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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/bottle.py
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fix(firecracker): run the agent from /home/node, not the /root SSH cwd
The control SSH logs in as root, so the agent (dropped to node via
runuser) inherited cwd=/root. That was harmless while the rootless
rootfs left /root node-owned, but the dropbear fix (chown /root →
root:root 0700) made /root unreadable to node — so the agent's cwd was
inaccessible, breaking Node's process.cwd(), Claude Code's shell-snapshot
machinery, and `/doctor` (which reported /root/.claude EACCES and failed
every Bash command).

Run the agent from its workdir (default /home/node) via `env --chdir`.
Not a `sh -c 'cd … && exec "$@"'` wrapper: ssh space-joins everything
after the host into one string for the guest shell, so the quoted script
+ $@ get re-split and mangled (it exec'd the $0 placeholder → exit 127).
`env --chdir=DIR …` is all simple words, so it survives the join.

Verified end-to-end: a real headless claude bottle now runs its Bash tool
and exits 0 (was EACCES/127 before).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-11 18:57:33 -04:00

190 lines
7.8 KiB
Python

"""Bottle handle for a Firecracker microVM, over SSH.
Every operation routes through SSH to the guest (dropbear, listening on
the TAP link). `exec` pipes a script over stdin and captures output;
`cp_in` uses scp; `exec_agent` uses `ssh -t` for an interactive PTY
session. `ssh -t` forwards the host terminal's SIGWINCH to the remote
PTY natively, so no separate resize bridge is needed.
Commands run as the image's `node` user via `runuser`, with HOME/USER/
PATH and the bottle env (HTTPS_PROXY at the sidecar, CA paths, …) set
per-invocation through `env` (the VM itself just runs the init; it has
no baked-in process env like a `docker run` container would).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shlex
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Mapping, cast
from ...agent_provider import PromptMode, prompt_args
from .. import Bottle, ExecResult
from ..terminal import exec_shell_script
from . import util
_HOME_FOR = {"node": "/home/node", "root": "/root"}
_DEFAULT_PATH_FOR = {
"node": (
"/home/node/.local/bin:"
"/home/node/.codex/packages/standalone/current/bin:"
"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
),
"root": "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
}
def _env_assignments_for(user: str, env: Mapping[str, str]) -> list[str]:
home = _HOME_FOR.get(user, f"/home/{user}")
out = [f"HOME={home}", f"USER={user}"]
if "PATH" not in env:
out.append(f"PATH={_DEFAULT_PATH_FOR.get(user, _DEFAULT_PATH_FOR['root'])}")
for k, v in env.items():
out.append(f"{k}={v}")
return out
class FirecrackerBottle(Bottle):
def __init__(
self,
name: str,
*,
private_key: Path,
guest_ip: str,
guest_env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
prompt_path_in_guest: str | None = None,
agent_command: str = "claude",
agent_prompt_mode: PromptMode = "append_file",
agent_provider_template: str = "claude",
terminal_title: str = "",
terminal_color: str = "",
agent_workdir: str = "/home/node",
) -> None:
self.name = name
self._private_key = private_key
self._guest_ip = guest_ip
self._guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
self.prompt_path = prompt_path_in_guest
self._agent_prompt_mode = agent_prompt_mode
self.agent_command = agent_command
self.terminal_title = terminal_title
self.terminal_color = terminal_color
self.agent_provider_template = agent_provider_template
self.agent_workdir = agent_workdir
def _ssh(self, *, tty: bool) -> list[str]:
argv = util.ssh_base_argv(self._private_key, self._guest_ip)
if tty:
# -t: allocate a remote PTY and forward window-size changes.
argv.insert(1, "-t")
return argv
def _agent_remote_argv(self, argv: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""The `runuser … <agent> …` command run inside the guest."""
full_argv = list(argv)
full_argv.extend(
prompt_args(
