Significant rewrite of PRD 0017 based on PR #25 design discussion.
Original draft proposed adding `path_allowlist` to the existing
cred-proxy. That bought opt-in path filtering for tools that
voluntarily routed through cred-proxy (Claude Code, git, npm) —
but raw `curl https://github.com/foo` from the agent goes to
HTTPS_PROXY=pipelock and bypasses cred-proxy entirely, so any
universal enforcement claim was a lie.
New design: replace cred-proxy with a mitmproxy-based egress-proxy
that becomes the agent's HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY. Every agent
HTTP/HTTPS request flows through it before reaching pipelock.
Path-level allow/deny enforcement is universal because the proxy
is on every leg. The proxy also absorbs cred-proxy's credential
injection role (mitmproxy addon hooks request → strip + inject
Authorization).
Net sidecar count: unchanged. cred-proxy is replaced 1:1 by
egress-proxy. Pipelock stays as hostname allow + DLP downstream
of egress-proxy.
Decisions baked in per PR-#25 discussion:
- Tool: mitmproxy (designed for this; Python addons; well-maintained).
- CA custody: egress-proxy holds the per-bottle MITM CA key
(concentration accepted; documented in trust-domain section).
- Migration: hard cutover. Existing `bottle.cred_proxy.routes[]`
manifests fail-fast at load time with a pointer at this PRD.
Open questions retained for the implementation PRs: addon
distribution (bake vs mount), prefix-vs-glob match, double-strip
of Authorization between egress-proxy and pipelock, whether
pipelock keeps TLS interception or stays hostname-only post-cutover,
performance under two-MITM-hops.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
didericis
b0d9802469