refactor(pipelock): drop bottle.ssh carve-outs
PRD 0007: SSH traffic now flows through the per-agent ssh-gate sidecar, so pipelock should know nothing about bottle.ssh. Removed: - pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, _trusted_domains, _ip_cidrs. - The trusted_domains / ssrf blocks built from ssh entries. - pipelock_proxy_host_port — its last caller (the ssh provisioner) is gone. - is_ipv4_literal — only used to classify ssh hostnames into trusted_domains vs ssrf.ip_allowlist, both of which are gone. api_allowlist now derives solely from baked-in defaults + bottle.egress.allowlist. Tests updated to pin the new shape and assert ssh hostnames do NOT leak into pipelock's config.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ def pipelock_proxy_url(slug: str) -> str:
|
||||
return f"http://{pipelock_container_name(slug)}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_proxy_host_port(slug: str) -> str:
|
||||
return f"{pipelock_container_name(slug)}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
|
||||
"""Generate a fresh per-bottle CA via a one-shot pipelock container.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import cast
|
||||
|
||||
from .manifest import Bottle
|
||||
from .util import is_ipv4_literal
|
||||
|
||||
# Baked-in default allowlist for hosts Claude Code itself needs.
|
||||
DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
@@ -40,30 +39,17 @@ def pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return list(bottle.egress.allowlist)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [e.Hostname for e in bottle.ssh if e.Hostname]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [h for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if not is_ipv4_literal(h)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [f"{h}/32" for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if is_ipv4_literal(h)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Deduplicated union of: baked-in defaults, bottle.egress.allowlist,
|
||||
bottle.ssh[].Hostname. Sorted for stability."""
|
||||
"""Deduplicated union of: baked-in defaults, bottle.egress.allowlist.
|
||||
Sorted for stability. Per PRD 0007, bottle.ssh entries do NOT
|
||||
contribute here — SSH traffic flows through the per-agent ssh-gate
|
||||
sidecar, not pipelock."""
|
||||
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
|
||||
for h in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST:
|
||||
seen.setdefault(h, None)
|
||||
for h in pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle):
|
||||
if h:
|
||||
seen.setdefault(h, None)
|
||||
for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle):
|
||||
if h:
|
||||
seen.setdefault(h, None)
|
||||
return sorted(seen.keys())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,12 +102,6 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
|
||||
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle),
|
||||
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
|
||||
}
|
||||
trusted = pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle)
|
||||
if trusted:
|
||||
cfg["trusted_domains"] = trusted
|
||||
ip_cidrs = pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle)
|
||||
if ip_cidrs:
|
||||
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": ip_cidrs}
|
||||
cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True}
|
||||
# Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP
|
||||
# "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's
|
||||
@@ -163,18 +143,6 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
|
||||
fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"])
|
||||
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
if "trusted_domains" in cfg:
|
||||
lines.append("trusted_domains:")
|
||||
for td in cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"]):
|
||||
lines.append(f' - "{td}"')
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
if "ssrf" in cfg:
|
||||
lines.append("ssrf:")
|
||||
ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
|
||||
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
|
||||
for cidr in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
|
||||
lines.append(f' - "{cidr}"')
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.append("dlp:")
|
||||
dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"])
|
||||
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ level deeper, under their backend package."""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
|
||||
@@ -17,15 +16,3 @@ def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
|
||||
home = os.environ.get("HOME", "")
|
||||
return home + path[1:]
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_IPV4_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_ipv4_literal(s: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True iff `s` looks like a dotted-quad IPv4 literal. Does not
|
||||
validate octet ranges; consumers that care about that should run
|
||||
a stricter check. Empty input returns False."""
|
||||
if not s:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return bool(_IPV4_RE.match(s))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
|
||||
"""Unit: pipelock_effective_allowlist — the union of baked-in defaults,
|
||||
bottle.egress.allowlist, and bottle.ssh[].Hostname. Plus a small check
|
||||
that IPv4 hostnames pick up the /32 suffix when classified as CIDRs.
|
||||
|
||||
The lower-level one-line helpers (pipelock_bottle_allowlist,
|
||||
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains)
|
||||
are exercised end-to-end by test_union_and_dedup, so they don't get
|
||||
their own tests."""
|
||||
"""Unit: pipelock_effective_allowlist — the union of baked-in defaults
|
||||
and bottle.egress.allowlist. Per PRD 0007, bottle.ssh entries do NOT
|
||||
contribute (SSH traffic goes through the per-agent ssh-gate, not
|
||||
pipelock)."""
