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Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis-codex dfeb32a473 ci: enforce canonical issue metadata policy
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test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 31s
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lint / lint (push) Failing after 11m37s
2026-07-18 02:03:22 +00:00
6 changed files with 11 additions and 99 deletions
+3 -17
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@@ -66,25 +66,11 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir mitmproxy==11.1.3
# would pin us to that image's cadence). python (already present) does the
# download so we add no curl/wget. trixie apt also ships gitleaks, but an
# older 8.16; the pinned download keeps the verified 8.30.1.
#
# Arch-aware: the asset + SHA are picked from the build's target
# architecture so an arm64 host (Apple Silicon) gets the arm64 binary
# rather than an x86_64 one that dies with "Exec format error" the first
# time the pre-receive hook runs it. TARGETARCH is auto-populated by
# BuildKit; the dpkg fallback keeps it correct under a legacy builder.
ARG GITLEAKS_VERSION=8.30.1
ARG GITLEAKS_SHA256_AMD64=551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb
ARG GITLEAKS_SHA256_ARM64=e4a487ee7ccd7d3a7f7ec08657610aa3606637dab924210b3aee62570fb4b080
ARG TARGETARCH
RUN arch="${TARGETARCH:-$(dpkg --print-architecture)}" \
&& case "$arch" in \
amd64) asset="linux_x64"; sha="${GITLEAKS_SHA256_AMD64}" ;; \
arm64) asset="linux_arm64"; sha="${GITLEAKS_SHA256_ARM64}" ;; \
*) echo "unsupported gitleaks target arch: $arch" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
esac \
&& url="https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_${asset}.tar.gz" \
ARG GITLEAKS_SHA256=551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb
RUN url="https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \
&& python3 -c "import sys,urllib.request; urllib.request.urlretrieve(sys.argv[1], '/tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz')" "$url" \
&& echo "${sha} /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& echo "${GITLEAKS_SHA256} /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/bin gitleaks \
&& rm /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz
@@ -94,12 +94,6 @@ def provision_git_gate(
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", "/etc/git-gate"])
transport.cp_into(str(plan.hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/pre-receive")
transport.cp_into(str(plan.access_hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/access-hook")
# The access-hook is exec'd directly (not via `sh`), so it needs the x bit.
# Set it here rather than trusting the copy to carry the staged 0o700:
# `docker cp` preserves source mode, but the Apple `container cp` does not,
# landing the hook 0o644 → EACCES when the git-http handler tries to exec it.
# chmod on the gateway side is backend-neutral and fixes every transport.
transport.exec(["chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"])
creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
for u in plan.upstreams:
+2 -4
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@@ -112,10 +112,8 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
access_hook = stage_dir / "git_gate_access_hook.sh"
access_hook.write_text(git_gate_render_access_hook())
# 0o700 (not 0o600): git daemon execs --access-hook directly,
# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. The gateway copy
# does not necessarily preserve this mode (`docker cp` does, the
# Apple `container cp` does not), so provision_git_gate re-applies
# +x on the gateway side — see backend/docker/gateway_provision.py.
# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. docker cp
# preserves source mode into the container.
access_hook.chmod(0o700)
upstreams_with_files: list[GitGateUpstream] = []
for u in upstreams:
+6 -18
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@@ -148,24 +148,12 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook",
)
peer = self.client_address[0]
try:
hook = subprocess.run(
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
# The access-hook couldn't be run (missing, not executable,
# timed out, …). Fail closed with a real HTTP error rather
# than letting the exception kill the handler thread — an
# unhandled exception closes the socket with no response, which
# the client sees as an opaque "empty reply from server".
self.log_message(
"access-hook could not run for %s: %s", parsed.path, exc,
)
self.send_error(503, "git-gate access-hook unavailable")
return
hook = subprocess.run(
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
if hook.returncode != 0:
detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
"utf-8", errors="replace",
-12
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@@ -69,18 +69,6 @@ class TestProvisionGitGate(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(1, len(exec_scripts))
self.assertIn("repo=/git/bottle1/${name}.git", exec_scripts[0][-1])
def test_makes_access_hook_executable_on_the_gateway(self) -> None:
# Regression: the access-hook is exec'd directly, so it needs the x
# bit. The copy alone can't be trusted to carry the staged 0o700
# (`docker cp` preserves mode, the Apple `container cp` does not),
# so provisioning must re-apply +x on the gateway side.
calls: list[list[str]] = []
with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
provision_git_gate(DockerGatewayTransport("gw"), "bottle1", _plan(_up("foo")))
self.assertIn(
["docker", "exec", "gw", "chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"], calls,
)
def test_omits_known_hosts_copy_when_absent(self) -> None:
calls: list[list[str]] = []
with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
-42
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@@ -364,48 +364,6 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("access-hook denied", logged)
self.assertIn("exit=2", logged)
def test_access_hook_that_cannot_run_fails_closed_503(self):
"""Regression: when the access-hook can't be exec'd (missing / not
executable — a PermissionError from subprocess.run), the handler must
fail closed with a real HTTP status instead of letting the exception
kill the thread, which closes the socket with no response and the
client sees an opaque "empty reply from server"."""
from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
import io
import sys
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
root = Path(tmp)
(root / "repo.git").mkdir()
old_root = os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT")
os.environ["GIT_PROJECT_ROOT"] = str(root)
self.addCleanup(self._restore_env, old_root)
server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), GitHttpHandler)
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
with mock.patch(
"bot_bottle.git_http_backend.subprocess.run",
side_effect=PermissionError(13, "Permission denied"),
):
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(sys, "stdout", buf):
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
"/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
method="GET",
)
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
self.fail("expected HTTPError 503")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: # type: ignore
self.assertEqual(503, e.code)
self.assertIn("access-hook could not run", buf.getvalue())
@staticmethod
def _restore_env(value: str | None) -> None:
if value is None: