Optional `ExtraHosts: { hostname: ip }` map per git entry. The
docker backend will surface these to the gate sidecar via
--add-host so the gate can resolve upstreams whose default
container DNS doesn't point at the reachable IP (e.g.
Tailscale-only hosts with a public DNS A record pointed
elsewhere). The agent-side insteadOf rewrite still keys off
the original hostname, so the manifest's Upstream URL stays
human-readable.
A pair of integration tests against a real sshd-based "upstream"
sibling container that prove every operation through the gate is
observably equivalent to the same operation against the upstream:
- test_clone_and_refetch_reflect_upstream: clone via gate
returns the upstream's current commit; an out-of-band commit
on the upstream shows up via the gate on the next ls-remote.
- test_push_through_gate_lands_on_upstream: a clean push routed
through the gate lands on the upstream's bare repo.
The upstream container is a tiny inline-built alpine image with
openssh-server, a `git` user (passwd -u so sshd doesn't reject
the locked account), and a baked bare repo seeded with one
commit. Host keys are baked in at build so the test can pin
KnownHostKey on the manifest entry before the container starts.
While wiring this up the access-hook gained a one-shot HEAD
sync: `git init --bare` defaults HEAD to refs/heads/master, and
upstreams that use main would leave the bare repo's HEAD
unresolvable — clones came through but the working tree was
empty. The hook now does a `rev-parse --verify HEAD` check
after the first fetch and runs `ls-remote --symref` to repoint
HEAD if it doesn't resolve. One extra round-trip on first
fetch only.
The agent's ~/.gitconfig now uses insteadOf (not pushInsteadOf),
so every git operation against a declared upstream — push, fetch,
clone, pull, ls-remote — routes through the gate. Matches the
gate's now-bidirectional design: fetch is mirrored via the
access-hook, push is gated via gitleaks.
The gate is now a transparent mirror, not push-only. Per-repo
init now runs `git remote add --mirror=fetch origin <url>` so a
later `git fetch origin` mirrors the upstream's full ref graph at
canonical paths. The pre-receive hook forwards accepted refs via
`git push origin` (renamed from upstream).
New: an access-hook script wired via `git daemon --access-hook`
runs `git fetch origin --prune` against the real upstream before
every upload-pack request (clone, fetch, pull, ls-remote). On
upstream error the hook exits non-zero — the agent's fetch fails
rather than the gate serving stale data.
The pre-existing smoke test (ls-remote against unreachable
upstream returns refs) had to invert: under the bidirectional
design any ls-remote success is necessarily a success against
the upstream, so the unreachable-upstream case now correctly
fails closed.
Two integration tests against a real Docker daemon:
- test_ls_remote_succeeds_against_fresh_gate: a freshly-started
gate has its empty bare repo exported via git daemon; ls-remote
from a sibling container on the internal network returns no
refs and exits 0.
- test_push_with_secret_is_rejected: the PRD 0008 success
criterion — a push containing an AKIA-shaped synthetic that
trips gitleaks's aws-access-token rule is rejected by the
pre-receive hook with a non-zero exit on the client and a
gitleaks rejection in the response.
Dockerfile.git-gate switches base to zricethezav/gitleaks (alpine
3.22 + gitleaks v8.30.1, pinned by digest) since gitleaks isn't
packaged for alpine, and adds git-daemon (the sub-package the
listener needs; the core git binary in the base doesn't include
the daemon).
DockerBottleBackend now instantiates a DockerGitGate alongside
DockerPipelockProxy and DockerSSHGate; the prepare step lifts
bottle.git into a GitGatePlan stored on DockerBottlePlan, and
launch starts/stops the sidecar in the same ExitStack as the
other two (only when bottle.git is non-empty).
bottle_plan.print now surfaces git remotes and per-upstream gate
forwards in the y/N preflight; to_dict adds git_remotes and
git_gate keys to the dry-run JSON payload for CLI consumers.