cast(PromptMode, self._agent_prompt_mode),
self.prompt_path,
argv=full_argv,
)
)
# ALWAYS cd into the workdir before exec'ing the agent. The
# control SSH logs in as root, so the inherited cwd is /root —
# which the agent (running as node) can't even read now that
# /root is root-owned. Run the agent from the node workdir
# (default /home/node) so its cwd is node-accessible; otherwise
# Node's process.cwd(), the shell-snapshot machinery, and
# `/doctor` all fail on the unreadable /root.
# Run the agent from the node workdir (default /home/node), NOT
# the /root cwd inherited from the root SSH login — /root is now
# root-owned and unreadable by node, which breaks Node's
# process.cwd(), the shell-snapshot machinery, and `/doctor`.
# Use `env --chdir` rather than a `sh -c 'cd … && exec "$@"'`
# wrapper: ssh space-joins everything after the host into one
# string for the guest shell, so a quoted script + $@ would be
# re-split and mangled (exec'ing the $0 placeholder). All-simple
# words survive that join.
workdir = self.agent_workdir or _HOME_FOR["node"]
remote = ["runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"env", f"--chdir={workdir}",
*_env_assignments_for("node", self._guest_env),
self.agent_command, *full_argv]
return remote
def agent_argv(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> list[str]:
return [*self._ssh(tty=tty), "--", *self._agent_remote_argv(argv)]
def exec_agent(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> int:
agent_argv = self.agent_argv(argv, tty=tty)
script = (
exec_shell_script(agent_argv, self.terminal_title, self.terminal_color)
if tty else None
)
if script is None:
return subprocess.run(agent_argv, check=False).returncode
return subprocess.run(["sh", "-lc", script], check=False).returncode
def exec(self, script: str, *, user: str = "node") -> ExecResult:
# Pipe the script over stdin (`sh -s`) so nothing needs shell
# quoting through the SSH command line.
remote = ["runuser", "-u", user, "--",
"env", *_env_assignments_for(user, self._guest_env),
"/bin/sh", "-s"]
result = subprocess.run(
[*self._ssh(tty=False), "--", *remote],
input=script, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
return ExecResult(
returncode=result.returncode,
stdout=result.stdout,
stderr=result.stderr,
)
def cp_in(self, host_path: str, container_path: str) -> None:
# Stream a tar over the SSH exec channel rather than scp: the
# guest runs dropbear, which ships no sftp-server/scp, but every
# agent image has `tar`. Copy so `container_path` becomes a copy
# of `host_path` (docker cp semantics — callers rm -rf the
# destination first).
host_parent = os.path.dirname(host_path.rstrip("/")) or "/"
host_base = os.path.basename(host_path.rstrip("/"))
guest_parent = os.path.dirname(container_path.rstrip("/")) or "/"
guest_base = os.path.basename(container_path.rstrip("/"))
remote = (
f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(guest_parent)} && "
f"cd {shlex.quote(guest_parent)} && "
f"rm -rf {shlex.quote(guest_base)} && tar -xf - && "
f"{{ [ {shlex.quote(host_base)} = {shlex.quote(guest_base)} ] || "
f"mv {shlex.quote(host_base)} {shlex.quote(guest_base)}; }}"
)
tar = subprocess.Popen(
["tar", "-C", host_parent, "-cf", "-", host_base],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
)
# Pass the command as one arg: ssh space-joins everything after
# the host into a single string for the guest's login shell, so a
# `sh -c <remote>` split would drop everything past the first word
# (the guest shell runs `<remote>` directly; stdin carries the
# tar).
ssh = subprocess.run(
[*self._ssh(tty=False), "--", remote],
stdin=tar.stdout, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
tar.wait()
if tar.returncode != 0 or ssh.returncode != 0:
sys.stderr.write(ssh.stderr)
raise subprocess.CalledProcessError(
ssh.returncode or tar.returncode,
["cp_in", host_path, container_path],
)
def close(self) -> None:
# Real teardown (VM terminate, TAP release) lives on the launch
# ExitStack; this is the idempotent alias the ABC expects.
pass