refactor(pipelock): drop bottle.ssh carve-outs

PRD 0007: SSH traffic now flows through the per-agent ssh-gate
sidecar, so pipelock should know nothing about bottle.ssh.

Removed:
- pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, _trusted_domains, _ip_cidrs.
- The trusted_domains / ssrf blocks built from ssh entries.
- pipelock_proxy_host_port — its last caller (the ssh provisioner)
  is gone.
- is_ipv4_literal — only used to classify ssh hostnames into
  trusted_domains vs ssrf.ip_allowlist, both of which are gone.

api_allowlist now derives solely from baked-in defaults +
bottle.egress.allowlist. Tests updated to pin the new shape and
assert ssh hostnames do NOT leak into pipelock's config.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-12 16:08:26 -04:00
parent ce948db0b7
commit 6130ea385f
6 changed files with 29 additions and 122 deletions
-4
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@@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ def pipelock_proxy_url(slug: str) -> str:
return f"http://{pipelock_container_name(slug)}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}" return f"http://{pipelock_container_name(slug)}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def pipelock_proxy_host_port(slug: str) -> str:
return f"{pipelock_container_name(slug)}:{PIPELOCK_PORT}"
def pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]: def pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
"""Generate a fresh per-bottle CA via a one-shot pipelock container. """Generate a fresh per-bottle CA via a one-shot pipelock container.
+4 -36
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@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast from typing import cast
from .manifest import Bottle from .manifest import Bottle
from .util import is_ipv4_literal
# Baked-in default allowlist for hosts Claude Code itself needs. # Baked-in default allowlist for hosts Claude Code itself needs.
DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST: tuple[str, ...] = ( DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST: tuple[str, ...] = (
@@ -40,30 +39,17 @@ def pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return list(bottle.egress.allowlist) return list(bottle.egress.allowlist)
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [e.Hostname for e in bottle.ssh if e.Hostname]
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [h for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if not is_ipv4_literal(h)]
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [f"{h}/32" for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if is_ipv4_literal(h)]
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]: def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
"""Deduplicated union of: baked-in defaults, bottle.egress.allowlist, """Deduplicated union of: baked-in defaults, bottle.egress.allowlist.
bottle.ssh[].Hostname. Sorted for stability.""" Sorted for stability. Per PRD 0007, bottle.ssh entries do NOT
contribute here — SSH traffic flows through the per-agent ssh-gate
sidecar, not pipelock."""
seen: dict[str, None] = {} seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for h in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST: for h in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST:
seen.setdefault(h, None) seen.setdefault(h, None)
for h in pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle): for h in pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle):
if h: if h:
seen.setdefault(h, None) seen.setdefault(h, None)
for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle):
if h:
seen.setdefault(h, None)
return sorted(seen.keys()) return sorted(seen.keys())
@@ -116,12 +102,6 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle), "api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle),
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True}, "forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
} }
trusted = pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle)
if trusted:
cfg["trusted_domains"] = trusted
ip_cidrs = pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle)
if ip_cidrs:
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": ip_cidrs}
cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True} cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True}
# Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP # Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP
# "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's # "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's
@@ -163,18 +143,6 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"]) fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}") lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
lines.append("") lines.append("")
if "trusted_domains" in cfg:
lines.append("trusted_domains:")
for td in cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"]):
lines.append(f' - "{td}"')
lines.append("")
if "ssrf" in cfg:
lines.append("ssrf:")
ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
for cidr in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
lines.append(f' - "{cidr}"')
lines.append("")
lines.append("dlp:") lines.append("dlp:")
dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"]) dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"])
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}") lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
-13
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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ level deeper, under their backend package."""
from __future__ import annotations from __future__ import annotations
import os import os
import re
def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str: def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
@@ -17,15 +16,3 @@ def expand_tilde(path: str) -> str:
home = os.environ.get("HOME", "") home = os.environ.get("HOME", "")
return home + path[1:] return home + path[1:]
return path return path
_IPV4_RE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$")
def is_ipv4_literal(s: str) -> bool:
"""True iff `s` looks like a dotted-quad IPv4 literal. Does not
validate octet ranges; consumers that care about that should run
a stricter check. Empty input returns False."""
if not s:
return False
return bool(_IPV4_RE.match(s))
+10 -24
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,12 @@
"""Unit: pipelock_effective_allowlist — the union of baked-in defaults, """Unit: pipelock_effective_allowlist — the union of baked-in defaults
bottle.egress.allowlist, and bottle.ssh[].Hostname. Plus a small check and bottle.egress.allowlist. Per PRD 0007, bottle.ssh entries do NOT
