didericis
90522d335a
podman derives conmon's attach socket as `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libpod/tmp/socket/<64-hex-id>/attach`. With the descriptive `/tmp/bot-bottle-podman-run` that path is 116 bytes, past the 108-byte sun_path limit, so every attached `docker run` failed with "unable to upgrade to tcp, received 500" — while image pulls and the service itself worked, which is what made it look like a compat-API bug rather than a path-length one. Found on the macOS host: quay.io pulled fine and then no container could be started. Test pins the budget so a more readable name cannot silently reintroduce it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
92 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
92 lines
2.9 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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set -eu
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uid="$(id -u)"
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if [ "$uid" -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "refusing to run the guest container engine as root" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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for command in podman docker fuse-overlayfs slirp4netns; do
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command -v "$command" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
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echo "missing nested-container prerequisite: $command" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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done
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# The inverse of the rootless-Docker check, and the whole point of the podman
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# variant: a subordinate range would push podman onto newuidmap, which cannot
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# write a multi-range uid_map without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in this guest. An empty
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# range keeps it on the single-UID self-mapping an unprivileged process may
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# write itself.
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if grep -q "^$(id -un):" /etc/subuid 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "unexpected subordinate UID range for $(id -un): podman would" >&2
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echo "require CAP_SYS_ADMIN via newuidmap in this guest" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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for device in /dev/fuse /dev/net/tun; do
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[ -r "$device" ] && [ -w "$device" ] || {
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echo "device $device is not readable/writable by $(id -un)" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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done
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# Short by necessity, not by accident: conmon's attach socket lives under
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# this directory and must fit in a 108-byte sun_path. See nested_containers.py.
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export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR="${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR:-/tmp/bbp}"
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config="$HOME/.config/containers"
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mkdir -p "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" "$config"
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chmod 700 "$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR"
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# ignore_chown_errors is required, not incidental: with a single-UID mapping
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# there is no second UID for image layers to be chowned to, so layers that
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# record other owners would otherwise fail to extract.
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cat > "$config/storage.conf" <<'CONF'
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[storage]
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driver="overlay"
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[storage.options.overlay]
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mount_program="/usr/bin/fuse-overlayfs"
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ignore_chown_errors="true"
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CONF
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# No cgroup delegation reaches this guest, so asking podman to manage cgroups
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# fails; events_logger=file avoids the journald socket that is equally absent.
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cat > "$config/containers.conf" <<'CONF'
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[containers]
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cgroups="disabled"
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[engine]
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cgroup_manager="cgroupfs"
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events_logger="file"
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CONF
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# Registry pulls egress through the bottle's proxy like everything else. The
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# token-bearing proxy URL is already in the agent's environment; persisting it
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# inside this disposable VM does not broaden its authority.
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python3 - <<'PY'
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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proxy = os.environ.get("HTTPS_PROXY") or os.environ.get("https_proxy", "")
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no_proxy = os.environ.get("NO_PROXY") or os.environ.get("no_proxy", "")
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config = {"proxies": {"default": {
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"httpProxy": proxy,
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"httpsProxy": proxy,
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"noProxy": no_proxy,
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}}}
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path = Path.home() / ".docker" / "config.json"
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path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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path.write_text(json.dumps(config), encoding="utf-8")
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path.chmod(0o600)
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PY
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if docker info >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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exit 0
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fi
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log=/tmp/bot-bottle-nested-containers.log
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nohup podman system service --time=0 \
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"unix://$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/podman.sock" \
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>"$log" 2>&1 </dev/null &
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