73 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
73 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/sh
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# Egress daemon entrypoint inside the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024).
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#
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# Extracted verbatim from Dockerfile.egress's prior inline `sh -c`
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# ENTRYPOINT so the supervisor in bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py can
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# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
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#
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# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
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# to `--mode upstream:URL` to forward all post-MITM traffic
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# through pipelock. mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on
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# its outbound side, so the upstream wiring has to be the
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# mitmproxy mode flag, not env.
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# * Upstream trust: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA is set, build a
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# combined trust bundle (system roots + pipelock CA) and point
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# mitmproxy at it. The option REPLACES mitmproxy's default
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# trust store, so passing pipelock's CA alone would break
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# pipelock-passthrough hosts (api.anthropic.com etc.).
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# * `-s /app/egress_addon.py` loads the addon that reads
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# /etc/egress/routes.yaml.
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set -e
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# Pin mitmproxy's config dir to the bind-mount location of its CA
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# regardless of which user mitmdump runs as. In the legacy
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# four-sidecar setup (Dockerfile.egress, USER mitmproxy) this
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# resolved naturally to `~mitmproxy/.mitmproxy`. In the PRD 0024
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# bundle (USER root) `~root/.mitmproxy` is empty, so without this
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# flag mitmdump would generate a fresh CA on the wrong path and
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# the agent's installed trust anchor would no longer match the
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# bumped leaf certs.
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CONFDIR=/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy
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CONFDIR_FLAG="--set confdir=$CONFDIR"
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MODE="--mode regular@9099"
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
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MODE="--mode upstream:$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY --listen-port 9099"
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fi
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# Bind address. Docker backend wants `0.0.0.0` (agent dials egress
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# directly via the docker network alias). Smolmachines backend
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# wants `127.0.0.1` because the agent dials pipelock — not egress
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# — and egress is pipelock's localhost-only upstream inside the
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# bundle. TSI's IP-only allowlist would otherwise let the agent
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# reach `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass pipelock's DLP; binding
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# 127.0.0.1 inside the bundle closes that gap (PRD 0023 chunk 3).
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LISTEN_HOST_FLAG=""
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST" ]; then
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LISTEN_HOST_FLAG="--listen-host $EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST"
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fi
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TRUST_FLAG=""
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ] && [ -f "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ]; then
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COMBINED=$CONFDIR/combined-trust.pem
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cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" > "$COMBINED"
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TRUST_FLAG="--set ssl_verify_upstream_trusted_ca=$COMBINED"
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fi
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# Scope the proxy env to this process tree only. In the bundle
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# image (PRD 0024) the four daemons share one container — setting
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# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's git
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# pushes through pipelock, which is wrong (pipelock doesn't proxy
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# SSH and would block public git repos). Setting them here means
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# only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them. In the legacy
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# four-sidecar setup these env vars are also set in compose; here
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# they're additionally defensive.
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
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export HTTPS_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
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export HTTP_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
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export NO_PROXY="localhost,127.0.0.1"
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fi
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exec mitmdump $CONFDIR_FLAG $MODE $LISTEN_HOST_FLAG $TRUST_FLAG -s /app/egress_addon.py
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