PRD: docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md
provision_git now does two things: copy the host cwd's .git (when
--cwd is set, existing behavior) and write ~/.gitconfig with
pushInsteadOf rules for each bottle.git entry. A 'git push <real
upstream URL>' from inside the agent transparently rewrites to
'git://<gate>/<name>.git' so the gate gets first crack at the
incoming refs.
pushInsteadOf (not insteadOf) keeps fetch on the original URL —
v1 of the git-gate is push-only scope per PRD 0008. The render
helper is exposed for testing without docker.
Mirrors the SSHGate/PipelockProxy shape: a host-side prepare that
lifts bottle.git into a tuple of GitGateUpstreams and renders two
shell scripts under stage_dir — the gate's entrypoint (which
initializes a bare repo per upstream and execs git daemon
--enable=receive-pack) and the shared pre-receive hook
(gitleaks-scan, then forward each accepted ref to the real
upstream using the per-repo credential).
Failure in either hook phase aborts the push so the agent sees a
real rejection, not a silent success. KnownHostKey absence is
fail-closed: the hook refuses to forward without a pinned key
rather than TOFU-trusting the upstream from inside the gate.
PRD: docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md
Each entry pairs a Name (local alias the gate exposes) with an
ssh:// Upstream URL, an IdentityFile the gate uses to push to
that upstream, and an optional KnownHostKey for upstream
host-key pinning. The Upstream URL is parsed at construction
into UpstreamUser/Host/Port/Path so downstream code doesn't
re-parse.
Two cross-validation rules: Names must be unique within a
bottle (each maps to a distinct bare repo), and no git entry's
(host, port) may overlap an ssh entry's (Hostname, Port) — the
same upstream reachable two ways would let a misbehaving agent
route around the gitleaks-bearing git-gate via the L4 ssh-gate.
PRD: docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md
Pipelock's BIP-39 seed-phrase scanner fires on Anthropic Messages API
bodies because user-authored conversation text can hit 12 consecutive
BIP-39 dictionary words that pass the checksum, returning a 403
`blocked: request body contains secret: BIP-39 Seed Phrase` that the
Claude CLI surfaces as `Please run /login`. Pipelock's `suppress`
section only covers git/file findings, not the inline body scanner,
so the recommended treatment for LLM endpoints is
`tls_interception.passthrough_domains`: CONNECT is still allowlist-
gated, but the body is not MITM'd. The existing body-scan integration
test moves to `raw.githubusercontent.com` so it still pins TLS body
DLP on non-passthrough'd hosts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bug: git fetch failed with "connect to host
claude-bottle-ssh-gate-implementer port 30009: Connection refused".
OpenSSH treats a URL-supplied port (the user's remote was
ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/...) as overriding the
~/.ssh/config Port directive, so even though the config wrote
Port 30000 the agent dialed :30009 — where nothing was listening
because the gate had been assigned BASE_LISTEN_PORT + index.
Fix: the gate's listen port now equals the upstream port. Same
script, same socat, just port = entry.Port. Two entries on the
same upstream port are rejected at prepare time (the gate is one
container with a flat port space).
Re-smoked: probe nc github.com via the gate at :22, banner came
back as expected.
PRD 0007 updated to record the design refinement.
PRD 0007: the launch ExitStack calls gate.stop on every failure
path, so an early bring-up error (where the gate container was
never created) must not raise from teardown. Mirrors the existing
DockerPipelockProxy.stop assertion.
The orphan-container enumeration in cleanup.py already covers
ssh-gate containers via its `claude-bottle-` name prefix filter —
no code change there.
PRD 0007: SSH traffic now flows through the per-agent ssh-gate
sidecar, so pipelock should know nothing about bottle.ssh.
Removed:
- pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, _trusted_domains, _ip_cidrs.
- The trusted_domains / ssrf blocks built from ssh entries.
- pipelock_proxy_host_port — its last caller (the ssh provisioner)
is gone.
- is_ipv4_literal — only used to classify ssh hostnames into
trusted_domains vs ssrf.ip_allowlist, both of which are gone.
api_allowlist now derives solely from baked-in defaults +
bottle.egress.allowlist. Tests updated to pin the new shape and
assert ssh hostnames do NOT leak into pipelock's config.
PRD 0007: thread the DockerSSHGate through the bottle lifecycle.
- DockerBottlePlan gains gate_plan: SSHGatePlan.