that IPv4 hostnames pick up the /32 suffix when classified as CIDRs. contribute (SSH traffic goes through the per-agent ssh-gate, not
pipelock)."""
The lower-level one-line helpers (pipelock_bottle_allowlist,
pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames, pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains)
are exercised end-to-end by test_union_and_dedup, so they don't get
their own tests."""
import unittest import unittest
from claude_bottle.manifest import Manifest from claude_bottle.manifest import Manifest
from claude_bottle.pipelock import ( from claude_bottle.pipelock import pipelock_effective_allowlist
pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs,
pipelock_effective_allowlist,
)
from tests.fixtures import fixture_with_ssh
class TestEffectiveAllowlist(unittest.TestCase): class TestEffectiveAllowlist(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -36,20 +28,14 @@ class TestEffectiveAllowlist(unittest.TestCase):
eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(manifest.bottles["dev"]) eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(manifest.bottles["dev"])
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", eff, "baked default present") self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", eff, "baked default present")
self.assertIn("registry.npmjs.org", eff, "egress.allowlist present") self.assertIn("registry.npmjs.org", eff, "egress.allowlist present")
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42", eff, "ssh ipv4 hostname present") # PRD 0007: ssh hostnames must not contribute to pipelock's
self.assertIn("github.com", eff, "ssh hostname present") # allowlist anymore — they're routed through the ssh-gate
# sidecar, which is on its own egress path.
self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", eff)
self.assertNotIn("github.com", eff)
self.assertEqual(len(eff), len(set(eff)), "deduplicated") self.assertEqual(len(eff), len(set(eff)), "deduplicated")
self.assertEqual(eff, sorted(eff), "sorted") self.assertEqual(eff, sorted(eff), "sorted")
class TestSSHIPCidrs(unittest.TestCase):
def test_ipv4_hostname_gets_32_suffix(self):
cidrs = pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(fixture_with_ssh().bottles["dev"])
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42/32", cidrs)
# Hostname-typed entries don't end up here.
self.assertNotIn("github.com", cidrs)
self.assertNotIn("github.com/32", cidrs)
if __name__ == "__main__": if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main() unittest.main()
-33
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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
"""Unit: is_ipv4_literal — the classifier that decides whether
bottle.ssh[].Hostname goes into pipelock's ssrf.ip_allowlist (IPv4
literal) or trusted_domains (hostname)."""
import unittest
from claude_bottle.util import is_ipv4_literal
class TestIPv4Classify(unittest.TestCase):
def test_positive(self):
for ip in ("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.5", "100.78.141.42", "0.0.0.0", "255.255.255.255"):
with self.subTest(ip=ip):
self.assertTrue(is_ipv4_literal(ip), ip)
def test_negative(self):
for hn in (
"github.com",
"gitea.dideric.is",
"100.78.141",
"100.78.141.42.5",
"::1",
"fe80::1",
"localhost",
"",
"1.2.3.4.example.com",
):
with self.subTest(hn=hn):
self.assertFalse(is_ipv4_literal(hn), hn)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+15 -12
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@@ -34,23 +34,25 @@ class TestBuildConfig(unittest.TestCase):
# Baked defaults always present. # Baked defaults always present.
self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"])) self.assertIn("api.anthropic.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
self.assertIn("raw.githubusercontent.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"])) self.assertIn("raw.githubusercontent.com", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
# No SSH entries → no trusted_domains, no ssrf. # PRD 0007: pipelock has no SSH carve-outs at all — neither
# trusted_domains nor ssrf are ever emitted from bottle data
# in v1.
self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains", cfg) self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains", cfg)
self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg) self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg)
# Without CA paths, the tls_interception block is omitted — # Without CA paths, the tls_interception block is omitted —
# pipelock falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`. # pipelock falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`.
self.assertNotIn("tls_interception", cfg) self.assertNotIn("tls_interception", cfg)
def test_ssh_shape(self): def test_ssh_entries_do_not_leak_into_pipelock(self):
# PRD 0007: bottle.ssh routes through the ssh-gate sidecar,
# so pipelock's config must not reflect those hostnames or
# IPs in any of its blocks.
cfg = pipelock_build_config(fixture_with_ssh().bottles["dev"]) cfg = pipelock_build_config(fixture_with_ssh().bottles["dev"])
self.assertIn("github.com", cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"])) allow = cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"])
self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"])) self.assertNotIn("github.com", allow)
self.assertIn( self.assertNotIn("100.78.141.42", allow)
"100.78.141.42/32", self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains", cfg)
cast(dict[str, Any], cfg["ssrf"])["ip_allowlist"], self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg)
)
# Strict mode: IPv4 host is also in the api_allowlist union.
self.assertIn("100.78.141.42", cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]))
def test_tls_interception_block_emitted_when_paths_supplied(self): def test_tls_interception_block_emitted_when_paths_supplied(self):
# PRD 0006: paths flow in via DockerPipelockProxy's in-container # PRD 0006: paths flow in via DockerPipelockProxy's in-container
@@ -95,12 +97,13 @@ class TestRenderAndWrite(unittest.TestCase):
for required in ( for required in (
"api_allowlist:", "api_allowlist:",
"forward_proxy:", "forward_proxy:",
"trusted_domains:",
"ssrf:",
"dlp:", "dlp:",
"request_body_scanning:", "request_body_scanning:",
): ):
self.assertIn(required, text) self.assertIn(required, text)
# PRD 0007: no ssh carve-outs in the rendered yaml.
self.assertNotIn("trusted_domains:", text)
self.assertNotIn("ssrf:", text)
def test_prepare_writes_file_at_mode_600(self): def test_prepare_writes_file_at_mode_600(self):
plan = DockerPipelockProxy().prepare( plan = DockerPipelockProxy().prepare(