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bot-bottle/claude_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh
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didericis-claude 909029085e
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feat(sidecars): egress binds 127.0.0.1 when EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST is set (PRD 0023 chunk 3)
Egress's bind address is now env-driven via EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST.
Unset → mitmdump's default (all interfaces) — the docker
backend's behavior, unchanged. Set to `127.0.0.1` → mitmdump
binds localhost only.

The smolmachines launch sets EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1 in
the bundle's env unconditionally. TSI's allowlist is
`<bundle-ip>/32` (IP-only, not port-granular), which would
otherwise let the agent dial `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass
pipelock's DLP by talking to egress directly. Binding egress
to localhost inside the bundle closes that gap at the socket
level — the agent still reaches the IP (TSI permits it) but
egress refuses the connect because it's not listening on the
docker bridge interface.

The docker backend doesn't set the env var because its agent
dials egress directly via the docker network alias — egress
MUST be reachable from outside the bundle there. The
asymmetry is documented in the entrypoint script's comment.

Changes:
- egress_entrypoint.sh: read EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST, conditionally
  pass `--listen-host <host>` to mitmdump.
- smolmachines/launch.py: BundleLaunchSpec.environment now
  includes `EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1`.
- New unit tests (5): the entrypoint script's argv shape under
  various env combinations, verified via a fake mitmdump shim
  that prints its argv.

545 unit + 3 integration tests passing. The egress-port-bypass
probe from chunk 2d still passes (chunk 2d ran with daemons_csv=""
so no egress was up; chunk 3 makes the probe preserve its
property once egress IS up in chunk 4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 04:49:22 -04:00

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#!/bin/sh
# Egress daemon entrypoint inside the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024).
#
# Extracted verbatim from Dockerfile.egress's prior inline `sh -c`
# ENTRYPOINT so the supervisor in claude_bottle/sidecar_init.py can
# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
#
# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
# to `--mode upstream:URL` to forward all post-MITM traffic
# through pipelock. mitmproxy does NOT honor HTTPS_PROXY on
# its outbound side, so the upstream wiring has to be the
# mitmproxy mode flag, not env.
# * Upstream trust: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA is set, build a
# combined trust bundle (system roots + pipelock CA) and point
# mitmproxy at it. The option REPLACES mitmproxy's default
# trust store, so passing pipelock's CA alone would break
# pipelock-passthrough hosts (api.anthropic.com etc.).
# * `-s /app/egress_addon.py` loads the addon that reads
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml.
set -e
# Pin mitmproxy's config dir to the bind-mount location of its CA
# regardless of which user mitmdump runs as. In the legacy
# four-sidecar setup (Dockerfile.egress, USER mitmproxy) this
# resolved naturally to `~mitmproxy/.mitmproxy`. In the PRD 0024
# bundle (USER root) `~root/.mitmproxy` is empty, so without this
# flag mitmdump would generate a fresh CA on the wrong path and
# the agent's installed trust anchor would no longer match the
# bumped leaf certs.
CONFDIR=/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy
CONFDIR_FLAG="--set confdir=$CONFDIR"
MODE="--mode regular@9099"
if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
MODE="--mode upstream:$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY --listen-port 9099"
fi
# Bind address. Docker backend wants `0.0.0.0` (agent dials egress
# directly via the docker network alias). Smolmachines backend
# wants `127.0.0.1` because the agent dials pipelock — not egress
# — and egress is pipelock's localhost-only upstream inside the
# bundle. TSI's IP-only allowlist would otherwise let the agent
# reach `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass pipelock's DLP; binding
# 127.0.0.1 inside the bundle closes that gap (PRD 0023 chunk 3).
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG=""
if [ -n "$EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST" ]; then
LISTEN_HOST_FLAG="--listen-host $EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST"
fi
TRUST_FLAG=""
if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ] && [ -f "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" ]; then
COMBINED=$CONFDIR/combined-trust.pem
cat /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_CA" > "$COMBINED"
TRUST_FLAG="--set ssl_verify_upstream_trusted_ca=$COMBINED"
fi
# Scope the proxy env to this process tree only. In the bundle
# image (PRD 0024) the four daemons share one container — setting
# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's git
# pushes through pipelock, which is wrong (pipelock doesn't proxy
# SSH and would block public git repos). Setting them here means
# only mitmdump's subprocess inherits them. In the legacy
# four-sidecar setup these env vars are also set in compose; here
# they're additionally defensive.
if [ -n "$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY" ]; then
export HTTPS_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
export HTTP_PROXY="$EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY"
export NO_PROXY="localhost,127.0.0.1"
fi
exec mitmdump $CONFDIR_FLAG $MODE $LISTEN_HOST_FLAG $TRUST_FLAG -s /app/egress_addon.py