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bot-bottle/bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/isolation_probe.py
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feat(firecracker): add Linux microVM backend to replace smolmachines
Adds a Firecracker-based backend for Linux, providing mature KVM-based
microVM isolation to replace smolmachines/libkrun (issue #342, closes
the dead-end tracked in #332).

Architecture:
- Guest control over SSH (dropbear injected into the rootfs) on a
  point-to-point TAP link. `ssh -t` forwards SIGWINCH natively, so no
  resize bridge is needed.
- Networking: a one-time, root-provisioned pool of user-owned TAP
  devices (no shared bridge → no docker0/virbr0/cni0 collisions) plus a
  dedicated `table inet bot_bottle_fc` nftables table (independent of
  Docker/ufw/firewalld rules). `./cli.py firecracker setup` prints the
  host-appropriate config (NixOS module or sudo script).
- Rootfs: `docker export` → ext4 via `mke2fs -d` (rootless, no mount),
  cached by image digest; per-bottle SSH pubkey + IP passed via the
  kernel cmdline.
- Sidecar: reuses the Docker bundle, published on the slot's host TAP IP.
- Fail-closed isolation: TAP pool verified at preflight; the egress
  boundary is proven empirically post-boot (before the agent runs) by a
  canary probe — the VM must fail to reach the host directly, or launch
  is refused.

Linux hosts with Firecracker + KVM now default to this backend;
macOS stays on macos-container.

Not yet validated end-to-end on live hardware (requires the one-time
network pool). Unit tests + pyright pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G8p32HJgPoS1hLPWubbftM
2026-07-11 10:32:55 -04:00

117 lines
4.0 KiB
Python

"""Empirical, post-boot isolation probe — the authoritative fail-closed
egress-boundary check.
The pre-boot nft check can't be trusted on every host (listing an
nftables table typically needs root; the launcher runs unprivileged).
So before the agent ever runs, we prove the boundary directly: open a
canary TCP listener on a host IP the VM must NOT be able to reach (the
host's primary non-TAP address), then have the guest try to connect. If
the isolation rules are in force the connection is dropped and times
out; if it succeeds, the VM can reach host services it shouldn't — a
sandbox escape — and we refuse to continue.
The listener is load-bearing: without it a "blocked" result could just
be connection-refused. With it, a reachable canary means a real leak
and a timeout means a real drop.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import socket
import subprocess
import threading
from pathlib import Path
from ...log import die, info, warn
from . import util
def _host_primary_ip() -> str:
"""The source IP the host uses for off-box traffic (its LAN
address) — a canary the VM must not reach. Empty if the host has no
such route (isolated box)."""
result = subprocess.run(
["ip", "-o", "route", "get", "1.1.1.1"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
return ""
tokens = result.stdout.split()
# `... src <addr> ...` — the address the host would use as source.
if "src" in tokens:
idx = tokens.index("src")
if idx + 1 < len(tokens):
return tokens[idx + 1]
return ""
# Guest-side connect test: exit 0 = reached the canary (LEAK), 1 =
# blocked (good), 2 = no usable tool (inconclusive -> fail-closed).
_GUEST_PROBE = r"""
h="$1"; p="$2"
if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
python3 - "$h" "$p" <<'PY'
import socket, sys
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(3)
sys.exit(0 if s.connect_ex((sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]))) == 0 else 1)
PY
elif command -v bash >/dev/null 2>&1; then
timeout 3 bash -c "exec 3<>/dev/tcp/$h/$p" >/dev/null 2>&1
elif command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
nc -w3 -z "$h" "$p" >/dev/null 2>&1
else
exit 2
fi
"""
def verify_isolation(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str) -> None:
"""Prove the VM cannot reach the host's primary IP. Dies
(fail-closed) on a confirmed leak or if the guest has no tool to
run the test. Warns (does not fail) when the host has no canary
address to test against."""
canary_ip = _host_primary_ip()
if not canary_ip:
warn("isolation probe skipped: host has no non-TAP route to test "
"against (isolated box).")
return
listener = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
listener.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
listener.bind((canary_ip, 0))
listener.listen(1)
listener.settimeout(6)
canary_port = listener.getsockname()[1]
accepted: list[bool] = []
def _accept() -> None:
try:
conn, _ = listener.accept()
accepted.append(True)
conn.close()
except OSError:
pass
thread = threading.Thread(target=_accept, daemon=True)
thread.start()
ssh = util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip)
result = subprocess.run(
[*ssh, "--", "sh", "-s", "--", canary_ip, str(canary_port)],
input=_GUEST_PROBE, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
thread.join(timeout=7)
listener.close()
if result.returncode == 0 or accepted:
die(f"ISOLATION FAILURE: the VM reached the host canary "
f"{canary_ip}:{canary_port}. The egress boundary is not in "
f"force — refusing to run the agent (fail-closed). Verify the "
f"nft table with: ./cli.py firecracker setup")
if result.returncode == 2:
die("isolation probe inconclusive: the guest has no python3/bash/nc "
"to run the connectivity test. Refusing to continue "
"(fail-closed).")
info(f"isolation verified: VM cannot reach host {canary_ip}")