- prepare.resolve_plan accepts a gate and renders its entrypoint
script next to the pipelock yaml.
- launch.launch starts the gate sidecar after pipelock (so it's on
the same internal + egress networks) and registers its stop in
the ExitStack. Skipped when the bottle has no ssh entries.
- DockerBottleBackend instantiates DockerSSHGate alongside the
pipelock proxy.
- bottle_plan.print + to_dict surface the upstream table so
--dry-run shows the per-host listen-port mapping.
ssh_config provisioning still points at pipelock; that swap lands
in the next commit so this one stays a pure wiring change.
First piece of PRD 0007: the per-agent SSH egress gate that will
let pipelock stop seeing SSH traffic. This commit only lands the
backend-agnostic surface — the SSHGate ABC, SSHGatePlan, the
listen-port assignment (BASE_LISTEN_PORT + index), and the
entrypoint-script renderer. Backend wiring lands in follow-up
commits.
Fourth and final step of PRD 0006. Two new end-to-end tests pin
the two paths through pipelock's tls_interception layer.
- test_pipelock_blocks_secret_https_post: posts a GitHub-PAT-shaped
body to api.anthropic.com over HTTPS through the bottle. With
pipelock now bumping the CONNECT and seeing the decrypted body,
it returns 403 with the documented `blocked: request body
contains secret: GitHub Token` body. The probe is a single curl
invocation — curl natively does CONNECT through HTTPS_PROXY, the
agent's trust store now contains pipelock's CA, no hand-rolled
TLS in the test.
- test_pipelock_allows_normal_https: GETs git's README from
raw.githubusercontent.com (a baked-in allowlist host). 200 +
non-zero body length proves the full chain works:
pipelock_tls_init → docker cp of CA into sidecar → bumped CONNECT
→ provision_ca installed CA in agent → curl trusts pipelock's
bumped leaf → body forwarded back through the tunnel.
- test_pipelock_sidecar_smoke: pre-existing direct-start smoke
test updated to call pipelock_tls_init and populate the CA
paths on the plan. (The full launch flow does this in launch.py;
this test exercises the proxy class in isolation.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third step of PRD 0006. The preflight now surfaces the TLS-
intercept layer so the operator sees it before agreeing to launch.
- Text output: one new line under the egress summary
("tls intercept : pipelock (per-bottle ephemeral CA, generated
at launch)").
- JSON output (--format=json contract): new
egress.tls_interception: { enabled: true, ca_fingerprint: null }
block. Fingerprint is always null at dry-run because the CA
only exists after launch; real launches print it as a stderr
log line from provision_ca.
- Pin the new shape in the dry-run integration test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First step of PRD 0006. Pipelock now does the CONNECT bumping that
PR #8's mitmproxy chain was supposed to provide — natively, in the
same single sidecar PRD 0001 wired up.
- claude_bottle/pipelock.py: pipelock_build_config grows optional
ca_cert_path / ca_key_path kwargs. When both are passed the
rendered YAML carries a `tls_interception: { enabled: true,
ca_cert, ca_key }` block. PipelockProxy gains class-level
CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER / CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER constants that
subclasses set to wherever they place the CA inside the
sidecar. PipelockProxyPlan gains ca_cert_host_path /
ca_key_host_path fields (default empty Path() — sentinel for
"not yet populated", filled by launch via dataclasses.replace).
- claude_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py: new
pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir) helper runs `pipelock tls init`
in a one-shot container against a host-mounted scratch dir.
DockerPipelockProxy sets its class constants to
/etc/pipelock-ca.pem and /etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem; .start
docker-cp's the cert + key into those paths between
`docker create` and `docker start`. Pipelock runs as root in
its distroless image, so no chown is needed (verified).
- claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py: calls pipelock_tls_init
between network creation and proxy.start. Prepare stays
side-effect-free on docker; the one-shot ca-init container
only runs on a real launch, not on `start --dry-run`.
- tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py: new assertions that
pipelock_build_config emits the tls_interception block only
when both paths are supplied (and rejects a half-set pair),
plus a test that the docker proxy's prepare plumbs the
in-container paths through to the rendered YAML.