|
||||
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
from claude_bottle.manifest import Manifest
|
||||
from claude_bottle.pipelock import (
|
||||
pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs,
|
||||
pipelock_effective_allowlist,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from tests.fixtures import fixture_with_ssh
|
||||
from claude_bottle.pipelock import pipelock_effective_allowlist
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestEffectiveAllowlist(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@@ -36,20 +28,14 @@ class TestEffectiveAllowlist(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(manifest.bottles["dev"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", eff, "baked default present")
|
||||
self.assertIn("registry.npmjs.org", eff, "egress.allowlist present")
|
||||
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42", eff, "ssh ipv4 hostname present")
|
||||
self.assertIn("github.com", eff, "ssh hostname present")
|
||||
# PRD 0007: ssh hostnames must not contribute to pipelock's
|
||||
# allowlist anymore — they're routed through the ssh-gate
|
||||
# sidecar, which is on its own egress path.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", eff)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("github.com", eff)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(eff), len(set(eff)), "deduplicated")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(eff, sorted(eff), "sorted")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestSSHIPCidrs(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_ipv4_hostname_gets_32_suffix(self):
|
||||
cidrs = pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(fixture_with_ssh().bottles["dev"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42/32", cidrs)
|
||||
# Hostname-typed entries don't end up here.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("github.com", cidrs)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("github.com/32", cidrs)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Unit: is_ipv4_literal — the classifier that decides whether
|
||||
bottle.ssh[].Hostname goes into pipelock's ssrf.ip_allowlist (IPv4
|
||||
literal) or trusted_domains (hostname)."""
|
||||
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
from claude_bottle.util import is_ipv4_literal
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIPv4Classify(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_positive(self):
|
||||
for ip in ("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.5", "100.78.141.42", "0.0.0.0", "255.255.255.255"):
|
||||
with self.subTest(ip=ip):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(is_ipv4_literal(ip), ip)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_negative(self):
|
||||
for hn in (
|
||||
"github.com",
|
||||
"gitea.dideric.is",
|
||||
"100.78.141",
|
||||
"100.78.141.42.5",
|
||||
"::1",
|
||||
"fe80::1",
|
||||
"localhost",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"1.2.3.4.example.com",
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.subTest(hn=hn):
|
||||
self.assertFalse(is_ipv4_literal(hn), hn)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -34,23 +34,25 @@ class TestBuildConfig(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# Baked defaults always present.
|
||||
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
|
||||
self.assertIn("raw.githubusercontent.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
|
||||
# No SSH entries → no trusted_domains, no ssrf.
|
||||
# PRD 0007: pipelock has no SSH carve-outs at all — neither
|
||||
# trusted_domains nor ssrf are ever emitted from bottle data
|
||||
# in v1.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains", cfg)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg)
|
||||
# Without CA paths, the tls_interception block is omitted —
|
||||
# pipelock falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("tls_interception", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_ssh_shape(self):
|
||||
def test_ssh_entries_do_not_leak_into_pipelock(self):
|
||||
# PRD 0007: bottle.ssh routes through the ssh-gate sidecar,
|
||||
# so pipelock's config must not reflect those hostnames or
|
||||
# IPs in any of its blocks.
|
||||
cfg = pipelock_build_config(fixture_with_ssh().bottles["dev"])
|
||||
self.assertIn("github.com", cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"]))
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"]))
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"100.78.141.42/32",
|
||||
cast(dict[str, Any], cfg["ssrf"])["ip_allowlist"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Strict mode: IPv4 host is also in the api_allowlist union.
|
||||
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
|
||||
allow = cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"])
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("github.com", allow)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", allow)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains", cfg)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_tls_interception_block_emitted_when_paths_supplied(self):
|
||||
# PRD 0006: paths flow in via DockerPipelockProxy's in-container
|
||||
@@ -95,12 +97,13 @@ class TestRenderAndWrite(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
for required in (
|
||||
"api_allowlist:",
|
||||
"forward_proxy:",
|
||||
"trusted_domains:",
|
||||
"ssrf:",
|
||||
"dlp:",
|
||||
"request_body_scanning:",
|
||||
):
|
||||
self.assertIn(required, text)
|
||||
# PRD 0007: no ssh carve-outs in the rendered yaml.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains:", text)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("ssrf:", text)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prepare_writes_file_at_mode_600(self):
|
||||
plan = DockerPipelockProxy().prepare(
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user