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bot-bottle/claude_bottle/egress_proxy_addon.py
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feat(supervise): list-egress-proxy-routes MCP tool, defaults on egress-proxy
Reshape the allowlist topology so the egress-proxy is the bottle's
single allowlist surface, and replace the agent-side
routes/allowlist file mounts with a live MCP tool.

Policy change (move defaults to egress-proxy):

  - `egress_proxy_routes_for_bottle(bottle)` now folds in
    DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST (the claude-code defaults) and
    `bottle.egress.allowlist` (user adds) as bare-pass routes (no
    auth, no path filter), on top of the bottle's
    `egress_proxy.routes`. Manifest routes win on host collision.
  - `pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle)` mirrors egress-proxy's
    effective host set when egress-proxy is in use. Pipelock is
    no longer the bottle's primary allowlist authority; it
    enforces a downstream copy as defense-in-depth + does DLP body
    scanning.
  - Split out `egress_proxy_manifest_routes(bottle)` for callers
    that want just the manifest entries (tests, internal use).
  - DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST moves from `pipelock.py` to `egress_proxy.py`
    (pipelock re-imports for the no-egress-proxy fallback path).
  - Dropped the `egress-proxy` auto-allow on pipelock's allowlist
    — the agent never dials egress-proxy via the proxy mechanism;
    pipelock only sees upstream hostnames from egress-proxy's
    CONNECTs.

Introspection endpoint (existing mitmproxy feature):

  - Egress-proxy addon recognises requests to the magic host
    `_egress-proxy.local` and synthesizes responses via
    `flow.response = http.Response.make(...)` — no upstream
    connection, no allowlist enforcement on the magic host.
  - `GET /allowlist` returns the in-memory route table as JSON
    (host + path_allowlist + auth_scheme + token_env per route;
    no token VALUES).
  - Smoke-tested end-to-end against a real egress-proxy container.

MCP tool (existing supervise plumbing):

  - New `list-egress-proxy-routes` tool (no inputs, no operator
    approval). Handler fetches via egress-proxy's introspection
    endpoint using urllib's ProxyHandler against
    `EGRESS_PROXY_FORWARD_PROXY`. Returns the JSON payload as the
    tool's text content; `isError: true` if the proxy is
    unreachable.
  - `egress-proxy-block` description now points the agent at
    `list-egress-proxy-routes` instead of a staged file path.
  - `pipelock-block` description acknowledges the mirror — agents
    should prefer `egress-proxy-block` to add hosts; pipelock-block
    stays for the rare divergence case.

Drop agent-side file mounts:

  - Supervise's `current-config` dir staging no longer writes
    routes.yaml / allowlist. Only `Dockerfile` remains
    (capability-block still reads it from
    `/etc/claude-bottle/current-config/Dockerfile`).
  - `prepare.py` stops passing `routes_content` /
    `allowlist_content` to `supervise.prepare`.
  - `Supervise.prepare` signature simplified to one
    `dockerfile_content` kwarg.

Tests: 400 unit + integration pass. Added coverage for
defaults-folding (`TestRoutesForBottleFoldsDefaults`), the new
tool definition + handler, and the updated supervise.prepare
shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:23:01 -04:00