The end-to-end "bumping actually fires" assertion lands in
chunk 4 (HTTPS integration tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The no-side-effects assertion calls `docker network ls` and
`docker ps -a` to verify the dry run created nothing. Inside the
Gitea Actions job container, those exit non-zero against the
host-mounted docker socket — the same act_runner topology issue
that already excludes other integration tests from CI (see
docs/ci.md). The failure was silently swallowed under the default
check=False; the recent style sweep that added check=True surfaced
it.
Gate the docker-enumerating check on GITEA_ACTIONS so the JSON
contract — the more useful part of the test — keeps running on CI.
Consolidate the two count helpers into one that surfaces stderr in
the failure message instead of raising a context-free
CalledProcessError, so the next docker surprise is debuggable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds bottle.egress.dlp_action ("block" | "warn", default block) and
wires it into pipelock as request_body_scanning.action. Pipelock's
own default is "warn", which previously meant claude-bottle detected
credential patterns in outbound bodies but forwarded the request
anyway.
The matching integration test posts a manifest env var shaped like
a GitHub PAT to api.anthropic.com via plain HTTP forward proxy so
pipelock can see the body. Pipelock answers 403 from its body-scan
layer instead of forwarding to the upstream.
Behavior change: bottles without an explicit egress.dlp_action now
block on body-scan hits. Set egress.dlp_action: "warn" to restore
the prior detect-only behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bottle.exec(script) -> ExecResult runs a POSIX shell script inside a
running bottle and returns captured stdout/stderr/returncode. The
Docker impl pipes the script via stdin to `docker exec -i ... sh -s`
so the source never crosses argv.
Two integration tests exercise it end-to-end through the pipelock
sidecar: a Node request to a non-allowlisted host (example.com)
returns 403 from pipelock; a Node CONNECT to an allowlisted host
(raw.githubusercontent.com) is tunneled with 200 Connection
Established. The 200/403 split on each verb is decided by pipelock
itself, isolating the allowlist decision from whatever the remote
might return.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test overrides HOME to isolate the manifest under test from the
dev's real ~/claude-bottle.json. On Docker Desktop that override
also breaks docker CLI endpoint resolution, since the active context
is read from $HOME/.docker/config.json and the per-user socket lives
under $HOME/.docker/run/docker.sock. Forward the parent's resolved
endpoint via DOCKER_HOST so the subprocess reaches the same daemon
regardless of $HOME.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Silences pylint W1510 / ruff PLW1510 across the codebase. The choice
at each site reflects existing intent:
- check=True where the caller implicitly trusts success (docker ps /
network ls returning stdout, docker build, exec chown/chmod inside
provisioners).
- check=False where the caller inspects .returncode (race-retry on
docker run, pipelock sidecar lifecycle, network plumbing, exec_claude
propagating the session's exit code, best-effort cleanup paths).
No behavior change; check= defaults to False so the False sites are
semantically identical.
Adds pyrightconfig.json (strict, Python 3.11) covering cli.py,
claude_bottle/, and tests/. Fixes the 49 strict-mode errors:
- Type DockerBottle.teardown as Callable[[], None].
- ResolvedEnv default_factory uses parameterized list[str] / dict[str, str].
- Erase BottleBackend generics at the registry boundary
(BottleBackend[Any, Any]) since selection is runtime-driven and
callers use the unparameterized interface.
- DockerBottleBackend.launch returns Generator[DockerBottle, None, None];
@contextmanager now flags Iterator returns as deprecated.
- Sidestep cli.list submodule shadowing builtins.list in main()'s argv
annotation via an aliased re-import in cli/__init__.py.
- Cast cfg[...] results in test_pipelock_yaml at the dict[str, object]
boundary.
- Annotate write_fixture's fn parameter and _manifest_with_runtime's
return type.
The smoke test now drives the production prepare/start path, which
calls network_create_internal. Under Gitea act_runner the docker
socket mount topology makes `docker network create --internal` fail
(or be invisible across the host/job-container boundary) — the same
limitation that test_orphan_cleanup.test_create_and_remove already
skips for. Match that skip here so CI goes green; the test still
runs in environments with a direct docker daemon.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PipelockProxy.prepare now accepts (bottle, slug, stage_dir) and derives
the yaml_path itself, so callers don't need to know the filename.
