Pipelock was 403-blocking legitimate egress cred-injected
traffic with 'blocked: request header contains secret'. The
chain is `agent → egress → pipelock → internet`: egress injects
`Authorization: Bearer <token>` for routes with an `auth_scheme`,
then forwards upstream to pipelock. Pipelock has `scan_env:
true` + `scan_headers: true` + `header_mode: all`, and the
bundle supervisor spawned every daemon (egress, pipelock,
git-gate, supervise) inheriting the bundle container's full env
— including the `EGRESS_TOKEN_<n>` slots set via
`docker run -e`. So pipelock had the token value egress
injected sitting in its own env, matched it in the request
headers, and blocked.
The agent itself runs in a different machine and never sees
`EGRESS_TOKEN_*`, so stripping these from non-egress daemons'
env loses no DLP coverage — pipelock can't catch the exfil of
a value the agent doesn't have in the first place.
New helper `_env_for_daemon(name, base_env)` returns the
unchanged base for `egress` and a copy with `EGRESS_TOKEN_*`
filtered for everyone else. `_spawn` now passes the scoped env
to `subprocess.Popen`. Prefix-based filter (not exact-match) so
future egress-only env slots don't have to update this code.
Tests:
- `TestEnvForDaemon`: egress gets full env, pipelock /
git-gate / supervise lose `EGRESS_TOKEN_0` + `EGRESS_TOKEN_1`
but keep `PATH`, `EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY`, `SUPERVISE_PORT`.
- Independent-dict invariant locked so callers can't
accidentally mutate the supervisor's env.
642 unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
didericis-claude
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