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Chunk 2 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's **durable secret** gap and replace chunk 1's BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET stopgap. - trust_domain.py: two new domains. LAUNCH_BROKER holds the durable HS256 key both the orchestrator (signer) and the host control server (verifier) share for the broker's launch JWT — a host-canonical key file minted 0600 on first use, so a restarted orchestrator re-verifies against the same key. HOST_CONTROLLER is the separate domain for the controller's own lifecycle endpoints, keyed by a key the orchestrator never holds (its role is `host`, deliberately outside control-plane ROLES). LaunchBrokerProvisioning is the fail-closed seam. - orchestrator_auth.py: ROLE_HOST, outside ROLES. - paths.py: key-file + env-var constants for both domains. Key resolution is split by owner (addresses codex review on #497): broker_secret(allow_host_file=...) — the host controller / dev-harness (True) may mint/read the durable host key file it owns; the GUEST orchestrator (--broker http, default False) must be *injected* the key and fails closed if it isn't. A guest that fell back to the host file would mint a process-local key unrelated to the host controller's, so startup would succeed but every launch would 401 — this prevents that silent divergence. Tested: domain boundary + separation, provisioning fail-closed, and broker_secret env-only (guest) vs host-file (host) resolution. pyright clean; pylint 9.86. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
177 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
177 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
"""Unit: trust domains + the shared control-plane provisioning contract (#476)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import unittest
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from unittest.mock import patch
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from bot_bottle import orchestrator_auth
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator_auth import ROLE_CLI, ROLE_GATEWAY, ROLE_HOST
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from bot_bottle.trust_domain import (
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CONTROL_PLANE,
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HOST_CONTROLLER,
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LAUNCH_BROKER,
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ControlPlaneProvisioning,
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LaunchBrokerProvisioning,
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ProvisioningError,
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TrustDomain,
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)
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# A second, unrelated domain — the shape #468's host controller would take: its
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# own key file, its own role, its own env vars. Distinct from CONTROL_PLANE.
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_HOST_CTRL = TrustDomain(
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name="host-controller",
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key_filename="host-controller-token",
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roles=frozenset({"host"}),
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key_env="BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_TOKEN",
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token_env="BOT_BOTTLE_HOST_CONTROLLER_JWT",
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)
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class TestTrustDomainMintVerify(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_mint_verify_round_trips_within_a_domain(self) -> None:
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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tok = CONTROL_PLANE.mint(ROLE_GATEWAY)
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_GATEWAY, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))
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def test_mint_rejects_a_role_outside_the_domain(self) -> None:
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# `host` is a valid role in _HOST_CTRL but not in the control plane —
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# the control-plane key must refuse to mint it.
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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CONTROL_PLANE.mint("host")
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def test_a_custom_role_set_verifies_its_own_role(self) -> None:
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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tok = _HOST_CTRL.mint("host")
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self.assertEqual("host", _HOST_CTRL.verify(tok, "k"))
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def test_key_from_env_reads_the_domains_env_var(self) -> None:
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self.assertEqual(
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"secret", CONTROL_PLANE.key_from_env({CONTROL_PLANE.key_env: " secret "}))
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self.assertEqual("", CONTROL_PLANE.key_from_env({}))
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class TestDomainBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
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"""The #476/#468 invariant: two domains, two keys, two role sets — one
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domain's key can neither mint nor verify the other's tokens."""
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def test_a_control_plane_token_does_not_verify_under_another_domains_key(
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self,
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) -> None:
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# Even with an IDENTICAL underlying key, a `cli` token minted under the
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# control-plane domain must not verify as a role in the host-controller
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# domain — the role isn't in that domain's set.
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cli_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(ROLE_CLI, "shared-bytes")
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self.assertIsNone(_HOST_CTRL.verify(cli_tok, "shared-bytes"))
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def test_distinct_keys_do_not_cross_verify(self) -> None:
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# The realistic case: distinct host-canonical keys per domain. A token
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# signed by one key never verifies under the other.