DockerBottleBackend.prepare_proxy becomes a one-line wrapper whose only
caller already has bottle and slug in scope, so it's inlined and
deleted.
The four lower-level helpers (pipelock_bottle_allowlist,
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs,
pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains) are one-line filters; testing
each in isolation duplicates coverage that pipelock_effective_allowlist
already provides end-to-end. The /32 CIDR suffix is the only behavior
beyond filtering, so it keeps a tiny dedicated test.
Drops the misplaced test_rejects_non_string_entry — that's manifest
validation, not allowlist resolution. Belongs in a manifest-validation
test file (which doesn't exist yet); leaving for a separate PR rather
than adding a one-branch sample here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move the --format=json-requires-dry-run check out of the integration
suite (it doesn't need Docker — argparse fails before any backend
runs) and tighten the assertion: previously asserted only that exit
code was nonzero, so any unrelated breakage (manifest resolution
failure, bad agent name, etc.) silently passed. Now asserts stderr
contains the actual flag-conflict message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The old smoke test hand-rolled the docker create/cp/start sequence in
parallel with what DockerPipelockProxy.start already does, so any
divergence in production code wouldn't trip it. Rewritten to call
.prepare and .start directly and probe /health from a sibling curl
container on the same internal network — same access topology the
agent container uses in production.
In-network probing means the test no longer depends on a published
port, so it can run under act_runner (where host-loopback port
publishing isn't reachable from the job container).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BottlePlan gains a to_dict method (abstract on the base, implemented
on DockerBottlePlan) returning a JSON-serializable view of the resolved
plan. `cli.py start --dry-run --format=json` prints it to stdout and
exits zero. --format=json without --dry-run is rejected — emitting JSON
during a real launch would race the y/N prompt.
The dry-run integration test now parses the JSON and asserts on
structured fields (agent, bottle, runtime, hosts sorted+deduped, etc.)
instead of regex-matching the human-readable preflight stdout. That
kills the magic-"8 hosts allowed" coupling — adding a new baked
default doesn't break the test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split pipelock config building from YAML rendering: pipelock_build_config
returns a dict, pipelock_render_yaml serializes it, and _build_pipelock_yaml
chains the two onto disk. Unchanged behavior — pipelock loads the same YAML.
The yaml test now asserts on the structured config dict, which is
robust to cosmetic YAML changes (key order, quoting). The two checks
that only make sense on the rendered output — file mode 0600 and
no-secret-leakage — stay against the on-disk content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the hand-maintained INTEGRATION_NAMES classifier (and the
bespoke run_tests.py around it) with a directory-driven split:
tests/unit/ unit tests, always run
tests/integration/ Docker-dependent, skip cleanly without Docker
tests/canaries/ upstream-regression checks, opt-in via
CLAUDE_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1
The pinned-pipelock-image check moves to the canary suite — it tests
upstream packaging, not our code, so it shouldn't gate every dev push.
A scheduled canaries.yml workflow runs it weekly.
The manifest-runtime tests collapse the four assertRaises cases for
distinct 'runtime' values into one subTest loop and drop the
error-message-wording assertions; the contract is "any value is
rejected", not "the error literally contains 'auto-detect'".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matches the allowlist-resolution helpers' shape: the caller resolves
the bottle once and passes it in. Signature drops from
(manifest, bottle_name, slug, yaml_path) to (bottle, slug, yaml_path).
DockerBottleBackend.prepare_proxy uses manifest.bottle_for(agent_name)
to get the bottle directly. Tests pass fixture.bottles[name].
prepare's docstring also explains what `slug` is: the lowercased,
hyphen-normalized agent identifier used as the suffix in every
per-agent resource name (agent container, pipelock container, the
internal/egress networks). It's stored on the plan so start can
derive the sidecar's container name.
Top-level pipelock.py drops the Manifest import — no longer used.
Both constants were already only used by Docker-specific code (the
sidecar boot, the proxy_url/host_port naming helpers, the image
contract test). Move them next to DockerPipelockProxy.
