Files
bot-bottle/claude_bottle/pipelock.py
T
didericis 3755e66abe feat(pipelock): enable tls_interception with per-bottle ephemeral CA
First step of PRD 0006. Pipelock now does the CONNECT bumping that
PR #8's mitmproxy chain was supposed to provide — natively, in the
same single sidecar PRD 0001 wired up.

- claude_bottle/pipelock.py: pipelock_build_config grows optional
  ca_cert_path / ca_key_path kwargs. When both are passed the
  rendered YAML carries a `tls_interception: { enabled: true,
  ca_cert, ca_key }` block. PipelockProxy gains class-level
  CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER / CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER constants that
  subclasses set to wherever they place the CA inside the
  sidecar. PipelockProxyPlan gains ca_cert_host_path /
  ca_key_host_path fields (default empty Path() — sentinel for
  "not yet populated", filled by launch via dataclasses.replace).

- claude_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock.py: new
  pipelock_tls_init(stage_dir) helper runs `pipelock tls init`
  in a one-shot container against a host-mounted scratch dir.
  DockerPipelockProxy sets its class constants to
  /etc/pipelock-ca.pem and /etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem; .start
  docker-cp's the cert + key into those paths between
  `docker create` and `docker start`. Pipelock runs as root in
  its distroless image, so no chown is needed (verified).

- claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py: calls pipelock_tls_init
  between network creation and proxy.start. Prepare stays
  side-effect-free on docker; the one-shot ca-init container
  only runs on a real launch, not on `start --dry-run`.

- tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py: new assertions that
  pipelock_build_config emits the tls_interception block only
  when both paths are supplied (and rejects a half-set pair),
  plus a test that the docker proxy's prepare plumbs the
  in-container paths through to the rendered YAML.

The end-to-end "bumping actually fires" assertion lands in
chunk 4 (HTTPS integration tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 14:45:36 -04:00

