didericis
2287b0dd08
Three deliverables:
1. Rewrite test_pipelock_apply bringup with a direct `docker run`.
Replaces the .start-based bringup deleted in chunk 3. Stages
the yaml + CAs to the real pipelock_state_dir so the bind-
mount target matches what apply_allowlist_change writes to —
the legacy .start path did this implicitly because it lived
inside the production flow; the new bringup needs to be
explicit about the path. All 4 cases pass.
2. New tests/integration/test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py: end-
to-end smoke with CLAUDE_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE=1. Brings up
a real bottle via the compose path and verifies the agent
can reach pipelock + supervise through the bundle's legacy
aliases (no agent-side config changes between flag positions).
Skipped under act_runner — multi-stage build + bind mounts.
3. Two bundle-path bugs surfaced and fixed while running PRD
0022 with the flag on:
- egress_entrypoint.sh: add `--set confdir=/home/mitmproxy/
.mitmproxy` so mitmdump finds the bind-mounted CA. The
legacy Dockerfile.egress runs as user mitmproxy (~mitmproxy
resolves correctly); the bundle runs as root and otherwise
would look in /root/.mitmproxy/ and mint a NEW CA the agent
doesn't trust. Symptom: PRD 0022 attack-3 curl failed with
"unable to get local issuer certificate".
- sidecar_init.py: add `--listen 0.0.0.0:8888` to pipelock's
argv. Without it pipelock defaults to 127.0.0.1, so the
in-bundle egress's upstream connect to the
`claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>` alias arrives over the
docker network and gets refused. The legacy renderer
passed this flag verbatim; the bundle dropped it. Symptom:
egress returned HTTP 502 with "Connect call failed
('172.x.x.x', 8888)".
PRD 0022's 5-attack sandbox-escape suite now passes with the
bundle flag on AND off.
Test status:
- Unit: 533 passing.
- Integration: 9 passing locally with flag off, 5 passing with
flag on. Bundle compose smoke + PRD 0022 sandbox-escape both
green under CLAUDE_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE=1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Bash
61 lines
2.6 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/sh
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# Egress daemon entrypoint inside the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024).
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#
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# Extracted verbatim from Dockerfile.egress's prior inline `sh -c`
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# ENTRYPOINT so the supervisor in claude_bottle/sidecar_init.py can
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# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
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#
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# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
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# to `--mode upstream:URL` to forward all post-MITM traffic
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# through pipelock. mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on
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# its outbound side, so the upstream wiring has to be the
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# mitmproxy mode flag, not env.
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# * Upstream trust: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA is set, build a
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# combined trust bundle (system roots + pipelock CA) and point
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# mitmproxy at it. The option REPLACES mitmproxy's default
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# trust store, so passing pipelock's CA alone would break
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# pipelock-passthrough hosts (api.anthropic.com etc.).
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# * `-s /app/egress_addon.py` loads the addon that reads
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# /etc/egress/routes.yaml.
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set -e
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# Pin mitmproxy's config dir to the bind-mount location of its CA
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# regardless of which user mitmdump runs as. In the legacy
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# four-sidecar setup (Dockerfile.egress, USER mitmproxy) this
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# resolved naturally to `~mitmproxy/.mitmproxy`. In the PRD 0024
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# bundle (USER root) `~root/.mitmproxy` is empty, so without this
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# flag mitmdump would generate a fresh CA on the wrong path and
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# the agent's installed trust anchor would no longer match the
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# bumped leaf certs.
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CONFDIR=/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy
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CONFDIR_FLAG="--set confdir=$CONFDIR"
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MODE="--mode regular@9099"
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
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MODE="--mode upstream:$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY --listen-port 9099"
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fi
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TRUST_FLAG=""
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ] && [ -f "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ]; then
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COMBINED=$CONFDIR/combined-trust.pem
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cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" > "$COMBINED"
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TRUST_FLAG="--set ssl_verify_upstream_trusted_ca=$COMBINED"
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fi
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# Scope the proxy env to this process tree only. In the bundle
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# image (PRD 0024) the four daemons share one container — setting
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# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's git
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# pushes through pipelock, which is wrong (pipelock doesn't proxy
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# SSH and would block public git repos). Setting them here means
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# only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them. In the legacy
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# four-sidecar setup these env vars are also set in compose; here
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# they're additionally defensive.
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if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
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export HTTPS_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
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export HTTP_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
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export NO_PROXY="localhost,127.0.0.1"
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fi
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exec mitmdump $CONFDIR_FLAG $MODE $TRUST_FLAG -s /app/egress_addon.py
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