Top-level pipelock.py drops the 'os' import along with the constants;
the two test files that pulled PIPELOCK_IMAGE retarget at the new
location.
The three slug-based naming helpers were nominally on pipelock.py but
each assumed a Docker container topology (the container name is
'claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>', the proxy URL uses that container
name). Move them next to DockerPipelockProxy:
pipelock_container_name -> claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>
pipelock_proxy_url -> http://<container>:<port>
pipelock_proxy_host_port -> <container>:<port>
backend.py imports them directly from .pipelock; the orphan-cleanup
test imports container_name from the same place.
PipelockProxy becomes an ABC with the platform-agnostic
prepare/_build_pipelock_yaml as concrete methods and start/stop as
abstract. Docker-specific sidecar lifecycle moves to a new sibling
file:
claude_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py
DockerPipelockProxy(PipelockProxy) — implements start (docker
create/cp/network connect/start) and stop (docker inspect/rm -f).
DockerBottleBackend._proxy is now a DockerPipelockProxy instance.
Tests that previously instantiated PipelockProxy() directly switch to
DockerPipelockProxy() (the base is no longer constructable).
Every function in the 'Allowlist resolution' section was doing
`manifest.bottles[bottle_name].X` as its first move. Push the lookup
to the caller and have each helper take a resolved Bottle:
pipelock_bottle_allowlist
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames
pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains
pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs
pipelock_effective_allowlist
pipelock_allowlist_summary
PipelockProxy._build_pipelock_yaml resolves bottle once at the top
and passes it through; DockerBottleBackend.prepare already had the
bottle in scope and now uses it directly. Tests pass the resolved
bottle from each fixture.
The classifier is a pure dotted-quad regex check — nothing
pipelock-specific about it. Pipelock now imports it from util.
test_pipelock_classify.py retargets at the new location.
Two manifest-accessor functions in pipelock.py
(pipelock_bottle_allowlist, pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames) look
generic but are 1-line wrappers used only internally; they stay
for now.
ProxyPlan -> PipelockProxyPlan, with two additional fields populated
in launch: internal_network, egress_network (default ""). prepare
fills yaml_path + slug; launch uses dataclasses.replace to populate
the networks before calling start.
pipelock_start -> PipelockProxy.start(plan). Reads yaml_path, slug,
internal_network, egress_network off the plan. Returns the resolved
container name.
pipelock_stop -> PipelockProxy.stop(proxy_target). Takes the resolved
container name directly (the value that start returned); no longer
needs to know about slugs or naming conventions.
Backend launch passes the running container name (state["pipelock"])
to stop. Test for stop's idempotency uses pipelock_container_name to
construct the proxy_target.
The YAML generation now lives on PipelockProxy.prepare(manifest,
bottle_name, yaml_path) in claude_bottle/pipelock.py. The class is the
natural home for any future proxy-level state.
DockerBottleBackend keeps an instance as a class attribute
(_proxy = PipelockProxy()) and its prepare_proxy becomes a thin
delegation. A future backend that wants a different egress proxy
(or none) plugs in its own strategy.
Tests retarget at the new home — PipelockProxy.prepare gets the
content-shape assertions; the sidecar smoke test uses the class
directly too. Same coverage.
Drops 6 tests with no real coverage loss:
- tests/test_pipelock_naming.py — 4 tests asserting that f-string
format helpers return their f-string. Shape locks, not behavior
gates.
- tests/test_pipelock_image.py:test_entrypoint_contains_pipelock and
:test_cmd_contains_run — Docker image metadata inspection. The
remaining test_binary_runs already covers 'does the pinned image
actually work,' which is the only scenario these were really
guarding against.
31 tests -> 25.
The yaml generation logic moves wholesale onto DockerBottleBackend
where it's used. pipelock_write_yaml is deleted; pipelock.py keeps
the allowlist resolution helpers (still called by prepare_proxy and
by pipelock_allowlist_summary).
The pipelock_start error message that referenced "pipelock_write_yaml
must run first" now says "backend.prepare_proxy must run first."
tests/test_pipelock_yaml.py rewritten to drive DockerBottleBackend().
prepare_proxy(spec, yaml_path); test_pipelock_sidecar_smoke.py call
site updated similarly. Same coverage at the new location.
