fix(ssh): tunnel ssh through pipelock so agents on --internal can reach git remotes

The agent container is on an --internal Docker network with no default
route — only the pipelock sidecar is reachable. HTTPS_PROXY routes
HTTP through pipelock, but raw TCP (e.g. SSH on port 30009) had no
egress path, so `git fetch` against any bottle.ssh entry failed with
"Network is unreachable".

Fix: tunnel SSH through pipelock's HTTP CONNECT proxy.
- lib/ssh.sh injects `ProxyCommand socat - PROXY:<pipelock>:%h:%p,proxyport=<n>`
  into each Host block in the in-container ~/.ssh/config. socat is
  already in the image (apt-installed for the ssh-agent forwarder).
- lib/pipelock.sh auto-adds each bottle.ssh[].Hostname to the effective
  allowlist so pipelock permits the CONNECT.
- cli.sh threads the pipelock host:port into ssh_setup.

Note: works for SSH hosts pipelock's SSRF layer doesn't block. CGNAT
(100.64.0.0/10) and other non-RFC1918 ranges should pass; if a future
host gets blocked, expose pipelock's trusted_domains as a follow-up.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-08 01:39:08 -04:00
parent f6c943fcad
commit 8582e608af
3 changed files with 54 additions and 8 deletions
+3 -1
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@@ -650,7 +650,9 @@ cmd_start() {
# Set up SSH keys and config.
if [ "${#SSH_ENTRIES[@]}" -gt 0 ]; then
ssh_setup "$CONTAINER" "$STAGE_DIR" "${SSH_ENTRIES[@]}"
local PIPELOCK_PROXY_HOST_PORT
PIPELOCK_PROXY_HOST_PORT="$(pipelock_proxy_host_port "$SLUG")"
ssh_setup "$CONTAINER" "$STAGE_DIR" "$PIPELOCK_PROXY_HOST_PORT" "${SSH_ENTRIES[@]}"
fi
# When --cwd is on, ship the host repo's .git directory in via `docker cp`
+33 -4
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@@ -108,6 +108,17 @@ pipelock_proxy_url() {
printf 'http://%s:%s' "$name" "$CLAUDE_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_PORT"
}
# pipelock_proxy_host_port <slug> — prints <sidecar>:<port> (no scheme),
# suitable for socat's PROXY: directive in an SSH ProxyCommand. The
# agent's --internal network has no default route, so SSH (and any other
# raw TCP) must tunnel via pipelock's HTTP CONNECT.
pipelock_proxy_host_port() {
local slug="${1:?pipelock_proxy_host_port: missing slug}"
local name
name="$(pipelock_container_name "$slug")"
printf '%s:%s' "$name" "$CLAUDE_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_PORT"
}
# --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
# pipelock_bottle_allowlist <manifest_file> <bottle_name>
@@ -139,12 +150,29 @@ pipelock_bottle_allowlist() {
' "$manifest_file"
}
# pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames <manifest_file> <bottle_name>
#
# Prints one hostname per line for each entry in bottles[<name>].ssh[].Hostname.
# These need to reach pipelock's allowlist so the agent can tunnel SSH
# through pipelock via HTTP CONNECT (see ssh_setup's ProxyCommand
# wiring). Empty output if the bottle has no ssh entries.
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames() {
local manifest_file="${1:?pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames: missing manifest file}"
local bottle_name="${2:?pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames: missing bottle name}"
jq -r --arg b "$bottle_name" '
.bottles[$b].ssh // [] | .[] | .Hostname // empty
' "$manifest_file"
}
# pipelock_effective_allowlist <manifest_file> <bottle_name>
#
# Prints the deduplicated union of the baked-in default allowlist and
# the bottle's declared allowlist, one hostname per line, sorted for
# stability. This is the single source of truth callers should use for
# both YAML generation and the preflight summary.
# Prints the deduplicated union of: the baked-in default allowlist, the
# bottle's declared egress.allowlist, and any bottle.ssh[].Hostname
# entries (so SSH tunneling through pipelock is permitted by the same
# allowlist check that gates HTTP CONNECT). One hostname per line,
# sorted for stability. This is the single source of truth callers
# should use for both YAML generation and the preflight summary.
pipelock_effective_allowlist() {
local manifest_file="${1:?pipelock_effective_allowlist: missing manifest file}"
local bottle_name="${2:?pipelock_effective_allowlist: missing bottle name}"
@@ -152,6 +180,7 @@ pipelock_effective_allowlist() {
{
printf '%s\n' "$CLAUDE_BOTTLE_PIPELOCK_DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST"
pipelock_bottle_allowlist "$manifest_file" "$bottle_name"
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames "$manifest_file" "$bottle_name"
} | awk 'NF && !seen[$0]++' | LC_ALL=C sort
}
+18 -3
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@@ -89,7 +89,12 @@ ssh_validate_entries() {
ssh_setup() {
local container="${1:?ssh_setup: missing container}"
local stage_dir="${2:?ssh_setup: missing stage dir}"
shift 2
# proxy_host_port is the pipelock sidecar as <host>:<port> (no scheme).
# Used as socat's PROXY: argument so the agent can reach SSH hosts
# over the agent's --internal network — the only egress route is the
# pipelock CONNECT proxy. Required.
local proxy_host_port="${3:?ssh_setup: missing proxy_host_port}"
shift 3
local container_home="${CLAUDE_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME:-/home/node}"
local container_ssh="${container_home}/.ssh"
@@ -140,8 +145,18 @@ ssh_setup() {
# No IdentityFile — IdentityAgent points SSH at the public (forwarded)
# socket. Pointing at the real agent socket directly would be rejected
# by ssh-agent's UID-match check (see file header).
printf 'Host %s\n HostName %s\n User %s\n Port %s\n IdentityAgent %s\n\n' \
"$name" "$hostname" "$user" "$port" "$public_socket" >> "$config_file"
#
# ProxyCommand tunnels the SSH connection through pipelock via HTTP
# CONNECT. The agent container has no default route (--internal
# network); pipelock is the only path to anywhere. socat's PROXY:
# mode does CONNECT host:port to the proxy. %h / %p expand to this
# block's HostName / Port. The SSH host must also appear in
# pipelock's allowlist — pipelock_effective_allowlist auto-includes
# bottle.ssh[].Hostname entries so this just works for declared
# hosts.
printf 'Host %s\n HostName %s\n User %s\n Port %s\n IdentityAgent %s\n ProxyCommand socat - PROXY:%s:%%h:%%p,proxyport=%s\n\n' \
"$name" "$hostname" "$user" "$port" "$public_socket" \
"${proxy_host_port%:*}" "${proxy_host_port##*:}" >> "$config_file"
if [ -n "$known_host_key" ]; then
# Write under both the Host alias and the Hostname so SSH finds the key