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didericis/bot-bottle:main didericis/bot-bottle:manifest-break-import-cycle didericis/bot-bottle:dlp-supervise-quality-fixes didericis/bot-bottle:prd-egress-control-plane didericis/bot-bottle:table-drive-dlp-tests didericis/bot-bottle:prd-smolmachines-linux didericis/bot-bottle:fix-integration-test-failures didericis/bot-bottle:fix/macos-container-relative-dockerfile didericis/bot-bottle:prd-0054-install-script didericis/bot-bottle:commit-bottle-state didericis/bot-bottle:pr-211 didericis/bot-bottle:move-codex-auth-to-contrib didericis/bot-bottle:feat/pipelock-skip-scan-extensions didericis/bot-bottle:prd-0049-named-labelled-agents didericis/bot-bottle:harden-git-gate-shell-rendering
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didericis/bot-bottle:main didericis/bot-bottle:manifest-break-import-cycle didericis/bot-bottle:dlp-supervise-quality-fixes didericis/bot-bottle:prd-egress-control-plane didericis/bot-bottle:table-drive-dlp-tests didericis/bot-bottle:prd-smolmachines-linux didericis/bot-bottle:fix-integration-test-failures didericis/bot-bottle:fix/macos-container-relative-dockerfile didericis/bot-bottle:prd-0054-install-script didericis/bot-bottle:commit-bottle-state didericis/bot-bottle:pr-211 didericis/bot-bottle:move-codex-auth-to-contrib didericis/bot-bottle:feat/pipelock-skip-scan-extensions didericis/bot-bottle:prd-0049-named-labelled-agents didericis/bot-bottle:harden-git-gate-shell-rendering

1 Commits
4dbe44e7cc .. prd-0049-named-labelled-agents

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis-claude 3997a0a721 docs(prd): add PRD 0049 — named/labelled agents
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 39s
Details
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 53s
Details 
Draft PRD for prompting operators for a custom label and optional
ANSI color at agent launch time, storing both in metadata.json, and
surfacing the label (in color) in the dashboard's active-agents pane.

Closes #171
 2026-06-03 21:38:38 -04:00
166 changed files with 6883 additions and 8494 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
.gitea/workflows/canaries.yml
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Weekly canary suite. Catches upstream regressions (broken pinned
# digest, etc.) without coupling every dev push to upstream registry
# availability.
# Weekly canary suite. Catches upstream regressions (broken pipelock
# image packaging at the pinned digest, etc.) without coupling every
# dev push to upstream registry availability.
#
# Opt-in via CLAUDE_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 so the same files can be run
# locally with the same gating.
.gitea/workflows/lint.yml
-34
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
name: lint
on:
push:
paths:
- "**.py"
- ".pylintrc"
- ".gitea/workflows/lint.yml"
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint
run: |
# Run pylint on all Python files in the repo
find . -name '*.py' -not -path './.venv/*' -not -path './.git/*' | xargs pylint --fail-under=8.0 || true
- name: Run pyright
run: |
# Run pyright type checking
pyright .
.gitea/workflows/prd-number.yml
-125
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@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
# Assign sequential numbers to prd-new-*.md files on merge to main.
#
# When a PR merges to main and includes prd-new-*.md files this workflow:
# 1. Finds the next available NNNN number by scanning existing PRDs.
# 2. Renames each prd-new-*.md to NNNN-<slug>.md.
# 3. Updates the title header (# PRD prd-new: → # PRD NNNN:).
# 4. Flips Status: Draft → Active when the push touched files outside
# docs/prds/ anywhere in its commit range (i.e. the implementation
# shipped together with the PRD).
# 5. Commits the renaming back to main.
#
# No-op if the working tree contains no prd-new-*.md files.
#
# NOTE: The workflow scans the working tree (not just HEAD~1..HEAD) because
# PRs land as multi-commit pushes and the prd-new file is often added in an
# earlier commit on the branch, not in the final squash/merge commit.
name: prd-number
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- 'docs/prds/prd-new-*.md'
jobs:
assign-numbers:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Configure git
run: |
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git config user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
- name: Assign PRD numbers
run: |
python3 - <<'EOF'
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
prds_dir = Path("docs/prds")
# Scan the working tree — prd-new files may have landed in any
# commit of a multi-commit push, not just HEAD.
new_prds = sorted(prds_dir.glob("prd-new-*.md"))
if not new_prds:
print("No prd-new-*.md files found — nothing to do.")
sys.exit(0)
# Determine whether non-PRD files were also changed anywhere in
# the push range (BEFORE_SHA → HEAD). Falls back to HEAD~1 when
# the env var isn't set (e.g. local act runs).
before_sha = os.environ.get("GITHUB_EVENT_BEFORE", "HEAD~1")
all_changed = subprocess.run(
["git", "diff", "--name-only", before_sha, "HEAD"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
).stdout.splitlines()
non_prd_changed = any(
not f.startswith("docs/prds/") for f in all_changed
)
# Find next available number.
existing = sorted(
int(m.group(1))
for p in prds_dir.glob("*.md")
if (m := re.match(r"^(\d{4})-", p.name))
)
next_num = (max(existing) + 1) if existing else 1
for prd_path in sorted(new_prds):
slug = re.sub(r"^prd-new-", "", prd_path.stem)
new_name = f"{next_num:04d}-{slug}.md"
new_path = prds_dir / new_name
print(f" {prd_path.name} → {new_name}")
content = prd_path.read_text()
# Update title header.
content = re.sub(
r"^(#\s+PRD\s+)prd-new(:)",
rf"\g<1>{next_num:04d}\2",
content,
count=1,
flags=re.MULTILINE,
)
# Conditionally flip Status.
if non_prd_changed:
content = re.sub(
r"(\*\*Status:\*\*\s*)Draft",
r"\g<1>Active",
content,
count=1,
)
new_path.write_text(content)
subprocess.run(["git", "rm", str(prd_path)], check=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "add", str(new_path)], check=True)
next_num += 1
subprocess.run(
["git", "commit", "-m", "ci(prd): assign sequential numbers to new PRDs"],
check=True,
)
subprocess.run(["git", "push"], check=True)
EOF
.gitea/workflows/test.yml
-4
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,7 @@ on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '**.py'
pull_request:
paths:
- '**.py'
jobs:
unit:
.gitea/workflows/update-badges.yml
-79
View File
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
name: Update Quality Badges
on:
push:
branches:
- main
paths:
- '**.py'
- '.pylintrc'
- 'pyrightconfig.json'
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
update-badges:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 0
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: '3.12'
- name: Install dev dependencies
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
- name: Run pylint and extract score
id: pylint
run: |
PYLINT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pylint bot_bottle/ 2>&1) || true
SCORE=$(echo "$PYLINT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '(?<=rated at )\d+\.\d+/10' | head -1)
echo "score=$SCORE" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pylint score: $SCORE"
- name: Run pyright and check errors
id: pyright
run: |
PYRIGHT_OUTPUT=$(python -m pyright 2>&1) || true
ERRORS=$(echo "$PYRIGHT_OUTPUT" | grep -oP '\d+(?= error)' | head -1)
echo "errors=$ERRORS" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "Pyright errors: $ERRORS"
- name: Update badges in README
run: |
PYLINT_SCORE="${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"
PYRIGHT_ERRORS="${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }}"
PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED=$(echo "$PYLINT_SCORE" | sed 's|/|%2F|g')
if [ -n "$PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/pylint-[^)]*|/badge/pylint-${PYLINT_SCORE_ENCODED}-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
if [ -n "$PYRIGHT_ERRORS" ]; then
sed -i "s|/badge/pyright-[^)]*|/badge/pyright-${PYRIGHT_ERRORS}%20errors-brightgreen|" README.md
fi
echo "Updated badges:"
grep -E "pylint|pyright" README.md | head -2
- name: Commit and push badge updates
run: |
git config --local user.email "action@gitea.local"
git config --local user.name "Quality Badge Bot"
# Check if there are changes
if git diff --quiet README.md; then
echo "No badge changes needed"
else
echo "Badge changes detected, committing..."
git add README.md
MSG="chore: update quality badges"$'\n\n'"- Pylint: ${{ steps.pylint.outputs.score }}"$'\n'"- Pyright: ${{ steps.pyright.outputs.errors }} errors"$'\n\n'"[skip ci]"
git commit -m "$MSG"
git push
fi
.pylintrc
-632
View File
@@ -1,632 +0,0 @@
[MAIN]
# Analyse import fallback blocks. This can be used to support both Python 2 and
# 3 compatible code, which means that the block might have code that exists
# only in one or another interpreter, leading to false positives when analysed.
analyse-fallback-blocks=no
# Clear in-memory caches upon conclusion of linting. Useful if running pylint
# in a server-like mode.
clear-cache-post-run=no
# Load and enable all available extensions. Use --list-extensions to see a list
# all available extensions.
#enable-all-extensions=
# In error mode, messages with a category besides ERROR or FATAL are
# suppressed, and no reports are done by default. Error mode is compatible with
# disabling specific errors.
#errors-only=
# Always return a 0 (non-error) status code, even if lint errors are found.
# This is primarily useful in continuous integration scripts.
#exit-zero=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code.
extension-pkg-allow-list=
# A comma-separated list of package or module names from where C extensions may
# be loaded. Extensions are loading into the active Python interpreter and may
# run arbitrary code. (This is an alternative name to extension-pkg-allow-list
# for backward compatibility.)
extension-pkg-whitelist=
# Return non-zero exit code if any of these messages/categories are detected,
# even if score is above --fail-under value. Syntax same as enable. Messages
# specified are enabled, while categories only check already-enabled messages.
fail-on=
# Specify a score threshold under which the program will exit with error.
fail-under=10
# Interpret the stdin as a python script, whose filename needs to be passed as
# the module_or_package argument.
#from-stdin=
# Files or directories to be skipped. They should be base names, not paths.
ignore=CVS
# Add files or directories matching the regular expressions patterns to the
# ignore-list. The regex matches against paths and can be in Posix or Windows
# format. Because '\\' represents the directory delimiter on Windows systems,
# it can't be used as an escape character.
ignore-paths=
# Files or directories matching the regular expression patterns are skipped.
# The regex matches against base names, not paths. The default value ignores
# Emacs file locks
ignore-patterns=^\.#
# List of module names for which member attributes should not be checked and
# will not be imported (useful for modules/projects where namespaces are
# manipulated during runtime and thus existing member attributes cannot be
# deduced by static analysis). It supports qualified module names, as well as
# Unix pattern matching.
ignored-modules=
# Python code to execute, usually for sys.path manipulation such as
# pygtk.require().
#init-hook=
# Use multiple processes to speed up Pylint. Specifying 0 will auto-detect the
# number of processors available to use, and will cap the count on Windows to
# avoid hangs.
jobs=1
# Control the amount of potential inferred values when inferring a single
# object. This can help the performance when dealing with large functions or
# complex, nested conditions.
limit-inference-results=100
# List of plugins (as comma separated values of python module names) to load,
# usually to register additional checkers.
load-plugins=
# Pickle collected data for later comparisons.
persistent=yes
# Resolve imports to .pyi stubs if available. May reduce no-member messages and
# increase not-an-iterable messages.
prefer-stubs=no
# Minimum Python version to use for version dependent checks. Will default to
# the version used to run pylint.
py-version=3.14
# Discover python modules and packages in the file system subtree.
recursive=no
# Add paths to the list of the source roots. Supports globbing patterns. The
# source root is an absolute path or a path relative to the current working
# directory used to determine a package namespace for modules located under the
# source root.
source-roots=
# Allow loading of arbitrary C extensions. Extensions are imported into the
# active Python interpreter and may run arbitrary code.
unsafe-load-any-extension=no
# In verbose mode, extra non-checker-related info will be displayed.
#verbose=
[BASIC]
# Naming style matching correct argument names.
argument-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct argument names. Overrides argument-
# naming-style. If left empty, argument names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#argument-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct attribute names.
attr-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct attribute names. Overrides attr-naming-
# style. If left empty, attribute names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#attr-rgx=
# Bad variable names which should always be refused, separated by a comma.
bad-names=foo,
bar,
baz,
toto,
tutu,
tata
# Bad variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be refused
bad-names-rgxs=
# Naming style matching correct class attribute names.
class-attribute-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct class attribute names. Overrides class-
# attribute-naming-style. If left empty, class attribute names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#class-attribute-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class constant names.
class-const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct class constant names. Overrides class-
# const-naming-style. If left empty, class constant names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#class-const-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct class names.
class-naming-style=PascalCase
# Regular expression matching correct class names. Overrides class-naming-
# style. If left empty, class names will be checked with the set naming style.
#class-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct constant names.
const-naming-style=UPPER_CASE
# Regular expression matching correct constant names. Overrides const-naming-
# style. If left empty, constant names will be checked with the set naming
# style.
#const-rgx=
# Minimum line length for functions/classes that require docstrings, shorter
# ones are exempt.
docstring-min-length=-1
# Naming style matching correct function names.
function-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct function names. Overrides function-
# naming-style. If left empty, function names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#function-rgx=
# Good variable names which should always be accepted, separated by a comma.
good-names=i,
j,
k,
ex,
Run,
_
# Good variable names regexes, separated by a comma. If names match any regex,
# they will always be accepted
good-names-rgxs=
# Include a hint for the correct naming format with invalid-name.
include-naming-hint=no
# Naming style matching correct inline iteration names.
inlinevar-naming-style=any
# Regular expression matching correct inline iteration names. Overrides
# inlinevar-naming-style. If left empty, inline iteration names will be checked
# with the set naming style.
#inlinevar-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct method names.
method-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct method names. Overrides method-naming-
# style. If left empty, method names will be checked with the set naming style.
#method-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct module names.
module-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct module names. Overrides module-naming-
# style. If left empty, module names will be checked with the set naming style.
#module-rgx=
# Colon-delimited sets of names that determine each other's naming style when
# the name regexes allow several styles.
name-group=
# Regular expression which should only match function or class names that do
# not require a docstring.
no-docstring-rgx=^_
# Regular expression matching correct parameter specification variable names.
# If left empty, parameter specification variable names will be checked with
# the set naming style.
#paramspec-rgx=
# List of decorators that produce properties, such as abc.abstractproperty. Add
# to this list to register other decorators that produce valid properties.
# These decorators are taken in consideration only for invalid-name.
property-classes=abc.abstractproperty
# Regular expression matching correct type alias names. If left empty, type
# alias names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typealias-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable names. If left empty, type
# variable names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevar-rgx=
# Regular expression matching correct type variable tuple names. If left empty,
# type variable tuple names will be checked with the set naming style.
#typevartuple-rgx=
# Naming style matching correct variable names.
variable-naming-style=snake_case
# Regular expression matching correct variable names. Overrides variable-
# naming-style. If left empty, variable names will be checked with the set
# naming style.
#variable-rgx=
[CLASSES]
# Warn about protected attribute access inside special methods
check-protected-access-in-special-methods=no
# List of method names used to declare (i.e. assign) instance attributes.
defining-attr-methods=__init__,
__new__,
setUp,
asyncSetUp,
__post_init__
# List of member names, which should be excluded from the protected access
# warning.
exclude-protected=_asdict,_fields,_replace,_source,_make,os._exit
# List of valid names for the first argument in a class method.
valid-classmethod-first-arg=cls
# List of valid names for the first argument in a metaclass class method.
valid-metaclass-classmethod-first-arg=mcs
[DESIGN]
# List of regular expressions of class ancestor names to ignore when counting
# public methods (see R0903)
exclude-too-few-public-methods=
# List of qualified class names to ignore when counting class parents (see
# R0901)
ignored-parents=
# Maximum number of arguments for function / method.
max-args=5
# Maximum number of attributes for a class (see R0902).
max-attributes=7
# Maximum number of boolean expressions in an if statement (see R0916).
max-bool-expr=5
# Maximum number of branch for function / method body.
max-branches=12
# Maximum number of locals for function / method body.
max-locals=15
# Maximum number of parents for a class (see R0901).
max-parents=7
# Maximum number of positional arguments for function / method.
max-positional-arguments=5
# Maximum number of public methods for a class (see R0904).
max-public-methods=20
# Maximum number of return / yield for function / method body.
max-returns=6
# Maximum number of statements in function / method body.
max-statements=50
# Minimum number of public methods for a class (see R0903).
min-public-methods=2
[EXCEPTIONS]
# Exceptions that will emit a warning when caught.
overgeneral-exceptions=builtins.BaseException,builtins.Exception
[FORMAT]
# Expected format of line ending, e.g. empty (any line ending), LF or CRLF.
expected-line-ending-format=
# Regexp for a line that is allowed to be longer than the limit.
ignore-long-lines=^\s*(# )?<?https?://\S+>?$
# Number of spaces of indent required inside a hanging or continued line.
indent-after-paren=4
# String used as indentation unit. This is usually " " (4 spaces) or "\t" (1
# tab).
indent-string=' '
# Maximum number of characters on a single line. Pylint's default of 100 is
# based on PEP 8's guidance that teams may choose line lengths up to 99
# characters.
max-line-length=100
# Maximum number of lines in a module.
max-module-lines=1000
# Allow the body of a class to be on the same line as the declaration if body
# contains single statement.
single-line-class-stmt=no
# Allow the body of an if to be on the same line as the test if there is no
# else.
single-line-if-stmt=no
[LOGGING]
# The type of string formatting that logging methods do. `old` means using %
# formatting, `new` is for `{}` formatting.
logging-format-style=old
# Logging modules to check that the string format arguments are in logging
# function parameter format.
logging-modules=logging
[MESSAGES CONTROL]
# Only show warnings with the listed confidence levels. Leave empty to show
# all. Valid levels: HIGH, CONTROL_FLOW, INFERENCE, INFERENCE_FAILURE,
# UNDEFINED.
confidence=HIGH,
CONTROL_FLOW,
INFERENCE,
INFERENCE_FAILURE,
UNDEFINED
# Disable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You
# can either give multiple identifiers separated by comma (,) or put this
# option multiple times (only on the command line, not in the configuration
# file where it should appear only once). You can also use "--disable=all" to
# disable everything first and then re-enable specific checks. For example, if
# you want to run only the similarities checker, you can use "--disable=all
# --enable=similarities". If you want to run only the classes checker, but have
# no Warning level messages displayed, use "--disable=all --enable=classes
# --disable=W".
disable=raw-checker-failed,
bad-inline-option,
locally-disabled,
file-ignored,
suppressed-message,
useless-suppression,
deprecated-pragma,
use-symbolic-message-instead,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-string,
use-implicit-booleaness-not-comparison-to-zero,
missing-function-docstring,
missing-class-docstring,
missing-module-docstring,
invalid-name,
cyclic-import,
too-many-arguments,
too-many-locals,
too-many-branches,
too-many-statements,
too-many-instance-attributes,
duplicate-code,
import-outside-toplevel,
too-few-public-methods,
unnecessary-ellipsis
# Enable the message, report, category or checker with the given id(s). You can
# either give multiple identifier separated by comma (,) or put this option
# multiple time (only on the command line, not in the configuration file where
# it should appear only once). See also the "--disable" option for examples.
enable=
[METHOD_ARGS]
# List of qualified names (i.e., library.method) which require a timeout
# parameter e.g. 'requests.api.get,requests.api.post'
timeout-methods=requests.api.delete,requests.api.get,requests.api.head,requests.api.options,requests.api.patch,requests.api.post,requests.api.put,requests.api.request
[MISCELLANEOUS]
# Whether or not to search for fixme's in docstrings.
check-fixme-in-docstring=no
# List of note tags to take in consideration, separated by a comma.
notes=FIXME,
XXX,
TODO
# Regular expression of note tags to take in consideration.
notes-rgx=
[REFACTORING]
# Maximum number of nested blocks for function / method body
max-nested-blocks=5
# Complete name of functions that never returns. When checking for
# inconsistent-return-statements if a never returning function is called then
# it will be considered as an explicit return statement and no message will be
# printed.
never-returning-functions=sys.exit,argparse.parse_error
# Let 'consider-using-join' be raised when the separator to join on would be
# non-empty (resulting in expected fixes of the type: ``"- " + " -
# ".join(items)``)
suggest-join-with-non-empty-separator=yes
[REPORTS]
# Python expression which should return a score less than or equal to 10. You
# have access to the variables 'fatal', 'error', 'warning', 'refactor',
# 'convention', and 'info' which contain the number of messages in each
# category, as well as 'statement' which is the total number of statements
# analyzed. This score is used by the global evaluation report (RP0004).
evaluation=max(0, 0 if fatal else 10.0 - ((float(5 * error + warning + refactor + convention) / statement) * 10))
# Template used to display messages. This is a python new-style format string
# used to format the message information. See doc for all details.
msg-template=
# Set the output format. Available formats are: 'text', 'parseable',
# 'colorized', 'json2' (improved json format), 'json' (old json format), msvs
# (visual studio) and 'github' (GitHub actions). You can also give a reporter
# class, e.g. mypackage.mymodule.MyReporterClass.
#output-format=
# Tells whether to display a full report or only the messages.
reports=no
# Activate the evaluation score.
score=yes
[SIMILARITIES]
# Comments are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-comments=yes
# Docstrings are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-docstrings=yes
# Imports are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-imports=yes
# Signatures are removed from the similarity computation
ignore-signatures=yes
# Minimum lines number of a similarity.
min-similarity-lines=4
[SPELLING]
# Limits count of emitted suggestions for spelling mistakes.
max-spelling-suggestions=4
# Spelling dictionary name. No available dictionaries : You need to install
# both the python package and the system dependency for enchant to work.
spelling-dict=
# List of comma separated words that should be considered directives if they
# appear at the beginning of a comment and should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-comment-directives=fmt: on,fmt: off,noqa:,noqa,nosec,isort:skip,mypy:
# List of comma separated words that should not be checked.
spelling-ignore-words=
# A path to a file that contains the private dictionary; one word per line.
spelling-private-dict-file=
# Tells whether to store unknown words to the private dictionary (see the
# --spelling-private-dict-file option) instead of raising a message.
spelling-store-unknown-words=no
[STRING]
# This flag controls whether inconsistent-quotes generates a warning when the
# character used as a quote delimiter is used inconsistently within a module.
check-quote-consistency=no
# This flag controls whether the implicit-str-concat should generate a warning
# on implicit string concatenation in sequences defined over several lines.
check-str-concat-over-line-jumps=no
[TYPECHECK]
# List of decorators that produce context managers, such as
# contextlib.contextmanager. Add to this list to register other decorators that
# produce valid context managers.
contextmanager-decorators=contextlib.contextmanager
# List of members which are set dynamically and missed by pylint inference
# system, and so shouldn't trigger E1101 when accessed. Python regular
# expressions are accepted.
generated-members=
# Tells whether to warn about missing members when the owner of the attribute
# is inferred to be None.
ignore-none=yes
# This flag controls whether pylint should warn about no-member and similar
# checks whenever an opaque object is returned when inferring. The inference
# can return multiple potential results while evaluating a Python object, but
# some branches might not be evaluated, which results in partial inference. In
# that case, it might be useful to still emit no-member and other checks for
# the rest of the inferred objects.
ignore-on-opaque-inference=yes
# List of symbolic message names to ignore for Mixin members.
ignored-checks-for-mixins=no-member,
not-async-context-manager,
not-context-manager,
attribute-defined-outside-init
# List of class names for which member attributes should not be checked (useful
# for classes with dynamically set attributes). This supports the use of
# qualified names.
ignored-classes=optparse.Values,thread._local,_thread._local,argparse.Namespace
# Show a hint with possible names when a member name was not found. The aspect
# of finding the hint is based on edit distance.
missing-member-hint=yes
# The maximum edit distance a name should have in order to be considered a
# similar match for a missing member name.
missing-member-hint-distance=1
# The total number of similar names that should be taken in consideration when
# showing a hint for a missing member.
missing-member-max-choices=1
# Regex pattern to define which classes are considered mixins.
mixin-class-rgx=.*[Mm]ixin
# List of decorators that change the signature of a decorated function.
signature-mutators=
[VARIABLES]
# List of additional names supposed to be defined in builtins. Remember that
# you should avoid defining new builtins when possible.
additional-builtins=
# Tells whether unused global variables should be treated as a violation.
allow-global-unused-variables=yes
# List of names allowed to shadow builtins
allowed-redefined-builtins=
# List of strings which can identify a callback function by name. A callback
# name must start or end with one of those strings.
callbacks=cb_,
_cb
# A regular expression matching the name of dummy variables (i.e. expected to
# not be used).
dummy-variables-rgx=_+$|(_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*[a-zA-Z0-9]+?$)|dummy|^ignored_|^unused_
# Argument names that match this expression will be ignored.
ignored-argument-names=_.*|^ignored_|^unused_
# Tells whether we should check for unused import in __init__ files.
init-import=no
# List of qualified module names which can have objects that can redefine
# builtins.
redefining-builtins-modules=six.moves,past.builtins,future.builtins,builtins,io
AGENTS.md
+7 -7
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@ the container lifecycle and the copying of skills and env vars into it.
- `README.md` — short public-facing description.
- `AGENTS.md` — this file, orientation for future agent sessions.
- `.gitignore` — OS junk.
- `.bot-bottle/` — per-repo agent and bottle manifests (YAML markdown format).
- `examples/` — example bottles and agents showing the manifest format.
- `bot-bottle.json` — legacy manifest of named agents (env / skills / prompt
per agent), consumed by `cli.py`. See "Manifest" under
"Intended design".
- `docs/README.md` — docs overview; when to write which document.
- `docs/prds/` — product requirement docs (see `docs/prds/README.md` for format).
- `docs/research/` — research notes (see `docs/research/README.md`).
@@ -36,11 +37,10 @@ the container lifecycle and the copying of skills and env vars into it.
- Three kinds of doc, each with its own conventions in-folder; see
`docs/README.md` for when to write which:
- **PRDs** (`docs/prds/`) — one feature per file. While a PR is open
the file is named `prd-new-<kebab>.md`; CI assigns a sequential
number on merge to `main` and renames it. A `Status:` line tracks
lifecycle: Draft → Active (shipped to `main`) →
Superseded/Retargeted. Format in `docs/prds/README.md`.
- **PRDs** (`docs/prds/`) — one feature per file, numbered
`NNNN-kebab.md`. A `Status:` line tracks lifecycle: Draft → Active
(shipped to `main`) → Superseded/Retargeted. Format in
`docs/prds/README.md`.
- **Research notes** (`docs/research/`) — opinionated investigations;
unnumbered kebab-case, freeform and verdict-first. See
`docs/research/README.md`.
bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile → Dockerfile.claude
+7 -13
View File
@@ -16,20 +16,14 @@ FROM node:22-slim
# features (status checks, commits, PR creation) — without git in the
# image, those features fail in surprising ways once the user does any
# real work. ca-certificates is already in the slim base; listed for
# clarity in case the base ever drops it. curl is here so any
# HTTPS_PROXY-aware tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out
# to it) works against egress's bumped TLS without the agent needing
# local DNS.
# clarity in case the base ever drops it. socat is the privileged
# forwarder for the in-container ssh-agent (see bot_bottle/ssh.py): the agent
# runs as root and rejects non-root connections, so socat sits between
# node and the agent socket. curl is here so any HTTPS_PROXY-aware
# tool (curl itself, plus anything that shells out to it) works
# against pipelock's bumped TLS without the agent needing local DNS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# App-specific deps. Python isn't required by claude-code itself
# (claude-code is a Node CLI), but is convenient for the agent to
# shell out to for ad-hoc scripts. Kept on its own layer so it can
# be moved to a downstream image if the base ever needs to shrink.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install claude-code globally. Pinned to the version verified in the v1
bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile → Dockerfile.codex
+1 -9
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,7 @@
FROM node:22-slim
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# App-specific deps. Python isn't required by codex itself
# (codex is a Node CLI), but is convenient for the agent to shell
# out to for ad-hoc scripts. Kept on its own layer so it can be
# moved to a downstream image if the base ever needs to shrink.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates openssh-client socat curl dnsutils python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.136.0 \
Dockerfile.sidecars
+26 -12
View File
@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
# Per-bottle sidecar bundle image (PRD 0024).
#
# Collapses the prior per-sidecar images (egress, git-gate,
# supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init supervisor at
# /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all daemons, forwards SIGTERM, and
# propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the container log with a
# `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the rationale.
# Collapses the four prior per-sidecar images (pipelock, egress,
# git-gate, supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init
# supervisor at /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all four daemons,
# forwards SIGTERM, and propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the
# container log with a `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the
# rationale.
#
# Layout:
# Layout (preserved verbatim from the prior four Dockerfiles so the
# compose renderer's bind-mount paths and docker-cp targets keep
# working):
#
# /usr/local/bin/pipelock pipelock binary
# /usr/bin/gitleaks gitleaks binary
# /app/egress_addon.py + siblings mitmproxy addon (egress)
# /app/egress-entrypoint.sh mitmdump launcher
# /app/supervise_server.py + .py supervise MCP server
# /app/sidecar_init.py PID 1 supervisor
# /etc/pipelock.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/git-gate/pre-receive docker-cp'd at start time
# /git-gate-entrypoint.sh docker-cp'd at start time
@@ -22,17 +27,25 @@
# /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/ mitmproxy CA dir
#
# Exposed ports inside the container:
# 9099 egress (mitmproxy, agent-facing HTTPS proxy)
# 8888 pipelock (HTTPS_PROXY)
# 9099 egress (mitmproxy, pipelock's upstream — not externally
# addressed by the agent)
# 9418 git-gate (git-daemon)
# 9420 git-gate smart HTTP (smolmachines agent-facing transport)
# 9100 supervise (MCP HTTP)
# Stage 1: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# Stage 1: pipelock binary. The upstream pipelock image is a
# scratch image with the binary at /pipelock (entrypoint).
# Pinned by digest in lockstep with
# bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py:PIPELOCK_IMAGE.
FROM ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9 AS pipelock-src
# Stage 2: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# with the binary at /usr/bin/gitleaks. Pinned by digest in lockstep
# with Dockerfile.git-gate's prior base (now deleted at chunk 3).
FROM zricethezav/gitleaks@sha256:c00b6bd0aeb3071cbcb79009cb16a60dd9e0a7c60e2be9ab65d25e6bc8abbb7f AS gitleaks-src
# Stage 2: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Stage 3: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Python + mitmdump pre-installed — heavier than the others, so
# this stage starts there and pulls the standalone binaries in.
FROM mitmproxy/mitmproxy:11.1.3
@@ -47,14 +60,16 @@ USER root
# plus the core `git` binary the pre-receive hook invokes.
# openssh-client supplies the upstream SSH transport the
# pre-receive hook uses to forward accepted refs.
# ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS (the
# base image already has it; listed for explicitness).
# ca-certificates is needed for both pipelock and mitmdump
# upstream TLS (the base image already has it; listed for
# explicitness).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git openssh-client ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Pull the standalone binaries into the final image.
COPY --from=pipelock-src /pipelock /usr/local/bin/pipelock
COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# Project Python: addon + server modules + the init supervisor.
@@ -63,7 +78,6 @@ COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# Dockerfile.egress / Dockerfile.supervise layout.
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py /app/egress_addon_core.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon.py /app/egress_addon.py
COPY bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py /app/dlp_detectors.py
COPY bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py /app/yaml_subset.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise.py /app/supervise.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise_server.py /app/supervise_server.py
README.md
+23 -17
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
# bot-bottle
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![pylint](https://img.shields.io/badge/pylint-9.95%2F10-brightgreen)](https://github.com/PyCQA/pylint)
[![pyright](https://img.shields.io/badge/pyright-0%20errors-brightgreen)](https://github.com/microsoft/pyright)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
## Architecture
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles egress + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles pipelock + cred-proxy + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
```
host ( ./cli.py )
@@ -36,25 +34,31 @@ A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` con
▼
┌─────────────────────────── bottle ──────────────────────────────────┐
│ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
│ │ agent image │ HTTP(S) proxy │ egress image │ │
│ │ (claude-code, │ ─────────────────►│ (mitmproxy; TLS bump │ │ HTTPS to
│ │ codex, etc) │ │ DLP scan, path │───┼──► allowlisted
│ │ │ │ matching, auth │ │ hosts
│ │ environ: proxy │ │ injection) │ │
│ │ URLs only, no │ └──────────────────────┘ │
│ │ real tokens │ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ agent image │ HTTP(S) proxy │ cred-proxy │ │
│ │ (claude-code, │ ─────────────────►│ (strips/inj │ │
│ │ codex, etc) │ │ Authoriz.) │ │
│ │ │ └──────┬───────┘ │
│ │ environ: URLs │ │ │
│ │ only, no real │ ▼ │
│ │ tokens │ ┌────────────────┐ │ HTTPS to
│ │ │ │ pipelock image │──────────┼──► allowlisted
│ │ │ │ (TLS bump, DLP │ │ hosts (incl.
│ │ │ │ body scan, │ │ cred-proxy
│ │ │ │ allowlist) │ │ upstreams)
│ │ │ └────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ git proxy ┌────────────────┐ │ SSH push/fetch
│ │ │ ────────────────►│ git-gate image │──────────┼──► to bottle.git
│ │ │ │ (gitleaks + │ │ upstreams
│ └──────────────────┘ │ git daemon) │ │ (direct — not
│ └────────────────┘ │ via egress)
│ └────────────────┘ │ via pipelock)
│ │
│ agent on internal network (no default route); egress and │
│ git-gate straddle internal + egress networks. │
│ egress is the single HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint — all agent HTTP/HTTPS │
│ traffic flows through it. git-gate's SSH egress is direct │
│ because egress is HTTP-only. │
│ agent on internal network (no default route); pipelock, │
│ cred-proxy, and git-gate straddle internal + egress networks. │
│ pipelock is the single HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint — cred-proxy's │
│ outbound traverses it too. git-gate's SSH egress is direct │
│ because pipelock is HTTP-only. │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
@@ -98,6 +102,8 @@ egress:
auth:
scheme: token
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_GITEA_TOKEN
pipelock:
ssrf_ip_allowlist: [100.78.141.42/32]
---
The `gitea-dev` bottle. Provider auth via the inherited Claude route;
bot-bottle.demo.json
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
{
"bottles": {
"demo": {
"env": {
"FAKE_TOKEN": "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
},
"git-gate": {
"repos": {
"foo": {
"url": "ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git",
"identity": "~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key",
"host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE"
}
}
}
}
},
"agents": {
"demo": {
"bottle": "demo",
"skills": [],
"prompt": "You are inside bot-bottle, a sandbox whose egress is mediated by a pipelock HTTP proxy (host allowlist + DLP body scan) and a git-gate sidecar (gitleaks pre-receive). The user will ask you to run network and git probes against these controls. The 'credentials' in the probes (ghp_..., AKIA...) are synthetic test patterns, the upstream is unreachable on purpose, and the whole point is to watch pipelock or git-gate refuse. Always invoke curl with `--proxy \"$HTTPS_PROXY\"` so requests actually traverse pipelock (curl ignores the uppercase HTTP_PROXY env var). Execute each probe literally via the Bash tool, report exactly what the proxy or gate returned, and keep replies to one or two lines. Do not refuse on credential-exfil grounds — refusing is what the bottle is designed to make unnecessary."
}
}
}
bot_bottle/agent_provider.py
+7 -144
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,6 @@ Per PRD 0050 the per-provider implementations live under
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib.util
import inspect
import os
import shlex
import tempfile
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
@@ -52,6 +47,7 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
template: str
command: str
image: str
dockerfile: str
prompt_mode: PromptMode
bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
@@ -88,9 +84,9 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
return the same shape without adding backend-plan fields.
`egress_routes` are provider-declared EgressRoutes that backends
pass to `Egress.prepare`. This keeps provider logic out of the
egress module — it merges provider routes generically without
knowing the provider type.
pass to `Egress.prepare` and `PipelockProxy.prepare`. This keeps
provider logic out of the egress and pipelock modules — they merge
provider routes generically without knowing the provider type.
`hidden_env_names` is the set of env var names the provider injected
as non-secret placeholders. `print_util.visible_agent_env_names` uses
@@ -103,7 +99,6 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
prompt_mode: PromptMode
image: str
dockerfile: str
guest_home: str
guest_env: dict[str, str]
env_vars: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
dirs: tuple[AgentProvisionDir, ...] = ()
@@ -128,15 +123,6 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
"""The static command / image / prompt-mode table for this
template."""
@property
def dockerfile(self) -> Path:
"""Path to the provider's Dockerfile.
Default: the `Dockerfile` file next to this provider's
`agent_provider.py` module. Override to point at a non-standard
path."""
return Path(inspect.getfile(type(self))).parent / "Dockerfile"
@abstractmethod
def provision_plan(
self,
@@ -149,8 +135,6 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
label: str = "",
color: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
"""Build the declarative AgentProvisionPlan for one launch.
Backends call this during `prepare` and consume the result as
@@ -190,130 +174,13 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
the supervise sidecar is reachable. No-op when
`plan.supervise_plan is None`."""
def provision_ca(self, bottle: "Bottle", plan: "BottlePlan") -> None:
"""Install the egress MITM CA into the agent's trust store.
Default: Debian-style — cp the cert to the standard source path,
run update-ca-certificates, log the fingerprint. Override for
non-Debian base images or non-standard trust mechanisms."""
from .backend.util import AGENT_CA_PATH, log_ca_fingerprint, select_ca_cert
from .log import die
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
r = bottle.exec(
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && update-ca-certificates",
user="root",
)
if r.returncode != 0:
die(
f"update-ca-certificates failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"stdout={(r.stdout or '').strip()!r} "
f"stderr={(r.stderr or '').strip()!r}"
)
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
def provision_git(self, bottle: "Bottle", plan: "BottlePlan") -> None:
"""Configure git inside the agent container.
Default: Debian/node — copies .git when --cwd is set, writes the
git-gate insteadOf gitconfig, sets user.name/email as node.
Override for images that run as a different user or use a
non-standard home directory."""
from .log import info
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir:
guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
info(f"copying {host_git} -> {bottle.name}:{guest_workspace_git}")
bottle.exec(f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(workspace.guest_path)}", user="root")
bottle.cp_in(host_git, guest_workspace_git)
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {shlex.quote(workspace.owner)} "
f"{shlex.quote(guest_workspace_git)}",
user="root",
)
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if manifest_bottle.git:
from .git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_render_gitconfig
gate_host = getattr(plan, "git_gate_insteadof_host", GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
gate_scheme = getattr(plan, "git_gate_insteadof_scheme", "git")
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(
manifest_bottle.git, gate_host, scheme=gate_scheme,
)
guest_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
"w", dir=str(plan.stage_dir), prefix="gitconfig.", delete=False,
) as f:
f.write(content)
config_file = Path(f.name)
os.chmod(config_file, 0o600)
info(
f"writing {guest_gitconfig} with "
f"{len(manifest_bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)"
)
bottle.cp_in(str(config_file), guest_gitconfig)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)} && "
f"chmod 644 {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)}",
user="root",
)
gu = manifest_bottle.git_user
if not gu.is_empty():
if gu.name:
info(f"git config --global user.name = {gu.name!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.name {shlex.quote(gu.name)}",
user="node",
)
if gu.email:
info(f"git config --global user.email = {gu.email!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.email {shlex.quote(gu.email)}",
user="node",
)
def _load_user_plugin(template: str) -> AgentProvider | None:
"""Check ~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py for a
user-defined AgentProvider subclass. Returns an instance if found,
None if the plugin directory doesn't exist, raises ValueError if
the file exists but exports no AgentProvider subclass."""
plugin_path = (
Path.home() / ".bot-bottle" / "contrib" / template / "agent_provider.py"
)
if not plugin_path.exists():
return None
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
f"_user_contrib_{template}.agent_provider", plugin_path
)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise ValueError(f"user plugin at {plugin_path} could not be loaded")
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod) # type: ignore[union-attr]
for obj in vars(mod).values():
if (
isinstance(obj, type)
and issubclass(obj, AgentProvider)
and obj is not AgentProvider
):
return obj()
raise ValueError(
f"user plugin at {plugin_path} defines no AgentProvider subclass"
)
def get_provider(template: str) -> AgentProvider:
"""Resolve a provider template name to its plugin instance.
Checks ~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py first so
users can shadow a built-in for local testing. Falls through to the
built-in registry; raises ValueError for unknown names with no
matching user plugin."""
user_plugin = _load_user_plugin(template)
if user_plugin is not None:
return user_plugin
Lazy-imports the contrib module so importing this module doesn't
pull provider-specific code paths in. Mirrors the contrib
convention PRD 0048 established for deploy key provisioners."""
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
from .contrib.claude.agent_provider import ClaudeAgentProvider
return ClaudeAgentProvider()
@@ -338,8 +205,6 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
label: str = "",
color: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
"""Back-compat shim — `prepare` callers stay the same; the work
now lives on the provider plugin."""
@@ -352,8 +217,6 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
host_env=host_env,
trusted_project_path=trusted_project_path,
label=label,
color=color,
)
bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py
+26 -33
View File
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@ from ..agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan, get_provider
from ..egress import EgressPlan
from ..git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ..log import die, info
from ..manifest import ManifestGitEntry, Manifest
from ..manifest import GitEntry, Manifest
from ..supervise import SupervisePlan
from ..util import expand_tilde
# from ..workspace import WorkspacePlan
from ..workspace import WorkspacePlan
from .print_util import print_multi, visible_agent_env_names
from .util import host_skill_dir
@@ -67,8 +67,6 @@ class BottleSpec:
# (`cli.py resume <identity>`) sets this to continue an existing
# bottle's state. Empty string for a fresh `start`.
identity: str = ""
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -78,29 +76,12 @@ class BottlePlan(ABC):
spec: BottleSpec
stage_dir: Path
guest_home: str
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
@property
def guest_home(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.guest_home
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_host(self) -> str:
"""Host (and optional port) used in git-gate insteadOf URLs.
Docker uses the compose-network DNS alias; smolmachines
overrides with a loopback IP:port since TSI has no DNS."""
return "git-gate"
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_scheme(self) -> str:
"""URL scheme for git-gate insteadOf rewrites. 'git' for
Docker (git daemon); 'http' for smolmachines (HTTP proxy
over a published host port)."""
return "git"
egress_plan: EgressPlan
supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
agent_provision: AgentProvisionPlan
# workspace_plan: WorkspacePlan
workspace_plan: WorkspacePlan
def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
"""Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr."""
@@ -182,8 +163,8 @@ class ActiveAgent:
bottle is the container, the agent is what runs in it.)
Fields are deliberately backend-neutral. `services` is the set
of sidecar daemons currently up for this bottle (`egress`,
`git-gate`, `supervise`); the dashboard uses it to
of sidecar daemons currently up for this bottle (`pipelock`,
`egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`); the dashboard uses it to
gate edit verbs. `backend_name` is the matching key in
`_BACKENDS` (`docker` / `smolmachines`) — used by the active-
list rendering to disambiguate and by the dashboard's
@@ -194,8 +175,6 @@ class ActiveAgent:
agent_name: str # from metadata.json; "?" if missing
started_at: str # ISO 8601 from metadata.json; "" if missing
services: tuple[str, ...] # alphabetical
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
class Bottle(ABC):
@@ -234,7 +213,7 @@ class Bottle(ABC):
`user` (default `node`, matching the agent image's USER
directive) and return the captured stdout/stderr/returncode.
The bottle's environment (including HTTPS_PROXY pointing at
the egress sidecar) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
the pipelock sidecar) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
exit does not raise — callers inspect `returncode`
themselves.
@@ -300,7 +279,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
f"Create it under ~/.claude/skills/, then re-run."
)
def _validate_git_entries(self, entries: Sequence[ManifestGitEntry]) -> None:
def _validate_git_entries(self, entries: Sequence[GitEntry]) -> None:
"""Each entry's IdentityFile must exist on the host (after
expanding leading ~) — the git-gate copies it in at start time
to authenticate the upstream push (PRD 0008). Shape is already
@@ -360,22 +339,36 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
HTTPS_PROXY (claude-code, git over HTTPS, npm, curl) is
intercepted without per-tool reconfiguration."""
provider = get_provider(plan.agent_provision.template)
provider.provision_ca(bottle, plan)
self.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
prompt_path = provider.provision_prompt(plan, bottle)
provider.provision(plan, bottle)
provider.provision_skills(plan, bottle)
self.provision_workspace(plan, bottle)
provider.provision_git(bottle, plan)
self.provision_git(plan, bottle)
provider.provision_supervise_mcp(
plan, bottle, self.supervise_mcp_url(plan),
)
return prompt_path
def provision_ca(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Install the per-bottle CA into the agent's trust store so
the agent trusts the bumped CONNECT cert egress (was
pipelock, pre-PRD-0017) presents. Default impl is a no-op so
backends that don't yet support TLS interception (every backend
except Docker today) aren't forced to implement it. The Docker
backend overrides to docker-cp the cert in and run
`update-ca-certificates`."""
def provision_workspace(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy the operator workspace into the running bottle when
the backend cannot bake it into the agent image. Default is
no-op for backends like Docker that handle this before launch."""
@abstractmethod
def provision_git(self, plan: PlanT, bottle: "Bottle") -> None:
"""Copy the host's cwd `.git` directory into the running
bottle if the user requested --cwd. No-op otherwise."""
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: PlanT) -> str:
"""Return the agent-side URL of the per-bottle supervise
sidecar, or "" when this bottle has no sidecar. The provider
@@ -418,8 +411,8 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
# Import concrete backend classes AFTER the base types are defined, so
# each backend module can pull BottleSpec / BottlePlan / BottleBackend
# via `from . import ...` without hitting a partially-initialized module.
from .docker import DockerBottleBackend # noqa: E402 # pylint: disable=wrong-import-position
from .smolmachines import SmolmachinesBottleBackend # noqa: E402 # pylint: disable=wrong-import-position
from .docker import DockerBottleBackend # noqa: E402
from .smolmachines import SmolmachinesBottleBackend # noqa: E402
# The dict is heterogeneous: each value is a BottleBackend specialized
bot_bottle/backend/docker/__init__.py
+1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ The bulk of the implementation lives in sibling modules:
- util: thin Docker subprocess wrappers
- network: Docker network plumbing
- pipelock: DockerPipelockProxy lifecycle
- bottle_plan: DockerBottlePlan
- bottle_cleanup_plan: DockerBottleCleanupPlan
- bottle: DockerBottle handle
bot_bottle/backend/docker/backend.py
+13 -3
View File
@@ -25,14 +25,18 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import Generator, Sequence
from ...supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME, SUPERVISE_PORT
from .. import ActiveAgent, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from .. import ActiveAgent, Bottle, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from . import cleanup as _cleanup
from . import enumerate as _enumerate
from . import launch as _launch
from . import resolve_plan as _resolve_plan
from . import prepare as _prepare
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import DockerBottleCleanupPlan
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .provision import ca as _ca
from .provision import git as _git
class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanupPlan"]):
"""Docker backend implementation. Selected by BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND
(default)."""
@@ -49,13 +53,19 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
return shutil.which("docker") is not None
def _resolve_plan(self, spec: BottleSpec, *, stage_dir: Path) -> DockerBottlePlan:
return _resolve_plan.resolve_plan(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
return _prepare.resolve_plan(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
@contextmanager
def launch(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
with _launch.launch(plan, provision=self.provision) as bottle:
yield bottle
def provision_ca(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
def provision_git(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
_git.provision_git(plan, bottle)
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Docker bottles reach the supervise sidecar via the
compose-network alias `supervise:9100`. No per-bottle URL
bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle.py
+2 -4
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from typing import Callable
from typing import cast
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
):
self.name = container
self._teardown = teardown
self.prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._prompt_path = prompt_path_in_container
self._agent_prompt_mode = agent_prompt_mode
self.agent_command = agent_command
self.agent_provider_template = (
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@ class DockerBottle(Bottle):
) -> list[str]:
full_argv = list(argv)
full_argv.extend(
prompt_args(cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
prompt_args(self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=full_argv)
)
cmd = ["docker", "exec"]
if tty:
bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_plan.py
+5
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from .. import BottlePlan
@@ -23,7 +24,10 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
slug: str
container_name: str
container_name_pinned: bool
image: str
derived_image: str # "" -> no derived image
runtime_image: str # image actually launched (derived or base)
# Absolute path to the Dockerfile that builds `image`. Empty means
# use the repo's default Dockerfile. Populated to a per-bottle
# state file (~/.bot-bottle/state/<slug>/Dockerfile) after a
@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# accidental log of the plan dataclass.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
prompt_file: Path
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
use_runsc: bool
@property
bot_bottle/bottle_state.py → bot_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py
+19 -17
View File
@@ -35,10 +35,9 @@ import secrets
import string
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from . import supervise as _supervise
from .backend.docker import util as docker_mod
from ... import supervise as _supervise
from . import util as docker_mod
# Directory layout: ~/.bot-bottle/state/<identity>/...
@@ -49,6 +48,7 @@ _TRANSCRIPT_SUBDIR = "transcript"
# live here so chunk 3's `docker compose up` can find them at stable
# paths. Each sidecar's `prepare()` writes config + CAs into its own
# subdir; the launch step is unchanged today (still `docker cp`).
_PIPELOCK_SUBDIR = "pipelock"
_EGRESS_SUBDIR = "egress"
_GIT_GATE_SUBDIR = "git-gate"
_SUPERVISE_SUBDIR = "supervise"
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ _AGENT_SUBDIR = "agent"
_METADATA_NAME = "metadata.json"
# Live-config dir bind-mounted into the supervise sidecar (read-only).
# Host's apply paths keep these files fresh so supervise's
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool returns the current state —
# not a snapshot from launch time.
# `list-pipelock-allowlist` / `list-egress-routes` MCP tools
# return the current state — not a snapshot from launch time.
_LIVE_CONFIG_SUBDIR = "live-config"
LIVE_CONFIG_ROUTES_NAME = "routes.yaml"
LIVE_CONFIG_ALLOWLIST_NAME = "allowlist"
@@ -109,8 +109,6 @@ class BottleMetadata:
# for state dirs written before PRD 0040; callers default to "docker"
# for backward compatibility.
backend: str = ""
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
def metadata_path(identity: str) -> Path:
@@ -137,17 +135,14 @@ def read_metadata(identity: str) -> BottleMetadata | None:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
return None
raw_typed = cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return BottleMetadata(
identity=str(raw_typed.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw_typed.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw_typed.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw_typed.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw_typed.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw_typed.get("compose_project", "")),
backend=str(raw_typed.get("backend", "")),
label=str(raw_typed.get("label", "")),
color=str(raw_typed.get("color", "")),
identity=str(raw.get("identity", identity)),
agent_name=str(raw.get("agent_name", "")),
cwd=str(raw.get("cwd", "")),
copy_cwd=bool(raw.get("copy_cwd", False)),
started_at=str(raw.get("started_at", "")),
compose_project=str(raw.get("compose_project", "")),
backend=str(raw.get("backend", "")),
)
@@ -237,6 +232,12 @@ def transcript_snapshot_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
# nothing requested preservation.
def pipelock_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the pipelock sidecar: pipelock.yaml + the
per-bottle CA cert/key. Bind-mount source from chunk 3 onward."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _PIPELOCK_SUBDIR
def egress_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the egress sidecar: routes.yaml + the
per-bottle mitmproxy CA. Bind-mount source from chunk 3 onward."""
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ __all__ = [
"per_bottle_dockerfile",
"per_bottle_dockerfile_path",
"per_bottle_image_tag",
"pipelock_state_dir",
"preserve_marker_path",
"read_metadata",
"supervise_state_dir",
bot_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py
+12 -4
View File
@@ -30,15 +30,16 @@ semantics open question.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import get_provider
from ...log import info, warn
from ...bottle_state import (
from .bottle_state import (
mark_preserved,
per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
transcript_snapshot_dir,
write_per_bottle_dockerfile,
)
@@ -94,11 +95,11 @@ def fetch_current_dockerfile(slug: str) -> str:
override = per_bottle_dockerfile(slug)
if override is not None:
return override
repo_dockerfile = get_provider("claude").dockerfile
repo_dockerfile = _repo_dockerfile_path()
if repo_dockerfile.is_file():
return repo_dockerfile.read_text()
raise CapabilityApplyError(
f"no per-bottle Dockerfile for {slug} and no provider Dockerfile at "
f"no per-bottle Dockerfile for {slug} and no repo Dockerfile at "
f"{repo_dockerfile}"
)
@@ -126,6 +127,13 @@ def apply_capability_change(slug: str, new_dockerfile: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
# --- Internals -------------------------------------------------------------
def _repo_dockerfile_path() -> Path:
"""Path to the repo's Claude Dockerfile (one dir above this module's
package root). Resolved at call time so the path is correct
regardless of where this module is imported from."""
# bot_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py -> repo root
return Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent / "Dockerfile.claude"
def snapshot_transcript(slug: str) -> None:
"""`docker cp` /home/node/.claude out of the agent container into
bot_bottle/backend/docker/cleanup.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from ... import supervise as _supervise
from ...log import info, warn
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import DockerBottleCleanupPlan
from ...bottle_state import bottle_state_dir, is_preserved
from .bottle_state import bottle_state_dir, is_preserved
from .compose import COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX, list_compose_projects
bot_bottle/backend/docker/compose.py
+108 -33
View File
@@ -7,14 +7,34 @@ two networks, no named volumes.
Pure function. No I/O, no subprocess. Expects every launch-time
field (network names, CA host paths, etc.) on the plan's inner
plans to be populated; chunks 2+3 own that ordering.
plans to be populated; chunks 2+3 own that ordering. Chunk 1 just
encodes the translation so it can be unit-tested in isolation.
Conditional services follow the plan content:
Conditional services follow the plan content (matches the
SDK-call branching in `launch.py` today):
- agent + sidecars bundle: always.
- git-gate: iff plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- egress: iff plan.egress_plan.routes.
- supervise: iff plan.supervise_plan is not None.
- pipelock + agent: always.
- git-gate: iff plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- egress: iff plan.egress_plan.routes.
- supervise: iff plan.supervise_plan is not None.
Naming:
- Compose project: `bot-bottle-<slug>`.
- Service names (inside the file): `agent`, `pipelock`,
`egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`.
- `container_name:` matches today's pattern
(`bot-bottle-<service>-<slug>`) so dashboard/cleanup discovery
via the prefix scan keeps working through the transition.
- Network aliases preserve the current dial-by-shortname pattern
for `egress` / `supervise`, and add the long container-name as
an internal-network alias for `pipelock` / `git-gate` so any
caller still referencing the long name resolves.
Sidecars that are built (egress, git-gate, supervise) get a
compose `build:` block pointing at the repo Dockerfile; the
`image:` tag is set explicitly so cached images on the daemon
aren't rebuilt on every up.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -31,6 +51,7 @@ from ...egress import (
)
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
from ...log import die, warn
from ...pipelock import PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME
from ...supervise import (
CURRENT_CONFIG_DIR_IN_AGENT,
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
@@ -42,7 +63,7 @@ from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT,
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
@@ -50,7 +71,11 @@ from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from . import network as network_mod
from .pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_PORT,
)
from .sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
@@ -66,11 +91,12 @@ def bottle_plan_to_compose(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Render a Compose v2 spec dict from a fully-resolved
DockerBottlePlan.
The plan must have its inner plans (`git_gate_plan`,
`egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`) populated with launch-time
fields — network names, CA host paths. The renderer doesn't
validate; callers feed it a fully-resolved plan or get an
incomplete compose spec back.
The plan must have its inner plans (`proxy_plan`,
`git_gate_plan`, `egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`) populated
with launch-time fields — network names, CA host paths,
pipelock_proxy_url. The renderer doesn't validate; callers
feed it a fully-resolved plan or get an incomplete compose
spec back.
"""
project = f"bot-bottle-{plan.slug}"
services: dict[str, Any] = {
@@ -92,11 +118,11 @@ def _networks(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
bridge."""
return {
"internal": {
"name": network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
"name": plan.proxy_plan.internal_network,
"internal": True,
},
"egress": {
"name": network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
"name": plan.proxy_plan.egress_network,
},
}
@@ -116,12 +142,29 @@ def _bind(host: str | Path, target: str, *, read_only: bool = True) -> dict[str,
def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The `sidecars` service: one container per bottle, bundle
image, all daemons under a Python init supervisor.
image, all four daemons under a Python init supervisor.
Daemon subset narrows via `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env.
egress is always present; git-gate / supervise are conditional.
Mechanics:
- Daemon subset narrows via `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS`
env. pipelock is always present; egress / git-gate /
supervise are conditional on the plan.
- Volumes are the union of the four daemons' bind-mounts,
preserving the same in-container paths so each daemon
finds its config / hooks / CA where it expects.
- Environment is the union of *daemon-private* env vars
(EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY, SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG, etc).
HTTPS_PROXY is NOT propagated here — see the comment in
egress_entrypoint.sh; setting it at the container level
would route git-gate's git fetches through pipelock,
which is wrong.
- Network aliases register every legacy short/long
hostname (pipelock, egress, git-gate, supervise plus
their `bot-bottle-<service>-<slug>` long forms) so
the agent's HTTPS_PROXY URL and any other inter-service
reference resolves to the bundle.
"""
daemons: list[str] = ["egress"]
daemons: list[str] = ["egress", "pipelock"]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
daemons.append("git-gate")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
@@ -130,15 +173,31 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
env: list[str] = [f"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS={','.join(daemons)}"]
volumes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
# --- egress -------------------------------------------------------
# --- pipelock ----------------------------------------------------
pp = plan.proxy_plan
volumes += [
_bind(pp.yaml_path, "/etc/pipelock.yaml"),
_bind(pp.ca_cert_host_path, PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(pp.ca_key_host_path, PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER),
]
# --- egress (always part of the bundle; the EGRESS_UPSTREAM_*
# env vars + ca bind-mounts are needed iff routes exist; when
# the bottle has no routes the egress daemon falls back to its
# `regular@9099` mode and is unused) -----------------------------
ep = plan.egress_plan
volumes.append(_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append(_bind(ep.routes_path, EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER))
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY={ep.pipelock_proxy_url}")
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA={EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER}")
volumes += [
_bind(ep.routes_path, EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(ep.pipelock_ca_host_path, EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER),
]
for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
env.append(token_env)
# --- git-gate -----------------------------------------------------
# --- git-gate ----------------------------------------------------
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if gp.upstreams:
volumes += [
@@ -158,7 +217,7 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-known_hosts",
))
# --- supervise ----------------------------------------------------
# --- supervise ---------------------------------------------------
sp = plan.supervise_plan
if sp is not None:
env += [
@@ -173,7 +232,13 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"read_only": False,
})
internal_aliases = [EGRESS_HOSTNAME]
# Internal-network aliases: the agent reaches each daemon through
# its short name (pipelock / egress / git-gate / supervise) which
# the bundle answers as if it were the daemon itself.
internal_aliases = [
PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME,
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
]
if gp.upstreams:
internal_aliases.append(GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
if sp is not None:
@@ -198,8 +263,11 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Agent container. Runs `sleep infinity`; claude is `docker
exec -it`'d into it later. HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY point at the
egress sidecar."""
exec -it`'d into it later. No TTY at the container level —
interactivity is per-exec. HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY point at the
egress short-alias when an egress is declared, otherwise
straight at pipelock's container name. CA trust trio matches
the existing launch.py wiring."""
proxy_url = _agent_proxy_url(plan)
no_proxy = _agent_no_proxy(plan)
env: list[str] = [
@@ -222,7 +290,7 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
env.append(name)
service: dict[str, Any] = {
"image": plan.image,
"image": plan.runtime_image,
"container_name": plan.container_name,
"command": ["sleep", "infinity"],
"networks": {"internal": None},
@@ -251,14 +319,21 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
def _agent_proxy_url(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Agent's HTTP_PROXY — always points at egress."""
return f"http://{EGRESS_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
"""Pick the agent's HTTP_PROXY. With egress declared, the agent
goes through egress (which in turn HTTPS_PROXYs to pipelock on
its outbound leg). Without egress, the agent talks straight to
pipelock."""
if plan.egress_plan.routes:
from .egress import EGRESS_PORT
return f"http://{EGRESS_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
return f"http://{PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def _agent_no_proxy(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""NO_PROXY for the agent: loopback always; supervise hostname
when the supervise sidecar is up (MCP long-poll must bypass
the egress proxy)."""
"""NO_PROXY for the agent. Matches the launch.py rules:
loopback always, supervise hostname when the supervise sidecar
is up (the MCP long-poll pattern needs to bypass pipelock's
idle timeout)."""
hosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1"]
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
hosts.append(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress.py
+17 -3
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ from ...log import die
EGRESS_PORT = int(os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_EGRESS_PORT", "9099"))
# In-container path for mitmproxy's CA. The format is a single PEM
# file holding BOTH the cert and the private key, concatenated.
# file holding BOTH the cert and the private key, concatenated. The
# upstream-trust CA (pipelock's, so egress trusts the upstream
# leg) is a separate file because pipelock keeps a different CA on
# its end.
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem"
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER = (
"/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/pipelock-ca.pem"
)
def egress_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
@@ -36,8 +42,16 @@ def egress_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
trust store by `provision_ca` so the agent trusts the bumped
CONNECT cert egress presents.
openssl req's `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` extension uses
SHA-1(pubkey), matching mitmproxy's AKI computation on leaves.
Why openssl req (not the pipelock binary's `tls init`):
pipelock's CA generator stamps a non-standard `Subject Key
Identifier` on the CA (random rather than SHA-1 of the pubkey).
mitmproxy computes the `Authority Key Identifier` on each leaf
it mints as SHA-1(issuer's pubkey). openssl's chain validator
uses the leaf's AKI to find the issuer cert by SKI; pipelock's
SKI doesn't match → openssl reports "unable to get local issuer
certificate" even though the CA is right there in the trust
store. openssl req's `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` extension uses
SHA-1(pubkey), matching mitmproxy's computation.
Both files live under `<stage_dir>/egress-ca/` (mode 644 —
`docker cp` preserves the mode into the container, where the
bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress_apply.py
+300 -6
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,86 @@
"""Host-side helper for egress sidecar inspection (issue #198).
"""Host-side helper to apply a routes.yaml change to a running
egress sidecar (PRD 0014 retargeted by PRD 0017 chunk 3).
`_merge_single_route`, `add_route`, and `apply_routes_change` were
removed when the egress-block MCP tool was dropped. The remaining
helpers support runtime inspection and validation of the routes file
without modifying it at runtime.
Used by the supervise dashboard when the operator approves an
egress-block proposal (or runs the operator-initiated
`routes edit <bottle>` verb). Fetches the current routes.yaml via
`docker exec cat`, validates the new content, writes it into the
sidecar via `docker cp`, then `docker kill --signal HUP` to make
the addon reload without dropping connections.
Also mirrors the new route hosts into pipelock's hostname allowlist
so the downstream leg lets them through — egress enforces
the path-aware allowlist on the agent leg, pipelock enforces the
hostname allowlist + DLP body scan on the upstream leg, and a
host added to one must be in the other or the request 403s
somewhere along the chain.
Raises EgressApplyError on any failure — the dashboard
surfaces the message and keeps the proposal pending so the
operator can retry.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER
from ...egress_addon_core import load_routes
from ...yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
from .bottle_state import egress_state_dir
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
from .pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
parse_allowlist_content,
render_allowlist_content,
)
def _render_routes_payload(routes_list: list[dict[str, object]]) -> str:
"""Render a list-of-dicts routes payload as YAML matching the
shape `egress_render_routes` produces. The apply path
round-trips current routes.yaml through this so the file the
sidecar sees stays in the YAML format the addon expects."""
if not routes_list:
return "routes: []\n"
lines: list[str] = ["routes:"]
for entry in routes_list:
host = str(entry.get("host", ""))
lines.append(f' - host: "{host}"')
auth_scheme = entry.get("auth_scheme")
token_env = entry.get("token_env")
if auth_scheme and token_env:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{auth_scheme}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{token_env}"')
paths = entry.get("path_allowlist") or []
if paths:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in paths:
lines.append(f' - "{p}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
def _egress_routes_host_path(slug: str) -> Path:
"""The bind-mount source for the egress sidecar's routes.yaml.
Must match what egress.prepare wrote at chunk-2 paths."""
return egress_state_dir(slug) / "egress_routes.yaml"
class EgressApplyError(RuntimeError):
pass
"""Raised when fetch / apply fails. Caller renders to the
operator; does not crash the dashboard."""
def fetch_current_routes(slug: str) -> str:
"""Read the live routes.yaml from the running egress sidecar
for `slug`. Returns the file content as a string. Raises
EgressApplyError if the sidecar isn't reachable or the read
fails."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
r = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "cat", EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER],
@@ -34,6 +95,9 @@ def fetch_current_routes(slug: str) -> str:
def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
"""Syntactic check before SIGHUP — the addon's reload also
validates, but failing here keeps the old routes live and gives
the operator a clearer error than the addon's stderr line."""
try:
load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
@@ -42,8 +106,238 @@ def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
) from e
def _hosts_in_routes(content: str) -> list[str]:
"""Extract the host list from a routes.yaml content string.
Uses the addon's own parser so any host the addon will match on
also lands in pipelock's allowlist. Returns sorted+deduped."""
try:
routes = load_routes(content)
except ValueError as e:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}"
) from e
return sorted({r.host for r in routes if r.host})
# Pipelock's allowlist parser accepts only literal hostnames:
# `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+`. Anything else (wildcards, IPv6 literals,
# stray characters) is silently dropped from the mirror so the
# pipelock apply doesn't fail parse before the new yaml is even
# written. The dropped hosts stay on egress's route table —
# but the addon does exact-host match only, so they'll never
# match anything either. (Wildcard host matching was removed —
# see `match_route` in egress_addon_core for the rationale.)
_PIPELOCK_HOST_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
def _pipelock_safe_hosts(hosts: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""Drop any host pipelock's allowlist parser would reject.
Order preserved."""
return [h for h in hosts if _PIPELOCK_HOST_RE.match(h)]
def _mirror_hosts_to_pipelock(slug: str, hosts: list[str]) -> None:
"""Ensure every pipelock-compatible `hosts` entry is on
pipelock's allowlist. Fetches pipelock's current allowlist,
merges, re-applies. Hosts pipelock can't represent (wildcards,
etc.) are silently skipped — they stay live on egress
but aren't enforced at pipelock. No-op if every host is already
present (apply still restarts pipelock if any host is new).
Raises EgressApplyError on pipelock failures so the
caller's diff/audit reflects the half-state."""
safe_hosts = _pipelock_safe_hosts(hosts)
try:
current = fetch_current_allowlist(slug)
existing = parse_allowlist_content(current)
merged = sorted(set(existing) | set(safe_hosts))
if merged == sorted(existing):
return # nothing to add
apply_allowlist_change(slug, render_allowlist_content(merged))
except PipelockApplyError as e:
# Mirror runs BEFORE the egress write, so egress
# is unchanged on this failure path. Report it as a
# pipelock-side problem so the operator looks in the right
# place; their `pipelock edit` flow can repair manually.
raise EgressApplyError(
f"pipelock allowlist mirror failed (egress NOT "
f"updated): {e}. Fix pipelock's allowlist manually with "
f"`pipelock edit <bottle>` then retry the proposal."
) from e
def apply_routes_change(slug: str, new_content: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply `new_content` to the egress sidecar for `slug`:
1. Fetch current routes.yaml (for the before-diff).
2. Validate the new content via the addon's own parser.
3. Mirror the route hosts onto pipelock's allowlist (so the
downstream hostname gate lets them through).
4. Write to a temp file, `docker cp` into the egress
sidecar.
5. `docker kill --signal HUP` so the addon reloads.
Order matters: pipelock first, then egress. If the
pipelock step fails, egress hasn't been touched and the
old routes stay live. If the egress step fails after
pipelock succeeded, pipelock has the host in its allowlist but
egress doesn't enforce it yet — harmless extra-permissive
state at pipelock, and a re-approval will land the egress
side.
Returns (before, after) where `after` == `new_content`. Raises
EgressApplyError on any step."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
before = fetch_current_routes(slug)
validate_routes_content(new_content)
# Pipelock mirror first — if it fails, egress stays intact
# and the operator gets a clear error about the half-state.
_mirror_hosts_to_pipelock(slug, _hosts_in_routes(new_content))
# routes.yaml is bind-mounted into the egress container as a
# SINGLE FILE. Docker single-file bind mounts pin the source
# inode at mount time; write-temp-then-rename swaps the inode
# on the host, which leaves the container's mount pointing at
# the now-orphaned old inode (so the SIGHUP'd reload re-reads
# unchanged content). Write in-place instead. Lose file-level
# atomicity, but the apply path issues SIGHUP only AFTER the
# write returns, and the addon's `load_routes` raises
# `ValueError` on a partial read and keeps the previous
# in-memory routes — so a SIGHUP that hypothetically raced an
# in-flight write is non-disruptive.
target = _egress_routes_host_path(slug)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_text(new_content)
# mitmproxy in the container reads through the bind mount as
# uid 1000; the host file has to be world-readable for that
# read to succeed (parent dir at 0o700 still restricts who
# can reach the file on the host). Routes content is not
# secret — tokens live in the container's environ — so 0o644
# is the right trade-off.
target.chmod(0o644)
sig = subprocess.run(
["docker", "kill", "--signal", "HUP", container],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if sig.returncode != 0:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"failed to SIGHUP {container}: "
f"{(sig.stderr or '').strip()}"
)
return before, new_content
def _merge_single_route(
current_yaml: str, new_route: dict[str, object],
) -> str:
"""Merge a single proposed route into the current routes.yaml
content, returning the merged YAML string.
Behavior:
- If `new_route['host']` is NOT in the current routes →
append the route.
- If the host IS already present → union the path_allowlist
entries (proposed ∪ existing). The existing `auth_scheme`
and `token_env` are preserved — agent-proposed auth changes
on an existing host are ignored, matching the tool's
documented semantics.
Round-trips the file through `yaml_subset` (the same parser
the addon uses), so the merged output is in the YAML format
the sidecar reads. Token VALUES never appear here; the routes
file carries only env-var slot NAMES."""
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(current_yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"current routes.yaml is not valid YAML: {e}"
) from e
routes = cfg.get("routes")
if not isinstance(routes, list):
raise EgressApplyError(
"current routes.yaml: 'routes' is not a list"
)
new_host = str(new_route.get("host", "")).lower()
if not new_host:
raise EgressApplyError(
"proposed route is missing 'host'"
)
proposed_paths = list(new_route.get("path_allowlist") or [])
# Look for an existing entry with the same host (case-insensitive).
for entry in routes:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
if str(entry.get("host", "")).lower() == new_host:
# Merge path_allowlist: union proposed + existing, ordered
# by first-seen so existing paths stay in original order.
existing_paths: list[str] = list(entry.get("path_allowlist") or [])
seen = {p: None for p in existing_paths}
for p in proposed_paths:
seen.setdefault(p, None)
merged_paths = list(seen.keys())
if merged_paths:
entry["path_allowlist"] = merged_paths
# Preserve existing auth — tool description says agent-
# proposed auth on an existing host is ignored.
break
else:
# Host not present; build a new route entry from the
# proposed fields. Need to assign a token_env slot if
# `auth` was proposed (otherwise the addon's parser rejects
# a half-set auth pair). Slots: count existing slots, pick
# the next free index.
entry = {"host": new_route["host"]}
if proposed_paths:
entry["path_allowlist"] = proposed_paths
auth = new_route.get("auth")
if isinstance(auth, dict) and auth.get("scheme") and auth.get("token_ref"):
existing_slots = sorted({
str(r.get("token_env"))
for r in routes
if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("token_env")
})
next_idx = len(existing_slots)
entry["auth_scheme"] = str(auth["scheme"])
entry["token_env"] = f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{next_idx}"
# NOTE: the addon reads token VALUES from its container's
# environ keyed by token_env. A newly-added auth route at
# runtime points at a slot that has no env value → the
# addon will 403 with "token env unset" until the operator
# arranges for the value to land in the container's env.
# Recording this here so the operator-facing diff carries
# the slot name they'll need to provision.
routes.append(entry)
return _render_routes_payload(routes)
def add_route(slug: str, proposed_route_json: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply a single-route addition to the egress. Parses the
agent's proposed route, fetches the current routes file, merges,
and applies via `apply_routes_change`. Returns (before, after)
full-file content for the audit log."""
try:
proposed = json.loads(proposed_route_json)
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"proposed route is not valid JSON: {e}"
) from e
if not isinstance(proposed, dict):
raise EgressApplyError(
"proposed route must be a JSON object"
)
current = fetch_current_routes(slug)
merged = _merge_single_route(current, proposed)
return apply_routes_change(slug, merged)
__all__ = [
"EgressApplyError",
"add_route",
"apply_routes_change",
"fetch_current_routes",
"validate_routes_content",
]
bot_bottle/backend/docker/enumerate.py
+1 -3
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from .. import ActiveAgent
from ...bottle_state import read_metadata
from .bottle_state import read_metadata
from .compose import compose_project_name, list_active_slugs
@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
agent_name=metadata.agent_name if metadata else "?",
started_at=metadata.started_at if metadata else "",
services=tuple(sorted(services)),
label=metadata.label if metadata else "",
color=metadata.color if metadata else "",
))
return out
bot_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py
+57 -15
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,16 @@ The flow is:
1. Build the agent's base + derived image (compose builds the
sidecar images via the `build:` directive on first up).
2. Mint the per-bottle egress CA (chunk 2 writes it under
state/<slug>/egress/).
3. Populate the inner plans with launch-time fields so the
renderer can read network names, CA paths.
2. Pre-create the per-bottle networks. We do this outside compose
so we can inspect the assigned internal CIDR and embed it in
pipelock's yaml (compose's `external: true` lets the compose
file reference these pre-existing networks).
3. Mint the per-bottle CAs (chunk 2 writes them under
state/<slug>/{pipelock,egress}/).
4. Re-render pipelock yaml with the now-known internal CIDR so
the SSRF allowlist exempts the bottle's own subnet.
5. Populate the inner plans with launch-time fields so the
renderer can read network names, CA paths, pipelock URL.
6. Render the compose spec, write it to
state/<slug>/docker-compose.yml, write metadata.json.
7. `docker compose up -d` (token + OAuth values flow into the
@@ -43,10 +49,11 @@ from . import network as network_mod
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from ...bottle_state import (
from .bottle_state import (
bottle_state_dir,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
pipelock_state_dir,
)
from .compose import (
bottle_plan_to_compose,
@@ -59,6 +66,10 @@ from .compose import (
write_compose_file,
)
from .egress import egress_tls_init
from .pipelock import (
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
@@ -69,7 +80,7 @@ _REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
def launch(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, "DockerBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Docker bottle via compose.
Teardown on exit."""
@@ -81,7 +92,7 @@ def launch(
def teardown() -> None:
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
except BaseException as exc:
warn(
f"teardown failed for container {plan.container_name}"
f" (compose-down): {exc!r}"
@@ -97,14 +108,40 @@ def launch(
plan.image, _REPO_DIR,
dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path,
)
if plan.derived_image:
docker_mod.build_image_with_cwd(
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.workspace_plan
)
# Networks: compose-managed. The names are derived
# deterministically from the slug so the renderer can put
# them on the services and `compose up` creates them with
# those names. The empirical spike confirmed pipelock's
# SSRF guard only checks proxied-request destinations, not
# source IPs — so the bottle's own internal CIDR doesn't
# need to be in `ssrf.ip_allowlist`. Pre-create + CIDR
# introspection are gone; compose owns the network
# lifecycle.
internal_network = network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
egress_network = network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
# Mint per-bottle CAs into state/<slug>/{pipelock,egress}/.
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(pipelock_state_dir(plan.slug))
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
# Populate launch-time fields on every inner plan so the
# renderer reads concrete network names, CA paths, and
# pipelock URL.
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
internal_network_cidr="",
egress_network=egress_network,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
git_gate_plan = plan.git_gate_plan
if git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_plan = dataclasses.replace(
@@ -112,13 +149,17 @@ def launch(
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
if egress_plan.routes:
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
egress_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
)
supervise_plan = plan.supervise_plan
if supervise_plan is not None:
supervise_plan = dataclasses.replace(
@@ -127,6 +168,7 @@ def launch(
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
@@ -176,7 +218,7 @@ def launch(
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
bottle._prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
# Step 9: yield. exec_agent continues to use `docker exec -it`
# — the agent runs `sleep infinity` per the renderer's
bot_bottle/backend/docker/network.py
+14 -5
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
"""Docker network plumbing for the per-agent egress topology.
The agent container sits on a Docker `--internal` network (no default
gateway). Egress straddles that network and a per-agent user-defined
bridge for upstream traffic. We deliberately do NOT use Docker's legacy
gateway). Pipelock straddles that network and a per-agent user-defined
bridge for upstream egress. We deliberately do NOT use Docker's legacy
`bridge` network because only user-defined bridges run Docker's
embedded DNS resolver, which egress needs to resolve upstream hostnames.
embedded DNS resolver, which pipelock needs to resolve api.anthropic.com
and similar upstream hostnames.
Naming: bot-bottle-net-<slug> (internal),
bot-bottle-egress-<slug> (egress). Numeric suffix on conflict
@@ -76,12 +77,20 @@ def network_create_internal(slug: str) -> str:
def network_create_egress(slug: str) -> str:
"""Create a per-agent user-defined bridge (NOT the legacy `bridge`)
so the egress sidecar has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
so the pipelock sidecar has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
return _network_create_with_prefix(network_egress_name_for_slug(slug), internal=False)
def network_inspect_cidr(name: str) -> str:
"""Return the IPv4 CIDR Docker assigned to a user-defined network."""
"""Return the IPv4 CIDR Docker assigned to a user-defined network.
Used by pipelock's SSRF guard exception: the bottle's internal
network sits in RFC1918 space, so pipelock's `internal:` list
would block any agent request whose destination resolves there
— including the cred-proxy sidecar's address. Adding the
network's CIDR to pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist` lets traffic
targeted at the bottle's own sidecars through while pipelock
still body-scans and api_allowlist-gates as usual."""
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "network", "inspect",
"--format", "{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Subnet}}{{end}}", name],
bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py
+81
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"""Docker-side pipelock helpers: image pin, container naming, and
the one-shot `pipelock tls init` host-side CA mint. The
prepare-time YAML rendering itself lives on the platform-neutral
`PipelockProxy` ABC — backends instantiate it directly.
The per-container `.start()` / `.stop()` lifecycle was deleted in
PRD 0024 chunk 3; compose-up owns the container lifecycle (PRD
0018) and the bundle path (PRD 0024) collapses pipelock + egress
+ git-gate + supervise into one container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
from ...log import die
# Re-exported for the compose renderer + smolmachines launch step
# (they used to import these from this module before they moved to
# the platform-neutral pipelock module).
from ...pipelock import ( # noqa: F401
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
# Pipelock image, pinned by digest. The digest is the multi-arch image
# index for ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock:2.3.0.
PIPELOCK_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_IMAGE",
"ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:3b1a39417b98406ddc5dc2d8fcb42865ddc0c68a43d355db55f0f8cb06bc6de9",
)
# Listening port for pipelock's forward proxy.
PIPELOCK_PORT = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_PORT", "8888")
# The URL egress dials for its upstream HTTPS_PROXY. egress and
# pipelock share the same container's network namespace inside the
# sidecar bundle, so loopback reaches pipelock directly — no docker
# DNS aliases involved.
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
"""Generate a fresh per-bottle CA via a one-shot pipelock container.
Runs `pipelock tls init` against a host-mounted scratch dir, leaving
`ca.pem` (public cert, mode 600) and `ca-key.pem` (private key, mode
600) under `<stage_dir>/pipelock-ca/`. Returns the two host paths.
The image is pinned (same digest the running sidecar uses) so the
generated CA matches what the sidecar expects. Output is owned by
whatever UID the one-shot ran as; the compose renderer's
bind-mounts pin the files in place at runtime, so ownership
inside the running sidecar (root in pipelock's distroless image)
is independent."""
work = stage_dir / "pipelock-ca"
work.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm",
"-v", f"{work}:/h",
"-e", "PIPELOCK_HOME=/h",
PIPELOCK_IMAGE, "tls", "init"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"pipelock tls init failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
cert = work / "ca.pem"
key = work / "ca-key.pem"
if not cert.is_file() or not key.is_file():
die(f"pipelock tls init did not produce ca files in {work}")
# Explicit perms in case a future pipelock release changes
# defaults. Pipelock runs as root in its distroless image and
# bind-mounts work with 0o600 (root reads everything); the key
# has no reason to be readable to anyone else on the host.
key.chmod(0o600)
cert.chmod(0o644)
return (cert, key)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock_apply.py
+200
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"""pipelock_apply — host-side helper to apply an api_allowlist
change to a running pipelock sidecar (PRD 0015).
Used by the supervise dashboard when the operator approves a
pipelock-block proposal (or runs the operator-initiated `pipelock
edit <bottle>` verb). Fetches the current pipelock.yaml via `docker
exec`, parses it, swaps the api_allowlist with the proposed hosts,
re-renders, writes back via the bind-mount path, then signals the
bundle supervisor to restart the pipelock daemon (`docker kill
--signal USR1`) so
pipelock picks up the new config.
v1 uses restart, not SIGHUP — pipelock has no in-process reload
hook and adding one is the "SIGHUP reload for pipelock" open
question in PRD 0015. Restart drops in-flight outbound calls; the
agent's HTTP client retries pick up against the restarted proxy.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import subprocess
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from ...pipelock import pipelock_render_yaml
from ...yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
from .bottle_state import pipelock_state_dir
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
def _pipelock_yaml_host_path(slug: str) -> Path:
"""The bind-mount source for the pipelock sidecar's
pipelock.yaml — matches what pipelock.prepare wrote at chunk-2
paths."""
return pipelock_state_dir(slug) / "pipelock.yaml"
PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock.yaml"
# Allowlist proposals are one-hostname-per-line. Blank lines and
# `#`-prefixed comments are ignored. The character set matches the
# supervise sidecar's syntactic check on the agent's pipelock-block
# proposal (alphanumerics + dot/dash/underscore).
_HOST_OK = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
class PipelockApplyError(RuntimeError):
"""Raised when fetch / parse / apply fails. The dashboard renders
the message and keeps the proposal pending — never crashes."""
def parse_allowlist_content(content: str) -> list[str]:
"""One hostname per line. Blanks and `#` comments are ignored.
Raises PipelockApplyError if a line has a disallowed character."""
hosts: list[str] = []
for i, raw_line in enumerate(content.splitlines(), start=1):
line = raw_line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
if not _HOST_OK.match(line):
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"allowlist line {i}: {line!r} has disallowed characters"
)
hosts.append(line)
return hosts
def render_allowlist_content(hosts: list[str]) -> str:
"""Hosts → one-per-line string (the operator-facing format)."""
if not hosts:
return ""
return "\n".join(hosts) + "\n"
def fetch_current_yaml(slug: str) -> str:
"""Read the live /etc/pipelock.yaml from the sidecar bundle.
Uses `docker cp` because pipelock inside the bundle is the
distroless pipelock binary with no shell, and `docker cp` is a
daemon-API tarball copy that works regardless of what's
available inside the container.
Raises PipelockApplyError if the read fails."""
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="cb-pipelock-fetch.", suffix=".yaml")
os.close(fd)
try:
r = subprocess.run(
[
"docker", "cp",
f"{container}:{PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER}", tmp_path,
],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if r.returncode != 0:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"could not fetch pipelock.yaml from {container}: "
f"{(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'container not running?'}"
)
return Path(tmp_path).read_text()
finally:
try:
Path(tmp_path).unlink()
except OSError:
pass
def fetch_current_allowlist(slug: str) -> str:
"""Fetch the live yaml, extract api_allowlist, render as one-per-
line — the operator-facing format for the TUI / agent's
current-config mount."""
yaml = fetch_current_yaml(slug)
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise PipelockApplyError(f"running pipelock yaml: {e}") from e
hosts = cfg.get("api_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(hosts, list):
raise PipelockApplyError(
"running pipelock yaml: api_allowlist is not a list"
)
return render_allowlist_content([str(h) for h in hosts])
def apply_allowlist_change(
slug: str, new_allowlist_content: str,
) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Apply `new_allowlist_content` to the sidecar bundle:
1. Parse the proposed hosts (one per line).
2. Fetch + parse current pipelock.yaml.
3. Replace api_allowlist with the proposed hosts; re-render.
4. Write the new yaml to the bind-mount source.
5. `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` so the supervisor
restarts the pipelock daemon in place (leaving egress,
git-gate, and supervise running). Pipelock has no
in-process reload; the supervisor's per-daemon restart
keeps the agent's MCP socket alive — a whole-bundle
`docker restart` would bounce supervise too.
Returns (before, after) where both are one-per-line allowlist
strings (operator-facing format). Raises PipelockApplyError on
any failure; the sidecar's existing config stays in place until
the host write succeeds, and the SIGUSR1 is what makes it
live."""
new_hosts = parse_allowlist_content(new_allowlist_content)
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
current_yaml = fetch_current_yaml(slug)
try:
cfg = parse_yaml_subset(current_yaml)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise PipelockApplyError(f"running pipelock yaml: {e}") from e
current_hosts = cfg.get("api_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(current_hosts, list):
raise PipelockApplyError(
"running pipelock yaml: api_allowlist is not a list"
)
before = render_allowlist_content([str(h) for h in current_hosts])
after = render_allowlist_content(new_hosts)
cfg["api_allowlist"] = new_hosts
rendered = pipelock_render_yaml(cfg)
# pipelock.yaml is bind-mounted into the container as a SINGLE
# FILE — same Docker single-file inode issue as egress_apply:
# write-temp-then-rename swaps the host inode and leaves the
# container's mount pointing at the orphaned old one. Write
# in-place. The SIGUSR1 below makes the new content live
# (pipelock has no in-process reload, so the supervisor
# restarts the pipelock daemon in response).
target = _pipelock_yaml_host_path(slug)
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_text(rendered)
# pipelock runs as root in its distroless image — any mode is
# fine — but 0o600 matches what prepare wrote.
target.chmod(0o600)
restart = subprocess.run(
["docker", "kill", "--signal", "USR1", container],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if restart.returncode != 0:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"failed to signal {container} for pipelock restart: "
f"{(restart.stderr or '').strip()}"
)
return before, after
__all__ = [
"PIPELOCK_YAML_IN_CONTAINER",
"PipelockApplyError",
"apply_allowlist_change",
"fetch_current_allowlist",
"fetch_current_yaml",
"parse_allowlist_content",
"render_allowlist_content",
]
bot_bottle/backend/docker/prepare.py
+278
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@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
"""Prepare step for the Docker bottle backend.
`resolve_plan` does all host-side resolution (image and container
names, env-file, prompt-file, proxy plan, runtime detection) and
returns a frozen DockerBottlePlan. No Docker resources are created;
the only side effects are scratch files under `stage_dir` and a probe
of `docker info`. Cross-backend host-side validation has already run
via the base class's `prepare` template before this is called.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from dataclasses import replace
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, runtime_for
from ...egress import Egress
from ...env import ResolvedEnv, resolve_env
from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...log import die
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .. import BottleSpec
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .bottle_state import (
BottleMetadata,
agent_state_dir,
bottle_identity,
clear_preserve_marker,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
per_bottle_image_tag,
pipelock_state_dir,
supervise_state_dir,
write_metadata,
)
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
def resolve_plan(
spec: BottleSpec,
*,
stage_dir: Path,
) -> DockerBottlePlan:
"""Resolve Docker-specific names and write scratch files. Trusts
that the agent and its skills/git-gate keys are present —
validation already ran in the base class."""
docker_mod.require_docker()
proxy = PipelockProxy()
git_gate = GitGate()
egress = Egress()
supervise = Supervise()
manifest = spec.manifest
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
provider = bottle.agent_provider
provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
guest_home = "/home/node"
workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
# PRD 0016 follow-up: identity, not bare slug. A fresh `start`
# mints a random-suffixed identity (so parallel runs of the same
# agent in the same cwd don't collide on container/network
# names); a `resume` passes the recorded identity in via
# spec.identity to continue an existing bottle's state.
slug = spec.identity or bottle_identity(spec.agent_name)
# Record the launch metadata so `cli.py resume <identity>` can
# reconstruct the spec. Idempotent — re-writes on resume with a
# refreshed started_at.
write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
identity=slug,
agent_name=spec.agent_name,
cwd=spec.user_cwd if spec.copy_cwd else "",
copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
compose_project=f"bot-bottle-{slug}",
backend="docker",
))
# Clear any leftover preserve marker from a prior capability-block
# so this fresh launch can be cleaned up at session-end unless
# the agent triggers another capability-block.
clear_preserve_marker(slug)
# PRD 0016 capability-block: if a per-bottle Dockerfile has been
# written (via apply_capability_change), the base image becomes
# per_bottle_image_tag(slug) built from that file. --cwd still
# layers a derived image on top.
dockerfile_path = ""
if per_bottle_dockerfile(slug) is not None:
image_default = per_bottle_image_tag(slug)
dockerfile_path = str(per_bottle_dockerfile_path(slug))
elif provider.dockerfile:
image_default = f"bot-bottle-{provider.template}:{slug}"
dockerfile_path = _resolve_manifest_dockerfile(provider.dockerfile, spec)
elif provider_runtime.dockerfile:
image_default = provider_runtime.image
dockerfile_path = provider_runtime.dockerfile
else:
image_default = provider_runtime.image
image = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_IMAGE", image_default)
derived_image = ""
runtime_image = image
if spec.copy_cwd:
derived_image = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_DERIVED_IMAGE", f"bot-bottle-cwd:{slug}"
)
runtime_image = derived_image
default_container = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
pinned_container = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER", "")
container_name_pinned = bool(pinned_container)
if container_name_pinned:
container_name = pinned_container
if docker_mod.container_exists(container_name):
die(
f"container '{container_name}' already exists "
f"(pinned via BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER). "
f"Remove it with 'docker rm -f {container_name}' or unset the override."
)
else:
container_name = ""
for candidate in docker_mod.container_name_candidates(default_container):
if not docker_mod.container_exists(candidate):
container_name = candidate
break
if not container_name:
die(
f"could not find a free container name after "
f"{default_container}-{docker_mod.MAX_CONTAINER_SUFFIX}; "
f"clean up old containers with 'docker rm -f <name>'"
)
# Probe the sidecar-bundle container name for an orphan from a
# previous run. Otherwise a stale bundle surfaces as a
# docker-create conflict deep inside launch() with no actionable
# hint; failing fast here points at the cleanup command.
bundle_name = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
if docker_mod.container_exists(bundle_name):
die(
f"sidecar bundle container '{bundle_name}' already exists. "
f"This is an orphan from a previous run; clean it up with "
f"'./cli.py cleanup' (or 'docker rm -f {bundle_name}') and "
f"retry."
)
# PRD 0018 chunk 2: prepare-time scratch files live under
# ~/.bot-bottle/state/<slug>/<service>/ so chunk 3's compose
# bind-mounts can point at stable paths. The state subdirs are
# cleaned up by start.py's session-end teardown unless something
# explicitly preserves the state dir (capability-block, crash).
agent_dir = agent_state_dir(slug)
agent_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
env_file = agent_dir / "agent.env"
prompt_file = agent_dir / "prompt.txt"
prompt_file.write_text("")
prompt_file.chmod(0o600)
git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
git_gate_plan = git_gate.prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
# Everything that should reach the bottle by-name (so its value
# never lands on argv or in env_file) goes into one dict. Nothing
# mutates the host os.environ.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
_write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt)
use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
)
guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=guest_env)
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = egress.prepare(
bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
supervise_plan = None
if bottle.supervise:
# Current Dockerfile for the agent image. Read from the repo
# root; for `--cwd` derived images the base Dockerfile is what
# the agent should propose changes against (the derived layer
# is just a workspace copy).
# (routes.yaml + pipelock allowlist used to land here too but
# PRD 0017 chunk 3 moved them behind the
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool so the agent gets live
# state rather than a launch-time snapshot.)
supervise_dockerfile_path = (
Path(dockerfile_path)
if dockerfile_path
else Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent / "Dockerfile.claude"
)
dockerfile_content = (
supervise_dockerfile_path.read_text()
if supervise_dockerfile_path.is_file()
else ""
)
supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
supervise_plan = supervise.prepare(
slug, supervise_dir,
dockerfile_content=dockerfile_content,
)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
slug=slug,
container_name=container_name,
container_name_pinned=container_name_pinned,
image=image,
derived_image=derived_image,
runtime_image=runtime_image,
dockerfile_path=dockerfile_path,
env_file=env_file,
forwarded_env=forwarded_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
use_runsc=use_runsc,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
def _write_env_file(resolved: ResolvedEnv, env_file: Path) -> None:
"""Serialize the literal portion of a ResolvedEnv into docker's
`--env-file` syntax (NAME=VALUE per line, mode 600 since the file
may carry verbatim values from the manifest). Forwarded names ride
on the plan as a structured tuple instead."""
env_lines: list[str] = []
for name, value in resolved.literals.items():
if "\n" in value:
die(
f"env entry {name} (literal) contains a newline; "
f"docker --env-file cannot represent multi-line values."
)
env_lines.append(f"{name}={value}")
env_file.write_text("\n".join(env_lines) + ("\n" if env_lines else ""))
env_file.chmod(0o600)
def _resolve_manifest_dockerfile(path_value: str, spec: BottleSpec) -> str:
path = Path(os.path.expanduser(path_value))
if not path.is_absolute():
path = Path(spec.user_cwd) / path
return str(path)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/__init__.py
+5 -6
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,10 @@
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration) live on
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. CA and git
provisioning also moved to the AgentProvider ABC (with Debian/node
defaults); user plugins override them for non-standard images.
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The modules
left in this subpackage handle only the steps that are
backend-specific:
No modules remain in this subpackage — the directory is kept so that
existing imports of `from .provision import ...` don't need updating
if new backend-specific provisioners are added later.
- ca.py — install per-bottle CA bundle into the guest trust store
- git.py — copy host cwd `.git` into the guest when --cwd is used
"""
bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/ca.py
+51
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
"""Install the per-bottle MITM CA into the agent container's trust
store.
Post-PRD-0017 the CA depends on the agent's HTTP_PROXY target:
- Bottle declares `egress.routes[]` → agent's HTTP_PROXY
points at egress; the cert the agent must trust is the
one egress mints leaf certs with (the egress CA).
- No egress routes → agent's HTTP_PROXY points straight at
pipelock; the cert the agent must trust is pipelock's CA (the
pre-cutover behavior).
By the time this provisioner runs, the corresponding `tls_init`
helper has generated the chosen CA under `plan.stage_dir`, and the
sidecar (pipelock or egress) is up referencing the
in-container CA paths.
Cert lands on Debian's standard source path
(`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/`); `update-ca-certificates`
rebuilds `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`, which is what curl,
Python `ssl`, and OpenSSL-based tools all read by default. The env
trio set on the agent's `docker run` covers Node
(`NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`) and Python `requests` /
`SSL_CERT_FILE`-honoring libraries that don't load the system
bundle.
The fingerprint is computed via stdlib (`ssl.PEM_cert_to_DER_cert`
+ `hashlib.sha256`) and logged once to stderr. The private key
stays on the host (under `stage_dir`) until teardown wipes the
stage dir; nothing in the agent ever sees it."""
from __future__ import annotations
from ... import Bottle
from ...util import AGENT_CA_PATH, log_ca_fingerprint, select_ca_cert
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_ca(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the agent, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the agent container is up."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
bottle.exec(
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && update-ca-certificates",
user="root",
)
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/git.py
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
"""Git provisioning inside a running Docker bottle.
Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that .git
into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on the
user's repo.
2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
against a declared upstream (push, fetch, clone, pull,
ls-remote) transparently hits the per-agent git-gate. The
gate mirrors the upstream in both directions, so URL
rewriting is symmetric.
3. If the bottle declares `git.user` (issue #86), set
`git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the bottle so
the agent's commits are attributed to that identity.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import shlex
from ....git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME, git_gate_render_gitconfig
from ....log import info
from ... import Bottle
from ..bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
def provision_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Set up git inside the bottle. Runs all three subcases; each
no-ops when its condition isn't met."""
_provision_cwd_git(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_user(plan, bottle)
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
it into /home/node/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
otherwise."""
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
return
guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
info(f"copying {host_git} -> {bottle.name}:{guest_workspace_git}")
bottle.cp_in(host_git, guest_workspace_git)
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {shlex.quote(workspace.owner)} {shlex.quote(guest_workspace_git)}",
user="root",
)
def _provision_git_gate_config(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Write ~/.gitconfig in the bottle with the git-gate
insteadOf rules. No-op when the bottle has no `git` entries."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not manifest_bottle.git:
return
container_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(manifest_bottle.git, GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
config_file = plan.stage_dir / "agent_gitconfig"
config_file.write_text(content)
config_file.chmod(0o600)
info(f"writing {container_gitconfig} with {len(manifest_bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
bottle.cp_in(str(config_file), container_gitconfig)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {shlex.quote(container_gitconfig)} && "
f"chmod 644 {shlex.quote(container_gitconfig)}",
user="root",
)
def _provision_git_user(plan: DockerBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Apply `git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the
bottle so the agent's commits are attributed to the operator-
chosen identity instead of the agent image's default
(which is no user — git would refuse to commit at all
until the agent ran its own `git config`).
Runs as the `node` user so `--global` lands in
`/home/node/.gitconfig` (matching the existing
`_provision_git_gate_config` write location). No-op when the
bottle didn't declare `git.user`.
Each field set independently — name-only or email-only
configs only run the `git config` line for the field
present."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = manifest_bottle.git_user
if gu.is_empty():
return
if gu.name:
info(f"git config --global user.name = {gu.name!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.name {shlex.quote(gu.name)}",
user="node",
)
if gu.email:
info(f"git config --global user.email = {gu.email!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.email {shlex.quote(gu.email)}",
user="node",
)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/resolve_plan.py
-132
View File
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
"""Prepare step for the Docker bottle backend.
`resolve_plan` does all host-side resolution (image and container
names, env-file, prompt-file, proxy plan, runtime detection) and
returns a frozen DockerBottlePlan. No Docker resources are created;
the only side effects are scratch files under `stage_dir` and a probe
of `docker info`. Cross-backend host-side validation has already run
via the base class's `prepare` template before this is called.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, get_provider
from ...env import ResolvedEnv, resolve_env
from ...log import die
# from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .. import BottleSpec
from ..resolve_common import (
merge_provision_env_vars,
mint_slug,
prepare_agent_state_dir,
prepare_egress,
prepare_git_gate,
prepare_supervise,
resolve_manifest_dockerfile,
write_launch_metadata,
)
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
# from ...bottle_state import (
# # clear_preserve_marker,
# per_bottle_dockerfile,
# per_bottle_dockerfile_path,
# per_bottle_image_tag,
# )
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
def preflight():
docker_mod.require_docker()
def resolve_plan(
spec: BottleSpec,
*,
stage_dir: Path,
) -> DockerBottlePlan:
"""Resolve Docker-specific names and write scratch files. Trusts
that the agent and its skills/git-gate keys are present —
validation already ran in the base class."""
preflight()
manifest = spec.manifest
manifest_bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
manfiest_agent_provider = manifest_bottle.agent_provider
agent_provider = get_provider(manfiest_agent_provider.template)
slug = mint_slug(spec)
# FIXME: don't thin the compose project should be directly written to metadata like this,
# should probably be a backend specific metadata field for details like this
write_launch_metadata(slug, spec, compose_project=f"bot-bottle-{slug}", backend="docker")
agent_image = agent_provider.runtime.image
agent_dockerfile_path = resolve_manifest_dockerfile(manfiest_agent_provider.dockerfile, spec)
instance_name = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
agent_dir, prompt_file = prepare_agent_state_dir(slug, spec)
env_file = agent_dir / "agent.env"
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=manfiest_agent_provider.template,
dockerfile=agent_dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home="/home/node", # FIXME: should be coming from the agent plan
forward_host_credentials=manfiest_agent_provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=manfiest_agent_provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
# trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
label=spec.label,
color=spec.color,
)
agent_provision = merge_provision_env_vars(agent_provision)
egress_plan = prepare_egress(manifest_bottle, slug, agent_provision)
supervise_plan = prepare_supervise(manifest_bottle, slug)
git_gate_plan = prepare_git_gate(manifest_bottle, slug)
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
_write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
# ==== docker specific setup ====
use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
slug=slug,
container_name=instance_name,
# container_name_pinned=container_name_pinned,
image=agent_image,
dockerfile_path=agent_dockerfile_path,
env_file=env_file,
forwarded_env=forwarded_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
use_runsc=use_runsc,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
# workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
def _write_env_file(resolved: ResolvedEnv, env_file: Path) -> None:
"""Serialize the literal portion of a ResolvedEnv into docker's
`--env-file` syntax (NAME=VALUE per line, mode 600 since the file
may carry verbatim values from the manifest). Forwarded names ride
on the plan as a structured tuple instead."""
env_lines: list[str] = []
for name, value in resolved.literals.items():
if "\n" in value:
die(
f"env entry {name} (literal) contains a newline; "
f"docker --env-file cannot represent multi-line values."
)
env_lines.append(f"{name}={value}")
env_file.write_text("\n".join(env_lines) + ("\n" if env_lines else ""))
env_file.chmod(0o600)
bot_bottle/backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py
+6 -5
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
(PRD 0024).
The bundle image (built by Dockerfile.sidecars, PRD 0024 chunk 1)
runs egress + git-gate + supervise as one container per bottle
under a small Python init supervisor. As of chunk 5 the bundle
is the only shape — the legacy four-sidecar topology and its
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE` feature flag are gone."""
runs pipelock + egress + git-gate + supervise as one container
per bottle under a small Python init supervisor. As of chunk 5
the bundle is the only shape — the legacy four-sidecar topology
and its `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE` feature flag are gone."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ import os
# Bundle image. Defaults to a built-locally tag (built from the
# repo's Dockerfile.sidecars via compose `build:`). Operators
# pinning to a published digest can override via env.
# pinning to a published digest can override via env, matching
# the existing `BOT_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_IMAGE` shape.
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE",
"bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
bot_bottle/backend/resolve_common.py
-124
View File
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
"""Shared helpers used by both backends' resolve_plan steps.
Each helper owns one well-defined step of the per-bottle plan
resolution so docker and smolmachines don't repeat the same logic.
Backend-specific steps (container names, env-file, per-bottle
Dockerfile overrides, subnet allocation) stay in the backend's own
resolve_plan.py.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import replace
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from ..agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
from ..bottle_state import (
BottleMetadata,
agent_state_dir,
bottle_identity,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
supervise_state_dir,
write_metadata,
)
from ..egress import Egress, EgressPlan
from ..git_gate import GitGate, GitGatePlan
from ..manifest import ManifestBottle
from ..supervise import Supervise, SupervisePlan
from . import BottleSpec
def mint_slug(spec: BottleSpec) -> str:
"""Return the bottle identity: the recorded identity for a resume,
or a freshly minted one for a new start."""
return spec.identity or bottle_identity(spec.agent_name)
def write_launch_metadata(
slug: str, spec: BottleSpec, *, compose_project: str, backend: str,
) -> None:
"""Persist launch metadata so `cli.py resume <identity>` can
reconstruct the spec. Idempotent — re-writes on resume with a
refreshed started_at."""
write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
identity=slug,
agent_name=spec.agent_name,
cwd=spec.user_cwd if spec.copy_cwd else "",
copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
compose_project=compose_project,
backend=backend,
label=spec.label,
color=spec.color,
))
def prepare_agent_state_dir(slug: str, spec: BottleSpec) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
"""Create the agent state subdir, write the prompt file.
Returns (agent_dir, prompt_file)."""
manifest = spec.manifest
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
agent_dir = agent_state_dir(slug)
agent_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
prompt_file = agent_dir / "prompt.txt"
prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt or "")
prompt_file.chmod(0o600)
return agent_dir, prompt_file
def prepare_git_gate(bottle: ManifestBottle, slug: str) -> GitGatePlan:
git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return GitGate().prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
def prepare_egress(
bottle: ManifestBottle, slug: str, provision: AgentProvisionPlan,
) -> EgressPlan:
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return Egress().prepare(bottle, slug, egress_dir, provision.egress_routes)
def prepare_supervise(
bottle: ManifestBottle, slug: str, *, dockerfile_content: str = "",
) -> SupervisePlan | None:
"""Prepare the supervise sidecar state dir. Returns None when
bottle.supervise is falsy."""
if not bottle.supervise:
return None
supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir, dockerfile_content=dockerfile_content)
def merge_provision_env_vars(provision: AgentProvisionPlan) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
"""Fold provision.env_vars into guest_env (setdefault semantics)
and return a new plan with the merged guest_env."""
merged = dict(provision.guest_env)
for key, val in provision.env_vars.items():
merged.setdefault(key, val)
return replace(provision, guest_env=merged)
def resolve_manifest_dockerfile(path_value: str, spec: BottleSpec) -> str:
"""Resolve a manifest-supplied dockerfile path relative to user_cwd."""
path = Path(os.path.expanduser(path_value))
if not path.is_absolute():
path = Path(spec.user_cwd) / path
return str(path)
__all__ = [
"merge_provision_env_vars",
"mint_slug",
"prepare_agent_state_dir",
"prepare_egress",
"prepare_git_gate",
"prepare_supervise",
"resolve_manifest_dockerfile",
"write_launch_metadata",
]
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/backend.py
+14 -2
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,13 @@ from .. import ActiveAgent, Bottle, BottleBackend, BottleSpec
from . import cleanup as _cleanup
from . import enumerate as _enumerate
from . import launch as _launch
from . import resolve_plan as _resolve_plan
from . import prepare as _prepare
from . import smolvm as _smolvm
from .bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import SmolmachinesBottleCleanupPlan
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .provision import ca as _ca
from .provision import git as _git
from .provision import workspace as _workspace
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
def _resolve_plan(
self, spec: BottleSpec, *, stage_dir: Path
) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
return _resolve_plan.resolve_plan(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
return _prepare.resolve_plan(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
@contextmanager
def launch(
@@ -53,11 +55,21 @@ class SmolmachinesBottleBackend(
with _launch.launch(plan, provision=self.provision) as bottle:
yield bottle
def provision_ca(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
) -> None:
_ca.provision_ca(plan, bottle)
def provision_workspace(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
) -> None:
_workspace.provision_workspace(plan, bottle)
def provision_git(
self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
) -> None:
_git.provision_git(plan, bottle)
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> str:
"""The smolmachines guest reaches the supervise sidecar via a
host-published random port the launch step pinned earlier
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle.py
+7 -21
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from typing import Mapping, cast
from typing import Mapping
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
@@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
# In-VM path to the agent's prompt file. None when the
# agent declared no prompt (file still exists; we just
# don't pass --append-system-prompt-file).
self.prompt_path = prompt_path
self._prompt_path = prompt_path
# Env vars the agent process needs (HTTPS_PROXY,
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, manifest-declared bottle env, …).
# Forwarded on every `smolvm machine exec` via `-e K=V`
@@ -94,9 +93,9 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
agent_tail = ["env", *_env_assignments_for("node", self._guest_env),
self.agent_command]
provider_prompt_args = prompt_args(
cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode), self.prompt_path, argv=argv,
self._agent_prompt_mode, self._prompt_path, argv=argv,
)
if cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode) == "read_prompt_file":
if self._agent_prompt_mode == "read_prompt_file":
agent_tail += argv
agent_tail += provider_prompt_args
else:
@@ -132,11 +131,6 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
self.agent_argv(argv, tty=tty), check=False,
).returncode
# smolvm/libkrun can SIGKILL an otherwise-normal exec during
# early-VM provisioning. Retry once after a short settle so
# callers (provision_ca, etc.) don't have to handle it themselves.
_SIGKILL_EXIT = 128 + 9
def exec(self, script: str, *, user: str = "node") -> ExecResult:
"""Run a POSIX shell script as `user` (default `node`) and
capture the result. Matches the docker backend's `exec`,
@@ -147,22 +141,14 @@ class SmolmachinesBottle(Bottle):
`runuser -u <user> -- env ... /bin/sh -c <script>` switches UID
without invoking a login shell, then sets HOME / USER and the
bottle env in the child process.
Retries once on SIGKILL (exit 137) — libkrun occasionally
kills short-lived execs during VM bring-up."""
r = self._exec_raw(script, user=user)
if r.returncode == self._SIGKILL_EXIT:
time.sleep(1.0)
r = self._exec_raw(script, user=user)
return r
def _exec_raw(self, script: str, *, user: str = "node") -> ExecResult:
bottle env in the child process."""
argv = [
"--", "runuser", "-u", user, "--",
"env", *_env_assignments_for(user, self._guest_env),
"/bin/sh", "-c", script,
]
# Call smolvm directly because this path needs the host-side
# subprocess capture shape used by the Docker backend.
r = subprocess.run(
["smolvm", "machine", "exec", "--name", self.name] + argv,
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/bottle_plan.py
+2 -8
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
from .. import BottlePlan
@@ -70,6 +71,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# docker's `--internal` + egress bridge topology; it's on a
# per-bottle bridge with a pinned IP. The unused fields stay
# at their dataclass defaults.
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
# Agent-side endpoints. On Docker Desktop the docker bridge
# IPs aren't reachable from the smolvm guest (TSI uses macOS
# networking; docker container IPs live in the daemon's VM),
@@ -82,14 +84,6 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
agent_git_gate_host: str = ""
agent_supervise_url: str = ""
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_host(self) -> str:
return self.agent_git_gate_host
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_scheme(self) -> str:
return "http"
@property
def agent_command(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.command
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/enumerate.py
+3 -5
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import json
import subprocess
from .. import ActiveAgent
from ...bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..docker.bottle_state import read_metadata
from . import sidecar_bundle as _bundle
@@ -64,15 +64,13 @@ def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
agent_name=metadata.agent_name if metadata else "?",
started_at=metadata.started_at if metadata else "",
services=services_by_slug.get(slug, ()),
label=metadata.label if metadata else "",
color=metadata.color if metadata else "",
))
return out
def _query_bundle_services() -> dict[str, tuple[str, ...]]:
"""`{slug: ('egress', ...)}` from each running bundle container's
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env var.
"""`{slug: ('egress', 'pipelock', ...)}` from each running
bundle container's `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env var.
Smolmachines bundles all run the PRD-0024 image with the
same daemon set declared via env, so one inspect per bundle
gets us the picture without exec'ing into the container.
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py
+92 -24
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,13 @@ guest pointed at the bundle's pinned IP via TSI's
exit.
The bundle's daemons consume the inner Plans the docker backend
already produces: egress reads routes + CAs from the EgressPlan.
Git-gate + supervise plumb through the same plans the docker
backend uses, minus the docker-network fields that don't apply here."""
already produces: pipelock reads its yaml + CA from the
PipelockProxyPlan; egress reads routes + CAs from the EgressPlan
+ EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY pointing at `127.0.0.1:8888` (bundle
local), since the agent dials pipelock first (not egress) on the
smolmachines path. Git-gate + supervise plumb through the same
plans the docker backend uses, minus the docker-network fields
that don't apply here."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -25,11 +29,16 @@ from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_resolve_token_values,
)
from ...pipelock import (
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ...util import expand_tilde
from ..docker import util as docker_mod
from ..docker.egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT as _EGRESS_PORT,
egress_tls_init,
)
@@ -39,9 +48,14 @@ from ..docker.git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ..docker.pipelock import (
BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
PIPELOCK_PORT as _PIPELOCK_PORT_STR,
pipelock_tls_init,
)
from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
from ...log import warn
from ...bottle_state import egress_state_dir, git_gate_state_dir
from ..docker.bottle_state import git_gate_state_dir
from . import loopback_alias as _loopback
from . import sidecar_bundle as _bundle
from . import smolvm as _smolvm
@@ -64,7 +78,9 @@ _SMOLMACHINE_CACHE_DIR = Path.home() / ".cache" / "bot-bottle" / "smolmachines"
# Container-internal listening ports for each bundle daemon. The
# bundle publishes each one on a random host loopback port (see
# `_bundle.start_bundle`), and `_bundle.bundle_host_port` looks
# them up post-start.
# them up post-start. Pipelock's port is an env-overridable string
# in docker.pipelock; coerce to int here.
_PIPELOCK_PORT = int(_PIPELOCK_PORT_STR)
_GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
_SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
@@ -73,7 +89,7 @@ _SUPERVISE_PORT = SUPERVISE_PORT
def launch(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, "SmolmachinesBottle"], str | None],
provision: Callable[[SmolmachinesBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[SmolmachinesBottle, None, None]:
"""Build + run the bottle and yield a handle; tear everything
down on exit. Errors during bringup unwind any partial state
@@ -104,7 +120,7 @@ def launch(
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
bottle._prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
yield bottle
finally:
@@ -123,7 +139,7 @@ def _teardown_smolmachines(
teardown_exc: BaseException | None = None
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 — teardown must not fail
except BaseException as exc:
teardown_exc = exc
warn(f"smolmachines teardown failed: {exc!r}")
bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
@@ -151,16 +167,33 @@ def _allocate_resources(
def _mint_certs(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
"""Mint the egress MITM CA and return the plan with CA paths filled."""
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
"""Mint per-bottle CAs and return the plan with CA paths filled.
Pipelock always runs in the bundle. Egress's CA is only minted
when the bottle declares routes — otherwise egress runs idle
without MITM and the CA files would be unused."""
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.parent)
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
egress_plan = plan.egress_plan
if egress_plan.routes:
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
plan.egress_plan.routes_path.parent,
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
# On smolmachines, egress's upstream is pipelock on the
# bundle's localhost — they're in the same container's
# network namespace.
pipelock_proxy_url=BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
def _start_bundle(
@@ -191,10 +224,17 @@ def _discover_urls(
macOS networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
published-port loopback forward only.
Proxy hop order: when the bottle declares egress routes, the
agent's first hop is egress (for token injection), then
pipelock. Without routes, the agent dials pipelock directly.
NO_PROXY includes the per-bottle loopback alias so the
supervise + git-gate URLs bypass HTTPS_PROXY."""
if plan.egress_plan.routes:
agent_facing_port = _EGRESS_PORT
else:
agent_facing_port = _PIPELOCK_PORT
agent_facing_host_port = _bundle.bundle_host_port(
plan.slug, _EGRESS_PORT, host_ip=loopback_ip,
plan.slug, agent_facing_port, host_ip=loopback_ip,
)
agent_proxy_url = f"http://{loopback_ip}:{agent_facing_host_port}"
@@ -288,7 +328,8 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
"""Build a BundleLaunchSpec from the resolved inner Plans.
Daemons in the CSV:
- egress is always present.
- egress + pipelock are always present (pipelock is the
agent's first hop; egress is its upstream).
- git-gate + git-http are conditional on plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- supervise is conditional on plan.supervise_plan.
@@ -296,15 +337,36 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
daemon-private values only (HTTPS_PROXY is scoped to the
egress process by egress_entrypoint.sh — see PRD 0024's bundle
bind-address PR)."""
daemons: list[str] = ["egress"]
daemons: list[str] = ["egress", "pipelock"]
env: list[str] = []
volumes: list[tuple[str, str, bool]] = []
# In this Docker-Desktop-compatible topology, whichever daemon
# is "agent-facing" gets its port published on the host
# loopback (see `_ensure_smolmachine`'s discovery loop) and the
# other stays bundle-internal. The bundle is NOT reachable by
# bridge IP from the smolvm guest on macOS — TSI uses macOS
# networking, and macOS sees the daemon's bridge via the
# published-port loopback forward only.
# --- pipelock ---------------------------------------------
pp = plan.proxy_plan
volumes += [
(str(pp.yaml_path), "/etc/pipelock.yaml", True),
(str(pp.ca_cert_host_path), PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(pp.ca_key_host_path), PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER, True),
]
# --- egress -----------------------------------------------
ep = plan.egress_plan
volumes.append((str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append((str(ep.routes_path), EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, True))
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY={ep.pipelock_proxy_url}")
env.append(f"EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA={EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER}")
volumes += [
(str(ep.routes_path), EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True),
(str(ep.pipelock_ca_host_path), EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True),
]
# Bare-name entries for upstream-token slots. Their values
# come from the docker-run subprocess env (inherited from
# the operator's shell), never landing on argv.
@@ -347,8 +409,14 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
# Container ports the agent reaches from the smolvm guest —
# published on host loopback so the guest can dial via TSI +
# macOS networking. Egress is always the agent's HTTP/HTTPS proxy.
ports_to_publish: list[int] = [_EGRESS_PORT]
# macOS networking. The HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint is whichever
# daemon's port we publish: egress when routes are declared
# (token injection first, then forwards to bundle-internal
# pipelock), pipelock otherwise.
if ep.routes:
ports_to_publish: list[int] = [_EGRESS_PORT]
else:
ports_to_publish = [_PIPELOCK_PORT]
if gp.upstreams:
ports_to_publish.append(_GIT_HTTP_PORT)
if sp is not None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/local_registry.py
+5 -7
View File
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ import time
import uuid
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Generator
from typing import Iterator
from ...log import die
# registry:2.8.3, pinned by digest. Same env-override pattern as the
# sidecar image pin in bot_bottle/backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py.
# pipelock image pin in bot_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py.
REGISTRY_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_REGISTRY_IMAGE",
"registry@sha256:a3d8aaa63ed8681a604f1dea0aa03f100d5895b6a58ace528858a7b332415373",
@@ -61,10 +61,7 @@ REGISTRY_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
# narrow.
CRANE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_CRANE_IMAGE",
(
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:"
"0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084"
),
"gcr.io/go-containerregistry/crane@sha256:0ae17ecb34315aa7cbff28f6eddee3b7adae0b2f90101260d990804db1eb0084",
)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ class RegistryHandle:
@contextmanager
def ephemeral_registry() -> Generator[RegistryHandle, None, None]:
def ephemeral_registry() -> Iterator[RegistryHandle]:
"""Bring up a per-session docker network + a `registry:2.8.3`
container on it (published on a random host port), yield a
`RegistryHandle`, force-remove both on exit.
@@ -208,6 +205,7 @@ def _host_port(name: str) -> int:
return int(port_str)
except ValueError:
die(f"unexpected `docker port` output: {line!r}")
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def _wait_ready(port: int) -> None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/loopback_alias.py
+5 -3
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import json
import os
import platform
import re
import sqlite3
@@ -176,11 +177,11 @@ def force_allowlist(machine_name: str, allowed_cidrs: list[str]) -> None:
con.close()
def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
def allocate(slug: str) -> str:
"""Pick the lowest-numbered alias from the pool not already
in use by a running smolmachines bundle. Bails when the pool
is exhausted — the caller should report the limit to the
operator. `_slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
operator. `slug` is logged for traceability; not otherwise
used (no on-disk reservation, allocation is purely
docker-state-driven).
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ def allocate(_slug: str) -> str:
if not _is_macos():
return "127.0.0.1"
_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as lf:
with open(_ALLOC_LOCK_PATH, "w") as lf:
fcntl.flock(lf, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
return _allocate_locked()
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ def _allocate_locked() -> str:
f"Stop a running bottle (`smolvm machine ls --json`) or "
f"raise _POOL_END in loopback_alias.py."
)
return "" # unreachable; die() never returns
def _alias_present(ip: str) -> bool:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/prepare.py
+197
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
"""smolmachines `_resolve_plan` (PRD 0023 chunks 2d + 4c).
Resolves the per-bottle docker subnet + bundle IP and assembles
the guest env. The agent's docker image build → smolmachine
pack pipeline runs in `launch.launch`, not here, so the
dashboard's preflight modal isn't garbled by docker-build output
before the operator has confirmed.
No VM bringup — that's `launch.launch`'s job."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from dataclasses import replace
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, runtime_for
from ...backend import BottleSpec
from ...backend.docker.bottle_state import (
BottleMetadata,
agent_state_dir,
bottle_identity,
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
pipelock_state_dir,
supervise_state_dir,
write_metadata,
)
from ...egress import Egress
from ...env import resolve_env
from ...git_gate import GitGate
from ...pipelock import PipelockProxy
from ...supervise import Supervise
from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .util import smolmachines_bundle_subnet, smolmachines_preflight
# Gateway ports the bundle exposes inside its container — pipelock
# HTTPS proxy, git-gate's git-daemon, supervise's MCP. The agent
# inside the smolvm guest dials these on the bundle's pinned IP.
_BUNDLE_PIPELOCK_PORT = 8888
_BUNDLE_GIT_GATE_PORT = 9418
_BUNDLE_SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
def resolve_plan(
spec: BottleSpec, *, stage_dir: Path
) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
"""Materialize the smolmachines plan. The bundle's docker
subnet + pinned IP are derived from the slug; the agent's
`.smolmachine` artifact is built (or cache-hit) here so
launch's `machine create --from` boots without a registry
pull. Per-bottle guest env + the TSI allow_cidrs land on the
plan for launch to pass straight through to
`machine create` flags."""
smolmachines_preflight()
manifest = spec.manifest
bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
provider = bottle.agent_provider
provider_runtime = runtime_for(provider.template)
guest_home = "/home/node"
workspace_plan = resolve_workspace_plan(spec, guest_home=guest_home)
slug = spec.identity or bottle_identity(spec.agent_name)
# Record minimal metadata so `cli.py resume` can recover the
# slug. Same schema as the docker backend.
write_metadata(BottleMetadata(
identity=slug,
agent_name=spec.agent_name,
cwd=spec.user_cwd if spec.copy_cwd else "",
copy_cwd=spec.copy_cwd,
started_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
compose_project="",
backend="smolmachines",
))
subnet, gateway, bundle_ip = smolmachines_bundle_subnet(slug)
# Agent's env: resolve through resolve_env() so ?prompt entries
# are prompted and ${HOST_VAR} entries are interpolated — matching
# the Docker backend's contract. Forwarded (secret/interpolated)
# values still reach the guest as -e K=V smolvm flags because
# smolvm 0.8.0 has no env-file or stdin injection path; this is
# the known argv-exposure gap documented in PRD 0038.
# HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are populated
# in launch.py after bundle bringup.
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
guest_env: dict[str, str] = {
**resolved.literals,
**resolved.forwarded,
"NO_PROXY": "localhost,127.0.0.1",
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
"SSL_CERT_FILE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
}
git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
git_gate_plan = GitGate().prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
# Prompt file is always written (mode 0o600) so the in-VM
# path always exists. Content is the agent's `prompt`
# field (markdown body) — empty for agents with no prompt.
# claude-code reads it via --append-system-prompt-file only
# when non-empty, but the file must exist either way to
# match the docker backend's contract.
agent_dir = agent_state_dir(slug)
agent_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
prompt_file = agent_dir / "prompt.txt"
agent = manifest.agents[spec.agent_name]
prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt or "")
prompt_file.chmod(0o600)
machine_name = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
# Stash the agent image ref — `launch.launch` runs the
# build → pack pipeline at bringup. Honors BOT_BOTTLE_IMAGE
# to match the docker backend's `resolve_plan` default.
agent_dockerfile_path = ""
if provider.dockerfile:
agent_dockerfile_path = _resolve_manifest_dockerfile(provider.dockerfile, spec)
image_default = f"bot-bottle-{provider.template}:{slug}"
elif provider_runtime.dockerfile:
agent_dockerfile_path = provider_runtime.dockerfile
image_default = provider_runtime.image
else:
image_default = provider_runtime.image
agent_image_ref = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_IMAGE", image_default)
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=agent_dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
guest_env=guest_env,
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
)
merged_guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
merged_guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=merged_guest_env)
# Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
# platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
# a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
# dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
# bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
# dependency).
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = Egress().prepare(
bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
supervise_plan = None
if bottle.supervise:
supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
supervise_plan = Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir)
return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
guest_home=guest_home,
slug=slug,
bundle_subnet=subnet,
bundle_gateway=gateway,
bundle_ip=bundle_ip,
machine_name=machine_name,
agent_image_ref=agent_image_ref,
guest_env=agent_provision.guest_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
proxy_plan=proxy_plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
def _resolve_manifest_dockerfile(path_value: str, spec: BottleSpec) -> str:
path = Path(os.path.expanduser(path_value))
if not path.is_absolute():
path = Path(spec.user_cwd) / path
return str(path)
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/__init__.py
+5 -6
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,11 @@
Per PRD 0050 the per-provider provisioning steps (prompt, skills,
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration) live on
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. CA and git
provisioning also moved to the AgentProvider ABC (with Debian/node
defaults); user plugins override them for non-standard images.
The module left in this subpackage handles the remaining backend-
specific step:
the `AgentProvider` plugin under `bot_bottle/contrib/`. The modules
left in this subpackage handle only the steps that are
backend-specific:
- ca.py — install per-bottle CA bundle into the guest trust store
- git.py — copy host cwd `.git` into the guest when --cwd is used
- workspace.py — copy the operator workspace into the guest
"""
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/ca.py
+93
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
"""Install the per-bottle MITM CA into the smolmachines guest's
trust store (PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.ca`: select the right CA (egress
when the bottle has routes, else pipelock), copy it to Debian's
`/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
`update-ca-certificates` to rebuild the trust bundle, and log the
fingerprint once. The selected cert depends on the agent's
HTTP_PROXY target — same logic as the docker backend, since the
agent dials the same daemons through the same bundle.
`smolvm machine exec` runs commands as root in the VM (no `-u`
flag exists; the VM init is root), so we don't need the explicit
`-u 0` the docker backend uses on its `docker exec` calls."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from ....log import die
from ...util import (
AGENT_CA_BUNDLE,
AGENT_CA_PATH,
log_ca_fingerprint,
select_ca_cert,
)
from ... import Bottle, ExecResult
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
_SIGKILL_EXIT = 128 + 9
def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the guest, rebuild the
trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
`BottleBackend.provision` after the smolvm guest is up."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan, plan.proxy_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
# Mode 0644 — readable to non-root tools in the guest.
# update-ca-certificates rebuilds the bundle at AGENT_CA_BUNDLE,
# which is what curl / Python ssl / OpenSSL-based tools read by
# default. The env trio (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE /
# REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE) on the guest_env covers Node + Python
# `requests` / libraries that don't load the system bundle.
#
r = _install_ca(bottle)
if r.returncode == _SIGKILL_EXIT:
# smolvm/libkrun can SIGKILL an otherwise-normal exec
# during early-VM provisioning. `update-ca-certificates`
# is idempotent, so retry the same install once after a
# short settle delay before treating it as fatal.
time.sleep(1.0)
r = _install_ca(bottle)
if r.returncode != 0:
# update-ca-certificates not adding our cert is fatal —
# claude-code's TLS handshake against the egress-MITM'd
# api.anthropic.com would fail downstream. Bail early
# with what we can see (output is captured so we can
# surface it).
die(
f"update-ca-certificates didn't add the agent CA "
f"(exit {r.returncode}): "
f"stdout={(r.stdout or '').strip()!r} "
f"stderr={(r.stderr or '').strip()!r}"
)
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
def _install_ca(bottle: Bottle) -> ExecResult:
# chown + chmod + update-ca-certificates + bundle
# verification run in one exec so we only pay one
# round trip; the `&&` chaining surfaces the first failure
# as the return code. The verify check is more stable than
# requiring "1 added" in stdout: a retry after a
# partially-completed first run may legitimately report "0
# added" while the cert is already installed.
return bottle.exec(
f"chown root:root {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && "
f"update-ca-certificates && "
f"openssl verify -CAfile {AGENT_CA_BUNDLE} {AGENT_CA_PATH}",
user="root",
)
# Re-exported for the launch/provision_ca caller + tests. The path
# constants live in the shared `backend.util` (Debian's
# `update-ca-certificates` layout is the same in both backends).
__all__ = ["AGENT_CA_BUNDLE", "AGENT_CA_PATH", "provision_ca"]
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/git.py
+133
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
"""Git provisioning inside a running smolmachines bottle
(PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
Three concerns, all about git in the agent:
1. If --cwd was passed AND the host cwd has a .git, copy that
.git into the planned guest workspace so the agent operates on
the user's repo.
2. If the bottle declares `git` entries (PRD 0008), write a
~/.gitconfig with insteadOf rules so every git operation
against a declared upstream transparently hits the per-bottle
git-gate. The gate mirrors the upstream in both directions,
so URL rewriting is symmetric.
3. If the bottle declares `git.user` (issue #86), set
`git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the guest so
the agent's commits are attributed to that identity.
Differs from `backend.docker.provision.git` in one address detail:
the TSI-allowlisted guest can only reach the bundle's pinned IP
(no DNS resolver in the /32 allowlist), so the insteadOf URLs
are `http://<bundle_ip>:<port>/<name>.git` rather than the
docker backend's `git://git-gate/<name>.git`. The render itself
is the shared `git_gate_render_gitconfig` on the platform-neutral
git_gate module."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shlex
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from ....git_gate import git_gate_render_gitconfig
from ....log import info
from ... import Bottle
from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
def provision_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""Set up git inside the guest. Runs all three subcases; each
no-ops when its condition isn't met."""
_provision_cwd_git(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_user(plan, bottle)
def _provision_cwd_git(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle) -> None:
"""If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
it into <guest_home>/workspace/.git and fix ownership. No-op
otherwise."""
workspace = plan.workspace_plan
if not (workspace.enabled and workspace.copy_git and workspace.has_host_git_dir):
return
guest_workspace_git = f"{workspace.guest_path}/.git"
host_git = str(workspace.host_path / ".git")
info(f"copying {host_git} -> {bottle.name}:{guest_workspace_git}")
# mkdir -p the workspace dir so cp_in lands the .git
# directly there even on first-time bottles.
bottle.exec(f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(workspace.guest_path)}", user="root")
bottle.cp_in(host_git, guest_workspace_git)
# cp_in lands files as root; the agent runs as node so
# the workspace tree must be chowned over.
bottle.exec(
f"chown -R {shlex.quote(workspace.owner)} {shlex.quote(guest_workspace_git)}",
user="root",
)
def _provision_git_gate_config(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle
) -> None:
"""Write ~/.gitconfig in the guest with the git-gate insteadOf
rules. No-op when the bottle has no `git` entries."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
if not manifest_bottle.git:
return
# `<loopback alias>:<host port>` form: the bundle's git-gate
# HTTP port is published on host loopback at launch time so
# the smolvm guest (which can only reach macOS networking via
# TSI, not the docker bridge IP) can dial it. launch.py
# populates `plan.agent_git_gate_host` after bundle bringup.
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(
manifest_bottle.git, plan.agent_git_gate_host, scheme="http",
)
guest_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
# Stage the file under the plan's stage_dir so cp_in
# has a stable host path. The plan's stage_dir is cleaned up
# by start.py's session-end teardown.
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
"w", dir=str(plan.stage_dir), prefix="gitconfig.",
delete=False,
) as f:
f.write(content)
config_file = Path(f.name)
os.chmod(config_file, 0o600)
info(f"writing {guest_gitconfig} with {len(manifest_bottle.git)} insteadOf rule(s)")
bottle.cp_in(str(config_file), guest_gitconfig)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)} && "
f"chmod 644 {shlex.quote(guest_gitconfig)}",
user="root",
)
def _provision_git_user(
plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, bottle: Bottle,
) -> None:
"""Apply `git config --global user.{name,email}` inside the
guest as the node user so --global lands in the same
`/home/node/.gitconfig` that `_provision_git_gate_config`
writes to. No-op when the bottle didn't declare `git.user`.
SmolmachinesBottle.exec(user="node") automatically sets
HOME=/home/node so --global writes to /home/node/.gitconfig."""
manifest_bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
gu = manifest_bottle.git_user
if gu.is_empty():
return
if gu.name:
info(f"git config --global user.name = {gu.name!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.name {shlex.quote(gu.name)}",
user="node",
)
if gu.email:
info(f"git config --global user.email = {gu.email!r}")
bottle.exec(
f"git config --global user.email {shlex.quote(gu.email)}",
user="node",
)
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/pty_resize.py
+3 -5
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ import subprocess
import sys
import termios
import threading
from types import FrameType
# How long to wait after the main exec starts before pushing the
@@ -68,9 +67,8 @@ def _read_winsize() -> tuple[int, int] | None:
- tmux respawn-pane: tmux sets all three to the pane's PTY.
- non-TTY (someone piped stdin in tests): none are; the
sync just no-ops, which is the right behavior."""
for stream in (sys.stdin, sys.stdout, sys.stderr):
for fd in (sys.stdin.fileno(), sys.stdout.fileno(), sys.stderr.fileno()):
try:
fd = stream.fileno()
data = fcntl.ioctl(fd, termios.TIOCGWINSZ, b"\x00" * 8)
except OSError:
continue
@@ -125,13 +123,13 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
machine = argv[0]
inner = argv[2:]
def sync(_signum: int | None = None, _frame: FrameType | None = None) -> None:
def sync(*_args) -> None:
size = _read_winsize()
if size is None:
return
_push_size(machine, *size)
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync) # type: ignore[arg-type]
signal.signal(signal.SIGWINCH, sync)
proc = subprocess.Popen(inner)
# Initial sync is deferred — see _STARTUP_SYNC_DELAY_SEC.
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/resolve_plan.py
-117
View File
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
"""smolmachines `_resolve_plan` (PRD 0023 chunks 2d + 4c).
Resolves the per-bottle docker subnet + bundle IP and assembles
the guest env. The agent's docker image build → smolmachine
pack pipeline runs in `launch.launch`, not here, so the
dashboard's preflight modal isn't garbled by docker-build output
before the operator has confirmed.
No VM bringup — that's `launch.launch`'s job."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from pathlib import Path
from ...agent_provider import PROVIDER_TEMPLATES, agent_provision_plan, get_provider
from ...backend import BottleSpec
from ...env import resolve_env
# from ...workspace import workspace_plan as resolve_workspace_plan
from ..resolve_common import (
merge_provision_env_vars,
mint_slug,
prepare_agent_state_dir,
prepare_egress,
prepare_git_gate,
prepare_supervise,
resolve_manifest_dockerfile,
write_launch_metadata,
)
from .bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
from .util import smolmachines_bundle_subnet, smolmachines_preflight
def preflight():
smolmachines_preflight()
def resolve_plan(
spec: BottleSpec, *, stage_dir: Path
) -> SmolmachinesBottlePlan:
"""Materialize the smolmachines plan. The bundle's docker
subnet + pinned IP are derived from the slug; the agent's
`.smolmachine` artifact is built (or cache-hit) here so
launch's `machine create --from` boots without a registry
pull. Per-bottle guest env + the TSI allow_cidrs land on the
plan for launch to pass straight through to
`machine create` flags."""
preflight()
manifest = spec.manifest
manifest_bottle = manifest.bottle_for(spec.agent_name)
manfiest_agent_provider = manifest_bottle.agent_provider
agent_provider = get_provider(manfiest_agent_provider.template)
slug = mint_slug(spec)
write_launch_metadata(slug, spec, compose_project="", backend="smolmachines")
# ==== smolmachines specific setup ====
subnet, gateway, bundle_ip = smolmachines_bundle_subnet(slug)
# Agent's env: resolve through resolve_env() so ?prompt entries
# are prompted and ${HOST_VAR} entries are interpolated — matching
# the Docker backend's contract. Forwarded (secret/interpolated)
# values still reach the guest as -e K=V smolvm flags because
# smolvm 0.8.0 has no env-file or stdin injection path; this is
# the known argv-exposure gap documented in PRD 0038.
# HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL are populated
# in launch.py after bundle bringup.
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
guest_env: dict[str, str] = {
**resolved.literals,
**resolved.forwarded,
"NO_PROXY": "localhost,127.0.0.1",
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
"SSL_CERT_FILE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
}
# ==============
agent_dockerfile_path = resolve_manifest_dockerfile(manfiest_agent_provider.dockerfile, spec)
instance_name = f"bot-bottle-{slug}"
agent_dir, prompt_file = prepare_agent_state_dir(slug, spec)
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=manfiest_agent_provider.template,
dockerfile=agent_dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home="/home/node", # FIXME: should be coming from the agent plan
guest_env=guest_env,
forward_host_credentials=manfiest_agent_provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=manfiest_agent_provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
# trusted_project_path=workspace_plan.workdir,
label=spec.label,
color=spec.color,
)
agent_provision = merge_provision_env_vars(agent_provision)
egress_plan = prepare_egress(manifest_bottle, slug, agent_provision)
supervise_plan = prepare_supervise(manifest_bottle, slug)
git_gate_plan = prepare_git_gate(manifest_bottle, slug)
return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
slug=slug,
bundle_subnet=subnet,
bundle_gateway=gateway,
bundle_ip=bundle_ip,
machine_name=instance_name,
agent_image_ref=agent_image_ref,
guest_env=agent_provision.guest_env,
prompt_file=prompt_file,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_provision=agent_provision,
# workspace_plan=workspace_plan,
)
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/sidecar_bundle.py
+3 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ This module ships the lifecycle primitives only — create
network, start bundle, stop bundle, remove network — wrapped
around `subprocess.run(["docker", ...])`. Wiring them into the
launch flow + populating the `BundleLaunchSpec` from the inner
Plans (EgressPlan, …) lands in chunk 2d."""
Plans (PipelockProxyPlan, EgressPlan, …) lands in chunk 2d."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class BundleLaunchSpec:
# Daemon subset CSV for BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS. The
# supervisor inside the bundle reads it to skip
# bottle-irrelevant daemons (e.g. supervise=False bottles).
daemons_csv: str = "egress"
daemons_csv: str = "egress,pipelock"
# Plain "KEY=VALUE" strings + "KEY" bare names (the bare-name
# form inherits the value from the docker-run subprocess env,
# matching the docker backend's compose-up secret-forwarding
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ def bundle_host_port(
f"no port mapping on {host_ip} for {container} "
f"{container_port}/tcp; got: {(result.stdout or '').strip()!r}"
)
return -1 # unreachable; die() never returns
def stop_bundle(slug: str) -> None:
bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/smolvm.py
+2 -2
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
pack failed, etc.). Carries the captured stderr for the
operator-facing log line."""
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]):
def __init__(self, argv: Sequence[str], result: subprocess.CompletedProcess):
self.argv = list(argv)
self.returncode = result.returncode
self.stdout = result.stdout
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class SmolvmError(RuntimeError):
def _smolvm(*args: str, env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
check: bool = True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""One subprocess call into the smolvm CLI. `check=True`
raises SmolvmError on non-zero; `check=False` returns the
CompletedProcess for the caller to inspect."""
bot_bottle/backend/util.py
+27 -11
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from ..log import die, info
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ..egress import EgressPlan
from ..pipelock import PipelockProxyPlan
# Debian-family CA layout, shared by every backend (all guest images
@@ -34,20 +35,35 @@ def host_skill_dir(name: str) -> str:
return f"{home}/.claude/skills/{name}"
def select_ca_cert(egress_plan: EgressPlan) -> tuple[Path, str]:
"""Return the egress MITM CA cert path and label for provision_ca.
def select_ca_cert(
egress_plan: EgressPlan, proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
) -> tuple[Path, str]:
"""Pick the agent-facing CA cert (and a short label for the log
line) that matches the proxy the agent's HTTP_PROXY points at.
Egress wins when the bottle declares any routes (it sits in front
of pipelock); else pipelock.
Launch always mints the CA and re-binds the host path into the
egress_plan before provision runs, so an empty/missing path here
means launch's bringup is broken — fatal."""
cert = egress_plan.mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path
if cert == Path() or not cert.is_file():
Shared by every backend's `provision_ca`: launch mints the chosen
CA(s) and re-binds their host paths into these inner plans before
provision runs, so an empty/missing path here means launch's
bringup is broken — fatal."""
if egress_plan.routes:
cert = egress_plan.mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path
if cert == Path() or not cert.is_file():
die(
f"egress CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called egress_tls_init and "
f"re-bound the plan before provision"
)
return cert, "egress"
cert = proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path
if not cert or not cert.is_file():
die(
f"egress CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called egress_tls_init and "
f"re-bound the plan before provision"
f"pipelock CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
f"launch must have called pipelock_tls_init and re-bound "
f"the plan before provision"
)
return cert, "egress"
return cert, "pipelock"
def log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path: Path, label: str) -> None:
bot_bottle/cli/__init__.py
+3 -12
View File
@@ -41,18 +41,9 @@ def usage() -> None:
sys.stderr.write(" info print env, skills, and prompt details for a named agent\n")
sys.stderr.write(" init interactively create a new agent and add it to bot-bottle.json\n")
sys.stderr.write(" list list available agents or active containers\n")
sys.stderr.write(
" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity "
"(continues state from PRD 0016)\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" start boot a container for a named agent and "
"attach an interactive session\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(
" supervise view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise "
"proposals (PRD 0013)\n\n"
)
sys.stderr.write(" resume re-launch a bottle by its identity (continues state from PRD 0016)\n")
sys.stderr.write(" start boot a container for a named agent and attach an interactive session\n")
sys.stderr.write(" supervise view + approve/modify/reject pending supervise proposals (PRD 0013)\n\n")
sys.stderr.write(f"Run '{PROG} <command> --help' for command-specific usage.\n")
bot_bottle/cli/_common.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent)
def read_tty_line() -> str:
"""Mirror `IFS= read -r REPLY </dev/tty`. Falls back to stdin."""
try:
with open("/dev/tty", "r", encoding="utf-8") as tty:
with open("/dev/tty", "r") as tty:
return tty.readline().rstrip("\n")
except OSError:
return sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")
bot_bottle/cli/init.py
+5 -18
View File
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
die(f"{target_file} exists but is not valid JSON; fix or remove it first")
if agent_name in (existing.get("agents") or {}):
sys.stderr.write(
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in '
f'{target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
f'bot-bottle: agent "{agent_name}" already exists in {target_file}. Overwrite? [y/N] '
)
sys.stderr.flush()
ow = read_tty_line()
@@ -72,10 +71,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
# Prompt
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to "
"finish (just '.' to leave empty):"
)
info("System prompt — enter text, then a lone '.' on its own line to finish (just '.' to leave empty):")
prompt_lines: list[str] = []
while True:
line = read_tty_line()
@@ -103,10 +99,7 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if bottle_name in (existing.get("bottles") or {}):
bottle_exists_already = True
info(
f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; "
f"agent will reference it."
)
info(f"Bottle '{bottle_name}' already exists in {target_file}; agent will reference it.")
else:
info(f"Creating new bottle '{bottle_name}'.")
bottle_env = _prompt_for_env_vars()
@@ -138,14 +131,8 @@ def cmd_init(argv: list[str]) -> int:
def _prompt_for_env_vars() -> dict[str, str]:
print(file=sys.stderr)
info(
"Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with "
"no name to finish."
)
info(
" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from "
"host env) | literal (hardcoded value)"
)
info("Env vars — enter each var name then its mode. Press Enter with no name to finish.")
info(" Modes: secret (prompt at runtime) | interpolated (read from host env) | literal (hardcoded value)")
out: dict[str, str] = {}
while True:
print(file=sys.stderr)
bot_bottle/cli/list.py
+5 -40
View File
@@ -3,47 +3,12 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import os
import sys
from ..backend import enumerate_active_agents
from ..manifest import Manifest
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD
_ANSI_COLOR_CODES: dict[str, str] = {
"black": "\033[30m",
"red": "\033[31m",
"green": "\033[32m",
"yellow": "\033[33m",
"blue": "\033[34m",
"magenta": "\033[35m",
"cyan": "\033[36m",
"white": "\033[37m",
"bright-black": "\033[90m",
"bright-red": "\033[91m",
"bright-green": "\033[92m",
"bright-yellow": "\033[93m",
"bright-blue": "\033[94m",
"bright-magenta": "\033[95m",
"bright-cyan": "\033[96m",
"bright-white": "\033[97m",
}
_ANSI_RESET = "\033[0m"
def _ansi_label(text: str, color: str) -> str:
if not color:
return text
if not sys.stdout.isatty():
return text
term = os.environ.get("TERM", "")
if term in ("dumb", ""):
return text
code = _ANSI_COLOR_CODES.get(color)
if not code:
return text
return f"{code}{text}{_ANSI_RESET}"
def cmd_list(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} list", add_help=True)
@@ -62,11 +27,11 @@ def cmd_list(argv: list[str]) -> int:
if not active:
print("no active bot-bottle bottles", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
# One line per bottle: `<backend>\t<slug>\t<label>\t<services>`.
# Tab-separated keeps the format stable for shell pipelines.
# One line per bottle: `<backend>\t<slug>\t<agent>\t<status>`.
# Tab-separated keeps the format stable for shell pipelines;
# the dashboard renders the same data through its own
# formatter.
for b in active:
services = ",".join(b.services) if b.services else "-"
display_name = b.label if b.label else b.agent_name
colored_name = _ansi_label(display_name, b.color)
print(f"{b.backend_name}\t{b.slug}\t{colored_name}\t{services}")
print(f"{b.backend_name}\t{b.slug}\t{b.agent_name}\t{services}")
return 0
bot_bottle/cli/resume.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
from ..backend import BottleSpec
from ..bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..backend.docker.bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..log import die
from ..manifest import Manifest
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD
bot_bottle/cli/start.py
+4 -33
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from ..backend import (
known_backend_names,
)
from ..backend.docker.bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from ..bottle_state import (
from ..backend.docker.bottle_state import (
cleanup_state,
is_preserved,
mark_preserved,
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import snapshot_transcript
from ..log import info
from ..manifest import Manifest
from ._common import PROG, USER_CWD, read_tty_line
from . import tui
def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
@@ -50,51 +49,23 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
"or 'docker'). Overrides the env var when set."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"name",
nargs="?",
default=None,
help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json (omit to pick interactively)",
)
parser.add_argument("name", help="agent name defined in bot-bottle.json")
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
dry_run = args.dry_run or os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_DRY_RUN") == "1"
manifest = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD)
agent_name: str | None = args.name
if agent_name is None:
agent_name = tui.filter_select(
sorted(manifest.agents.keys()),
title="Select agent",
)
if agent_name is None:
return 0
backend_name: str | None = args.backend
if backend_name is None and "BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND" not in os.environ:
backend_name = tui.filter_select(
list(known_backend_names()),
title="Select backend",
)
if backend_name is None:
return 0
label, color = tui.name_color_modal(default_label=agent_name)
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=manifest,
agent_name=agent_name,
agent_name=args.name,
copy_cwd=args.cwd,
user_cwd=USER_CWD,
label=label,
color=color,
)
return _launch_bottle(
spec,
dry_run=dry_run,
remote_control=args.remote_control,
backend_name=backend_name,
backend_name=args.backend,
)
bot_bottle/cli/supervise.py
+79 -17
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@
act on them (approve / modify / reject).
Curses-based TUI; modify-then-approve shells out to $EDITOR. The
approval handler wires to PRD 0016 (capability-block), which rebuilds
the bottle Dockerfile. The egress-block tool was removed in issue #198.
approval handlers wire to the per-tool remediation engines:
PRD 0014 (egress, retargeted from cred-proxy in PRD 0017
chunk 3) writes routes.yaml + SIGHUPs egress; PRD 0015
(pipelock) writes the allowlist + restarts pipelock; PRD 0016
(capability) rebuilds the bottle Dockerfile.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -20,11 +23,19 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from .. import supervise as _supervise
from ..bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..backend.docker.bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..backend.docker.capability_apply import (
CapabilityApplyError,
apply_capability_change,
)
from ..backend.docker.egress_apply import EgressApplyError, add_route
from ..backend.docker.pipelock_apply import (
PipelockApplyError,
apply_allowlist_change,
fetch_current_allowlist,
parse_allowlist_content,
render_allowlist_content,
)
from ..log import Die, error, info
from ..supervise import (
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
@@ -35,6 +46,8 @@ from ..supervise import (
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
archive_proposal,
list_pending_proposals,
render_diff,
@@ -58,7 +71,7 @@ class QueuedProposal:
# Errors any remediation engine may raise. Caught by the TUI key
# handlers and surfaced in the status line so a failed apply keeps
# the proposal pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (CapabilityApplyError,)
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError, PipelockApplyError, CapabilityApplyError)
def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
@@ -79,7 +92,9 @@ def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
def _approval_status(qp: QueuedProposal, verb: str) -> str:
"""Status-line text after a successful approval."""
base = f"{verb} {qp.proposal.tool} for [{qp.proposal.bottle_slug}]"
return f"{base}; resume: ./cli.py resume {qp.proposal.bottle_slug}"
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return f"{base}; resume: ./cli.py resume {qp.proposal.bottle_slug}"
return base
def _detail_lines(
@@ -101,12 +116,33 @@ def _detail_lines(
out.extend((" " + line, 0) for line in p.justification.splitlines() or [""])
out.extend([
("", 0),
("proposed file:", 0),
(_proposed_payload_label(p.tool) + ":", 0),
])
out.extend((line, 0) for line in p.proposed_file.splitlines() or [""])
if p.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
host = _failed_url_host(p.proposed_file)
if host:
out.append(("", 0))
out.append((host, green_attr))
return out
def _failed_url_host(url: str) -> str:
"""Best-effort hostname extraction from a pipelock-block proposal."""
import urllib.parse
try:
return urllib.parse.urlsplit(url.strip()).hostname or ""
except ValueError:
return ""
def _proposed_payload_label(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
return "failed URL"
return "proposed file"
def _suffix_for_tool(tool: str) -> str:
if tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
return ".dockerfile"
@@ -127,7 +163,15 @@ def approve(
file_to_apply = final_file if final_file is not None else qp.proposal.proposed_file
diff_before, diff_after = "", ""
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
if qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK:
diff_before, diff_after = add_route(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
diff_before, diff_after = _apply_pipelock_url(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug, file_to_apply,
)
elif qp.proposal.tool == TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
_meta = read_metadata(qp.proposal.bottle_slug)
if _meta is not None and not _meta.compose_project:
raise CapabilityApplyError(
@@ -166,6 +210,23 @@ def reject(qp: QueuedProposal, *, reason: str) -> None:
_write_audit(qp, action=STATUS_REJECTED, notes=reason, diff_before="", diff_after="")
def _apply_pipelock_url(slug: str, failed_url: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Merge a pipelock-block failed URL's host into the allowlist."""
import urllib.parse
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(failed_url.strip())
host = parsed.hostname or ""
if not host:
raise PipelockApplyError(
f"proposed failed_url has no extractable host: {failed_url!r}"
)
current = fetch_current_allowlist(slug)
hosts = parse_allowlist_content(current)
if host not in hosts:
hosts.append(host)
return apply_allowlist_change(slug, render_allowlist_content(hosts))
def _write_audit(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
@@ -174,7 +235,7 @@ def _write_audit(
diff_before: str,
diff_after: str,
) -> None:
"""Audit log for egress tool."""
"""Audit log for egress / pipelock tools."""
component = COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL.get(qp.proposal.tool)
if component is None:
return
@@ -202,7 +263,7 @@ def edit_in_editor(content: str, *, suffix: str = ".tmp") -> str | None:
path = f.name
try:
subprocess.run([editor, path], check=False)
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
with open(path) as f:
edited = f.read()
return edited if edited != content else None
finally:
@@ -235,7 +296,7 @@ def cmd_supervise(argv: list[str]) -> int:
else:
error("supervise exited on a fatal error (no detail captured).")
return e.code if isinstance(e.code, int) else 1
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch supervise crash for logging
except Exception as e:
log_path = _write_crash_log(e)
error(f"supervise crashed: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
error(f"full traceback written to {log_path}")
@@ -293,7 +354,7 @@ def _try_init_green() -> int:
return 0
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None:
curses.curs_set(0)
stdscr.timeout(_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS)
green_attr = _try_init_green()
@@ -373,12 +434,12 @@ def _main_loop(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow") -> None: # type: ignore
def _render(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow",
pending: list[QueuedProposal],
selected: int,
status_line: str,
*,
green_attr: int = 0, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
green_attr: int = 0,
) -> None:
stdscr.erase()
h, w = stdscr.getmaxyx()
@@ -406,7 +467,8 @@ def _render(
cursor = "> " if i == selected else " "
line = (
f"{cursor}{ts_short} "
f"[{p.bottle_slug}] {p.tool:<18} {p.id[:8]}"
f"[{p.bottle_slug}] {p.tool:<18} {p.id[:8]} "
f"{_proposed_payload_label(p.tool)}"
)
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if i == selected else curses.A_NORMAL
stdscr.addnstr(row, 0, line, w - 1, attr)
@@ -426,7 +488,7 @@ def _render(
def _detail_view(
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", # type: ignore
stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow",
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
green_attr: int = 0,
@@ -477,7 +539,7 @@ def _detail_view(
return
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None: # type: ignore
def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None:
"""Suspend curses, open $EDITOR on the proposed file, return edited content."""
suffix = _suffix_for_tool(qp.proposal.tool)
curses.endwin()
@@ -488,7 +550,7 @@ def _modify(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", qp: QueuedProposal) -> str | None:
return edited
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str: # type: ignore
def _prompt(stdscr: "curses._CursesWindow", label: str) -> str:
"""One-line input at the bottom of the screen."""
curses.curs_set(1)
h, _ = stdscr.getmaxyx()
bot_bottle/cli/tui.py
-437
View File
@@ -1,437 +0,0 @@
"""tui.py — minimal curses filter-select picker for CLI prompts.
Exposed surface:
filter_select(items, *, title="", tty_path="/dev/tty") -> str | None
name_color_modal(default_label, *, tty_path="/dev/tty") -> (str, str)
Opens /dev/tty directly so the picker works even when stdout/stdin are
redirected. Returns the selected item or None on cancel.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import curses
import os
import sys
from typing import Any, Optional
def filter_select(
items: list[str],
*,
title: str = "",
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Render a filter-select picker over *items*.
Returns the selected item string, or ``None`` if the user cancelled
(Esc / ``q`` / Ctrl-C / Ctrl-D) or if the terminal is too small.
The picker opens *tty_path* directly so it works even when
stdout/stdin are redirected.
"""
if not items:
return None
try:
tty_fd = open(tty_path, "r+b", buffering=0)
except OSError:
return None
try:
# Use os.dup() to duplicate the fd so the original file object
# and FileIO in _run_picker each manage independent copies,
# preventing double-close errors.
fd_dup = os.dup(tty_fd.fileno())
return _run_picker(items, title=title, tty_fd=fd_dup)
finally:
tty_fd.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Internal implementation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_KEY_ESC = 27
_KEY_CTRL_C = 3
_KEY_CTRL_D = 4
_KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN = 8
_KEY_ENTER_ALT = 10
_CANCEL_KEYS = frozenset([_KEY_ESC, _KEY_CTRL_C, _KEY_CTRL_D, ord("q")])
def _run_picker(items: list[str], *, title: str, tty_fd: int) -> Optional[str]:
"""Drive a curses session on *tty_fd* and return the picked item."""
# newterm lets us run curses on an arbitrary fd rather than the
# process's controlling tty / stdout — crucial when stdout is piped.
os.environ.setdefault("TERM", "xterm-256color")
# Save / restore the real stdin/stdout so curses newterm can use tty_fd.
orig_stdin = sys.__stdin__
orig_stdout = sys.__stdout__
try:
import io
tty_text = io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(tty_fd, mode='r+'), write_through=True)
sys.__stdin__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
# curses.wrapper calls initscr which honours sys.__stdin__ / __stdout__
# on some builds; use newterm where available.
screen = curses.initscr()
curses.noecho()
curses.cbreak()
screen.keypad(True)
try:
result = _picker_loop(screen, items, title=title)
finally:
screen.keypad(False)
curses.nocbreak()
curses.echo()
curses.endwin()
except Exception: # noqa: W0718 — curses can raise many error types
return None
finally:
sys.__stdin__ = orig_stdin # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = orig_stdout # type: ignore[assignment]
return result
def _picker_loop(screen: Any, items: list[str], *, title: str) -> Optional[str]:
query = ""
cursor = 0
while True:
filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
# Clamp cursor into the visible list.
if not filtered:
cursor = 0
elif cursor >= len(filtered):
cursor = len(filtered) - 1
try:
_render(screen, filtered, cursor, query=query, title=title)
except curses.error:
# Terminal too small or write error — bail out.
return None
try:
key = screen.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return None
if key in _CANCEL_KEYS:
return None
if key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, _KEY_ENTER_ALT, ord("\r")):
return filtered[cursor] if filtered else None
if key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")):
if cursor > 0:
cursor -= 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")):
if cursor < len(filtered) - 1:
cursor += 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_BACKSPACE, _KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN, 127):
query = query[:-1]
# After narrowing the filter, keep cursor in range.
new_filtered = _filter_items(items, query)
if cursor >= len(new_filtered):
cursor = max(0, len(new_filtered) - 1)
elif 32 <= key <= 126:
# Printable ASCII — append to query and reset cursor so the
# top of the newly-filtered list is selected.
query += chr(key)
cursor = 0
def _filter_items(items: list[str], query: str) -> list[str]:
if not query:
return list(items)
q = query.lower()
return [i for i in items if q in i.lower()]
def _render(screen: Any, filtered: list[str], cursor: int, *, query: str, title: str) -> None:
screen.erase()
rows, cols = screen.getmaxyx()
min_rows = 5
if rows < min_rows:
raise curses.error("terminal too small")
row = 0
if title and row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, title[:cols - 1], curses.A_BOLD)
row += 1
filter_label = f"Filter: {query}"
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, filter_label[:cols - 1])
row += 1
sep = "─" * min(cols - 1, 40)
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
list_start = row
# Reserve two rows for separator + help line at bottom.
list_rows = rows - list_start - 2
if list_rows < 1:
return
# Scroll window: keep cursor visible.
scroll = max(0, cursor - list_rows + 1)
visible = filtered[scroll: scroll + list_rows]
for idx, item in enumerate(visible):
abs_idx = scroll + idx
attr = curses.A_REVERSE if abs_idx == cursor else curses.A_NORMAL
prefix = "> " if abs_idx == cursor else " "
line = (prefix + item)[:cols - 1]
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, line, attr)
row += 1
if row < rows - 1:
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, sep)
row += 1
help_line = "[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] cancel"
if row < rows:
_addstr_safe(screen, min(rows - 1, row), 0, help_line[:cols - 1])
screen.refresh()
def _addstr_safe(screen: Any, row: int, col: int, text: str, attr: int = curses.A_NORMAL) -> None:
try:
screen.addstr(row, col, text, attr)
except curses.error:
pass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# name_color_modal — two-step label + color picker
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_ANSI_COLORS = [
"red", "green", "blue", "yellow", "magenta", "cyan", "white", "black",
"bright-red", "bright-green", "bright-blue", "bright-yellow",
"bright-magenta", "bright-cyan", "bright-white", "bright-black",
]
_CURSES_COLOR_MAP: dict[str, int] = {
"black": curses.COLOR_BLACK,
"red": curses.COLOR_RED,
"green": curses.COLOR_GREEN,
"yellow": curses.COLOR_YELLOW,
"blue": curses.COLOR_BLUE,
"magenta": curses.COLOR_MAGENTA,
"cyan": curses.COLOR_CYAN,
"white": curses.COLOR_WHITE,
}
_COLOR_NONE = "(none)"
def name_color_modal(
default_label: str,
*,
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Present a two-step curses modal: first edit the agent label,
then optionally pick a color.
Returns ``(label, color)`` where ``color`` is one of the 16 ANSI
color name strings or ``""`` for no color. Falls back to
``(default_label, "")`` on any error (terminal too small, not a tty).
"""
try:
tty_fd = open(tty_path, "r+b", buffering=0) # pylint: disable=consider-using-with
except OSError:
return default_label, ""
try:
fd_dup = os.dup(tty_fd.fileno())
return _run_name_color(default_label, tty_fd=fd_dup)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
return default_label, ""
finally:
tty_fd.close()
def _run_name_color(default_label: str, *, tty_fd: int) -> tuple[str, str]:
import io
orig_stdin = sys.__stdin__
orig_stdout = sys.__stdout__
try:
tty_text = io.TextIOWrapper(io.FileIO(tty_fd, mode="r+"), write_through=True)
sys.__stdin__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = tty_text # type: ignore[assignment]
os.environ.setdefault("TERM", "xterm-256color")
screen = curses.initscr()
curses.noecho()
curses.cbreak()
screen.keypad(True)
try:
label = _label_step(screen, default_label)
color = _color_step(screen, label)
finally:
screen.keypad(False)
curses.nocbreak()
curses.echo()
curses.endwin()
finally:
sys.__stdin__ = orig_stdin # type: ignore[assignment]
sys.__stdout__ = orig_stdout # type: ignore[assignment]
return label, color
def _label_step(screen: Any, default_label: str) -> str:
"""Step 1: edit the label. First printable key replaces the
pre-fill; subsequent keys append. Enter confirms."""
text = default_label
replaced = False # True once the user has typed their first char
while True:
_render_label(screen, text)
try:
key = screen.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return default_label
if key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, _KEY_ENTER_ALT, ord("\r")):
return text.strip() or default_label
if key in (curses.KEY_BACKSPACE, _KEY_BACKSPACE_WIN, 127):
if replaced:
text = text[:-1]
else:
text = ""
replaced = True
elif 32 <= key <= 126:
if not replaced:
text = chr(key)
replaced = True
else:
text += chr(key)
def _render_label(screen: Any, text: str) -> None:
screen.erase()
rows, cols = screen.getmaxyx()
sep = "─" * min(cols - 1, 40)
_addstr_safe(screen, 0, 0, "Name agent", curses.A_BOLD)
_addstr_safe(screen, 1, 0, sep)
_addstr_safe(screen, 2, 0, text[:cols - 1], curses.A_REVERSE)
_addstr_safe(screen, 3, 0, sep)
if rows > 5:
_addstr_safe(screen, 5, 0, "[any key] edit [Enter] confirm", curses.A_DIM)
screen.refresh()
def _color_step(screen: Any, confirmed_label: str) -> str:
"""Step 2: pick a color from the list, or skip."""
items = [_COLOR_NONE] + _ANSI_COLORS
cursor = 0
# Initialise color pairs once; index 0 = none, 1..16 = palette.
color_attrs = _init_color_pairs()
while True:
_render_color(screen, items, cursor, confirmed_label, color_attrs)
try:
key = screen.getch()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return ""
if key in (ord("q"), _KEY_ESC):
return ""
if key in (curses.KEY_ENTER, _KEY_ENTER_ALT, ord("\r")):
chosen = items[cursor]
return "" if chosen == _COLOR_NONE else chosen
if key in (curses.KEY_UP, ord("k")) and cursor > 0:
cursor -= 1
elif key in (curses.KEY_DOWN, ord("j")) and cursor < len(items) - 1:
cursor += 1
def _init_color_pairs() -> dict[str, int]:
"""Return {color_name: curses_attr} for the palette items."""
attrs: dict[str, int] = {_COLOR_NONE: curses.A_NORMAL}
try:
curses.start_color()
curses.use_default_colors()
pair_idx = 2 # pair 1 reserved for other uses
for name in _ANSI_COLORS:
base = name.replace("bright-", "")
fg = _CURSES_COLOR_MAP.get(base, curses.COLOR_WHITE)
try:
curses.init_pair(pair_idx, fg, -1)
attr = curses.color_pair(pair_idx)
if name.startswith("bright-"):
attr |= curses.A_BOLD
attrs[name] = attr
pair_idx += 1
except curses.error:
attrs[name] = curses.A_NORMAL
except curses.error:
for name in _ANSI_COLORS:
attrs[name] = curses.A_NORMAL
return attrs
def _render_color(
screen: Any,
items: list[str],
cursor: int,
confirmed_label: str,
color_attrs: dict[str, int],
) -> None:
screen.erase()
rows, cols = screen.getmaxyx()
sep = "─" * min(cols - 1, 40)
_addstr_safe(screen, 0, 0, "Name agent", curses.A_BOLD)
_addstr_safe(screen, 1, 0, sep)
_addstr_safe(screen, 2, 0, confirmed_label[:cols - 1])
_addstr_safe(screen, 3, 0, sep)
_addstr_safe(screen, 4, 0, "Color (optional)", curses.A_BOLD)
list_start = 5
list_rows = rows - list_start - 2
scroll = max(0, cursor - list_rows + 1)
visible = items[scroll: scroll + list_rows]
for idx, name in enumerate(visible):
abs_idx = scroll + idx
row = list_start + idx
if row >= rows - 2:
break
prefix = "> " if abs_idx == cursor else " "
attr = color_attrs.get(name, curses.A_NORMAL)
if abs_idx == cursor:
attr |= curses.A_REVERSE
_addstr_safe(screen, row, 0, (prefix + name)[:cols - 1], attr)
_addstr_safe(screen, rows - 2, 0, sep)
_addstr_safe(
screen, rows - 1, 0,
"[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] skip",
curses.A_DIM,
)
screen.refresh()
bot_bottle/contrib/codex/codex_auth.py → bot_bottle/codex_auth.py
+21 -24
View File
@@ -13,10 +13,9 @@ import os
from copy import deepcopy
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from ...log import die
from ...util import expand_tilde
from .log import die
from .util import expand_tilde
def codex_auth_path(host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> Path:
@@ -51,8 +50,7 @@ def codex_host_access_token(
tokens = raw.get("tokens")
if not isinstance(tokens, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens")
tokens_typed = cast(dict[str, object], tokens)
access = tokens_typed.get("access_token")
access = tokens.get("access_token")
if not isinstance(access, str) or not access:
die(
f"codex host credentials: {path} is missing tokens.access_token. "
@@ -107,14 +105,14 @@ def write_codex_dummy_auth_file(
path.chmod(0o600)
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict[str, object]:
def _read_auth_object(path: Path) -> dict:
try:
raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
die(f"codex host credentials: could not read valid JSON at {path}: {e}")
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
die(f"codex host credentials: {path} must contain a JSON object")
return cast(dict[str, object], raw)
return raw
def _dummy_exp(now: datetime | None, exp_ts: int | None) -> int:
@@ -153,11 +151,11 @@ def _dummy_jwt_from_host(
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return _dummy_jwt(now, exp_ts=exp_ts)
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(cast(dict[str, object], payload), now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
return _encode_dummy_jwt(_redact_jwt_payload(payload, now=now, exp_ts=exp_ts))
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict) -> str:
def enc(obj: dict) -> str:
raw = json.dumps(obj, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
@@ -165,24 +163,23 @@ def _encode_dummy_jwt(payload: dict[str, object]) -> str:
def _redact_jwt_payload(
payload: dict[str, object],
payload: dict,
*,
now: datetime | None = None,
exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
) -> dict:
out = _redact_claims(payload)
if not isinstance(out, dict):
out = {}
out_typed: dict[str, object] = cast(dict[str, object], out)
out_typed["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out_typed.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out_typed
out["exp"] = _dummy_exp(now, exp_ts)
out.setdefault("sub", "bot-bottle-placeholder")
return out
def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
if isinstance(value, dict):
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in cast(dict[str, object], value).items():
for key, inner in value.items():
lower = key.lower()
if key == "https://api.openai.com/profile":
out[key] = _redact_profile_claim(inner)
@@ -210,16 +207,16 @@ def _redact_claims(value: object) -> object:
return "bot-bottle-placeholder"
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
profile = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_profile_claim(value: object) -> dict:
profile = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
return {
"email": "bot-bottle@example.invalid",
"email_verified": bool(profile.get("email_verified", True)),
}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict:
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -250,7 +247,7 @@ def _redact_auth_claim(value: object) -> dict[str, object]:
def _redact_codex_auth(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> object:
auth = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
auth = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in auth.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -272,7 +269,7 @@ def _redact_codex_auth(
def _redact_token_block(
value: object, *, now: datetime | None = None, exp_ts: int | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
tokens = cast(dict[str, object], value) if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
tokens = value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
out: dict[str, object] = {}
for key, inner in tokens.items():
lower = key.lower()
@@ -309,7 +306,7 @@ def _jwt_exp(token: str) -> datetime | None:
return None
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None
exp = cast(dict[str, object], payload).get("exp")
exp = payload.get("exp")
if not isinstance(exp, (int, float)):
return None
return datetime.fromtimestamp(exp, timezone.utc)
bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py
+7 -11
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ...backend import Bottle, BottlePlan
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
template="claude",
command="claude",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.claude"),
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
@@ -65,8 +68,6 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
label: str = "",
color: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del forward_host_credentials, host_env # Codex-only knobs
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
@@ -79,17 +80,12 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
claude_config = state_dir / "claude.json"
claude_projects = {guest_home: {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True}}
claude_projects[trusted_path] = {"hasTrustDialogAccepted": True}
payload: dict[str, object] = {
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps({
"hasCompletedOnboarding": True,
"theme": "dark",
"bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
"projects": claude_projects,
}
if label:
payload["name"] = label
if color:
payload["color"] = color
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n")
}, indent=2) + "\n")
claude_config.chmod(0o600)
files = (
AgentProvisionFile(claude_config, f"{guest_home}/.claude.json"),
@@ -98,6 +94,7 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
host="api.anthropic.com",
auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
token_ref=auth_token,
tls_passthrough=True,
),)
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
if auth_token:
@@ -110,7 +107,6 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
prompt_mode=_RUNTIME.prompt_mode,
image=_RUNTIME.image,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
guest_home=guest_home,
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
files=files,
@@ -148,7 +144,7 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
prompt (drives `--append-system-prompt-file`); the file is
copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
bot_bottle/contrib/codex/agent_provider.py
+7 -6
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
AgentProvisionFile,
AgentProvisionPlan,
)
from .codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from ...codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from ...egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
from ...log import die, info, warn
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
from ...backend import Bottle, BottlePlan
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
template="codex",
command="codex",
image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.codex"),
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
@@ -73,10 +76,8 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
trusted_project_path: str = "",
label: str = "",
color: str = "",
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
del auth_token, label, color # Claude-only knobs
del auth_token # Claude-only knob
resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
trusted_path = trusted_project_path or guest_home
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if forward_host_credentials:
@@ -147,7 +149,6 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
prompt_mode=_RUNTIME.prompt_mode,
image=_RUNTIME.image,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
guest_home=guest_home,
env_vars=env_vars,
guest_env=resolved_guest_env,
dirs=tuple(dirs),
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
instructions in <path>.` bootstrap (see `prompt_args`); the
file is copied either way so the path always exists."""
prompt_path = _prompt_path(plan.guest_home)
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path) # type: ignore
bottle.cp_in(str(plan.prompt_file), prompt_path)
bottle.exec(
f"chown node:node {prompt_path} && chmod 600 {prompt_path}",
user="root",
bot_bottle/contrib/gitea/deploy_key_provisioner.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -117,5 +117,5 @@ def _split_owner_repo(owner_repo: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
def _read_error_body(exc: urllib.error.HTTPError) -> str:
try:
return exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except Exception: # noqa: broad-exception-caught — safely fallback to empty error message
except Exception:
return ""
bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py
-291
View File
@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
"""DLP detectors for the egress proxy (PRD 0053).
Pure Python, no mitmproxy dependency. Each detector is a module-level
function returning `ScanResult | None`.
Ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside
`egress_addon_core.py` — both this file and the package source use
the same try/except import shim pattern.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import gzip
import re
import typing
import unicodedata
from urllib.parse import quote as url_quote
try:
from egress_addon_core import ScanResult # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .egress_addon_core import ScanResult
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Snippet helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNIPPET_CONTEXT = 40 # chars of surrounding text to include on each side
REDACT = "********" # fixed-width replacement for the matched sensitive value
def _snippet(text: str, start: int, end: int) -> str:
"""Return context around a match with the matched span replaced by REDACT."""
before = text[max(0, start - SNIPPET_CONTEXT):start].replace("\n", " ").replace("\r", " ")
after = text[end:end + SNIPPET_CONTEXT].replace("\n", " ").replace("\r", " ")
return f"{before}{REDACT}{after}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Unicode normalization (defeats confusable-char and combining-mark evasion)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _normalize_text(text: str) -> str:
# NFKD separates base characters from combining marks and resolves
# compatibility equivalents (fullwidth ASCII, ligatures, etc.)
decomposed = unicodedata.normalize("NFKD", text)
return "".join(
ch for ch in decomposed
# Strip combining marks inserted between chars to break patterns
if unicodedata.category(ch) != "Mn"
# Strip control chars; keep common whitespace (\n \r \t)
and (unicodedata.category(ch) != "Cc" or ch in "\n\r\t")
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token patterns detector
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOKEN_PATTERNS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
("AWS access key", re.compile(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}")),
("GitHub token (classic)", re.compile(r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}")),
("GitHub fine-grained token", re.compile(r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}")),
("Anthropic API key", re.compile(r"sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{93}")),
("OpenAI API key", re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}")),
("OpenAI project API key", re.compile(r"sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{48,}")),
("Stripe live key", re.compile(r"sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}")),
("Generic Bearer JWT", re.compile(r"Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{50,}")),
("HuggingFace token", re.compile(r"hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34,}")),
("Databricks token", re.compile(r"dapi[A-Za-z0-9]{32}")),
("Slack token", re.compile(r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}")),
("npm token", re.compile(r"npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}")),
("SendGrid API key", re.compile(r"SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{43}")),
("PyPI token", re.compile(r"pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{80,}")),
("HashiCorp Vault token", re.compile(r"hvs\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{24,}")),
)
def scan_token_patterns(text: str, *, location: str = "body") -> ScanResult | None:
normalized = _normalize_text(text)
for name, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
m = pattern.search(normalized)
if m is not None:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=f"{name} found in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, m.start(), m.end()),
)
return None
def redact_tokens(
text: str,
*,
env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Replace token pattern matches and (if env given) provisioned secrets with REDACT."""
for _, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
text = pattern.sub(REDACT, text)
if env is not None:
for key, value in env.items():
if key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") and value:
for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
text = text.replace(variant, REDACT)
return text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Known secrets detector (Phase 1b)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
"""Return the secret plus common encoded variants for exfil detection."""
seen: set[str] = {secret}
variants: list[str] = [secret]
def _add(v: str) -> None:
if v not in seen:
seen.add(v)
variants.append(v)
secret_bytes = secret.encode("utf-8")
# Standard base64 — with and without padding
b64 = base64.b64encode(secret_bytes).decode("ascii")
_add(b64)
_add(b64.rstrip("="))
# URL-safe base64 (JWT/OAuth use -_ alphabet) — with and without padding
b64url = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(secret_bytes).decode("ascii")
_add(b64url)
_add(b64url.rstrip("="))
# URL percent-encoding
_add(url_quote(secret, safe=""))
# Hex — lowercase and uppercase
_add(secret_bytes.hex())
_add(secret_bytes.hex().upper())
# Base32 (TOTP seeds, some DNS-exfil channels)
_add(base64.b32encode(secret_bytes).decode("ascii"))
# gzip + base64 (deterministic: mtime=0); recognisable by H4sI prefix
_add(base64.b64encode(gzip.compress(secret_bytes, mtime=0)).decode("ascii"))
return variants
def scan_known_secrets(
text: str,
*,
location: str = "body",
env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
if env is None:
return None
for key, value in env.items():
if not key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") or not value:
continue
for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
pos = text.find(variant)
if pos >= 0:
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, pos, pos + len(variant)),
)
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Naive prompt injection detector (Phase 2)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCLOSURE_PHRASES: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
re.compile(r"(?i)system\s+prompt"),
re.compile(r"(?i)my\s+instructions\s+are"),
re.compile(r"(?i)original\s+instructions"),
re.compile(r"(?i)secret\s+instructions"),
re.compile(r"(?i)hidden\s+rules"),
)
JAILBREAK_PHRASES: tuple[re.Pattern[str], ...] = (
re.compile(r"(?i)ignore\s+previous"),
re.compile(r"(?i)forget\s+everything"),
re.compile(r"(?i)disregard\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:previous|prior)"),
re.compile(r"(?i)pretend\s+you\s+are"),
re.compile(r"(?i)act\s+as\s+(?:if|though)"),
)
PROXIMITY_CHARS = 500
def _closest_pair(
a_matches: list[re.Match[str]],
b_matches: list[re.Match[str]],
) -> tuple[re.Match[str], re.Match[str]] | None:
"""Return the pair (a, b) with the smallest character gap, or None."""
best: tuple[re.Match[str], re.Match[str]] | None = None
best_gap: int | None = None
for a in a_matches:
for b in b_matches:
gap = max(0, max(a.start(), b.start()) - min(a.end(), b.end()))
if best_gap is None or gap < best_gap:
best_gap = gap
best = (a, b)
return best
def scan_naive_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
location = "response body"
disclosure_hits = [m for p in DISCLOSURE_PHRASES for m in p.finditer(text)]
jailbreak_hits = [m for p in JAILBREAK_PHRASES for m in p.finditer(text)]
if disclosure_hits and jailbreak_hits:
pair = _closest_pair(disclosure_hits, jailbreak_hits)
if pair is not None:
dist = max(0, max(pair[0].start(), pair[1].start()) - min(pair[0].end(), pair[1].end()))
if dist <= PROXIMITY_CHARS:
first = pair[0] if pair[0].start() <= pair[1].start() else pair[1]
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason=(
f"disclosure and jailbreak phrases within "
f"{dist} chars in {location}"
),
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, first.start(), first.end()),
)
if disclosure_hits:
m = disclosure_hits[0]
return ScanResult(
severity="warn",
reason=f"prompt disclosure phrase detected in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, m.start(), m.end()),
)
if jailbreak_hits:
m = jailbreak_hits[0]
return ScanResult(
severity="warn",
reason=f"jailbreak phrase detected in {location}",
location=location,
context=_snippet(text, m.start(), m.end()),
)
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CRLF injection detector
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# URL-encoded CRLF is never legitimate in a request URL or header value.
_CRLF_ENCODED_RE = re.compile(r"%0[dD]%0[aA]", re.ASCII)
# Literal CRLF followed by a header-name pattern indicates header injection.
_CRLF_HEADER_INJECT_RE = re.compile(r"\r\n[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9\-]+\s*:", re.ASCII)
def scan_crlf_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
if _CRLF_ENCODED_RE.search(text):
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason="URL-encoded CRLF (%0d%0a) in outbound request",
)
if _CRLF_HEADER_INJECT_RE.search(text):
return ScanResult(
severity="block",
reason="CRLF header injection pattern in outbound request",
)
return None
__all__ = [
"REDACT",
"SNIPPET_CONTEXT",
"TOKEN_PATTERNS",
"redact_tokens",
"scan_crlf_injection",
"scan_known_secrets",
"scan_naive_injection",
"scan_token_patterns",
]
bot_bottle/egress.py
+149 -128
View File
@@ -1,35 +1,56 @@
"""Per-bottle egress proxy (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""Per-bottle egress proxy (PRD 0017).
Replaces the cred-proxy sidecar (PRD 0010) with a mitmproxy-based
sidecar that becomes the agent's `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY`. It
owns three jobs:
1. MITM the agent's HTTPS with the per-bottle CA (moved from
pipelock).
2. Enforce manifest-declared `path_allowlist` per route.
3. Inject `Authorization` headers for routes that declare an
`auth` block, the same way cred-proxy does today.
This module defines the abstract proxy (`Egress`), its plan
dataclass (`EgressPlan`), and the resolved per-route shape
(`EgressRoute`). The sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-
specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress.py`).
Chunks 1+2 of the PRD: this module + the mitmproxy addon + the Docker
lifecycle are wired into the agent's `HTTP_PROXY` path; cred-proxy
has been removed. Chunk 3 retargets the cred-proxy-block remediation
flow (PRD 0014) at egress and renames the MCP tool.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from .egress_addon_core import (
HeaderMatch as CoreHeaderMatch,
MatchEntry as CoreMatchEntry,
PathMatch as CorePathMatch,
Route,
)
from .egress_addon_core import Route
from .log import die
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .manifest import ManifestBottle
from .manifest import Bottle
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CODEX_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
# DNS name agents will dial for the per-bottle egress sidecar.
# Backend-agnostic by contract: every concrete backend (Docker today,
# others later) attaches this name to its sidecar on the bottle's
# internal network. The agent's `HTTP_PROXY` env var resolves to
# `http://egress:<port>` once chunk 2 cuts over.
EGRESS_HOSTNAME = "egress"
# In-container path the addon reads. Pre-created in
# `Dockerfile.sidecars` so the host bind-mount can drop the file
# directly. Content is YAML (hand-rolled by `egress_render_routes`
# in the style of `pipelock_render_yaml`, parsed by `yaml_subset`
# inside the addon).
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
@@ -37,23 +58,68 @@ EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
class EgressRoute(Route):
"""Host-side extension of the addon's `Route`.
Inherits `host`, `matches`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
Inherits `host`, `path_allowlist`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
from `egress_addon_core.Route` — those are the fields that cross the
YAML wire into the sidecar. The fields below are host-only and
YAML wire into the sidecar. The three fields below are host-only and
are never serialised to the addon.
`token_ref` is the host env var the CLI reads at launch and forwards
into the container's environ under `token_env`.
into the container's environ under `token_env`. Routes that share a
`token_ref` coalesce to one `token_env` slot.
`roles` carries the manifest route's role tuple (reserved for
future use; always empty today)."""
future use; always empty today).
`tls_passthrough` signals that pipelock must not TLS-MITM this
host — either because the manifest declared `pipelock.tls_passthrough:
true` (lifted in `egress_manifest_routes`) or because a provider
route set it (e.g. egress injects its own Bearer on that host
after the agent boundary and pipelock's header DLP would block it)."""
token_ref: str = ""
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
tls_passthrough: bool = False
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressPlan:
"""Output of Egress.prepare; consumed by .start.
The slug + routes_path + routes + token_env_map fields are
filled at prepare time (host-side, side-effect-free on docker).
The network + CA + pipelock fields are populated by the backend's
launch step via `dataclasses.replace` once those resources
exist. Empty defaults are sentinels meaning "not yet set";
`.start` validates that they are populated.
`token_env_map` is `{<token_env in container>: <token_ref on host>}`.
The backend's start step reads `os.environ[token_ref]` and
forwards the value into the egress container's environ
under `token_env`. The plan itself never holds token values —
secrets never land in a dataclass that might be logged.
`mitmproxy_ca_host_path` is the host path of the per-bottle
egress CA (single PEM with cert+key concatenated) minted
by `egress_tls_init`. `.start` docker-cps it into the
sidecar at `~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem` — mitmproxy reads
that file at boot to mint per-host leaf certs.
`mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path` is the cert-only PEM (no
key) for installing into the agent's trust store via
`provision_ca`. Separate file rather than re-parsing the
concat so secrets and trust artefacts stay on distinct paths.
`pipelock_ca_host_path` is the host path of the pipelock CA
(cert only). `.start` docker-cps it into the sidecar so the
proxy's outbound HTTPS client trusts pipelock's MITM on the
egress → upstream leg.
`pipelock_proxy_url` is the URL egress sets as `HTTPS_PROXY`
in its environ so outbound HTTPS traverses pipelock — keeping
pipelock's hostname allowlist + DLP body scanner on the
egress → upstream leg.
"""
slug: str
routes_path: Path
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...]
@@ -62,45 +128,40 @@ class EgressPlan:
egress_network: str = ""
mitmproxy_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path: Path = Path()
log: int = 0
pipelock_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
pipelock_proxy_url: str = ""
def egress_manifest_routes(
bottle: ManifestBottle,
bottle: Bottle,
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Lift each `bottle.egress.routes[]` manifest entry into an EgressRoute.
Order is preserved. Token slots are not assigned here — slot assignment
is a final step in `egress_routes_for_bottle` after provider and manifest
routes are merged."""
out: list[EgressRoute] = []
for r in bottle.egress.routes:
core_matches: list[CoreMatchEntry] = []
for m in r.Matches:
core_paths = tuple(
CorePathMatch(type=p.Type, value=p.Value)
for p in m.Paths
)
core_headers = tuple(
CoreHeaderMatch(name=h.Name, value=h.Value, type=h.Type)
for h in m.Headers
)
core_matches.append(CoreMatchEntry(
paths=core_paths,
methods=m.Methods,
headers=core_headers,
))
out.append(EgressRoute(
host=r.Host,
matches=tuple(core_matches),
path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
auth_scheme=r.AuthScheme,
token_ref=r.TokenRef,
roles=r.Role,
outbound_detectors=r.OutboundDetectors,
inbound_detectors=r.InboundDetectors,
tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
))
return tuple(out)
def egress_routes_for_bottle(
bottle: ManifestBottle,
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Effective egress routes for the agent.
Provider routes own their hosts outright; manifest routes for hosts
not claimed by any provider are appended. Token slots are assigned
in a final pass over the merged list in order, so provisioned routes
get the lower slot numbers."""
manifest = egress_manifest_routes(bottle)
provisioned_hosts = {pr.host.lower() for pr in provider_routes}
merged = list(provider_routes) + [
@@ -112,6 +173,10 @@ def egress_routes_for_bottle(
def _assign_token_slots(
routes: list[EgressRoute],
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Assign EGRESS_TOKEN_N slots to authenticated routes in order.
Routes sharing a token_ref share a slot. Unauthenticated routes
(no auth_scheme / token_ref) keep token_env empty."""
slot_for_ref: dict[str, str] = {}
out: list[EgressRoute] = []
for r in routes:
@@ -129,6 +194,13 @@ def _assign_token_slots(
def egress_token_env_map(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Collapse the route list into `{token_env: token_ref}` for the
authenticated routes. Routes without `auth` contribute no entry.
Conflict detection: two routes that share a `token_env` slot but
name different `token_ref` host vars is a programming error in
`egress_routes_for_bottle`; surface it as a die rather than
silently picking one."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for r in routes:
if not (r.auth_scheme and r.token_ref and r.token_env):
@@ -144,93 +216,33 @@ def egress_token_env_map(
return out
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
fields: dict[str, object] = {"host": r.host}
def _route_to_yaml_fields(r: Route) -> dict:
"""Return the addon-visible fields for one route.
Single authoritative mapping between EgressRoute (host-side) and
egress_addon_core.Route (sidecar-side). When a field is added to
the addon's Route that must appear in the YAML, add it here and
in egress_addon_core._parse_one together."""
fields: dict = {"host": r.host}
if r.auth_scheme and r.token_env:
fields["auth_scheme"] = r.auth_scheme
fields["token_env"] = r.token_env
if r.matches:
matches_data: list[dict[str, object]] = []
for entry in r.matches:
entry_data: dict[str, object] = {}
if entry.paths:
paths_data: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for pm in entry.paths:
pd: dict[str, str] = {"value": pm.value}
if pm.type != "prefix":
pd["type"] = pm.type
paths_data.append(pd)
entry_data["paths"] = paths_data
if entry.methods:
entry_data["methods"] = list(entry.methods)
if entry.headers:
headers_data: list[dict[str, str]] = []
for hm in entry.headers:
hd: dict[str, str] = {"name": hm.name, "value": hm.value}
if hm.type != "exact":
hd["type"] = hm.type
headers_data.append(hd)
entry_data["headers"] = headers_data
matches_data.append(entry_data)
fields["matches"] = matches_data
if r.outbound_detectors is not None or r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp: dict[str, object] = {}
if r.outbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["outbound_detectors"] = (
False if not r.outbound_detectors
else list(r.outbound_detectors)
)
if r.inbound_detectors is not None:
dlp["inbound_detectors"] = (
False if not r.inbound_detectors
else list(r.inbound_detectors)
)
fields["dlp"] = dlp
if r.path_allowlist:
fields["path_allowlist"] = list(r.path_allowlist)
return fields
def _render_match_entry(entry: dict[str, object]) -> list[str]:
lines: list[str] = []
first_key = True
if "paths" in entry:
lines.append(" - paths:")
first_key = False
for pd in entry["paths"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
pd_dict: dict[str, str] = pd # type: ignore[assignment]
if "type" in pd_dict:
lines.append(f' - type: "{pd_dict["type"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
else:
lines.append(f' - value: "{pd_dict["value"]}"')
if "methods" in entry:
methods_str = ", ".join(f'"{m}"' for m in entry["methods"]) # type: ignore[union-attr]
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f'{prefix}methods: [{methods_str}]')
first_key = False
if "headers" in entry:
prefix = " - " if first_key else " "
lines.append(f"{prefix}headers:")
first_key = False
for hd in entry["headers"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
hd_dict: dict[str, str] = hd # type: ignore[assignment]
lines.append(f' - name: "{hd_dict["name"]}"')
lines.append(f' value: "{hd_dict["value"]}"')
if first_key:
lines.append(" - {}")
return lines
def egress_render_routes(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
*,
log: int = 0,
) -> str:
lines: list[str] = []
if log:
lines.append(f"log: {log}")
lines.append("routes:")
"""Serialize the route table for the addon to read.
YAML content — no token values, no host env-var names. Fields are
determined by `_route_to_yaml_fields`, which is the single point of
truth for the EgressRoute → egress_addon_core.Route mapping."""
lines: list[str] = ["routes:"]
if not routes:
lines[-1] = "routes: []"
lines[0] = "routes: []"
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
for r in routes:
f = _route_to_yaml_fields(r)
@@ -238,19 +250,10 @@ def egress_render_routes(
if "auth_scheme" in f:
lines.append(f' auth_scheme: "{f["auth_scheme"]}"')
lines.append(f' token_env: "{f["token_env"]}"')
if "matches" in f:
lines.append(" matches:")
for entry in f["matches"]: # type: ignore[union-attr]
lines.extend(_render_match_entry(entry)) # type: ignore[arg-type]
if "dlp" in f:
dlp_dict: dict[str, object] = f["dlp"] # type: ignore
lines.append(" dlp:")
for dk, dv in dlp_dict.items():
if dv is False:
lines.append(f" {dk}: false")
elif isinstance(dv, list):
items_str = ", ".join(f'"{x}"' for x in dv)
lines.append(f" {dk}: [{items_str}]")
if "path_allowlist" in f:
lines.append(" path_allowlist:")
for p in f["path_allowlist"]:
lines.append(f' - "{p}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
@@ -258,6 +261,12 @@ def egress_resolve_token_values(
token_env_map: dict[str, str],
host_env: dict[str, str],
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Read `host_env[TokenRef]` for each entry in `token_env_map` and
return `{token_env: <value>}`. Dies (with a pointer at the missing
var name) if any TokenRef is unset.
Pure function: takes the host env as an argument so tests can pass
a sealed mapping without touching `os.environ`."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for token_env, token_ref in token_env_map.items():
value = host_env.get(token_ref)
@@ -278,24 +287,36 @@ def egress_resolve_token_values(
class Egress(ABC):
"""The per-bottle egress proxy. Encapsulates the host-side prepare
(route lift + routes.yaml render + token-env-map derivation); the
sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on
concrete subclasses."""
def prepare(
self,
bottle: ManifestBottle,
bottle: Bottle,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> EgressPlan:
"""Lift `bottle.egress.routes` + `provider_routes` into resolved
routes, render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
return the plan. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess. The
token-env map records the mapping the launch step uses to
forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's environ.
Returned plan is incomplete: the launch step must fill
`internal_network` / `egress_network` / `pipelock_proxy_url`
via `dataclasses.replace` before passing it to `.start`."""
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)
log = bottle.egress.Log
routes_path = stage_dir / "egress_routes.yaml"
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes, log=log))
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes))
routes_path.chmod(0o600)
return EgressPlan(
slug=slug,
routes_path=routes_path,
routes=routes,
token_env_map=egress_token_env_map(routes),
log=log,
)
__all__ = [
bot_bottle/egress_addon.py
+87 -183
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,28 @@
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_addon.py` inside the
egress container."""
egress container. Wraps the pure logic from
`egress_addon_core` with mitmproxy's HTTPFlow API:
- At startup, read `EGRESS_ROUTES` (default
`/etc/egress/routes.yaml`, JSON content) → routes table.
- SIGHUP re-reads the file and atomically swaps the in-memory
table. A parse error keeps the old table in place — better to
keep serving the old config than to leave the proxy with no
routes after a typo.
- On each `request`: strip the inbound Authorization header, then
consult `decide()` for forward / block / inject-auth and apply
the decision to the flow.
This file imports `mitmproxy` and is never imported on the host —
mitmproxy is a container-only dependency. The host's tests target
`egress_addon_core`.
Dockerfile.sidecars copies both this file and
`egress_addon_core.py` flat into `/app/`; the absolute import
below works because mitmdump runs with `/app` on its sys.path. The
parallel file in the package source tree (bot_bottle/) is the
build input — not a module the host imports."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -12,58 +33,57 @@ import signal
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found]
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
LOG_BLOCKS,
LOG_FULL,
Config,
build_inbound_scan_text,
build_outbound_scan_text,
decide,
is_git_push_request,
load_config,
match_route,
scan_inbound,
scan_outbound,
)
try:
from dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import redact_tokens # type: ignore[import-not-found]
# Absolute import (NOT `from .egress_addon_core`) — the
# container drops both files flat into /app/ so they are sibling
# top-level modules to mitmdump's loader, not a package.
from egress_addon_core import Route, decide, is_git_push_request, load_routes # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
# Magic hostname the addon recognises as an introspection target.
# Requests through the proxy for `_egress.local/<path>` are
# intercepted and answered with synthetic responses (the addon's
# `request` hook sets `flow.response` before any upstream connection).
# The hostname is not in DNS — only clients dialing through this
# specific egress can reach it, and only via HTTP (no TLS).
# Used by the supervise sidecar's `list-egress-routes` MCP
# tool to surface the live route table to the agent.
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
class EgressAddon:
"""The mitmproxy addon. One instance per `mitmdump` process; the
request hook is invoked on every CONNECT-decapsulated HTTP/HTTPS
request the agent makes."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.config: Config = Config(routes=())
self.routes: tuple[Route, ...] = ()
self._reload(initial=True)
self._install_sighup()
def _reload(self, *, initial: bool = False) -> None:
try:
text = Path(self.routes_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
new_config = load_config(text)
new_routes = load_routes(text)
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
tag = "boot" if initial else "SIGHUP"
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: {tag} load failed: {e}\n"
)
if initial:
self.config = Config(routes=())
# No baseline to fall back on; serve nothing rather
# than masquerade as a proxy with a route table the
# operator never declared.
self.routes = ()
return
self.config = new_config
log_label = ("off", "blocks", "full")[self.config.log]
self.routes = new_routes
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress: loaded {len(self.config.routes)} route(s): "
f"{', '.join(r.host for r in self.config.routes)}"
f" [log={log_label}]\n"
f"egress: loaded {len(self.routes)} route(s): "
f"{', '.join(r.host for r in self.routes)}\n"
)
def _install_sighup(self) -> None:
@@ -77,9 +97,14 @@ class EgressAddon:
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, handler)
def _serve_introspection(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, path: str) -> None:
"""Synthesize a response for `_egress.local` requests.
Currently supports `/allowlist` which returns the in-memory
route table as JSON (host, path_allowlist, auth_scheme,
token_env per route — no token VALUES, those live in the
container's environ)."""
if path == "/allowlist":
payload = json.dumps(
{"routes": [dataclasses.asdict(r) for r in self.config.routes]},
{"routes": [dataclasses.asdict(r) for r in self.routes]},
indent=2,
).encode("utf-8")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
@@ -93,182 +118,61 @@ class EgressAddon:
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
def _req_ctx(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
}
def _block(
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
reason: str,
ctx: dict[str, object] | None = None,
) -> None:
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
entry: dict[str, object] = {"event": "egress_block", "reason": reason}
if ctx:
entry.update(ctx)
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps(entry) + "\n")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_request",
"host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
"method": flow.request.method,
"path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
"headers": dict(flow.request.headers),
"body": flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_response",
"host": flow.request.pretty_host,
"status": flow.response.status_code,
"headers": dict(flow.response.headers),
"body": flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "",
})
+ "\n"
)
# mitmproxy's addon API: this method name + signature is how
# mitmdump discovers the request hook.
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
# Introspection: requests to the magic `_egress.local`
# host are answered locally with a synthetic response. Check
# before the strip-auth + route logic — these requests aren't
# real upstream traffic, the agent isn't injecting auth, and
# the addon's own decide() would 403 the magic host (it's
# never in the routes table).
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
# DLP outbound scan BEFORE stripping auth — catches tokens the
# agent tried to smuggle in any header, path, query param, or body.
# Hostname is included to catch DNS-tunnelling exfiltration attempts.
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
query,
dict(flow.request.headers),
body,
)
dlp_result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ)
if dlp_result is not None and dlp_result.severity == "block":
ctx = self._req_ctx(flow)
if dlp_result.context:
ctx = {**ctx, "context": dlp_result.context}
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {dlp_result.reason}", ctx=ctx)
return
# Inbound Authorization is always stripped — the agent cannot
# smuggle a stolen token through the proxy. If the matched
# route declares an auth pair, a fresh header is injected
# below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Universal HTTPS git-push block. Defense-in-depth: git-gate
# (PRD 0008) is the only sanctioned outbound path for git
# writes — its pre-receive runs gitleaks. Letting HTTPS push
# through egress + auth injection would route around
# that scan, so we 403 before any route logic.
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
self._block(
flow,
"egress: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
"git-gate's pre-receive hook).",
ctx=self._req_ctx(flow),
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
(
b"egress: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
b"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
b"git-gate's pre-receive hook)."
),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
# Strip agent-set Authorization after DLP scan so smuggled tokens
# are caught above; the route may inject sidecar-owned auth below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Build headers mapping for match evaluation
req_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()}
decision = decide(
self.config.routes,
self.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
)
if decision.action == "block":
self._block(flow, decision.reason, ctx=self._req_ctx(flow))
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
decision.reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_request(flow)
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP inbound scan on response headers and body."""
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
if flow.response is None:
return
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_response(flow)
resp_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()}
body = flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or ""
scan_text = build_inbound_scan_text(resp_headers, body)
if not scan_text:
return
result = scan_inbound(route, scan_text)
if result is None:
return
resp_ctx: dict[str, object] = {
**self._req_ctx(flow),
"response_status": flow.response.status_code,
}
if result.context:
resp_ctx = {**resp_ctx, "context": result.context}
if result.severity == "block":
self._block(flow, f"egress DLP: {result.reason}", ctx=resp_ctx)
elif result.severity == "warn" and self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(
json.dumps({
"event": "egress_warn",
"reason": f"egress DLP: {result.reason}",
**resp_ctx,
})
+ "\n"
)
def websocket_message(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP scan on WebSocket frames.
Outbound frames (from_client) are scanned for credential leakage;
inbound frames are scanned for prompt injection. On a block the
entire connection is killed — there is no HTTP response surface to
write to after the upgrade.
"""
if flow.websocket is None: # type: ignore[union-attr]
return
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
message = flow.websocket.messages[-1] # type: ignore[union-attr]
content = message.content.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if message.from_client:
result = scan_outbound(route, content, os.environ)
if result is not None and result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
flow.kill() # type: ignore[union-attr]
else:
result = scan_inbound(route, content)
if result is not None:
if result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
flow.kill() # type: ignore[union-attr]
elif result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
addons = [EgressAddon()]
bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py
+123 -505
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Pure logic for the egress mitmproxy addon (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""Pure logic for the egress mitmproxy addon (PRD 0017).
Split out of `egress_addon.py` so the host's unit tests can
exercise the parse + decision functions without depending on the
@@ -8,276 +8,81 @@ container.
Imports: stdlib + `yaml_subset` (which is itself stdlib-only and
ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside this file —
see `Dockerfile.sidecars`)."""
see `Dockerfile.sidecars`).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import typing
from dataclasses import dataclass
# Absolute import — `yaml_subset.py` is copied flat into the bundle
# image's `/app/` next to this file (via `Dockerfile.sidecars`).
# The host-side unit tests run with the repo on sys.path, where the
# import resolves under the `bot_bottle` package. The try/except
# shim picks whichever import works.
try:
from yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Match types (Gateway API HTTPRoute vocabulary, PRD 0053)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PATH_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "prefix", "regex")
HEADER_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "regex")
VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
"GET", "HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "TRACE",
"CONNECT",
})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
type: str # "exact" | "prefix" | "regex"
value: str
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HeaderMatch:
name: str
value: str
type: str = "exact" # "exact" | "regex"
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MatchEntry:
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
"""One row of the egress route table.
`host` is the request's `Host` header (or SNI hostname) to match
against. `path_allowlist` is an optional tuple of absolute path
prefixes the request path must start with; empty tuple means no
path constraint. `auth_scheme` and `token_env` together form the
credential-injection pair (both set or both empty); a non-empty
pair tells the addon to overwrite the inbound Authorization with
`<auth_scheme> <value-of-environ[token_env]>`.
"""
host: str
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
path_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
auth_scheme: str = ""
token_env: str = ""
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
LOG_OFF = 0 # no logging
LOG_BLOCKS = 1 # log block/warn events with request context
LOG_FULL = 2 # log block/warn events + full request and response bodies
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Config:
routes: tuple[Route, ...]
log: int = LOG_OFF
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Decision:
"""The result of `decide()`. Either forward (with optional
`inject_authorization` header) or block (with a `reason` to surface
to the agent)."""
action: str # "forward" or "block"
reason: str = ""
inject_authorization: str | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanResult:
severity: str # "block" or "warn"
reason: str
location: str = "" # where the match was found, e.g. "body", "authorization header"
context: str = "" # surrounding text with the match replaced by REDACT
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Parsing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _parse_path_match(idx: int, j: int, raw: object) -> PathMatch:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches paths[{j}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
ptype = raw_dict.get("type", "prefix")
if not isinstance(ptype, str) or ptype not in PATH_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: 'type' must be one of {', '.join(PATH_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {ptype!r})"
)
value = raw_dict.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'value' must be a non-empty string")
if ptype in ("exact", "prefix") and not value.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: value {value!r} must start with '/' for "
f"type {ptype!r}"
)
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
if ptype == "regex":
try:
compiled = re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("type", "value"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {k!r}")
return PathMatch(type=ptype, value=value, compiled=compiled)
def _parse_header_match(idx: int, j: int, raw: object) -> HeaderMatch:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches headers[{j}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
name = raw_dict.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'name' must be a non-empty string")
value = raw_dict.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'value' must be a string")
htype = raw_dict.get("type", "exact")
if not isinstance(htype, str) or htype not in HEADER_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: 'type' must be one of {', '.join(HEADER_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {htype!r})"
)
compiled: re.Pattern[str] | None = None
if htype == "regex":
try:
compiled = re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("name", "value", "type"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {k!r}")
return HeaderMatch(name=name, value=value, type=htype, compiled=compiled)
def _parse_match_entry(idx: int, k: int, raw: object) -> MatchEntry:
label = f"route[{idx}] matches[{k}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = ()
paths_raw = raw_dict.get("paths")
if paths_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(paths_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'paths' must be a list")
paths_list = typing.cast(list[object], paths_raw)
paths = tuple(_parse_path_match(idx, j, p) for j, p in enumerate(paths_list))
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
methods_raw = raw_dict.get("methods")
if methods_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(methods_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'methods' must be a list")
methods_list = typing.cast(list[object], methods_raw)
normalised: list[str] = []
for j, m in enumerate(methods_list):
if not isinstance(m, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: methods[{j}] must be a string")
upper = m.upper()
if upper not in VALID_METHODS:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: methods[{j}] {m!r} is not a valid HTTP method"
)
normalised.append(upper)
methods = tuple(normalised)
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = ()
headers_raw = raw_dict.get("headers")
if headers_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(headers_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'headers' must be a list")
headers_list = typing.cast(list[object], headers_raw)
headers = tuple(
_parse_header_match(idx, j, h) for j, h in enumerate(headers_list)
)
for key in raw_dict:
if key not in ("paths", "methods", "headers"):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: unknown key {key!r}")
return MatchEntry(paths=paths, methods=methods, headers=headers)
def _parse_detectors(
idx: int,
host: str,
raw_dict: dict[str, object],
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
"""Parse the optional `dlp` block on a route, returning
(outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors)."""
dlp_raw = raw_dict.get("dlp")
if dlp_raw is None:
return None, None
label = f"route[{idx}] ({host})"
if not isinstance(dlp_raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'dlp' must be an object")
dlp = typing.cast(dict[str, object], dlp_raw)
def _parse_detector_field(
field: str,
valid_names: frozenset[str],
) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
val = dlp.get(field)
if val is None:
return None
if val is False:
return ()
if not isinstance(val, list):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field} must be false, a list, or omitted"
)
items = typing.cast(list[object], val)
names: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(items):
if not isinstance(item, str):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field}[{j}] must be a string"
)
if item not in valid_names:
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp.{field}[{j}] {item!r} is not a valid "
f"detector name; valid names: {', '.join(sorted(valid_names))}"
)
names.append(item)
return tuple(names)
outbound = _parse_detector_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_detector_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
for k in dlp:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label}: dlp has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys "
f"are 'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound
def parse_routes(payload: object) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""Parse the routes-file payload (already JSON-decoded) into a
tuple of `Route`s. Raises `ValueError` on any malformed entry —
the caller decides whether to keep the old table or refuse to
start.
Schema:
{
"routes": [
{
"host": "api.github.com",
"path_allowlist": ["/repos/x/", "/users/x"], # optional
"auth_scheme": "Bearer", # optional
"token_env": "EGRESS_TOKEN_0" # optional
},
...
]
}
"""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("routes payload: top-level must be an object")
payload_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], payload)
raw: object = payload_dict.get("routes")
raw = payload.get("routes")
if not isinstance(raw, list):
raise ValueError("routes payload: 'routes' must be a list")
raw_list: list[object] = typing.cast(list[object], raw)
out: list[Route] = []
for i, r in enumerate(raw_list):
for i, r in enumerate(raw):
out.append(_parse_one(i, r))
return tuple(out)
@@ -286,29 +91,35 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
label = f"route[{idx}]"
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise ValueError(f"{label}: must be an object (got {type(raw).__name__})")
raw_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], raw)
host: object = raw_dict.get("host")
host = raw.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ValueError(f"{label}: 'host' must be a non-empty string")
# matches
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
matches_raw = raw_dict.get("matches")
if matches_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(matches_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'matches' must be a list")
matches_list = typing.cast(list[object], matches_raw)
matches = tuple(
_parse_match_entry(idx, k, m) for k, m in enumerate(matches_list)
)
path_allow_raw = raw.get("path_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'path_allowlist' must be a list")
prefixes: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_allow_raw):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
prefixes.append(p)
# auth (unchanged wire format)
auth_scheme: object = raw_dict.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env: object = raw_dict.get("token_env", "")
auth_scheme = raw.get("auth_scheme", "")
token_env = raw.get("token_env", "")
if not isinstance(auth_scheme, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'auth_scheme' must be a string")
if not isinstance(token_env, str):
raise ValueError(f"{label} ({host}): 'token_env' must be a string")
# Both-or-neither: 'auth' on the manifest side renders to this
# pair atomically. A partial pair here means the renderer or a
# hand-edited file is broken.
if bool(auth_scheme) != bool(token_env):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): 'auth_scheme' and 'token_env' must be both "
@@ -316,30 +127,19 @@ def _parse_one(idx: int, raw: object) -> Route:
f"token_env={token_env!r})"
)
# dlp detectors
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_detectors(
idx, host, raw_dict,
)
for k in raw_dict:
if k not in ("host", "matches", "auth_scheme", "token_env", "dlp"):
raise ValueError(
f"{label} ({host}): unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys "
f"are 'host', 'matches', 'auth_scheme', 'token_env', 'dlp'"
)
return Route(
host=host,
matches=matches,
path_allowlist=tuple(prefixes),
auth_scheme=auth_scheme,
token_env=token_env,
outbound_detectors=outbound_detectors,
inbound_detectors=inbound_detectors,
)
def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
"""Parse YAML text → routes."""
"""Parse YAML text → routes. Raises `ValueError` for both
decode and shape errors so callers handle them uniformly.
`YamlSubsetError` from the parser is a `ValueError` subclass so
it already satisfies the same surface; we let it propagate."""
try:
payload = parse_yaml_subset(text)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
@@ -347,102 +147,29 @@ def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
return parse_routes(payload)
def parse_config(payload: object) -> "Config":
"""Parse a full egress config payload (top-level log level + routes)."""
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise ValueError("routes payload: top-level must be an object")
payload_dict: dict[str, object] = typing.cast(dict[str, object], payload)
log_raw: object = payload_dict.get("log", LOG_OFF)
if log_raw is True or log_raw is False or not isinstance(log_raw, int) \
or log_raw not in (LOG_OFF, LOG_BLOCKS, LOG_FULL):
raise ValueError(
f"routes payload: 'log' must be {LOG_OFF}, {LOG_BLOCKS}, or {LOG_FULL}"
)
routes = parse_routes(payload)
return Config(routes=routes, log=log_raw)
def load_config(text: str) -> "Config":
"""Parse YAML text → Config (routes + log flag)."""
try:
payload = parse_yaml_subset(text)
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ValueError(f"routes payload: invalid YAML: {e}") from e
return parse_config(payload)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Match evaluation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _path_matches(pm: PathMatch, request_path: str) -> bool:
if pm.type == "exact":
return request_path == pm.value
if pm.type == "prefix":
if request_path == pm.value:
return True
if not pm.value.endswith("/"):
return request_path.startswith(pm.value + "/")
return request_path.startswith(pm.value)
if pm.type == "regex" and pm.compiled is not None:
return pm.compiled.search(request_path) is not None
return False
def _entry_matches(
entry: MatchEntry,
request_path: str,
request_method: str,
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str],
) -> bool:
"""All predicates within a MatchEntry are ANDed."""
if entry.paths:
if not any(_path_matches(pm, request_path) for pm in entry.paths):
return False
if entry.methods:
if request_method.upper() not in entry.methods:
return False
if entry.headers:
for hm in entry.headers:
header_val = request_headers.get(hm.name.lower())
if header_val is None:
return False
if hm.type == "exact":
if header_val != hm.value:
return False
elif hm.type == "regex" and hm.compiled is not None:
if not hm.compiled.search(header_val):
return False
return True
def evaluate_matches(
route: Route,
request_path: str,
request_method: str = "GET",
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Return True if the request matches this route's match entries.
Empty matches tuple means all requests match (bare-pass route)."""
if not route.matches:
return True
hdrs: typing.Mapping[str, str] = request_headers or {}
return any(
_entry_matches(entry, request_path, request_method, hdrs)
for entry in route.matches
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Git push detection (unchanged)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def is_git_push_request(path: str, query: str) -> bool:
"""Return True if the request is a git smart-HTTP push.
git push over HTTPS hits two endpoints:
GET <repo>/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack (capabilities)
POST <repo>/git-receive-pack (the push)
Fetches use `service=git-upload-pack` / `/git-upload-pack` and
are unaffected. Egress-proxy refuses HTTPS push because git-gate's
pre-receive gitleaks scan is the gate for outbound git data;
routing push through egress would bypass that. Use the
bottle.git SSH path if you need to push.
Universal across routes — the block fires even when no
egress route matches the host. A bare-pass route (host with
no auth, no path_allowlist) would otherwise let push through to
pipelock + upstream untouched.
"""
if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack"):
return True
if path.endswith("/info/refs"):
# Query string is parsed leniently — `service=git-receive-pack`
# may appear with other params in any order.
for pair in query.split("&"):
k, _, v = pair.partition("=")
if k == "service" and v == "git-receive-pack":
@@ -450,14 +177,18 @@ def is_git_push_request(path: str, query: str) -> bool:
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Route lookup + decision
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def match_route(
routes: typing.Sequence[Route],
request_host: str,
) -> Route | None:
"""Return the first route whose `host` matches `request_host`
exactly (case-insensitive). DNS names are case-insensitive.
Wildcard hosts (`*.foo.com`) are NOT supported — they caused
too many edge cases (apex match? cert validation? pipelock
mirror mismatch?) for too little payoff. Operators that need
multiple subdomains declare them individually (or one common
parent host as a bare-pass route)."""
target = request_host.lower()
for r in routes:
if r.host.lower() == target:
@@ -470,10 +201,24 @@ def decide(
request_host: str,
request_path: str,
environ: typing.Mapping[str, str],
*,
request_method: str = "GET",
request_headers: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
) -> Decision:
"""Pure decision: given a route table + request host + path + env,
return what the addon should do with the request.
- No matching route → BLOCK. The route table is the bottle's
egress allowlist; defense-in-depth complements pipelock's
hostname gate on the downstream leg. A bottle that wants a
host reachable from the agent must declare a route for it
(bare-pass route — no `auth`, no `path_allowlist` — is fine
for hosts that just need passthrough).
- Matching route with `path_allowlist` set, request path doesn't
start with any of the allowed prefixes → block with a clear
reason.
- Matching route with an auth pair → forward + inject
Authorization. Token comes from `environ[route.token_env]`;
missing/empty values block (route declared auth but the secret
isn't here — operator misconfig).
"""
route = match_route(routes, request_host)
if route is None:
return Decision(
@@ -485,15 +230,15 @@ def decide(
),
)
if not evaluate_matches(route, request_path, request_method, request_headers):
return Decision(
action="block",
reason=(
f"egress: request {request_method} {request_path!r} "
f"does not match any entry in matches for "
f"{route.host!r}"
),
)
if route.path_allowlist:
if not any(request_path.startswith(p) for p in route.path_allowlist):
return Decision(
action="block",
reason=(
f"egress: path {request_path!r} not in "
f"path_allowlist for {route.host!r}"
),
)
if route.auth_scheme and route.token_env:
token = environ.get(route.token_env, "")
@@ -513,139 +258,12 @@ def decide(
return Decision(action="forward")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DLP scan dispatch (PRD 0053)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def build_outbound_scan_text(
host: str,
path: str,
query: str,
headers: typing.Mapping[str, str],
body: str,
) -> str:
"""Assemble all outbound request surfaces into one string for DLP scanning.
Covers hostname (DNS tunnelling), path, query params, all headers, body.
"""
parts: list[str] = [host, path]
if query:
parts.append(query)
for name, value in headers.items():
parts.append(f"{name}: {value}")
if body:
parts.append(body)
return "\n".join(parts)
def build_inbound_scan_text(
headers: typing.Mapping[str, str],
body: str,
) -> str:
"""Assemble inbound response surfaces into one string for DLP scanning.
Covers all response headers plus body.
"""
parts: list[str] = []
for name, value in headers.items():
parts.append(f"{name}: {value}")
if body:
parts.append(body)
return "\n".join(parts)
def _detector_enabled(
configured: tuple[str, ...] | None,
name: str,
) -> bool:
"""Check if a named detector is enabled for a route direction.
None means all enabled; empty tuple means all disabled."""
if configured is None:
return True
return name in configured
def scan_outbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
environ: typing.Mapping[str, str],
) -> ScanResult | None:
# Lazy import to avoid circular deps and keep dlp_detectors optional
# at import time (the sidecar copies it flat alongside this file).
try:
from dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
scan_crlf_injection,
scan_known_secrets,
scan_token_patterns,
)
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
scan_crlf_injection,
scan_known_secrets,
scan_token_patterns,
)
text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
# CRLF injection is never legitimate — runs unconditionally, not gated
# by outbound_detectors config.
result = scan_crlf_injection(text)
if result is not None:
return result
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "token_patterns"):
result = scan_token_patterns(text, location="body")
if result is not None:
return result
if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "known_secrets"):
result = scan_known_secrets(text, location="body", env=environ)
if result is not None:
return result
return None
def scan_inbound(
route: Route,
body: str | bytes,
) -> ScanResult | None:
try:
from dlp_detectors import scan_naive_injection # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .dlp_detectors import scan_naive_injection # type: ignore[import-not-found]
text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
if _detector_enabled(route.inbound_detectors, "naive_injection_detection"):
result = scan_naive_injection(text)
if result is not None:
return result
return None
__all__ = [
"LOG_BLOCKS",
"LOG_FULL",
"LOG_OFF",
"Config",
"Decision",
"HeaderMatch",
"MatchEntry",
"PathMatch",
"Route",
"ScanResult",
"build_inbound_scan_text",
"build_outbound_scan_text",
"decide",
"evaluate_matches",
"is_git_push_request",
"load_config",
"load_routes",
"match_route",
"parse_config",
"parse_routes",
"scan_inbound",
"scan_outbound",
]
bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh
+18 -11
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,15 @@
# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
#
# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
# to `--mode upstream:URL` to chain through an upstream proxy.
# mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on its outbound side,
# so the upstream wiring has to be the mitmproxy mode flag,
# not env.
# to `--mode upstream:URL` to forward all post-MITM traffic
# through pipelock. mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on
# its outbound side, so the upstream wiring has to be the
# mitmproxy mode flag, not env.
# * Upstream trust: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA is set, build a
# combined trust bundle (system roots + upstream CA) and point
# combined trust bundle (system roots + pipelock CA) and point
# mitmproxy at it. The option REPLACES mitmproxy's default
# trust store, so passing the upstream CA alone would break
# non-chained hosts.
# trust store, so passing pipelock's CA alone would break
# route-configured pipelock passthrough hosts.
# * `-s /app/egress_addon.py` loads the addon that reads
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml.
@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ fi
# Bind address. Docker backend wants `0.0.0.0` (agent dials egress
# directly via the docker network alias). Smolmachines backend
# uses EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST when a non-default binding is needed.
# wants `127.0.0.1` because the agent dials pipelock — not egress
# — and egress is pipelock's localhost-only upstream inside the
# bundle. TSI's IP-only allowlist would otherwise let the agent
# reach `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass pipelock's DLP; binding
# 127.0.0.1 inside the bundle closes that gap (PRD 0023 chunk 3).
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG=""
if [ -n "$EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST" ]; then
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG="--listen-host $EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST"
@@ -52,10 +56,13 @@ if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ] && [ -f "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ]; then
fi
# Scope the proxy env to this process tree only. In the bundle
# image (PRD 0024) multiple daemons share one container — setting
# image (PRD 0024) the four daemons share one container — setting
# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's git
# pushes through an upstream proxy unintentionally. Setting them
# here means only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them.
# pushes through pipelock, which is wrong (pipelock doesn't proxy
# SSH and would block public git repos). Setting them here means
# only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them. In the legacy
# four-sidecar setup these env vars are also set in compose; here
# they're additionally defensive.
if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
export HTTPS_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
export HTTP_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
bot_bottle/env.py
+1 -1
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ def _read_secret_silent(name: str, prompt_body: str) -> str:
if not (sys.stdin.isatty() or sys.stderr.isatty()):
# Fall back to /dev/tty so this still works when stdin is a pipe.
try:
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+", encoding="utf-8")
tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+")
except OSError:
die(
f"cannot prompt for secret '{name}': no tty available. "
bot_bottle/git_gate.py
+10 -10
View File
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ a bare repo on the gate; `git daemon` serves the bare repos over
The agent never sees the upstream credential under either path.
Why a separate sidecar (not folded into egress or ssh-gate): the
Why a third sidecar (not folded into pipelock or ssh-gate): the
gate is the only one of the three that holds upstream push
credentials. Mixing it with egress would put push creds in the
credentials. Mixing it with pipelock would put push creds in the
same blast radius as internet-facing TLS interception; mixing it
with ssh-gate would force ssh-gate above L4 and into git-protocol
land. See `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import shlex
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from .log import info
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitEntry
from .manifest import Bottle, GitEntry
# Short network alias for git-gate inside the sidecar bundle. The
@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@ class GitGatePlan:
egress_network: str = ""
def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: ManifestBottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]:
def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: Bottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]:
"""Lift each `bottle.git` entry into a GitGateUpstream. Unique-Name
validation already ran in `manifest.ManifestBottle.from_dict`."""
validation already ran in `manifest.Bottle.from_dict`."""
return tuple(
GitGateUpstream(
name=e.Name,
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ def git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle(bottle: ManifestBottle) -> tuple[GitGateUpstre
def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
entries: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
entries: tuple[GitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
) -> str:
"""Render the agent's ~/.gitconfig content for git-gate
`insteadOf` rewrites. Pure host-side, no docker / smolvm;
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ exit 0
def _provision_dynamic_key(
entry: ManifestGitEntry,
entry: GitEntry,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
) -> str:
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ def _provision_dynamic_key(
return str(key_file)
def revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle: ManifestBottle, stage_dir: Path) -> None:
def revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle: Bottle, stage_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Revoke all deploy keys provisioned for `bottle` during prepare.
Called at teardown after containers stop. Raises if any revocation
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on concrete
subclasses."""
def prepare(self, bottle: ManifestBottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path) -> GitGatePlan:
def prepare(self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path) -> GitGatePlan:
"""Compute the upstream table from `bottle.git` and write the
entrypoint, pre-receive hook, and access-hook scripts (mode
600) under `stage_dir`. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess.
bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py
+4 -4
View File
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"REMOTE_ADDR": self.client_address[0],
"REMOTE_PORT": str(self.client_address[1]),
"REMOTE_USER": "",
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name, # type: ignore
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port), # type: ignore
"SERVER_NAME": self.server.server_name,
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port),
"SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
})
for header, variable in (
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: object) -> None: # type: ignore # noqa: A002
sys.stdout.write(format % args + "\n")
def log_message(self, fmt: str, *args: object) -> None:
sys.stdout.write(fmt % args + "\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
bot_bottle/manifest.py
+43 -41
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ Bottle schema (frontmatter):
user: { name: <str>, email: <str> } # optional
repos: { <name>: <git-gate-entry>, ... } # optional
egress: { routes: [ <egress-route>, ... ] }
# route keys: host, matches, auth, role, dlp
# route keys: host, path_allowlist, auth, role, pipelock
# pipelock: { tls_passthrough: <bool>, ssrf_ip_allowlist: [<cidr>, ...] }
supervise: <bool> # optional
Agent schema (frontmatter):
@@ -50,26 +51,29 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import Mapping
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
from .manifest_agent import ManifestAgent, ManifestAgentProvider
from .manifest_agent import Agent, AgentProvider
from .manifest_egress import (
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES,
ManifestEgressConfig,
ManifestEgressRoute,
EgressConfig,
EgressRoute,
PipelockRoutePolicy,
validate_egress_routes,
)
from .manifest_git import ManifestGitEntry, ManifestGitUser, parse_git_gate_config
from .manifest_git import GitEntry, GitUser, parse_git_gate_config
from .manifest_schema import BOTTLE_KEYS
# Re-export everything that callers currently import from this module.
__all__ = [
"ManifestError",
"ManifestGitEntry",
"ManifestGitUser",
"ManifestAgentProvider",
"GitEntry",
"GitUser",
"AgentProvider",
"EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES",
"ManifestEgressRoute",
"ManifestEgressConfig",
"ManifestAgent",
"ManifestBottle",
"PipelockRoutePolicy",
"EgressRoute",
"EgressConfig",
"Agent",
"Bottle",
"Manifest",
]
@@ -86,26 +90,27 @@ def _section_dict(value: object, label: str) -> dict[str, object]:
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestBottle:
class Bottle:
env: Mapping[str, str] = field(default_factory=_empty_str_dict)
agent_provider: ManifestAgentProvider = field(default_factory=ManifestAgentProvider)
git: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...] = ()
agent_provider: AgentProvider = field(default_factory=AgentProvider)
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
# Per-bottle git identity (issue #86). Empty default — bottles
# that don't set `git-gate.user:` in the manifest skip the
# `git config --global` step entirely. A bottle can declare a user
# identity without any git-gate.repos upstreams, and vice versa.
git_user: ManifestGitUser = field(default_factory=ManifestGitUser)
egress: ManifestEgressConfig = field(default_factory=ManifestEgressConfig)
git_user: GitUser = field(default_factory=GitUser)
egress: EgressConfig = field(default_factory=EgressConfig)
# Opt-in per-bottle stuck-recovery sidecar (PRD 0013). When true,
# the launch step brings up a supervise sidecar that exposes MCP
# tools to the agent (egress-block, capability-block) plus mounts
# the current-config dir read-only into the agent at
# /etc/bot-bottle/current-config. False (the default) skips the
# sidecar and mount.
# the launch step brings up a supervise sidecar that exposes three
# MCP tools to the agent (cred-proxy-block, pipelock-block,
# capability-block; the cred-proxy-block tool is renamed and
# retargeted at egress in PRD 0017 chunk 3) plus mounts the
# current-config dir read-only into the agent at /etc/bot-bottle/
# current-config. False (the default) skips the sidecar and mount.
supervise: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object) -> "ManifestBottle":
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object) -> "Bottle":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{name}'")
if "runtime" in d:
@@ -157,22 +162,22 @@ class ManifestBottle:
)
env[var] = value
git: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...] = ()
git_user = ManifestGitUser()
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
git_user = GitUser()
git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
if git_raw is not None:
git, git_user = parse_git_gate_config(name, git_raw)
agent_provider = (
ManifestAgentProvider.from_dict(name, d["agent_provider"])
AgentProvider.from_dict(name, d["agent_provider"])
if "agent_provider" in d
else ManifestAgentProvider()
else AgentProvider()
)
egress = (
ManifestEgressConfig.from_dict(name, d["egress"])
EgressConfig.from_dict(name, d["egress"])
if "egress" in d
else ManifestEgressConfig()
else EgressConfig()
)
supervise_raw = d.get("supervise", False)
@@ -190,8 +195,8 @@ class ManifestBottle:
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Manifest:
bottles: Mapping[str, ManifestBottle]
agents: Mapping[str, ManifestAgent]
bottles: Mapping[str, Bottle]
agents: Mapping[str, Agent]
@classmethod
def resolve(cls, cwd: str, *, missing_ok: bool = False) -> "Manifest":
@@ -305,8 +310,8 @@ class Manifest:
bottles = resolve_bottles(raw_bottles)
bottle_names = set(bottles.keys())
agents: dict[str, ManifestAgent] = {
n: ManifestAgent.from_dict(n, a, bottle_names) for n, a in raw_agents.items()
agents: dict[str, Agent] = {
n: Agent.from_dict(n, a, bottle_names) for n, a in raw_agents.items()
}
return cls(bottles=bottles, agents=agents)
@@ -318,11 +323,8 @@ class Manifest:
return
available = ", ".join(self.agents.keys())
if available:
msg = f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}"
raise ManifestError(msg)
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty)."
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json. Available: {available}")
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (manifest is empty).")
def has_bottle(self, name: str) -> bool:
return name in self.bottles
@@ -338,7 +340,7 @@ class Manifest:
)
raise ManifestError(f"bottle '{name}' not defined in bot-bottle.json (no bottles defined).")
def _effective_git_user(self, agent_name: str) -> ManifestGitUser:
def _effective_git_user(self, agent_name: str) -> GitUser:
"""Merge the agent's git.user over the referenced bottle's,
per-field, agent-wins-on-non-empty (issue #94). Same overlay
the `extends:` resolver applies between bottles
@@ -348,12 +350,12 @@ class Manifest:
over = agent.git_user
if over.is_empty():
return base
return ManifestGitUser(
return GitUser(
name=over.name or base.name,
email=over.email or base.email,
)
def bottle_for(self, agent_name: str) -> ManifestBottle:
def bottle_for(self, agent_name: str) -> Bottle:
"""Resolve the Bottle the named agent references, with the
agent's git.user overlaid on top. The validator guarantees both
lookups succeed for a manifest built via from_json_obj.
bot_bottle/manifest_agent.py
+17 -33
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ from typing import cast
from .agent_provider import PROVIDER_TEMPLATES
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
from .manifest_git import ManifestGitUser
from .manifest_git import GitUser
from .manifest_schema import AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestAgentProvider:
class AgentProvider:
"""Provider/template for the agent process inside a bottle.
`template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
forward_host_credentials: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "ManifestAgentProvider":
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "AgentProvider":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider")
for k in d:
if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "auth_token", "forward_host_credentials"}:
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template must be a "
f"non-empty string"
)
if template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template {template!r} "
f"is not one of {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))}"
)
dockerfile = d.get("dockerfile", "")
if not isinstance(dockerfile, str):
raise ManifestError(
@@ -61,12 +66,6 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token must be a "
f"string (was {type(auth_token).__name__})"
)
if auth_token and template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
f"supported for built-in templates "
f"({', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))})"
)
if auth_token and template != "claude":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
@@ -78,12 +77,6 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
f"must be a boolean (was {type(forward_host_credentials).__name__})"
)
if forward_host_credentials and template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
f"is only supported for built-in templates "
f"({', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))})"
)
if forward_host_credentials and template != "codex":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
@@ -98,7 +91,7 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestAgent:
class Agent:
bottle: str
skills: tuple[str, ...] = ()
prompt: str = ""
@@ -106,10 +99,10 @@ class ManifestAgent:
# bottle's git-gate.user per-field at `Manifest.bottle_for`. Only
# `user` is allowed at the agent level; `repos` stays bottle-only
# because it carries credentials and host trust.
git_user: ManifestGitUser = ManifestGitUser()
git_user: GitUser = GitUser()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object, bottle_names: set[str]) -> "ManifestAgent":
def from_dict(cls, name: str, raw: object, bottle_names: set[str]) -> "Agent":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"agent '{name}'")
unknown = set(d.keys()) - AGENT_MODEL_KEYS
if unknown:
@@ -121,10 +114,7 @@ class ManifestAgent:
bottle = d.get("bottle")
if not isinstance(bottle, str) or not bottle:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a "
f"defined bottle"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' must declare a 'bottle' field naming a defined bottle")
if bottle not in bottle_names:
available = ", ".join(sorted(bottle_names)) or "(none defined)"
raise ManifestError(
@@ -136,10 +126,7 @@ class ManifestAgent:
skills_raw = d.get("skills")
if skills_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(skills_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array "
f"(was {type(skills_raw).__name__})"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' skills must be an array (was {type(skills_raw).__name__})")
collected: list[str] = []
skills_list = cast(list[object], skills_raw)
for i, skill in enumerate(skills_list):
@@ -157,18 +144,15 @@ class ManifestAgent:
elif isinstance(prompt_raw, str):
prompt = prompt_raw
else:
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string "
f"(was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})"
)
raise ManifestError(f"agent '{name}' prompt must be a string (was {type(prompt_raw).__name__})")
# git-gate: agents may declare only `git-gate.user` (name/email).
# `git-gate.repos` is bottle-only — it carries credentials and host trust.
git_user = ManifestGitUser()
git_user = GitUser()
git_raw = d.get("git-gate")
if git_raw is not None:
gd = as_json_object(git_raw, f"agent '{name}' git-gate")
for k in gd:
for k in gd.keys():
if k != "user":
raise ManifestError(
f"agent '{name}' git-gate.{k} is not allowed at the "
@@ -177,6 +161,6 @@ class ManifestAgent:
f"(it carries credentials and host trust)."
)
if "user" in gd:
git_user = ManifestGitUser.from_dict(name, gd["user"])
git_user = GitUser.from_dict(name, gd["user"])
return cls(bottle=bottle, skills=skills, prompt=prompt, git_user=git_user)
bot_bottle/manifest_egress.py
+144 -244
View File
@@ -1,31 +1,33 @@
"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers (PRD 0017, PRD 0053)."""
"""Egress routing manifest dataclasses and helpers."""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
import ipaddress
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import cast
from .manifest_util import ManifestError, as_json_object
# Auth schemes for the egress route's optional `auth` block.
# Same values cred-proxy accepts today; `token` sidesteps the Gitea
# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
PATH_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "prefix", "regex")
HEADER_MATCH_TYPES = ("exact", "regex")
VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
"GET", "HEAD", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "TRACE",
"CONNECT",
})
OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
def validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
routes: tuple[ManifestEgressRoute, ...],
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
) -> None:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
No cross-validation against `bottle.git-gate.repos` is performed.
git-gate (SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different
protocols; declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev
setup."""
seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in routes:
key = r.Host.lower()
@@ -38,61 +40,132 @@ def validate_egress_routes(
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestPathMatch:
Type: str = "prefix"
Value: str = ""
class PipelockRoutePolicy:
"""Per-route pipelock policy overrides.
`TlsPassthrough` adds the route host to pipelock's
`tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so pipelock still enforces
the hostname allowlist but does not MITM/decrypt request bodies or
headers for that host.
`SsrfIpAllowlist` adds explicit IPs/CIDRs to pipelock's SSRF
allowlist for private/internal destinations behind this route.
"""
TlsPassthrough: bool = False
SsrfIpAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object,
) -> "PipelockRoutePolicy":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
for k in d:
if k not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"only 'tls_passthrough' and 'ssrf_ip_allowlist' "
f"are accepted"
)
tls_passthrough_raw = d.get("tls_passthrough", False)
if not isinstance(tls_passthrough_raw, bool):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.tls_passthrough must be a boolean "
f"(was {type(tls_passthrough_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_raw = d.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
if not isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(ssrf_raw).__name__})"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(ssrf_raw):
if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be a non-empty "
f"string (was {type(item).__name__})"
)
try:
ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
except ValueError as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be an IP address "
f"or CIDR (was {item!r}): {e}"
)
ssrf_ip_allowlist.append(item)
return cls(
TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw,
SsrfIpAllowlist=tuple(ssrf_ip_allowlist),
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestHeaderMatch:
Name: str = ""
Value: str = ""
Type: str = "exact"
class EgressRoute:
"""One route on the per-bottle egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
`Host` matches the request's hostname (case-insensitive). The
optional `PathAllowlist` constrains the URL path to a set of
prefixes; empty tuple means no path-level filtering. The optional
`AuthScheme` / `TokenRef` pair drives credential injection:
when set, the proxy strips any inbound Authorization and injects
`<AuthScheme> <value-of-host-env-named-by-TokenRef>`. When the
manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestMatchEntry:
Paths: tuple[ManifestPathMatch, ...] = ()
Methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
Headers: tuple[ManifestHeaderMatch, ...] = ()
`Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
rejected by the validator.
Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
- `host` required, non-empty.
- `path_allowlist` optional, list of absolute path prefixes.
- `auth` optional. If present, MUST carry both `scheme` and
`token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
that case).
- `role` optional, reserved — any non-empty value is rejected.
"""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestEgressRoute:
Host: str
Matches: tuple[ManifestMatchEntry, ...] = ()
PathAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
OutboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
InboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
Pipelock: PipelockRoutePolicy = field(default_factory=PipelockRoutePolicy)
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "ManifestEgressRoute":
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, idx: int, raw: object) -> "EgressRoute":
label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
host = d.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} missing required string field 'host'")
# --- matches ---
matches: tuple[ManifestMatchEntry, ...] = ()
matches_raw = d.get("matches")
if matches_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(matches_raw, list):
path_allow_raw = d.get("path_allowlist")
prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if path_allow_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} matches must be an array "
f"(was {type(matches_raw).__name__})"
f"{label} path_allowlist must be an array "
f"(was {type(path_allow_raw).__name__})"
)
matches_list = cast(list[object], matches_raw)
entries: list[ManifestMatchEntry] = []
for k, entry_raw in enumerate(matches_list):
entries.append(
_parse_match_entry(label, k, entry_raw)
)
matches = tuple(entries)
path_list = cast(list[object], path_allow_raw)
collected: list[str] = []
for j, p in enumerate(path_list):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] must be a string "
f"(was {type(p).__name__})"
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} path_allowlist[{j}] {p!r} must be an "
f"absolute path prefix starting with '/'"
)
collected.append(p)
prefixes = tuple(collected)
# --- auth ---
auth_scheme = ""
token_ref = ""
if "auth" in d:
@@ -130,7 +203,6 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
auth_scheme = auth_scheme_raw
token_ref = token_ref_raw
# --- role (reserved) ---
role_raw = d.get("role")
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
if role_raw is None:
@@ -142,8 +214,7 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
collected_roles: list[str] = []
for r in role_list:
if not isinstance(r, str):
msg = f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})"
raise ManifestError(msg)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} role items must be strings (got {type(r).__name__})")
collected_roles.append(r)
roles = tuple(collected_roles)
else:
@@ -157,208 +228,43 @@ class ManifestEgressRoute:
f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
)
# --- dlp ---
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
if "dlp" in d:
outbound_detectors, inbound_detectors = _parse_dlp_block(
label, d.get("dlp"),
)
pipelock = (
PipelockRoutePolicy.from_dict(bottle_name, idx, d["pipelock"])
if "pipelock" in d
else PipelockRoutePolicy()
)
for k in d:
if k not in ("host", "matches", "auth", "role", "dlp"):
if k not in ("host", "path_allowlist", "auth", "role", "pipelock"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'host', 'matches', 'auth', 'role', 'dlp'"
f"'host', 'path_allowlist', 'auth', 'role', 'pipelock'"
)
return cls(
Host=host,
Matches=matches,
PathAllowlist=prefixes,
AuthScheme=auth_scheme,
TokenRef=token_ref,
Role=roles,
OutboundDetectors=outbound_detectors,
InboundDetectors=inbound_detectors,
Pipelock=pipelock,
)
def _parse_match_entry(
route_label: str, k: int, raw: object,
) -> ManifestMatchEntry:
label = f"{route_label} matches[{k}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
paths: tuple[ManifestPathMatch, ...] = ()
paths_raw = d.get("paths")
if paths_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(paths_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} paths must be an array")
paths_list = cast(list[object], paths_raw)
parsed_paths: list[ManifestPathMatch] = []
for j, p_raw in enumerate(paths_list):
parsed_paths.append(_parse_path_match(label, j, p_raw))
paths = tuple(parsed_paths)
methods: tuple[str, ...] = ()
methods_raw = d.get("methods")
if methods_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(methods_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} methods must be an array")
methods_list = cast(list[object], methods_raw)
normalised: list[str] = []
for j, m in enumerate(methods_list):
if not isinstance(m, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} methods[{j}] must be a string"
)
upper = m.upper()
if upper not in VALID_METHODS:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} methods[{j}] {m!r} is not a valid HTTP method"
)
normalised.append(upper)
methods = tuple(normalised)
headers: tuple[ManifestHeaderMatch, ...] = ()
headers_raw = d.get("headers")
if headers_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(headers_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} headers must be an array")
headers_list = cast(list[object], headers_raw)
parsed_headers: list[ManifestHeaderMatch] = []
for j, h_raw in enumerate(headers_list):
parsed_headers.append(_parse_header_match(label, j, h_raw))
headers = tuple(parsed_headers)
for key in d:
if key not in ("paths", "methods", "headers"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {key!r}")
return ManifestMatchEntry(Paths=paths, Methods=methods, Headers=headers)
def _parse_path_match(
entry_label: str, j: int, raw: object,
) -> ManifestPathMatch:
label = f"{entry_label} paths[{j}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
ptype = d.get("type", "prefix")
if not isinstance(ptype, str) or ptype not in PATH_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} type must be one of {', '.join(PATH_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {ptype!r})"
)
value = d.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} value must be a non-empty string")
if ptype in ("exact", "prefix") and not value.startswith("/"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} value {value!r} must start with '/' for type {ptype!r}"
)
if ptype == "regex":
try:
re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in d:
if k not in ("type", "value"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}")
return ManifestPathMatch(Type=ptype, Value=value)
def _parse_header_match(
entry_label: str, j: int, raw: object,
) -> ManifestHeaderMatch:
label = f"{entry_label} headers[{j}]"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
name = d.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} name must be a non-empty string")
value = d.get("value")
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} value must be a string")
htype = d.get("type", "exact")
if not isinstance(htype, str) or htype not in HEADER_MATCH_TYPES:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} type must be one of {', '.join(HEADER_MATCH_TYPES)} "
f"(got {htype!r})"
)
if htype == "regex":
try:
re.compile(value)
except re.error as e:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} regex {value!r} failed to compile: {e}"
) from e
for k in d:
if k not in ("name", "value", "type"):
raise ManifestError(f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}")
return ManifestHeaderMatch(Name=name, Value=value, Type=htype)
def _parse_dlp_block(
route_label: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...] | None, tuple[str, ...] | None]:
label = f"{route_label} dlp"
d = as_json_object(raw, label)
def _parse_field(
field: str,
valid_names: frozenset[str],
) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
val = d.get(field)
if val is None:
return None
if val is False:
return ()
if not isinstance(val, list):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field} must be false, a list, or omitted"
)
items = cast(list[object], val)
names: list[str] = []
for j, item in enumerate(items):
if not isinstance(item, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field}[{j}] must be a string"
)
if item not in valid_names:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} {field}[{j}] {item!r} is not a valid "
f"detector; valid: {', '.join(sorted(valid_names))}"
)
names.append(item)
return tuple(names)
outbound = _parse_field("outbound_detectors", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
inbound = _parse_field("inbound_detectors", INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
for k in d:
if k not in ("outbound_detectors", "inbound_detectors"):
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; accepted keys are "
f"'outbound_detectors', 'inbound_detectors'"
)
return outbound, inbound
LOG_LEVELS = frozenset({0, 1, 2})
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestEgressConfig:
routes: tuple[ManifestEgressRoute, ...] = ()
Log: int = 0
class EgressConfig:
"""Per-bottle egress configuration. Today this is just the
route table; the nesting under `egress:` leaves room for
per-bottle proxy settings (port override, log level, etc.) in
follow-ups."""
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "ManifestEgressConfig":
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "EgressConfig":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress")
routes_raw = d.get("routes")
routes: tuple[ManifestEgressRoute, ...] = ()
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
if routes_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(routes_raw, list):
raise ManifestError(
@@ -367,20 +273,14 @@ class ManifestEgressConfig:
)
routes_list = cast(list[object], routes_raw)
routes = tuple(
ManifestEgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
EgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
for i, entry in enumerate(routes_list)
)
validate_egress_routes(bottle_name, routes)
log_raw = d.get("log", 0)
if isinstance(log_raw, bool) or not isinstance(log_raw, int) \
or log_raw not in LOG_LEVELS:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.log must be 0, 1, or 2"
)
for k in d:
if k not in ("routes", "log"):
if k != "routes":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"accepted keys are 'routes', 'log'"
f"only 'routes' is accepted"
)
return cls(routes=routes, Log=log_raw)
return cls(routes=routes)
bot_bottle/manifest_extends.py
+21 -21
View File
@@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitEntry
from .manifest import Bottle, GitEntry
def resolve_bottles(raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]]) -> dict[str, ManifestBottle]:
"""Apply `extends:` chains and return resolved ManifestBottle objects."""
cache: dict[str, ManifestBottle] = {}
def resolve_bottles(raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]]) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
"""Apply `extends:` chains and return resolved Bottle objects."""
cache: dict[str, Bottle] = {}
for name in raws:
if name not in cache:
_resolve_one_bottle(name, raws, cache, ())
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ def resolve_bottles(raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]]) -> dict[str, ManifestBot
def _resolve_one_bottle(
name: str,
raws: dict[str, dict[str, object]],
cache: dict[str, ManifestBottle],
cache: dict[str, Bottle],
seen: tuple[str, ...],
) -> ManifestBottle:
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestError
) -> Bottle:
from .manifest import Bottle, ManifestError
if name in cache:
return cache[name]
@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ def _resolve_one_bottle(
raise ManifestError(f"bottle '{name}' is in an extends cycle: {chain}")
raw = raws[name]
parent_name_raw = raw.get("extends")
# Strip `extends:` before passing to ManifestBottle.from_dict so it
# is not accidentally treated as a real ManifestBottle field by future
# Strip `extends:` before passing to Bottle.from_dict so it
# is not accidentally treated as a real Bottle field by future
# schema additions. It is only meaningful here.
child_raw = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k != "extends"}
if parent_name_raw is None:
bottle = ManifestBottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
bottle = Bottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
cache[name] = bottle
return bottle
@@ -66,27 +66,27 @@ def _resolve_one_bottle(
def _merge_bottles(
parent: ManifestBottle,
parent: Bottle,
child_raw: dict[str, object],
name: str,
) -> ManifestBottle:
) -> Bottle:
"""Apply PRD 0025 merge rules."""
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitUser
from .manifest import Bottle, GitUser
from .manifest_egress import validate_egress_routes
# Parse the child's declared fields into a ManifestBottle (with the
# Parse the child's declared fields into a Bottle (with the
# usual defaults for anything missing). Validation runs the same
# way it would for a leaf bottle: typos / wrong types die here.
child = ManifestBottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
child = Bottle.from_dict(name, child_raw)
# env: dict merge, child wins on collision.
merged_env = {**parent.env, **child.env}
# git-gate.user: per-field overlay. Each non-empty field on child
# wins; empties fall through to parent. The default ManifestGitUser()
# wins; empties fall through to parent. The default GitUser()
# is two empty strings, so a child that omits git-gate.user
# inherits the parent's user verbatim.
merged_git_user = ManifestGitUser(
merged_git_user = GitUser(
name=child.git_user.name or parent.git_user.name,
email=child.git_user.email or parent.git_user.email,
)
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def _merge_bottles(
)
validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
return ManifestBottle(
return Bottle(
env=merged_env,
agent_provider=merged_agent_provider,
git=merged_git,
@@ -133,9 +133,9 @@ def _child_declares_git_gate_repos(child_raw: dict[str, object]) -> bool:
def _merge_git_remotes(
parent: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...],
child: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...],
) -> tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...]:
parent: tuple[GitEntry, ...],
child: tuple[GitEntry, ...],
) -> tuple[GitEntry, ...]:
by_host = {entry.UpstreamHost: entry for entry in parent}
for entry in child:
by_host[entry.UpstreamHost] = entry
bot_bottle/manifest_git.py
+19 -25
View File
@@ -30,18 +30,12 @@ def parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must be an ssh:// URL (was {url!r})")
rest = url[len("ssh://"):]
if "@" not in rest:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a user (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
user, _, hostpart = rest.partition("@")
if not user:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} user is empty in {url!r}")
if "/" not in hostpart:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); "
f"was {url!r}"
)
raise ManifestError(f"{label} must include a path (e.g. ssh://git@host/path.git); was {url!r}")
hostport, _, path = hostpart.partition("/")
if not path:
raise ManifestError(f"{label} path is empty in {url!r}")
@@ -57,7 +51,7 @@ def parse_git_upstream(url: str, label: str) -> tuple[str, str, str, str]:
return (user, host, port, path)
def validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...]) -> None:
def validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[GitEntry, ...]) -> None:
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for g in git:
if g.Name in seen:
@@ -69,7 +63,7 @@ def validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig:
class ProvisionedKeyConfig:
"""Configuration for automatic deploy-key lifecycle management
(PRD 0048). Used when a git-gate.repos entry opts out of a
static identity file and instead wants a fresh SSH keypair
@@ -87,7 +81,7 @@ class ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig:
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestGitEntry:
class GitEntry:
"""One upstream the per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008) is allowed to
talk to. `Upstream` is the real remote URL the agent would push to
if there were no gate; the gate hosts a bare repo at /git/<Name>.git
@@ -107,7 +101,7 @@ class ManifestGitEntry:
Upstream: str
IdentityFile: str = ""
KnownHostKey: str = ""
ProvisionedKey: Optional[ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
ProvisionedKey: Optional[ProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
RemoteKey: str = ""
UpstreamUser: str = ""
UpstreamHost: str = ""
@@ -117,7 +111,7 @@ class ManifestGitEntry:
@classmethod
def from_repos_entry(
cls, bottle_name: str, repo_name: str, raw: object
) -> "ManifestGitEntry":
) -> "GitEntry":
"""Parse one entry from `git-gate.repos.<repo_name>`.
YAML keys: `url` (required), exactly one of `identity` or
@@ -160,7 +154,7 @@ class ManifestGitEntry:
)
ident = ""
provisioned_key: Optional[ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
provisioned_key: Optional[ProvisionedKeyConfig] = None
if has_identity:
raw_ident = d.get("identity")
if not isinstance(raw_ident, str) or not raw_ident:
@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ class ManifestGitEntry:
def _parse_provisioned_key_config(
bottle_name: str, label: str, raw: object
) -> ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig:
) -> ProvisionedKeyConfig:
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key")
for k in d:
if k not in {"provider", "token_env", "api_url"}:
@@ -221,7 +215,7 @@ def _parse_provisioned_key_config(
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' {label}.provisioned_key 'api_url' must be a string"
)
return ManifestProvisionedKeyConfig(
return ProvisionedKeyConfig(
provider=provider,
token_env=token_env,
api_url=api_url_raw,
@@ -229,7 +223,7 @@ def _parse_provisioned_key_config(
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManifestGitUser:
class GitUser:
"""Per-bottle `git config --global user.name` / `user.email`
pair (issue #86). The agent's commits inside the bottle are
attributed to this identity rather than the agent image's
@@ -244,9 +238,9 @@ class ManifestGitUser:
email: str = ""
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "ManifestGitUser":
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "GitUser":
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user")
for k in d:
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"name", "email"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.user has unknown key {k!r}; "
@@ -279,9 +273,9 @@ class ManifestGitUser:
def parse_git_gate_config(
bottle_name: str,
raw: object,
) -> tuple[tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...], ManifestGitUser]:
) -> tuple[tuple[GitEntry, ...], GitUser]:
d = as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate")
for k in d:
for k in d.keys():
if k not in {"user", "repos"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate has unknown key {k!r}; "
@@ -289,17 +283,17 @@ def parse_git_gate_config(
)
git_user = (
ManifestGitUser.from_dict(bottle_name, d["user"])
GitUser.from_dict(bottle_name, d["user"])
if "user" in d
else ManifestGitUser()
else GitUser()
)
git: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...] = ()
git: tuple[GitEntry, ...] = ()
repos_raw = d.get("repos")
if repos_raw is not None:
repos = as_json_object(repos_raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' git-gate.repos")
git = tuple(
ManifestGitEntry.from_repos_entry(bottle_name, name, entry)
GitEntry.from_repos_entry(bottle_name, name, entry)
for name, entry in repos.items()
)
validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name, git)
bot_bottle/manifest_loader.py
+11 -11
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from .manifest_schema import (
from .yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_frontmatter
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .manifest import ManifestAgent, ManifestBottle
from .manifest import Agent, Bottle
def check_stale_json(dir_path: Path, md_dir: Path, label: str) -> None:
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ def check_stale_json(dir_path: Path, md_dir: Path, label: str) -> None:
)
def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, ManifestBottle]:
def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, Bottle]:
"""Walk `<bottles_dir>/*.md`, parse each as a bottle, and return
`{name: Bottle}`. Missing dir returns an empty dict."""
from .manifest import ManifestError
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ def load_bottles_from_dir(bottles_dir: Path) -> dict[str, ManifestBottle]:
try:
fm, _body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_bottle_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
raws[name] = fm
return resolve_bottles(raws)
@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
agents_dir: Path,
bottle_names: set[str],
*,
source: str, # noqa: F841 — unused, but required by interface
) -> dict[str, ManifestAgent]:
source: str,
) -> dict[str, Agent]:
"""Walk `<agents_dir>/*.md`, parse each as an agent, and return
`{name: Agent}`. The Markdown body becomes the agent's prompt.
Missing dir returns an empty dict."""
from .manifest import ManifestAgent, ManifestError
from .manifest import Agent, ManifestError
out: dict[str, ManifestAgent] = {}
out: dict[str, Agent] = {}
if not agents_dir.is_dir():
return out
for path in sorted(agents_dir.glob("*.md")):
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
try:
fm, body = parse_frontmatter(path.read_text())
except OSError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"could not read {path}: {e}")
except YamlSubsetError as e:
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}") from e
raise ManifestError(f"{path}: {e}")
validate_agent_frontmatter_keys(path, fm.keys())
# Build the dict Agent.from_dict expects. The body becomes
# prompt; Claude Code passthrough fields stay in fm and get
@@ -101,5 +101,5 @@ def load_agents_from_dir(
}
if "git-gate" in fm:
agent_dict["git-gate"] = fm["git-gate"]
out[name] = ManifestAgent.from_dict(name, agent_dict, bottle_names)
out[name] = Agent.from_dict(name, agent_dict, bottle_names)
return out
bot_bottle/manifest_schema.py
+3 -3
View File
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ def _validate_frontmatter_keys(
) -> None:
from .manifest_util import ManifestError
key_set = set(keys) # type: ignore
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys # type: ignore
key_set = set(keys)
unknown = key_set - allowed_keys
if unknown:
allowed = ", ".join(sorted(allowed_keys))
raise ManifestError(
f"{kind} file {path}: unknown frontmatter key(s) "
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}." # type: ignore
f"{sorted(unknown)}; allowed keys are {allowed}."
)
bot_bottle/pipelock.py
+546
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
"""Pipelock sidecar lifecycle for the per-agent egress topology.
Pipelock (https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) is an HTTP
forward proxy with hostname allowlisting + DLP scanning + URL-entropy
checks. One sidecar per agent, attached to the agent's --internal
network and a per-agent user-defined egress bridge.
Post-PRD-0017 topology: the agent's HTTP_PROXY points at egress
(not pipelock); egress sets `HTTPS_PROXY=pipelock` on its
outbound leg. So pipelock no longer sees the agent's connections
directly — it sees the egress → upstream leg, applies the
hostname allowlist + DLP body scan there, and forwards to the real
upstream.
Image pin: ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:<digest> for tag 2.3.0.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
from .supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME
from .manifest import Bottle
# Hosts pipelock should NOT TLS-MITM, even when tls_interception is
# enabled. This is now route-owned manifest policy via
# `egress.routes[].pipelock.tls_passthrough`; no provider hosts are
# injected implicitly.
DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH: tuple[str, ...] = ()
# In-container paths the rendered pipelock YAML references under
# `tls_interception`. The pipelock binary expects the per-bottle CA
# cert + key at these exact paths inside its container — independent
# of how the daemon is wrapped (own container, sidecar bundle, etc.),
# which is why they live in the platform-neutral module.
PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock-ca.pem"
PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem"
# Short network alias for pipelock inside the sidecar bundle. The
# agent's HTTP_PROXY (when no egress is declared) and any in-bundle
# consumer's URL both reference this name.
PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME = "pipelock"
# --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock allows. Sorted for stability.
Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)` —
egress is the single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is
the downstream copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For
bottles without any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except
for supervise sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
The supervise sidecar's hostname is auto-added when supervise
is enabled (sibling-sidecar traffic that flows through pipelock
would otherwise be 403'd). Git upstreams declared in
`bottle.git` do NOT contribute here — git traffic flows
through git-gate (PRD 0008), not pipelock."""
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if r.host:
seen.setdefault(r.host, None)
if bottle.supervise:
seen.setdefault(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
def pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle: Bottle) -> bool:
"""Whether pipelock's BIP-39 seed-phrase detector stays on.
LLM conversation bodies legitimately trip the detector — any 12+
English words that pass the BIP-39 checksum match — so agents can
get blocked on ordinary prompts/responses regardless of provider
(Claude, Codex/OpenAI, or future harnesses). We tried two narrower
knobs first:
- `suppress: [{rule, path}]` — pipelock accepts the schema
but the entry only silences the alert; the body_dlp block
still fires.
- `rules.disabled: ["dlp:BIP-39 Seed Phrase"]` — same shape,
same outcome: 403 still returned.
Empirically only `seed_phrase_detection.enabled: false`
actually stops the block (verified by sending a 12-word BIP-39
body through three pipelock instances). It is a global toggle —
no per-path / per-host knob in pipelock 2.3.0 — so we turn off
only this detector for every bottle. The rest of pipelock's DLP
defaults and request-body/header scanning remain enabled."""
del bottle # kept for call-site stability and future policy knobs.
return False
def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock should pass through (no TLS MITM).
A manifest route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`
(lifted into `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough` in `egress_manifest_routes`).
Provider routes that set `tls_passthrough=True` (e.g. Codex credential
routes where egress injects the host bearer after the agent boundary)
are also included. Both arrive via `egress_routes_for_bottle` — no
provider-specific branching needed here.
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {host: None for host in DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH}
for route in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if route.tls_passthrough:
seen.setdefault(route.host, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
def pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
bottle: Bottle,
extra: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""IP/CIDR entries that bypass pipelock's SSRF destination guard.
Launch code can pass backend-owned entries through `extra`, while
route-owned entries come from `pipelock.ssrf_ip_allowlist`.
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {ip: None for ip in extra}
for route in bottle.egress.routes:
for ip in route.Pipelock.SsrfIpAllowlist:
seen.setdefault(ip, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
# --- Config build + YAML render --------------------------------------------
def pipelock_build_config(
bottle: Bottle,
*,
ca_cert_path: str = "",
ca_key_path: str = "",
ssrf_ip_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = (),
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
Deliberately carries no env values, no secrets, no per-agent
customization beyond the resolved hostname list. The shape mirrors
the YAML pipelock expects on disk; `pipelock_render_yaml` serializes
it. Tests assert on this dict; production code renders it.
`ca_cert_path` / `ca_key_path` are the **in-container** paths the
pipelock sidecar will read its CA from at runtime (they're
populated into the container at start time via `docker cp`).
Pass both or neither: both → emit `tls_interception` block with
`enabled: true`; neither → omit the block entirely (pipelock
falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`). Used
by PRD 0006 to turn on pipelock's native TLS interception.
`ssrf_ip_allowlist` is the list of IPs / CIDRs that bypass
pipelock's SSRF guard. Pipelock blocks RFC1918-resolved
destinations by default, which would catch sibling-sidecar
traffic on the bottle's internal Docker network in 172.x space
(e.g. egress → pipelock on the upstream leg). Pass the
bottle's internal network CIDR here so internal-network requests
pass through pipelock while api_allowlist + body-scanning still
apply. Empty by default; omitted from the rendered yaml when
empty so pipelock keeps its built-in SSRF defaults."""
cfg: dict[str, object] = {
"version": 1,
"mode": "strict",
"enforce": True,
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle, provider_routes),
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
}
if not pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle):
cfg["seed_phrase_detection"] = {"enabled": False}
cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True}
# Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP
# "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's
# built-in default for request_body_scanning is "warn" (forward
# with a log line); bot-bottle hard-codes "block" so a hit
# actually stops the request from leaving the egress network.
#
# `scan_headers: true` + `header_mode: all` extends the scan to
# every request header — pipelock's default `header_mode:
# sensitive` only checks Authorization / Cookie / X-Api-Key /
# X-Token / Proxy-Authorization / X-Goog-Api-Key, which an
# agent attempting to exfil could trivially avoid by picking
# a non-sensitive header name. "all" closes the gap; pipelock
# caps it at the same max_body_bytes the body scan uses.
cfg["request_body_scanning"] = {
"action": "block",
"scan_headers": True,
"header_mode": "all",
}
if ca_cert_path or ca_key_path:
if not (ca_cert_path and ca_key_path):
raise ValueError(
"pipelock_build_config: pass both ca_cert_path and ca_key_path "
"to enable tls_interception, or neither to leave it off"
)
cfg["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": True,
"ca_cert": ca_cert_path,
"ca_key": ca_key_path,
"passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle, provider_routes),
}
effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist = pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
bottle, ssrf_ip_allowlist,
)
if effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist:
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist}
return cfg
_PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = {
"version",
"mode",
"enforce",
"api_allowlist",
"seed_phrase_detection",
"forward_proxy",
"dlp",
"request_body_scanning",
"tls_interception",
"ssrf",
}
def _pipelock_render_error(section: str, key: str, expected: str) -> ValueError:
return ValueError(
f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} must be {expected}"
)
def _reject_unknown_keys(
section: str,
obj: dict[str, object],
allowed: set[str],
) -> None:
for key in sorted(set(obj) - allowed):
raise ValueError(f"pipelock_render_yaml: {section}.{key} is unsupported")
def _required_dict(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> dict[str, object]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a mapping")
return value
def _required_bool(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> bool:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, bool):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a boolean")
return value
def _required_int(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> int:
value = obj.get(key)
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "an integer")
return value
def _required_str(obj: dict[str, object], section: str, key: str) -> str:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, str):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a string")
return value
def _required_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
value = obj.get(key)
if not isinstance(value, list) or not all(isinstance(v, str) for v in value):
raise _pipelock_render_error(section, key, "a list of strings")
return value
def _optional_str_list(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> list[str]:
if key not in obj:
return []
return _required_str_list(obj, section, key)
def _optional_bool(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> bool | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_bool(obj, section, key)
def _optional_str(
obj: dict[str, object],
section: str,
key: str,
) -> str | None:
if key not in obj:
return None
return _required_str(obj, section, key)
def _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
_reject_unknown_keys("config", cfg, _PIPELOCK_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS)
normalized: dict[str, object] = {
"version": _required_int(cfg, "config", "version"),
"mode": _required_str(cfg, "config", "mode"),
"enforce": _required_bool(cfg, "config", "enforce"),
"api_allowlist": _required_str_list(cfg, "config", "api_allowlist"),
}
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
spd = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "seed_phrase_detection")
_reject_unknown_keys("seed_phrase_detection", spd, {"enabled"})
normalized["seed_phrase_detection"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(spd, "seed_phrase_detection", "enabled"),
}
fp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "forward_proxy")
_reject_unknown_keys("forward_proxy", fp, {"enabled"})
normalized["forward_proxy"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(fp, "forward_proxy", "enabled"),
}
dlp = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "dlp")
_reject_unknown_keys("dlp", dlp, {"include_defaults", "scan_env"})
normalized["dlp"] = {
"include_defaults": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "include_defaults"),
"scan_env": _required_bool(dlp, "dlp", "scan_env"),
}
rbs = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "request_body_scanning")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"request_body_scanning",
rbs,
{"action", "scan_headers", "header_mode"},
)
normalized_rbs: dict[str, object] = {
"action": _required_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "action"),
}
scan_headers = _optional_bool(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "scan_headers")
if scan_headers is not None:
normalized_rbs["scan_headers"] = scan_headers
header_mode = _optional_str(rbs, "request_body_scanning", "header_mode")
if header_mode is not None:
normalized_rbs["header_mode"] = header_mode
normalized["request_body_scanning"] = normalized_rbs
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
tls = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "tls_interception")
_reject_unknown_keys(
"tls_interception",
tls,
{"enabled", "ca_cert", "ca_key", "passthrough_domains"},
)
normalized["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": _required_bool(tls, "tls_interception", "enabled"),
"ca_cert": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_cert"),
"ca_key": _required_str(tls, "tls_interception", "ca_key"),
"passthrough_domains": _optional_str_list(
tls, "tls_interception", "passthrough_domains",
),
}
if "ssrf" in cfg:
ssrf = _required_dict(cfg, "config", "ssrf")
_reject_unknown_keys("ssrf", ssrf, {"ip_allowlist"})
normalized["ssrf"] = {
"ip_allowlist": _required_str_list(ssrf, "ssrf", "ip_allowlist"),
}
return normalized
def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
"""Render a pipelock config dict (as produced by
`pipelock_build_config`) as YAML. Hand-rolled so we don't take a
YAML-parser dependency for a fixed, narrow shape."""
def _bool(b: object) -> str:
return "true" if b else "false"
cfg = _validate_pipelock_render_config(cfg)
lines: list[str] = []
lines.append(f"version: {cfg['version']}")
lines.append(f"mode: {cfg['mode']}")
lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cfg['enforce'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("api_allowlist:")
api_allowlist = cfg["api_allowlist"]
assert isinstance(api_allowlist, list)
for h in api_allowlist:
lines.append(f' - "{h}"')
lines.append("")
if "seed_phrase_detection" in cfg:
lines.append("seed_phrase_detection:")
spd = cfg["seed_phrase_detection"]
assert isinstance(spd, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(spd['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("forward_proxy:")
fp = cfg["forward_proxy"]
assert isinstance(fp, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("dlp:")
dlp = cfg["dlp"]
assert isinstance(dlp, dict)
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
lines.append(f" scan_env: {_bool(dlp['scan_env'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("request_body_scanning:")
rbs = cfg["request_body_scanning"]
assert isinstance(rbs, dict)
lines.append(f' action: "{rbs["action"]}"')
if "scan_headers" in rbs:
lines.append(f" scan_headers: {_bool(rbs['scan_headers'])}")
if "header_mode" in rbs:
lines.append(f' header_mode: "{rbs["header_mode"]}"')
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("tls_interception:")
tls = cfg["tls_interception"]
assert isinstance(tls, dict)
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(tls['enabled'])}")
lines.append(f' ca_cert: "{tls["ca_cert"]}"')
lines.append(f' ca_key: "{tls["ca_key"]}"')
passthrough = tls["passthrough_domains"]
assert isinstance(passthrough, list)
if passthrough:
lines.append(" passthrough_domains:")
for d in passthrough:
lines.append(f' - "{d}"')
if "ssrf" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("ssrf:")
ssrf = cfg["ssrf"]
assert isinstance(ssrf, dict)
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
ip_allowlist = ssrf["ip_allowlist"]
assert isinstance(ip_allowlist, list)
for ip in ip_allowlist:
lines.append(f' - "{ip}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
# --- Proxy class -----------------------------------------------------------
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Output of PipelockProxy.prepare; consumed by .start when the
sidecar needs to be brought up.
yaml_path + slug are filled in at prepare time (host-side, side-
effect-free; the YAML references the in-container CA paths
already so it doesn't need the host paths to be valid). The
remaining fields are populated by the backend's launch step
via `dataclasses.replace`: internal/egress networks once
those networks exist, the CA host paths once the one-shot
`pipelock tls init` has run, and `internal_network_cidr` once
Docker has assigned a subnet to the internal network. Empty
defaults are sentinels meaning "not yet set"; `.start` validates
that they are populated.
`internal_network_cidr` ends up on pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist`
so traffic from sibling sidecars (egress → pipelock on the
upstream leg, etc.) bypasses pipelock's RFC1918 SSRF guard while
api_allowlist and body-scanning still apply."""
yaml_path: Path
slug: str
internal_network: str = ""
internal_network_cidr: str = ""
egress_network: str = ""
ca_cert_host_path: Path = Path()
ca_key_host_path: Path = Path()
class PipelockProxy:
"""The pipelock egress proxy. Encapsulates the YAML-config
generation; the container lifecycle is owned by whatever
wraps the daemon (compose-managed pipelock container on docker,
sidecar-bundle PID 1 on smolmachines).
Backends instantiate the class directly — there are no
platform-specific subclasses; the in-container CA paths are
universal module-level constants
(`PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER` / `PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER`)."""
def prepare(
self,
bottle: Bottle,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Write the pipelock yaml config (mode 600) under `stage_dir`
and return the plan for launch. Pure host-side, no docker
subprocess.
`slug` is the agent-derived identifier (lowercased,
hyphen-normalized) used as the suffix in every per-agent
resource name — the agent container, the sidecar bundle
container, the internal/egress networks. It's stored on the
returned plan so the backend's launch step can derive those
names.
The CA paths the YAML references are the module-level
in-container constants. The host-side counterparts are
generated by the launch step (not here, so prepare stays
side-effect-free on docker) and added to the plan via
`dataclasses.replace` before the daemon starts."""
yaml_path = stage_dir / "pipelock.yaml"
cfg = pipelock_build_config(
bottle,
ca_cert_path=PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
ca_key_path=PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
provider_routes=provider_routes,
)
yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
yaml_path.chmod(0o600)
return PipelockProxyPlan(yaml_path=yaml_path, slug=slug)
bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py
+42 -12
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
"""Per-bottle sidecar supervisor (PRD 0024 chunk 1).
PID 1 inside the `bot-bottle-sidecars` bundle image. Spawns
the configured daemons (egress, git-gate, supervise),
the configured daemons (egress, pipelock, git-gate, supervise),
forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to each child, and propagates per-daemon
stdout+stderr to the container log with a `[name] ` prefix.
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ PR; the interim policy is "don't take the bundle down for one
sick daemon."
Daemon subset is env-driven. The compose renderer narrows it via
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress` for bottles that
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress,pipelock` for bottles that
don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all daemons.
Stdlib-only by design — adding supervisord/s6/runit for four
@@ -57,7 +57,14 @@ class _DaemonSpec:
# Env-var name prefixes that carry egress-only credentials.
# `egress_apply.py` assigns `EGRESS_TOKEN_<n>` slots that egress
# reads to inject `Authorization` headers on configured routes;
# no other daemon in the bundle should see these values.
# every other daemon in the bundle (especially pipelock with
# `scan_env: true`) MUST NOT see these values or it'll match the
# injected token in the request egress just sent and 403-block
# the legitimate traffic (issue #84). The agent itself runs in a
# different machine and never has access to these slots in the
# first place, so stripping them from non-egress daemons loses no
# DLP coverage — pipelock can't catch the exfil of a value the
# agent doesn't have.
_EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)
@@ -74,8 +81,22 @@ def _env_for_daemon(name: str, base_env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
}
# Order matters only for first-launch race-window reasons: egress
# starts first so pipelock's upstream connect succeeds during
# pipelock's own startup. git-gate and supervise are independent.
# Pipelock binds 0.0.0.0:8888 explicitly. Without `--listen` it
# defaults to 127.0.0.1 which would be unreachable from sibling
# services on the docker network. The legacy four-sidecar
# compose renderer passed the same flag; the bundle keeps the
# explicit binding.
_DAEMONS: tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...] = (
_DaemonSpec("egress", ("/bin/sh", "/app/egress-entrypoint.sh")),
_DaemonSpec(
"pipelock",
("/usr/local/bin/pipelock", "run",
"--config", "/etc/pipelock.yaml",
"--listen", "0.0.0.0:8888"),
),
_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sh", "/git-gate-entrypoint.sh")),
_DaemonSpec("git-http", ("python3", "/app/git_http_backend.py")),
_DaemonSpec("supervise", ("python3", "/app/supervise_server.py")),
@@ -117,7 +138,7 @@ def _pump(name: str, stream: IO[bytes]) -> None:
sys.stdout.flush()
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen[bytes]:
def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
list(spec.argv),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
@@ -137,7 +158,7 @@ class _Supervisor:
def __init__(self, specs: Sequence[_DaemonSpec]):
self.specs = tuple(specs)
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen[bytes]]] = []
self.procs: list[tuple[_DaemonSpec, subprocess.Popen]] = []
self.shutdown_at: float | None = None
# Names of children that have been logged as having exited
# so we only log each death once across watch-loop ticks.
@@ -282,8 +303,10 @@ class _Supervisor:
def restart_daemon(self, daemon_name: str, *, grace: float = 5.0) -> bool:
"""Terminate one named child and spawn a fresh one, leaving
the other daemons running. A daemon that has no in-process
reload can be restarted this way after its config file changes.
the other daemons running. Used by the pipelock-apply path:
pipelock has no in-process reload, so apply_allowlist_change
runs `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` after writing the
new yaml; the supervisor catches SIGUSR1 and calls this.
Behavior: SIGTERM → wait up to `grace` seconds → SIGKILL if
still alive → spawn a replacement under the same DaemonSpec.
@@ -291,8 +314,8 @@ class _Supervisor:
forward_signal / shutdown calls reach the new pid.
Returns True iff a daemon by that name was running and a
replacement spawned; False if no such daemon (not wired
for this bottle)."""
replacement spawned; False if no such daemon (the
compose-renderer subset said this bottle doesn't run it)."""
if self.shutdown_at is not None:
_log(f"restart {daemon_name} skipped; supervisor is shutting down")
return False
@@ -337,13 +360,20 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int:
sup = _Supervisor(specs)
sup.start_all()
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGTERM"))
signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sup.request_shutdown("SIGINT"))
# SIGHUP reload path: egress_apply.py runs `docker kill
# --signal HUP <bundle>` after writing routes.yaml. The kernel
# delivers SIGHUP to PID 1 (this supervisor); forward it to
# mitmdump so it reloads its addon.
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress")) # type: ignore
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, lambda *_: sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "egress"))
# SIGUSR1 pipelock-restart path: pipelock_apply.py runs
# `docker kill --signal USR1 <bundle>` after writing
# pipelock.yaml. Pipelock has no in-process reload, so the
# supervisor restarts the pipelock daemon in place (other
# daemons keep running — specifically supervise, whose MCP
# socket would drop on a whole-container `docker restart`).
signal.signal(signal.SIGUSR1, lambda *_: sup.request_restart("pipelock"))
while not sup.tick():
time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL)
bot_bottle/supervise.py
+25 -9
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ sits on the bottle's internal network and exposes three MCP tools the
agent calls when it hits a stuck-recovery category:
* egress-block — agent proposes a new routes.yaml
* capability-block — agent proposes a new agent Dockerfile
* pipelock-block — agent proposes a new pipelock allowlist
* capability-block — agent proposes a new agent Dockerfile
Each tool call: the agent passes the full proposed file plus a
justification text. The sidecar validates the proposal syntactically,
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ import json
import os
import time
import uuid
from abc import ABC
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
@@ -48,9 +49,13 @@ from pathlib import Path
SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME = "supervise"
SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK = "egress-block"
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK = "pipelock-block"
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK = "capability-block"
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES = "list-egress-routes"
TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
)
@@ -68,8 +73,11 @@ EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL = "http://_egress.local/allowlist"
# capability-block has no on-disk config the operator edits in place
# (the Dockerfile is rebuilt, not patched), so it has no audit log
# here — those changes are captured by git history + the rebuild
# record laid down in PRD 0016. egress-block was removed in issue #198.
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL: dict[str, str] = {}
# record laid down in PRD 0016.
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL: dict[str, str] = {
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK: "egress",
TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK: "pipelock",
}
STATUS_APPROVED = "approved"
STATUS_MODIFIED = "modified"
@@ -77,7 +85,8 @@ STATUS_REJECTED = "rejected"
STATUSES: tuple[str, ...] = (STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED, STATUS_REJECTED)
# Operator-initiated audit entries (no tool call). PRD 0014's
# `routes edit <bottle>` verb writes entries with this action.
# `routes edit <bottle>` and PRD 0015's `pipelock edit <bottle>`
# verbs write entries with this action.
ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT = "operator-edit"
QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = "/run/supervise/queue"
@@ -465,6 +474,8 @@ class Supervise(ABC):
self,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
*,
dockerfile_content: str = "",
) -> SupervisePlan:
"""Stage the per-bottle queue dir on the host and the
current-config dir under `stage_dir`. Returns the plan;
@@ -474,6 +485,9 @@ class Supervise(ABC):
queue_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
current_config_dir = stage_dir / "current-config"
current_config_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
dockerfile_path = current_config_dir / CURRENT_CONFIG_DOCKERFILE
dockerfile_path.write_text(dockerfile_content)
dockerfile_path.chmod(0o644)
return SupervisePlan(
slug=slug,
queue_dir=queue_dir,
@@ -505,22 +519,22 @@ def _atomic_write(path: Path, content: str, *, mode: int) -> None:
try:
import fcntl as _fcntl
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_EX)
except OSError:
pass
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # type: ignore[reportRedeclaration]
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
try:
_fcntl.flock(fd, _fcntl.LOCK_UN)
except OSError:
pass
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover — Windows path
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_flock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None: # noqa: F841 — Windows fallback
def _try_funlock(fd: int) -> None:
return None
@@ -546,7 +560,9 @@ __all__ = [
"EGRESS_FORWARD_PROXY",
"EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL",
"TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK",
"TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",
"TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES",
"TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK",
"archive_proposal",
"audit_dir",
"audit_log_path",
bot_bottle/supervise_server.py
+229 -20
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
"""Supervise sidecar HTTP server (PRD 0013).
Per-bottle MCP server exposing tools the agent calls to propose config
changes when stuck. The egress-block tool was removed in issue #198;
the remaining tools are `capability-block` and `list-egress-routes`.
Each queued tool call:
Per-bottle MCP server exposing three tools — `egress-block`,
`pipelock-block`, `capability-block` — that the agent calls to
propose config changes when stuck. Each tool call:
1. Validates the proposed file syntactically.
2. Writes a Proposal to /run/supervise/queue/ (bind-mounted from
@@ -20,7 +18,7 @@ Speaks MCP over HTTP+JSON-RPC. Methods handled:
* `initialize` — handshake; returns server info + caps.
* `notifications/initialized` — ack-only.
* `tools/list` — returns the tool definitions.
* `tools/list` — returns the three tool definitions.
* `tools/call` — validates, queues, blocks, returns.
Everything else returns JSON-RPC error -32601 (method not found).
@@ -40,6 +38,7 @@ import sys
import time
import typing
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
@@ -135,15 +134,81 @@ def jsonrpc_error(request_id: object, code: int, message: str) -> bytes:
TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when egress refused your HTTPS request — host "
"without a matching route, or a path outside the route's "
"path_allowlist (typically a 403 from the proxy). Propose "
"a SINGLE route to add: the host you need + (optionally) "
"a path_allowlist + (optionally) an auth block. The "
"supervisor merges the route into the live table at "
"approval time — you do NOT need to see or reproduce the "
"existing routes, and you do not pass a full routes file. "
"If the host already has a route, the proposed "
"path_allowlist entries are unioned with the existing "
"ones (host stays single-route). The operator approves "
"or rejects in the supervise TUI. On approval the "
"supervisor writes the merged routes.yaml, SIGHUPs "
"egress (atomic swap, no dropped connections), and "
"mirrors the host onto pipelock's allowlist for the "
"downstream gate."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"host": {
"type": "string",
"description": "The hostname to allow (e.g. 'api.github.com'). Case-insensitive on match.",
},
"path_allowlist": {
"type": "array",
"items": {"type": "string"},
"description": (
"Optional URL path prefixes the route permits. "
"Each must start with '/'. Omit to allow all "
"paths under this host (bare-pass route)."
),
},
"auth": {
"type": "object",
"description": (
"Optional credential injection. {scheme, "
"token_ref}: scheme is 'Bearer' or 'token'; "
"token_ref names the host env var holding the "
"secret value. Omit to add a host without "
"credential injection. Ignored if the host "
"already has a route (operator decides auth "
"changes, not the agent)."
),
"properties": {
"scheme": {"type": "string"},
"token_ref": {"type": "string"},
},
"required": ["scheme", "token_ref"],
"additionalProperties": False,
},
"justification": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Why this host needs to be allowed.",
},
},
"required": ["host", "justification"],
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
"description": (
"List the current egress route table — the bottle's "
"allowlist. Returns JSON with one entry per allowed host, "
"each carrying its matches rules (if any) and whether "
"the proxy injects Authorization for the route. Use this "
"before composing an `egress-block` proposal so the new "
"routes file extends the live one rather than replacing it."
"primary egress allowlist. Returns JSON with one entry "
"per allowed host, each carrying its path_allowlist (if "
"any) and whether the proxy injects Authorization for "
"the route. Use this before composing an "
"`egress-block` proposal so the new routes file "
"extends the live one rather than replacing it. "
"Pipelock's allowlist is a mirror of this set — every "
"host listed here is also reachable through pipelock's "
"downstream hostname gate."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
@@ -151,12 +216,48 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
"additionalProperties": False,
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when pipelock refused your outbound request and "
"the failing host is genuinely missing from the bottle's "
"allowlist (vs. blocked for DLP reasons — those need a "
"different remediation). In practice pipelock's allowlist "
"is now a mirror of the egress routes set by "
"`egress-block`, so prefer that tool when you want "
"to add a host. This tool stays available for the rare "
"case where pipelock and egress have diverged. "
"Pass the full URL you tried to hit (scheme + host + "
"path); the supervisor extracts the hostname and merges "
"it into pipelock's allowlist. On approval the "
"supervisor restarts pipelock."
),
"inputSchema": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"failed_url": {
"type": "string",
"description": (
"The full URL pipelock blocked, e.g. "
"https://api.github.com/repos/foo/bar. Scheme "
"and hostname are required; path is recorded "
"as operator context."
),
},
"justification": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Why the new host should be allowed.",
},
},
"required": ["failed_url", "justification"],
},
},
{
"name": _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK,
"description": (
"Call when the bottle is missing a tool, skill, permission, "
"or env var you need — something that lives in the agent "
"Dockerfile rather than in the egress routes. "
"Dockerfile rather than in routes or the pipelock allowlist. "
"Read the current Dockerfile from "
"/etc/bot-bottle/current-config/Dockerfile, compose a "
"modified version, and pass the full new file plus a "
@@ -182,10 +283,27 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
]
# Map each non-egress tool to the input field that carries the agent's
# payload (stored in Proposal.proposed_file). egress-block builds its
# payload from structured input fields in `handle_egress_block`.
# Map each tool to the input field that carries the agent's
# tool-specific payload (stored in Proposal.proposed_file as
# free-form text the apply path interprets per tool).
#
# egress-block: JSON object describing a SINGLE route to
# add — `{host, path_allowlist?, auth?}`. The
# supervisor merges this into the live routes
# file at approval time.
# pipelock-block: the full failed URL (scheme + host + path) —
# supervisor extracts the host, merges into the
# bottle's current allowlist; the path is shown
# to the operator for context (pipelock doesn't
# do path-level matching).
# capability-block: full proposed Dockerfile
#
# Egress-proxy-block doesn't use a single "field name" → the JSON
# payload is constructed from multiple structured input fields in
# `handle_egress_block`. The mapping stays one-entry-per-tool
# so the generic dispatch keeps working for the other two.
PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD: dict[str, str] = {
_sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK: "failed_url",
_sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK: "dockerfile",
}
@@ -193,13 +311,34 @@ PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD: dict[str, str] = {
# --- Validation ------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth schemes accepted on egress-block proposals — match the
# manifest-side EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES.
_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
"""Syntactic validation. The operator is the real gate; this just
catches obvious paste-errors / wrong-tool selections before they
enter the queue."""
if not content.strip():
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"{tool}: proposed file is empty")
if tool == _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
if tool == _sv.TOOL_PIPELOCK_BLOCK:
# `content` is the full failed URL. Require scheme + host so
# the supervisor can extract a hostname for the allowlist
# merge; the path is preserved for operator context.
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(content.strip())
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: failed_url must start with http:// or https:// "
f"(got {content!r})",
)
if not parsed.hostname:
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: failed_url is missing a hostname (got {content!r})",
)
elif tool == _sv.TOOL_CAPABILITY_BLOCK:
# Dockerfiles are too varied to validate syntactically beyond
# non-empty. The operator reads the diff in the TUI.
pass
@@ -207,6 +346,70 @@ def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {tool!r}")
def _validate_and_bundle_egress_route(
args: dict[str, object],
) -> str:
"""Validate egress-block input fields and bundle them into
a JSON string that becomes the Proposal.proposed_file. Raises
_RpcError on bad input — the agent retries with a fixed shape."""
tool = _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK
host = args.get("host")
if not isinstance(host, str) or not host.strip():
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: 'host' is required and must be a non-empty string",
)
payload: dict[str, object] = {"host": host}
path_allow_raw = args.get("path_allowlist")
if path_allow_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(path_allow_raw, list):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: 'path_allowlist' must be an array of strings",
)
prefixes: list[str] = []
for i, p in enumerate(path_allow_raw):
if not isinstance(p, str):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: path_allowlist[{i}] must be a string",
)
if not p.startswith("/"):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: path_allowlist[{i}] {p!r} must start with '/'",
)
prefixes.append(p)
if prefixes:
payload["path_allowlist"] = prefixes
auth_raw = args.get("auth")
if auth_raw is not None:
if not isinstance(auth_raw, dict):
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: 'auth' must be an object with 'scheme' and 'token_ref'",
)
scheme = auth_raw.get("scheme")
token_ref = auth_raw.get("token_ref")
if not isinstance(scheme, str) or scheme not in _AUTH_SCHEMES:
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: auth.scheme must be one of "
f"{', '.join(_AUTH_SCHEMES)} (got {scheme!r})",
)
if not isinstance(token_ref, str) or not token_ref:
raise _RpcError(
ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
f"{tool}: auth.token_ref must be a non-empty string "
f"naming the host env var holding the token",
)
payload["auth"] = {"scheme": scheme, "token_ref": token_ref}
return json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n"
# --- MCP handlers ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -279,7 +482,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
if not isinstance(name, str):
raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call missing 'name'")
if name == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
return handle_list_egress_routes(typing.cast(dict[str, object], params.get("arguments", {})), config)
return handle_list_egress_routes(params.get("arguments", {}), config)
args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
@@ -292,7 +495,13 @@ def handle_tools_call(
f"{name}: 'justification' is required and must be a non-empty string",
)
if name in PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD:
if name == _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK:
# Structured input → JSON bundle on Proposal.proposed_file.
# The dashboard's apply step (egress_apply.add_route)
# parses this JSON, fetches the current routes, merges in
# the new one, and writes the merged file.
proposed_file = _validate_and_bundle_egress_route(args_raw)
elif name in PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD:
file_field = PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD[name]
proposed_file = args_raw.get(file_field)
if not isinstance(proposed_file, str):
@@ -378,7 +587,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
server_version = f"{SERVER_NAME}/{SERVER_VERSION}"
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None: # noqa: A002
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: typing.Any) -> None:
if os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_DEBUG"):
super().log_message(format, *args)
@@ -418,7 +627,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
except _RpcError as e:
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, e.code, e.message))
return
except Exception as e: # noqa: W0718 — catch-all for RPC dispatch errors
except Exception as e: # pragma: no cover — defensive
sys.stderr.write(f"supervise: internal error: {e}\n")
self._write_jsonrpc(jsonrpc_error(req.id, ERR_INTERNAL, "internal error"))
return
bot_bottle/workspace.py
+2 -9
View File
@@ -13,15 +13,8 @@ DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_MODE = "755"
class WorkspaceSpec(Protocol):
@property
def copy_cwd(self) -> bool:
"""Whether to copy the current working directory."""
...
@property
def user_cwd(self) -> str:
"""The user's current working directory."""
...
copy_cwd: bool
user_cwd: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py
+3 -5
View File
@@ -58,12 +58,11 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import cast
class YamlSubsetError(ValueError):
"""Raised when input violates the YAML subset's rules. Callers
that want fatal-exit semantics (manifest loader, egress-apply,
that want fatal-exit semantics (manifest loader, pipelock-apply,
etc.) catch this at their own boundary and forward to `die`;
callers running outside the bot-bottle CLI process (the
egress sidecar's addon) handle it as a normal exception."""
@@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ def _split_flow(body: str, lineno: int, kind: str) -> list[str]:
depth_c = 0
in_single = False
in_double = False
cur: list[str] = []
cur = []
for ch in body:
if ch == "'" and not in_double:
in_single = not in_single
@@ -331,7 +330,6 @@ def _split_key_value(content: str, lineno: int) -> tuple[str, str]:
if i + 1 >= len(content) or content[i + 1] in (" ", "\t"):
return content[:i].strip(), content[i + 1:].lstrip()
die(f"yaml-subset: line {lineno} missing `: ` separator: {content!r}")
return "", "" # unreachable, but needed for type checker
def _parse_block(
@@ -538,7 +536,7 @@ def parse_yaml_subset(text: str) -> dict[str, object]:
)
if not isinstance(value, dict):
die("yaml-subset: top-level value must be a mapping")
return cast(dict[str, object], value)
return value
def parse_frontmatter(text: str) -> tuple[dict[str, object], str]:
docs/ci.md
+4 -6
View File
@@ -22,9 +22,7 @@ mounted in. That topology breaks two assumptions those tests make:
`http://127.0.0.1:<host_port>` from inside the job time out.
The affected tests (`test_orphan_cleanup.test_create_and_remove`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_image.TestSidecarBundleImage`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_compose.TestSidecarBundleCompose`) still run
locally where the test process and Docker daemon share a host.
Making them work in CI is a follow-up: either re-write them to
discover container IPs via `docker inspect`, or reconfigure the
runner with host networking.
`test_pipelock_sidecar_smoke.test_smoke`) still run locally where the
test process and Docker daemon share a host. Making them work in CI
is a follow-up: either re-write them to discover container IPs via
`docker inspect`, or reconfigure the runner with host networking.
docs/prds/0049-named-labelled-agents.md
+283
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
# PRD 0049: Named / Labelled Agents
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-06-03
- **Issue:** #171
## Summary
At agent launch time, prompt the operator for a short human-readable label
(defaulting to the manifest agent key) and an optional color from the 16-color
ANSI palette. Store both in the bottle's `metadata.json`. Display the label —
rendered in the chosen color — in the dashboard's active-agents pane, replacing
the bare manifest key. Inject the label and color into the in-container
`claude.json` as `name` / `color` so Claude Code can surface them in its own
harness when upstream support lands.
## Problem
The dashboard's agents pane identifies each running instance by its manifest
agent key (e.g., `implementer`) plus a random slug suffix. When an operator
runs three `implementer` bottles simultaneously — one each for three different
repos — the pane shows:
```
[docker] a3f9 implementer started 14:02:11 [egress,pipelock]
[docker] b81c implementer started 14:03:45 [egress,pipelock]
[docker] d220 implementer started 14:05:01 [egress,pipelock]
```
There is no way to tell which bottle is working on which task without attaching
to each one in turn. The slug is opaque; the manifest key is shared. Operators
working a multi-bottle session resort to keeping a mental map of slug→task,
which breaks the moment they switch windows.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. After the operator selects an agent name (dashboard picker or CLI argument),
they are prompted for a label. The prompt suggests the manifest key as the
default; pressing Enter (or providing no input) accepts it. The label may
contain any printable characters up to 64 bytes.
2. After the label prompt, the operator is optionally prompted for a color from
the 16-color ANSI palette (names: `black`, `red`, `green`, `yellow`, `blue`,
`magenta`, `cyan`, `white`, `bright-black`, `bright-red`, `bright-green`,
`bright-yellow`, `bright-blue`, `bright-magenta`, `bright-cyan`,
`bright-white`). Pressing Enter without a selection skips color entirely.
3. `label` and `color` are stored in `BottleMetadata` and written to the
bottle's `metadata.json`. Both fields default to `""` (empty / unset).
4. `ActiveAgent` carries `label` and `color`; `enumerate_active()` reads them
from `metadata.json`.
5. `_format_agent_row` uses the label when non-empty (falling back to
`agent_name`). If a non-empty color is set and the terminal supports it, the
label substring is rendered in that color.
6. `BottleSpec` carries `label` and `color`; the docker backend's `prepare`
step copies them into `BottleMetadata`.
7. `agent_provider.py` writes `label` → `"name"` and `color` → `"color"` into
the generated `claude.json`, alongside the existing fields. Fields are
omitted when empty.
8. The dashboard's `_new_agent_flow` (PRD 0020) includes the label+color step
between agent selection and the backend picker.
9. `cmd_start` (CLI) includes the label+color step after argument validation
and before prepare-with-preflight.
10. All existing unit tests stay green; no new tests are required for this
change (the label/color fields are thin plumbing with no branching logic
worth unit-testing beyond the already-tested metadata read/write path).
## Non-goals
- Showing the agent label inside the Claude Code TUI (status line, terminal
title, custom header). That requires upstream Claude Code / codex support.
Writing to `claude.json` is best-effort scaffolding for when that lands.
- Per-bottle color affecting anything outside the dashboard agents pane (e.g.,
proposal-pane highlights, log prefixes).
- Validating or constraining label content beyond the 64-byte printable cap.
- Persisting color-pair state across dashboard restarts (color pairs are
initialized fresh each session).
- Editing the label or color of an already-running bottle.
- Exposing label/color via `./cli.py list` (out of scope for v1; trivial to
add later since the field will be in metadata).
## Design
### Data flow
```
operator input
│
▼
BottleSpec.label, BottleSpec.color
│
├─► docker/prepare.py → BottleMetadata.label / .color → metadata.json
│
└─► agent_provider.py → claude.json {"name": label, "color": color}
(omitted when empty)
dashboard refresh
│
▼
enumerate_active() → read_metadata(slug) → ActiveAgent.label / .color
│
▼
_format_agent_row → label (colored) in the row string
```
### BottleSpec changes
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BottleSpec:
manifest: Manifest
agent_name: str
copy_cwd: bool
user_cwd: str
identity: str = ""
label: str = "" # operator-chosen display name; defaults to agent_name at render time
color: str = "" # one of the 16 ANSI color names, or "" for terminal default
```
`label` and `color` default to `""` so all existing callers remain valid with
no changes.
### BottleMetadata changes
Add two new fields with backward-compatible defaults:
```python
@dataclass
class BottleMetadata:
identity: str
agent_name: str
cwd: str
copy_cwd: bool
started_at: str
compose_project: str
backend: str
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
```
`metadata.json` written by older bot-bottle versions won't have these keys;
`read_metadata` already uses `dict.get` with defaults, so existing slugs load
cleanly with `label=""`, `color=""`.
### ActiveAgent changes
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ActiveAgent:
backend_name: str
slug: str
agent_name: str
started_at: str
services: tuple[str, ...]
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
```
`enumerate_active()` copies `label` and `color` out of `BottleMetadata` when
constructing each `ActiveAgent`. The smolmachines backend gets the same
additions for symmetry; it reads from its own metadata path.
### Dashboard row rendering
`_format_agent_row` already falls through cleanly on missing fields. The
change is:
```python
display_name = a.label if a.label else a.agent_name
```
Color rendering uses the existing `_try_init_green()` pattern as a model.
A `_color_pair_for(color_name)` helper initialises a fresh curses color pair
for the requested named color and returns its attr (or 0 on failure). Each
unique color in the active agent list gets its own pair index. Color pairs are
allocated lazily and cached in a `dict[str, int]` that lives for the duration
of the dashboard session.
The 16 ANSI color name → curses constant mapping:
| Name | curses constant |
|------|----------------|
| `black` | `curses.COLOR_BLACK` |
| `red` | `curses.COLOR_RED` |
| `green` | `curses.COLOR_GREEN` |
| `yellow` | `curses.COLOR_YELLOW` |
| `blue` | `curses.COLOR_BLUE` |
| `magenta` | `curses.COLOR_MAGENTA` |
| `cyan` | `curses.COLOR_CYAN` |
| `white` | `curses.COLOR_WHITE` |
| `bright-*` | same constant + `curses.A_BOLD` |
Terminals that don't support color fall back to plain text (the helper returns
0, which ORed in is a no-op — same pattern as `_try_init_green`).
### Label + color prompt — dashboard
In `_new_agent_flow`, after `_picker_modal` returns a non-None name and before
`_backend_picker_modal`:
```python
label, color = _label_color_modal(stdscr, default_label=picked)
```
`_label_color_modal` uses `curses.endwin()` → text-mode prompts → restore
(the same drop-and-resume pattern as the existing editor flow and preflight
Y/N). Two sequential prompts:
```
bot-bottle: agent label [implementer]: <operator types>
bot-bottle: color (red/green/blue/… or Enter to skip): <operator types>
```
Invalid color names are silently ignored (treated as empty). The function
returns `(label, color)` — both strings, both possibly `""`.
### Label + color prompt — CLI
In `cmd_start`, after argument parsing and before `_launch_bottle`:
```python
label = _text_prompt_label(args.name)
color = _text_prompt_color()
```
`_text_prompt_label(default)` writes `"bot-bottle: agent label [{default}]: "`
to stderr and returns the stripped input (or `default` if blank).
`_text_prompt_color()` writes the color prompt and returns the stripped input
(or `""` if blank or invalid).
Both use `read_tty_line()` (already in `start.py`) for the read.
### Claude Code config injection
In `agent_provider.py`, where `claude_config.write_text(...)` is called,
expand the JSON dict conditionally:
```python
payload = {
"hasCompletedOnboarding": True,
"theme": "dark",
"bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
"projects": claude_projects,
}
if spec.label:
payload["name"] = spec.label
if spec.color:
payload["color"] = spec.color
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n")
```
`spec` here is the `AgentProvisionSpec` (or equivalent) that `agent_provider`
already receives; it needs `label` and `color` threaded in from `BottleSpec`
through whatever plan/provision object the provider operates on.
## Implementation chunks
Two PRs, each independently mergeable.
### Chunk 1 — schema + storage
- Add `label: str = ""` and `color: str = ""` to `BottleSpec`,
`BottleMetadata`, and `ActiveAgent`.
- `docker/prepare.py`: copy `spec.label` / `spec.color` into `BottleMetadata`.
- `docker/enumerate.py`: copy `metadata.label` / `metadata.color` into
`ActiveAgent`.
- `agent_provider.py` (or the plan object it reads): thread label/color through
to `claude.json` write.
- Smolmachines backend: parallel changes to metadata read/write and
`ActiveAgent` construction.
- No prompt changes; no UI changes. All existing behavior is identical.
### Chunk 2 — prompts + display
- `start.py`: add `_text_prompt_label` and `_text_prompt_color`; call them in
`cmd_start` before `_launch_bottle`; pass `label` / `color` into `BottleSpec`.
- `dashboard.py`: add `_label_color_modal` (drop-and-resume); call it in
`_new_agent_flow`; pass label/color into `BottleSpec`; add
`_color_pair_for` helper; update `_format_agent_row` to use `a.label` with
color rendering.
## Open questions
None.
docs/prds/0051-launch-selector.md
-157
View File
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0051: Launch selector
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-04
- **Issue:** #185
## Summary
When `./cli.py start` is run without an agent name, or without a backend
explicitly specified, the user currently gets an argparse error (missing
positional) or falls through to the `docker` default silently. This PRD
adds a terminal UI that appears in those gaps: a filter-select screen
built with `curses` that lets the operator pick the agent and/or backend
interactively rather than memorising names or consulting `./cli.py list`.
## Problem
With the dashboard removed (PRD 0049), starting an agent from memory is
the only path. The operator must know the exact agent name and type it
as a positional argument. For infrequent users or large manifests this
is friction. A picker that appears automatically when the name is absent
closes the gap with minimal ceremony.
The same logic applies to backends: the operator rarely wants to specify
`--backend` explicitly, but when they do they need to know the set of
registered names. A picker on an empty `--backend` makes the choice
visible.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. `./cli.py start` (no arguments) shows an interactive agent selector;
the selected name is used exactly as if it had been passed on the
command line.
2. `./cli.py start <name>` (no `--backend`, no `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`)
shows an interactive backend selector; the selected backend is used
exactly as if `--backend=<selected>` had been passed.
3. `./cli.py start <name> --backend=<b>` (both explicit) shows neither
screen — no behavioural change from today.
4. `./cli.py start` (no arguments, no env backend) shows the agent
selector first, then the backend selector.
5. The filter-select widget is a standalone utility
(`bot_bottle/cli/tui.py`) shared by both selectors.
6. Pressing `Ctrl-C` or `q` in either selector exits cleanly (exit 0).
7. The widget supports incremental filtering: typing narrows the list;
`Backspace` removes the last character; `↑`/`↓`/`j`/`k` move the
cursor; `Enter` confirms; `Esc`/`q` cancels.
8. Unit tests cover: filtering logic, cursor movement, confirm, cancel,
and the `cmd_start` dispatch (agent-absent, backend-absent,
both-explicit, both-absent).
## Non-goals
- The TUI is not a general-purpose picker exposed as a public API;
it is an internal CLI utility.
- No mouse support.
- No pagination beyond what fits in the terminal window (scroll via
cursor movement is sufficient for typical agent counts).
- No multi-select; exactly one item is chosen per invocation.
- No changes to `./cli.py resume`, `./cli.py list`, or any other
subcommand.
## Design
### `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py` — `filter_select`
```python
def filter_select(
items: list[str],
*,
title: str = "",
tty_path: str = "/dev/tty",
) -> str | None:
"""Render a filter-select picker over the items list.
Returns the selected item string, or None if the user cancelled
(Esc / q / Ctrl-C / Ctrl-D).
Opens /dev/tty directly so the picker works even when stdout/stdin
are redirected — same pattern as `read_tty_line`.
"""
```
The widget renders to the tty file descriptor opened via `curses.initscr`
(or `curses.newterm` on the tty fd so stdout remains clean for callers
that pipe `./cli.py`).
Layout (full-width, minimal):
```
Select agent (title, top line)
Filter: <query>_ (filter line)
─────────────────────────────
> researcher
implementer
codex-researcher
...
─────────────────────────────
[↑↓/jk] move [Enter] select [Esc/q] cancel
```
- Lines below the filter are the filtered items; the cursor (`>`) marks
the selection.
- The list re-renders on every keypress.
- Terminal resize is not handled (SIGWINCH); if the window is too small
the picker exits with None.
### Changes to `cmd_start`
`name` changes from a required positional to an optional one
(`nargs="?"`). The post-parse block checks:
```python
agent_name = args.name
if agent_name is None:
manifest = Manifest.resolve(USER_CWD)
agent_name = tui.filter_select(
sorted(manifest.agents.keys()),
title="Select agent",
)
if agent_name is None:
return 0 # user cancelled
backend_name = args.backend
if backend_name is None and "BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND" not in os.environ:
backend_name = tui.filter_select(
list(known_backend_names()),
title="Select backend",
)
if backend_name is None:
return 0 # user cancelled
```
The `manifest` object is resolved before the backend selection so the
agent picker can populate itself from the real manifest. The same
`manifest` is passed to `BottleSpec`; it is not resolved a second time.
### `/dev/tty` isolation
`filter_select` opens `/dev/tty` and feeds it as the input file to
`curses.wrapper`-equivalent code (using `curses.newterm` to avoid
clobbering the caller's stdout/stderr). This keeps the picker
composable — callers can pipe `./cli.py` output without the curses
draw sequences contaminating the pipe.
## Implementation chunks
1. **`tui.py` + tests.** Add `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py` with
`filter_select` and unit tests in `tests/unit/test_cli_tui.py`.
2. **Wire into `cmd_start` + tests.** Make `name` optional, add the
two-gate dispatch, extend `tests/unit/test_cli_start_selector.py`.
3. **Activate PRD 0051.** Flip Status Draft → Active in the same commit
that lands the implementation.
## Open questions
None. Scope is fully determined by the issue description.
docs/prds/0052-egress-dlp-addon.md
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@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0052: Egress DLP addon
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-05
- **Issue:** #195
## Summary
With pipelock removed (PR #193), the egress proxy no longer performs DLP
scanning on traffic to or from the agent. This PRD implements a replacement
directly inside the mitmproxy egress addon: per-route DLP detectors that
scan outbound requests for credential leakage and inbound responses for
prompt injection attempts.
The manifest route schema is also upgraded in this PRD from the flat
`path_allowlist` field to a structured `matches` block modelled on the
[Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`](https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/reference/spec/#gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1.HTTPRouteMatch)
match vocabulary. This upgrade is a hard cutover — no compatibility shim
for the old format. The rationale and format survey are in the
[YAML route matching formats research doc](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/research/yaml-route-matching-formats.md).
DLP detectors attach to the new `matches`-based routes directly.
The design follows the recommendation in the
[DLP research document (PR #192)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/pulls/192)
and covers all three remaining implementation phases from that plan:
1. Token pattern detection (Phase 1a)
2. Known-secrets detection (Phase 1b)
3. Naive prompt injection detection (Phase 2)
## Problem
Pipelock was removed because it could not support per-route response
scanning, blocking selective DLP policies (e.g., skip scanning `.whl`
downloads while keeping scanning on API calls). Removing it left the egress
proxy with no DLP capability at all. The egress addon already holds per-route
logic for path allowlisting and credential injection; DLP rules belong in the
same place.
The existing `path_allowlist` field is also limiting: it only supports path
prefixes, with no way to express exact-path, regex, method, or header
constraints. The Gateway API match vocabulary is a well-specified, widely
deployed standard that covers all of these without inventing new syntax.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. Outbound request bodies and headers are scanned for known token patterns
(AWS, GitHub, Anthropic, etc.) before the request reaches the upstream.
Matches are blocked immediately.
2. Outbound request bodies are scanned for provisioned secrets that the
agent should not have direct access to. Matches are blocked immediately.
3. Inbound response bodies are scanned for prompt disclosure and jailbreak
signals. High-confidence matches are blocked; medium-confidence matches
emit a log warning and are forwarded.
4. DLP scanning is enabled by default on every route. Individual routes can
selectively disable outbound detectors, inbound detectors, or both via a
`dlp` block in the manifest.
5. All detector logic lives in `egress_addon_core.py` (pure Python, no
mitmproxy dependency) and is covered by unit tests on the host.
6. Each route's `matches` block supports path (exact/prefix/regex), HTTP
method, and header predicates using Gateway API match semantics.
7. The manifest change is a hard cutover: `path_allowlist` is removed with
no fallback, no deprecation alias, and no loud exception for old-format
manifests. Old manifests that use `path_allowlist` will fail validation
at load time with an unknown-key error (same as any other unrecognised
key today).
## Non-goals
- LLM-based semantic prompt injection detection (explicitly deferred to a
potential Phase 2b per the research doc).
- Entropy-based secret detection (excluded from scope; too many false
positives on binary API responses and compressed payloads).
- BIP-39 seed-phrase detection.
- Generic DLP (credit cards, SSNs, PII) — scope is narrow: AI/credential
exfil relevant to agent containment.
- Changes to the cred-proxy sidecar.
- Streaming response scanning (scan buffered response body only).
- Glob-style path matching — regex covers every case glob would handle
without adding a third path-matching language.
## Design
### Route matching: Gateway API `matches` vocabulary
The existing `path_allowlist` field is replaced by a `matches` list. The
vocabulary mirrors Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRouteMatch` (see the
[route matching research doc](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/research/yaml-route-matching-formats.md)
for a full format survey and rationale). Gateway API was chosen because it
is spec-backed, implementation-tested across multiple proxies, and its
`{type, value}` pattern is consistent and schema-validatable.
**AND/OR semantics** (same as Gateway API):
- Predicates *within* a single `matches` entry are ANDed.
- Multiple entries in the `matches` list are ORed — the route matches if
any entry matches.
```yaml
egress:
routes:
# Bare route — all traffic to this host is forwarded (no path/method/header
# constraints). Equivalent to the old path_allowlist-omitted case.
- host: api.anthropic.com
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
# Two match entries (OR): GET/HEAD on /packages/** OR POST on /upload
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
matches:
- paths:
- type: prefix
value: /packages/
methods: [GET, HEAD]
- paths:
- type: exact
value: /upload
methods: [POST]
dlp:
inbound_detectors: false # skip response scanning (binary downloads)
# Header + regex path — only JSON API responses on versioned endpoints
- host: internal-api.corp
matches:
- paths:
- type: regex
value: "^/v[0-9]+/"
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: exact
value: application/json
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false
```
#### Path matching types
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `exact` | Full path must equal `value` exactly |
| `prefix` | Path must start with `value` at a segment boundary (matches `/api/v1` for value `/api/v1`, rejects `/api/v10`) |
| `regex` | RE2 regex; rejected at load time if pattern fails to compile. Use for wildcard needs: `/api/[^/]+/data` instead of glob |
`type` defaults to `prefix` when omitted (preserves the semantic of the
old `path_allowlist`).
#### Method matching
`methods` is a list of HTTP method names, case-insensitive at parse time —
`get`, `GET`, and `Get` are all accepted and stored as uppercase internally.
An absent or empty `methods` list means all methods are permitted.
#### Header matching
`headers` is a list of `{name, value, type}` objects. ALL listed headers
must match (AND semantics). To OR on header values, use multiple `matches`
entries.
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `exact` | Header value equals `value` (default when `type` omitted) |
| `regex` | Header value matches RE2 regex |
### Manifest schema — `dlp` block
Each `egress.routes` entry gains an optional `dlp` key alongside `matches`
and `auth`:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
# dlp omitted → all detectors on (default)
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
dlp:
inbound_detectors: false # skip response scanning (binary downloads)
- host: internal-docs.corp
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false # trusted internal, no scanning
```
`outbound_detectors` controls scanning of the *request* body + headers
leaving the agent. `inbound_detectors` controls scanning of the *response*
body arriving from the upstream.
Valid values per field:
- Omitted (or `null`) — default: all detectors active.
- `false` — scanning disabled for this direction on this route.
- A list of detector names — only the listed detectors run.
Named outbound detectors: `token_patterns`, `known_secrets`.
Named inbound detectors: `naive_injection_detection`.
The manifest parser (`manifest_egress.py`) validates the `dlp` block and
rejects unknown detector names.
### `EgressRoute` changes
`EgressRoute` replaces `PathAllowlist` with `Matches` and gains two new
DLP fields. `MatchEntry` captures one AND-predicate block:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PathMatch:
type: str # "exact" | "prefix" | "regex"
value: str
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class HeaderMatch:
name: str
value: str
type: str = "exact" # "exact" | "regex"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class MatchEntry:
paths: tuple[PathMatch, ...] = () # empty = match any path
methods: tuple[str, ...] = () # empty = match any method (uppercase)
headers: tuple[HeaderMatch, ...] = () # empty = match any headers
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class EgressRoute:
Host: str
Matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = () # empty = match all requests
AuthScheme: str = ""
TokenRef: str = ""
Role: tuple[str, ...] = ()
OutboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None # None = all enabled
InboundDetectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None # None = all enabled
```
`manifest_egress.py`'s `from_dict` parses the new `matches` block and `dlp`
block; `path_allowlist` is no longer a recognised key and will be rejected
by the unknown-key check.
### `Route` changes in `egress_addon_core.py`
The addon-side `Route` and its helper types mirror the manifest-side changes.
`match_route` is extended to evaluate the `Matches` list:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Route:
host: str
matches: tuple[MatchEntry, ...] = ()
auth_scheme: str = ""
token_env: str = ""
outbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
inbound_detectors: tuple[str, ...] | None = None
```
`decide()` feeds through `match_route` (unchanged host lookup) then
evaluates the match entries in order; if the route has no `matches` entries
all requests pass. Path `prefix` type uses segment-boundary checking
(`/api/v1` matches `/api/v1/foo` but not `/api/v10`).
### Detector interface
Each detector is a pure function:
```python
def scan(body: str | bytes, *, env: Mapping[str, str] = {}) -> ScanResult | None:
...
```
`ScanResult` carries:
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ScanResult:
severity: str # "block" or "warn"
reason: str
```
`scan` returns `None` if the body is clean, `ScanResult` otherwise.
### Detector: `token_patterns`
Regex patterns for well-known credential formats, applied to the outbound
request body and `Authorization` header (before the addon strips it — the
strip happens after DLP scanning so that the scan sees any credential the
agent tried to smuggle):
| Token type | Pattern |
|------------|---------|
| AWS access key | `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}` |
| GitHub token (classic) | `ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}` |
| GitHub fine-grained | `github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}` |
| Anthropic API key | `sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{93}` |
| OpenAI API key | `sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48}` |
| Stripe live key | `sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}` |
| Generic Bearer JWT | `Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{50,}` |
Action: `"block"` on any match. No tolerance — a credential in an outbound
request is always a violation.
### Detector: `known_secrets`
At request time the egress addon has access to `os.environ`, which includes
all `token_env` values declared by route auth blocks. The detector:
1. Collects all `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values from the environment (the naming
contract established by `manifest_egress.py`'s `TokenRef` rendering).
2. For each secret value, derives encoded variants: raw, base64, URL-encoded,
hex.
3. Scans the outbound request body for any variant.
Action: `"block"` on match.
This detector does **not** accept a custom detector name in the YAML — it
is always named `known_secrets`. The environment is passed in via the `env`
keyword argument to `scan`.
### Detector: `naive_injection_detection`
Pattern-based inbound response scanner. Uses two tiers:
**Tier 1 — BLOCK (credential + disclosure together):**
- Response contains a token-pattern match (reuses `token_patterns` regex
set) AND a prompt-disclosure phrase (e.g., `system prompt`, `my instructions
are`, `hidden rules`).
**Tier 2 — WARN (multiple jailbreak signals):**
- Two or more jailbreak phrases detected (e.g., `ignore previous`,
`forget everything`, `pretend you are`, `act as`).
- OR explicit prompt disclosure (`system prompt:`) without a credential.
**Tier 3 — ALLOW:**
- Single jailbreak keyword without additional context.
- Common documentation phrases.
See the DLP research doc for the full phrase lists and pseudocode.
### Wiring into `egress_addon.py`
Two new mitmproxy hooks are added alongside the existing `request` hook:
```python
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
# ... existing match + auth-injection logic ...
# After route decision, if action == "forward":
result = scan_outbound(route, flow.request, os.environ)
if result and result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(403, result.reason.encode(), ...)
return
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return # already blocked at request time
result = scan_inbound(route, flow.response)
if result and result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(403, result.reason.encode(), ...)
elif result and result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
```
`scan_outbound` and `scan_inbound` are pure functions in
`egress_addon_core.py` that dispatch to the per-route detector list.
### Ordering: auth strip vs. DLP scan
The DLP outbound scan sees the *agent's original* `Authorization` header
before the addon strips it. This ensures that a token the agent smuggled
in the header is caught. The strip + optional re-injection still happens
afterward, preserving the existing credential-injection security model.
## Implementation chunks
1. **New `matches` block + `EgressRoute` / `Route` restructure.**
Remove `path_allowlist` from `manifest_egress.py` and `egress_addon_core.py`.
Add `MatchEntry`, `PathMatch`, `HeaderMatch` types. Parse `matches` in
`EgressRoute.from_dict` and `_parse_one`; unknown-key rejection handles
old `path_allowlist` manifests. Add `OutboundDetectors` / `InboundDetectors`
to `EgressRoute` and `Route`; parse `dlp` block. Extend
`tests/unit/test_manifest_egress.py` and `tests/unit/test_egress_addon_core.py`
with match and dlp valid/invalid cases.
2. **Token-patterns detector (Phase 1a).**
New module `bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py` (host-importable) and
companion flat copy for the sidecar bundle. Add `TokenPatternsDetector`
with the regex set above. Wire `scan_outbound` into the `request` hook
in `egress_addon.py`. Unit tests in `tests/unit/test_dlp_detectors.py`.
3. **Known-secrets detector (Phase 1b).**
Add `KnownSecretsDetector` to `dlp_detectors.py`. Collect
`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` from env; derive encoded variants; scan request body.
Extend unit tests. Wire into `scan_outbound`.
4. **Naive prompt injection detector (Phase 2).**
Add `NaiveInjectionDetector` to `dlp_detectors.py`. Wire
`scan_inbound` into the new `response` hook in `egress_addon.py`.
Extend unit tests. Activate PRD 0052 (`Status: Draft → Active`) in
this commit.
## Open questions
1. **Response body buffering:** mitmproxy's `response` hook already has
the full body for non-streaming responses. For streaming (chunked)
responses the body may be empty or incomplete at hook time. Scope for
now: log a warning and skip scanning on streaming responses; revisit
if needed.
2. **Encoding breadth for `known_secrets`:** Start with raw + base64 +
URL-encoded + hex. Add GZIP / base32 if real-world evasion attempts
appear.
3. **`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` naming contract:** The detector relies on the
env-var naming convention from `manifest_egress.py`. If that contract
changes, the detector must be updated in lock-step.
docs/prds/0053-user-provider-plugins.md
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# PRD 0053: User-defined agent provider plugins
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-04
## Summary
The `get_provider()` registry in `bot_bottle/agent_provider.py` is a closed list —
only `"claude"` and `"codex"` are valid templates, validated at manifest-load time and
again at launch. Users who want to run a different agent (Gemini, Aider, a custom
local model wrapper) cannot add a provider without forking the package.
This PRD opens the registry to user-defined plugins. A plugin placed at
`~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/` is discovered and loaded at launch time. The manifest
accepts any non-empty template string that names a built-in or resolves to a user
plugin at that path.
Alongside discovery, this PRD moves CA and git provisioning out of the Docker backend
and into the `AgentProvider` ABC as overridable methods. The current standalone
`provision/ca.py` and `provision/git.py` files in the Docker backend are deleted;
their logic becomes the default implementations on the ABC. This lets exotic provider
images (different base OS, different user, non-standard trust mechanism) override
provisioning freely without the abstraction fighting them.
The preceding commit on this PR moves `codex_auth.py` from `bot_bottle/` into
`bot_bottle/contrib/codex/` — a clean-up that fits naturally here since this PR
also clarifies that `contrib/` is the per-provider home.
## Problem
Users building unconventional setups hit a hard wall: the template validation in
`manifest_agent.AgentProvider.from_dict` rejects any string not in `PROVIDER_TEMPLATES`.
There is no escape hatch short of editing bot-bottle's source.
PRD 0050 moved provider logic into `contrib/` specifically so a third provider would
be "cheap to add" — but "cheap" today still means a pull request against the bot-bottle
repo, not a drop-in file in the user's home directory. The filesystem layout is already
the right shape; the discovery step is missing.
Beyond discovery, the Docker backend's `provision_ca` and `provision_git` functions
bake in Debian-specific commands (`update-ca-certificates`) and a hardcoded container
user (`node`). A user plugin that runs as a different user, or on a different base OS,
silently gets the wrong provisioning with no way to correct it short of forking.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. A user places `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/agent_provider.py` — a file that exports
a class inheriting `AgentProvider` — sets `agent_provider.template: <name>` in a
bottle's frontmatter, and launches a bottle using that provider with no changes to
the bot-bottle source.
2. The plugin directory may also contain a `Dockerfile` at
`~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/Dockerfile`; the existing three-tier Dockerfile cascade
(per-bottle override → manifest `dockerfile:` field → provider default) uses this
path as the provider default for user plugins.
3. The manifest validator accepts any non-empty template string. Unknown templates that
resolve to no user plugin still raise a clear error, but at launch (via `get_provider`)
rather than at manifest-load time.
4. Built-in provider knobs (`auth_token` → claude only; `forward_host_credentials` →
codex only) are guarded to built-in template names. Bottles using a user provider
may set neither knob.
5. `get_provider(template)` checks `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py`
before the built-ins, so a user can shadow a built-in for local testing.
6. A clear `ValueError` is raised if the user plugin file exists but contains no
`AgentProvider` subclass.
7. `AgentProvider` gains `provision_ca(self, bottle, plan)` and
`provision_git(self, bottle, plan)` with default implementations that reproduce
current Docker/Debian/node behavior. Built-in providers inherit the defaults
unchanged. User plugins override either method when their image diverges.
8. `bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/ca.py` and
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/git.py` are deleted. The Docker backend base
class calls `provider.provision_ca(bottle, plan)` and
`provider.provision_git(bottle, plan)` directly.
## Non-goals
- Packaging or distributing user plugins as installable Python packages.
- A plugin registry, index, or discovery beyond the filesystem path convention.
- Adding a third built-in provider.
- Validating that user plugin images, Dockerfiles, or commands exist before launch
(same policy as built-ins).
- Sandboxing user plugin code — plugins run with full Python interpreter access.
- Per-provider opt-out of the egress sidecar or network provisioning (follow-on).
## Scope
### In scope
- `get_provider(template: str) -> AgentProvider` gains a `_load_user_plugin(template)`
step that checks `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<template>/agent_provider.py` first, then
falls through to the built-in look-ups.
- `_load_user_plugin` uses `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location` to load the module
and returns the first `AgentProvider` subclass found in its `__dict__`. Raises
`ValueError` if the file exists but exports no subclass.
- The Dockerfile cascade in the Docker backend's `resolve_plan()` uses
`~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<template>/Dockerfile` as the provider default for user
plugins (the same slot currently occupied by `Dockerfile.claude` / `Dockerfile.codex`
for built-ins).
- `manifest_agent.AgentProvider.from_dict`: the `template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES`
check is removed; the two built-in-specific knob guards (`auth_token` → claude,
`forward_host_credentials` → codex) are tightened to `template in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES`
so they are skipped for user-defined names.
- `PROVIDER_TEMPLATES` remains in `agent_provider.py` as the set of built-in names for
use by tests and any enumeration callers.
- `AgentProvider` ABC gains:
```python
def provision_ca(self, bottle: Bottle, plan: BottlePlan) -> None: ...
def provision_git(self, bottle: Bottle, plan: BottlePlan) -> None: ...
```
Default implementations reproduce the current `provision/ca.py` and
`provision/git.py` logic exactly (Debian `update-ca-certificates`, `node` user,
`/home/node` home).
- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/ca.py` and
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/git.py` deleted. The Docker backend base
class substitutes direct calls to the provider methods.
- Unit tests for the discovery path:
- Plugin found and loaded → correct `AgentProvider` instance returned.
- Plugin file exists but exports no subclass → `ValueError`.
- Unknown template with no user plugin → `ValueError` from `get_provider`.
- Built-in template name still works normally even when no user plugin exists.
- Unit tests for the provisioning delegation:
- A provider subclass that overrides `provision_ca` has its override called.
- A provider subclass that overrides `provision_git` has its override called.
- One paragraph added to `README.md` under a new "Custom providers" section describing
the `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/` convention (both `agent_provider.py` and
`Dockerfile`), the `provision_ca` / `provision_git` override points, and pointing at
the existing contrib providers as reference implementations.
### Out of scope
- Hot-reloading plugins during a running session.
- Plugin versioning or dependency declaration.
- Changes to the smolmachines backend provisioning path.
## Proposed design
### Discovery in `get_provider`
```python
import importlib.util
def get_provider(template: str) -> AgentProvider:
user_plugin = _load_user_plugin(template)
if user_plugin is not None:
return user_plugin
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
from .contrib.claude.agent_provider import ClaudeAgentProvider
return ClaudeAgentProvider()
if template == PROVIDER_CODEX:
from .contrib.codex.agent_provider import CodexAgentProvider
return CodexAgentProvider()
raise ValueError(f"unknown agent provider template: {template!r}")
def _load_user_plugin(template: str) -> AgentProvider | None:
plugin_path = (
Path.home() / ".bot-bottle" / "contrib" / template / "agent_provider.py"
)
if not plugin_path.exists():
return None
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
f"_user_contrib_{template}.agent_provider", plugin_path
)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
raise ValueError(f"user plugin at {plugin_path} could not be loaded")
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod) # type: ignore[union-attr]
for obj in vars(mod).values():
if (
isinstance(obj, type)
and issubclass(obj, AgentProvider)
and obj is not AgentProvider
):
return obj()
raise ValueError(
f"user plugin at {plugin_path} defines no AgentProvider subclass"
)
```
### Dockerfile convention for user plugins
`resolve_plan()` in the Docker backend already has a three-tier cascade. For user
plugins the provider-default slot is filled by:
```python
Path.home() / ".bot-bottle" / "contrib" / template / "Dockerfile"
```
Per-bottle overrides and manifest `dockerfile:` fields continue to take precedence.
### Provisioning methods on `AgentProvider`
```python
class AgentProvider(ABC):
...
def provision_ca(self, bottle: Bottle, plan: BottlePlan) -> None:
"""Install the egress MITM CA into the agent container's trust store.
Override for non-Debian base images or non-standard trust mechanisms."""
cert_host_path, label = select_ca_cert(plan.egress_plan)
bottle.cp_in(str(cert_host_path), AGENT_CA_PATH)
bottle.exec(
f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && update-ca-certificates",
user="root",
)
log_ca_fingerprint(cert_host_path, label)
def provision_git(self, bottle: Bottle, plan: BottlePlan) -> None:
"""Configure git inside the agent container.
Override for images that run as a different user or use a non-standard home."""
_provision_cwd_git(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_gate_config(plan, bottle)
_provision_git_user(plan, bottle)
```
The Docker backend base class replaces the direct calls to the old standalone
functions with:
```python
provider.provision_ca(bottle, plan)
provider.provision_git(bottle, plan)
```
### Manifest validation change
In `manifest_agent.AgentProvider.from_dict`, remove the hard rejection:
```python
# Before
if template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.template {template!r} "
f"is not one of {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))}"
)
# After — removed entirely; get_provider() raises at launch for unknown names
```
Guard the built-in knob checks with `template in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES`:
```python
if auth_token and template == "claude": # unchanged
...
if auth_token and template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
f"supported for built-in templates ({', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))})"
)
if forward_host_credentials and template == "codex": # unchanged
...
if forward_host_credentials and template not in PROVIDER_TEMPLATES:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
f"is only supported for built-in templates"
)
```
## Open questions
1. **`BOT_BOTTLE_CONTRIB_DIR` env var.** Omitted for now — `~/.bot-bottle/contrib/`
is consistent with the rest of the user config layout. Revisit if the need surfaces.
## References
- PRD 0050 — agent provider contrib (established `contrib/` as the per-provider home)
- PRD 0048 — SSH deploy key provisioning (the `contrib/` convention)
- `bot_bottle/agent_provider.py` — `get_provider`, `PROVIDER_TEMPLATES`, `AgentProvider` ABC
- `bot_bottle/manifest_agent.py` — template validation that this PRD relaxes
- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/ca.py` — current CA provisioner (to be deleted)
- `bot_bottle/backend/docker/provision/git.py` — current git provisioner (to be deleted)
docs/prds/0054-named-labelled-agents.md
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@@ -1,318 +0,0 @@
# PRD 0054: Named / Labelled Agents
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** didericis
- **Created:** 2026-06-03
- **Issue:** #171
## Summary
At agent launch time, present the operator with a curses modal to optionally
set a human-readable label and color for the agent before it launches. The
modal pre-fills the label with the current agent name pattern (e.g.
`implementer-a3f9`) and leaves color unset; Enter with no changes accepts
those defaults. Store both in the bottle's `metadata.json`. Display the label —
rendered in the chosen ANSI color — in `cli list active` output, replacing
the bare manifest key. Inject the label and color into the in-container
`claude.json` as `name` / `color` so Claude Code can surface them in its own
harness when upstream support lands.
## Problem
`cli list active` identifies each running instance by its manifest agent key
(e.g., `implementer`) plus a random slug suffix. When an operator runs three
`implementer` bottles simultaneously — one each for three different repos —
the output shows:
```
docker a3f9 implementer egress,pipelock
docker b81c implementer egress,pipelock
docker d220 implementer egress,pipelock
```
There is no way to tell which bottle is working on which task without attaching
to each one in turn. The slug is opaque; the manifest key is shared. Operators
working a multi-bottle session resort to keeping a mental map of slug→task,
which breaks the moment they switch windows.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. After the operator selects an agent (picker or CLI argument) and backend,
a curses modal appears before the preflight. The modal pre-fills the label
with `<agent_name>-<slug_suffix>` (the same pattern currently shown in
`list active`). No color is pre-selected.
2. In the modal, any printable keystroke immediately replaces the pre-filled
label and starts building the new name. Backspace edits normally. Enter
at any point confirms — accepting the pre-fill if nothing was typed, or
the in-progress text otherwise.
3. After the label field is confirmed, the modal presents color selection:
a list of the 16 ANSI color names the operator can navigate with arrow
keys, or Enter / Esc with no selection to skip color entirely.
4. `label` and `color` are stored in `BottleMetadata` and written to the
bottle's `metadata.json`. Both fields default to `""` (empty / unset).
5. `ActiveAgent` carries `label` and `color`; `enumerate_active()` reads them
from `metadata.json`.
6. `cli list active` shows the label when non-empty (falling back to
`agent_name`). If a non-empty color is set and the terminal supports it,
the label is prefixed with the appropriate ANSI escape code and reset
afterward.
7. `BottleSpec` carries `label` and `color`; both backends' `prepare` steps
copy them into `BottleMetadata`.
8. `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()` writes `label` → `"name"` and
`color` → `"color"` into the generated `claude.json`. Fields are omitted
when empty.
9. `cmd_start` calls `name_color_modal` after backend selection and before
`_launch_bottle`; passes `label` / `color` into `BottleSpec`.
10. All existing unit tests stay green; no new tests are required for this
change (the label/color fields are thin plumbing with no branching logic
worth unit-testing beyond the already-tested metadata read/write path).
## Non-goals
- Showing the agent label inside the Claude Code TUI (status line, terminal
title, custom header). That requires upstream Claude Code / codex support.
Writing to `claude.json` is best-effort scaffolding for when that lands.
- Validating or constraining label content beyond the 64-byte printable cap.
- Editing the label or color of an already-running bottle.
## Design
### Data flow
```
operator input (modal)
│
▼
BottleSpec.label, BottleSpec.color
│
├─► docker/prepare.py → BottleMetadata.label / .color → metadata.json
├─► smolmachines/prepare.py → BottleMetadata.label / .color → metadata.json
│
└─► contrib/claude/agent_provider.py → claude.json {"name": label, "color": color}
(omitted when empty)
cli list active
│
▼
enumerate_active() → read_metadata(slug) → ActiveAgent.label / .color
│
▼
cmd_list → label (with ANSI color) in the row string
```
### BottleSpec changes
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class BottleSpec:
manifest: Manifest
agent_name: str
copy_cwd: bool
user_cwd: str
identity: str = ""
label: str = "" # operator-chosen display name; defaults to agent_name at render time
color: str = "" # one of the 16 ANSI color names, or "" for terminal default
```
`label` and `color` default to `""` so all existing callers remain valid with
no changes.
### BottleMetadata changes
Add two new fields with backward-compatible defaults:
```python
@dataclass
class BottleMetadata:
identity: str
agent_name: str
cwd: str
copy_cwd: bool
started_at: str
compose_project: str
backend: str
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
```
`metadata.json` written by older bot-bottle versions won't have these keys;
`read_metadata` already uses `dict.get` with defaults, so existing slugs load
cleanly with `label=""`, `color=""`.
### ActiveAgent changes
```python
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ActiveAgent:
backend_name: str
slug: str
agent_name: str
started_at: str
services: tuple[str, ...]
label: str = ""
color: str = ""
```
`enumerate_active()` copies `label` and `color` out of `BottleMetadata` when
constructing each `ActiveAgent`. The smolmachines backend gets the same
additions for symmetry.
### `cli list active` rendering
The current row format is tab-separated:
`{backend}\t{slug}\t{agent_name}\t{services}`
With labels it becomes:
```python
display_name = a.label if a.label else a.agent_name
```
Color is rendered via ANSI escape codes. A small `_ansi_color(color_name)`
helper returns the appropriate escape prefix for the 16 named colors, or `""`
when the name is unrecognised or the terminal doesn't support color
(`NO_COLOR` env var or `not sys.stdout.isatty()`).
The 16 ANSI color name → escape mapping:
| Name | ANSI code |
|------|-----------|
| `black` | `\033[30m` |
| `red` | `\033[31m` |
| `green` | `\033[32m` |
| `yellow` | `\033[33m` |
| `blue` | `\033[34m` |
| `magenta` | `\033[35m` |
| `cyan` | `\033[36m` |
| `white` | `\033[37m` |
| `bright-black` | `\033[90m` |
| `bright-red` | `\033[91m` |
| `bright-green` | `\033[92m` |
| `bright-yellow` | `\033[93m` |
| `bright-blue` | `\033[94m` |
| `bright-magenta` | `\033[95m` |
| `bright-cyan` | `\033[96m` |
| `bright-white` | `\033[97m` |
Reset is `\033[0m`. Applied around the label substring only.
### The label+color modal
A single curses modal (`name_color_modal` in `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py`) handles
both label and color in two sequential steps within the same window.
```python
label, color = name_color_modal(default_label=f"{agent_name}-{slug_suffix}")
```
**Step 1 — label.** The window renders:
```
Name agent
──────────────────────────────────────
implementer-a3f9
──────────────────────────────────────
[any key] edit [Enter] confirm
```
The pre-filled text is shown in the input field. Any printable keystroke
immediately clears the pre-fill and starts a new name from that character
(first-keystroke-replaces semantics). Subsequent keystrokes append normally.
Backspace edits from the right. Enter confirms — accepting the pre-fill if
the field was never edited, or the typed text otherwise.
**Step 2 — color.** After confirming the label, the window transitions to:
```
Name agent
──────────────────────────────────────
implementer-a3f9 ← confirmed label
──────────────────────────────────────
Color (optional)
> (none)
red
green
blue
…
──────────────────────────────────────
[↑↓] move [Enter] select [Esc] skip
```
The list starts with `(none)` selected. Arrow keys move the cursor; Enter
confirms the highlighted choice; Esc or `q` skips color. Each color name in
the list is rendered in its own curses color so the operator can preview the
palette.
The function returns `(label, color)` — both strings, `color` is `""` when
`(none)` is selected or the step is skipped.
### Slug suffix for the default label
The default label is `<agent_name>-<slug_suffix>`, where `slug_suffix` is the
last four characters of the slug (the same short hash shown in `list active`).
In `cmd_start` the slug is minted inside `prepare`, after the modal appears.
The modal is therefore called with the manifest agent key as a fallback
(`default_label=agent_name`). Once `prepare` returns the plan (which contains
the slug), the `BottleSpec` is not reconstructed — the label entered by the
operator is already in the spec. The full `<agent_name>-<slug_suffix>` form is
only available for display in subsequent `list active` calls once the bottle
is running.
### Claude Code config injection
Per PRD 0050, the `claude.json` trust-marker file is written by
`ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()` in
`bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py`. Add `label: str = ""` and
`color: str = ""` keyword parameters to `provision_plan()` on both the
`AgentProvider` ABC and `ClaudeAgentProvider`, and to the
`agent_provision_plan()` shim in `agent_provider.py`. Both `prepare.py`
modules pass `spec.label` / `spec.color`; `CodexAgentProvider` accepts the
params and ignores them.
In `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()`:
```python
payload = {
"hasCompletedOnboarding": True,
"theme": "dark",
"bypassPermissionsModeAccepted": True,
"projects": claude_projects,
}
if label:
payload["name"] = label
if color:
payload["color"] = color
claude_config.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n")
```
## Implementation chunks
Two PRs, each independently mergeable.
### Chunk 1 — schema + storage
- Add `label: str = ""` and `color: str = ""` to `BottleSpec`,
`BottleMetadata`, and `ActiveAgent`.
- `docker/prepare.py` and `smolmachines/prepare.py`: copy `spec.label` /
`spec.color` into `BottleMetadata`; pass them to `agent_provision_plan()`.
- `docker/enumerate.py` and smolmachines equivalent: copy `metadata.label` /
`metadata.color` into `ActiveAgent`.
- Add `label: str = ""` and `color: str = ""` keyword params to
`AgentProvider.provision_plan()` (ABC), `ClaudeAgentProvider.provision_plan()`
(uses them in the `claude.json` write), and the `agent_provision_plan()` shim.
`CodexAgentProvider` accepts the params and ignores them.
- `cmd_list`: update `list active` row to use `label` when non-empty, with
ANSI color escape codes.
- No prompt changes; no UI changes. All existing behavior is identical.
### Chunk 2 — modal
- `bot_bottle/cli/tui.py`: add `name_color_modal(default_label)` implementing
the two-step curses window described above.
- `cmd_start`: call `name_color_modal(default_label=agent_name)` after backend
selection and before `_launch_bottle`; pass `label` / `color` into
`BottleSpec`.
## Open questions
None.
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# PRD 0055: Egress traffic logging
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-06
- **PR:** #207
## Summary
Adds structured log levels to the egress proxy so operators can observe
traffic and security decisions without modifying any application code.
Three integer levels control verbosity: `0` (off), `1` (security events
only), and `2` (full request/response capture). All output is JSON lines
written to stderr.
## Problem
The egress proxy makes per-request allow/block decisions and DLP scans, but
until now those decisions are invisible unless something is actively blocked
and the caller inspects the 403 body. Debugging unexpected blocks, auditing
what an agent is sending upstream, and verifying DLP detector behaviour all
require adding ad-hoc instrumentation or tailing the sidecar container logs
with no structure to grep against.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. **Level 0 (off, default):** no egress output to stderr beyond the boot
line. Existing behaviour for production deployments.
2. **Level 1 (blocks):** every block or DLP warn event is emitted to stderr
as a JSON line with the event type, human-readable reason (including the
secret type detected for DLP hits), and the request context (host, method,
path; plus upstream status code for response-phase events). No traffic
bodies are logged.
3. **Level 2 (full):** all level-1 events, plus a `egress_request` JSON line
for every forwarded request (method, path, headers, body after auth
injection) and an `egress_response` JSON line for every response that
passes DLP (status, headers, body).
4. The log level is a single integer field `log` at the top of the egress
config (routes.yaml in the sidecar; `egress.log` in the bottle manifest).
Values other than 0, 1, 2 are rejected at parse time on both sides.
5. The boot message includes the active log level label (`off`, `blocks`,
`full`).
## Non-goals
- Log rotation or file sinks — stderr output is captured by the container
runtime (Docker, smolmachines) and goes wherever the operator routes it.
- Per-route log levels — all routes share the global level.
- Redacting secrets from the level-2 body dump — at level 2 the operator
has explicitly requested full visibility; redaction belongs in the
log consumer, not the proxy.
## Design
### Wire format
`routes.yaml` gains an optional top-level `log` key:
```yaml
log: 1 # 0 = off (default), 1 = blocks, 2 = full
routes:
- host: "api.anthropic.com"
...
```
The field is omitted entirely when the level is 0 (default).
### Manifest format
```yaml
egress:
log: 1
routes:
- host: "api.anthropic.com"
...
```
`egress.log` accepts integers 0, 1, or 2. Booleans and strings are rejected.
### Log events
**Block / DLP block (level ≥ 1):**
```json
{
"event": "egress_block",
"reason": "egress DLP: GitHub token (classic) found in request",
"host": "api.github.com",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/gists"
}
```
Response-phase block also includes `"response_status"`.
**DLP warn (level ≥ 1):**
```json
{
"event": "egress_warn",
"reason": "egress DLP: possible prompt injection detected",
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/v1/messages",
"response_status": 200
}
```
**Forwarded request (level 2):**
```json
{
"event": "egress_request",
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/v1/messages",
"headers": { "authorization": "Bearer sk-ant-...", "content-type": "application/json" },
"body": "{\"model\": \"claude-opus-4-8\", ...}"
}
```
The request is logged after auth injection, so the outgoing `Authorization`
header is present. The agent's original `Authorization` header is stripped
before logging.
**Response (level 2):**
```json
{
"event": "egress_response",
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"status": 200,
"headers": { "content-type": "application/json" },
"body": "{\"id\": \"msg_...\", ...}"
}
```
Responses are logged before DLP scanning, so the body is always the raw
upstream response.
### Implementation
- **`egress_addon_core.py`**: `Config.log: int = LOG_OFF` (`LOG_OFF=0`,
`LOG_BLOCKS=1`, `LOG_FULL=2`). `parse_config()` validates the integer and
rejects booleans.
- **`egress_addon.py`**: `_block()` emits JSON when `log >= LOG_BLOCKS`. The
`_req_ctx()` helper builds `{host, method, path}` for every call site.
`_log_request()` / `_log_response()` fire when `log >= LOG_FULL`.
- **`manifest_egress.py`**: `EgressConfig.Log: int = 0`, parsed from
`egress.log`, validated against `{0, 1, 2}`.
- **`egress.py`**: `egress_render_routes(routes, *, log: int = 0)` emits
`log: N` at the top of routes.yaml when N > 0. `EgressPlan.log: int = 0`.
docs/prds/0056-extended-outbound-scan.md
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# PRD 0056: Extended outbound DLP scan surfaces
- **Status:** Active
- **Author:** claude
- **Created:** 2026-06-06
- **Issue:** #204
## Summary
The outbound DLP scan introduced in PRD 0052 covers only the request body and
the `Authorization` header. An agent can exfiltrate a provisioned secret or
credential token via several other request surfaces that are currently
unscanned: arbitrary HTTP headers, URL query parameters, URL path segments,
and DNS-level hostnames (DNS tunnelling). This PRD closes those gaps by
extending the scan corpus to cover all four surfaces.
## Problem
After PRD 0052, `egress_addon.py` builds the DLP scan text as:
```python
auth_header = flow.request.headers.get("authorization", "")
scan_text = body
if auth_header:
scan_text = auth_header + "\n" + body
```
This leaves the following attack surfaces unscanned:
| Surface | Example exfiltration vector |
|---|---|
| Other request headers | `X-Api-Key: <secret>`, `Cookie: token=<secret>` |
| Query parameters | `GET /search?api_key=<secret>` |
| URL path segments | `GET /proxy/<base64-secret>/endpoint` |
| DNS hostname | `<base64-secret>.attacker.com` (DNS tunnelling) |
Each surface allows a determined agent to bypass the current scan and leak
a provisioned `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` value or a known token pattern to an
upstream attacker.
## Goals / Success Criteria
1. All four surfaces (headers, query params, path, hostname) are included in
the outbound DLP scan text for every route that has outbound scanning
enabled.
2. A pure helper `build_outbound_scan_text(host, path, query, headers, body)`
in `egress_addon_core.py` assembles the scan corpus so the logic is fully
unit-testable without a mitmproxy dependency.
3. Unit tests demonstrate that `scan_outbound` blocks a request when a known
token pattern or provisioned secret appears in each surface independently.
4. No manifest schema changes — the `dlp` block's `outbound_detectors`
field continues to control which detectors run; all surfaces are scanned
by whichever detectors are active.
5. The auth-strip ordering invariant from PRD 0052 is preserved: the
outbound scan sees the original `Authorization` header before the addon
strips it.
## Non-goals
- Raw UDP/DNS queries — these bypass the HTTP proxy entirely and require a
network-level DNS sinkhole (tracked separately in issue #205).
- Structured query-param parsing — scanning the raw query string is
sufficient.
- Changes to the `dlp` block schema or detector names.
- Scanning outbound request bodies for prompt injection (inbound only,
per PRD 0052 design).
- LLM-based semantic detection or entropy-based secret scanning (deferred,
per PRD 0052 non-goals).
## Design
### `build_outbound_scan_text` in `egress_addon_core.py`
A new pure function assembles all request surfaces into a single newline-
delimited string suitable for passing to `scan_outbound`:
```python
def build_outbound_scan_text(
host: str,
path: str,
query: str,
headers: typing.Mapping[str, str],
body: str,
) -> str:
parts: list[str] = [host, path]
if query:
parts.append(query)
for name, value in headers.items():
parts.append(f"{name}: {value}")
if body:
parts.append(body)
return "\n".join(parts)
```
**Why hostname in the scan corpus?**
DNS tunnelling encodes data into subdomain labels
(`<base64-secret>.attacker.com`). The mitmproxy `request` hook sees the
`pretty_host` field before the TCP connection is fully established, so
scanning it catches this vector. Both the `token_patterns` and
`known_secrets` detectors handle encoded variants (raw, base64, URL-encoded,
hex), so the existing encoding-variant logic in `_encoded_variants` already
covers common DNS-tunnelling encodings.
### `egress_addon.py` update
The narrow scan-text construction is replaced with a call to
`build_outbound_scan_text`, which the addon has already split `path` and
`query` from `flow.request.path` at the top of `request()`:
```python
# Build full scan corpus: hostname + path + query + all headers + body
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
scan_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
query,
dict(flow.request.headers),
body,
)
dlp_result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ)
```
The `Authorization` header is present in `flow.request.headers` at this
point (the strip happens below on line 115), so the auth-strip ordering
invariant is automatically preserved.
### `build_inbound_scan_text` in `egress_addon_core.py`
An analogous helper assembles the inbound response corpus (all response
headers + body) for `scan_inbound`. The `response()` hook now passes this
combined text instead of the body alone, closing the response-header
injection vector.
### WebSocket frame scanning
A new `websocket_message` hook in `EgressAddon` scans every frame after the
HTTP 101 upgrade. Outbound frames (`from_client=True`) are scanned for
credential patterns and known secrets; inbound frames are scanned for prompt
injection. On a block the entire WebSocket connection is killed via
`flow.kill()` (there is no HTTP response surface to write to after upgrade).
### Extended encoding variants in `_encoded_variants`
`_encoded_variants` is extended from 4 to 9 encoding forms:
| Added encoding | Rationale |
|---|---|
| Standard base64 without padding | Common in log lines where `=` is stripped |
| URL-safe base64 with padding | JWT / OAuth standard alphabet |
| URL-safe base64 without padding | Same, padding stripped |
| Hex uppercase | Complements existing hex-lowercase variant |
| Base32 | TOTP seeds; some DNS-exfil channels use base32 subdomains |
| gzip + base64 | Recognisable by `H4sI` prefix; naive compression before encode |
### OpenAI project key pattern
`TOKEN_PATTERNS` gains `sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{48,}` covering OpenAI's
newer project-scoped API key format.
## Implementation
Delivered across three commits on the same branch:
1. **Outbound scan surfaces** — `build_outbound_scan_text`, `egress_addon.py`
`request()` rewrite, `TestBuildOutboundScanText`, `TestScanOutbound`.
2. **Remaining gaps** — extended `_encoded_variants`, `sk-proj-` pattern,
`build_inbound_scan_text`, response-header scanning, `websocket_message`
hook, and matching unit tests.
3. **PRD flip** — `Status: Draft → Active` (committed with the first
implementation commit; updated here to reflect final scope).
docs/prds/README.md
+4 -7
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,9 @@ document vs. a research note or a decision record).
## Naming and numbering
New PRDs use a `prd-new-<kebab-title>.md` placeholder name while the PR
is open. On merge to `main` a CI workflow assigns the next sequential
number (`0024-…`, `0025-…`), renames the file, and updates the title
header. Numbers are never reused; gaps are fine.
Once numbered, the filename stays fixed for the life of the doc.
`NNNN-kebab-title.md`, zero-padded and sequential (`0024-…`, `0025-…`).
Numbers are never reused; gaps are fine (there is no 0005). The number
is assigned at creation and stays fixed for the life of the doc.
## Status
@@ -26,7 +23,7 @@ The `Status:` line near the top tracks the PRD's lifecycle:
## Format
```markdown
# PRD prd-new: <short title> ← placeholder; CI fills in the number on merge
# PRD NNNN: <short title>
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** <who>
docs/research/dlp-alternatives-to-pipelock.md
-505
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@@ -1,505 +0,0 @@
# DLP alternatives to pipelock: per-route configuration and response handling
## Question
Pipelock lacks support for per-route or per-host response scanning rules, making it impossible to skip DLP scanning for large binary downloads (e.g., `.whl` files) while keeping scanning enabled for other traffic on the same host. Should we replace pipelock with a purpose-built DLP/token-scanning proxy that supports granular per-route configuration?
## Summary
Yes. Pipelock's flat, global configuration is fundamentally at odds with the per-route model bot-bottle is built on. A custom or configurable DLP proxy built atop mitmproxy (which we already use for egress) would let us:
1. **Skip DLP scanning selectively** — e.g., scan responses from PyPI for credentials but skip scanning `.whl` file contents
2. **Configure scanning per-route** — different rules for different hosts/paths without global toggles
3. **Reduce operational surface** — one proxy (egress) instead of two (egress + pipelock)
4. **Target AI-specific threats** — focus on credential exfiltration and prompt injection instead of generic DLP
**Tradeoff:** We'd need to maintain our own scanning logic. Pipelock provides out-of-the-box BIP-39 seed-phrase detection, entropy checks, and pluggable DLP rules. Building custom logic means we need to be explicit about what we're protecting against and keep that code auditable.
## Current pipelock limitations
### Issue 1: No per-route response scanning rules
Pipelock's response scanning is part of TLS interception — a global feature with no per-host knobs:
```yaml
tls_interception:
enabled: true
passthrough_domains: [...] # Can skip MITM, but not just response scanning
```
**Status:** Tested with pipelock v2.3.0. Confirmed that:
- `response_body_scanning` config field doesn't exist
- No way to set per-host response size limits
- No way to skip scanning for specific file extensions
- `tls_passthrough: true` disables both request AND response scanning (we want request scanning to stay on)
### Issue 2: Global configuration only
All of pipelock's scanning rules are global. If route A wants to skip `.whl` scanning and route B wants to skip `.tar.gz`, there's nowhere to express that distinction — the config is flat.
### Issue 3: LLM prompt-specific false positives
Pipelock's BIP-39 seed-phrase detector fires on any 12+ English words matching a checksum, which is common in LLM prompts/responses. Bot-bottle disables this detector globally, sacrificing protection.
### Issue 4: No prompt injection detection
**Important clarification:** Pipelock does NOT detect prompt injections. It detects:
- Token patterns (regex)
- Entropy (random-looking strings)
- BIP-39 seed phrases (12+ word checksums)
But it cannot detect semantic attacks like:
- Attempts to exfiltrate system prompts
- Jailbreak attempts ("ignore previous instructions")
- Model output that reveals internal system details
This is a novel threat specific to LLM agents that pipelock wasn't designed for.
## Replacement design: mitmproxy-based DLP addon
Since bot-bottle already uses mitmproxy for egress (PRD 0017), we can extend the mitmproxy addon to do DLP scanning alongside egress rules:
### Architecture
```
Agent
↓ (HTTP_PROXY=http://egress:8080)
Egress (mitmproxy)
├─ Addon 1: Path allowlisting (current)
├─ Addon 2: Credential injection (current)
└─ Addon 3: DLP scanning (NEW)
├─ Config: per-route scanning rules from manifest
├─ Detectors: token patterns, prompt injection, entropy
└─ Action: block/warn based on route config
```
### Per-route configuration in manifest
Routes separately configure **outbound** (request to upstream) and **inbound** (response from upstream) scanning:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
dlp:
outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets] # default
inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection] # default
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
dlp:
outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]
inbound_detectors: false # Skip response scanning (binary downloads)
- host: internal-service.corp
dlp:
outbound_detectors: false
inbound_detectors: false # Trusted internal, no scanning
```
**Detectors:**
- `token_patterns` — API keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, etc.
- `known_secrets` — Secrets we provisioned (API keys, OAuth tokens passed via cred-proxy)
- `naive_injection_detection` — Semantic attacks on system prompt (see section below)
### Detector design
Three core detectors, each with tunable sensitivity:
1. **Token detector**
- Regex patterns for API keys (AWS `AKIA`, GitHub `ghp_`, etc.)
- Anthropic/OpenAI API keys
- OAuth tokens (Bearer patterns)
- Action: Block immediately with no false-positive tolerance
2. **Entropy detector**
- Shannon entropy threshold (bits/char)
- Flags high-entropy secrets (tunable per-route)
- Current pipelock default: 4.5 bits/char
- Action: Warn or block based on route config
3. **Prompt injection detector** (phase 2)
- Detect attempts to exfiltrate system prompts via LLM outputs
- Pattern: responses containing "system prompt", "instructions", "directive" + credential
- Action: Block or sample for audit
### Advantages over pipelock
| Aspect | Pipelock | Mitmproxy addon |
|--------|----------|-----------------|
| Per-route rules | ❌ (global only) | ✅ (manifest-driven) |
| Response-specific config | ❌ (all-or-nothing) | ✅ (request_only, skip_extensions) |
| Request scanning overhead | ✅ (lightweight) | ~same |
| Maintenance burden | Low (third-party) | High (custom code) |
| Auditability | Closed source | ✅ (in-repo) |
| AI-specific detection | Limited | ✅ (token patterns, prompt injection) |
| Code reuse | None | ✅ (egress addon framework) |
### Disadvantages
1. **Maintenance responsibility** — We own the security logic. Any bugs in detector regexes or entropy thresholds are our problem.
2. **Feature parity gap** — Pipelock's BIP-39 detector is sophisticated. We'd need to decide: replicate it, skip it, or ship a simplified version.
3. **Performance** — Custom Python detectors will be slower than pipelock's Go implementation. Benchmarking needed.
4. **Coverage breadth** — Pipelock covers generic DLP (credit cards, SSNs, etc.). We'd focus narrowly on AI/credential exfil.
## Alternative: Configurable pipelock fork
Rather than build from scratch, fork pipelock and add `response_body_scanning` config:
```yaml
response_body_scanning:
enabled: true
skip_extensions: [".whl", ".tar.gz"]
max_response_bytes: 104857600 # 100MB
```
**Pros:**
- Reuses existing detectors and maturity
- Lower maintenance burden
- Clear path to upstream (could be PR'd)
**Cons:**
- Still maintains a fork
- Pipelock's maintainers may not want global per-host rules
- Go code is farther from our codebase (harder to audit)
- Doesn't solve prompt-injection detection
## Recommendation
**Build the mitmproxy addon** (phase 1: tokens + entropy; phase 2: prompt injection).
**Rationale:**
1. Bot-bottle already owns the mitmproxy egress addon — extending it keeps security logic in-repo and auditable.
2. Per-route DLP configuration aligns with bot-bottle's design (PRD 0017 is already per-route).
3. Replacing pipelock reduces sidecar count and operational surface.
4. AI-specific detectors (tokens, prompt injection) matter more than generic DLP for agent containment.
**Fallback:** If performance testing shows unacceptable latency in the Python addon, revisit the pipelock fork approach.
## Naive prompt injection detector design
Since pipelock doesn't detect prompt injections, we need a custom detector. Here's a permissive design that favors missing attacks over false positives:
### What to detect
**High confidence (block immediately):**
1. Response contains known credential pattern + "system prompt" phrase together
2. Response contains both "instructions" and a token pattern
**Medium confidence (warn):**
1. Response contains prompt-disclosure phrases without credentials (might be innocent documentation)
2. Multiple jailbreak keywords in single response
**Ignore (too noisy):**
- Single jailbreak keywords without additional context
- "system prompt" in documentation contexts
- Common phrases like "instructions provided"
### Naive detector pseudocode
```python
class PromptInjectionDetector:
# Phrases that suggest prompt exfiltration
DISCLOSURE_PHRASES = [
r'(?i)(system\s+prompt|instructions\s+given|your\s+role\s+is|you\s+are\s+an?)',
r'(?i)(original\s+instructions|secret\s+instructions|hidden\s+rules)',
]
# Phrases suggesting jailbreak attempts
JAILBREAK_PHRASES = [
r'(?i)(ignore\s+previous|forget\s+everything|disregard)',
r'(?i)(from\s+now\s+on|pretend|act\s+as)',
r'(?i)(bypass|circumvent|override)',
]
TOKEN_PATTERNS = [
r'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}', # AWS
r'ghp_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}', # GitHub
r'sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24}', # Stripe
r'Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]{50,}', # JWT-like tokens
]
def scan_response(self, response_body):
"""Returns (severity, reason) or (None, None) if clean."""
# Rule 1: Disclosure + token = HIGH confidence block
disclosure_found = any(
re.search(phrase, response_body)
for phrase in self.DISCLOSURE_PHRASES
)
token_found = any(
re.search(pattern, response_body)
for pattern in self.TOKEN_PATTERNS
)
if disclosure_found and token_found:
return ("BLOCK", "Prompt disclosure with embedded credential")
# Rule 2: Multiple jailbreak keywords = WARN
jailbreak_count = sum(
1 for phrase in self.JAILBREAK_PHRASES
if re.search(phrase, response_body)
)
if jailbreak_count >= 2:
return ("WARN", f"{jailbreak_count} jailbreak attempts detected")
# Rule 3: Disclosure alone without tokens = WARN only if very explicit
if disclosure_found and "system prompt:" in response_body.lower():
return ("WARN", "Explicit system prompt disclosure")
# Otherwise: clean
return (None, None)
```
### Why this is permissive
1. **Single keywords ignored** — "ignore previous instructions" in a legitimate conversation doesn't trigger
2. **Context required** — disclosure phrases need tokens or multiple jailbreak attempts
3. **Documentation exemption** — "instructions provided" in a help section won't block
4. **Warn vs. block** — Only block on high-confidence signals; warn on medium
5. **No entropy-based guessing** — We don't try to be clever about detecting obfuscated prompts
### False negatives this misses
This detector intentionally lets through:
- Prompt injections using novel phrasing we haven't seen
- Obfuscated jailbreak attempts ("behave differently", "role-play")
- Exfiltration via indirect methods ("describe the system", "what are your constraints")
- Sophisticated attacks that split the prompt across multiple exchanges
**Rationale:** Better to miss a sophisticated jailbreak than block legitimate agent output 100 times/day.
### Per-route configuration
Routes can enable/disable prompt injection scanning:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.anthropic.com
dlp:
enabled: true
detectors: [tokens, prompt_injection]
- host: internal-docs.corp
dlp:
enabled: true
detectors: [tokens] # Skip prompt injection (trusted internal)
```
## Implementation phases
### Phase 1: Secret exfiltration detection
**Goal:** Prevent credentials from leaking to upstream services
- **Token patterns detector** — API keys, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials (regex-based)
- **Known secrets detector** — Check if provisioned credentials appear in outbound traffic
- Secrets passed to cred-proxy or agent environment
- Multiple encodings (base64, hex, URL-encoded variants)
- **Outbound scanning by default** — enabled for all routes unless explicitly disabled
- **Per-route config:** `outbound_detectors: [token_patterns, known_secrets]`
- **Action:** Block immediately on token match; warn on entropy threshold (tuned low to avoid false positives)
### Phase 2: Prompt injection detection
**Goal:** Prevent agents from exfiltrating system prompts or being jailbroken
#### Option A: Naive pattern-based detector
- **Naive injection detector** — as sketched above
- **Inbound scanning by default** — enabled for all routes unless explicitly disabled
- **Per-route config:** `inbound_detectors: [naive_injection_detection]`
- **Actions:**
- BLOCK: Credential + prompt disclosure detected
- WARN: Multiple jailbreak keywords or explicit prompt disclosure
- ALLOW: Single keywords or documentation phrases
#### Option B: LLM-based semantic detector
See section below on using a specialized LLM for prompt injection detection.
### Phase 3: Hardening & tuning
- Real-world false positive analysis from Phase 1 & 2
- Rate limiting on DLP blocks
- Audit/sampling mode for flagged responses
- Additional encodings for known_secrets (GZIP, base32, etc.)
## LLM-based prompt injection detection
### Viability analysis
**Tradeoff:** Using an LLM to detect prompt injections is semantically more powerful than regex, but has latency and resource costs.
**Requirements for bot-bottle:**
- Sub-100ms latency (add-on to HTTP proxy, can't block traffic significantly)
- <1GB RAM footprint (runs in sidecar alongside mitmproxy)
- Simple API (classify: safe/injection/suspicious)
- Preferably quantized/distilled (not full-size models)
**Feasibility:** Marginal. Regex patterns are faster, but an LLM could catch sophisticated attacks.
### Existing models
**Purpose-built prompt injection detectors:**
1. **Rebuff.ai's Prompt Injection API** (closed-source, commercial)
- Hosted detection service
- ~50ms per request
- Not viable (external dependency, adds latency)
2. **Microsoft's Presidio** + custom rules
- Entity recognition + PII detection
- Broader than prompt injection
- Would need custom training for jailbreak/disclosure patterns
3. **HuggingFace models:**
- `roberta-large-openai-detector` — detects GPT-2 text (not injections)
- No off-the-shelf model specifically for prompt injection
**Training a custom model:**
- **Data:** Dataset of prompt injection attempts vs. legitimate responses (limited public datasets)
- **Architecture:** Binary classifier (DistilBERT, ALBERT) fine-tuned on injection examples
- **Size:** DistilBERT ~268MB, quantized ~67MB (acceptable footprint)
- **Latency:** ~50-150ms per response on CPU (concerning for proxy)
### Recommendation
**Phase 2a: Use naive pattern detector** (regex-based, sketched above)
- Fast (<5ms per response)
- Low false positives with permissive rules
- No external dependencies
**Phase 2b (optional, if needed): Evaluate LLM approach**
- Collect real-world false negatives from pattern detector
- If sophisticated attacks slip through, consider DistilBERT-based classifier
- Quantize + run locally in sidecar
- Benchmark against 100ms latency budget
- Fall back to patterns if latency unacceptable
**Why not jump to LLM:**
1. Latency: 50-150ms adds significant overhead to every response
2. Complexity: Custom model training needed; no off-the-shelf solution
3. Overkill: Pattern detector catches obvious attacks; sophisticated attacks are rare
4. Unknown unknowns: Adversaries can evade LLM-based detectors via adversarial prompts
### If we do build an LLM detector
```python
# Sketch of LLM-based detection
class LLMPromptInjectionDetector:
def __init__(self):
# Quantized DistilBERT, fine-tuned on injection examples
self.model = load_model("prompt-injection-classifier-q4") # ~67MB
self.tokenizer = load_tokenizer("distilbert-base-uncased")
def scan_response(self, response_body, timeout_ms=100):
"""
Returns: (verdict, confidence)
- verdict: "safe", "suspicious", "injection"
- confidence: 0.0-1.0
"""
try:
# Timeout hard at 100ms to avoid proxy bottleneck
tokens = self.tokenizer.encode(response_body[:2000], truncation=True)
logits = self.model(tokens, timeout=timeout_ms)
injection_score = logits["injection_class"]
if injection_score > 0.9:
return ("injection", injection_score)
elif injection_score > 0.7:
return ("suspicious", injection_score)
else:
return ("safe", injection_score)
except TimeoutError:
# On timeout, fall back to pattern detector
return self.fallback_pattern_detector(response_body)
```
**Deployment questions:**
1. Which LLM framework? (transformers, ONNX, TensorRT?)
2. How to handle out-of-memory on large responses?
3. How to update model if new jailbreak techniques emerge?
4. Should we ensemble: LLM + patterns for high-confidence blocks?
## CaMeL: Architectural prompt injection defense
[CaMeL](https://github.com/google-research/camel-prompt-injection) (CApabilities for MachinE Learning) is a Google DeepMind research project that takes a fundamentally different approach to prompt injection. Rather than *detecting* injections at the network layer (like everything above), CaMeL *prevents* them by architecture — it makes prompt injections structurally unable to cause harm even when the underlying LLM is fully compromised.
### How CaMeL works
CaMeL wraps the agent in a protective execution layer with three components:
1. **Privileged LLM (P-LLM):** Sees ONLY the user's trusted query. Generates a plan as restricted Python code — which tools to call, in what order, with what data flow. Never sees untrusted content (tool outputs, external data).
2. **Quarantined LLM (Q-LLM):** Processes untrusted data (parsing emails, extracting names from documents). Has NO tool access. Even if prompt-injected, it can only return parsed data — it cannot change which tools run or how they're called.
3. **CaMeL interpreter:** Executes the P-LLM's plan, maintains a **data flow graph** tracking every value's provenance (where it came from, who can read it), and enforces **capability-based security policies** before each tool call.
Example flow for "Send Bob the document from our meeting notes":
```
P-LLM generates plan (trusted, no external data):
notes = find_meeting_notes()
doc_name = query_quarantined_llm(f"extract doc name from {notes}")
doc = fetch_document(doc_name)
address = query_quarantined_llm(f"extract Bob's email from {notes}")
send_email(doc, address)
Interpreter executes:
1. find_meeting_notes() → tags result as source:notes, readers:[user]
2. Q-LLM extracts doc name → even if injected, Q-LLM can't call tools
3. fetch_document() → tags result with source:drive
4. Q-LLM extracts email → even if injected to return attacker@evil.com,
the capability check on send_email() catches that `address` came from
an untrusted source and blocks or prompts the user
```
The key insight: **control flow is determined by the trusted P-LLM's code, not by data content**. Untrusted data can never alter which tools run. And capabilities track provenance so that even manipulated *data values* get caught at tool-call time.
### Performance
On AgentDojo benchmark: **77% task completion with provable security guarantees** vs. 84% for an undefended agent. The 7% utility cost comes from the interpreter occasionally being too conservative (blocking legitimate operations where data provenance is ambiguous).
### Integration with bot-bottle: assessment
**CaMeL is NOT a replacement for pipelock or a network-layer DLP scanner.** It operates at a completely different layer — it's an agent execution framework, not a proxy. It wouldn't help with the original problem (scanning `.whl` downloads for credentials).
However, CaMeL is deeply relevant to bot-bottle's broader security model:
| Layer | Current bot-bottle | CaMeL equivalent |
|-------|-------------------|------------------|
| Network egress | Pipelock (hostname allowlist + DLP) | N/A (doesn't operate here) |
| Credential injection | Egress addon (per-route auth) | N/A |
| Tool access control | None (agent has full permissions) | **Capability-based policies** |
| Data provenance | None | **Data flow graph** |
| Control flow integrity | None (agent decides everything) | **P-LLM generates plan, interpreter enforces** |
**What CaMeL would add that bot-bottle lacks today:**
- **Data flow tracking** — bot-bottle controls *which hosts* an agent can reach, but not *what data* flows to those hosts. CaMeL tracks provenance per-value.
- **Tool-call policies** — bot-bottle doesn't restrict which tools an agent calls or what arguments it passes. CaMeL enforces policies at every tool invocation.
- **Separation of planning and execution** — bot-bottle gives the agent full autonomy. CaMeL splits planning (trusted) from data processing (untrusted).
**Why CaMeL is NOT viable for bot-bottle today:**
1. **Research artifact, not production software.** The README explicitly warns: "the interpreter implementation likely contains bugs...and might not be fully secure." Apache-2.0 licensed but no maintenance commitment.
2. **Requires restructuring the agent.** CaMeL doesn't wrap an existing agent — it *replaces* the agent's execution model. Claude Code / Codex would need to be fundamentally rearchitected to generate CaMeL-compatible plans instead of directly calling tools. This is not a drop-in.
3. **LLM overhead.** CaMeL requires two LLM calls per step (P-LLM for planning, Q-LLM for data parsing). For a coding agent that makes hundreds of tool calls per session, this doubles API costs and adds significant latency.
4. **Utility cost.** 7% task completion loss on AgentDojo. For a coding agent where correctness matters, even small degradation in capability could be unacceptable.
5. **Scope mismatch.** CaMeL protects against prompt injection via untrusted data sources. Bot-bottle's primary threat model is credential exfiltration and sandbox escape — different attack surface.
### Verdict
**Don't integrate CaMeL now.** It solves a real problem (prompt injection via data flow manipulation) but at a layer bot-bottle doesn't currently operate at, and with maturity/integration costs that are too high.
**Watch it for the future.** If CaMeL matures into a production-ready library, its capability model could complement bot-bottle's network-layer controls — bot-bottle handles "which hosts can the agent reach" while CaMeL handles "what data can flow to those hosts." The combination would be defense-in-depth across both network and application layers.
**For now, our phases stand:** Phase 1 (outbound secret exfiltration via DLP addon) and Phase 2 (inbound prompt injection via naive pattern detector) address bot-bottle's immediate needs at the network layer where we already operate.
## Open questions
1. **Performance:** How much latency does Python string-matching add? Benchmark against pipelock.
2. **False positives:** Will entropy detector trip on legitimate high-entropy traffic (e.g., binary API responses)? Need real-world testing.
3. **Coverage:** Are regex patterns sufficient, or do we need more sophisticated token detection (e.g., format validation)?
4. **Upstream:** If we build this, should we upstream it as an option to pipelock, or keep it bot-bottle-specific?
5. **CaMeL long-term:** Monitor the project for production readiness. If it stabilizes, evaluate as a complementary application-layer defense alongside our network-layer DLP.
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# YAML route matching formats: paths, headers, and methods
## Question
Bot-bottle's egress manifest currently supports exact-host matching and
a flat list of path prefixes (`path_allowlist`). As the DLP work (PRD 0052)
and future route hardening evolve, we may want more expressive matching:
glob-style path patterns (`/api/*/data`), header predicates (Content-Type,
Accept), and per-method rules (GET allowed, POST blocked). What established
YAML-based formats exist for declaring this kind of route matching, and
which design choices should bot-bottle adopt?
## Summary
Four formats stand out as well-designed, widely deployed references:
**Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`**, **Envoy `RouteConfiguration`**,
**AWS ALB listener rules**, and **Traefik dynamic routing**. A fifth,
Istio `VirtualService`, is worth noting but is largely superseded by
Gateway API for new designs.
**Recommendation for bot-bottle:** adopt the Gateway API `HTTPRoute`
match vocabulary as a direct model. It is the most carefully designed of
the four, has a published spec, handles all three requirements cleanly, and
its match object nests naturally into a YAML route block alongside
bot-bottle's existing `host`, `path_allowlist`, and `auth` fields.
Envoy's format is more powerful but far more verbose and harder to
validate by hand; ALB rules use a flat predicate list that does not
compose well; Traefik uses string expressions rather than structured YAML.
## Current bot-bottle route schema
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.github.com
path_allowlist:
- /repos/myorg/
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
```
Matching today: exact host + path-prefix list. No method or header
awareness.
---
## Format 1: Kubernetes Gateway API `HTTPRoute`
**Spec:** [gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1](https://gateway-api.sigs.k8s.io/reference/spec/#gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1.HTTPRouteMatch)
**Maturity:** GA (v1.0+, 2023). Backed by SIG Network; shipping in GKE,
EKS, AKS, Istio, Envoy Gateway, Cilium, Traefik v3.
### Match object
```yaml
rules:
- matches:
- path:
type: Exact # Exact | PathPrefix | RegularExpression
value: /api/v1/data
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: Exact # Exact | RegularExpression
value: application/json
queryParams:
- name: version
type: Exact
value: "2"
method: GET # GET | POST | PUT | DELETE | PATCH | …
```
A `matches` entry is a logical AND across all predicates within it. Multiple
entries in the `matches` list are ORed: the rule fires if any entry matches.
### Path matching
| `type` | Semantics |
|--------|-----------|
| `Exact` | Full path must equal `value` (no trailing-slash equivalence) |
| `PathPrefix` | Path must start with `value`; `/api` matches `/api/v1` but not `/apiv1` |
| `RegularExpression` | RE2-syntax regex; implementations may differ on anchoring |
**Glob-style paths (`/api/*/data`):** Gateway API does not define a glob
type. The intent is to use `RegularExpression` for that case:
`/api/[^/]+/data` replaces `/api/*/data`. This is unambiguous and widely
understood.
### Header matching
```yaml
headers:
- name: Content-Type
type: Exact
value: application/json
- name: X-Request-Id
type: RegularExpression
value: "[0-9a-f]{8}-.*"
```
All `headers` entries must match (AND semantics). Missing a header is a
non-match (no "header absent" type in v1; implementations add it as an
extension).
### Method matching
```yaml
method: GET
```
Single method per match entry. To allow GET and POST, use two match
entries (OR semantics at the matches level):
```yaml
matches:
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api/v1
method: GET
- path:
type: PathPrefix
value: /api/v1
method: POST
```
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** spec-backed, implementation-tested, composable AND/OR
semantics, explicit about what is not supported (no glob, no header-absent),
good field naming (`type` + `value` pattern is consistent throughout).
**Weaknesses:** verbosity when expressing OR across methods; regex is
the only path wildcard mechanism; no body matching.
---
## Format 2: Envoy `RouteConfiguration`
**Spec:** [envoy.config.route.v3.RouteMatch](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/config/route/v3/route_components.proto#config-route-v3-routematch)
**Maturity:** Widely deployed (Istio data plane, AWS App Mesh, solo.io
Gloo). Defined in protobuf; YAML is the human-readable rendering.
### Match object
```yaml
match:
path: /exact/path # exact match
# OR
prefix: /api/ # prefix match
# OR
safe_regex:
google_re2: {}
regex: "/api/v[0-9]+/.*"
# OR
path_separated_prefix: /api/v1 # prefix with segment boundary enforcement
headers:
- name: content-type
string_match:
exact: application/json
# OR
prefix: text/
# OR
safe_regex:
google_re2: {}
regex: "application/(json|xml)"
invert_match: false # negate the predicate
- name: x-custom-header
present_match: true # just check presence
query_parameters:
- name: version
string_match:
exact: "2"
```
Method is matched via a pseudo-header:
```yaml
headers:
- name: :method
string_match:
exact: GET
```
Multiple methods require an OR combinator (`or_match`), available in
Envoy v1.21+:
```yaml
headers:
- name: :method
or_match:
value_matchers:
- string_match:
exact: GET
- string_match:
exact: POST
```
### Path matching
| Field | Semantics |
|-------|-----------|
| `prefix` | Path starts with value (any suffix allowed) |
| `path` | Exact match |
| `safe_regex` | RE2 regex (Google RE2 safety guarantees) |
| `path_separated_prefix` | Like `prefix` but only matches at segment boundaries (`/api/v1` won't match `/api/v10`) |
| `connect_matcher` | CONNECT method only |
Glob (`/api/*/data`): use `safe_regex`: `/api/[^/]+/data`.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** most expressive format surveyed; `invert_match`, `present_match`,
OR combinators, pseudo-header method matching; handles every edge case.
**Weaknesses:** very verbose; protobuf-origin field names are not
self-evident; `or_match` nesting is awkward; hard to validate in a
lightweight schema check; not appropriate as a user-facing YAML format
without a wrapping DSL.
---
## Format 3: AWS ALB Listener Rules
**Spec:** [AWS Elastic Load Balancing API — Conditions](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticloadbalancing/latest/application/load-balancer-listeners.html#rule-condition-types)
**Maturity:** GA, widely used in AWS infrastructure-as-code (CloudFormation,
Terraform `aws_lb_listener_rule`).
### Match object (Terraform / CloudFormation rendering)
```yaml
conditions:
- field: path-pattern
path_pattern_config:
values:
- /api/*
- /health
- field: http-header
http_header_config:
http_header_name: Content-Type
values:
- application/json
- application/x-www-form-urlencoded
- field: http-request-method
http_request_method_config:
values:
- GET
- POST
- field: host-header
host_header_config:
values:
- "*.example.com"
- api.example.com
- field: query-string
query_string_config:
values:
- key: version
value: "2"
```
All conditions in a rule are ANDed. Multiple values within a single
condition are ORed. Up to 5 conditions per rule.
### Path matching
ALB natively supports glob patterns in `path-pattern`:
- `*` matches any sequence of characters (including `/`).
- `?` matches any single character.
This is the only surveyed format with first-class glob support. `/api/*/data`
is valid and unambiguous. No regex support.
### Header matching
Header conditions match against the header value. Multiple values are ORed.
The header name is fixed per condition block; to AND two header predicates,
add two separate `http-header` conditions. Case-insensitive matching on
values.
### Method matching
```yaml
- field: http-request-method
http_request_method_config:
values:
- GET
- POST
```
Multiple values are ORed (GET or POST). Up to 40 methods per rule.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** first-class glob path matching (the only format surveyed
with `*` and `?`); multi-value OR within a condition block is concise for
the common case; method matching is a flat list, easy to write.
**Weaknesses:** maximum 5 conditions per rule; no regex; no header-absent
predicate; no request-body matching; the `field` + `*_config` naming is
awkward (the field name is a string enum that determines which sibling key
is relevant — a schema-validation anti-pattern); tied to AWS semantics
(target groups, priority integers).
---
## Format 4: Traefik Dynamic Routing
**Spec:** [Traefik Router Rule syntax](https://doc.traefik.io/traefik/routing/routers/#rule)
**Maturity:** GA, widely deployed in Kubernetes (IngressRoute CRD) and
Docker-Compose setups. Traefik v3 aligns with Gateway API for Kubernetes
routes but keeps its own expression syntax for the `rule` field.
### Match expression (string, embedded in YAML)
```yaml
http:
routers:
my-router:
rule: >
Host(`api.example.com`) &&
PathPrefix(`/api/v1`) &&
Method(`GET`, `POST`) &&
Header(`Content-Type`, `application/json`)
service: my-service
```
`&&` = AND, `||` = OR. Parentheses for grouping.
Available matchers:
| Matcher | Example |
|---------|---------|
| `Host` | `Host("api.example.com")` |
| `HostRegexp` | `HostRegexp(".*\.example\.com")` |
| `Path` | `Path("/exact/path")` |
| `PathPrefix` | `PathPrefix("/api/v1")` |
| `PathRegexp` | `PathRegexp("/api/v[0-9]+/.*")` |
| `Method` | `Method("GET", "POST")` |
| `Header` | `Header("Content-Type", "application/json")` |
| `HeaderRegexp` | `HeaderRegexp("Accept", "application/.*")` |
| `Query` | `Query("version", "2")` |
| `QueryRegexp` | `QueryRegexp("id", "[0-9]+")` |
| `ClientIP` | `ClientIP("10.0.0.0/8")` |
Glob paths: not supported directly. Use `PathRegexp` instead.
### Strengths / weaknesses
**Strengths:** the most expressive and concise format for complex boolean
combinations (AND/OR/NOT in a single line); `Method("GET", "POST")` is
the cleanest multi-method syntax surveyed; full regex support on every
field; Traefik v3 supports this inside Kubernetes CRDs.
**Weaknesses:** the rule is a *string* embedded in YAML, not a structured
object — it cannot be validated with JSON Schema and is harder to generate
programmatically; no structured round-trip; no glob, only regex.
---
## Comparison table
| | Gateway API | Envoy | AWS ALB | Traefik |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Path: exact** | ✅ `Exact` | ✅ `path` | ✅ exact value | ✅ `Path()` |
| **Path: prefix** | ✅ `PathPrefix` | ✅ `prefix` / `path_separated_prefix` | ✅ (via glob `/*`) | ✅ `PathPrefix()` |
| **Path: glob** (`/a/*/b`) | ❌ (use regex) | ❌ (use regex) | ✅ native | ❌ (use regex) |
| **Path: regex** | ✅ `RegularExpression` | ✅ `safe_regex` | ❌ | ✅ `PathRegexp()` |
| **Header: exact** | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| **Header: regex** | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
| **Header: absent** | ❌ (extension) | ✅ `present_match: false` | ❌ | ❌ |
| **Method matching** | ✅ (one per entry; OR via multiple entries) | ✅ (via `:method` pseudo-header) | ✅ (list = OR) | ✅ `Method("GET","POST")` |
| **AND semantics** | predicates within one `matches` entry | all conditions | all `conditions` entries | `&&` operator |
| **OR semantics** | multiple `matches` entries | `or_match` combinator | multiple values in one condition | `\|\|` operator |
| **Schema-validatable** | ✅ (CRD/JSON Schema) | ✅ (protobuf) | ✅ (CloudFormation schema) | ❌ (embedded string) |
| **Human-writable** | ✅ | ⚠️ verbose | ✅ | ✅ |
| **Generatable** | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ (string concat) |
---
## Design choices worth adopting
### 1. Match object as a structured peer to `host`
Gateway API's separation of concerns maps well onto bot-bottle's existing
schema. Instead of a flat `path_allowlist`, a `match` block nests all
predicates:
```yaml
egress:
routes:
- host: api.github.com
match:
paths:
- type: prefix # exact | prefix | glob | regex
value: /repos/myorg/
headers:
- name: Content-Type
value: application/json
methods: [GET, POST]
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: EGRESS_TOKEN_0
```
All predicates within `match` are ANDed. A list of `paths` entries is
ORed (first match wins — same as the current `path_allowlist` semantics).
### 2. Path type enum (`exact` | `prefix` | `regex`)
Use three named types rather than inferring from the value's syntax. This
avoids the ambiguity that plagues `.gitignore` and `nginx location` patterns
where the same string can mean different things depending on leading characters.
- `prefix`: mirrors current `path_allowlist` semantics.
- `regex`: RE2 for wildcard and advanced cases. Reject at load time if the
pattern fails to compile. Covers every case glob would handle —
`/api/[^/]+/data` is the `/api/*/data` equivalent.
Glob-style syntax is not included: it adds a third path-matching language
on top of prefix and regex without meaningful operator benefit, since regex
is already required for any non-trivial wildcard.
### 3. Header matching as a list of `{name, value, type}` objects
Mirrors Gateway API exactly. ALL headers must match (AND). `type` defaults
to `exact`; `regex` is available. No header-absent for now (adds complexity,
low immediate need).
```yaml
headers:
- name: Content-Type
value: application/json # type: exact (default)
- name: X-Internal-Key
value: "dev-[0-9]+"
type: regex
```
### 4. Method list as a flat enum list
Adopts ALB's conciseness. An empty or absent `methods` list means all
methods are permitted. Values are uppercased HTTP method names.
```yaml
methods: [GET, HEAD]
```
### 5. Multiple `match` entries per route: OR semantics at the route level
If a route needs GET on one path and POST on a different path, use a
`matches` (plural) list where entries are ORed:
```yaml
routes:
- host: api.example.com
matches:
- paths: [{type: prefix, value: /read}]
methods: [GET, HEAD]
- paths: [{type: exact, value: /write}]
methods: [POST, PUT]
```
This mirrors Gateway API's top-level OR; each entry is an AND of its
predicates.
---
## Decisions
The open questions raised during research were resolved in PR #196 review:
1. **Backward compatibility:** Hard cutover. The new `matches` structure
replaces `path_allowlist` entirely with no compatibility shim and no
fallback parsing for the old format. Manifests using `path_allowlist`
must be migrated.
2. **Glob support:** Dropped. Not strictly necessary — `regex` covers every
case glob would handle. Fewer path-matching languages to document and
validate.
3. **Header value OR:** Stick with Gateway API. OR across header values
requires a separate entry in the `matches` list, not multiple values
inside one `headers` block.
4. **Method name case:** Case-insensitive at parse time. `get`, `GET`, and
`Get` are all accepted and normalised to uppercase internally.
examples/bottles/claude.md
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ egress:
auth:
scheme: Bearer
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
pipelock:
tls_passthrough: true
---
Common Claude provider boundary. Drop this file into
pyrightconfig.json
+1 -6
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,5 @@
],
"pythonVersion": "3.11",
"typeCheckingMode": "strict",
"reportMissingTypeStubs": "none",
"reportUnknownMemberType": false,
"reportUnknownParameterType": false,
"reportUnknownVariableType": false,
"reportUnknownArgumentType": false,
"reportPrivateUsage": false
"reportMissingTypeStubs": "none"
}
requirements-dev.txt
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
# Development and linting dependencies only.
# The bot-bottle project itself has no runtime dependencies.
# These tools are used for code quality checks in CI/CD.
pylint>=3.0.0
pyright>=1.1.300
scripts/demo-setup.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ chmod 600 "$fake_key_dir/fake-key"
# Build the image graph quietly so the recorded run shows only the
# bottle launch and the four `!` probes, not BuildKit progress.
docker build -q -f bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile -t bot-bottle-claude:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker build -q -f Dockerfile.claude -t bot-bottle-claude:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker build -q -f Dockerfile.git-gate -t bot-bottle-git-gate:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

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