ac8c7ba696
End-to-end provisioning parity with the docker backend. After this
chunk a smolmachines bottle has a working trust store, git-gate
gitconfig, and supervise MCP registration — same shape as docker,
dispatched via `smolvm machine cp` / `smolvm machine exec` instead
of `docker cp` / `docker exec`.
Adds three new provision modules:
- ca.py: select egress vs pipelock CA (same logic as
docker), machine cp + update-ca-certificates,
log sha256 fingerprint.
- git.py: copy host .git when --cwd was passed; render
~/.gitconfig with insteadOf URLs. URL prefix is
`git://<bundle_ip>:9418/...` (no DNS in the
TSI-allowlisted guest) vs docker's
`git://git-gate/...`.
- supervise.py: `claude mcp add` via machine_exec; URL is
`http://<bundle_ip>:9100/`. Failure is logged but
non-fatal (matches docker).
Shared render: `render_git_gate_gitconfig` moves out of
backend/docker/provision/git.py into the platform-neutral
claude_bottle/git_gate.py (renamed to git_gate_render_gitconfig
for consistency with the existing git_gate_render_* helpers),
parameterized on a `gate_host` argument so both backends use the
same logic with different addresses.
Path/user fixups for the post-chunk-4c agent image (real
claude-bottle image, USER node, $HOME=/home/node):
- prompt.py default path moves from /root/... to
/home/node/.claude-bottle-prompt.txt; chown + chmod after
machine cp.
- skills.py default skills dir moves from /root/.claude/skills to
/home/node/.claude/skills; chown -R per skill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
84 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
84 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
"""Install the per-bottle MITM CA into the smolmachines guest's
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trust store (PRD 0023 chunk 4d).
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Mirrors `backend.docker.provision.ca`: select the right CA (egress
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when the bottle has routes, else pipelock), `smolvm machine cp` it
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to Debian's `/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/` path,
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`update-ca-certificates` to rebuild the trust bundle, and log the
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fingerprint once. The selected cert depends on the agent's
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HTTP_PROXY target — same logic as the docker backend, since the
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agent dials the same daemons through the same bundle.
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`smolvm machine exec` runs commands as root in the VM (no `-u`
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flag exists; the VM init is root), so we don't need the explicit
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`-u 0` the docker backend uses on its `docker exec` calls."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import ssl
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from pathlib import Path
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from ....log import die, info
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from ...docker.provision.ca import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
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from .. import smolvm as _smolvm
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from ..bottle_plan import SmolmachinesBottlePlan
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def _select_ca_cert(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> tuple[Path, str]:
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"""Pick the CA cert (and a short label for the log line) that
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matches the proxy the agent's HTTP_PROXY points at. Egress-proxy
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wins when the bottle declares any routes; else pipelock.
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The launch step minted both CAs (pipelock always; egress when
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routes are declared) and stored their host paths back into the
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inner Plans via `dataclasses.replace`. If those paths are empty
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here something has gone wrong in launch's bringup."""
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if plan.egress_plan.routes:
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cert = plan.egress_plan.mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path
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if cert == Path() or not cert.is_file():
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die(
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f"egress CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
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f"launch must have called egress_tls_init and "
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f"re-bound the plan before provision"
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)
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return cert, "egress"
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cert = plan.proxy_plan.ca_cert_host_path
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if not cert or not cert.is_file():
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die(
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f"pipelock CA cert missing at {cert or '(empty)'}; "
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f"launch must have called pipelock_tls_init and re-bound "
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f"the plan before provision"
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)
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return cert, "pipelock"
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def provision_ca(plan: SmolmachinesBottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
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"""Copy the agent-facing CA cert into the guest, rebuild the
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trust bundle, emit a one-line fingerprint log. Called from
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`BottleBackend.provision` after the smolvm guest is up."""
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cert_host_path, label = _select_ca_cert(plan)
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_smolvm.machine_cp(str(cert_host_path), f"{target}:{AGENT_CA_PATH}")
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# Mode 0644 — readable to non-root tools in the guest.
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# update-ca-certificates rebuilds the bundle at AGENT_CA_BUNDLE,
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# which is what curl / Python ssl / OpenSSL-based tools read by
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# default. The env trio (NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE /
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# REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE) on the guest_env covers Node + Python
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# `requests` / libraries that don't load the system bundle.
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_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["chmod", "644", AGENT_CA_PATH])
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_smolvm.machine_exec(target, ["update-ca-certificates"])
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# Stdlib SHA-256 of the cert's DER bytes — the standard
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# fingerprint form. Never the private key.
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der = ssl.PEM_cert_to_DER_cert(cert_host_path.read_text())
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fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(der).hexdigest()
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info(f"{label} ca fingerprint: sha256:{fingerprint[:32]}...")
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# Re-exported for the launch/provision_ca caller + tests. The path
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# constants come from the docker module because they're tied to
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# Debian's `update-ca-certificates` layout — same in both backends
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# since both guest images are Debian-family.
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__all__ = ["AGENT_CA_BUNDLE", "AGENT_CA_PATH", "provision_ca"]
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