179 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress-proxy sidecar (PRD 0017).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_proxy_addon.py` inside the
egress-proxy container. Wraps the pure logic from
`egress_proxy_addon_core` with mitmproxy's HTTPFlow API:
- At startup, read `EGRESS_PROXY_ROUTES` (default
`/etc/egress-proxy/routes.yaml`, JSON content) → routes table.
- SIGHUP re-reads the file and atomically swaps the in-memory
table. A parse error keeps the old table in place — better to
keep serving the old config than to leave the proxy with no
routes after a typo.
- On each `request`: strip the inbound Authorization header, then
consult `decide()` for forward / block / inject-auth and apply
the decision to the flow.
This file imports `mitmproxy` and is never imported on the host —
mitmproxy is a container-only dependency. The host's tests target
`egress_proxy_addon_core`.
Dockerfile.egress-proxy copies both this file and
`egress_proxy_addon_core.py` flat into `/app/`; the absolute import
below works because mitmdump runs with `/app` on its sys.path. The
parallel file in the package source tree (claude_bottle/) is the
build input — not a module the host imports."""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import json
import os
import signal
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found]
# Absolute import (NOT `from .egress_proxy_addon_core`) — the
# container drops both files flat into /app/ so they are sibling
# top-level modules to mitmdump's loader, not a package.
from egress_proxy_addon_core import Route, decide, is_git_push_request, load_routes # type: ignore[import-not-found]
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress-proxy/routes.yaml"
# Magic hostname the addon recognises as an introspection target.
# Requests through the proxy for `_egress-proxy.local/<path>` are
# intercepted and answered with synthetic responses (the addon's
# `request` hook sets `flow.response` before any upstream connection).
# The hostname is not in DNS — only clients dialing through this
# specific egress-proxy can reach it, and only via HTTP (no TLS).
# Used by the supervise sidecar's `list-egress-proxy-routes` MCP
# tool to surface the live route table to the agent.
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress-proxy.local"
class EgressProxyAddon:
"""The mitmproxy addon. One instance per `mitmdump` process; the
request hook is invoked on every CONNECT-decapsulated HTTP/HTTPS
request the agent makes."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_PROXY_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.routes: tuple[Route, ...] = ()
self._reload(initial=True)
self._install_sighup()
def _reload(self, *, initial: bool = False) -> None:
try:
text = Path(self.routes_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
new_routes = load_routes(text)
except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
tag = "boot" if initial else "SIGHUP"
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress-proxy: {tag} load failed: {e}\n"
)
if initial:
# No baseline to fall back on; serve nothing rather
# than masquerade as a proxy with a route table the
# operator never declared.
self.routes = ()
return
self.routes = new_routes
sys.stderr.write(
f"egress-proxy: loaded {len(self.routes)} route(s): "
f"{', '.join(r.host for r in self.routes)}\n"
)
def _install_sighup(self) -> None:
if not hasattr(signal, "SIGHUP"):
return
def handler(signum: int, frame: object) -> None:
del signum, frame
self._reload()
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, handler)
def _serve_introspection(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, path: str) -> None:
"""Synthesize a response for `_egress-proxy.local` requests.
Currently supports `/allowlist` which returns the in-memory
route table as JSON (host, path_allowlist, auth_scheme,
token_env per route — no token VALUES, those live in the
container's environ)."""
if path == "/allowlist":
payload = json.dumps(
{"routes": [dataclasses.asdict(r) for r in self.routes]},
indent=2,
).encode("utf-8")
flow.response = http.Response.make(
200, payload,
{"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
return
flow.response = http.Response.make(
404,
f"egress-proxy introspection: no such endpoint {path!r}".encode(),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
# mitmproxy's addon API: this method name + signature is how
# mitmdump discovers the request hook.
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
# Introspection: requests to the magic `_egress-proxy.local`
# host are answered locally with a synthetic response. Check
# before the strip-auth + route logic — these requests aren't
# real upstream traffic, the agent isn't injecting auth, and
# the addon's own decide() would 403 the magic host (it's
# never in the routes table).
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
# Inbound Authorization is always stripped — the agent cannot
# smuggle a stolen token through the proxy. If the matched
# route declares an auth pair, a fresh header is injected
# below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Universal HTTPS git-push block. Defense-in-depth: git-gate
# (PRD 0008) is the only sanctioned outbound path for git
# writes — its pre-receive runs gitleaks. Letting HTTPS push
# through egress-proxy + auth injection would route around
# that scan, so we 403 before any route logic.
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
(
b"egress-proxy: git push over HTTPS is not supported; "
b"use the bottle.git SSH path (gitleaks-scanned by "
b"git-gate's pre-receive hook)."
),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
decision = decide(
self.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
)
if decision.action == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
decision.reason.encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
addons = [EgressProxyAddon()]