didericis-claude
bbd6ec85ac
- Remove pipelock_state_dir, _PIPELOCK_SUBDIR from bottle_state.py - Remove proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan from DockerBottlePlan - Remove EGRESS_PIPELOCK_CA_IN_CONTAINER from docker/egress.py - Remove pipelock TLS init and proxy_plan population from launch.py - Remove PipelockProxy import and pipelock_dir setup from prepare.py - Remove pipelock volumes, daemon entry, and network alias from compose.py - Remove pipelock mirroring entirely from egress_apply.py - Agent HTTP_PROXY now always points at egress (no pipelock fallback)
110 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
110 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
"""Docker-side egress helpers: port pin, in-container CA paths,
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container naming, and the host-side mitmproxy CA mint. The
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prepare-time routes-yaml rendering itself lives on the
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platform-neutral `Egress` ABC — backends instantiate it directly.
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The per-container `.start()` / `.stop()` lifecycle was removed in
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PRD 0024 chunk 3; the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024) runs egress
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under its python init supervisor."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import subprocess
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from pathlib import Path
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from ...log import die
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# Listening port the egress daemon binds inside the bundle. The
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# agent's HTTP_PROXY env var resolves to `http://egress:<port>`,
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# and the bundle's network aliases route `egress` to itself.
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EGRESS_PORT = int(os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_EGRESS_PORT", "9099"))
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# In-container path for mitmproxy's CA. The format is a single PEM
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# file holding BOTH the cert and the private key, concatenated.
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EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem"
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def egress_tls_init(stage_dir: Path) -> tuple[Path, Path]:
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"""Mint the per-bottle egress MITM CA via host `openssl req`.
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Returns `(mitmproxy_pem, cert_only_pem)`:
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- `mitmproxy_pem` is the single-PEM concat (cert + key)
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mitmproxy reads from `~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem`.
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- `cert_only_pem` is the cert alone — installed into the agent's
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trust store by `provision_ca` so the agent trusts the bumped
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CONNECT cert egress presents.
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openssl req's `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` extension uses
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SHA-1(pubkey), matching mitmproxy's AKI computation on leaves.
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Both files live under `<stage_dir>/egress-ca/` (mode 644 —
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`docker cp` preserves the mode into the container, where the
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mitmproxy user (uid 1000) reads them; the host stage_dir is
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mode 700 so the private key isn't world-exposed)."""
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work = stage_dir / "egress-ca"
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work.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
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key_path = work / "ca-key.pem"
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cert_path = work / "ca.pem"
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cnf_path = work / "ca.cnf"
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# RSA-2048 — broad mitmproxy compatibility (its default leaf-cert
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# config matches RSA CAs without surprise), and openssl req's
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# default behavior here is exactly what we want.
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keygen = subprocess.run(
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["openssl", "genrsa", "-out", str(key_path), "2048"],
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capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
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)
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if keygen.returncode != 0:
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die(f"egress ca keygen failed: {keygen.stderr.strip()}")
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# Standalone private key — never docker-cp'd, never bind-mounted
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# (mitmproxy reads the cert+key concat below). Lock to owner-
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# only so it doesn't sit at the default umask on disk.
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key_path.chmod(0o600)
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# `subjectKeyIdentifier=hash` makes openssl compute the SKI as
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# SHA-1(pubkey), matching how mitmproxy computes the AKI on the
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# leaves it later mints. Without this, chain validation breaks
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# despite the CA being present in the trust store.
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cnf_path.write_text(
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"[req]\n"
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"distinguished_name = req_dn\n"
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"prompt = no\n"
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"x509_extensions = v3_ca\n"
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"\n"
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"[req_dn]\n"
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"O = bot-bottle\n"
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"CN = bot-bottle egress CA\n"
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"\n"
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"[v3_ca]\n"
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"basicConstraints = critical, CA:TRUE\n"
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"keyUsage = critical, keyCertSign, cRLSign\n"
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"subjectKeyIdentifier = hash\n"
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)
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cnf_path.chmod(0o644)
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req = subprocess.run(
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["openssl", "req", "-x509", "-new", "-nodes",
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"-key", str(key_path),
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"-sha256", "-days", "365",
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"-config", str(cnf_path),
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"-out", str(cert_path)],
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capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
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)
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if req.returncode != 0:
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die(f"egress ca cert generation failed: {req.stderr.strip()}")
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cert_path.chmod(0o644)
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# mitmproxy reads cert + key from a single concatenated PEM file.
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# This file IS bind-mounted into the egress container (chunk 3+),
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# where mitmproxy runs as uid 1000 — so the host file has to be
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# world-readable for the container's user to read it through the
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# mount. Owner-only mode on the parent dir (state/<slug>/, under
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# ~/.bot-bottle which inherits ~'s 0o700) is what actually
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# restricts who can reach this file on the host.
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mitm = work / "mitmproxy-ca.pem"
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mitm.write_bytes(cert_path.read_bytes() + key_path.read_bytes())
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mitm.chmod(0o644)
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return (mitm, cert_path)
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