276 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""Pipelock sidecar lifecycle for the per-agent egress topology.
Pipelock (https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) is an HTTP
forward proxy with hostname allowlisting + DLP scanning + URL-entropy
checks. One sidecar per agent, attached to the agent's --internal
network and a per-agent user-defined egress bridge. Combined with
HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY pointing at the sidecar's service name, pipelock
is the only egress route the agent has.
Image pin: ghcr.io/luckypipewrench/pipelock@sha256:<digest> for tag 2.3.0.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from .manifest import Bottle
from .util import is_ipv4_literal
# Baked-in default allowlist for hosts Claude Code itself needs.
DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST: tuple[str, ...] = (
"api.anthropic.com",
"statsig.anthropic.com",
"sentry.io",
"claude.ai",
"platform.claude.com",
"downloads.claude.ai",
"raw.githubusercontent.com",
)
# --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
def pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames in bottle.egress.allowlist."""
return list(bottle.egress.allowlist)
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [e.Hostname for e in bottle.ssh if e.Hostname]
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [h for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if not is_ipv4_literal(h)]
def pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
return [f"{h}/32" for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle) if is_ipv4_literal(h)]
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
"""Deduplicated union of: baked-in defaults, bottle.egress.allowlist,
bottle.ssh[].Hostname. Sorted for stability."""
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for h in DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST:
seen.setdefault(h, None)
for h in pipelock_bottle_allowlist(bottle):
if h:
seen.setdefault(h, None)
for h in pipelock_bottle_ssh_hostnames(bottle):
if h:
seen.setdefault(h, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
def pipelock_allowlist_summary(bottle: Bottle) -> str:
"""One-line summary for the y/N preflight display:
"<N> hosts allowed (host1, host2, host3, +M more)"."""
hosts = pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle)
count = len(hosts)
if count == 0:
return "0 hosts allowed (none)"
show = count
more = 0
if count > 5:
show = 3
more = count - show
joined = ", ".join(hosts[:show])
if more > 0:
return f"{count} hosts allowed ({joined}, +{more} more)"
return f"{count} hosts allowed ({joined})"
# --- Config build + YAML render --------------------------------------------
def pipelock_build_config(
bottle: Bottle,
*,
ca_cert_path: str = "",
ca_key_path: str = "",
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
Deliberately carries no env values, no secrets, no per-agent
customization beyond the resolved hostname list. The shape mirrors
the YAML pipelock expects on disk; `pipelock_render_yaml` serializes
it. Tests assert on this dict; production code renders it.
`ca_cert_path` / `ca_key_path` are the **in-container** paths the
pipelock sidecar will read its CA from at runtime (they're
populated into the container at start time via `docker cp`).
Pass both or neither: both → emit `tls_interception` block with
`enabled: true`; neither → omit the block entirely (pipelock
falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`). Used
by PRD 0006 to turn on pipelock's native TLS interception."""
cfg: dict[str, object] = {
"version": 1,
"mode": "strict",
"enforce": True,
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle),
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
}
trusted = pipelock_bottle_ssh_trusted_domains(bottle)
if trusted:
cfg["trusted_domains"] = trusted
ip_cidrs = pipelock_bottle_ssh_ip_cidrs(bottle)
if ip_cidrs:
cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": ip_cidrs}
cfg["dlp"] = {"include_defaults": True, "scan_env": True}
# Body-scan enforcement is a separate pipelock section (each DLP
# "surface" — body, MCP, response — has its own action). Pipelock's
# built-in default for request_body_scanning is "warn" (forward
# with a log line); claude-bottle's default is "block" so a hit
# actually stops the request from leaving the egress network.
cfg["request_body_scanning"] = {"action": bottle.egress.dlp_action}
if ca_cert_path or ca_key_path:
if not (ca_cert_path and ca_key_path):
raise ValueError(
"pipelock_build_config: pass both ca_cert_path and ca_key_path "
"to enable tls_interception, or neither to leave it off"
)
cfg["tls_interception"] = {
"enabled": True,
"ca_cert": ca_cert_path,
"ca_key": ca_key_path,
}
return cfg
def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
"""Render a pipelock config dict (as produced by
`pipelock_build_config`) as YAML. Hand-rolled so we don't take a
YAML-parser dependency for a fixed, narrow shape."""
def _bool(b: object) -> str:
return "true" if b else "false"
lines: list[str] = []
lines.append(f"version: {cfg['version']}")
lines.append(f"mode: {cfg['mode']}")
lines.append(f"enforce: {_bool(cfg['enforce'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("api_allowlist:")
for h in cast(list[str], cfg["api_allowlist"]):
lines.append(f' - "{h}"')
lines.append("")
lines.append("forward_proxy:")
fp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["forward_proxy"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(fp['enabled'])}")
lines.append("")
if "trusted_domains" in cfg:
lines.append("trusted_domains:")
for td in cast(list[str], cfg["trusted_domains"]):
lines.append(f' - "{td}"')
lines.append("")
if "ssrf" in cfg:
lines.append("ssrf:")
ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
lines.append(" ip_allowlist:")
for cidr in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
lines.append(f' - "{cidr}"')
lines.append("")
lines.append("dlp:")
dlp = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["dlp"])
lines.append(f" include_defaults: {_bool(dlp['include_defaults'])}")
lines.append(f" scan_env: {_bool(dlp['scan_env'])}")
lines.append("")
lines.append("request_body_scanning:")
rbs = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["request_body_scanning"])
lines.append(f' action: "{rbs["action"]}"')
if "tls_interception" in cfg:
lines.append("")
lines.append("tls_interception:")
tls = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["tls_interception"])
lines.append(f" enabled: {_bool(tls['enabled'])}")
lines.append(f' ca_cert: "{tls["ca_cert"]}"')
lines.append(f' ca_key: "{tls["ca_key"]}"')
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
# --- Proxy class -----------------------------------------------------------
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Output of PipelockProxy.prepare; consumed by .start when the
sidecar needs to be brought up.
yaml_path + slug are filled in at prepare time (host-side, side-
effect-free; the YAML references the in-container CA paths
already so it doesn't need the host paths to be valid). The
remaining fields are populated by the backend's launch step
via `dataclasses.replace`: internal/egress networks once
those networks exist, and the CA host paths once the
one-shot `pipelock tls init` has run. Empty defaults are
sentinels meaning "not yet set"; `.start` validates that
they are populated."""
yaml_path: Path
slug: str
internal_network: str = ""
egress_network: str = ""
ca_cert_host_path: Path = Path()
ca_key_host_path: Path = Path()
class PipelockProxy(ABC):
"""The pipelock egress proxy. Encapsulates the YAML-config
generation; the sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific
and lives on concrete subclasses.
The class-level constants `CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER` /
`CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER` are the in-container paths the YAML config
references — they correspond to wherever the backend's `.start`
places the CA cert and key inside the sidecar. Subclasses
override the constants."""
CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER: str = ""
CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER: str = ""
def prepare(
self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path
) -> PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Write the pipelock yaml config (mode 600) under `stage_dir`
and return the plan for `.start`. Pure host-side, no docker
subprocess.
`slug` is the agent-derived identifier (lowercased,
hyphen-normalized) used as the suffix in every per-agent
resource name — the agent container, the pipelock container
(`claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>`), the internal/egress
networks. It's stored on the returned plan so the backend's
start step can derive the sidecar's container name.
The CA paths the YAML references are the in-container paths
from the concrete subclass's class-level constants. The
host-side counterparts are generated by the launch step
(not here, so prepare stays side-effect-free on docker) and
added to the plan via `dataclasses.replace` before `.start`."""
yaml_path = stage_dir / "pipelock.yaml"
cfg = pipelock_build_config(
bottle,
ca_cert_path=self.CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
ca_key_path=self.CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
)
yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
yaml_path.chmod(0o600)
return PipelockProxyPlan(yaml_path=yaml_path, slug=slug)
@abstractmethod
def start(self, plan: PipelockProxyPlan) -> str:
"""Bring up the pipelock sidecar according to `plan`. Returns
the proxy_target string identifying the running instance — the
same value to pass to `.stop`. Backend-specific."""
@abstractmethod
def stop(self, proxy_target: str) -> None:
"""Tear down the pipelock sidecar identified by `proxy_target`
(the value `.start` returned). Idempotent: a missing target is
success. Backend-specific."""