ca91fc4d91
The control plane had no caller authentication — dispatch() routed every request straight through, and the only guards anywhere were the (source_ip, identity_token) checks inside /resolve and /attribute, which authenticate the *bottle* a request is about, not the *caller*. On the consolidated backends the agent shares a network with the control-plane port (macOS: the infra container runs 8099 on the agent's --internal network; docker: the orchestrator container sits on the shared gateway network), so a prompt-injected agent could GET /bottles (enumerate siblings + policies), PUT /bottles/<id>/policy (rewrite its own egress allowlist to allow-all), POST /resolve (read the injected upstream credentials it's never meant to see), and POST /supervise/respond (self-approve its own proposals). Every README guarantee collapsed to the agent's discretion. Fix: a per-host control-plane secret required on every route but GET /health, compared with hmac.compare_digest. It is held only by the trusted callers and never handed to an agent: - minted + persisted 0600 at <root>/control-plane-token (paths.host_control_plane_token); - injected as $BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN into the orchestrator + gateway containers via bare `--env NAME` (value inherited from the launch process, so it never lands on argv or in `container/docker inspect`); - presented by the gateway's PolicyResolver (reads the env) on /resolve, and by the host CLI's OrchestratorClient (reads the host file) on every call. The agent container is never given the env var or the host file, so from a bottle every /bottles*, /resolve, /attribute, and /supervise/* call now returns 401 — closing the enumeration, allowlist-rewrite, credential-lift, and self-approval. The existing (source_ip, identity_token) checks stay as defense-in-depth. Enforced when configured: macOS + docker inject the secret (→ enforced). With no secret set the server runs open and warns loudly at startup — a fail-visible fallback for the unit suite and for Firecracker, whose port-scoped nft already blocks agents from 8099 (wiring the secret into its infra-VM init is a clean fast-follow, left out here to avoid churning the prebuilt-artifact hash). Verified end-to-end on real Apple Container: infra comes up healthy, the host CLI (with the secret) lists bottles while an unauthenticated GET /bottles gets 401, all five issue-#400 attacks from inside the agent get 401, and egress policy still works (200 allowed / 403 denied) — proving the gateway authenticates to /resolve with the secret. 1829 unit tests pass, pyright clean, pylint 9.91. Refs #400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tests
Plain-Python test suite using stdlib unittest. No external
dependencies. Unit tests run anywhere Python 3 is present; integration
tests need Docker and skip cleanly otherwise.
Layout
tests/
fixtures.py # JSON manifest builders (shared)
_docker.py # docker-availability skip helper (shared)
unit/
test_egress.py
test_egress_addon_core.py
test_manifest_egress.py
test_dlp_detectors.py
test_manifest_runtime.py
... # many others; see unit/ directory
integration/
test_gateway_image.py
test_dry_run_plan.py
test_orphan_cleanup.py
...
canaries/ # opt-in; see below (currently empty)
Classification falls out of the directory — no hand-maintained list to keep in sync.
Running
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit -v # unit only
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v # integration only
python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests -v # both (recursive)
python -m unittest tests.unit.test_manifest_egress # one file
Discovery is invoked with -t . (top-level dir = repo root) so the
bot_bottle package on sys.path resolves correctly.
What the integration tests cover
test_dry_run_plan.py—cli.py start --dry-run --format=jsonemits a structured plan that contains the resolved egress allowlist and the bottle's runtime, and creates zero Docker resources.test_orphan_cleanup.py—network_removeis idempotent against missing resources, so the EXIT trap can call it unconditionally.test_gateway_image.py— builds Dockerfile.gateway and probes that gitleaks / mitmdump / supervise are all reachable inside the gateway image.
Canaries
tests/canaries/ holds upstream-regression checks gated on
BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 and not part of the per-push suite.
They're invoked by the scheduled canaries workflow. Currently
no canaries are defined.
BOT_BOTTLE_RUN_CANARIES=1 python -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/canaries -v
What's NOT covered
bot_bottle/ssh.pyend-to-end (would need a fake SSH host inside the container).- A live SSH-through-git-gate tunnel against a real Tailscale-style IP.
- DLP false-positive measurements.
- TLS handling / cert pinning behavior.
Adding a test
- Pick the directory:
tests/unit/for a pure unit test,tests/integration/for one that needs Docker. - Filename:
test_<topic>.py. - Boilerplate:
import unittest from bot_bottle.<module> import <symbol> class TestThing(unittest.TestCase): def test_x(self): ... if __name__ == "__main__": unittest.main() - For Docker-dependent tests, decorate the class with
@skip_unless_docker()fromtests._docker.