3755e66abe
First step of PRD 0006. Pipelock now does the CONNECT bumping that PR #8's mitmproxy chain was supposed to provide — natively, in the same single sidecar PRD 0001 wired up. - claude_bottle/pipelock.py: pipelock_build_config grows optional ca_cert_path / ca_key_path kwargs. When both are passed the rendered YAML carries a `tls_interception: { enabled: true, ca_cert, ca_key }` block. PipelockProxy gains class-level CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER / CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER constants that subclasses set to wherever they place the CA inside the sidecar. PipelockProxyPlan gains ca_cert_host_path / ca_key_host_path fields (default empty Path() — sentinel for "not yet populated", filled by launch via dataclasses.replace). - claude_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py: new pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir) helper runs `pipelock tls init` in a one-shot container against a host-mounted scratch dir. DockerPipelockProxy sets its class constants to /etc/pipelock-ca.pem and /etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem; .start docker-cp's the cert + key into those paths between `docker create` and `docker start`. Pipelock runs as root in its distroless image, so no chown is needed (verified). - claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py: calls pipelock_tls_init between network creation and proxy.start. Prepare stays side-effect-free on docker; the one-shot ca-init container only runs on a real launch, not on `start --dry-run`. - tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py: new assertions that pipelock_build_config emits the tls_interception block only when both paths are supplied (and rejects a half-set pair), plus a test that the docker proxy's prepare plumbs the in-container paths through to the rendered YAML. The end-to-end "bumping actually fires" assertion lands in chunk 4 (HTTPS integration tests). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>