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host_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(
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"host", "host-ctrl-key", roles=_HOST_CTRL.roles)
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self.assertIsNone(_HOST_CTRL.verify(host_tok, "control-plane-key"))
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self.assertEqual("host", _HOST_CTRL.verify(host_tok, "host-ctrl-key"))
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class TestControlPlaneProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_orchestrator_key_returns_the_canonical_key(self) -> None:
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prov = ControlPlaneProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="key"):
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self.assertEqual("key", prov.orchestrator_key())
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def test_orchestrator_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
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# Invariant 4: the orchestrator must never start without a key — it would
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# run OPEN and grant every caller that reaches it full `cli`. There is no
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# topology opt-out: a separate host does not stop the gateway (or any
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# other caller) from reaching the control-plane listener.
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prov = ControlPlaneProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
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with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
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prov.orchestrator_key()
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def test_gateway_token_is_a_verifiable_gateway_role_token(self) -> None:
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prov = ControlPlaneProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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tok = prov.gateway_token()
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_GATEWAY, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))
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def test_gateway_token_cannot_be_reused_as_cli(self) -> None:
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# The data plane's token is `gateway`-scoped: it never carries `cli`.
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prov = ControlPlaneProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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tok = prov.gateway_token()
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self.assertNotEqual(ROLE_CLI, CONTROL_PLANE.verify(tok, "k"))
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class TestLaunchBrokerAndHostControllerDomains(unittest.TestCase):
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"""The real #468 domains: the launch-broker key (shared by orchestrator +
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host controller) and the host controller's own lifecycle key."""
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def test_launch_broker_mints_no_role_tokens(self) -> None:
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# Empty role set — it provides durable key material for the broker's own
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# launch JWT, not orchestrator_auth role tokens.
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self.assertEqual(frozenset(), LAUNCH_BROKER.roles)
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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LAUNCH_BROKER.mint(ROLE_CLI)
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def test_host_controller_signs_host_role_only(self) -> None:
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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tok = HOST_CONTROLLER.mint(ROLE_HOST)
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_HOST, HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(tok, "k"))
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# A control-plane `cli` token (the orchestrator's key) never verifies as a
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# host-controller role — the orchestrator can't forge lifecycle creds.
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cli_tok = orchestrator_auth.mint(ROLE_CLI, "k")
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self.assertIsNone(HOST_CONTROLLER.verify(cli_tok, "k"))
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def test_control_plane_cannot_mint_the_host_role(self) -> None:
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# `host` is outside the control-plane role set on purpose.
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="k"):
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with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
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CONTROL_PLANE.mint(ROLE_HOST)
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def test_the_three_domains_use_distinct_keys_and_env_vars(self) -> None:
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self.assertEqual(3, len({
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CONTROL_PLANE.key_filename,
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LAUNCH_BROKER.key_filename,
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HOST_CONTROLLER.key_filename,
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}))
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self.assertEqual(3, len({
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CONTROL_PLANE.key_env, LAUNCH_BROKER.key_env, HOST_CONTROLLER.key_env,
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}))
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class TestLaunchBrokerProvisioning(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_broker_key_returns_the_durable_key(self) -> None:
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prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value="bk"):
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self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
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def test_broker_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
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# An empty key would leave the host controller unable to verify any
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# launch — fail-closed rather than hand back a useless/dangerous key.
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prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
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with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
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prov.broker_key()
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def test_controller_key_is_distinct_from_the_broker_key(self) -> None:
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# The orchestrator holds the broker key but NEVER the controller key.
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prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
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keys = {"launch-broker-key": "bk", "host-controller-key": "ck"}
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key",
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side_effect=keys.__getitem__):
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self.assertEqual("bk", prov.broker_key())
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self.assertEqual("ck", prov.controller_key())
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def test_controller_key_fail_closes_when_empty(self) -> None:
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prov = LaunchBrokerProvisioning()
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with patch("bot_bottle.trust_domain.host_signing_key", return_value=""):
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with self.assertRaises(ProvisioningError):
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prov.controller_key()
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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unittest.main()
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