything_nonempty(self):
validate_proposed_file(
_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"FROM python:3.13\nRUN apk add git\n",
)
def test_empty_proposed_file_rejected_for_tools_with_file_field(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError):
validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, " \n\t")
def test_capability_block_rejected_as_unknown_tool(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
validate_proposed_file("capability-block", "FROM python:3.13\n")
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
self.assertIn("unknown tool", cm.exception.message)
validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK, " \n\t")
def test_egress_routes_yaml_is_validated(self):
validate_proposed_file(
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
_sv.TOOL_ALLOW,
"routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
)
@@ -70,74 +67,6 @@ class TestValidation(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError):
validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK, "routes: nope\n")
def test_egress_routes_yaml_rejects_log_full(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
validate_proposed_file(
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"log: 2\nroutes:\n - host: example.com\n",
)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
self.assertIn("must not change egress logging", cm.exception.message)
# --- Error taxonomy --------------------------------------------------------
class TestRpcErrorTaxonomy(unittest.TestCase):
def test_rpc_client_error_is_rpc_error(self):
e = _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "bad param")
self.assertIsInstance(e, _RpcError)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, e.code)
self.assertEqual("bad param", e.message)
def test_rpc_internal_error_is_rpc_error(self):
e = _RpcInternalError("disk full")
self.assertIsInstance(e, _RpcError)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, e.code)
self.assertEqual("disk full", e.message)
def test_rpc_internal_error_preserves_cause(self):
cause = OSError("no space left on device")
try:
raise _RpcInternalError("failed to write") from cause
except _RpcInternalError as e:
self.assertIs(cause, e.__cause__)
def test_parse_error_is_client_error(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError):
parse_jsonrpc(b"{bad json")
def test_validation_error_is_client_error(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError):
validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, "routes: nope\n")
def test_unknown_tool_in_tools_call_is_client_error(self):
config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", queue_dir=Path("/unused"))
with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
handle_tools_call({"name": "no-such-tool", "arguments": {}}, config)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
class TestRpcInternalErrorOnIoFailure(unittest.TestCase):
def test_write_proposal_os_error_raises_internal(self):
config = ServerConfig(
bottle_slug="dev",
queue_dir=Path("/dev/null/cannot-exist"),
)
with self.assertRaises(_RpcInternalError) as cm:
handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"justification": "x",
},
},
config,
)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, cm.exception.code)
self.assertIsNotNone(cm.exception.__cause__)
# --- JSON-RPC parsing ------------------------------------------------------
@@ -218,7 +147,8 @@ class TestHandleToolsList(unittest.TestCase):
names = [t["name"] for t in result["tools"]] # type: ignore[index]
self.assertEqual(
sorted([
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
_sv.TOOL_ALLOW,
_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
_sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
]),
@@ -251,7 +181,7 @@ class TestHandleToolsList(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("required", schema) # type: ignore[operator]
def test_egress_tools_take_routes_yaml_and_justification(self):
for tool_name in (_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
for tool_name in (_sv.TOOL_ALLOW, _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
with self.subTest(tool_name=tool_name):
tool = next(t for t in TOOL_DEFINITIONS if t["name"] == tool_name)
schema = tool["inputSchema"]
@@ -294,10 +224,10 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
try:
result = handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"justification": "need example.com",
"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
"justification": "need git",
},
},
self.config,
@@ -314,7 +244,7 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
try:
result = handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"name": _sv.TOOL_ALLOW,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"justification": "need example.com",
@@ -334,9 +264,9 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
try:
result = handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
"justification": "needed for tests",
},
},
@@ -358,52 +288,20 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError):
handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"arguments": {"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n"},
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"arguments": {"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n"},
},
self.config,
)
def test_missing_name_raises(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
handle_tools_call({"arguments": {}}, self.config)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
def test_arguments_must_be_object(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"arguments": [],
},
self.config,
)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
self.assertIn("must be an object", cm.exception.message)
def test_capability_block_call_raises_unknown_tool(self):
with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
handle_tools_call(
{
"name": "capability-block",
"arguments": {
"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
"justification": "need git",
},
},
self.config,
)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
self.assertIn("unknown tool", cm.exception.message)
def test_archives_proposal_after_response(self):
responder = self._respond_when_proposal_appears(_sv.STATUS_APPROVED)
try:
handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
"justification": "x",
},
},
@@ -425,10 +323,10 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
)
result = handle_tools_call(
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"justification": "need egress",
"dockerfile": "FROM python:3.13\n",
"justification": "need a capability",
},
},
config,
@@ -443,31 +341,6 @@ class TestHandleToolsCall(unittest.TestCase):
class TestHandleListEgressRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
def test_success_returns_body_text(self):
class _Resp:
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, exc_type: type[BaseException] | None, exc: BaseException | None, tb: object) -> bool:
return False
def read(self):
return b"[{\"host\": \"example.com\"}]"
class _Opener:
def open(self, *args, **kwargs): # noqa: ANN001, ANN002, ANN003 # type: ignore
return _Resp()
with patch.object(supervise_server.urllib.request, "build_opener", return_value=_Opener()):
result = handle_list_egress_routes(
{},
ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", queue_dir=Path("/unused")),
)
self.assertFalse(result["isError"]) # type: ignore[index]
text = result["content"][0]["text"] # type: ignore[index]
self.assertIn("example.com", text)
def test_url_error_returns_tool_error(self):
class _Opener:
def open(self, *args, **kwargs): # noqa: ANN001, ANN002, ANN003 # type: ignore
@@ -527,13 +400,6 @@ class TestFormatResponseText(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("the operator modified", text.lower())
class TestFormatPendingResponseText(unittest.TestCase):
def test_formats_timeout_message(self):
text = supervise_server.format_pending_response_text(12.5)
self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
self.assertIn("12.5s", text)
# --- End-to-end HTTP sanity ------------------------------------------------
@@ -584,8 +450,8 @@ class TestHttpEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("2.0", result["jsonrpc"])
self.assertEqual(1, result["id"])
names = [t["name"] for t in result["result"]["tools"]] # type: ignore[index]
self.assertNotIn("capability-block", names)
self.assertIn(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, names)
self.assertIn(_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK, names)
self.assertIn(_sv.TOOL_ALLOW, names)
self.assertIn(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK, names)
def test_unknown_method_returns_jsonrpc_error(self):
@@ -594,26 +460,6 @@ class TestHttpEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
)
self.assertEqual(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, result["error"]["code"]) # type: ignore[index]
def test_internal_error_returns_err_internal_over_http(self):
with patch.object(
supervise_server._sv, "write_proposal",
side_effect=OSError("disk full"),
):
result = self._post_jsonrpc({
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 99,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
"arguments": {
"routes_yaml": "routes:\n - host: example.com\n",
"justification": "x",
},
},
})
self.assertIn("error", result)
self.assertEqual(ERR_INTERNAL, result["error"]["code"]) # type: ignore[index]
def test_health_endpoint(self):
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection("127.0.0.1", self.port, timeout=5)
try: