die() raises Die(SystemExit), which implies a process exit. A timeout in
wait_exec_ready is a bringup failure — raising SmolvmError lets the caller
decide whether it's fatal, consistent with how machine_start failures propagate.
Decompose the 207-line launch() into six named helpers: _allocate_resources,
_mint_certs, _start_bundle, _discover_urls, _launch_vm, _init_vm. Each has
explicit inputs/outputs and is independently testable.
Replace time.sleep(1.5) with smolvm.wait_exec_ready(), which polls
`machine exec true` with exponential backoff. Exits as soon as the exec
channel is ready; dies loudly with a timeout message instead of silently
leaving the VM in an unknown state.
File-lock loopback_alias.allocate() with fcntl.flock(LOCK_EX) so concurrent
bottle launches can't race on docker state and claim the same alias.
Add `provisioned_env: dict[str, str]` to `AgentProvisionPlan`. When
`forward_host_credentials=True`, `agent_provision_plan` reads the host
Codex access token at prepare time and stores it under
`CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`. Both backends merge `provisioned_env`
over `os.environ` before calling `egress_resolve_token_values`, so the
token slot resolves like any other manifest-declared token ref.
Removes `egress_resolve_token_values_with_provider` and the sentinel
`continue` skip from `egress_resolve_token_values`. The function is now
fully generic — it neither knows nor cares about provider identity.
Extract egress_resolve_token_values_with_provider into bot_bottle/egress.py.
Both docker and smolmachines launch paths now call the shared function
instead of duplicating the forward_host_credentials / CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
resolution block.
Also fixes the host_env: object annotation on smolmachines._resolve_token_env
to the correct dict[str, str].
Closes#118.
Operators can now declare:
agent_provider:
template: claude
auth_token: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
and the provisioner injects a provider-owned api.anthropic.com egress
route (Bearer, tls_passthrough) rather than requiring a manually
declared route with the former claude_code_oauth role.
Changes:
- Add auth_token field to AgentProvider; validate claude-only.
- Remove claude_code_oauth from EGRESS_ROLES / PROVIDER_EGRESS_ROLES.
Manifests that declare the role now fail at parse time with "unknown
role" — the provisioner owns the route.
- agent_provision_plan: replace manifest_egress_routes/has_provider_auth
with auth_token; Claude branch injects the api.anthropic.com route,
placeholder env, and nonessential-traffic flags when auth_token is set.
- Add hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] to AgentProvisionPlan; Claude
branch populates it with CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN.
- Remove auth_role from AgentProviderRuntime and placeholder_env_for().
- print_util.visible_agent_env_names: accept hidden_env_names from the
plan instead of dispatching on agent_provider_template.
- Both backends: drop manifest_egress_routes call, pass auth_token.
- PRD 0029 rescoped to cover both Codex and Claude provider auth.
Assisted-by: Claude Code
The has_provider_auth check and egress-placeholder injection were
duplicated in both backends. Move them into agent_provision_plan so
the provisioner owns that decision entirely:
- Replace has_provider_auth: bool param with manifest_egress_routes,
compute has_provider_auth internally from the route roles.
- Inject CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder inside the plan
when has_provider_auth, alongside the existing nonessential-traffic
vars. Backends no longer touch the placeholder env.
- Remove placeholder_env from AgentProviderRuntime; expose
placeholder_env_for() for print_util's hide-from-summary logic.
Assisted-by: Claude Code
Remove provider-specific branching from egress.py and pipelock.py.
Previously, `egress_routes_for_bottle` and `pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough`
both contained `template == "codex"` checks — the same pattern the rest
of the PR moved out of the backends.
Root cause: `EgressRoute` had no `tls_passthrough` field, so pipelock
couldn't learn from the synthesised Codex routes that they needed
passthrough. Fix:
- Add `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough: bool`. `egress_manifest_routes` lifts
the existing `pipelock.tls_passthrough` manifest flag here; provider
routes set it directly.
- Add `AgentProvisionPlan.egress_routes`. `agent_provision_plan` populates
it for Codex + `forward_host_credentials`, including `tls_passthrough=True`.
- Replace Codex-specific `egress_routes_for_bottle` logic with a generic
`_merge_provider_route` helper. Backends call `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle,
plan.egress_routes)`; no provider type checks inside egress or pipelock.
- Rewrite `pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough` to read `route.tls_passthrough`
from the merged route set instead of re-implementing the provider check.
- Both backends now call `agent_provision_plan` before `Egress.prepare` and
`PipelockProxy.prepare`, threading `plan.egress_routes` to both. `has_provider_auth`
is derived from `egress_manifest_routes` (manifest routes only — provider
routes carry no auth roles, so the result is identical).
Assisted-by: Claude Code
Debugging a live codex smolmachines bottle surfaced three independent
failures past the sign-in screen; fix each so forward_host_credentials
works end to end:
- codex_auth: dummy access/id tokens now inherit the *real* host token's
exp instead of now+1h. Codex (0.135) refreshes when its local token's
JWT exp lapses; with a placeholder refresh_token that refresh fails and
drops to the sign-in screen. Aligning exp tracks the real token's life.
- prepare: set CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE to the agent CA bundle for codex
bottles. Codex is rustls and ignores the system store / NODE_EXTRA_CA_
CERTS; it reads CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE (fallback SSL_CERT_FILE) for custom
roots across HTTPS + wss, so it must be pointed at the egress MITM CA or
injection can't work without tls_passthrough.
- pipelock: auto tls_passthrough the Codex API hosts when
forward_host_credentials is on. Egress injects the bearer before
pipelock, whose header DLP then flags the JWT ("request header contains
secret") and the retry storm trips its 429. passthrough host-gates the
CONNECT but skips decrypt+rescan of egress-owned auth. The auto-added
routes aren't in bottle.egress.routes, so the hosts are added explicitly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agents may declare git.user (name/email); it overlays the referenced
bottle's git.user per-field at Manifest.bottle_for (agent wins on
non-empty), mirroring the extends: merge. git.remotes is rejected on
agents — it carries credentials and host trust and stays bottle-only.
The overlay lives at bottle_for, the single chokepoint both backends
use, so the docker/smolmachines git provisioners are unchanged. Adds
Manifest.git_identity_summary with per-field (agent)/(bottle)
provenance, printed in both preflights and `info`.
Refs #94
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two Debian-family CA-layout constants lived in
docker/provision/ca.py, which forced the smolmachines backend to
import them cross-backend (smolmachines -> docker). Move them into
the shared backend/util.py next to select_ca_cert; docker, compose,
and smolmachines now all import from there. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both backends' provision_ca duplicated _select_ca_cert and the
SHA-256 fingerprint computation verbatim. Lift them into the shared
backend/util.py as select_ca_cert + log_ca_fingerprint; docker and
smolmachines now call the shared helpers. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>