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Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) — the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller. Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens (compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency): * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway` (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher). * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch` gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/ {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated, 403 wrong role). * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key. * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key. Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s); Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
199 lines
9.6 KiB
Python
199 lines
9.6 KiB
Python
"""Gateway-side per-client policy resolver (PRD 0070).
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The consolidated gateway serves every bottle from one process, so for each
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request it must apply the *calling* bottle's policy, selected by the source
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IP the attribution invariant makes unspoofable. This resolves that policy
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from the orchestrator's control plane (`POST /resolve`), keyed on the
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`(source_ip, identity_token)` pair.
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**Always fresh — no cache.** The resolver is called rarely enough that a
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round-trip doesn't matter, and correctness matters more than speed: every
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resolve reflects the orchestrator's *current* view, so a revocation, a
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policy change, or a bottle teardown the orchestrator knows about is honored
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immediately rather than lingering for a cache TTL. (If this ever becomes a
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hot path, add caching with orchestrator-driven invalidation — not a blind
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TTL.)
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**Fail-closed:** an unattributed client (the orchestrator answers `403`)
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resolves to `None`, and the caller (the egress addon, git-gate) must then
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deny — exactly as an unknown bottle should be treated. Orchestrator
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*errors* (unreachable / unexpected status) raise, so the caller can fail
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closed too rather than silently serving stale or empty policy.
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The resolved value is the policy blob the orchestrator stores verbatim; the
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consumer parses it (e.g. the egress addon's `load_config`). This module is
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stdlib-only and free of bot-bottle imports.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import os
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import urllib.error
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import urllib.request
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DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2.0
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# The role-scoped `gateway` token this data plane presents on every control-plane
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# call, read from the env the launcher injects into the gateway (a pre-minted
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# signed JWT — the gateway never holds the signing key, so it can't forge a
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# higher-privilege `cli` token). Constant + env-var name are duplicated here
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# rather than imported because this module is COPYed flat into the gateway image,
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# free of bot-bottle imports — same rationale as IDENTITY_HEADER in egress_addon
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# / git_http_backend.
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CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-control-auth"
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CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT"
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def _control_auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
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"""The auth header to send, or {} when no token is configured (an open
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control plane, e.g. Firecracker behind its nft boundary — sending nothing
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is correct there and harmlessly ignored)."""
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token = os.environ.get(CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV, "").strip()
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return {CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER: token} if token else {}
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class PolicyResolveError(RuntimeError):
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"""The orchestrator was unreachable or returned an unexpected status —
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distinct from a clean `403` (unattributed), which returns None."""
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class PolicyResolver:
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"""Resolves each client's policy from the orchestrator, fresh per call."""
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def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
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self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
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self._timeout = timeout
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def _post_json(self, path: str, payload: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object] | None:
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"""POST `payload` to control-plane `path`, returning the JSON object body
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— or None when the orchestrator answers `403` (unattributed / fail
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closed). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an unreachable / unexpected-status
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/ malformed response so every caller can fail closed. Shared by
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`_post_resolve` and the supervise propose/poll RPCs."""
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body = json.dumps(payload).encode()
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req = urllib.request.Request(
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f"{self._base}{path}", data=body, method="POST",
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", **_control_auth_headers()},
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)
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try:
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with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
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data = json.loads(resp.read())
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
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if e.code == 403:
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return None # unattributed → fail closed (caller denies)
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raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} returned HTTP {e.code}") from e
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except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
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raise PolicyResolveError(f"{path} unreachable or malformed: {e}") from e
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return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
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def _post_resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> dict[str, object] | None:
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"""The orchestrator's `/resolve` payload for this client, or None if
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unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an
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unreachable / unexpected-status / malformed response so every caller
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can fail closed. Shared by `resolve` and `resolve_bottle_id`."""
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return self._post_json(
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"/resolve", {"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token},
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)
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def propose_supervise(
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self,
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source_ip: str,
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identity_token: str,
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*,
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tool: str,
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proposed_file: str,
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justification: str,
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) -> str | None:
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"""Queue a supervise proposal on the control plane and return its
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`proposal_id`. The orchestrator attributes the proposal to the calling
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bottle by `(source_ip, identity_token)` — exactly like `/resolve` — so a
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bottle can only ever queue its *own* proposals. Returns None when the
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pair is unattributed (a clean `403`); raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
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orchestrator can't be reached, so the data-plane caller fails closed
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(blocks / refuses) rather than silently dropping the proposal."""
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payload = self._post_json("/supervise/propose", {
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"source_ip": source_ip,
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"identity_token": identity_token,
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"tool": tool,
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"proposed_file": proposed_file,
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"justification": justification,
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})
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if payload is None:
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return None
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proposal_id = payload.get("proposal_id")
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return proposal_id if isinstance(proposal_id, str) and proposal_id else None
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def poll_supervise(
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self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str, proposal_id: str,
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) -> dict[str, object] | None:
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"""Poll a queued proposal for the operator's decision, **non-blocking**.
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Attributed by `(source_ip, identity_token)` so a bottle can only read its
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*own* proposal's response. Returns `{"status": ...}` where status is one
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of the terminal decisions (`approved`/`modified`/`rejected`, carrying
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`notes` + `final_file`), `pending` (queued, no decision yet), or
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`unknown` (no such queued proposal for this bottle). Returns None when
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unattributed; raises `PolicyResolveError` if unreachable."""
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return self._post_json("/supervise/poll", {
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"source_ip": source_ip,
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"identity_token": identity_token,
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"proposal_id": proposal_id,
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})
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def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
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"""The calling bottle's policy blob, or None if unattributed. Always
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fetches from the orchestrator so revocations / changes / teardowns
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are honored immediately.
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`identity_token` is optional *transitionally* — omitting it resolves
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by source IP alone (the network-layer attribution, sound by
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construction on Firecracker's `/31`+nft, weaker elsewhere). The
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consolidated end state makes the token mandatory so the app-layer
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defense is always enforced, not silently degraded; that flips at the
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`/resolve` boundary once identity-token *delivery* lands (a PRD 0070
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open question — we can't require what the agent can't yet present).
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Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the orchestrator can't be reached."""
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payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
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if payload is None:
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return None
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policy = payload.get("policy")
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return policy if isinstance(policy, str) else ""
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def resolve_bottle_id(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
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"""The calling bottle's id, or None if unattributed. This is the
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source-IP-keyed identity the git-gate uses to select the bottle's
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repo namespace (there is no per-bottle policy blob to parse — the
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bottle *is* the namespace). Same fail-closed contract as `resolve`."""
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payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
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if payload is None:
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return None
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bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
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return bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None
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def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
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self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
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) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict[str, str]]:
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"""The policy blob, bottle id, **and per-bottle egress auth tokens** in
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a single `/resolve` — so the egress addon gets everything it needs
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(policy for routing, bottle id for the supervise queue/safelist, tokens
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to inject upstream auth) in one round-trip. Returns `(None, None, {})`
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when unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
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orchestrator can't be reached, so the caller still fails closed."""
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payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
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if payload is None:
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return None, None, {}
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policy = payload.get("policy")
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bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
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raw = payload.get("tokens")
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tokens = {
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k: v for k, v in raw.items() if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, str)
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} if isinstance(raw, dict) else {}
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return (
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policy if isinstance(policy, str) else "",
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bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None,
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tokens,
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)
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__all__ = ["PolicyResolver", "PolicyResolveError"]
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