Across the package:
- claude_bottle/platform/ -> claude_bottle/backend/
- platform/docker/platform.py -> backend/docker/backend.py
- class BottlePlatform -> BottleBackend
- class DockerBottlePlatform -> DockerBottleBackend
- get_bottle_platform() -> get_bottle_backend()
- env var CLAUDE_BOTTLE_PLATFORM -> CLAUDE_BOTTLE_BACKEND
- dict _PLATFORMS -> _BACKENDS
"Backend" is shorter and more established as the term for a
pluggable strategy-pattern implementation. "Platform" was vague
(could mean OS, hardware, cloud) and mildly redundant — Docker is
itself a platform.
The previous PRD section claiming "the Backend protocol was
rejected" referred to a low-level run/exec/cp/network_connect
protocol; the name was never the reason. The PRD is updated to
describe that rejected design by shape rather than by name.
The bottle/agent concepts and the manifest schema are unchanged.
Introduce claude_bottle/bottles/ with a Bottle Protocol and a
get_bottle_factory() that dispatches on CLAUDE_BOTTLE_PLATFORM
(default "docker"). Move every Docker-specific subprocess.run call
from cli/start.py, plus the orchestration of build, networks, the
pipelock sidecar, container launch, and per-container provisioning
(prompt, skills, ssh, .git), into create_docker_bottle.
Drop bottles[].runtime from the manifest schema. Auto-detect whether
gVisor is registered with the daemon and pass --runtime=runsc when it
is; the preflight shows the resolved runtime so the choice is visible.
Manifests still carrying 'runtime' get a clear error pointing at the
auto-detect behavior, rather than silent ignore.
Out of scope: cli/cleanup.py and cli/list.py still call docker
directly. They enumerate active bottles across the host, which is a
separate concern from "create a bottle" and is left for a follow-up
that introduces a list_active/cleanup primitive on the factory.
Replace the TypedDict + 14 manifest_* free functions with frozen
dataclasses (SshEntry, BottleEgress, Bottle, Agent, Manifest) carrying
their own validators and constructors. Call sites import Manifest and
chain attribute access; the manifest_* helpers and manifest_validate
are gone.
Behavior changes worth flagging:
- Agent.bottle is now required (was optional with a "(none)" fallback).
Manifest.from_json_obj dies if any agent lacks a 'bottle' field or
references an undefined bottle, where previously start.py raised the
error lazily for the specific agent being launched.
- ssh.py now takes SshEntry instances; Host/IdentityFile shape checks
moved upstream into Manifest construction, leaving only the IdentityFile
filesystem-existence check in ssh_validate_entries.
- pipelock_bottle_allowlist's per-element string check is dropped — the
Manifest validator enforces it at load.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move schema checks out of per-access getters into a single
manifest_validate pass invoked by manifest_resolve. Getters can now
assume bottles/agents are well-typed dicts and every agent has a
defined bottle, so the .get(...) or {} chains collapse. Behavior
change: a bad runtime / shape error anywhere in the manifest now
fails at load instead of on the N-th read.
Intermediate step toward replacing TypedDict with a dataclass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bottles can now set "runtime": "runsc" to launch the agent container
under gVisor instead of runc, adding a userspace syscall barrier
between the agent and the host kernel. Default is runc (Docker
default). Pipelock stays on the default runtime per the research doc's
minimum-diff prescription.
The launcher verifies runsc is registered with the daemon before
launch, surfaces the runtime in the preflight plan, and dies with an
install pointer (and a macOS-not-supported note) when runsc is
requested but unavailable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces cli.sh + lib/*.sh with a claude_bottle/ Python package and a
cli.py entry point. No external dependencies — uses only Python's
stdlib (json, subprocess, getpass, tempfile, argparse, re, etc.).
- claude_bottle/{log,docker,manifest,env_resolve,network,pipelock,
skills,ssh,cli}.py mirror the previous lib/*.sh modules.
- Tests converted to unittest under tests/test_*.py with a stdlib
runner at tests/run_tests.py (unit | integration | path).
- .githooks/commit-msg ported to Python; same Conventional Commits rules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
didericis