feat(control-plane): role-scoped signed tokens so the gateway can't drive operator routes
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Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) — the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller. Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens (compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency): * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway` (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher). * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch` gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/ {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated, 403 wrong role). * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key. * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key. Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s); Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ import unittest
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import urllib.error
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
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from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
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from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import (
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CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER,
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CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV,
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PolicyResolveError,
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PolicyResolver,
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_control_auth_headers,
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)
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_URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.policy_resolver.urllib.request.urlopen"
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@@ -23,6 +29,18 @@ def _http_error(code: int) -> urllib.error.HTTPError:
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return urllib.error.HTTPError("http://x/resolve", code, "err", {}, None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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class TestControlAuthHeaders(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_sends_the_gateway_jwt_when_configured(self) -> None:
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV: "gateway.jwt.tok"}):
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self.assertEqual({CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: "gateway.jwt.tok"}, _control_auth_headers())
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def test_sends_nothing_when_unset(self) -> None:
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import os
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with patch.dict("os.environ", {}, clear=False):
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os.environ.pop(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, None)
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self.assertEqual({}, _control_auth_headers())
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class TestPolicyResolver(unittest.TestCase):
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def setUp(self) -> None:
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self.r = PolicyResolver("http://orch:8080")
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